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Populism As a Historical Development Emilia Palonen, Senior Lecturer [email protected] the Concept of Populism

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Populism As a Historical Development Emilia Palonen, Senior Lecturer Emilia.Palonen@Helsinki.Fi the Concept of Populism Populism as a historical development Emilia Palonen, Senior Lecturer [email protected] The concept of Populism • Contested concept • Thin centered ideology (Mudde)? Emphasis on the nominal people (Canovan), heartland (Taggart)? • Rhetorical style? (Moffitt) • Threat or corrective to democracy (Rovira Kaltwasser)? • Response to a crisis • Financial crisis. Disillusionment with democracy – or the elites (Kriesi & Pappas) • Crisis of representation > performing the people (Laclau, Moffitt&Tormey) • http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9248.12032 • Empty articulation of “us” (Laclau) • Mode of articulation with ideological grip (attachment & enthusiasm) that seeks to construct “us” in a dichotomous way (against something). Heartlands of populism • Populism may be seen as: • Targeting heartlands (Paul Taggart) • Speaking for nativism (Cas Mudde) • Presenting an alternative of the majority, people or a mob rule (Jacques Rancière, Nadia Urbinati) • Articulating the people (Laclau – but for him it is not a pre-given but in flux) • Offering a solution for political identification to those who have suffered from postindustrialism (former industrial heartlands of American economy) • Restoring faith in something like an abstract ideal such as the nation • Fantasies of salvation (Tismaneanu) Popularizing and simplifying • Mediatized politics – or telepopulisme (Pierre-André Taguieff) • Simplification of the political message – or simplification of politics? • Are you trying to make the audience to understand – or is politics just a farse (video from Jul 14, 2015)? • How can a meeme turn into political strength? • Reduction of political debate into mere identity or identification – rather than political demands, issues, or interests? • Modern mass politics is about identities but is that what they all is? • Reduction of the political debate into a dichotomy: divided society between us and them? (Laclau) Populism as anti-elitism • Thin ideology: people and the elite (Cas Mudde) • The Tea Party and Occupy movements in particular, Obama electoral success in 2008 • widespread discussion of Latin American populism • emergence of populism in Europe have drawn attention to populism in the United States. • Populism of Modi in India and populist-nationalisms in Asia • So we can say that emergence of anti-elitism was expected after the economic downturn and recession. First there was “left-wing” populism, now also right-wing anti-elitism is on the rise. • Attack on the status quo and the style and background of those who have been educated into the political class or even inherited their positions through political clan (Jeb Michican debate March 7, 2016 (1.24) Bush, Hillary Clinton) • “Dissaffected middle-class”: New Hampshire was the ‘popuist moment’ of the election campaigns so far Populism as a mode of articulation • Performative-constitutive character of populism (Ernesto Laclau, Benjamin Moffitt) • Constitutive dichotomy: populism related to a radical division of the social field or field of representation into “us” and ”them” (Laclau) • Temporary or permanent? • What happens when substance disappear? • What are the substantive demands? • Can be grouping many together under a single heading. But populism is not reducible to a single-issue politics. The heading, slogan, leader offers a sense of unity for the heterogeneous groups and demands. Simplifies space of representation. From Populist Parties to Populism within political parties • Populism relies on antagonism and simplifying articulation of the ’people’ (or other overarching empty signifier) as a common point of identification • Affects – passions, not irrational politics • Democracy not demography >>> constitutive people not pre-given people • Populism is not a permanent characteristic – even of parties calling themselves populist • (inclusive/exclusive? Each articulation of the people is also already exclusive of what is not the people, which is the raison d’être for the articulation of the people) • (How much? Extent of populism? Intensity of antagonism) • (populism vs. institutionalism, articulation vs. 1=1 representation, mere identification vs. technocracy?) • Perhaps we ought not to look at populism per se but… • populist dynamics: an analytical distinction Instead of clear-cut All parties can resort to categories (cat-dog) we populism should perhaps talk about something else Listen to the new voices in “Mainstream parties research and populist parties Categories are difficult… (Benjamin Moffitt, gathers binary is dead” some of the points made at his keynote: PSA Populism SG conference, 23 March 2018) Gradational not binary Populism is not against (populist or NOT democracy – but always populist) includes it at some level Challenge to traditional conceptualisations of democracy and politics Political meaning-making central The populist effects on Politics as rhetoric-performative, constitutive #polisci If old cleavages are not working in explaining the developments let us try something else? • Most usual reference is the elite-people distinction What is • Who the are the people and the elite? – ‘Mere’ rhetoric? Populism? • Manifesto research offers a wide range of references for the people • Populism could be anywhere where there is the nation or us? • What about the populists (especially when in power) are they not the elites? • E.g. Berlusconi, Orbán, even Timo Soini? Was ist Populismus? 01 02 Well, it’s not nationalism, Can get entangled with as has been suggested nationalism and racism, between the lines (Müller xenophobia 2016) If a thin-centred Populism has no Trash that! ideology, core is content an empty shell Thin-centred for Michael Freeden (Journal of Political Ideologies 2017) What does this mean? When things are There may even be an empty they don’t Dichotomy and a emotional, gripping have content BUT reference to an “us” element!? they may have a form Categories to dynamics If there is something constitutive or even performative in political meaning-making in the populist way … why don’t we look at rhetoric to for concepts that could capture this? Rhetorical moves or tropes for example? Dynamics or moves in the party system! (Populist) dynamics in Competing populism party system Mainstream(ing) populism = populist meaning-making that emerges in the ”mainstream” parties Fringe(ing) populism = populism that challenges all the other parties from a supposed outside NOT niche parties etc. Competing populism / bi-polar polarisation (in the ”mainstream”) = two parties co-constitute each other NOT because there is a sedimented/established cleavage BUT because reject each other (often as illegitimate): includes anti-populism (NOT just the content that is rejected but the whole chain of reference) Problems: we are not used to this non-stuff Transformations How to Long-term Dynamics in the have effect on measure? development party system each other Not only some items get entangled with populism get adopted by other parties (mainstreamed?) Dichotomous meaning-making has effects on the party system Research What effects? question Should we just look at dynamics? forming Parties move to different positions? Something gets challenged and something mainstreamed/sidelined? Examples: In Finland: Finns Party to the mainstream and then after the split fringing again. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Parties move to different Austria and Italy witness similar moves: more Longterm view 1999-present France, Hungary, Italy positions fringe parties mainstream. In Hungary: Jobbik mainstreams and Fidesz fringes while trying to hold on to competing Six country populism. cases with Chapel Hill expert data: main L&R parties (populist) w/ RRP; • L-R scale; • (a) the salience of corruption issues dynamicsElection results and (b) the salience of anti- Political Data Yearbook Other data? elite issues to the party. qualitative analysis of reports If parties mainstream populism, does t hat mean that corruption and anti- elite issues become more salient and pr ominent for mainstream parties? Austria Denmark Finland France Italy Hungary Effects? Anything to do with “populism”? Parties move to different positions? Not longterm effects on L-R. Populist moments Dichotomous language and entangled meanings mainstream Something gets challenged or sidelined in mainstreaming? Limits of technocracy on era of fluid meanings and emotions. Mainstream, fringe, competing populism • Emilia Palonen Logic(s) of Populism and Populist Dynamics… Case Studies: Hungary, Finland, etc. • The analytical distinction is drawn on Hungarian politics Populist dynamics • Exactly how does populism emerges? Which dynamics? • Mainstream • Fidesz, SP • SDP, NC • Fringe • Jobbik • Finns Party • Competing • Polarisation • Political frontier • Blocks debate Viktor Orbán, Fidesz 1989- PM 1998-2002, 2010- (youth > nation > polgári/civic/bourgeois/progressive anti-communism 2002 > extra- parliamentary village populism in striped shirts > tough anti-immigration statesman) Populism in Hungary ØFidesz, Viktor Orbán PM 1998-2002 ØCompeting populism 2000-2010: “Right” and “Left” (Socialist Party & Alliance of Free Democrats) ØFidesz government 2010- (vs. fragmented opposition) ØPopulism exists also in the mainstream and actually something we call here “mainstream populism” is connected to “fringe populism” ØThese analytical concepts are helpful in outlining what is going on in the two countries Hungarian Politics • Polarisation late 1990s to the present. Competing populism with strong frontier. Impedes any real debate on concrete
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