Notes Introduction 1. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000, p. 474. 2. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons 1958–64. 3. This act did not, however, enter into force until 1 January 2005. 4. During the course of both the British Nuclear History Study Group and BROHP meetings the ad hoc nature of the preservation process has been brought to light with many documents destroyed or still waiting for security vetting. 5. Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War. 6. Arnold, ‘A Letter from Oxford: The History of Nuclear History in Britain’, pp. 211–12. 7. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 6. 8. Quoted in De Groot, The Bomb: A Life, p. 297. 9. ‘Obituary: Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Elworthy’, The Independent, 6 April 1993. 10. Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography, p. 581. 11. Confidential correspondence, 28 July 2006. 12. Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964–70, p. 3. 13. From World War II onwards the United States has provided around two thirds of NATO’s forces. But with Vietnam placing growing pressures on US military commitments, calls for American troops to be brought back from Europe greatly increased. 14. The Sword being essentially offensive and nuclear while the Shield amounted to the approximate number and type of defensive forces needed to carry out NATO’s strategy which at this time was still based on the threat on ‘Massive [nuclear] Retaliation’. 15. TNA, PREM 13/26, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 25 November 1964. 16. Williams, Gregory and Simpson, Crisis in Procurement: A Case Study of the TSR-2, p. 10. 17. Passed by the US in 1946 preventing the transfer of nuclear technology to a third party for military uses. 18. Jamison, Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1952–1958: From Independence to Transatlantic Nuclear Sharing and Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality. 19. Mackby and Cornish (eds), U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After Fifty Years. 20. See, for example, Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy 1945–1970, for a balanced view and Gunston and Donald, ‘Fleet Air Arm 1960–69’, pp. 188–205 for a critique of British policy. 21. Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, p. 47. 22. Its full title is the Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, Cmnd. 537 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1958). 243 244 Notes 23. On the vulnerability of bombers to a pre-emptive first strike, see Roman, ‘Strategic Bombers over the Missile Horizon, 1957–1963’, pp. 198–236. 24. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957–1962, p. 413. 25. See, for example, Clark and Wheeler, British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 43–90 and 210–29 and Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 359–89. 26. This revision was driven by the recommendations of the British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group in 1961. Still, as Clark and Baylis show, even these figures need interpretation and the fine detail of the targeting arrangements in this period is still obscure with mention of 10 cities not 5. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, 382–94, Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 304–12 and Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, p. 286. 27. TNA, DEFE 13/752, Annex A to COS 45/72, 25 April 1972. 28. Rosenberg, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960’, pp. 3–71. A similar line of thought was also followed by C. P. Snow in ‘Science and Government: The Godkin Lectures at Harvard, 1960’. 29. The ‘marriage’ of ‘High’ Policy to ‘Operational’ Policy in the US nuclear weapons programme is to be found in Henry Rowan, ‘Formulating Nuclear Doctrine’ in ‘U.S. Commission on the Organisation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy’, pp. 219–34. 30. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p. 8. 31. These ministers included the Secretary of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Home Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 32. The Committee on Nuclear Requirements for Defence had been designed ‘to consider major issues of policy concerned with the nuclear requirements of the Services and the testing of nuclear weapons’ and had been chaired by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. The Official Committee on Atomic Energy was a senior civil service body, which had handled ‘questions of policy in respect of atomic energy (other than health and safety and purely defence questions) which require interdepartmental consideration’. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 27 September 1966. 33. TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(66) 1st Meeting Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 28 September 1966. Reproduced with commentary in Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 209–12. 34. On the BNDSG see for example Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, pp. 14–18, 43–7. 35. TNA, CAB 165/600, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 27 September 1966. 36. On its formation see TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(66)1, 30 September 1966. 37. Freedman, ‘British Nuclear Targeting’, pp. 81–99, Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945–1955, pp. 210–29, Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 319–58. 38. Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 15 August 2006. 39. This phrase originates under the Anglo–American Nassau Agreement of December 1962, when agreement was reached to purchase Polaris. 40. However neither SHAPE nor SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) was privy to information concerning the patrol lanes of UK Polaris. Confidential correspondence, 19 February 2008. SACLANT was always an American admiral with a British deputy. 41. Like SACLANT, SACEUR was always an American officer with a European deputy (and usually British). Notes 245 42. Confidential correspondence, 19 Feb. 2008. For information on the origins and evolution of the SIOP, see Desmond Ball ‘The Development of the SIOP’ in Ball and Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 57–83 and Burr, NSA Website, ‘The Creation of SIOP 62’, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB130/ press.htm and ‘The Nixon Administration, the SIOP and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1974’, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB173/index.htm, accessed on 25 July 2007. 43. Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 309. 44. For a comprehensive list and valuable synopsis of US nuclear facilities, see The Brookings Institute, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project Website, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, Testing, and Production, and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Facilities. 45. The Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs) had first been set up as part of the 1958 MDA along with the Joint Atomic Energy Information Group ( JAEIG) which provided a mechanism for passing information along with regular ‘Stocktakes’ or Reviews which ensured that everyone employed in each specialist area worked to mutual advantage. Confidential correspondence, October 2002. Although the MDA was published as a government Command Paper the substance of the agree- ment remained hidden in a series of classified annexes. The same was also true for the 1959 US/UK agreement relating to nuclear materials and the specific terms of the ‘barter exchanges’ under the MDA. TNA, PREM 13/3129, S. Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 16 December 1964. 46. Now Lockheed Martin. As with the UK effort, a large number of both government and private contractors each played a part. 47. Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961–1963, p. 335. 48. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence: Success and Civility in the Anglo–American Special Nuclear Relationship 1962–1982. 49. Ibid., particularly pp. 319–58. 50. Bahamas Meetings: Text of Joint Communiqués, Cmnd. 1915 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1962). 51. On the defence review see David Greenwood, Budgeting for Defence (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1972). 52. Quoted in Angelika Volle, ‘The Political Debate on Security Policy in the Federal Republic’, in Kaiser and Roper (eds), British-German Defence Co-operation, p. 47. 1 The Labour Government: The Inheritance of Polaris and Anglo–US Nuclear Relations, 1964–1966 1. This is a line of reasoning can also be found in Gill, ‘Strength in Numbers: The Labour Government and the Size of the Polaris Force’. 2. Bahamas Meetings: Text of Joint Communiqués, Cmnd. 1915 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1962). The design of the Resolution class SSBN largely followed the design of the UK’s Valiant class, the RN’s first nuclear powered submarines, with a reactor section grafted on to the US designed missile compartment, which had been largely manufactured by the UK, building a new fore section to house both the forward torpedo tubes and sonar equipment. Grove, Vanguard to Trident British Naval Policy Since World War 2, p. 242. 3. TNA, PREM 13/3129, S. Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 16 December 1964. More detail can be found in Peter Hammersley, ‘The Propulsion System’, in Moore, 246 Notes The Impact of Polaris: The Origins of Britain’s Seaborne Deterrent, pp. 155–58 and in Steve Ludlam, ‘The Role of Nuclear Submarine Propulsion’, in Mackby and Cornish, U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation: An Assessment and Future Prospects, pp. 247–58. 4. Polaris Sales Agreement, Cmnd. 1995 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963). Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 5. John Moore, ‘The Awakening’; I. J. Galantin ‘The Birth of Polaris in the USA’; Peter La Niece, ‘First Contact with Polaris by the RN’; Alan Pritchard, ‘The UK Strategic Deterrent 1958–1961’; Michael Simeon, ‘Watching Brief 1958–1961’; Sidney John Palmer, ‘Technical Evaluation 1961’; Hugh Mackenzie, ‘Setting up the UK Project’, all in Moore, The Impact of Polaris, pp.