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Perceptia Rusiei Iulian Chifu Oazu Nantoi Oleksandr Sushko THE PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN ROMANIA, REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE PERCEPÞIA RUSIEI ÎN ROMÂNIA, REPUBLICA MOLDOVA ªI UCRAINA Ediþie bilingvã Editura Curtea Veche Bucureºti 2010 The present book is the result of the research of the East East Project of the Soros Foundation “The Perception of Russia in the trilateral Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine” where the following participated: Prezenta carte este rezultatul cercetãrii în cadrul proiectului East East al Fundaþiei Soros “Percepþia Rusiei în trilaterala România-Republica Moldova-Ucraina” la care au participat: UKRAINE/UCRAINA Natalia Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy Oleksandr Sushko, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Hryhory Perepelitsya, Kyiv Diplomatic Academy Volodymyr Horbach, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation ROMANIA/ROMÂNIA Iulian Chifu, Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Cornel Codiþã, CPCEW Vlad Cucu Popescu, National School for Political and Administrative Studies Narciz Bãlãºoiu, CPCEW REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA/ REPUBLICA MOLDOVA Oazu Nantoi, Institute for Public Policy Radu Vrabie, Foreign Policy Association Ion Preaºcã, IPP Iurie Pîntea, IPP Editing/Editare: Gabi Radu, Iulian Chifu Publication financially supported by the Soros Foundation Romania, through the East-East: Partnership Beyond Borders Program. The content of this publication and/or opinions expressed therein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Soros Foundation Romania, but solely those of the author(s). Publicatie editata cu sprijinul financiar al Fundatiei Soros Romania, prin programul East-East: Partnership Beyond Borders. Continutul prezentei publicatii si/sau opiniile prezentate in cadrul acesteia nu reflecta, in mod necesar, vederile Fundatiei Soros Romania, ci numai pe cele ale autorului(autorilor). SUMAR/SUMARRY Varianta în românã Prefaþã . 5 I. Percepþia Rusiei în România . 7 Metodologie 1. Dimensiunea relaþiilor oficiale . 9 2. Percepþia Rusiei în spaþiul public românesc . 24 3. Cazul de spionaj de la Moscova: provocarea, compromiterea ºi discreditarea unui diplomat român . 43 Anexã. Sondaj de opinie. Percepþia Rusiei . 57 II. Percepþia Rusiei în Republica Moldova . 65 1. Rusia ºi politica de soft power . 65 2. Republica Moldova – Rusia: între dependenþa energeticã de Rusia ºi cea de piaþa rusã de desfacere a mãrfurilor . 91 3. Relaþiile Republica Moldova - Rusia prin prisma conflictului transnistrean . 108 4. Probabilitatea unor conflicte militare în regiune . 128 III. Percepþia despre Rusia în Ucraina . 143 1. Rusia în politica Ucrainei . 143 2. Rusia contemporanã în spaþiul public din Ucraina . 160 3. Factorul rus în politica internã a Ucrainei . 178 4. Prezenþa economicã a Rusiei în Ucraina – interes, evoluþie ºi trenduri . 193 English version Foreword . 205 I. Russia’s Perception in Romania . 207 Methodology 1. Official relations . 209 2. Russia in Romania’s public space . 222 3. The case of espionage in Moscow: provocation, compromise and discredit of a Romanian diplomat . 238 II. The Perception of Russia in Republic of Moldova . 251 1. Rusia and the soft power policy towards Republic of Moldova . 251 2. Republic of Moldova – Rusia: between dependence on Russia’s energy and Russian market . 279 3. Bilateral relations and the Transnistrian conflict . 295 4. The likelihood of military conflicts in the region . 314 III. The Perception of Russia in Ukraine . 329 1. Russian economic presence in Ukraine: interests, evolution and current trends . 329 2. Modern Russia in the Ukrainian public sphere . 339 3. Russia in state policies of Ukraine . 358 4. Russian factor in the internal policies of Ukraine . 376 © Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Oleksandr Sushko Editura Curtea Veche Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naþionale a României CHIFU, IULIAN Percepþia Rusiei în România, Republica Moldova ºi Ucraina = The Perception of Russia in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine / Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Oleksandr Sushko. - Bucureºti : Curtea Veche, 2010 ISBN 978-973-1983-46-2 I. Nantoi, Oazu II. Sushko, Oleksandr 94(47) Tipãrit la „Curtea Veche“ Trading S.R.L. The perception of Russia in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine / Percepþia Rusiei în România, Republica Moldova ºi Ucraina 5 Prefaþã Cartea aceasta este rezultatul unui proiect finanþat de cãtre Proiectul East East al Fundaþiei Soros ºi are drept scop sã prezinte percepþia despre Rusia în trilaterala România-Republica Moldova - Ucraina. Abordarea celor trei capitole sunt, evident, diferite, din cauza faptului cã, în cazurile Republicii Moldova ºi al Ucrainei, elementele dominante vin din democraþiile tinere ºi independenþa recentã a celor douã state, dar ºi din cauza politicilor Rusiei faþã de fostele componente ale imperiilor succesive conduse de la Moscova, ca ºi din cauza „politicilor umanitare” ale Rusiei dar ºi din cauza numãrului important de cetãþeni ai acestor þãri aparþinând minoritãþii ruse ºi a influenþei pe care o deþine încã Rusia în aceste þãri în mai multe arii de activitãþi. În ceea ce priveºte abordarea româneascã, baza a fost un studiu amãnunþit al relaþiilor la nivel oficial, a spaþiului public ºi al sondajelor de opinie legate de Rusia, autoritãþile ruse ºi ruºii. Aceste studii au fost realizate pe o perioadã de aproape 2 ani pe baza unui studiu foarte amãnunþit. Rezultatele în detaliu sunt spectaculoase ºi este o premierã realizarea unui asemenea studiu amãnunþit în România asupra spaþiului public, studiu ce aratã la ce este expus un român mediu când iese din casã ºi intrã în spaþiul public. Studiul nu ia în consideraþie în mod direct comunicãrile de pe interne ºi discuþiile în spaþii private, dar credem cã aceastã parte a spaþiului public a fost acoperitã prin intermediul sondajelor de opinie care acoperã gãurile pe care le presupune utilizarea exclusiv a mass media în desenarea percepþiei Rusiei. În cazurile Republicii Moldova ºi a Ucrainei, experienþele trecute ºi influenþele sunt analizate în amãnunþime, inclusiv temerile legate de un posibil rãzboi care sã implice regiunea separatistã Transnistria ºi implicarea Rusiei în aceastã regiune, la fel ca ºi implicarea în economie, privatizare ºi politicile interne din Ucraina. 6 IULIAN CHIFU, OAZU NANTOI, OLEKSANDR SUSHKO Sperãm ca acest studiu aprofundat sã ofere atât decidenþilor din cele trei þãri – România, Republica Moldova ºi Ucraina – ca ºi Rusiei o imagine clarã a percepþiilor, temerilor, a simbolurilor ºi stereotipurilor care dominã spaþiile publice respective precum ºi organismele oficiale, politice ºi instituþionale din aceste state. Scopul studiului este ºi acela de a oferi tuturor acestor actori, inclusiv societãþii civile, un instrument valid pentru a gãsi locurile unde lucrurile ar trebui îmbunãtãþite, sau unde ar trebui abordatã frontal lipsa de încredere pentru a avea fundamente solide pentru îmbunãtãþirea relaþiilor bilaterale ale acestor state cu Rusia. Aºa cum s-a putut vedea, existã abordãri comune ale statelor din acest grup: probleme comune legate de percepþia negativã a autoritãþilor ruse ºi lipsa de democraþie, abordarea autoritarã a figurilor proeminente ale Rusiei ca ºi condamnarea directã a modului în care au fost abordate principalele crize din regiune – Rãzboiul ruso-georgian din august 2008 ºi criza gazelor ruso- ucraineanã din ianuarie 2009. Pe de altã parte, modul în care Rusia a tratat ºi s-a implicat în regiunea separatistã Transnistria a fost receptatã drept problematicã de cãtre România ºi Republica Moldova, în timp ce Chiºinãul ºi Kievul au privit în acelaºi fel drept provocatoare, chiar constituind o ameninþare la adresa independenþei lor implicarea Moscovei în þãrile respective prin intermediul unor pârghii energetice sau folosind “instrumentele umanitare” ale protejãrii “compatrioþilor ruºi”, a “rusofonilor” sau a cetãþenilor ruºi din statele respective. Iulian Chifu The perception of Russia in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine / Percepþia Rusiei în România, Republica Moldova ºi Ucraina 7 I. PERCEPÞIA RUSIEI ÎN ROMÂNIA August 2008-Aprilie 2010 Iulian Chifu Metodologie Pentru a evalua relaþia la nivel oficial între România ºi Federaþia Rusã, am utilizat analiza documentelor oficiale, în primul rând cele douã Strategii – Strategia de Securitate Naþionalã 2007 ºi Strategia Naþionalã de Apãrare 2010, ºi modul în care sunt definite relaþiile cu Federaþia Rusã, dar ºi programele de Guvernare în domeniul Politicii Externe ºi a Politicii energetice. Am adãugat raportul la 6 luni de Guvernare, în Iulie 2010, al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, toate aceste documente programatice oficiale fiind oglinda unui desen pe care autoritãþile române îl contureazã în ceea ce priveºte Federaþia Rusã. Pentru a contura ºi mai exact percepþia Rusiei în România, în aceastã perioadã, am utilizat ºi discursurile anuale ale Preºedintelui României, în anii 2008, 2009 ºi 2010 în faþa Corpului Diplomatic Român acreditat peste hotare, dar ºi discursurile Preºedintelui în faþa Corpului diplomatic strãin acreditat la Bucureºti, în 2009, 2010, profitând de tradiþia acestor discursuri ºi semnificaþia lor ca indicaþii prezidenþiale în politica externã, reuniuni simbolice care au loc regulat, o datã pe an, în ianuarie cu diplomaþii acreditaþi la Bucureºti ºi în septembrie cu diplomaþii români acreditaþi peste hotare. Mai deschise, mai exacte, cu putere politicã ºi impact de etapã, aceste discursuri prezidenþiale dau mãsura relaþiei bilaterale între România ºi Rusia. În fine, nu ne-am oprit la nivelul discursurilor ºi documentelor programatice, oricât de elocvente ar
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