Introduction

Home , Chevaline, Frank Panton, John Grandy, Mk 101 Lulu, Nassau Agreement, Peter Hammersley

Notes

Introduction

1. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000, p. 474. 2. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons 1958–64. 3. This act did not, however, enter into force until 1 January 2005. 4. During the course of both the British Nuclear History Study Group and BROHP meetings the ad hoc nature of the preservation process has been brought to light with many documents destroyed or still waiting for security vetting. 5. Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War. 6. Arnold, ‘A Letter from Oxford: The History of Nuclear History in Britain’, pp. 211–12. 7. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 6. 8. Quoted in De Groot, The Bomb: A Life, p. 297. 9. ‘Obituary: Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Elworthy’, The Independent, 6 April 1993. 10. Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography, p. 581. 11. Confidential correspondence, 28 July 2006. 12. Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964–70, p. 3. 13. From World War II onwards the United States has provided around two thirds of NATO’s forces. But with Vietnam placing growing pressures on US military commitments, calls for American troops to be brought back from Europe greatly increased. 14. The Sword being essentially offensive and nuclear while the Shield amounted to the approximate number and type of defensive forces needed to carry out NATO’s strategy which at this time was still based on the threat on ‘Massive [nuclear] Retaliation’. 15. TNA, PREM 13/26, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 25 November 1964. 16. Williams, Gregory and Simpson, Crisis in Procurement: A Case Study of the TSR-2, p. 10. 17. Passed by the US in 1946 preventing the transfer of nuclear technology to a third party for military uses. 18. Jamison, Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1952–1958: From Independence to Transatlantic Nuclear Sharing and Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality. 19. Mackby and Cornish (eds), U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After Fifty Years. 20. See, for example, Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy 1945–1970, for a balanced view and Gunston and Donald, ‘Fleet Air Arm 1960–69’, pp. 188–205 for a critique of British policy. 21. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 47. 22. Its full title is the Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, Cmnd. 537 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1958).

243 244 Notes

23. On the vulnerability of bombers to a pre-emptive first strike, see Roman, ‘Strategic Bombers over the Missile Horizon, 1957–1963’, pp. 198–236. 24. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957–1962, p. 413. 25. See, for example, Clark and Wheeler, British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 43–90 and 210–29 and Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 359–89. 26. This revision was driven by the recommendations of the British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group in 1961. Still, as Clark and Baylis show, even these figures need interpretation and the fine detail of the targeting arrangements in this period is still obscure with mention of 10 cities not 5. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, 382–94, Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 304–12 and Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 286. 27. TNA, DEFE 13/752, Annex A to COS 45/72, 25 April 1972. 28. Rosenberg, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960’, pp. 3–71. A similar line of thought was also followed by C. P. Snow in ‘Science and Government: The Godkin Lectures at Harvard, 1960’. 29. The ‘marriage’ of ‘High’ Policy to ‘Operational’ Policy in the US nuclear weapons programme is to be found in Henry Rowan, ‘Formulating Nuclear Doctrine’ in ‘U.S. Commission on the Organisation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy’, pp. 219–34. 30. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p. 8. 31. These ministers included the Secretary of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Home Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 32. The Committee on Nuclear Requirements for Defence had been designed ‘to consider major issues of policy concerned with the nuclear requirements of the Services and the testing of nuclear weapons’ and had been chaired by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. The Official Committee on Atomic Energy was a senior civil service body, which had handled ‘questions of policy in respect of atomic energy (other than health and safety and purely defence questions) which require interdepartmental consideration’. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 27 September 1966. 33. TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(66) 1st Meeting Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 28 September 1966. Reproduced with commentary in Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 209–12. 34. On the BNDSG see for example Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 14–18, 43–7. 35. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 27 September 1966. 36. On its formation see TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(66)1, 30 September 1966. 37. Freedman, ‘British Nuclear Targeting’, pp. 81–99, Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945–1955, pp. 210–29, Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 319–58. 38. Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 15 August 2006. 39. This phrase originates under the Anglo–American Nassau Agreement of December 1962, when agreement was reached to purchase Polaris. 40. However neither SHAPE nor SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) was privy to information concerning the patrol lanes of UK Polaris. Confidential correspondence, 19 February 2008. SACLANT was always an American admiral with a British deputy. 41. Like SACLANT, SACEUR was always an American officer with a European deputy (and usually British). Notes 245

42. Confidential correspondence, 19 Feb. 2008. For information on the origins and evolution of the SIOP, see Desmond Ball ‘The Development of the SIOP’ in Ball and Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 57–83 and Burr, NSA Website, ‘The Creation of SIOP 62’, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB130/ press.htm and ‘The Nixon Administration, the SIOP and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1974’, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB173/index.htm, accessed on 25 July 2007. 43. Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 309. 44. For a comprehensive list and valuable synopsis of US nuclear facilities, see The Brookings Institute, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project Website, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, Testing, and Production, and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Facilities. 45. The Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs) had first been set up as part of the 1958 MDA along with the Joint Atomic Energy Information Group ( JAEIG) which provided a mechanism for passing information along with regular ‘Stocktakes’ or Reviews which ensured that everyone employed in each specialist area worked to mutual advantage. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. Although the MDA was published as a government Command Paper the substance of the agreement remained hidden in a series of classified annexes. The same was also true for the 1959 US/UK agreement relating to nuclear materials and the specific terms of the ‘barter exchanges’ under the MDA. TNA, PREM 13/3129, S. Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 16 December 1964. 46. Now Lockheed Martin. As with the UK effort, a large number of both government and private contractors each played a part. 47. Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961–1963, p. 335. 48. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence: Success and Civility in the Anglo–American Special Nuclear Relationship 1962–1982. 49. Ibid., particularly pp. 319–58. 50. Bahamas Meetings: Text of Joint Communiqués, Cmnd. 1915 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1962). 51. On the defence review see David Greenwood, Budgeting for Defence (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1972). 52. Quoted in Angelika Volle, ‘The Political Debate on Security Policy in the Federal Republic’, in Kaiser and Roper (eds), British-German Defence Co-operation, p. 47.

1 The Labour Government: The Inheritance of Polaris and Anglo–US Nuclear Relations, 1964–1966

1. This is a line of reasoning can also be found in Gill, ‘Strength in Numbers: The Labour Government and the Size of the Polaris Force’. 2. Bahamas Meetings: Text of Joint Communiqués, Cmnd. 1915 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1962). The design of the Resolution class SSBN largely followed the design of the UK’s Valiant class, the RN’s first nuclear powered submarines, with a reactor section grafted on to the US designed missile compartment, which had been largely manufactured by the UK, building a new fore section to house both the forward torpedo tubes and sonar equipment. Grove, Vanguard to Trident British Naval Policy Since World War 2, p. 242. 3. TNA, PREM 13/3129, S. Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 16 December 1964. More detail can be found in Peter Hammersley, ‘The Propulsion System’, in Moore, 246 Notes

The Impact of Polaris: The Origins of Britain’s Seaborne Deterrent, pp. 155–58 and in Steve Ludlam, ‘The Role of Nuclear Submarine Propulsion’, in Mackby and Cornish, U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation: An Assessment and Future Prospects, pp. 247–58. 4. Polaris Sales Agreement, Cmnd. 1995 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963). Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 5. John Moore, ‘The Awakening’; I. J. Galantin ‘The Birth of Polaris in the USA’; Peter La Niece, ‘First Contact with Polaris by the RN’; Alan Pritchard, ‘The UK Strategic Deterrent 1958–1961’; Michael Simeon, ‘Watching Brief 1958–1961’; Sidney John Palmer, ‘Technical Evaluation 1961’; Hugh Mackenzie, ‘Setting up the UK Project’, all in Moore, The Impact of Polaris, pp. 13–54. 6. Bahamas Meetings, Cmnd. 1915. See also Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 236–39. 7. See also Middeke, ‘Anglo–American Nuclear Weapons Co-operation after the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence’, pp. 69–96. 8. Epstein, ‘The Nuclear Deterrent and the British Election of 1964’, pp. 139–63. Epstein’s view is not shared by Peter Hennessy who argues that ‘Nineteen Sixty Four was the nuclear deterrent election’. Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 114. 9. Labour’s 1964 manifesto is available at http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ man/lab64.htm, accessed on 4 September 2008. 10. Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 252. 11. Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–1970: A Personal Record, pp. 68–9 and Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 302. 12. Ibid. pp. 262–72. 13. Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 68–9. 14. Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 302 and Wilson, Ibid., pp. 68–9. 15. Grove, Vanguard to Trident British Naval Policy Since World War 2, p. 242. 16. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/7 Atlantic Nuclear Force The Size of the British Polaris Force Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, 20 November 1964. Reproduced, with commentary, in Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 176–80. 17. MISC 17 included the Prime Minister; George Brown, the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (and Deputy Leader of the Labour Party); Patrick Gordon Walker, the Foreign Secretary; Herbert Bowden, Lord President of the Council; James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Denis Healey – Secretary of State for Defence; Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Secretary; Roy Jenkins, Minister of Aviation; Fred Mulley, Deputy Secretary of State for Defence and Army Minister; George Wigg, the Paymaster General; Lord Chalfont, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Lord Mountbatten, the Chief of the Defence Staff; Sir David Luce, the Chief of the Naval Staff; Sir Richard (Dick) Hull, Chief of the General Staff; Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Elworthy, the Chief of the Air Staff; Brigadier J. H. Gibbon of the Ministry of Defence; Sir William Armstrong of the Treasury; Sir Harold Caccia from the Foreign Office; Sir Henry Hardman and Sir Solly Zuckerman of the MoD; Sir Saville Garner of the Commonwealth Office; and Sir Richard Way of the Ministry of Aviation. Its secretariat contained the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, P. Rogers, D. Laskey and Air Vice Marshall J. H. Lapsley. 18. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/4th Meeting Cabinet Defence Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held at Chequers on Sunday, 22 November, 1964, at 10.30 a.m., 23 November 1964. Reproduced in Hennessy, Ibid., pp. 181–96. 19. Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 302. Notes 247

20. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Frank Cooper Deployment of Polaris Submarines, 11 November 1966 and The Times, 17 February 1966. The issue of the MLF and its reworking into the ANF have already undergone extensive treatment, most notably Pierre, Nuclear Politics, pp. 276–82. Archival treatment can be found in Walker (2007)‘British Nuclear Weapons, the ANF and the NPT 1965–1968’ and Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO Britain, America and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962–1968, pp. 101–21. These issues will be covered in more detail in Chapter 3. 21. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/4th Meeting Cabinet Defence Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held at Chequers on Sunday, 22 November 1964, at 10.30 a.m., 23 November 1964. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. TNA, PREM 13/26, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 25 November 1964. 25. Ibid. Macmillan had agreed to the storage of UK nuclear weapons in Singapore in August 1962, Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 214. 26. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality. 27. However, the ANF would still be subject to a national veto by Britain and the United States. Ibid. 28. TNA, CAB 129/39, C.C. (64) 11th Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S. W. 1, on Thursday, 26 November 1964, at 10.30 a.m., 26 November 1964. Reproduced in Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 197–201. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx, pp. 208–9. 32. Quoted in Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 116. 33. Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 302. 34. ‘Recollections of a Secretary of State for Defence’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Vol. 31 (2004), p. 12. 35. At Nassau it had been agreed to build four submarines with an option on a fifth boat. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 33. 36. This process of reorganisation was ‘helped by the reforms introduced at the MOD under the aegis of Mountbatten in the last years of the Tory government – resuming the momentum of the Sandys era. These abolished the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, consolidating all three bureaucracies in a unified Ministry of Defence’. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and Power in the Twentieth Century, pp. 228–9. 37. TNA, DEFE 13/350, P. S. to S. of S. The Case for 5 S.S.B.N.s, 19 October 1964. 38. Ibid. On JIGSAW studies see files within the class, DEFE 19/91 and Moore, ‘A JIGSAW Puzzle for Operations Researchers: British Global War Studies, 1954–1962’, pp. 75–91. 39. TNA, DEFE 13/350, F. W. Mottershead (D.U.S. (POL)) to P.U.S. C.D.S. C.S.A. Size of the Polaris Force, 19 November 1964. 40. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/7 Atlantic Nuclear Force: The Size of the British Polaris Force Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, 20 November 1964. 41. Ibid. 42. Peter Hennessy recounts, ‘At its table sit the heads of the secret agencies plus Whitehall representatives and it reaches agreed views, by consensus, which are then circulated to an inner group of ministers and departmental customers.’ Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War, p. 4. 248 Notes

43. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/7 Atlantic Nuclear Force: The Size of the British Polaris Force Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, 20 November 1964. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 34–5. 48. A four-boat force would require 300 kg of Grade A plutonium by 1967/8 with a further 125 kg needed by 1968/9. These quantities could be produced by mid 1968 if this was needed by accelerating the production programme. This ‘would be from reactors which would then at that time still be fuelled with the cheaper “pippa” fuel elements. Additional weapon grade plutonium would also be obtainable by the premature discharge of the more expensive ‘“herringbone” fuel elements’ along with a supply of U-235 from the United States. TNA, DEFE 19/125, Aide Memoire of a discussion between Dr Press, Mr Carter and Mr Gilliams on January 25 1965 Fissile Material Production Programme for Defence, 29 January 1965. 49. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Denis Healey to Prime Minister, 6 January 1966. 50. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Patrick Gordon Walker to Prime Minister, 11 January 1965. 51. TNA, CAB 148/18, O.P.D. (65) 5th Meeting Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 29 January 1965. 52. Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 68–9. 53. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Size of the Polaris Force, 4 February 1965. 54. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Christopher Mayhew to John Diamond, 15 February 1965. 55. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/7, Atlantic Nuclear Force: The Size of the British Polaris Force, 20 November 1964. Quoted by Haddon, ‘British Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, 1945–75’, Chapter 4. 56. TNA, CAB 158/51, JIC (64) 4, ‘Employment of Soviet Forces in the Event of General War up to the End of 1968’, 24 February 1964. Quoted by Haddon, ‘British Intelligence Assessments’, Chapter 4. 57. TNA, CAB 182/13, Missile Threat Co-ordination Sub-Committee 1964, JIC (MT) (64) 2nd Meeting, 3 March 1964. Quoted by Haddon, ‘British Intelligence Assessments’, Chapter 4. 58. On strategic culture see, for example, Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, pp. 32–64 and Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, pp. 49–69. 59. JOWOGs had first been set up as part of the 1958 MDA along with the Joint Atomic Energy Information Group ( JAEIG) which provided a mechanism for passing information along with regular ‘Stocktakes’ or reviews which ensured that everyone employed in each specialist area worked to mutual advantage. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 60. Mike Simeon ‘Watching Brief 1958–60’ in Moore, The Impact of Polaris, pp. 34–5. 61. For a more comprehensive synopsis of the structure of the Polaris management team see McGeoch, ‘The British Polaris Project’, pp. 138–43, see also Pike, FAS. Org, SLBM Page, United Kingdom. 62. Often abbreviated as ‘Jerswig’. 63. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Sixth Joint Annual Report (1968) of the Project Officers for the United States and United Kingdom Polaris Programme to the Secretary of Defence and to the Secretary of State for Defence, 10 July 1968. 64. Nailor, The Nassau Connection, pp. 93–6. Lockheed Missile and Space Company was a sub-division of the Lockheed Corporation (now Lockheed Martin) based in California. Notes 249

65. Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the Smiling Buddha’, pp. 87–108, Heuser, Britain, NATO, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000, p. 85 and Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, p. 171. 66. TNA, PREM 13/3129, Visit of the Prime Minister of India Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street at 3p.m. on Friday, 4 December 1964, 5 December 1964. See also Jones and Young, ‘Polaris, East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968’, pp. 847–70. 67. TNA, DEFE 13/350, CNS to Secretary of State (through CDS), 13 January 1965. It was not possible to continuously deploy Polaris East of Suez without a depot ship which would cost between £18–20 million and take between five and eight years to build depending on the priority given to the project. TNA, DEFE 13/350, J. H. Lapsley Air Vice Marshall Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee to CNS COS CAS Support Facilities for Polaris Submarines East of Suez Annex A, 1 July 1965. 68. This required a floating dock to be built which was estimated at £4 million. Ibid. 69. If the planned depot ship was reassigned for Polaris operations this would mean that any UK hunter-killer submarines in the region would also have to sail to Guam for maintenance and refit, and would be separated from the rest of the fleet by 2500 nm. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Sir Burke Trend C.O.S. Report on Polaris – COS 11/66, 28 January 1966. 70. On the subject of submarine communications see Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, pp. 80–5. 71. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Sir Burke Trend C.O.S. Report on Polaris – COS 11/66, 28 January 1966. 72. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, p. 81. 73. A precursor of the now commonly used Global Positioning System (GPS). 74. It was also possible to develop staging facilities at Singapore, Freemantle, an unnamed island in the Indian Ocean (possibly Diego Garcia) and a Royal Navy base in Guam but each entailed operational problems based on the transit time to the proposed firing locations. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Frank Cooper Deployment of Polaris Submarines, 11 November 1966 and TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Sir Burke Trend C.O.S. Report on Polaris – COS 11/66, 28 January 1966. On the development of the Transit system see Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, pp. 75–6. 75. Quoted in Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, p. 81. 76. Ibid. 77. May, ‘Mk 2 Mod 6 SINS History’, p. 8. 78. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Sir Burke Trend C.O.S. Report on Polaris – COS 11/66, 28 January 1966 and private correspondence with Richard Moore, 9 April 2006. 79. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Frank Cooper Deployment of Polaris Submarines, 11 November 1966. 80. TNA, PREM 13/3129, DWH to Prime Minister, 8 February 1965. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. TNA, PREM 13/3129, M.S. to Prime Minister Initiation of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 19 February 1965. 84. This assumption was of crucial importance, as the computer data tapes needed for targeting the missiles took several months to encode and had to be ready 250 Notes

when the Polaris force began operational patrols. TNA, CAB 164/714, DWH to Prime Minister, 1 July 1966. New targets could also be dialled in on patrol by latitude and longitude without the need for a new tape. Private correspondence, 10 December 2007. 85. TNA, CAB 164/714, DWH to Prime Minister, 1 July 1966. 86. TNA, CAB 164/713, A. M. Palliser to R. M. Hastie-Smith, 11 July 1966. 87. TNA, CAB 164/713, Burke Trend to Mr Palliser Deployment of Polaris Submarines, 25 July 1966. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90. TNA, PREM 15/1359, Annex B to MO 26/10/6 Credibility of UK Polaris Force Against Russian ABM Defences, 16 July 1970. 91. See Walker, Britain, the United States, Weapon Policies and Nuclear Testing, 1954–1973: Tensions and Contradictions, pp. 224–5. 92. TNA, DEFE 13/548, V. H. B. Macklen DCA (PN) to P/S of S of S, 19 March 1969. 93. For descriptions of the measures the US was undertaking for Polaris see Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, pp. 66–74. 94. The confidential annexes can be found in TNA, PREM 11/4737, Discussions on intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs): cancellation of Skybolt; Polaris sales agreement; part 9, 1963–1964. The author is grateful to Dr Richard Moore for pointing this out. For further information see Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, Chapter 4. 95. Due to different safety standards, the US W-58 primary had not met the Ordnance Board’s criteria for British nuclear devices. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006 and 28 July 2006. 96. The codenames refer first to the test series and then the device. The best analysis of the UK’s nuclear testing programme is Arnold, A Very Special Relationship, British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia and Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb. However, important as these studies are to an understanding of the nature of British nuclear testing, they deal only with the period until 1958. The only other example of an historical study of British warhead design is Moore, ‘British Nuclear Warhead Development 1958–66: How much American Help?’ pp. 207–28. 97. Walker, Tensions and Contradictions, p. 269. 98. Ibid. p. 267. 99. TNA, AB 49/17, British Underground Nuclear Test (Nevada) September, 1965 ‘Charcoal’ Penney to Seaborg, Chairman USAEC, 9 April 1965. Quoted in Walker, Tensions and Contradictions, p. 268. 100. TNA, PREM 13/123, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 23 March 1965. 101. TNA, PREM 13/3129, S. Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 16 December 1964. Tritium is used in nuclear weapons for boosting fission devices, including thermonuclear primaries. Tritium needs to be replaced periodically due to radioac- tive decay and is often combined with deuterium in the form of a gas which is then injected into a hollow pit of fissile plutonium or uranium. Boosting allows for more efficient use of fissile materials. Compounds such as Lithium-6 are used as a neutron absorber during the fusion process, again increasing the efficiency of thermonuclear weapons. 102. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 197–8. 103. Ibid. pp. 166 and 266. 104. TNA, DEFE 19/197, W. C. Penney to Sir William Cook, 14 September 1966. 105. Baker, Dry Ginger: The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael Le Fanu, p. 11. Notes 251

106. For a reflection of this see Smith and Hollis, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making’, pp. 269–86. 107. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 32–3. 108. See, for example, files within PREM 13/219, Defence. Atlantic nuclear force as alternative to multilateral force: UK proposal: part 3, Dec 1964 – Feb 1965, PREM 13/220, Defence. Atlantic nuclear force as alternative to multilateral force: part 4, Feb–Nov 1965, CAB 165/209, Defence and oversea policy (Official) committee: sub-committee on Atlantic Nuclear Force, 1965–1967 and Walker, ‘British Nuclear Weapons, the ANF and the NPT 1965–1968’. 109. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 84. 110. Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 40, Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 71 and Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo–American Relations in the Cold War and After, pp. 140–1. 111. An interesting discussion of this phenomenon can be found in Lavoy, ‘Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses’, pp. 433–52. 112. Haddon, ‘British Intelligence Assessments’, Chapter 4.

2 The Labour Government and UK/US Responses to Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missiles, 1964–1966

1. For an excellent synopsis of the US development of Polaris, see Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, pp. 35–74. 2. Middeke, ‘Anglo–American Nuclear Weapons Co-operation after the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence’, pp. 69–96. 3. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Polaris – Confirmation Firings, 14 October 1965. 4. TNA, DEFE 19/125, D.C. Fakely to AUS (R & D), 16 February 1967. See also Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 227–31. 5. Confidential correspondence, 7 April 2006. 6. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Galosh, undated but likely to be Spring 1965. 7. TNA, DEFE 19/83, SZ/554/65, Solly Zuckerman to Paul Gore-Booth, 3 September 1965. 8. See, for example, Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 202–37. 9. Smart, ‘Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide’. 10. Rex Pay, ‘New Effort Aimed at X-Ray Protection’. The issue of ABMs is discussed at length in many of the industry journals such as Technology Week, as well as some newspapers of the time. 11. Smart, ‘Advanced Strategic Missiles’. 12. On the development of radar see, for example, Robert Buderi, The Invention that Changed the World: How a Small Group of Radar Pioneers Won the Second World War and Launched a Technological Revolution. 13. Phased array radars work by altering the phase between signals from adjacent antenna so that the direction of the projected wave is changed and can be done very quickly. However, the Hen House, Dog House and Cat House radars used by the Soviets were raster scanning devices like a television screen and, unlike later Soviet radars such as Pill Box, did not produce multiple independent beams. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 14. However, during dusk and dawn these radars are less reliable due to changes in the ionosphere. 252 Notes

15. For a more thorough analysis, see Smart, ‘Advanced Strategic Missiles’. 16. Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002, Chapter 6. The first tests of ABM system components did not begin until about 1957 with a test of a prototype of the V-1000 missile while tests of the system began in 1960. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005. 17. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 18. TNA, ES 10/1046, Comparison of the neutron flux from clean and dirty warheads for ABM, 01/01/1963 – 31/12/1963, classified under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. Although these reports are not yet scheduled for declassification, they nevertheless are listed at The National Archives at Kew. AWRE, based at Aldermaston, is the most important of all the British nuclear weapons establishments and is responsible for designing British nuclear weapons which are assem- bled at Burghfield. 19. The British themselves had examined the feasibility of missile defence within anti-aircraft organisations between 1953 and 1963. Confidential correspondence, 24 March 2005. 20. TNA, DEFE 19/83, SZ/554/65, Solly Zuckerman to Paul Gore-Booth, 3 September 1965. Harold Brown was then the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the United States and was later to become Defense Secretary during the Carter Administration. 21. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, pp. 239–41. It was not until Zuckerman left to become CSA for the government as a whole in 1967, to be replaced by William Cook and Alan Cottrell, that government research establishments were instructed to look much more seriously towards methods of improving Polaris, confidential correspondence, 24 March 2005. 22. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 414. 23. Basic research and advanced development was generally undertaken by Scientific- Research Institutes, better known by their Russian acronym, NII (Nauchno- issledovatelskiy Institut). Although some NII were military organisations staffed primarily by uniformed personnel, most were civilian research organisations staffed by civilian scientists and engineers. Each industrial ministry generally has a central NII (often called a TsNII, or Central NII, in Russian) which acts as a super-NII, overseeing the development effort in an entire section of the industry. The next rung in the ladder is the Experimental Design Bureau, or OKB (Opytnoe konstruktorskoye biuro). Engineering development of a concept pioneered in a NII is generally transferred to an OKB. Some industrial ministries use terms other than OKB; sometimes it is shortened as KB, Machine Design Bureau (MKB), Special Design Bureau (SKB), or Central Design Bureau (TsKB), and all these acronyms can have the prefix Gos- which means ‘State’. The OKB is responsible for the engineering development of a new weapon system, based on advanced research that might have been undertaken by a NII or other research organisation. The OKB frequently has an experimental production factory attached to it, which is used to produce prototypes of a new system. Previously once the prototype was completed and the system accepted for service in the Soviet armed forces, the production was relocated to a factory (zavod) under control of one of the defence industrial ministries. The OKB had no formal control over the factories, though it often had extensive interchange with the factory during the course of a system’s production and modernisation. Aviation Week & Space Technology website: http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/2001outlook/ aw339.htm, accessed on 6 November 2003. Notes 253

24. Khariton was one of the Soviet Union’s chief warhead designers and, along with Igor Kurchatov began the Soviet nuclear weapons programme. See, for example, Khariton and Smirnov, ‘The Khariton Version’, pp. 20–31. 25. Peter George Edward Fitzgerald Jones, ‘Overview of History of UK Strategic Weapons’, paper presented to the Royal Aeronautical Society, 17 March 1999. 26. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 413. 27. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 413–14. 28. Ibid., p. 414. 29. Ibid., p. 414. 30. Neutrons would heat fissile material in space or high in the atmosphere, which occurs at half a kilometre with a 1MT burst. This was a sure kill mechanism and well within the intercept accuracy of Soviet ABMs. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 31. However, ‘[a] more important factor in cutting this number down was the exces- sive complexity of the system. It was more like Kisunko was ordered to scale the system down and advances in technology helped him keep the performance at somewhat acceptable level’. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005. 32. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 414. 33. These ABM systems were codenamed Griffon, Galosh, Gazelle and Gorgon by NATO. 34. By using high yield warheads, the defence ‘kills’ large swathes of threat clouds produced by the incoming missile. This was met by increasing the in-flight separation of the re-entry vehicles containing the warheads. What mattered was the angles of the radars and when the threats were expected from the US and China, or from one submarine, they came through a very narrow window, and the Soviet requirement was to increase the ability of the radars to switch their range rather than swinging around the sky. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 35. ABM should not be seen as a single complete system but rather as several integrated systems acting in coordination. 36. Griffon was initially designated as a Surface to Air Missile system. 37. Vladimir Trendafilovski, RZ-25 Anti-Ballistic Missile System Page, http://www. wonderland.org.nz/rz-25.htm, accessed on 19 January 2002. However, the ‘Griffon, the Tallinn and Leningrad lines etc. were an ambitious air-defense project gone awry. It was considered in the West to be a missile defense … but in reality it wasn’t’. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005. 38. Confidential correspondence, 7 April 2006. 39. Confidential correspondence, 7 April 2006. 40. US ABM Programmes, Nike Zeus Page, http://www.paineless.id.au/missiles/ NikeZeus.html, accessed on 23 September 2002. 41. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 42. As they were on the surface, they could be destroyed by a nuclear blast more easily than underground facilities. TNA, CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970 and Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, pp. 392–3. 43. Eight were originally planned but only four were ever made operational. 44. Like the US Safeguard program, the initial Russian system had problems with its radars vulnerable to ‘blackout’ or ‘blinding’ by nuclear explosions (which could include those from its own interceptor missiles). The system could not cover all 254 Notes

possible ‘attack corridors’ which meant that missiles approaching from certain directions might be undetectable until too late in the attack. Furthermore, the Moscow defence was largely incapable of dealing with countermeasures, such as decoys and chaff, and could be overwhelmed by missiles armed with MIRVed warheads, which were relatively inexpensive compared to the cost of maintaining or expanding the defensive system. As such, the system was strictly limited, and was designed to defend against an attack by only six to eight ICBMs. This was a plausible number when the idea was first conceived in 1959, but it would prove to be essentially redundant by the 1970s when ICBM forces had reached higher quantitative and qualitative levels. For these reasons, Anglo–US intelligence assessed the Soviet system as having little ability to protect Moscow against anything other than a strictly limited attack. UCSUSE.org, Russian BMD Programmes, http://www.ucsusa.org/security/fact.russiaMD.html accessed on 2 December 2002 and Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security, p. 50. 45. Pavel Podvig, ‘History and the Current Status of the Russian Early Warning System’, pp. 21–60. The Nikolayev radar may actually be further south near Sevastapol, Pike, Global Security.org, Russian ABM Radars, Hen House Page. 46. FAS.org, ABM Programmes, Soviet Hen House Page, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, Nuclear Arms Reduction: The Process and Problems, Chapter 3 and Global Security.org, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Russia, Hen House Radar Page. Although these radars were ‘somewhat limited in their capability, it wasn’t a factor in overall ABM system performance’. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005. 47. FAS.org, ABM Programmes, Soviet Dog House Page. 48. FAS.org, ABM Programmes, Soviet Try Add Page. See also Karpenko, ‘ABM and Space Defense’, pp. 2–47. 49. John J. Holst, ‘Missile Defence, the Soviet Union, and the Arms Race’, in Holst and Schneider Jr., Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defence Controversy, pp. 145–86. 50. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 414. 51. On the background to these systems, see Steven Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945–1964. 52. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 414. 53. The Soviets were also starting work on preparing twice as many launch sites, 128, on the ‘E-ring’ around Moscow where there had been earlier anti-aircraft sites. There were also limitations on rapid reloading, which was assumed by the UK to take at least half an hour; but intelligence observations of actual exercises showed it to be much longer. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 54. However by the late 1960s American studies, information from which was passed along to the British, were indicating that maintaining radar blackout would only be possible in a large scale strategic exchange, as it would require ‘a few hundred missiles’; but the ‘placing [of] black-out patches in position … [would] conceal the advance of an offensive missile’. TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(67) 2nd Meeting Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 3 April 1967. A further problem for the defensive radars was a problem known as ‘Grey out’, which was the loss of strength and return and distortion along with the appearance of ‘striations’. These made the interpretation of the radar signals more difficult and complicated the planning of the ABM defence. Both the Soviet Union and United States relied on different high altitude tests for their empirical data so there is no reason to Notes 255

believe they had the same views on the severity of the effects. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 55. More exotic systems, reminiscent of the SDI proposals of the early 1980s, were also considered; and considerable research and development was expended in an effort to develop ground- and space-based microwave and laser weapons for missile destruction and anti-satellite capabilities (ASAT) such as Kaskad. Experiments looking at developing these technologies, such as those at Arzamas-16, continued until the early 1990s. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 419–20. 56. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 415. 57. BND (TSC) (61) 3 Ministry of Defence British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group Technical Sub-Committee Active Defence Against Strategic Missiles in the Period 1970/80 Report by Ministry of Aviation, 18 January 1961. Declassified document provided through confidential correspondence, March 2005. 58. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti- Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966. 59. Ibid. 60. As one senior official has noted, the development of Galosh was a ‘radical change of ABM doctrine which needed assessment’, confidential correspondence, 24 March 2005. 61. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti- Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated spring 1966. 62. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Galosh, Undated but likely to be spring 1965. 63. The report mentions, ‘Because so little can be seen of the missile inside the can- ister it is impossible to make an accurate or comprehensive analysis of either the missile or its performance. However, this report, which is based solely on parade photography, presents a concept of the type of missile which could be enclosed and a reasonable assessment of the performance of such a missile. While the quantitative results must be treated with reserve, it is felt that they represent a reasonable estimate of range and times of flight which might be expected.’ The report continued, ‘No attempt has been made to assess the effectiveness of the system of which GALOSH may form a part. This would require a knowledge not only of the missile’s characteristics but also of its associated electronic equipment on the ground. This information is not available.’ TNA, DEFE 44/115, Galosh, Undated but likely to be spring 1965. 64. That new intelligence assessments had been made available is hinted at in the documents contained within this class but is not explicitly stated due to ongoing security restrictions related to intelligence gathering during the Cold War. 65. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti- Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 71. TNA, DEFE 19/83, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966. 72. Ibid. However, for planning purposes it was also assumed, through analysis of the Soviet defence budget, that the USSR could allocate resources to defend one 256 Notes

new city per year or upgrade existing sites. After Moscow and Leningrad, it was believed the next most likely cities would have been Kiev, Gorkiy and Kharkov. Confidential correspondence, 7 April 2006. 73. Similar conservative assessments of the destructive potential of American nuclear forces are to be found among the US defence intelligence and military community. This, it has been argued, is a feature of an organisational (or bureaucratic) frame of mind through its definition and solving of problems. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 47 and Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation. 74. Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 23 October 2002. 75. Baylis, ‘British Nuclear Doctrine: The ‘Moscow Criterion’ and the Polaris Improvement Programme, pp. 53–65. 76. TNA, DEFE 19/83, DP.16/166(A)(Draft) 8 March 1966. 77. Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 23 October 2002. 78. Views expressed to the author by a number of senior government officials involved in the project at The History of the Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme conference held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, UK, October 2004. This concept forms part of the British characteristic of independent nuclear deterrence referred to by Beatrice Heuser as a ‘nuclear mentality’. This is part of a wider ‘strategic culture’. Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG. 79. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti- Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966. Added to this, as a later report recognised, was the concern that the proposed modification to Polaris by the Americans, Antelope, may have been compromised in flight tests off Kwajalein atoll as part of proving trials. Soviet ships were in the impact area of the full scale Antelope trials and ‘must therefore be assumed to have obtained radar information on Antelope decoys and warheads for subsequent study’. TNA, CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970. 83. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966. 84. Ibid. 85. Mathers, ‘“A Fly in Outer Space”: Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence during the Khrushchev Period’, p. 31. See also Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin, pp. 37–87. 86. Ibid. 87. TNA, DEFE 19/83, DCSA (S) A.B.M.s (Proposed informal talks with U.S.), J. E. F. Clarke, 23 August 1965. 88. Ibid. 89. Digital National Security Archives, George Washington University (henceforward DNSA), Dean Rusk to Robert McNamara, 23 August 1965. 90. DNSA, Llewelyn E. Thompson to Secretary of State, 14 September 1965. 91. TNA, DEFE 19/83, P.H. Gore-Booth to Sir Richard Way, 30 September 1965. 92. Ibid. Notes 257

93. Ibid. 94. TNA, DEFE 68/21, ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES Draft Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation, undated July 1966. 95. Confidential correspondence, 9 March 2005. 96. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Prime Minister PM/62/12 The ABM Question, 30 January 1967. 97. Ibid. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Ibid. 101. Ibid. Although the document is not explicit, this presumably meant the State Department who were traditionally hostile to the British and French nuclear programmes. It could also refer to individuals within the DoD. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, pp. 386–99. 102. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 86–100. 103. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966. 104. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 392. 105. For a somewhat different view of the role of AWRE in the role of the Polaris improvement programme, see Spinardi, ‘Aldermaston and British Nuclear Weapons Development: Testing the “Zuckerman thesis”’, pp. 547–82. 106. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 392. 107. Ibid., p. 393. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid. See Chapter 5 for more information an Anglo–French negotiations. 110. TNA, DEFE 19/83, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966. 111. Ibid. 112. Baylis, The ‘Moscow Criterion’. 113. For example, see TNA, CAB 159/49, JIC (68) 31st Meeting, 11 July 1968. 114. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 115. HR 169 was supported by the United States which gave the RAE access to their studies regarding the effectiveness of counter-measures against ABMs without revealing their designs. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 116. These included Intercept in 1964 and PEN-X in 1965. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. For more information see Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, pp. 73–4. 117. The ABM warhead detonation could damage the casing of the re-entry vehicle so that it did not survive the defensive environment. This was therefore considered to be a ‘consequential kill’ rather than an immediate ‘catastrophic kill’. Second, the response time of any ABM system is important in accurately attempting to launch a precursor nuclear detonation. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 118. Information on the origins and development of the TTCP can be found in Thomas-Durell Young, ‘Cooperative Diffusion through Cultural Similarity: The Postwar Anglo-Saxon Experience’ in Goldman and Eliason, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, p. 105. 119. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966. 120. Confidential correspondence, 28 July, 2006. 121. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, p. 74. 258 Notes

122. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti- Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966. 123. Robert G. Ridley, ‘The Requirement and Early R & D Programme’, Proceedings from a conference on The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme, held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 28 October 2004. 124. Confidential correspondence, 29 December 2007. 125. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 31 March 1967. 126. TNA, DEFE 13/547, MO/26/10/6 Aide Memoire, undated January 1967. 127. Government hesitancy was also based on the uncertain outcome of the SALT negotiations which were threatening to halt ABM developments as well as the strategic arguments against improving Polaris put forward by Zuckerman. 128. TNA, DEFE 13/547, MO/26/10/6 Aide Memoire, undated January 1967. 129. Ellison, ‘Defeating the General: Anglo–American Relations, Europe and the NATO Crisis of 1966’, pp. 85–111.

3 Britain, the United States and the Reform of NATO Strategy, 1964–1966

1. Limited treatment is to be found in Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO Britain, America and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962–1968, pp. 122–37. 2. Norris and Arkin, ‘NATO Nuclear Weapons in Western Europe’, pp. 48–9. 3. These are some of the last available figures for SIOP 63 of November 1962. Desmond Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’ in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 62–7. 4. Ibid p. 63 and Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 36. 5. Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, p. 62. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., pp. 62–4. 8. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 9. McNamara and his staff also had to combat rhetorical statements regarding possible ‘missile gaps’ or ‘bomber gaps’ based on worst-case intelligence assessments, public fears and lobbying from powerful military-industrial groups. 10. Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, p. 68. 11. TNA, DEFE 68/81, Ministry of Defence Operational Requirements Committee, 5 March 1964. 12. Norris and Kristensen, ‘U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1954–2004’, pp. 76–7. 13. Also known as ‘keys to the cupboard’. These ‘Dual Key’ arrangements required political authorisation to release the nuclear munitions from US custody into allied hands. 14. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–1964, p. 132. 15. Gaddis and Nitze, ‘NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered’, pp. 164–76. 16. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/7 Atlantic Nuclear Force: The Size of the British Polaris Force Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, 20 November 1964. 17. Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Formerly Top Secret Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, box 22, NATO. National Security Archives website: http://www. gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB31/index.html, accessed on 4 August 2005. Notes 259

18. Much has already been written on the MLF. See, for example, Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939–70, pp. 276–82 and Buchan, ‘The Multilateral Force: A Study in Alliance Polities’, pp. 619–37. 19. Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, p. 167. 20. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 182–6. 21. This in turn worried the Soviets who feared a German finger on the nuclear trig- ger. TNA, DEFE 31/54, K. V. D. Strong, The Soviet Union and the MLF, 14 October 1964. 22. Ibid. 23. In November 1964, a month after the new Labour government had been elected into office, Sir Solly Zuckerman was informing the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, not only of the considerable political impediments to the MLF but also the logistical and operational difficulties it would engender. TNA, CAB 164/713, SZ to Secretary of State, 18 November 1964. 24. Digital National Security Archives, George Washington University (henceforward DNSA), Critical Assessment of the Multilateral Force, 3 October 1964. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. DNSA, Chet Holifield to Lyndon Johnson, 3 October 1964. 29. DNSA, Visit of Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker, October 26–27, 1964 Talking Points Paper, 26 October 1964. 30. Gilpatric had earlier been the US Deputy Secretary of Defense. DNSA, Roswell Gilpatric to Arthur K. Watson, 10 December 1964. 31. DNSA, Visit of Prime Minister Harold Wilson December 7–8, 1964, Nuclear Problems and Policies of the Alliance, December 1964. 32. Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 276. 33. DNSA, Information for the Forthcoming U.S.–U.K. Talks, 5 December 1964. 34. Ibid. 35. This followed his defeat as a parliamentary candidate at the 1964 general election and loss at a subsequent by-election. 36. TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/3rd Meeting Cabinet Defence Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held at Chequers on Saturday, 21 November 1964, at 5.30 p.m., 23 November 1964, TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/4th Meeting Cabinet Defence Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held at Chequers on Sunday, 22 November 1964, at 10.30 a.m., 23 November 1964, TNA, PREM 13/26, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 25 November 1964. Reproduced in Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 181–96. 37. DNSA, Information for the Forthcoming U.S.–U.K. Talks, 5 December 1964. 38. Ibid. 39. The Times, 17 December 1964. 40. Ibid. 41. TNA, CAB 165/209, Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee Sub-Committee of the Atlantic Nuclear Force Composition and Terms of Reference Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 19 February 1965. 42. TNA, CAB 165/209, Frank Mottershead to P. Rogers, 22 March 1965. 43. Young, ‘Killing the MLF? The Wilson Government and Nuclear Sharing in Europe, 1964–66’, p. 305. 44. Federation of American Scientists (FAS.org), National Security Action Memorandum Web Page, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-lbj/index.html (NSAM 322), accessed on 30 November 2006. 260 Notes

45. See, for example, Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Salmon and Shepherd, Toward a European Army? A Military Power in the Making, Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP and Nuttall, European Foreign Policy. The author is grateful to Dr Alastair Shepherd for these references and for his views on this issue. 46. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Frank Cooper Deployment of Polaris Submarines, 11 November 1966 and The Times, 17 February 1966. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’ pp. 295–324. 47. Quoted in Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’ p. 299. 48. The Times, 16 November 1964. 49. The AMF referred to is quite possibly a typographical error or stands for Atlantic Missile Force. DNSA, McGeorge Bundy to AMEMB London for Ambassador, Ball and Neustadt, 29 November 1964. 50. Ibid. 51. TNA, PREM 13/453, Sir E. Shuckburgh Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 292 of 23 November, 23 November 1965. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. TNA, PREM 13/453, Sir E. Shuckburgh Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 294 of 23 November, 23 November 1965. 56. Nothing more is known about the HICOM Programme at the time of writing. TNA, PREM 13/453, Sir E. Shuckburgh Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 293 of 23 November, 23 November 1965. 57. TNA, PREM 13/453, Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr Robert McNamara, at luncheon at 10 Downing Street, on Friday, November 26, 1965. 26 November 1965. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. TNA, PREM 13/453, Outline of speech by the Right Hon. Denis Healey Secretary of State for Defence to NATO Nuclear Special Committee on 27 November 1965. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. The Times, 22 February 1966. 64. TNA, PREM 13/1042, Foreign Office to United Delegation to N.A.T.O. Paris No. 130, 6 March 1966. 65. Ibid. 66. TNA, PREM 13/1042, Lyndon Johnson to The Right Honourable Harold Wilson, 7 March 1966. 67. He went so far as to suggest moving Canadian and American air bases currently in France to Britain. TNA, PREM 13/1042, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 9 March 1966. 68. Ibid. 69. As a flank power bordering Southern Europe and the Middle East, Turkey was a key Alliance member. Its hostile relationship with Greece, and the relative political instability in the country and in the region as a whole, made it a noted cause of weakness as well. Nicolet, ‘The Development of US Plans for the Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict in 1964: The Limits of American Power’, pp. 95–126. 70. DNSA, Dean Rusk Memorandum for the President, 21 March 1966. Notes 261

71. DNSA, McG Memorandum for the President, 28 January 1966. 72. DNSA, Dean Rusk Memorandum for the President, 21 March 1966. 73. Ibid. 74. TNA, DEFE 11/471, Nuclear Planning Group: The History of the NPG, 7 June 1972. 75. These logistical problems included possible delays in bringing weapons to bear in a hostile and fluid situation during the rapid advance of Warsaw Pact forces, due to logistic and communication difficulties. National Security Archive Website, Document Page, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/04-01.htm, accessed on 21 November 2004. 76. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pp. 48–52. 77. Allied Command Europe was the name given to NATO’s regional military structure. It was divided into Northern, Central and Southern Sectors. 78. McNamara also stated that the SIOP gave equal priority to targets that threatened America and targets that threatened Western Europe only. Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Formerly Top Secret Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, box 22, NATO. NSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB31/index. html, accessed on 4 August 2005. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Quoted in Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, p. 69. 83. TNA, CAB 164/713, SZ to Secretary of State, 18 November 1964. 84. TNA, DEFE 19/118, COS 113/65 SACEUR’s Current Conventional Capability Appraisal (The Mountbatten Exercise), 14 June 1965. 85. However, Healey also stated that, ‘Despite our differences of temperament and experience, McNamara and I worked well together and became friends for life.’ Healey, The Time of My Life, pp. 306–7. 86. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the Politics of Power, pp. 251–62 and Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, Chapter 6. 87. Estimated by three distinguished American nuclear researchers, Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, as approximately 7300. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd99norris_024, accessed on 2 November 2004. 88. Kaiser and Roper, British-German Defence Co-operation, p. 18. 89. As at least one commentator has suggested, perhaps US preferences were not pressed as strongly as they otherwise might have been due to America’s preoccupa- tion with Vietnam and the run up to the 1968 presidential election. Ibid., p. 18. 90. Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 305. 91. Ibid.

4 Britain, America and Allied Tactical Nuclear Weapons Planning, 1964–1966

1. See, for example, Gray, Modern Strategy. 2. Rosenberg in ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960’, pp. 3–71. 3. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, p. 334. Quoted in Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. xviii. 262 Notes

4. Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 1. 5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 127–47. 6. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. xix. 7. On ‘Independence in Concert’ see Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964. 8. TNA, DEFE 13/976, Mountbatten to Lemnitzer, 23 May 1963 quoted in Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–1964, pp. 208–10. 9. The 2nd TAF was one of three air forces operating in the FRG. 10. See, for example, Maloney, ‘Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO’s ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War’, pp. 585–613. 11. Much has been written on the V-bombers, largely by UK former pilots or air enthusiasts; the literature is therefore not unbiased towards the application of air power. See, for example, Brookes, V-Force: The History of Britain’s Airborne Deterrent, Jackson, V-Bombers and Laming, The Vulcan Story 1952–2002. For an unbiased approach to the deficiencies of air power in the age of the missile see Roman,, pp. 198–236. 12. Delve, Green and Clemons, English Electric Canberra, pp. 46–7, 59–64. See also Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 98. 13. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces: Their Origins, Roles and Deployment 1946–1969, pp. 369–70. The Mk 7 was capable of multiple yields considered in the tactical range. These were 9, 19, 22, 30, 31 and 61 kt through air or ground burst. They remained in service until 1967. Its warhead was also used in other devices including the Corporal and Honest John battlefield missiles. 14. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 98–9. 15. No. 2 Group had been disbanded in 1958. 16. Brocklebank, ‘World War III – The 1960’s Version’, pp. 341–7. 17. Brookes, V-Force, p. 134. 18. TNA, CAB 158/61, JIC (66) 3, ‘Soviet Bloc War Potential 1966–1970’, 9 February 1966. Quoted by Haddon, ‘British Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, 1945–75’, Chapter 4. 19. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, pp. 455–62. 20. ‘The Proceedings of the RAFHS seminar on RAF and Nuclear Weapons, 1960–1998’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Vol. 26 (2001), p. 14. 21. The results of Micky Finn can be found in files contained within TNA, AIR 14, 4364, 4369, 4370, 4378 and 4393. 22. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, pp. 439–41. 23. Withington, Wild Weasel Fighter Attack: The Story of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. 24. AVM Stuart Peach, ‘RAF-USAF Air Power in Germany During the Cold War’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Vol. 32 (2004), p. 92. 25. TNA, DEFE 25/250, G. G. Street PS to VCAS to Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee, 19 January 1965. 26. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, pp. 258 and 262–70. 27. The term non-strategic is used to refer to the tactical air forces as distinct from battlefield nuclear weapons. These battlefield munitions are referred to as tactical nuclear weapons throughout for purposes of consistency. 28. These methods of delivery are detailed later. On the Mk. 28 see Cochran, Arkin and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities Volume 1, pp. 42–4. It is not known what modification of the Mk 28 or Mk 43 was used Notes 263

on the Valiant. Nuclear Weapon Archive Webpage: http://nuclearweaponarchive. org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html, accessed on 6 November 2007. 29. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Draft Minute from the Secretary of State for Defence to Prime Minister, Undated, January 1965. 30. Eight of them had a reconnaissance role. TNA, PREM 13/212, F. Cooper to DSA to DS of S, 5 March 1965. 31. TNA, DEFE 25/250, MOD UK to UKNMR SHAPE, 6 October 1964. 32. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Extract from Part 1 to COS 71st Meeting/64, 1 December 1964. 33. TNA, DEFE 25/250, G.G. Street PS to VCAS to Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee, 19 January 1965. TNA, DEFE 25/250, CDS to UKNMR SHAPE, 14 December 1964. 34. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State, 20 January 1965. 35. These forces had been reallocated in early 1965 to combat the Indonesian emergency. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State Replacement of SACEUR-Assigned Tactical Bomber Force With Surplus Vulcan Mark 1 Aircraft, 25 January 1965. 36. Ibid. 37. TNA, DEFE 25/250, M.E. Quinlan PS to CAS to Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee, 25 January 1965. 38. The RAF felt this withdrawal could also be used by SACEUR to press for the introduction of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) of which they were not in favour. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Secretary of Defence, Undated, January 1965. 39. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Extract for COS 5th Mtg’65, 26 January 1965. 40. SACEUR now claimed that the loss of the Valiant, and the conversion of other bombers at his disposal to tankers, meant his strike capability was reduced by 45% from 246 to 136 targets. TNA, PREM 13/212, Sir E. Shuckburgh Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 79 of 27 March, 27 March 1965. 41. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Extract for COS 5th Mtg’65, 26 January 1965. 42. TNA, DEFE 25/250, DWH to C.D.S., 11 February 1965. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Chiefs of Staff Committee Extract from COS 10th Meeting /65 held on Tuesday, 23 February 1965. 46. TNA, DEFE 25/250, DWH to C.D.S., 11 February 1965. 47. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Chiefs of Staff Committee Extract from COS 10th Meeting /65 held on Tuesday, 23 February 1965. 48. TNA, DEFE 25/250, Denis Healey to Foreign Secretary, 4 March 1965. 49. The Times, 30 April 1965. This report also mentioned the Javelin, but it had not been made nuclear capable, despite earlier plans to equip it with Red Beard. Private correspondence with Richard Moore, 10 December 2007. 50. TNA, PREM 13/212, Sir E. Shuckburgh Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 43 of 17 February, 17 February 1965. 51. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Background Note For Number 10 Downing Street, Undated but likely to be early 1970. 52. TNA, PREM 13/212, F. Cooper to DSA to DS of S, 5 March 1965. Malaysia was a British protectorate. For further information see Easter, ‘“Keep the Indonesian pot boiling”: Western covert intervention in Indonesia, October 1965–March 1966’, pp. 55–73. 264 Notes

53. TNA, PREM 13/212, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 18 March 1965. 54. Ibid. 55. In the period immediately prior to 1964 see Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command and Control of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964, pp. 125–7. 56. TNA, DEFE 25/250, CAS to CSA, 11 November 1964. 57. Ibid. 58. On these agreements see Young, ‘No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases’, pp. 1133–67. 59. TNA, PREM 13/3129, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 27 November 1964. 60. In the interim, this agreement had been renewed on 8 December 1964, and it was renewed again when Richard Nixon was elected President. TNA, PREM 13/3129, Secretary of State for Defence FS/65/38 Nuclear Consultation, 19 February 1965, TNA, PREM 13/3129, M.S. to Prime Minister, 30 July 1965 and TNA, PREM 13/3129, EY to J.A.N. Graham, 25 September 1969. 61. Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) George Washington University, Washington DC, Release of British-Based U.S. Nuclear Weapons; Includes Background Memoranda and President Johnson’s Response, 3 September 1965. 62. The declassified text (with some redaction) of the Murphy–Dean Agreement can be found on the National Security Archive website, ‘Consultation is Presidential Business’ webpage: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB159/usukconsult-8. pdf, accessed on 21 October 2008. A further (UK) commentary on the significance of the Murphy–Dean Agreement can be found in Baylis, ‘Exchanging Nuclear Secrets’, p. 58. 63. DNSA, Release of British-Based U.S. Nuclear Weapons; Includes Background Memoranda and President Johnson’s Response, 3 September 1965. 64. Ibid. 65. Nigel Baldwin, ‘Training in Peace for War’ seminar reprinted in the RAF Historical Society Journal, No. 20 (1999), pp. 30–1. 66. Brocklebank, ‘World War III – The 1960’s Version’, p. 341. 67. Squadron Leader Roy Brocklebank, ‘UK–US Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 1964–1976’, talk delivered at the UK Space Conference, Charterhouse, Surrey, UK, 28 March 2008. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. This figure may be higher, as other airfields could have been used in such an emergency. 71. Brookes, ‘V-force Operational Deployment and Readiness’, p. 50. 72. Brocklebank, ‘World War III – The 1960’s Version’, p. 342. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. TNA, CAB 21/5644, Government War Book, 1965–1968. 76. Files for this period covering the ‘Machinery of Government in War’ can be found in TNA, PREM 11/5222, 5223, 5224, TNA, PREM 13/3565 and 3566. 77. Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War, pp. 171–93. See also Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, pp. 12, 83–5, 88, 202, 210–12 and 321. 78. Woolven, Civil Defence and Nuclear Weapons 1960–1974, UK Nuclear History Working Paper No 3. See also Grant, After the Bomb Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945–68, pp. 175–92. 79. Detailed information is available in Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 120–70. Notes 265

80. Brocklebank, ‘World War III – The 1960’s Version’, pp. 342–3. 81. Dalsjö, Life-Line Lost. The Rise and Fall of ‘Neutral’ Sweden’s Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West. 82. Brocklebank, ‘World War III – The 1960’s Version’, p. 344. 83. Private correspondence with Roy Brocklebank and Dr Robin Woolven, January 2008. 84. Brocklebank, ‘UK-US Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 1964–1976’. 85. Brookes, ‘V-force Operational Deployment and Readiness’, p. 50 and private correspondence with Dr Robin Woolven, 31 January 2008. 86. Confidential correspondence, 19 Feb. 2008. For information on the origins and evolution of the SIOP see Desmond Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP’ in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 57–83 and Burr, NSA Website, ‘The Creation of SIOP 62’ and ‘The Nixon Administration, the SIOP and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1974’. 87. Burr, NSA Website, ‘The Creation of SIOP 62’ and ‘The Nixon Administration, the SIOP and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1974’. 88. It has also been argued that these plans did not take sufficient account of collateral damage, particularly resulting from nuclear fire. Eden’s excellent study, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation. 89. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, pp. 34–78. 90. Ibid., pp. 34, 63 and 47. 91. Ibid., p. 41. 92. Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’ in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 62–7. 93. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy”’, p. 41. 94. ‘The Proceedings of the RAFHS seminar on RAF and Nuclear Weapons, 1960–1998’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Vol. 26, p. 50. 95. Nicholas, ‘Big Bangs for a Buck’, pp. 46–7. 96. Interview conducted with Squadron Leader Roy Brocklebank, 31 January 2008. 97. See documents in the file TNA, DEFE 25/216, SEATO Plan 4, 1964–1966. 98. Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, pp. 107–8; see also TNA, DEFE 5/143, COS.339/63, 4 Oct 1963. Both quoted in Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 214. 99. See documents contained within the file TNA, AIR 20/12199, Nuclear weapons policy: RAF units in Germany, 1969–1970. 100. Nicholas, ‘Big Bangs for a Buck’, p. 47 and TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1969. 101. Interview with Squadron Leader Roy Brocklebank, 31 January 2008. 102. TNA, AIR 2/13705, D. A. V. Johnson to AD/AWD2 Retention of Yellow Sun MK2 Weapons, 20 May 1966. 103. Brocklebank, ‘World War III – The 1960’s Version’, p. 343. 104. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, appendix 1. 105. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, pp. 462–3. 106. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 113. 107. Moore, ‘A Pedantic Glossary of British Nuclear Weapons’, UK Nuclear History Working Paper No. 1. 108. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, p. 462. 109. Ibid., p. 463. 110. Brookes, V-Force, pp. 126–7. 266 Notes

111. Ibid., p. 127. 112. John Allen, ‘Blue Steel and Developments’, The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent, Royal Aeronautical Society, 17 March 1999. 113. Ibid. 114. Laming, The Vulcan Story 1952–2002, p. 90. 115. Graham, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in the Cold War’, p. 63. 116. Private correspondence with Robin Woolven, 14 January 2008. 117. Brocklebank, ‘World War III – The 1960’s Version’, p. 345. 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid., p. 346. 121. Ibid., p. 344. 122. Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 139, 176 and 190. 123. Gunston and Donald, ‘Fleet Air Arm 1960–69’, p. 193. 124. Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 104, 110, 119, 186 and 190. 125. For more information, see Pitchfork, The Buccaneers Operational Service with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and Laming, Buccaneer: The Story of the Last All- British Strike Aircraft. 126. TNA, DEFE 13/326, TSR 2: Canberra Replacement, 1963–1964. 127. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 137. 128. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 137–8. 129. See, for example, Hastings, The Murder of the TSR.2 and Barnett-Jones, TSR-2 Phoenix, Or Folly? 130. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, p. 503. 131. Straw and Young, ‘The Wilson Government and the Demise of the TSR 2, October 1964–April 1965’, pp. 18–44. 132. Forbat, TSR2 Precision Attack to Tornado. 133. Finch, ‘Replacing the V-bombers: RAF Strategic Nuclear Systems Procurement and the Bureaucratic Politics of Threat’, pp. 233–66. 134. TNA, DEFE 13/204, Study on TFX: US equivalent of TSR 2, 1965. 135. TNA, CAB 148/18/19, TSR 2 AND TFX, 29 March 1965. 136. Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy 1945–1970, pp. 181–2, 200–1. 137. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, p. 529. 138. Ibid., pp. 530–45. 139. SHAPE was based at Fontainebleau in Paris until 1967 when it was moved to Casteau near Mons in Belgium. 140. After the disbandment of the Mediterranean Fleet, in 1967, the Home Fleet became the Western Fleet. 141. Norris and Arkin, ‘NATO Nuclear Weapons in Western Europe’, pp. 48–9. 142. Two files related to the Heidelberg Agreement are listed by the National Archives, Kew. Both, however, remain classified. TNA, T 225/927, Supply of American Atomic Warheads to British Corporal Guided Weapons Regiments stationed in Germany (Heidelberg Agreement), 1958 and TNA, WO 32/17085, Heidelberg Agreement on storage of Corporal warheads, 1953–1962. 143. Columbia University website: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal. html, accessed on 19 January 2009. 144. TNA, DEFE 68/81, Draft Ministry of Defence Operational Requirements Committee Battlefield Nuclear Missile System (GSR 3376/1) Paper by the Army Department, 8 June 1971. Notes 267

145. For more information on the Corporal see Redstone Arsenal Historical Information Page, http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/pdf/corporal/corp1. pdf and http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/pdf/corporal/corp2.pdf, accessed on 8 January 2009. Another source suggests its range was 60 miles. Major Michael L. Kirk, ‘Nuke … “End of Mission, Out”’, pp. 40–1. 146. The Guardian, 6 September 2003. 147. TNA, AIR 8/2204, Atomic surface-to-surface guided weapons for the Army, October 1959. Quoted in Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 130. 148. They were, at least initially, given titles to conceal their new nuclear role. However, ‘[o]n 18 March 1964 roles were reinserted into regimental titles and batteries, the regiments becoming missile regiments and the batteries becoming missile batteries and heavy batteries as appropriate’. Windscreen: The Magazine of the Military Vehicle Trust, Issue 111 (Summer, 2006), pp. 10–12. 149. For more information see the US 59th Ordnance Brigade website: http:// www.usarmygermany.com/units/Ordnance/USAREUR_59thOrdBde%201. htm#IUKCorps, accessed on 8 January 2009. 150. Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume 5: British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 82. 151. Other sources give ranges between 3.4m and 22m. Colonel Norman Dodd, ‘The Royal Artillery of the British Army’, p. 11. ‘Honest John’, Windscreen, pp. 10–12. 152. ‘Honest John’, Ibid. 153. TNA, WO 32/21248, Honest John ground-launched SSGW: procurement aspects, 1958–1960. Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 82–3. 154. British Army Units 1945 on Locations and dates website, http://british- army- units1945on.co.uk/24thRegimentRA.aspx, accessed on 13 January 2009. 155. Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 82–3. 156. Kirk, ‘Nuke … “End of Mission, Out”’, pp. 40–1. 157. ‘Honest John’, Windscreen, pp. 10–12. 158. Dodd, ‘The Royal Artillery of the British Army’, p. 10. 159. Colonel P. G. Barry, 50 Missile Club RA website: http://www.50missileclubra. com/lance.html, accessed on 12 January 2009. 160. It was the most formidably armed and heavily armoured main battle tank in NATO, serving with distinction in a number of combat roles for over 30 years, including the 1991 Gulf War. Dunstan, Chieftain Main Battle Tank 1965–2003. 161. Thunderbird Surface to Air Missile System website: http://www.36regimentra. org.uk/TLaunch/id16.htm, accessed on 13 January 2009. 162. Dodd, ‘The Royal Artillery of the British Army’, p. 11. 163. This was not rectified until a series of Hawk improvement programmes was initiated in the 1970s. Armed Forces International website: http://www. armedforces- int.com/projects/Missiles/mim-23-hawk, accessed on 13 January 2009. See also Jane’s MIM-14 Nike Hercules (United States), Defensive weapons website: http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Strategic-Weapon-Systems/MIM-14-Nike- Hercules-United-States.html, accessed on 13 January 2009. 164. TNA, PREM 13/338, Fred Mulley to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 September 1965. 165. Ibid. 268 Notes

166. For a different account of these tactical arrangements and how they related to the ‘Grand Strategy’ of Flexible Response see Maloney, ‘Fire Brigade or Tocsin’, pp. 585–613. 167. Mulley felt the tone and substance reflected more on domestic political considerations than foreign policy. TNA, PREM 13/338, Fred Mulley to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 September 1965. 168. Moore says of Blue Water, ‘two versions were eventually planned with low- and high-yield warheads of around ten and 100kt respectively … Service entry was hoped for in 1965, and targets would include enemy missile and rocket sites, dug-in infantry, bridges, defiles, corps or divisional headquarters, forward airfields, beachheads or paratroop dropping zones. The missile and its mobile erec- tor-launcher were to be air-transportable, making use outside Europe a practical proposition. Rapid launch was required, and inertial guidance; Blue Water would not have the limitations of Corporal’. It had a range of around 65 miles but was suddenly cancelled in July 1962 when it was decided that ‘there were plenty of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe already, and that TSR.2 could cover many of the targets the army had in mind for Blue Water’. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 130–1 and 162. 169. TNA, PREM 13/338, Michael Stewart to Deputy Secretary of State for Defence, 13 September 1965. 170. Ibid. 171. TNA, PREM 13/338, Denis Healey to His Excellency Herr Kai-Uwe von Hassel, 16 September 1965. 172. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 102. 173. Freedman, Atlas of Global Strategy: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, p. 98. 174. The quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional arms must be compared against their qualitative utility, which, if the guiding example of Russian forces during both world wars is anything to go by, was not always reliable. 175. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000, p. 1. 176. Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955–1991, pp. 77–558. 177. Mastny and Byrne, ‘Plan of Actions of the Czechoslovak People’s Army for War Period (1964)’, Cardboard Castle, pp. 160–9. 178. Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security website: http://www.php.isn. ethz.ch/documents/BodoeReport.pdf, accessed on 16 January 2009. 179. TNA, DEFE 68/81, Ministry of Defence Operational Requirements Committee, 5 March 1964. This blitzkrieg tactic was known in NATO circles as ‘a quick grab’. This might have occurred as sheer opportunism under the guise of a military exercise along the Central Front. 180. Simon Lunn, ‘The Anglo-American relationship: the Alliance context’, in Clarke and Hague, European Defence Co-operation: America, Britain and NATO, p. 78. 181. Christoph Bluth, ‘British–German Defence Relations, 1950–80: A Survey’, in Kaiser and Roper, British-German Defence Co-operation, pp. 8–9. 182. For additional information on American C³I arrangements see, for example, Ball, ‘Can Nuclear War be Controlled?’ and David Alan Rosenberg, ‘U.S. Nuclear War Planning, 1945–1960’, in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, particularly pp. 53–5, 59 and Tucker, ‘Strategic Command-and-Control Vulnerabilities: Dangers and Remedies’, pp. 941–63. Notes 269

183. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. 184. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy & World Power in the 20th Century, pp. 226–37. 185. See, for example, Aldrich, Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945–1970 and Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency. 186. Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 39. See also Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. At this time the UK’s intelligence assessments were based on ‘circumstantial evidence’, including overt and classified writings on Soviet strategy, training doctrine, their military exercises and statements made by the Politburo. TNA, DEFE 31/54, DCDS to CDS Employment of Soviet Forces in the Event of General War up to the end of 1969 JIC(65)4, 25 February 1965. 187. Fontaine, ‘De Gaulle’s view of Europe and the Nuclear Debate’, pp. 33–4. Quoted in Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 17. 188. Freedman, Atlas of Global Strategy, p. 98. 189. Ibid. 190. Heuser, Britain, France and the FRG, pp. 133–6 and 143–5. 191. TNA, DEFE 68/81, Ministry of Defence Operational Requirements Committee, 5 March 1964. 192. Ibid. 193. Ibid.

5 The Second Wilson Government and the Maintenance of Polaris, 1966–1970

1. Richard Moore, ‘Why Chevaline? Political and Military Context, 1966–73’, Proceedings from a conference on The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme, held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 28 October 2004. Henceforward referred to as Conference at RAES, 28 October 2004. 2. On the Healey defence review see Greenwood, Budgeting for Defence. 3. Middeke, ‘Britain’s Global Military Role, Conventional Defence and Anglo- American Interdependence after Nassau’, pp. 143–164. 4. For a wider perspective, built on economic and political arguments see Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community, 1964–7 and Parr and O’Hara, The Labour Governments 1964–1970 Reconsidered. 5. It is clear that relations were suffering from an early stage in the war. TNA, PREM 13/2083, Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong Statement by the Prime Minister, 15 June 1966. Other documents in this class also bear this out. Still, the government stopped short of outright condemnation, despite public protests in the UK. 6. TNA, PREM 11/4738, Butler to Home, 9 January 1964. Quoted in Priest, ‘In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 1962–1968’, p. 355. 7. Evidence of this is found in the April 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA), which excluded the penetration aids the US was developing on their own Polaris missiles. As the British had developed penetration aids for the cancelled Blue Streak programme, this was not a major factor for the UK Polaris project in 1964. Kate Pyne, ‘…More Complex than Expected… – the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment’s contribution to the Chevaline Payload’, Conference at RAES, 28 October 2004, and confidential correspondence, October 2002. 8. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 270 Notes

9. For a first hand account of the development of Polaris for the United States Navy see Galantin, Submarine Admiral: From Battlewagons to Ballistic Missiles. See also Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident. 10. On the Royal Navy’s wider role in nuclear weapons and Polaris see Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons. 11. This refers to the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, which is discussed next. 12. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Frank Cooper Deployment of Polaris Submarines, 11 November 1966. 13. Ibid. China had exploded a nuclear device in October 1964, the day after Labour was elected. 14. TNA, CAB 164/713, DWH to Prime Minister Assignment to NATO of Polaris Missiles, 2 January 1967. 15. TNA, CAB 164/713, R. J. Andrew Head of D.S.12 to E. J. W. Barnes, 12 January 1967. 16. TNA, CAB 164/713, P. Rogers to Sir Burke Trend, 5 May 1967. 17. Ibid. 18. TNA, CAB 164/713, DWH to Prime Minister Nuclear Issues in the Defence Field, 5 June 1968. 19. TNA, DEFE 13/547, CDS to S of S, 21 December 1967. 20. On the issue of independence see Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State. 21. Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–1970, p. 68. 22. It remains an open question whether or not the British government would have ceded command and control to a NATO structure dominated by the US if the Atlantic Nuclear Force had ever come to fruition. 23. TNA, DEFE 13/635, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term Annex A to COS 43/48, 4 July 1968 24. TNA, DEFE 11/437, G. Leitch D.U.S. (Pol.) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1967. 25. Heuser, Britain, NATO, France and the FRG, pp. 85–6. 26. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State Polaris – Command and Control, 13 January 1966. 27. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 233. 28. See Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 164–8. 29. Hill-Norton, who would later serve as Chief of the Defence Staff and chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, was a forceful personality. His obituary in the Daily Telegraph in May 2004 read: ‘He was in the habit of answering the telephone with the words: “Gunnery Division. Hill-Norton. Kindly state your business briefly; we’re busy men here” An inadequate response would result in the telephone receiver being slammed down … Although Hill-Norton was feared, hated and respected in equal measure he led from the front. His harsh manner and foul lan- guage belied a man who could, on rare occasions, demonstrate an otherwise well- concealed humanity. He was always receptive to sound arguments but would not suffer fools or those who weakened before his onslaughts.’ The Daily Telegraph, 19 May 2004. 30. One of several deputies to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Field Marshal Sir Dick Hull. 31. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Handwritten note by PHN, 13 January 1966. 32. TNA, DEFE 13/350, R. W. Hastie-Smith APS/S. of S. to MA/CDS, 14 January 1966. Notes 271

33. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939–70, pp. 276–82. 34. Some years earlier, in July 1964, the United States had gone through a similar exercise. Their first Polaris submarines were starting to be commissioned and they too found that marrying national priorities to NATO deployment and targeting was anything but straightforward. Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), John H. Burns to David H. Popper, 20 July 1964. 35. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Annex A TO COS 75/66 NATO Targeting of the Polaris Force, 22 June 1966. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State, 23 June 1966. 39. TNA, DEFE 13/350, DWH to Prime Minister, July 1966. 40. TNA, DEFE 11/437, G. Leitch D.U.S. (Pol.) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1967. 41. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. 42. Ibid. 43. TNA, DEFE 11/437, G. Leitch D.U.S. (Pol.) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1967. 44. Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, pp. 321–2. 45. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister Annex A Draft Memorandum to SACEUR Assignment of Polaris Missiles, 3 August 1967. 46. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister Annex B Draft Memorandum to SACLANT Assignment of Polaris Submarines, 3 August 1967. 47. Although patrol in the North Atlantic was always favoured, if they were not assigned in this way the Polaris submarines would have to patrol in the Mediterranean, as this was the only area under SACEUR’s control for which deployment was suitable. While the Baltic Sea was also under the remit of SACEUR, this was ‘not suitable for Polaris operations’. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. 48. Ibid. 49. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Guide for Duty Commanders On Polaris Operations, 2 July 1968. They did, however, exploit the contours in the ocean to evade Soviet hunter killer submarines, although towards the end of their service life, when the nuclear reactor life was limited, at least once a submarine ‘sat’ on the bottom of the ocean and did not move for a patrol. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 50. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister Annex B Draft Memorandum to SACLANT Assignment of Polaris Submarines, 3 August 1967. 51. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. 52. From the evidence released so far it is not possible to tell what happened during Brown’s visit. 53. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. His minute was then sent for discussion to the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy. TNA, DEFE 11/437, Derek Andrews to P. D. Nairne, 7 August 1967. 54. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 55. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. 56. Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat and Prados, The Soviet Estimate. 57. The Times, 22 February 1966. 58. For further discussion on the Healey–Schroeder Report and the PPGs, see Heuser, ‘European Defence Before and After the “Turn of the Tide”’, pp. 409–19 and Chapter 7. 272 Notes

59. TNA, DEFE 13/547, DWH to PUS Political Control of Polaris Force, 16 August 1967. 60. TNA, DEFE 13/547, Draft letter from PS/Secretary of State to Michael Halls, No. 10, 15 September 1967. Nothing is currently known about the composition of this committee, and although there are listings of their deliberations in The National Archives, Kew, they are withheld under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. 61. TNA, DEFE 13/547, E. Broadbent to Michael Halls, 29 September 1967. 62. TNA, PREM 13/2571, DWH to Prime Minister Polaris – Command and Control of Firing Orders, 21 March 1967. 63. Between March 1967 and June 1968 a backup communications system for Polaris was initiated in Whitehall at ‘the second Polaris HQ’. TNA, PREM 13/2571, Final Version Procedure for routine daily tests from No. 10 Downing Street of the closed circuit television link with Polaris HQ, 11 June 1968. 64. Although it is not stated explicitly, this would probably have included the Prime Minister’s designated deputies in the chain of command. Moreover, as Sir Frank Cooper, who was Deputy Secretary (Policy) in the Ministry of Defence at this time, said in an interview with Peter Hennessy in 2000, ‘the key word is ‘authorised’. The Prime Minister can only authorise … the use of nuclear weapons … he cannot give an order. The only legitimate orders can be given by commissioned officers of Her Majesty’s forces.’ Cooper continued, ‘this distinction between authorisation and the power to give orders is a very important one … this is where you are into the Royal Prerogative basically’. This means ‘members are servants of the crown, not mere instruments of ministers’. Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 183–4. 65. TNA, PREM 13/2571, DWH to Prime Minister Polaris – Command and Control of Firing Orders, 21 March 1967. 66. TNA, PREM 13/2571, A.N. Halls to Sir Burke Trend, 23 March 1967. 67. TNA, PREM 13/2571, Burke Trend to Mr Halls, 6 April 1967. 68. TNA, PREM 13/2571, HW to Secretary of State for Defence, 10 April 1967. Discussions also ensued to ensure that no one could imitate the Prime Minister. See, for example, TNA, PREM 13/2571, P. J. Hudson to A. N. Halls, 16 September 1969. 69. TNA, PREM 13/2571, M. Hodges to A. N. Halls, 6 September 1967. Hodges, a Royal Navy captain, was (among other things) the Communications Advisor to No. 10. TNA, PREM 13/2571, Michael Halls to E. Broadbent, 15 September 1967. 70. TNA, PREM 13/2571, M. Hodges to A. N. Halls, 6 September 1967. 71. TNA, PREM 13/2571, Ewan Broadbent to A. N. Halls, 10 September 1967. 72. TNA, PREM 13/2571, J. O. H. Burrough to A. N. Halls, 24 January 1968. However, Burrough said that a drill twice daily ‘fills me with some misgivings’, as did the prospect of these taking place in the early evenings, when the Cabinet Office remained busy. He suggested they should take place at 8.45am and again at 2.00pm in the afternoon with a review of these arrangements after three months. TNA, PREM 13/2571, Michael Halls to J. O. H. Burrough, 26 January 1968. 73. TNA, PREM 13/2571, J. O. H. Burrough to A. N. Halls, 24 January 1968. 74. TNA, PREM 13/2571, John Burrough to A. N. Halls, 2 May 1968. The ‘two man rule’ did not apply to the tests. TNA, PREM 13/2571, J. H. Burrough No.87/3/7A, 14 May 1968. 75. TNA, PREM 13/2571, J. H. Burrough No.87/3/7A, 14 May 1968. 76. TNA, PREM 13/2571, Note for the Record, 29 June 1968. Notes 273

77. Ibid. 78. A similar conundrum would also have faced the US president. See Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 46. 79. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Guide for Duty Commanders on Polaris Operations, 2 July 1968. 80. Ibid. 81. Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 171–93. See also Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, pp. 12, 83–5, 88, 202, 210–12 and 321. 82. Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 186. 83. Hansard, Fifth Series, Vol. LXV, 1914, pp. 1809 ff. 84. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 38–9. 85. TNA, DEFE 13/350, H. S. Mackenzie to Minister (R.N.) C.N.S. Controller of the Navy 2nd P.U.S (R.N.), 19 January 1965. MIRV was also being developed for the land based Minuteman. On the US development of Poseidon, see Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, pp. 86–112. 86. A missile that only narrowly avoided being designated a further derivative of Polaris, partly as a result of the wording of Paragraph IV of the Polaris Sales Agreement and by Lyndon Johnson’s ‘desire to impress Congress with new ini- tiatives’. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 38. 87. Mackenzie felt that Poseidon could be accommodated during the refitting of the Polaris submarines if it was purchased instead of the Polaris A-3. TNA, DEFE 13/350, H.S. Mackenzie to Minister (R.N.) C.N.S. Controller of the Navy 2nd P.U.S (R.N.), 19 January 1965. 88. A popular British television comedy of the time. 89. TNA, PREM 13/228, S of S for Defence to P.M., 24 February 1965. 90. TNA, DEFE 13/350, Third Joint Annual Report (1965) of the Project Officers for the United States and the United Kingdom Polaris Programme to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of State for Defence, 13 July 1965. 91. TNA, PREM 13/228, DWH to P.M., 22 July 1965. 92. Pike, FAS.org, SLBM Page, Poseidon, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/ c-3.htm, accessed 7 October 2002. See also Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, p. 90. 93. Pike, FAS.org, SLBM Page. 94. In 1973, reliability was estimated by Admiral Levering Smith at 68%, while press reports were putting it as low as 58%. TNA, PREM 15/1360, ACO(W)600/2/630, Notes on a meeting held at Crystal City, Alexandria VA at 10.30 hrs, 29 August 1973. 95. However, it might also have been the case that designing a warhead small enough for Poseidon might have proved problematic for AWRE. Confidential correspondence, 29 December 2007. 96. TNA, DEFE 19/190, V. H. B. Macklen DCA(PN) to DUS(P), 6 June 1972. In his memoirs, Dennis Healey has repudiated the charge that Britain ever asked to buy Poseidon. Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 133. 97. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 38. 98. HC Debs, 748, Oral Answers, 13 June 1967, Coll. 299. Quoted in Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, p. 192. 99. Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964–70, p. 260. 100. Panton, ‘Polaris Improvements and the Chevaline System 1967–1975/6’, pp. 110–13. 274 Notes

101. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence. 102. Certainly AWRE scientists were contributing to American efforts, with some fundamental work ‘both on shield materials and on methods of simulation that would reduce the need for expensive underground testing’. TNA, PREM 13/2493, Technical Discussion with the Americans on Polaris hardening – M. J. V. Bell to A. M. Palliser, 19 February 1969. 103. As Harold Wilson admitted in his memoirs, ‘Britain’s defence forces were over- stretched almost to breaking point … Something had to give: it had to be commitments … Everything had to be questioned, justified where it could be justified, and costed.’ Further to this ‘the first defence bill must represent a sharp cut in the figure of £2,400 millions (at 1964 prices) for 1969–70 which we had inherited from our predecessors…in this review there would be no sacred cows’. Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 42. See also Castle, Diaries, pp. 353–62. See also TNA, PREM 13/1731, Record of a Discussion held at the Grand Trianon, Versailles, on Monday, 19 June 1967 at 11 a.m., 19 June 1967. 104. For a discussion of cost cutting at AWRE and at the Royal Ordnance Factories see TNA, DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of State for Defence, CA(PR), ACSA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 13 February 1969. 105. Additionally, the slow down in Anglo–American technical exchanges in the mid 1960s was partly because AWRE lacked two components that the scientific community in the US considered essential to the development of technological innovation in the field. These were high-level computational capability and code development along with laboratory simulators. Both were essential, as Britain and the US were publicly committed to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (1968), which severely ham- pered testing and slowed the implementation of new systems. P. G. E. F. Jones, ‘Overview of History of UK Strategic Weapons’, paper presented to the Royal Aeronautical Society, 17 March 1999. 106. In some ways there was nothing new or unusual in this but this was placing a restrictive interpretation on both the 1958 MDA and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement whereas before the US had shown themselves to be quite forthcoming. Still it must be remembered that the MDA in particular was operated only on the basis by which the UK and US would only barter information where a specific trade was requested. This had to be mutually beneficial for their defence interests. 107. Confidential correspondence, 29 December 2007. 108. Affectionately known as ‘Alphabet’ Jones, Jones had formally been a Chief Weapons Designer, then Principal Deputy Director and then Director of AWRE. On AWRE’s involvement in the Polaris improvement programme at this time see, Jones, ‘Chevaline Technical Programme 1966–1976’, pp. 179–86. 109. Jones, ‘Chevaline Technical Programme 1966–1976’, pp. 179–86. 110. Panton, ‘Polaris Improvements and the Chevaline System 1967–1975/6’, pp. 110–11. 111. This was merely confirming the government’s position, which had been laid out by Zuckerman at a 1965 nuclear ‘stocktake’ meeting. This had also been con- firmed by Healey to Robert McNamara in April 1967 and repeated in the House of Common’s on 13 June 1967. Private correspondence with Richard Moore, 9 April 2006. 112. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 405. Zuckerman’s continuing influ- ence will be apparent in later chapters. It has also been pointed out to the author Notes 275

by several senior officials on more than one occasion that Zuckerman remained within the Cabinet Office until the early 1980s when he was ‘made to retire’. 113. Ibid. 114. On the US development of Antelope see Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, pp. 72–4. 115. See Chapter 2. 116. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 117. TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(67) 2nd Meeting Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 3 April 1967. 118. TNA, CAB 165/600, Prime Minister’s minute M. 94/67 to the Foreign Secretary, 24 July 1967. 119. Ibid. 120. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 121. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 1 December 1967. 122. TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(67)6, 5 December 1967 and CAB 134/3120, PN(67)7, 5 December 1967. The DOPC were not, however, as crucial to the nuclear decision making process as the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, to which major policy decisions were left. 123. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 1 December 1967. 124. Ibid. 125. On strategic culture see Snyder, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, Rand Corporation, 1977, available at http://www. rand.org/pubs/reports/R2154.html, accessed on 8 May 2011, Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History and Johnson, Karchner and Larsen, Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction. See also Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, pp. 391–425 and Wendt, Social Theory of World Politics for social constructivist arguments that offer further insights into strategic cultural approaches. 126. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 1 December 1967. 127. TNA, CAB 165/600, Prime Minister British Nuclear Weapons Policy (PN(67)6 and PN(67)7), 1 December 1967. 128. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 1 December 1967. and TNA, CAB 165/600, Prime Minister British Nuclear Weapons Policy (PN(67)6 and PN(67)7), 1 December 1967. 129. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 4 January 1968. 130. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 131. The group was known colloquially as the ‘Press Gang’. 132. Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Chevaline: The Hidden Nuclear Programme, 1967–1982’, pp. 124–55. 133. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. On Kings Norton see next. 134. As Technology Week pointed out in 1967, ‘To date, much of the work done to harden weapons systems against nuclear weapons has concentrated on near- surface bursts, where such effects as neutron damage, gamma-ray photo-currents, and electromagnetic pulse predominate in ranges where systems can expect to survive destruction from blast.’ It was further pointed out, ‘Many techniques have been devised to reduce a system’s vulnerability to such effects. However, to harden the same systems against X-ray effect calls for additional precautions.’ However, the ‘[s]everity of the problem is further increased by the fact that the nuclear weapons designer has the option of changing the characteristics of the 276 Notes

radiation put out by the weapon. He can shift the peak in the thermal-radiation spectrum so that the intensities of various types of X-rays can be adjusted to damage certain types of materials or to penetrate certain depths before deposit- ing their energy’. Pay, ‘New Effort Aimed at X-Ray Protection’. 135. Scientists consider the earth’s exo-atmosphere to be from 300 and 600 miles above the surface with an upper limit of 6000 miles. By contrast, the endo- atmosphere begins 600 miles above the surface of the earth. UK nuclear scientists considered the part of the endo-atmosphere most likely for ABM nuclear interception to be around 43 miles. 136. TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(67) 2nd Meeting Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 3 April 1967. 137. A Soviet first-strike with little or no warning. 138. The UK also took seriously the need to vary the ‘loft’ of the Polaris missiles in- flight. This varied the flight time of the missiles so they could be launched in sequence but arrive nearly simultaneously. However, this would have brought many re-entry vehicles physically close together in the ‘intercept zone’ and many more would have been disabled by a single ABM detonation. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 139. TNA, CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/ PENAIDS, 23 July 1970. 140. Ibid. 141. TNA, DEFE 13/547, F. L. Lawrence Wilson to Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 6 December 1967. 142. TNA, DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)152/68 Polaris Improvements William Cook to Secretary of State, 9 April 1968. 143. Ibid. 144. TNA, DEFE 13/548, C. M. Rose Future Nuclear Policy, 15 February 1969. 145. TNA, DEFE 19/190, W. R. Cook to CPE Mini-Poseidon, 12 February 1968. 146. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 147. This group also looked at a variety of nuclear effects and tried to anticipate a counter to the likely successor systems to the Galosh ABM. Their work took into account previous studies on penetration aids and decoys, which did not extend to consideration of highly classified exo-atmospheric effects of radiation on nuclear warheads. Before Blue Streak was cancelled, in 1960, there had been a number of studies conducted at the Royal Ordnance Factories at Malvern and Farnborough, stretching as far back as 1954. Early solutions were proposed by Marconi and English Electric in 1956, but detailed engineering reviews were not done until those at British Aerospace at Filton, near Bristol, and English Electric between 1956 and 1958, when work was halted on the basis of a report from Dr Penley in 1962. This led to the cancellation of the building of a test vehicle by BAE, as well as the discrimination radar designed at Malvern for use on the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR). By this time, some of the major problems associated with ABM systems, such as insufficient radar performance, inadequate computing power and wider issues associated with atmospheric and re-entry phenomenology, had been recognised. This situation led directly to joint work conducted on a tripartite basis between the US, the UK and Australia in the Gaslight, Dazzle and Sparta programs along with the proposed Crusade observa- tion based on Black Knight and Redstone flights at Woomera throughout the 1960s. The observance of these flight trials fed directly into US research through the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Panel (TTCP) – which did not extend into Notes 277

the nuclear field – and contributed to their thinking of a terminal defence layer through interceptor missiles such as Sprint and Loads for point defence. Confidential correspondence, October 2002, 29 December 2007. See also Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 224. 148. TNA, DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)152/68 Polaris Improvements William Cook to Secretary of State, 9 April 1968. 149. TNA, DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)108/68, Polaris Improvement Study William Cook to I.P. Bancroft, 6 March 1968. 150. Ibid. 151. The report was described by Solly Zuckerman disparagingly as a ‘white-washing report’ as it came down in favour of a Polaris improvement programme. TNA, PREM 13/2493, Sir Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister Atomic Weapons Establishments (PN(68)9, after 6 December 1967. It has been suggested that the formation of the Kings Norton Committee was purposefully recommended by Zuckerman as a delaying tactic and as an attempt to cut AWRE down to size so that it could not undertake the proposed Polaris improvement programme. The majority report that was issued did not, however, reflect Zuckerman’s views. The minority report, issued by Lord Rothschild, was more in line with his opinions. Confidential correspondence, 28 July 2006. 152. TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(67)8, 15 December 1967. 153. TNA, CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968. 154. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Denis Greenhill to Private Secretary, 19 February 1969. 155. The £4m per annum that was keeping AWRE in the nuclear field was making for discord between the government and the scientific community, leading one official to ponder the extent to which ‘this is needed to impress the Americans, rather than simply to keep our AWRE scientists happy’. TNA, DEFE 13/770, To S of S from A. R. M. Jaffray, 28 April 1970. 156. HC Debs, 748, Oral Answers, 13 June 1967, Coll. 299. Quoted in Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, p. 192. See also Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–1970, p. 54. 157. Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, pp. 191–95. 158. Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb, pp. 71–83. 159. TNA, DEFE 13/547, F. L. Lawrence Wilson to Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 6 December 1967. 160. Kings Norton was taken together with the earlier Macklen Report, as the find- ings of Kings Norton depended on the reaction to Victor Macklen’s team’s study, who had worked within a Top Secret plus compartment with named access only. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 161. TNA, CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968. See also TNA, DEFE 19/98, Polaris Improvement Study and Report on Atomic Weapons Establishments CGWL, 29 May 1968. This hold-up by the Polaris Improvement Study Group meant there was ‘a long delay before the U.S. would agree to talk on engineering feasibility as it related to their missile system designs’. TNA, DEFE 13/548, (L.1/20/5/68) Letter by Anthony Wedgwood Benn, 20 May 1968. 162. Fearing that this would lead to a huge open ended commitment Solly Zuckerman believed ‘[t]he future of AWRE is a test case for the whole of this exercise. If we 278 Notes

fail to curtail its present ambitions we may fail all along the line’. TNA, PREM 13/2493, SZ/0344, 19 December 1968. 163. The idea of a ‘sock’ was an approach AWRE disliked from the beginning, as it placed limits in the hardening performance and could not fill the requirements of the systems upgrade planned by the MoD and AWRE, considerations under- lined by Denis Fakley’s report from the Macklen Committee. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 164. Depending on the yield and composition of the nuclear warhead. 165. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. What they knew of the effects of other kinds of irradiation and of the general effects of EMP is less clear, although research into this area was ongoing and had led to a number of advanced studies (many of which date from the time of Blue Streak). Later tests include the US led Operation Sailor Hat in 1967 and Operation Loxwood in 1969. TNA, ES 4/983, Operation SAILOR HAT: preliminary report on the EMP and VLF measurements made by British project 6.1 team on event D, 1967 and TNA, ES 5/371, Operation LOXWOOD: EMP measurements, 1969. Both of these files remain classified under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. 166. Confidential correspondence, 28 July 2006. 167. Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Chevaline: The Hidden Nuclear Programme’, p. 131. 168. TNA, CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968. 169. Ibid. 170. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 171. Flight trials were an expensive but necessary method of proving the characteristics of the Polaris front-end as it re-entered the atmosphere. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 172. TNA, CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968. 173. Ibid. 174. Lord Rothschild, who published a minority report, dissented in this conclusion. 175. TNA, CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968. 176. Ibid. 177. This statement to Harold Wilson followed discussions in Washington concerning the American ABM system Sentinel (a derivative of the Nike-Zeus programme). TNA, PREM 13/2493, Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister Sentinel Anti-Missile System, 21 October 1968. 178. Ibid. 179. TNA, CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/ PENAIDS, 23 July 1970. 180. For discussions regarding strategic arms limitation talks see Chapter 2. 181. TNA, PREM 13/3053, Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 8 July 1969. 182. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), ACSA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 12 February 1969. 183. Ibid. Notes 279

184. TNA. However, AWRE could not design a Re-entry Vehicle small enough for the concept, and it was thought anyway to be economically unviable. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 185. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), AC SA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 12 February 1969. 186. TNA, PREM 13/3053, Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 8 July 1969. 187. TNA, PREM 13/3053, Note for the Record, 7August 1969. 188. This was part of an overall budgetary ceiling of £2 billion for the defence budget as a whole. United Kingdom Parliament website, www.parliament.the- stationery- office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13804.htm, accessed 11 November 2002. 189. TNA, CAB 168/277, SZ to Prime Minister, undated January 1970. 190. TNA, PREM 13/3053, Tony [Benn] to Harold Wilson, 5 February 1970. 191. TNA, PREM 13/3053, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 6 February 1970. 192. TNA, PREM 13/3053, I.T. Manley Ministry of Technology, 19 February 1970. 193. Given the costs of £1 million (of which £0.6 million was estimated to be extra costs) just for a feasibility study, it does appear that the Polaris improvement programme was becoming a significant drain on resources. But, as previously noted, this was viewed by the government as necessary, since the US Antelope modifications had ‘serious shortcomings’. However, it was believed that ‘the design of decoy systems can be improved to an extent that, allied with some further hardening of the warhead, satisfactory penetration capability could be maintained without resulting in either a new weapons system or intoler- able costs’. TNA, DEFE 13/770, V. H. B. Macklen DCA(PN) to DUS(P), 6 May 1970. 194. TNA, CAB 168/277, S.Z. to Sir Burke Trend, March 1970. Zuckerman presumably meant AWRE and the MoD by ‘the boys’. 195. TNA, CAB 168/277, S.Z. to Sir Burke Trend, March 1970. 196. Still classified material includes Cabinet discussions that took place from July to November 1969. TNA, CAB 164/309, Defence Implications of UK entry into the EEC: Anglo–French Nuclear Collaboration, 1969 and retained under Section 27 of The Freedom of Information Act (2005). Section 27 indicates ‘release of this information could risk relations between the United Kingdom and any other state, international organisation or international court; the interests of the United Kingdom abroad; or the United Kingdoms ability to promote or protect its interests’. Private correspondence with the Cabinet Office, March 2007. 197. The Times, 27 June 1969. 198. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 95. 199. On French nuclear strategy see Ibid., pp. 19 and 93–123. 200. Wilson had met him as Prime Minister twice before in April 1965 and in January 1967. 201. TNA, PREM 13/2489, SZ to Prime Minister, 6 June 1967. 202. Ibid. 203. The other being Marcel Dassault. Ibid. 204. Also present were M. Robert, Director of the French nuclear weapons programme, M. Horowitz, head of the French reactor programme and Robert Galley, who had until recently was in charge of the CEA (and who would later become Minister of Defence). Ibid. 205. Ibid. 280 Notes

206. Moore, ‘British Nuclear Warhead Development 1958–66: How much American Help?’, pp. 213–14. See also Pyne, ‘Art or article? The Need for and Nature of the British Hydrogen Bomb, 1954–58’, pp. 562–85. 207. TNA, PREM 13/2489, SZ to Prime Minister, 6 June 1967. 208. Ibid. 209. Ibid. 210. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Secret Mr Halls Prime Minister, 8 June 1967. 211. TNA, PREM 13/2489, SZ to Prime Minister, 6 June 1967. 212. France’s SSBS S2 intermediate range ballistic missiles, armed with a single warhead, were eventually three years late into service, and were not operational until 1971. More information can be found in Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V: British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press/National Resources Defense Council, 1994), pp. 182–321. 213. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Secret Mr Halls Prime Minister, 8 June 1967. 214. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Sir P. Reilly to Foreign Office, 15 June 1967. 215. TNA, PREM 13/1731, Record of a Discussion held at the Grand Trianon, Versailles, on Monday, 19 June 1967 at 11 a.m., 19 June 1967. 216. Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 520. 217. Ibid., p. 522. Rambouillet was where Harold Macmillan had met de Gaulle in December 1962, less than a week before the Nassau conference and a month before the first French veto on Britain’s application to join the EEC. 218. TNA, PREM 13/1731, Record of a Discussion held at the Grand Trianon, Versailles, on Monday, 19 June 1967 at 4 p.m., 19 June 1967. 219. Wilson, The Labour Government, p. 523. Wilson also told de Gaulle that once the Polaris missiles had been delivered the UK would not longer be dependent on the Americans for their supply. TNA, PREM 13/1731, Record of a Discussion held at the Grand Trianon, Versailles, on Monday, 19 June 1967 at 4 p.m., 19 June 1967. 220. Wilson also suggested challenging the Americans in the European market for the U-235 used in civil reactors. TNA, PREM 13/1731, Record of a Discussion held at the Grand Trianon, Versailles, on Monday, 19 June 1967 at 4 p.m., 19 June 1967. 221. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Note for the Record, 14 September 1967. 222. Billaud, ‘Comment la France a fait sa bombe H’. 223. ‘Boosting’ is a method of significantly increasing the yield from fission designs using small amounts of fusion fuel. Moore, ‘How much American help?’, pp. 209–11. 224. In Britain this story was broken by Susannah Herbert, ‘British mole “led French to bomb”’, The Daily Telegraph, 28 November 1996. Herbert took much of her story from Billaud’s article in Le Recherche. 225. This view is based on a number of private conversations with the author. 226. At the first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, in September 1966, Wilson had suggested this post should go to Sir Solly Zuckerman. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 4 December 1967. 227. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 14 March 1968. 228. Ibid. 229. Ibid. 230. Private correspondence with the Cabinet Office, March 2007. 231. DNSA, National Security Studies Memorandum 47, 21 April 1969. Notes 281

232. DNSA, National Security Memorandum 47, 21 April 1969. 233. DNSA, Memorandum of Conversation Invitation to President Pompidou to Visit the United States, 27 June 1969. 234. Ibid. 235. Ibid. 236. Ibid. 237. These files are contained in TNA, FCO 41/571, Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation in Defence Field, 1969, TNA, FCO 41/572, Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation in Defence Field, 1969, TNA, FCO 41/573, Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation in Defence Field, 1969. 238. Ludlow, Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge: The European Community, 1963–1969, pp. 166–73, 174–98; Pine, ‘Application on the Table: The Second British Application to the European Communities, 1967–70’, pp. 240–6. Quoted in Helen Parr, ‘Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration and Britain’s Policy towards Europe, 1970–73’, Paper for the European Liaison Group of Historians, ‘Beyond the Customs Union: the European Community’s quest for Completion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969–1975’, University of Groningen, 27–29 October 2005, pp. 5–6. The author is grateful to Dr Parr for providing a copy of her article. 239. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Stewart to Washington Nuclear Defence Cooperation with France, 14 August 1969. 240. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Valerie Hartles to D. H. Andrews Nuclear Defence Co-operation with France, 15 August 1969. 241. TNA, PREM 16/885, The Mildenhall Agreement, 11 July 1970. The agreement is not available in contemporary records however and the full text was only released as part of the New Year release of files for 1976 on 1 January 2007. It closely resembles a communiqué from Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Stewart to Washington N.I.P.T., 14 August 1969. 242. TNA, PREM 16/885, The Mildenhall Agreement, 11 July 1970. 243. A journalist for The Financial Times, Freddie Fisher, was also digging around this issue and to put him off the scent it was suggested to give him ‘negative guidance’ (i.e. disinformation) regarding it. This, from Fisher’s point of view, would be a rebuttal article to a speculative piece by Fred Lewis also in The Financial Times. As this proposal wound its way through members of the civil service, and eventually to Wilson himself, the policy changed to one of ‘posi- tive guidance’ albeit unattributed. The Financial Times, 11 November 1969, TNA, PREM 13/2489, W. A. Nield to Sir Burke Trend, 13 November 1969, TNA, PREM 13/2489, EY to Prime Minister, 14 November 1969. 244. Alternatively, this might indicate the need to rebuild Anglo–American relations with France. More background can be found in Stoddart, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Britain’s Policy Towards France, 1960–1974’, pp. 719–44. 245. This could include operational cooperation on tactical and strategic doctrine, to bring them more into line with NATO thinking, as well as technical cooperation on warhead and missile technology. All the while any bilateral or trilateral cooperation would have to take into account the undoubted objections of West Germany. TNA, PREM 13/2489, Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration in the Defence Field Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, October 1969. 246. DNSA, NSSM 47 Military Relations with France, 20 October 1969. 247. Ibid. 282 Notes

248. TNA DEFE 19/180, J. A. Thompson to Mr Wilberforce, 9 October 1975. It took until May 1976 for Wilson’s second government to get a more complete picture of this support from the US government. So secret were the negotiations with the French, that only a few people in the Nixon Administration knew about it (perhaps as few as five) and even the ‘inner circle’ did not have the complete picture. TNA DEFE 19/180, J. A. Thompson to H of C, 12 May 1976. 249. TNA, DEFE 13/770, I. T. Manley to A. R. M. Jaffray, 2 June 1970. 250. For further information see Stoddart, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Britain’s Policy Towards France’, pp. 719–44. 251. Admiral Rickover, US Chief of Naval Operations, would, however, later claim that the British Polaris boats could be vulnerable due to their higher cruising speeds, which generated increased noise from the propeller screws. TNA, CAB 168/277, Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 4 January 1971. See also Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 175–6. 252. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Draft Polaris: Exercise National Right of Withdrawal, Undated, but likely early 1970. 253. In 1981 Victor Macklen, a former Assistant Chief Scientific Advisor Nuclear (ACSA(N)), recorded that while there had been a clear operational need to improve Polaris the issue was obscured by Solly Zuckerman and undermined US confidence in UK intentions leading to a great deal of political uncertainty. Quoted by Panton, ‘Politics and Strategic Background’, Conference at RAES, October 2004. 254. It does not appear that Lord Rothchild’s minority report had any discernable effect.

6 ABM Systems and Arms Control, 1966–1970

1. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Draft Brief for Prime Minister Anti Ballistic Missile Deployment, undated 1964–66. 2. Ibid. 3. TNA, DEFE 68/21, A. W. G. Le Hardy to A. Charmier, Defence Policy and Planning Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 February 1970. 4. Walker, ‘British Nuclear Weapons and the SALT Negotiations 1969–1973’. 5. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 204–10. 6. Private correspondence with Frank Panton, 9 March 2005. 7. TNA, FO 371/187536, Dean to Rennie, 23 December 1966, TNA, FCO 10/174, Dean to Rennie, 11 January 1967. Quoted in Jeremy Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 138. 8. Quoted in Time magazine, 21 June 2005. 9. Healey, The Time of My Life, pp. 312–13. This claim, however, conflicts with official government documents which show prior diplomatic consultation. Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, p. 142. 10. In his memoirs, Harold Wilson painted a different picture. Somewhat contradict- ing declassified government documents, Wilson stated, ‘Though we were not directly involved, our nuclear expertise and international experience had been of some value to the American negotiations, not least in helping resolve the anxie- ties of non-nuclear European allies who feared, as we did not, the consequences of a deal between the United States and Soviet Union.’ Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–1970, p. 689. Notes 283

11. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Annex A to COS 1702/11/8/67 Polaris Improvement Programme – Contribution B to Paper for DOP(O) Committee, 11 August 1967. 12. Illustratively, George Brown’s biographer recounts an anecdote in which Wilson ‘liked to show off a favourite party trick, producing a zippo lighter bearing a replica of the Seal of the United States. ‘A present from President Johnson’, he would say, flicking it into flame to light his pipe, and adding with a grin, ‘It’s fuelled with napalm.’ Paterson, Tired and Emotional, p. 224. For British policy towards America over Vietnam, see also Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 230–1 and Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx, pp. 221–9. 13. On nuclear arms control until SALT, see Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon. 14. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), AC SA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 12 February 1969. 15. TNA, DEFE 68/21, V. H. B. Macklen to ACSA (SN) to P.S. to Secretary of State, US Public Statements on ABMs and Improvements to Offensive Systems, 9 July 1968. 16. For the views of the Chief Scientific Advisor to the government on ABMs see Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, p. 393 and TNA, DEFE 19/83, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966 and TNA, DEFE 19/83, DP.16/166(A)(Draft) 8 March 1966 for the opinions of the UK Chiefs of Staff. 17. An endo-atmospheric or terminal defence system was a lower atmospheric interception system such as the American Sprint and later Patriot defensive missiles. 18. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Attachment to VHBM/489/68 dated 9 July 1968. Precis of U.S. Official Statements on ABM’S and Improvements to Offensive Missile Systems, 9 July 1968. It is unclear from the evidence so far released what effect such defensive measures would have on the population they were meant to be defending through nuclear fall-out but significant collateral damage would have occurred at altitudes of less than 70km. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 19. BMEWS and MIDAS, coupled with the Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar net- works in the Northern US and Canada, would, it was hoped, give the United States around half an hour to launch a retaliatory response. Bartlett, The Long Retreat, pp. 151–3. 20. An Electro Magnetic Pulse is part of the effect of a nuclear detonation follow- ing on from the release of Gamma Rays in the form of photons. These photons produce high-energy free electrons that, through a process known as Compton’s Scattering, become trapped in the earth’s magnetic field between approximately 20–40 km. This results in the process known as an Electro Magnetic Pulse; this pulse can spread very quickly to an area the size of a continent and produce destructive ground effects on electrical systems. For further information of EMP and their relation to nuclear weapons, see the Federation of American Scientists (FAS.org), EMP Page, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/emp.htm, accessed on 11 July 2004. 21. The exo-atmosphere is considered by scientists to be between 300–600 miles above the surface of the earth with an upper limit of 6000 miles. The endo- atmosphere falls within the 600 miles above the earth’s surface. British nuclear scientists considered the part of the endo-atmosphere most likely to be used for ABM nuclear interception to be around 43 miles. 22. Up to 300 NIKE missile systems were deployed at various times around large American cities and military installations up until 1967. Conventionally armed 284 Notes

Nike Ajax batteries were deployed from 1953 until 1964, when they were replaced by the nuclear capable Nike Hercules. 23. FAS.org, SALT 1 Page, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/intro.htm, accessed on 24 June 2002. Similar arguments have been made regarding 21st century ballistic missile defence and the threat from ‘rogue states’. See, for example, Gustav Lindstrom, ‘Missile Defence in Europe: The Political and Security Dimensions’, ISS Policy Brief EU Institute for Security Studies, No. 1 (March 2008), http://www. iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/policyBrief_001.pdf, accessed on 18 April 2011. 24. John Finney, ‘A Historical Perspective’, in Stützle, Jasani and Cohen (eds), The ABM Treaty, pp. 29–44. 25. York, Race to Oblivion, pp. 195–212. 26. Spinardi, ‘The Rise and Fall of Safeguard: Anti-ballistic Missile Technology and the Nixon Administration’, pp. 313–34. 27. Finney, ‘A Historical Perspective’, pp. 35–41. 28. The Times, 8 February 1967. See also, for examples, the recollections of Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, Dorothy Fosdick (ed.), Henry M. Jackson and World Affairs: Selected Speeches, 1953–1983, (Washington DC: University of Washington Press, 1990). 29. The Times, 4 February 1967. 30. The Times, 26 April 1967. 31. See, for example, Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo–American Relations in the Cold War and After, pp. 62–88 and Laquer, Europe in Our Time: A History 1945–1992, pp. 362–9. 32. Middeke, ‘Anglo–American Nuclear Weapons Co-operation after the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence’, pp. 69–96. 33. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 278–358 and Ibid. 34. TNA, PREM 13/2083, Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr Rusk, United States Secretary of State at 10 a.m. on 10.6.66 at 10, Downing Street (Extract), 10 June 1966. Ziegler, Wilson, pp. 329–32. 35. Greenwood, Budgeting for Defence, Young, The Labour Governments 1964–70 Volume 2 International Policy, pp. 31–61 and 115–41. 36. Zuckerman went on to say, ‘If you can see a way to protect yourselves against nuclear missiles, however imperfect and expensive it is, you will be prepared to go all the way to financial ruin to achieve it. The real argument against ABMs is that they will promote an increase in offensive missiles and so make arms control and disarmament more difficult to achieve than at present.’ TNA, DEFE 19/83, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966. 37. Twigge and Schrafstetter, Avoiding Armageddon, pp. 163–201. 38. The Times, 19 September 1967 39. TNA, DEFE 13/544, Nuclear Policy Paper, Polaris Improvement Programme – Contribution B, Ministry of Defence Contribution, 12 September 1967. Quoted by Catherine Haddon, ‘British Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, 1945–75’, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen Mary, University of London (2008), Chapter 4. 40. The Americans gave help with early thoughts on improvements such as the use of ‘lofting’ which was used to increase the range of the missile in flight, how to reorient the re-entry vehicle so that it faced the defence sensors, and providing engineering studies for which the UK paid. The UK also received briefs on the US ABM system through Sub-Group F of the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Panel (TCCP) before they decided to deploy Spartan and Sprint. It has been suggested Notes 285

to the author that ‘[o]n the day of the announcement [of Safeguard] the US were briefing us on the missiles and radar designs and the detailed notes we made were significant inputs to the UK studies in 1967–8 and incorporated into the various reports’. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 41. TNA, DEFE 13/544, Annex B to COS 1745/30/8/67, ‘Nuclear Policy Paper, Polaris Improvement Programme – Contribution B’, Ministry of Defence Contribution, 12 September 1967. Quoted by Haddon, ‘British intelligence assessments’, Chapter 4. 42. Confidential correspondence, 9 March 2005. 43. TNA, CAB 168/277, SALT: First Report of the Working Party, July 1969. Partly due to the difficulties experienced with past nuclear arms control measures, the United States and Soviet Union had both responded to widespread international and domestic pressure by committing themselves to bilateral negotiations. TNA, CAB 168/277, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Certain Missions, 13 November 1969. 44. TNA, CAB 168/277, A. R. M. Jaffray, 7 November 1969. 45. TNA, CAB 168/277, Michael Stewart to Prime Minister, 15 January 1970. 46. TNA, CAB 168/277, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 20 January 1970. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. TNA, CAB 168/277, R. Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman, 6 April 1970. See also Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 483–93. 50. TNA, DEFE 68/21, Attachment to VHBM/489/68 dated 9 July, 1968. Precis of U.S. Official Statements on ABM’S and Improvements to Offensive Missile Systems, 9 July 1968. 51. Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 64. 52. Press had moved on from an equivalent post in the Ministry of Defence to rejoin Solly Zuckerman at the Cabinet Office in 1968. 53. TNA, CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/ PENAIDS, 23 July 1970. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. The missiles could only be fired at 15-second intervals. TNA, CAB 168/27, EF/ D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970. 57. The analysis of the performance capabilities of the radars was done in the UK in 1967/8, but the view of the system capability was refined over a number of years. The outstanding issue was the capability of handing over from one radar to another when they operated on different wavelengths. Although each could generate a ‘Threat Object Map’ (TOM), this did not guarantee that the offence had not taken counter-measures to ensure that the pattern did not carry over. UK studies always assumed the Soviets had solved the problem. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 58. TNA, CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/ PENAIDS, 23 July 1970. 59. This is meant in terms of only one submarine being available in a worst-case sce- nario of a ‘bolt from the blue’ through a Soviet pre-emptive strike. At least two, or up to three quarters, of the complement of the four submarines could be made available in a day or two of a crisis developing. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 286 Notes

60. The SSBNs were considered to be almost undetectable on patrol, although vulnerable to the ASW capabilities of the Soviet Northern Fleet and to pre-emptive action against the submarine’s basing facilities at Faslane and Coulport. TNA, CAB 168/277, Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 4 January 1971. 61. Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 23 October 2002. 62. Baylis, ‘British Nuclear Doctrine: The “Moscow Criterion” and the Polaris Improvement Programme’, pp. 53–65. 63. Jones, ‘Chevaline Technical Programme 1966–1976’, pp. 184. 64. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 55. 65. The British government were under few illusions about the difficulty of this task. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), AC SA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 12 February 1969. 66. The Soviets too had been disparaging of what they clearly viewed as British inter- ference in Superpower negotiations. Of heated exchanges during a visit by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, in February 1967, Wilson said, ‘Kosygin … had been critical of our view that there should be direct talks before either major power embarked on a major programme of development of ABMs.’ Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 380–1 and 689.

7 NATO and Flexible Response, 1966–1970

1. Salmon and Kaldor, ‘Principles for the Use of the Military in Support of Law Enforcement Operations’, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), The Centre for Global Governance Web Page, http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/ global/2securitypub.htm, accessed on 2 November 2007. 2. Supporting evidence is to be found in Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962–1968, pp. 138–54. 3. NATO Documents Page, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c671213b.htm, accessed on 15 May 2007. 4. For more information see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Review, Issue 1 (spring 2007), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue1/english/history.html, accessed on 7 July 2011. 5. TNA, PREM 13/2264, Paris to Foreign Office, 9 June 1966. 6. TNA, PREM 13/2264, Bonn to Foreign Office, 29 June 1966. 7. TNA, PREM 13/2264, United Kingdom Delegation to NATO Paris to Foreign Office, 28 June 1966. 8. TNA, DEFE 13/635, R. J. Andrew (Head of D.S. 12) to D.U.S.(Pol), 30 September 1966. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to DUS(Pol), 30 September 1966. 13. Ibid. 14. TNA, DEFE 13/635, G. Leitch to C.D.S. (O), 3 October 1966. 15. TNA, DEFE 13/635, G. Leitch D.U.S. (Pol.) to Secretary of State, 5 October 1966. 16. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to D.U.S. (Pol), 7 October 1966. 17. TNA, DEFE 13/635, R. J. Andrew Head of D.S. 12 to D.P.S. (Lt. Col. Maco), 12 October 1966. Notes 287

18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. On ACE see Maloney, ‘Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO’s ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War’, pp. 585–613. 21. TNA, DEFE 13/635, R. J. Andrew Head of D.S. 12 to D.P.S. (Lt. Col. Maco), 12 October 1966. 22. TNA, DEFE 13/635, G. Leitch D.U.S.(Pol.) to C.D.S., 25 October 1966. 23. Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967, p. 156. 24. This could also be equally considered to be a domestic political issue. 25. CAB 164/713, P. ROGERS to Frank Cooper Deployment of Polaris Submarines, 11 November 1966. 26. Ibid. 27. The Times, 17 February 1966. 28. Ibid. 29. The Times, 23 February 1967. 30. The Times, 10 May 1967. 31. Heuser, Britain, NATO, France and the FRG, p. 52 32. Bartlett, The Long Retreat, pp. 220–1 and 229 and The Times, 13 December 1967. 33. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 6 February 1968. 34. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 6 February 1968. 35. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 6 February 1968. This reference to the TSR 2 and F-111 brought a sharp rebuke from the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Grandy, who felt Healey was misrepresenting their strategic role as laid out in the Operational Requirement of 1961. TNA, DEFE 13/635, CAS to Secretary of State, 7 February 1968. 36. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 6 February 1968. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS CNS, 9 February 1968. 40. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Michael to Varyl, 21 February 1968. 41. TNA, DEFE 13/635, R. M. Hastie-Smith to MA/CDS, 23 February 1968. 42. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Memorandum for the Record, 16 February 1968. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 28 February 1968. 47. TNA, DEFE 13/635, A. Earle to CDS, 29 February 1968. 48. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Chief of Defence Staff to Secretary of State, 4 March 1968. 49. Ibid. 50. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Bernhard Burrows to The Viscount Hood, 4 March 1968. 51. Ibid. 52. Smith, ‘Power Transferred? Britain, the United States, and the Gulf, 1956–71’, pp. 1–23. 53. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Bernhard Burrows to The Viscount Hood, 4 March 1968. 54. Ibid. 55. Between 1966 and 1968 the DGI was Air Chief Marshall Sir Alfred Earle who was succeeded by Air Marshal Harold Maguire (1968–1972). It is unclear which of these was in post at the time. 56. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Alain Enthoven to Honorable Denis Healey, 4 March 1968. 288 Notes

57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Bernhard Burrows to The Viscount Hood, 4 March 1968. 60. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Denis Fakely to Alain Enthoven, 13 March 1968. 61. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DCA(RS) to PS/S of S, 27 March 1968. It is not known why the US were not sharing these intelligence assessments at this time. 62. TNA, DEFE 13/635, I.J. Shaw to DCA(RS), 20 March 1968. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. TNA, DEFE 13/635, W. E. Harford to PS/S of S, 26 March 1968. 67. It was also true that Warsaw Pact planners felt the same about NATO manoeuvres, particularly the Able Archer exercise conducted in 1983. See, for example, Ben Fischer, ‘A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare’, CIA Website, https:// www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books- and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm, accessed on 21 April 2011. 68. TNA, DEFE 13/635, L. J. Sabatini Head of DS 12 to PS/Secretary of State, 26 March 1968. 69. Ibid. 70. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to DCA(RS), 29 March 1968. 71. Ibid. 72. Subsequently, Edward Tomkins from the Washington Embassy also met with Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, an opponent of Symington’s and a consistent advocate of greater defence spending, who suggested that at least part of Symington’s reasoning was to ‘scare the Europeans into doing more for their own defence’. TNA, DEFE 13/635, E. E. Tomkins to The Viscount Hood, 15 May 1968. 73. Ibid. 74. Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition, pp. 783–884. 75. TNA, DEFE 13/635, E. E. Tomkins to The Viscount Hood, 15 May 1968. 76. Ibid. 77. TNA, DEFE 13/635, E. J. F. Barnes to E. E. Tomkins, 17 May 1968. 78. These were to be prepared by June as background material for ministerial discussion. TNA, DEFE 13/635, F. Cooper to A.P.S. to S. of S., 17 May 1968. 79. Named after the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel. For specific information on the ‘Harmel Exercise see, Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, in particular pp. 320–85. 80. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Mutual East/West Force Reductions, 17 June 1968. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid. 86. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Joint Note by Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence Officials, 19 June 1968. 87. Ibid. 88. This train of thought was also evident in US thinking. See Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 57. 89. Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955–1991, pp. 294–301. Notes 289

90. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Joint Note by Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence Officials, 19 June 1968. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. TNA, DEFE 13/635, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term, 4 July 1968. 95. There were also expressed doubts about France’s tous azimuts nuclear strategy (‘defence in all directions’), by which French national strategy looked at all sides as potential adversaries, even though military planning in practise continued to regard the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact as the likely enemy. Ibid. See also Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 62. 96. It was also noted that Albania had almost completely severed its ties with Russia, although it remained a member of the Warsaw Pact. 97. TNA, DEFE 13/635, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term Annex A to COS 43/48, 4 July 1968. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. This last part was to be proved accurate, with the deployment of the SS-20 in the mid-1970s. 101. TNA, DEFE 13/635, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term Annex A to COS 43/48, 4 July 1968. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. This concept was also in evidence in US strategic thinking, although there were considerable doubts expressed regarding the potential for ‘escalation control’. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy”’, p. 45 and 58–60. 108. TNA, DEFE 13/635, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term Annex A to COS 43/48, 4 July 1968. 109. Ibid. 110. Mastny, ‘Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?’, pp. 149–77. 111. TNA, DEFE 13/635, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term Annex A to COS 43/48, 4 July 1968. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State, 5 July 1968. 116. Both inter-service rivalry and inter-operability between the various component pieces of NATO’s military machinery remain difficult issues to resolve. 117. These operational factors included submarine attack, ship-borne helicopter attack, guided-weapons attack, strike-aircraft attack, maritime aircraft armed with Martel, attack in the maritime theatres, and fighter versus ground attack, as well as the nature of the would-be tank battle in Central Europe. TNA, DEFE 13/635, E. Broadbent to Secretary of State, 22 July 1968. 118. William Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the SIOP, and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1974’, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing 290 Notes

Book No. 173, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/index.htm, accessed on 23 November 2005. 119. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy”’, p. 48, f. 31. 120. Ibid., p. 34. 121. TNA, AIR 2/13383, DD Ops(B)(RAF) to The UK Member JSTPS Omaha Coordination of Strike Plans for General War – Southern Russia, undated 1969 and TNA, PREM 13/212, Sir E. Shuckburgh Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 79 of 27 March, 27 March 1965. 122. Like SACLANT, SACEUR was always an American officer with a European (and usually British) deputy. 123. However, neither SHAPE nor SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) was privy to information concerning the patrol lanes of UK Polaris. Confidential correspondence, 19 Feb. 2008. 124. Charles, ‘Who Controls NATO’s Nuclear Weapons?’ pp. 45–8. 125. Perhaps because the PPGs were concerned only with tactical nuclear weapons. 126. Mastny, ‘Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?’ p. 151. 127. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Abridged with an introduction and notes by Beatrice Heuser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 65–8. 128. Mastny, ‘Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?’ p. 168. 129. Ibid. 130. Digital National Security Archives (DNSA), NATO Policy Review-NSSM 6 [Includes Report Entitled NSC Review U.S. Policy toward NATO Secret, Memorandum], 17 March 1969. 131. Ibid. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. Ibid. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid. 137. TNA, FCO 46/281, DP 34/68(C)(Preliminary Draft), 4 November 1968. 138. Ibid. 139. Ibid. 140. TNA, FCO 46/281, Vulcan Aircraft for NATO and SEATO Note by the Secretary, 12 February 1969. 141. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Defence Org Secret Note for the Record, 6 May 1970. 142. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Alistair Jaffray to P.L. Gregson, 5 May 1970. 143. TNA, PREM 13/2083, Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr Rusk, United States Secretary of State at 10 a.m. on 10.6.66 at 10, Downing Street (Extract), 10 June 1966. 144. TNA, PREM 13/2083, Personal to the Prime Minister from the President, 14 June 1966. 145. TNA, PREM 13/2083, From Washington to Foreign Office Sir P. Dean, 15 June 1966. 146. TNA, PREM 13/2083, BMC Singapore to Commonwealth Office, 8 January 1968. 147. Even Cyprus had greeted the move quite warmly, despite increasing signs of neu- trality from the Greek Cypriots. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 22 May 1968. 148. Italy was also subject to these restrictions as part of the peace treaty signed after World War II. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 124. Notes 291

149. Mastny, ‘Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?’ pp. 149–77. 150. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 90.

8 Britain, America and Allied Tactical Nuclear Operations, 1966–1970

1. These commitments were demonstrated through six-monthly major exercises at least in CENTO area, where UK forces were regularly deployed to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. 2. NATO’s 4th TAF containing elements of the United States Air Force Europe as well as Canadian and West German forces, were headquartered in Ramstein Air Force Base and covered NATO’s southern region. 3. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DP 71/66(Revised Final) Chiefs of Staff Committee Defence Planning Staff NATO Strategy – Assessment for the Implications of Deploying Forces Outside Germany Report by the Defence Planning Staff, 22 November 1966. 4. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Appendix 1 to Annex A to DP 71/66 (Revised Final) Report by the Foreign Office, 22 November 1966. 5. Ibid. 6. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Annex A to DP 71/66 (Revised Final), 22 November 1966. 7. It was the considered view of the Foreign Office that Berlin could not be defended in the event of a determined attack by the Warsaw Pact. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Appendix 1 to Annex A to DP 71/66 (Revised Final) Report by the Foreign Office, 22 November 1966. 8. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Annex A to DP 71/66 (Revised Final), 22 November 1966. The Foreign Office did not believe this contingency to be likely. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Appendix 1 to Annex A to DP 71/66 (Revised Final) Report by the Foreign Office, 22 November 1966. 9. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Annex A to DP 71/66 (Revised Final), 22 November 1966. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Appendix 1 to Annex A to DP 71/66 (Revised Final) Report by the Foreign Office, 22 November 1966. 14. TNA, DEFE 13/635, K. C. Macdonald Head of D.S. 12 to APS/S of S, 3 July 1968. Furthermore, 1968/9 saw the re-emergence of Northern Ireland as a factor in British domestic politics. From this point, members of the British armed forces (almost exclusively the British Army) were routinely rotated for tours of duty in the province. This dramatically impinged on trained forces available for service in BAOR. For more information see, for example, Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland. 15. General Sir Hugh Beach, ‘Visions of the Nuclear battlefield’, Lecture to the Society of Army Historical Research, National Army Museum, 22 April 1998. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Heuser, Britain, NATO, France and the FRG, pp. 141–5. 20. Beach, ‘Visions of the Nuclear battlefield’. 292 Notes

21. Hugh Beach, ‘Visions of the Nuclear battlefield’. 22. TNA, DEFE 19/197, D.C.S.A.(P) to C.D.S., 26 July 1966. 23. This is clear from a later document. TNA, DEFE 68/81, Nuclear Artillery for BAOR, 22 March 1971. 24. TNA, DEFE 68/81, OR/P(66)7 Ministry of Defence Operational Requirements Committee Battlefield Nuclear Missile System Note by the Secretaries, 11 February 1966. 25. TNA, DEFE 68/81, CDS(OR) (thro A1) Lance, 24 August 1967. 26. TNA, DEFE 68/81, Lance – Procurement Programme, 29 November 1967. 27. Atomic Demolition Munitions. 28. TNA, DEFE 13/635, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term Annex A to COS 43/48, 4 July 1968 29. TNA, AIR 20/12080, DS9 to DUS(P)(Cooper), 27 September 1968. 30. TNA, AIR 2/13383, Strike Force Availability for SACEUR, 30 May 1968. 31. TNA, AIR 2/13383, MOD (AIR) to SACEUR, May 1969. 32. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship. 33. Desmond Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, in Ball and Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 57–83. 34. See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 35. Young, ‘No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)Understandings and the Use of the English Airbases’, pp. 1133–68. 36. Private correspondence with Roy Brocklebank and Robin Woolven, 14 January 2008. 37. The Celle air base was outside Hannover and was intended to complement the existing British base at Geilenkirchen in North West Germany. 38. TNA, AIR 2/13383, VCAS to Air Marshal Sir Denis Spotswood Commander-in- Chief Headquarters Royal Air Force Germany (Second Tactical Air Force), 21 June 1966. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. TNA, AIR 2/19130, D. F. Spotswood to Air Chief Marshal Sir John Grandy, 6 December 1968. 42. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955–1958, pp. 202–39 and Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964, pp. 258–60. 43. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, particularly pp. 34–66 and 178–277. 44. Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 57–83. 45. TNA, AIR 2/13383, DD Ops(B)(RAF) to The UK Member JSTPS Omaha Coordi- nation of Strike Plans for General War – Southern Russia, undated 1969. 46. See, for example, Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 70–1, Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, pp. 34–63 and Chapter 5. 47. TNA, AIR 2/19130, Relationship of AOC in C Strike Command to NATO, 6 November 1968. 48. Freedman, ‘British Nuclear Targeting’, Ball and Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 109–26. 49. TNA, DEFE 13/976, Mountbatten to Lemnitzer, 23 May 1963 quoted in Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 98–9. Notes 293

50. Parallel History Project Website, The Future Tasks of the Alliance: NATO’s Harmel Report, 1966/67 Web Page, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_Harmel. htm, accessed on 23 January 2007. 51. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Background Note for Number 10 Downing Street, Undated but likely to be early 1970. 52. Moore, ‘Where Her Majesty’s Weapons Were’, pp. 58–64. 53. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Background Note for Number 10 Downing Street, Undated but likely to be early 1970. 54. Ibid. 55. TNA, AIR 2/13383, Co-ordination of Strike and Reconnaissance Plans for General War, 18 December 1967. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 22 May 1968. 60. In the case of Malta this depended on whether or not Dom Mintoff was in office. 61. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 22 May 1968. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. See, for example, documents in the file TNA, FCO 51/300, Philosophy of the Libyan Revolution 1969–1973, 1973. 65. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 22 May 1968. 66. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Roger Allen to British Embassy Ankara, 21 May 1968. 67. TNA, DEFE 13/635, E. Broadbent to Secretary of State, 2 July 1968. 68. Ibid. 69. This was because the Turkish government had required the use of the hangar. However, the COS now felt that, with the decision to allocate increased military resources into the Mediterranean area, the Turkish government might be more amenable. This would be taken up by the Foreign Office. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Defence Policy Notes on meeting held by the Secretary of State for Defence in Room 6147, Ministry of Defence, on Wednesday 3 July 1968 at 11 a.m., 3 July 1968. 70. TNA, DEFE 13/635, Defence Policy Notes on meeting held by the Secretary of State for Defence in Room 6147, Ministry of Defence, on Wednesday 3 July 1968 at 11 a.m., 3 July 1968. 71. Ibid. 72. As far as Malta was concerned the last British battalion was scheduled to leave in 1971, and SACEUR was in favour of keeping an allied military presence there, as it could make up part of a reaction force along the Southern Flank and could be moved out to Aden if the situation demanded. 73. TNA, AIR 2/13383, DD Ops(B)(RAF) to The UK Member JSTPS Omaha Coordi- nation of Strike Plans for General War – Southern Russia, undated 1969. 74. TNA, AIR 2/13383, W.D. Robertson Air Commodore D of OPS(A Def & O)(RAF) to ACAS(Ops) Report on a Briefing held at HQ 2ATAF on 17 November 69 About SACEUR’s Revised Nuclear Strike Plans, 21 November 1969. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. With the exception of new chemical weapons facilities which were included in a revised target list. Ibid. 294 Notes

78. NATO MC 14/2(Revised)(Final Decision), § 17, quoted in Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 39. 79. TNA, AIR 2/13383, W.D. Robertson Air Commodore D of OPS(A Def & O)(RAF) to ACAS(Ops) Report on a Briefing held at HQ 2ATAF on 17 November 69 About SACEUR’s Revised Nuclear Strike Plans, 21 November 1969. 80. With the exception of one squadron based at Laarbruch there were no plans to disperse these aircraft. 81. TNA, AIR 2/13383, W.D. Robertson Air Commodore D of OPS(A Def & O)(RAF) to ACAS(Ops) Report on a Briefing held at HQ 2ATAF on 17 November 69 About SACEUR’s Revised Nuclear Strike Plans, 21 November 1969. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. The GSP also maintained UK political control of these nuclear capable aircraft, at least when they were grounded, but it was noted that once they had reached a certain failsafe point while airborne they could not be recalled. Ibid. 85. TNA, AIR 2/13383, J. G. Mathews Group Captain (Acting Director of Operations Strike) (RAF) to UK National Military Representative SHAPE, Revised SACEUR/ USCINCEUR Selective Release Procedure, 15 August 1969. 86. Ibid. 87. TNA, AIR 2/13383, Loose Minute K. Ritchley Group Captain A/D of Ops (A Def & O)(RAF) to DASS thro’ ACAS(Ops), 24 July 1969. 88. Ibid. 89. TNA, AIR 2/13383, J.G. Mathews Group Captain (Acting Director of Operations Strike) (RAF) to UK National Military Representative SHAPE, SACEUR/USCINCEUR Nuclear Weapon Release Procedures, 4 November 1969. 90. TNA, AIR 2/13383, W.D. Robertson Air Commodore D of OPS(A Def & O)(RAF) to ACAS(Ops) Report on a Briefing held at HQ 2ATAF on 17 November 69 About SACEUR’s Revised Nuclear Strike Plans, 21 November 1969. 91. Ibid. 92. Private correspondence with Richard Moore, 10 December 2007. 93. TNA, AIR 2/13383, MOD (Air) to SACEUR, Undated 1969. 94. Gunston and Donald, ‘Fleet Air Arm 1960–69’, p. 205. 95. Bartlett, The Long Retreat, pp. 205–11. 96. TNA, AIR 2/13383, Strike Force Availability for SACEUR, 30 May 1968. 97. TNA, AIR 2/13383, MOD (Air) to SACEUR, Undated 1969. 98. Ibid. 99. TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1969. 100. There were two other tactical devices mentioned, but these have been retained under Section 5.1 of the Public Records Act. TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1969. This minute was also copied to the other two remaining members of the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, while any further discussions on these matters would be kept secret. 101. TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1969. 102. Ibid. and private correspondence with Richard Moore, 10 December 2007. 103. TNA, DEFE 19/103, Zuckerman to Paymaster General, 15 June 1965. 104. TNA, AIR 2/13755, RN-Ikara – Requirement for the Nuclear Payload (Note by the Navy Department) The Nuclear Depth Bomb (WE 177A), undated 1964. Notes 295

105. TNA, AIR 2/18209, Draft RAF Nuclear Weapons for the 1970s D Air Plans, 16 July 1969. 106. TNA, AIR 20/12080, A/D of Ops(B&R) to D Air Plans, 21 November 1967. 107. TNA, AIR 20/12080, Clementi to Humphreys, 29 November 1967. 108. TNA, AIR 20/12080, Untitled document, 22 May 1968. 109. TNA, AIR 20/12080, Notes for a lecture by VCAS on current nuclear forces, 22 February 1968. The Australian built Ikara was housed on Leander class frigates. 110. TNA, AIR 2/18209, Draft submission for CAS for S of S, prepared by DS9, circulated by AUS(AS), 26 November 1968. The yield in a later document is given as 450 kt. TNA, AIR 2/18210, Humphreys to D Air Plans, 5 March 1970. WE-177B was a two-stage thermonuclear weapon that had a British primary called Katie, utilising American know-how under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, combined with a secondary developed from the US W-59 warhead (RE.179) codenamed Simon. The overall warhead was codenamed ZA297. WE-177A used only a primary codenamed PT176. 111. TNA, AIR 2/18209, Draft submission for CAS for S of S, prepared by DS9, circulated by AUS(AS), 26 November 1968. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid. 116. TNA, AIR 2/18209, CAS submission to S of S WE177A, 24 January 1969 and Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces: Their Origins, Roles and Deployment 1946–1969, pp. 546–9. 117. TNA, AIR 2/18209, S of S to CAS, 1 March 1969. 118. TNA, DEFE 19/125, Humphreys (DS9) to ACAS(Pol), 24 March 1969. 119. Ibid. 120. TNA, AIR 2/18210, DOR3 comments on WDC(NS).4/69, 14 November 1969. 121. TNA, AIR 20/12199 contains information related to the withdrawal of Red Beard from the Far East. For further information see, Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 99. 122. TNA, AIR 20/12080, DS9 amendments to a draft paper from DS12 British nuclear policy, 28 July 1967. 123. TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1969. 124. Ibid. 125. Laird ‘saw no difficulties’ in these arrangements. TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1969. 126. TNA, PREM 13/3126, MS to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 3 July 1967. 127. Ibid. 128. TNA, PREM 13/3126, John Graham to E. M. Youde, 22 July 1969. 129. TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Naval Airborne Nuclear Weapons, 1 June 1970. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. 132. TNA, PREM 13/3126, A. R. M. Jaffray to P. J. S. Moon, 1 June 1970. These new procedures had not been discussed outside of the Ministry of Defence but had been shown to the Cabinet Office. TNA, PREM 13/3126, P. J. S. Moon to Prime Minister, 3 June 1970. 296 Notes

133. Healey explained the reasons for this in a note that was attached to the original document but is omitted from the file in The National Archives. Healey also stated that these procedures had been agreed by the N.R.P.E.C., the Nuclear Release Procedures Executive Committee. This was an internal Ministry of Defence Committee, but very little is known about its composition or terms of reference. Ibid. and TNA, PREM 13/3126, Burke Trend to Prime Minister Naval Airborne Nuclear Weapons, 9 June 1970. The Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) is a military term for the person heading up an operation. 134. TNA, PREM 13/3126, Burke Trend to Prime Minister Naval Airborne Nuclear Weapons, 9 June 1970. 135. Due to government restrictions regarding C², it is not know at the time of writing whether they were in fact authorised in this form. TNA, PREM 13/3126, P. J. S. Moon to Prime Minister, 3 June 1970. 136. TNA, AIR 2/18210, Humphreys to D Air Plans, 5 March 1970. 137. Ibid. 138. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. 139. Ibid. 140. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister Annex B Draft Memorandum to SACLANT Assignment of Polaris Submarines, 3 August 1967. 141. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Background Note for Number 10 Downing Street, Undated but likely to be early 1970. 142. TNA, PREM 13/3126, DWH to Prime Minister Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1969. 143. TNA, PREM 13/3126, A. R. M. Jaffray to P. J. S. Moon, 1 June 1970 and TNA, PREM 13/3126, P. J. S. Moon to Prime Minister, 3 June 1970. 144. TNA, DEFE 68/81, Nuclear Artillery for BAOR, 5 June 1969. 145. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 54. 146. The Times, 28 October 1971.

Conclusion

1. TNA, DEFE 19/83, SZ/554/65, Solly Zuckerman to Paul Gore-Booth, 3 September 1965, TNA, DEFE 44/115, Galosh, Undated but likely to be spring 1965. 2. This view was, however, disputed by Sir Michael Quinlan who suggests, ‘It was already clear, well before he [Zuckerman] officially retired in 1971, that zero ABMs would not be negotiable.’ Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 15 August 2006. 3. Sir Michael Quinlan pointed out, ‘We were being kept closely informed by … both the regular and through US briefings of NATO, and bilateral discussions (in which I was involved) led by the State Department’s SALT team.’ Ibid. 4. Confidential correspondence, 28 July 2006. 5. TNA, CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968. 6. TNA, DEFE 13/547, F.L. Lawrence-Wilson to Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 6 December 1967. 7. TNA, DEFE 13/548, Denis Greenhill to Private Secretary, 19 February 1969. 8. TNA, CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968. Notes 297

9. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles an Autobiography, 1946–1988, pp. 390–99. 10. Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Chevaline: The Hidden Programme, 1967–1982’, pp. 124–55. 11. See, for example, Baker, Dry Ginger: The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael le Fanu, pp. 170–1 and Moore (ed.), The Impact of Polaris: The Origins of Britain’s Seaborne Deterrent. 12. TNA, DEFE 13/635, DWH to CDS, 22 May 1968. 13. TNA, PREM 13/3133, Background Note for Number 10 Downing Street, Undated but likely to be early 1970. 14. Ibid. 15. NATO’s 4th TAF containing elements of the United States Air Force Europe as well as Canadian and West German force, were headquartered in Ramstein Air Force Base and covered NATO’s southern region. 16. TNA, AIR 2/18209, Draft submission for CAS for S of S, prepared by DS9, circulated by AUS(AS), 26 November 1968. 17. ‘The Proceedings of the RAFHS seminar on RAF and Nuclear Weapons, 1960–1998’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Vol. 26 (2001), p. 15. 18. The concept of ‘a bolt from the blue’ can also be found in American strategic thinking of the period. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 46. 19. TNA, DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti- Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966. 20. TNA, DEFE 11/437, DWH to Prime Minister, 3 August 1967. 21. As Sir Michael Quinlan recounted, ‘the vulnerability concern related also to a perceived risk of ‘counter-battery’ fire – that is, strike by air- or ground-launched nuclear-headed missiles once the submarine’s position was known. Rather far- fetched, I always thought, but this was the sort of thing that snag-seekers worried about.’ Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 15 August 2006. 22. TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent, 13 August 1979. 23. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p. 389. 24. TNA, CAB 130/3, GEN 75/1 The Atomic Bomb Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 28 August 1945. Reproduced in Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 36–8. 25. Billaud, ‘Comment la France a fait sa bombe H’. 26. Bartlett, The Long Retreat, p. 230. 27. Heuser, Britain, NATO, France and the FRG, pp. 44–5. 28. Solly Zuckerman recounted a story in which one of McNamara’s Assistant Secretaries said to him ‘Don’t you see … First we need enough Minutemen to be sure that we destroy all those Russian cities. Then we need Polaris missiles to follow in order to tear up the foundations to a depth of ten feet, maybe helped by Skybolt … Then, when all Russia is silent, and when no air defences are left, we want waves of aircraft to drop enough bombs to tear the whole place up down to a depth of forty feet to prevent the Martians recolonising the country. And to hell with the fallout.’ Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality, pp. 46–7. 29. Christoph Bluth, ‘British-German Defence Relations, 1950–80: A Survey’, in Kaiser and Roper (eds), British-German Defence Co-operation, p. 9. 30. Duffield, ‘The Soviet Military Threat to Western Europe: US Estimates in the 1950s and 1960s’, pp. 208–27. 31. Duffield, ‘The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpreta- tion’, pp. 132–56. 298 Notes

32. ‘Morning Discussion Period’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Vol. 26 (2001), p. 14. There is also evidence for these doubts in American strategic thinking during the Nixon administration. They, too, saw a lack of a viable solution to the nuclear security dilemma. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy”’, pp. 61–2. 33. For a discussion of this issue, see The John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, “The United Kingdom” in Born, Bates and Hanggi (eds) Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 77–102. 34. The Times, 23 February 1966. 35. ‘Morning Discussion Period’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, p. 50. 36. Ibid. 37. Discussion of how ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’ affect international relations can be found in Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma. The importance of these twin ontological conditions at the high policy level, where they are more crucial, is discussed in Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century. 38. ‘Recollections of a Secretary of State for Defence’, Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society, Vol. 31 (2004), pp. 10–11. Bibliography

Primary sources (UK)

The National Archives, Kew UK: AB 49/17 AIR 2/13383 AIR 2/13755 AIR 2/18209 AIR 2/18210 AIR 2/19130 AIR 8/2204 AIR 20/12080 AIR 20/12199 CAB 21/5644 CAB 129/39 CAB 130/213 CAB 130/3 CAB 134/3120 CAB 134/3121 CAB 148/18 CAB 148/18/19 CAB 158/51 CAB 158/61 CAB 159/49 CAB 164/309 CAB 164/713 CAB 164/714 CAB 165/209 CAB 165/600 CAB 168/27 CAB 168/277 CAB 182/13 DEFE 5/143 DEFE 11/437 DEFE 11/471 DEFE 13/204 DEFE 13/326 DEFE 13/350 DEFE 13/544 DEFE 13/547 DEFE 13/548 DEFE 13/635 DEFE 13/752 DEFE 13/770 DEFE 13/976

299 300 Bibliography

DEFE 19/83 DEFE 19/91 DEFE 19/98 DEFE 19/103 DEFE 19/118 DEFE 19/125 DEFE 19/180 DEFE 19/190 DEFE 19/197 DEFE 25/216 DEFE 25/250 DEFE 25/335 DEFE 31/54 DEFE 44/115 DEFE 68/21 DEFE 68/81 ES 4/983 ES 5/371 ES 10/1046 FO 371/187536 FCO 10/174 FCO 41/571 FCO 41/572 FCO 41/573 FCO 46/281 FCO 51/300 PREM 11/4737 PREM 11/4738 PREM 11/5222 PREM 11/5223 PREM 11/5224 PREM 13/26 PREM 13/123 PREM 13/212 PREM 13/219 PREM 13/220 PREM 13/228 PREM 13/338 PREM 13/453 PREM 13/1042 PREM 13/1731 PREM 13/2083 PREM 13/2264 PREM 13/2489 PREM 13/2493 PREM 13/2571 PREM 13/3053 PREM 13/3126 PREM 13/3129 PREM 13/3133 PREM 13/3565 Bibliography 301

PREM 13/3566 PREM 15/1359 PREM 15/1360 PREM 16/885 T 225/927 WO 32/17085 WO 32/21248

Command documents

Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, Cmnd. 537 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1958). Bahamas Meetings: Text of Joint Communiqués, Cmnd. 1915 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1962). Polaris Sales Agreement, Cmnd. 1995 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963).

Other

Hansard, Fifth Series, Vol. LXV, 1914.

Newspapers

The Daily Telegraph – various dates The Financial Times – various dates The Guardian – various dates The Independent – various dates The Times – various dates

Periodicals

Time magazine – various dates

Primary sources (US)

Rowan, Henry, ‘Formulating Nuclear Doctrine’ in ‘U.S. Commission on the Organisation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy’, Report of the Commission Appendices, Vol. 4 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1975).

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313 314

Appendix 1 Continued

Weapon Deployed Warhead Estimated Yield Type Method of Delivery/Estimated Stockpile in March 1970

8’ Howitzer 1960–92 W-53 (US)* 0.5, 5, 10 or Artillery shell Ground Launched – ground 40 kt burst/air burst. 36. Mk 101 ‘Lulu’ 1965–71 W-34 (US)** 11 kt Nuclear Depth Air Delivered – underwater burst. Bomb Unknown. Mk 7 1958–66 Unknown (US)* 9, 28, 43 or Gravity Bomb Air Launched – retarded, airburst 60 kt. or contact. 48. Mk 43 1963–91 Unknown (US)* 70, 500 kt and Gravity Bomb Air Launched – retarded, airburst, 1 mt.*** contact or laydown release. Unknown.

* Supplied Under Project E. ** Supplied Under Project N. *** Also capable of two other yields – both unknown. Index

2nd Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF), 80–81, Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM), 89, 111, 200, 203, 206, 209, 233, 73, 187, 205 262 Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence 4th Tactical Air Force (4th TAF), 297 Purposes, see UK/US Mutual Defence Agreement Acheson, Dean, US politician, 1 Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Adenauer, Konrad, West German Aldermaston (AWRE now AWE), 19, politician, 170 48, 50, 129, 131 Akrotiri, 81–82, 98, 194, 209, 219–220, functions and responsibilities, 14, 232 136–141, 144, 277 Aldan, Soviet ABM, 41, 43 nuclear warhead programme, 32, 34, Allied Command Europe (ACE), 73, 170, 204, 219, 229–230, 273–274 186, 212, 261 Polaris improvements, 132, 134–136, Alphand, Herve, French civil servant, 143 150–151, 155, 257, 278–279 Anglo-French nuclear co-operation, and Soviet ABMs, 41, 131, 141, 160, 141–149, 151, 183, 237, 257, 279, 163, 252 281 Attlee–Truman understandings, 88 Ann Arbor, 9, 57 Australia, 30, 276 Antelope (US Polaris modification), 132, Austria, 197 134–135, 137–140, 150, 230, 256, 275, 279 B-52, US bomber, 96–97 Anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), 9, 12, 16, Bahrain, 220 18, 27, 35, 37–39, 46–53, 118, 120, Baku, 99 128–131, 134–136, 138–141, 143, Baldwin, AVM Nigel, 90 149–165, 185, 228–230, 235, Ball, George, US State Department 251–258, 276, 278, 283–286, 296 official, 72 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 88, 149, Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 185, 218–219, 223, 225, 286 (BMEWS), 157, 283 Archangel, 93 Ballykelly, RAF, 91 Ark Royal, HMS, 216, 223 Baltic Sea, 91, 93, 96, 168, 271 Arkin, William, 56, 87 Barrow-in-Furness, 28 Arnold, Lorna, 5, 137, 250 Battle of Britain, 236 Arzamas 16, Soviet nuclear site, 41, 255 Battlefield nuclear weapons, 8, 110, 114, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (ACNS), 262 127 see also central front, tactical nuclear Assistant Chief Scientific Advisor weapons and individual (Nuclear) (ACSA(N)), 130, 282 weapons Athens Guidelines, 88 Batumi, 99 Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), 16, 22–24, Baylis, John, 11, 14, 208, 235, 244 26, 34–35, 60, 63–70, 77, 85, Beach, Hugh, 203–204 120–121, 167, 170–171, 197, 231, Begg, Adm Sir Varyl, 173 239, 247, 270 Belgium, 68, 80, 197, 200–210, 266 Atlantic Ocean, 13, 88, 119, 121, 123, Berlin, 80, 188, 191, 193, 201, 291 162, 227, 271 Billaud, Pierre, 145, 280

315 316 Index

Bipolarity, 54, 77 Cabinet, 5–7, 11–12, 14, 21–24, 33–34, Birkenhead, 28 38, 53, 64, 86, 92, 118, 124–127, Blankenhorn, Herbert, West German 130, 146, 180, 230–231, 241, 272, diplomat, 110 275, 279, 295 Bloodhound, UK SAM, 83, 164 Cabinet by sub-committee: Blue Danube, fission bomb, 101 MISC 17, 21–22, 26–27, 246 Blue Steel, powered bomb, 44, 82, MISC 183, 145–146 100–103, 217, 221, 233–234, MISC 237, 160 313 Cabinet Committee on Nuclear Blue Streak, MRBM, 44, 51, 136, 269, Retaliation Procedures, 125–126 276, 278 Cammell Laird, shipbuilder, 28, 120 Blue Water, surface-to-surface Tactical Canada, 68, 71, 201, 283 missile, 111, 268 Canberra, light bomber aircraft, 81–84, Bolt from the Blue, 38, 92, 135, 235, 87, 89, 98–102, 105–107, 111, 116, 285, 297 194–195, 200, 206, 211–214, 216, Bomber Command, RAF, 83–84, 89, 91, 218, 220–221, 232–233 93, 96–97, 101, 207–208, 214 Capenhurst, 144 Bondi, Hermann, 6 Caspian Sea, 210–211 Bonn, 61, 170, 226, 239 Cat House, Soviet ABM radar, 43, 251 Boosting, warhead design technique, CEA, French atomic energy agency 250, 280 Celle, 207, 292 Brampton, RAF, 94 Central Army Group (Centag), 142, 145, British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), 8, 237, 279 59–60, 80, 85–86, 107–111, Central Front, 7, 9, 17, 60–61, 73, 89, 172–173, 190, 200–205, 238, 291 105–106, 110–111, 169, 173, 181, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 185–186, 188–191, 202, 212–213, 93, 126 240, 268 British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), (BNDSG), 12, 44, 244 8, 17, 35, 78, 80, 98–99, 105–106, Broadbent, Ewan, UK civil servant, 116, 121, 183, 194–195, 200, 207, 213 209–214, 218, 220–221, 223, 225, Brocklebank, Roy, 90, 99–100, 103–104, 232–233, 235, 291 207 Chalfont, Alan, UK Minister, 22, 246 Brosio, Manlio, NATO Secretary General, Chelyabinsk 70, Soviet nuclear site, 41 86, 174 Chequers, 22–23, 63 Brown, George, UK politician, 48, 49, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), 11, 66, 86, 123, 222, 246, 271, 283 174, 212–213 Brown, Harold, US defence official, 41, Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), 173 252 Chief Polaris Executive (CPE), 28, 135 Bruggen, RAF, 81 Chiefs of Staff (COS), 9, 11, 25, 29, 45, Brussels, 167, 180 56, 75, 131, 168, 183–185, Buccaneer, Royal Navy strike aircraft, 103, 187–189, 198, 213 105–106, 206, 216, 218–224, 236 Chieftain, UK Main Battle Tank, 110 Bukhara, 99 China, 15, 28, 31, 35, 46–47, 53, 57, Bundy, McGeorge, US official, 67 98–99, 116, 119, 153, 157, 210, Burghfield, ROF, 28, 132, 252 232–233, 253, 270 Burma, 66, 99, 232 Christmas Island, Pacific UK nuclear test Burr, William, 190–191, 256 site, 32 Burrows, Bernhard, 175 Cities, see damage criteria Butterworth, RAAF Station, 99–100 Civil defence, 92 Index 317

Civil nuclear energy, 33 Counter-force targeting, see Nuclear Clark, Ian, 14 targets and targeting and NATO Clausewitz, Carl von, 14, 37, 79–80, Counter-value targeting, see Nuclear 113, 118, 166, 186 targets and targeting and NATO Clifford, Clark, US Senator, 179 Criggion, 121 Coastal Command, RAF, 125 Crisis management, 70, 77, 92, 127, Cold War, 3, 8, 57–59, 66, 112–113, 121, 171, 186 124, 174, 192, 206, 231, 240, 242, Crusade, re-entry experiments, 276 256 CTF 345, 127 command and control, 7, 9–10, 16, 18, Cuban missile crisis, 58, 71, 186, 199 29–31, 35, 54, 57, 59, 61, 63–64, Custody of nuclear weapons, 59–60, 66–67, 71–73, 77, 84, 87, 89–90, 109, 217, 223, 258 92, 107, 113, 120–121, 123–128, CVA-01, aircraft carrier project, 8, 106, 150–151, 171, 183, 199, 207–209, 216 215–217, 219, 224, 231, 234–235, Cyprus, 81–82, 94, 98–99, 194–195, 209, 238– 239, 270, 296 211–212, 218–220, 232–233, 260, see also Murphy-Dean Agreement 290 Commander-in-Chief Western Fleet Czechoslovakia, 177, 180, 184, 188, 192 (CINCWF), 127 Commonwealth, 1, 3, 7, 15, 20, 31, 35, Damage criteria for strategic deterrence, 89, 130, 225 10, 68, 74, 120, 189, 236, 265 Concorde, Anglo-French civilian airliner, see also nuclear targets 106, 144 Davy Crockett, recoilless rifle, 110 Congress, US, 61, 67, 128–129, 135, Dazzle, re-entry experiments, 276 155, 157–158, 178–179, 182, 193, de Gaulle, Charles, French President, 50, 272 54, 70–71, 114, 142–147, 151, 184, Coningsby, RAF, 82 237–238, 280 Conservative Party, 3, 5, 15, 19–21, Debré, Michel, French Defence Minister, 24, 38, 60–61, 110, 114, 149, 161, 148 164–165, 223, 227 Decca, radio navigation system, 30 Continuous-at-sea-Deterrence (CASD), 18, Decoys, see Penetration Aids 23, 235 Defence and Oversea Policy Committee conventional (non-nuclear) forces, 6–9, (DOPC), 26, 133, 275 13, 20, 24, 31, 56, 58–59, 67, 69, Defence Committee, British cabinet, 11, 71, 73–78, 86, 89, 99–100, 105, 107, 296 110–115, 118, 125, 133–134, Defence Planning Staff (DPS), 168, 168–170, 173, 175–176, 182, 194–195, 200–202 186–197, 209, 212–217, 232, 236, Defence Review, 16, 25, 30, 85–86, 238–242, 268, 283–284 110–111, 118–119, 130, 134, 136, Cook, William, UK scientist, 6, 132, 134, 140, 151, 155, 158, 164, 168, 171, 136, 144–145, 151, 237, 252 205, 225, 230, 245, 269 Cooper, Frank, UK civil servant, 98, 241, Defense Department, US, 14, 19, 37, 66, 272 88, 131, 135, 139, 156, 173, 176, Corporal, US surface-to-surface missile, 257 59, 108–112, 262, 266–268 Demonstration and Shakedown Cottesmore, RAF, 82 Operation (DASO), 119 Cottrell, Alan, UK nuclear scientist, 6, Dispersal of nuclear forces, 91–92, 95 132, 252 Dog House, Soviet ABM radar, 43, 162, Coulport, naval armament depot, 149, 251 286 Dortmund, 59, 108 318 Index

Douglas-Home, Alec, British Prime Fakley, Denis, UK nuclear scientist, 134, Minister, 3, 60, 227 278 Downing Street, 69, 100, 125–126 Faldingworth, RAF, 91 Dr Strangelove, 126 Fallex, 13, 207 Dual key custody of US nuclear Far East Air Force (FEAF), 99 weapons, 8, 59, 108, 258 Far east, 23, 87, 99, 101, 195, 207, 209, see also Heidelberg Agreement, Nuclear 216, 221, 295 Sharing and Project E Farnborough, see RAE Dushanbe, 99 Faslane, 29, 123, 127, 286 Dusseldorf, 80 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), see West Germany Eagle, HMS, 216, 223 Fieldhouse, Richard, see Norris East Germany, 93, 177, 184 Fighter Command, RAF, 93, 96 East of Suez, 8, 15–16, 18, 27–35, 77, Finch, Guy, 106 99–100, 106, 118–124, 155, Finland, 44, 93 172–179, 194–200, 203, 206, 210, Fissile material, UK/US barter 217–217, 222, 225, 227, 229, arrangements, 26, 33, 85, 101, 129, 231–233, 236, 249 145, 217, 219–221, 250, 253 Eisenhower, Dwight D., former US see also plutonium, uranium (U-235) President, 57 Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) programme, Eisenhower-Eden undertaking, 88 28, 51 El Adem, 96 see also Polaris, Poseidon Electronic counter-measures (ECM), 81, Flintlock (Charcoal), 33–34 91 Force de Frappe, 73, 113, 143 Elworthy, Charles, Chief of the Defence Foreign and Commonwealth Office Staff, 6, 172–174, 211 (FCO), 31, 48, 63–66, 70, 86, 134, Emblem, 80 145, 147–148, 155, 168, 179–183, English Electric, UK aerospace company, 194, 202, 222, 292, 293 276 Forth, HMS, 29 Enthoven, Alain, US politician, 173–178 Foster, John, US nuclear scientist, 129, Erhard, Ludwig, West German 135 politician, 70 France, 7, 16, 20, 50, 54, 56, 62–65, Escalation control, 74–77, 186, 289 70–73, 86, 89, 113, 115, 133, ET 317, UK Polaris warhead, 33, 38, 313 141–151, 164, 167–168, 171, 177, Ethan Allen, USS class of SSBN, 129, 136, 183–184, 193, 201, 222, 237–239, 139 260, 280–281, 289 Eurofighter Typhoon, European multi-role see also Anglo-French nuclear aircraft, 106 cooperation and Force de Frappe European Defence Community (EDC), 62 Freedman, Lawrence, 80, 111, 114, European Economic Community (EEC), 208–209 50, 114, 134, 142–147, 151, 183, Freedom of Information Act, UK, (2000), 237, 280 4, 279 European Launcher Development Fulbright, James, US Senator, 179 Organisation (ELDO), 137 Fulda Gap, 204 European theatre, 71, 160, 183, 185, Fusion, 33, 100, 250, 280 193, 199, 225, 238 Fylingdales, RAF, 157, 234

F-111, US strike aircraft, 107, 172, 206, Galosh (Soviet ABM system), 41–46, 216, 218, 232, 287 135, 143, 163, 228, 253, 255, 276 F-22, US multirole aircraft, 106 Gareloch, 116 Index 319

Gata, RAF, 99 Healey-Schröder Report, see also PPGs, Gaydon, RAF 124, 191, 226, 240, 271 Geilenkirchen, RAF, 82 Heath, Edward, UK Conservative General Election (1964), 34, 259 politician, 3, 7, 15, 76, 149, 164, 223 General Election (1966), 70 Heidelberg Agreement, 108, 266 General Election (1970), 149, 161, Helms, Richard, CIA Director, 146, 148 223–224 Hen House, Soviet ABM radar, 43, 251, General Strike Plan, 85, 209, 214, 294 254 Geneva, 21, 180 Hennessy, Peter, 5, 92, 127, 246–247, 272 George Washington, USS SSBN Class, 129, Hermes, HMS, 216 136, 139 Heuser, Beatrice, 256 Germany, 61, 80, 89, 200, 239 High Wycombe, 90–91, 96 see also East and West German High-test peroxide (HTP), 102 Gibraltar, 196, 211, 233 Hill-Norton, Vice Adm Peter, 121, 270 Gilpatric, Roswell, US official, 62, 259 Holy Loch, 88 Goldshmidt, Bertrand, French nuclear Honest John, US surface-to-surface rocket, scientist, 142–143 59, 108–111, 203–205, 262, 313 Gore-Booth, Paul, UK civil servant, 48 Honnington, RAF, 82 Grandy, Air Marshal Sir John, 194, 208, House of Commons, see parliament 220, 287 House of Lords, see parliament Gray, Colin, 13, 80 House of Representatives, see Congress Greece, 60, 68, 71, 168, 177, 189, 193, HR169, Polaris penetration study, 51–53, 213, 260 132, 150, 229, 257 Griffon, Soviet ABM programme, 42–45, Hull, Gen Sir Richard, 246, 270 253 Hunter-Killer submarine, see SSN Guam, 29, 249 Hunting, Engineering company, 101

Hackett, Gen John, 107 Ikara (AS-12), Australian anti-submarine Haddon, Catherine, 35 weapon, 218, 295 Hague Summit, 147 Implosion, 101 Hainan, 99, 232 Independent UK deterrence, 9, 13–14, Hamburg, 60, 114, 238 19–20, 25, 38, 45–46, 50–51, Harmel Exercise, 167, 172, 180, 288 120–128, 206, 209, 213, 221, Harrier, UK VSTOL aircraft, 173 235–238, 256, 270 Hawk, US SAM, 110, 267 India, 15, 28–29, 35, 119, 225, 233 H-bomb, see hydrogen bomb Indian Ocean, 29, 99, 249 Healey, Denis, Labour Secretary of State Indonesia, 29, 85–87, 99–100, 263 for Defence, 5, 21, 23–26, 30–31, Intelligence, 4, 11–12, 35, 38, 42–53, 50, 86–87, 119, 121–125, 128, 132, 67–68, 91, 97, 113–114, 124, 127, 140, 180, 196, 200, 206–207, 218, 135, 140–141, 149–151, 160, 161, 220–221, 223, 242, 246, 259, 261, 163–164, 174–178, 180, 184, 214, 273–274, 287, 296 228–229, 234–235, 254–256, 258, Defence intellectual, 6, 35, 167, 269, 288 168–169, 171–174,176, 178–179, see also Joint Air Reconnaissance 211–213, 232, 238, 241 Intelligence Centre; Joint views on NATO and nuclear Intelligence Committee; Satellite strategy,60, 63, 69–70, 75–77, 131, Reconnaissance 171–174, 176, 178–179, 238 Inter-continental ballistic missile relations with the US, 154–155, (ICBM), 45, 47, 60, 96, 157–158, 178 185, 254 320 Index

Interdependence, 38 Kisunko, Grigory, Soviet nuclear Intermediate-range ballistic missile scientist, 43, 253 (IRBM), 45, 185, 263 Kobayashi Maru, 166 Iran, 94, 194, 212–213, 232, 291 Kuwait, 194, 232 Iron Curtain, 71, 171, 175, 240 Italy, 60, 68, 71–72, 89, 193, 210, 213, Laarbruch, RAF Air Base, 81, 294 290 Labour Party, 3, 5, 9, 15–26, 34, 35, 37–38, 52–55, 60, 63–64, 75–76, 106, Jackson, Senator Henry ‘Scoop’, 284, 111, 114, 118–119, 130, 133–134, 288 137, 140, 149, 151, 153–154, 158, Jaguar, UK ground attack aircraft, 164–165, 195, 200, 223–224, 227, 218–224 231, 259 Javelin, fighter aircraft, 87, 263 Laird, Melvin, US Defense Secretary, Johnson, Lyndon B, US President, 31, 146, 148, 222, 295 34, 61, 64–67, 70, 72, 89, 97–98, Lance, US surface-to-surface missile, 118, 128, 135, 152, 155–158, 179, 109–111, 205 181, 196, 229, 273, 283 Latvia, 93, 97 Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Lawrence Livermore National Centre ( JARIC), 94 Laboratory, 14, 129 Joint Chiefs of Staff, US, 9, 73, 146, 174, Le Fanu, Adm Sir Michael, 173 176 Leitch, George, UK MoD official, 122, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 61, 168, 170 149 Lemnitzer, Gen Lyman US Army, 63, 85 Joint Intelligence Committee ( JIC), 10, Leningrad, 38, 42, 44–45, 83, 93, 253, 12, 25, 27, 44, 82, 131, 134, 169, 256 184, 201–202, 228 Libya, 96, 194, 196, 212, 232, 233 Joint Inter-service Group for the Study Limited war, 106, 187, 201 of All-out War ( JIGSAW), 25, 247 see also central front, tactical nuclear Joint Re-entry Systems Working Group, weapons, European theatre 28 Linköping, 93 Joint Steering Task Group ( JSTG), 19, 28 Lion, HMS, 223 Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Lithium, 33, 250 ( JSTPS), 13, 96, 122, 191, 206, 209, Lithuania, 93, 97 211, 214, 234 Lockheed, US aerospace company, 14, Joint Working Group ( JOWOG), 14, 28, 28, 52, 128, 136, 245, 248 131, 150, 160, 245, 248 Loran-C, radio navigation system, 30 Jones, Peter, AWRE/AWE Chief Engineer, Los Alamos, US nuclear-weapons 131, 134, 163–164, 274 laboratory, 14 Lossiemouth, RAF, 91 Kennedy, John F, US President, 9, 19, 55, Low-altitude bombing system (LABS), 57, 98, 158 81, 101–103, 218, 313 Khariton, Yuli B., Soviet nuclear Luce, First Sea Lord David, 25, 216 scientist, 41, 253 Luftwaffe, 107 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, Soviet Lulu, see Nuclear Depth Bomb, 88, 110, leader, 47, 55 314 Kiev, 94, 256 Kings Norton enquiry, 134–141, 144, M109, artillery gun, 110–111, 314 151, 219, 230–231, 277 M115, artillery gun, 59, 109 Kissinger, Henry, US academic and Mackenzie, Vice Adm Sir Hugh, 28, 128, politician, 146, 148, 190 273 Index 321

Macklen, Victor, UK nuclear scientist, 6, Minuteman, US ICBM, 62, 67, 76, 273 132, 134, 277–278, 282 Mirage IV, French bomber aircraft, Macmillan, Harold, Conservative Prime 142 Minister, 3, 5–7, 14, 19, 38, 158, Missile guidance, 40–41, 43, 52 227, 231, 247, 280 Mk.7, US atomic bomb, 81, 262, 314 Malaysia, 87, 99, 263 Mk.28, US thermonuclear bomb and Malta, 196, 211–212, 233, 293 warhead, 82, 84, 100, 262 Malvern, 276 Mk.43, US thermonuclear bomb and Mansfield, Mike, US Senator, 179 warhead, 84, 262, 314 Marconi, electronics company, 276 Moore, Richard, 3, 5, 8, 14, 59, 81, Marham, RAF, 82, 84 100–101, 105, 111, 121, 245, 250, Mason, Ronald, 6 268, 270 Mastny, Vojtech, 191–192 Morocco, 212–213 Mathers, Jennifer, 47 Moscow, 38, 48, 88, 158, 238 Mayhew, Christopher, UK politician, Moscow Criterion, 9–10, 12–13, 38, 216 42–47, 50, 53, 124, 135, 140, 143, MC 14/2, NATO strategy document, 214 149, 159–164, 229, 235, 254–256 MC 48, NATO strategy document, see see also Nuclear Targeting NATO; Massive Retaliation Strategy Mottershead Report, 73 McMahon Act, 8, 146 Mountbatten of Burma, AdmFlt Earl, 6, see Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) 66, 84–86, 121, 247 McNamara, Robert S, US Defense Mulley, Fred, UK politician, 110, 246, Secretary, 9, 47, 57–58, 69, 73–74, 268 76, 98, 155, 161, 171, 174, 176–177, Multiple independently targetable 179, 199, 238, 258, 261, 274, 297 re-entry vehicles (MIRV), 118, Mediterranean, 121, 123, 173, 189, 128–129, 135, 140, 160, 164, 229, 211–213, 266, 271, 293 254, 273 Medium Bomber Force (MBF), see NATO Multi-Lateral Force (MLF), 16, 19– V-bombers 20, 22, 35, 54, 60–70, 76–77, 167, Menden, 59, 109 170, 197, 231, 239, 247, 259 Micky Finn, RAF exercise, 83, 262 Murmansk, 93 Middle East, 8, 80, 98, 116, 119, 144, Murphy-Dean Agreement, 88, 264 184, 190, 212, 233, 260 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Mildenhall Agreement, 141–149, 151, (MBFR), 174, 179–182, 197 237, 281 Mutual Assured Destruction, 47, 58, 72, Ministerial Committee on Nuclear 154, 165, 171 Policy (MCNP), 11–12, 119, 122, Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA), 9, 125, 132–135, 137, 145–146, 231, 14, 19, 27–28, 32–33, 38, 51, 53, 270–271, 275, 280, 294 130, 135–139, 143, 147, 150–151, Ministry of Aviation, 28, 246 160, 229–230, 237, 245, 274, 295 Ministry of Defence (MoD), 6, 12–13, Mutual deterrence, 47, 76, 186 25–26, 31, 33, 37, 40–41, 46, 48, see also nuclear sufficiency 50, 52–53, 63–64, 66, 75, 84–85, 87, 90, 91, 108, 121, 127–128, 130–134, NA.39, see Buccaneer 136–137, 139–140, 143, 145, 147– Napier, 108 150, 155–156, 158–159, Nassau Agreement, 15–23, 26–27, 35, 167–169, 173, 176, 178, 180, 76, 89, 118–124, 137, 142, 151, 206, 182–183, 194, 200, 210, 212–215, 208, 224, 231, 244 223, 229, 235, 244, 246–247, 272, see also Supreme National Interest 278–279, 285, 295–296 Clause 322 Index

National Retaliatory War Plan (NRWP), Reinforcements, 148, 169, 176, 183, 89, 94 189–190 National Security Council (NSC), 161, see also Allied Command Europe, Athens 192, 194 Guidelines, Central front, Limited National Strategic Targeting Attack war Policy (NSTAP), 98 ANF, MLF, Polaris commitment to Near East Air Force (NEAF), 210–211, NATO 214, 220 Northern Army Group (Northag), 80, Netherlands, 68, 71, 89, 164, 200–201 107–110, 200, 238 Neutron radiation, 33, 42, 138, 250, Northwood, 121, 125–127 252–253, 275 Norway, 44, 71, 93–94, 168, 173, 177, Nevada, US nuclear test site, 138, 159 193 Nienburg, 59, 109 NSSM 6, 192–193 Nike Hercules, US SAM, 110, 267, NSSM 47, 147–149 284 Nuclear Depth Bomb (NDB), 88–89, Nike Zeus, U SAM, 157, 278 218–219, 313 Nimrod, UK reconnaissance aircraft, see also ASW 211, 218–221, 224 Nuclear deterrence, 6–17, 23–29, 37–38, Nixon, Richard (US President), 98, 140, 47, 58, 64, 66, 69, 73–78, 85, 97–99, 146–152, 157–158, 160, 190, 237, 112, 121, 124, 126, 151, 162–165, 264, 273, 282, 298 167–170, 178, 186, 195, 197, 206, Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 44, 52, 222, 225, 227–228, 233, 235–238, 159–160, 180, 183, 217, 274 242, 256 North American Air Defense Network Nuclear equipoise, 197 (NORAD), 234 Nuclear escalation, 6–7, 59, 69, 72–76, North Atlantic Council, 72, 84, 86, 215 77–98, 111–115, 162, 171–172, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 186–189, 193–194, 236, 289 (NATO), 3–4, 6, 8, 13–15, 17, Nuclear howitzer, 59, 107–111, 205, 19, 22–24, 27, 30–31, 42–43, 46, 313–314 49–50, 54–91, 94, 96–100, 105–116, see also M109; M115 118–124, 127, 134, 142, 146–148, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 16, 68, 150–151, 153–155, 158–160, 72, 124, 147–148, 155, 161, 168, 165–215, 216–217, 219, 221–222, 183, 193, 197–199, 226–227, 239 224–227, 231–241, 243, 253, 261, Nuclear Planning Working Group 267–268, 270–271, 281, 288–289, (NPW), 68, 70–72, 77, 168 291, 296–297 Nuclear power and reactors, 21, 185, 245 Estimates of Warsaw Pact strength, 68, see also Civil Nuclear Energy 168–172, 174–188, 197 Nuclear propulsion and reactors, 9, 19, Flexible Response strategy (MC 14/3), 21, 26, 137, 144, 245–246, 248, 271, 17, 56, 72, 97, 158, 166–167, 279–280 171–172, 175, 182–183, 186, see also SSN 189–191, 193, 197–199, 209, 212, Nuclear release procedures, 62, 67, 214–215, 217, 224, 226–227, 236, 90–96, 209, 223, 240, 296 239–240 see also Command and control; Crisis Massive Retaliation strategy (search management; CTF 345; Northwood; also for MC 48), 17, 56–57, 75, Turnstile; Pindar 114–115, 158, 165, 170, 182, 189, Nuclear sharing, 19, 60, 63–64, 66–67, 214, 224, 226, 239–240 69–70, 72, 76–77, 114, 142, 227, Mobilisation, 113, 168, 176–177, 181, 237 187 Nuclear Strike Programme, 191, 214, 217 Index 323

Nuclear sufficiency, 9–10, 12, 52–53, see also ABM; decoys; HR 169; Antelope; 58–59, 75, 78, 80, 160, 170, 201, Super Antelope 205, 236 Penney, Sir William, AWRE Director, 5 see also Mutual deterrence Pentagon, 9, 154, 169, 190 Nuclear targets and targeting, 9–10, Permissive Action Link, 108 12–14, 16, 24–27, 30–31, 37–39, Pershing, US surface-to-surface missile, 42–46, 50, 53–60, 68–69, 73, 80–85, 61, 74, 110 89–90, 94–105, 107–116, 122–123, Peshawar, 99 129, 134, 140, 163–164, 185–187, Phantom, US strike aircraft, 107, 200, 191, 195, 203–207, 214, 218, 221, 206, 216, 218, 220–221, 223, 233 223–224, 229, 232, 237–238, 244, Photo Reconnaissance, 82, 94, 201, 249–250, 261, 263, 265, 268, 271, 211–212 293 see also Intelligence see also damage criteria, Moscow Pierrelatte, 144 Criterion Pindar, 92 Nuclear testing, British, 15, 32–33, 49, Plutonium, 33–34, 248, 250 53, 131, 151, 229–230, 250 Podvig, Pavel, 252–255 see also Individual test series – Poland, 177 Whetstone (Cormorant); Whetstone Polaris Re-entry Systems Study Group, (Courser); Flintlock (Charcoal) 134, 138–139 Nuclear testing, international, 142, 145, Polaris Sales Agreement, 14–15, 27–28, 157, 210 32, 38, 51, 128–129, 135, 139, 151, Nuclear tripwire, 75, 86, 115, 133 209, 269, 273–274 NUCOPS, 13, 96, 191 see also Command and control, East of Suez, MLF/ANF Omaha, 13, 96, 122, 206, 211, 234 see also Antelope; Nassau Agreement; Oman, 220 Super Antelope Operational Conversion Unit (OCU), Polaris, US/UK submarine-launched 81–82, 219–220, 224 ballistic missile, 4, 8–9, 12, 12–19, Operational requirements (OR), 106, 21–41, 44–53, 56, 60, 62–64, 66–67, 155, 190, 287 69, 73, 76, 81, 85, 87, 96, 100, Operational research, 13 116, 118–143, 146, 149–151, 153, Ordnance Board, 33, 250 155, 156, 159–160, 162–164, 185, Ostpolitik, 170 205–206, 208–210, 214, 217, 219, Overstretch, 179, 196, 198–200, 211, 223–225, 227–232, 234–236, 217, 233, 274 241–242, 248–252, 256–258, 269–274, 276–280, 282, 290, 297 Pacific Ocean, 29 Commitment to NATO, 15, 17–19, 22, Paderborn, 59, 109 30–31, 50, 62–64, 69, 118–128, Pakistan, 212, 225, 233, 291 150–151, 208–209, 214, 217, Panton, Frank (UK nuclear scientist), 227–228, 231–232, 234, 236, 244, 130, 154 269, 271, 274 Paris, 142–143, 148, 167, 237, 239, 266 Pompidou, Georges, French President, Parliament, UK, 63, 84, 87, 107, 124, 129, 147–148, 151 137, 142, 178, 195, 210, 230–231 Poseidon, US submarine-launched Penetration Aid Carrier (PAC), 139, 150 ballistic missile, 14, 16, 53, 76, Penetration aids (for missiles), 33, 38, 128–136, 142, 144, 150–151, 44, 46, 50–51, 93, 129–132, 229–230, 273 135–136, 139, 140, 150, 154, 156, Powers, Gary, 82 163, 269, 276, 270 Prague Spring, 192–193 324 Index

Primary, thermonuclear, 32–33, 250, 295 Rothschild, Lord, UK politician, Project E, 8, 81, 84–89, 108, 145, 205, 136–138, 276, 278 218–221, 236, 314 Royal Air Force (RAF), 12–13, 63, 75, see also Nuclear Sharing, Dual custody 81–83, 85, 89–90, 100–103, Project N, 220, 314 105–108, 121, 173, 200–201, 206, Proliferation of nuclear weapons, 17, 29, 209, 214, 215, 218–219, 221, 223, 35, 44, 49, 52, 58, 62, 64, 119, 153, 226, 233–234, 241, 263 158–160, 180, 225, 251, 274 see also individual aircraft and weapons Pyne, Kate, 269 Royal Aircraft Establishment Farnborough (RAE), 14, 38, 51, 132, Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), 83–84, 87, 135, 150, 229, 257, 276 89, 91, 169, 207, 234–235 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), 99–100 Quinlan, Michael, 12, 45, 85, 98, 163, Royal Navy, 6, 25, 28–29, 32, 64, 99–101, 241, 296–297 105–106, 121, 123, 127–128, 163, 206, 208, 213, 216, 219, 221, 223, RAF Bomber Command, 83–84, 89, 91, 226, 229, 249, 270, 272 93, 96–97, 101, 207–208, 214, 217 see also individual ships, aircraft and RAF Coastal Command, 125 weapons RAF Fighter Command, 93, 96 Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF), 138, RAF Germany, 80, 202, 216, 220, 223, 236 274, 276 RAF Strike Command, 207, 214, 216–217 Rugby, 30, 121, 125 see also 2nd TAF Rusk, Dean, US Secretary of State, 47–48, see also aircraft and weapons 72 Rambouillet, 144, 280 Russia, see Soviet Union Rand Corporation, 57, 190 Rangoon, 99, 207 SA-2, Soviet SAM, 82–83, 94, 102, 116 Reconnaissance satellites, 58, 169 SA-3, Soviet SAM, 94, 110 Red Beard, tactical nuclear bomb, 82, Sabatini, LJ., UK government official, 178 85, 99–101, 105, 195, 206, 217–218, Safeguard, US ABM system, 158, 253, 221, 232–233, 263, 295, 313 285 Red Snow, anglicised Mk.28 Samarqand, 99 thermonuclear warhead, 100, 102, Sandys, Duncan, Conservative 313 Politician, 247 Re-entry, re-entry vehicles, re-entry Scampton, RAF, 82, 102 phenomenology, 10, 28, 32–33, Schröder, Gerhard, West German 38, 41, 44, 51–52, 119, 131–132, Defence Minister, 70, 206 135–139, 157, 229, 253, 257, 276, see also Healey-Schröder Report 279, 284 Schumann, Maurice, French scientist, 143 see also ABM; decoys; HR 169; JSRWG; Scimitar, RN fighter, 105 MIRV; Penetration Aids Scotland, 91, 123, 127 Renown, HMS, 28, 120 Sea Vixen, Royal Navy fighter/ground Repulse, HMS, 28, 116–117 attack aircraft, 105 Resolution, HMS, 21, 28, 116, 119, 245 Seaborg, Glen T., US scientist, 146, 148 Revenge, HMS, 28 Second World War see World War II Reykjavik, 180 Secondary, thermonuclear, 32–33, 295 Rheindahlen, 80, 200 Secrecy, 3, 124, 137, 206, 231, 241 Rickover, Adm. Hyman, US Navy Security dilemma, 17, 112–115, 225, 298 nuclear propulsion chief, 67, 282 Senate, see Congress Robinson, AVM Michael, 83, 234 Sennelager, 59, 109 Rosenberg, David A., 10, 18, 38, 79 Sentinel, US ABM system, 157, 278 Index 325

Sergeant, US surface-to-surface missile, Suez Crisis (1956), 144 59, 110–111 Super Antelope (UK Polaris modification), Shackleton, maritime patrol aircraft, 88, 137, 139–140, 150, 230 211, 218 Supercruise, 106 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Indian Prime Superpowers, 37, 47, 54–55, 72, 77, 134, Minister, 28 153–155, 159, 164, 167, 196–197, Ship’s Inertial Navigation System (SINS), 238, 286 30 Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Shuckburgh, Evelyn, UK civil servant, (SACLANT), 107, 173, 244, 290 61, 67 commitment of UK nuclear forces to, Silk Route, 99, 209, 233 30–31, 88–89, 122–124, 216, Simpson, John, 270 219–220, 223–224, 271 Singapore, 29, 81, 99, 221, 232, 247, 249 see also Murphy-Dean Understanding Single Integrated Operational Plan Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SIOP), US, 13, 57–60, 73, 96–98, (SACEUR), 13, 51, 61–63, 70, 75, 116, 122, 190–192, 199, 206, 80, 84–86, 94, 125, 173, 179, 181, 208–209, 235, 245, 258, 261, 265 191, 194, 210, 213, 234–235, 244, see also Nuclear targeting 263, 293 Skybolt, US air-launched ballistic commitment of UK nuclear forces to, missile, 9, 34, 44, 297 15, 30–31, 81–82, 90, 96–98, 107, South East Asia Treaty Organisation 116, 119–124, 150–151, 172, 194, (SEATO), 8, 15, 17, 35, 78, 80, 207–208, 215–217, 220–224, 232, 98–100, 105–106, 116, 121, 195–196, 236, 271 200, 209–210, 221, 225, 232–235 see also Nuclear Strike Plan Soviet Union, see also USSR Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Special Projects Office (SPO), US Navy, Europe (SHAPE), 13, 31, 68–69, 86, 14, 28, 128–130, 135 89–90, 96, 107, 125, 150–151, 177, Spinardi, Graham, 249–251, 257, 270, 190–191, 206, 208–209, 213–217, 273, 275 239, 241, 244, 266, 290 Spotswood, MRAF Denis, 208 Supreme National Interest Clause, 13, 15, Sprint, US ABM, 47, 135, 158, 277, 19, 89, 120–123, 217, 224, 231 283–284 Surface-to-air missiles (SAM), 27, 45, Nuclear ballistic missile submarine 82–83, 91, 93, 96–97, 102–103, 110, (SSBN), 15, 18, 21–22, 25–26, 29–31, 116, 176, 218, 234 88, 119, 121–122, 127, 129, 185, see also individual weapons 227, 245, 286 Sverdlov-class cruisers (USSR), 105 Nuclear hunter-killer submarine (SSN), 21, Sweden, 93, 96 29, 74, 123, 127, 213, 235, 249, 271 Symmetrical Escalation, 7, 73–74, St. Mawgan, RAF, 88, 91 113–115, 197 State Department, US, 60–62, 88, 182, 257, 296 TACEVAL, 83, 90 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 12–13, Tactical nuclear weapons, 6, 8, 13, 122, 191, 206 15–16, 56, 59, 63, 73–77, 79, 86, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 111–115, 168, 170, 178, 186–188, 44, 49–50, 52, 131, 140, 141, 149, 193, 195, 202–205, 214, 224–226, 154–162, 197, 229–230, 258, 278, 238–242, 262, 268, 290 283, 285, 296 see also Battlefield nuclear weapons, Strategic bombing, 97, 219 Central Front; Limited war; NATO; Strategic culture, 17, 27, 90, 127, 133, European theatre and individual 167, 236, 242, 248, 256, 275 weapons 326 Index

Tbilisi, 99 United Nations, 20 Technical Tripartite Cooperation Panel United States, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9–10, 15–17, (TTCP), 51, 257, 276–277 27–28, 31, 38, 43–44, 47–48, 49–50, Teller-Ulam Principle, 145 52, 56, 61, 63–74, 77, 80, 98, 108, Tengah, RAF, 81, 99, 101, 221 112–115, 120, 124, 127, 131, TFX, see F-111 136–137, 139, 142–154, 157, 159, Thermonuclear weapons, see Hydrogen 161, 167, 169, 173, 175, 179, 183, bomb 200, 205, 208–209, 227, 229–232, Thirty Year Rule, 4 237–239, 243, 247–248, 252, 254, Thompson, Llewellyn E., US Ambassador 257, 271, 282, 283, 285 to Moscow, 158 see also individual US persons; Thorneycroft, Peter, UK Conservative departments, armed services; ships; Defence Secretary, 38, 60, 63 aircraft and weapons Thoulouze, (French) Gen André, 145 United States Air Force (USAF), 58, 83, Thunderbird, UK SAM, 110 97, 107, 191, 291, 297 Tiger, HMS, 218, 223 United States Navy (USN), 19, 30, 32, Tomkins, Edward, UK civil servant, 37, 119, 130, 136, 184, 270 179–180, 288 US Air Force (USAF), 58, 83, 97, 107, Tornado, European strike aircraft, 106, 191 221 US Army, 108 Transit, US satellite navigation system, US Atomic Energy Commission 30, 249 (USAEC), 14, 131, 138–139, 146 Treasury, 15, 25–26, 64, 134, 141, 241 USSR, 5, 9–10, 12, 15–16, 20, 27, 29,35, Trend, Burke (Cabinet Secretary), 7, 23, 37–38, 40–50, 53, 56, 58, 66, 69, 71, 70–71, 87–88, 125, 133, 141, 146, 82–83, 89–90, 98,106, 112, 114–116, 161, 241, 246 121, 129, 133–135, 143, 149–153, Trident, US SLBM, 14, 227 156–164, 167, 169–170, 177, 182, Tritium, 33, 143, 250 184, 188, 194–195, 197, 201, 206, Truman, Harry S, former US President, 228–229, 232, 234–235, 239, 3, 62 253–255, 282, 285, 289 see also Attlee-Truman understandings Try Add (Soviet Phased Array Radar), 43 Valiant, medium bomber aircraft, 16, TSR.2, strike/reconnaissance aircraft, 8, 81–87, 90, 102–103, 107, 116, 225, 61, 105–107, 111, 172, 216, 232, 268 234, 262–263 Tunisia, 212–213 V-bombers, 8–9. 12, 19, 22, 25, 27, 31, Turkey, 60, 68, 71–72, 94, 169, 177, 189, 60, 63, 69, 80–81, 83, 85, 89–94, 193–194, 212–213, 232, 260, 291 96–97, 99, 101, 105, 115, 124, 126, Turnstile, UK alternative government 149–150, 163, 172, 195, 206, base, 92, 127 208–209, 211, 214, 218, 221, Type 82 destroyer, 8 224–225, 228, 232, 234–235, 262 see also Bomber Command U-2, US reconnaissance aircraft, 82–83 V-bomber delivery means, 81, 101– U-235, see Uranium, highly enriched 105, 218, 313 UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), Very low frequency radio (VLF), 29, 121, 137–138, 140 125 UK/US Mutual Defence Agreement Victor, medium bomber aircraft, 81–85, (MDA), 9, 14, 19, 27–28, 32–34, 87, 89, 102–103, 218, 234 38, 51, 53, 130, 135–139, 143, 147, Vietnam War, 7, 76, 83, 100, 118–119, 150–151, 160, 229–230, 237, 245, 155, 158, 174–175, 178–179, 192–197, 274, 295 199, 229, 233, 243, 261, 283 Index 327

Vienna, 161 Wheeler, (US) Gen Earl, 146, 148, 174 Violet Club, interim megaton weapon, Whetstone (Cormorant), UK nuclear 101 test, 33 Von Hassel, Kai-Uwe, West German Whetstone (Courser), UK nuclear test, 33 Defence Minister, 76, 207 Whitehall, 6–7, 17, 48, 53, 59, 92, 98, Vulcan, medium bomber aircraft, 81–87, 106, 247, 272 89, 98–100, 102–104, 172, 194, 200, Wildenrath, RAF, 81 206–210, 212–213, 216–220, 223, Wilson, Harold, Labour Prime Minister, 232–234, 236 3–7, 11, 15–18, 20–22, 26, 28–29, 31–35, 37, 49–50, 52–53, 55, 61–64, Waddington, RAF, 82, 96, 99 66, 69–70, 72, 76–77, 87–89, Wales, 121 118–119, 122–125, 130, 132, 133, Walker, John, 32–33, 247 137, 140–145, 147–149, 151–156, Walker, Patrick Gordon, 21, 26, 63, 246 158, 161–162, 164, 167, 195–196, Warsaw Pact, 3, 7, 15, 17, 56, 58–59, 66, 212, 217–218, 227, 231, 233, 237, 68, 72–76, 80, 82–83, 85, 98, 107, 274, 278–283, 286 110–113, 115–116, 120, 124, 149, WINTEX, 13, 207, 241 154, 166–168, 170–171, Wittering, RAF, 82 174–178, 180–182, 184–192, Woolven, Robin, 102 197–198, 201–204, 212, 214–215, Woomera, 276 222, 225, 234, 238–240, 261, 268, World War III, 9, 127, 183–188, 198 288–289, 291 Wynn, Humphrey, 101, 107 Warsaw Pact war plans, 74, 112–113, Wyton, RAF, 82 190–191 Washington, 24, 62–63, 72, 119, 129, X-rays, 39–40, 42, 138, 145, 157, 148, 158, 171, 238–239, 278, 288 159–160, 162, 275–276 Wasp, light anti-submarine helicopter, 218 Yellow Sun, megaton bomb, 101 WE-177A, kiloton bomb, 17, 101, 106, Yellow Sun Mk 2, megaton bomb, 85, 206, 217–225, 233, 236, 295, 313 100, 102–103, 221, 233, 313 WE-177B, kiloton bomb, 100–101, Yerevan, 99 218–219, 221, 223–224, 226, 233, Young, John, 64 295, 313 Young, Ken, 264 WE-177C, kiloton bomb, 221 Wessex, RN helicopter, 218 Zuckerman, Sir Solly, MoD/Government West Germany, 7, 17, 54, 60–62, 66, chief scientist, 6, 32–33, 41, 48, 68–72, 76–77, 81, 83, 89, 106, 110, 50–53, 75, 87, 129–132, 134, 136, 112, 115, 168–171, 177–178, 184, 139–144, 146, 149, 158, 161, 190, 193, 198, 201–203, 207, 216, 229–230, 235, 241, 246, 252, 239, 281, 292 257–259, 274–275, 277, 280, Western European Union, 197, 202 282–285, 296–297