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from all restraint apart from the requirement that LIBERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL basic civic be preserved. Most pertinent, for RELATIONS the'impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other This entry presents an overview of recent trends states nor the internal authority of special preroga­ and developments in relations tives held, for example, by monarchs or military theory-both empirical and normative. An effort bureaucracies over foreign policy. Third, the econ­ is made to highlight the link between contempo­ omy rests on a recognition of the rights of private rary liberal scholarship on international relations property, including the ownership of means of and the thought of classical liberal figures such as production. Property is justified by individual , , , acquisition (e.g., by labor) or by social agreement , and . The first or social utility. This excludes state or part of the essay introduces key liberal principles state , but it need not exclude market and ideas and identifies three different traditions socialism or various forms of the . of liberal thought on international relations. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly Thereafter, we discuss classical and contemporary shaped by the forces of supply and demand, theories on the relationship between liberal domestically and internationally, and are free from and international peace, followed by strict control by bureaucracies. an overview of related, recent scholarship on global governance and international cooperation Locke, Smith, and Kant: Three Pillars among . The final part of the essay of briefly discusses two alternative liberal approaches to the ethics of military intervention and shows, in Liberal internationalism consists, at its most funda­ particular, how liberal theorists, while they all mental level, in the attempt to promote. the afore­ share a fundamental attachment to representative mentioned principles and institutions across governance and human rights, can fundamentally national borders and apply variations thereof to differ in their support for coercive regime change. international relations. The classical realists from Thucydides onward described an international state of war that could be mitigated, but not overcome, Basic Liberal Principles and Institutions short of a world Leviathan. The classical , Liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles with important variations, broke with this skeptical and institutions, recognizable by certain character­ tradition and announced the possibility of a state of istics~such as individual , political peace among independent, sovereign states. participation, , and equality Contemporary scholarship on liberalism and of opportunity-that all liberal democratic societies, international relations looks back at three distinct by definition, share to some degree. Political theo­ traditions of liberalism, attributable to three groups rists identify liberalism with an essential principle: of theorists: John Locke-the great founder of the importance of the freedom of the individual. liberal , who claimed that Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral states have themselves rights derived from indi­ freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to vidual rights to life and (political indepen­ treat others as ethical subjects and not as objects or dence) and property (territorial integrity), thereby means only. providing the liberal foundations of international The ideal version of liberalism is marked by a law; Adam Smith, Baron de , and shared commitment to four essential institutions. Joseph Schum peter-brilliant explicators of com­ First, citizens possess juridical equality and other mercialliberalism and what they saw as its natural fundamental civic rights such as freedom of reli­ result, liberal pacifism; and finally, Immanuel Kant gion and the press. Second, the effective sovereigns and Giuseppe Mazzini-liberal republicans who of the state are representative legislatures deriving theorized an internationalism that institutes peace their authority from the consent of the electorate among fellow liberal republics. The liberal repub­ and exercising their representative authority free lican tradition, while incorporating to some degree Liberalism in International Relations 1435

both liberal individualism and commercialliberal­ republican governments would introduce various ism, has exerted the greatest influence on contem­ institutional restraints on foreign policy and porary liberal international relations theory. It ingrain the habit of respect for individual rights. argues that leaves a coherent Of course, we know today that domestic republi­ international legacy on foreign affairs: a separate can restraints do not automatically end war. (If peace. Liberal states are peaceful with each other, they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which but they are also prone to make war on nonliberal is far from the case.) Kant seems to have been well states. aware of this: He pointed out that institutional restraints merely introduce republican caution, or hesitation, in place of monarchical caprice. In line A Separate Peace Among with this intuition, modern Liberal Democracies does not need to assume either that public opinion The claim that liberal constitutional states behave directly rules foreign policy or that the entire gov­ differently in their foreign relations goes back at ernmental elite is liberal. It can instead assume that least as far as Immanuel Kant and , the elite typically manages public affairs but that but attempts to demonstrate it empirically are potentially nonliberal members of the elite have more recent. In the 20th century, Clarence Streit reason to doubt that illiberal policies would be (1938) first pointed out the tendency of modern e1ectorally sustained and endorsed by the majority liberal democracies to maintain peace among of the 'democratic public. In other words, liberal themselves, and Dean V. Babst (1972) was the first states fight only for popular, ostensibly liberal pur­ to find statistical support for the hypothesis. Over poses since elites need to be constantly concerned the past 3 decades, scholars have found strong a bout domestic support for the war effort. empirical evidence for the existence of a separate Second, Kant foresaw that liberal republics peace among liberal democracies but not between would progressively establish peace among them­ democracies and nondemocracies. Critiques of the selves by means of the pacific union described in separate-peace proposition have focused largely on his Second Definitive Article of . the underlying causal argument, suggesting that Kant probably had in mind a mutual nonaggres­ the interdemocratic peace might be simply a by­ sion pact or perhaps a collective security agree­ product of bipolarity and related strategic ment with a rudimentary court of arbitration. patterns during the (see, e.g., Henry Complementing the constitutional guarantee of Farber & Joanne Gowa, 1997). caution, international law adds a second source-a Michael Doyle, in his 1997 book Ways of War pledge of peaceful respect. As republics emerge and Peace, argues that two centuries of separate (the first source) and as culture progresses, an peace among liberal democracies cannot be dis­ understanding of the legitimate rights of all citi­ missed as an epiphenomenon, or by-product, of zens and of all republics comes into play; and this, strategic alliances; in fact, stable international alli­ now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the ance patterns among liberal democracies appear to moral foundations for the liberal peace. Corres­ be largely a consequence of shared liberal values pondingly, international law highlights the impor­ and domestic institutions. Doyle develops an origi­ tance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity nal explanation of the separate peace among lib­ helps ensure that the officials of republics act eral democracies based on Kant's essay "Perpetual according to the principles they profess to hold Peace." In Doyle's interpretation, Kant's hypo­ just and the interests of the citizens they claim to thetical peace treaty shows how liberal republics represent. Internationally, free speech and the lead to a dichotomous international politics: peace­ effective communication of accurate conceptions ful relations-a pacific union-among similarly of the political life of foreign peoples are essential liberal states and a state of war between liberals to establish and preserve the understanding on and nonliberals. which the guarantee of respect depends. First, Kant viewed the republic, based on consti­ Kant's categorical imperative of course requires tutionalism and popular representation, as the that all statesmen and liberal republics reject impe­ ideal form of government; he understood that rialism and international aggression on moral 1436 Liberalism in International Relations .~------~

grounds. But liberal republics cannot simply assume these critics, Kant's pacific union, the foedus paci­ reciprocal peace with all other states; instead, they ficum outlined in his second definitive article, was understand that states subject to international probably intended to include all states and not just anarchy are potentially aggressive. Only republics liberal republics. Stefano Recchia and Nadia tend to be· consensual and constrained, and they Urbinati (2009) go one step further and suggest are therefore presumed capable by other republics that the first to explicitly anticipate the emergence of reliable mutual accommodation. The experience of a separate peace among constitutional democra­ of cooperation among republics helps engender cies, based on a defensive pact of alliance against further cooperative behavior when the conse­ despotic states, was not Kant but Giuseppe Maz­ quences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) zini, the 19th-century revolutionary thinker and mutually beneficial. In short, fellow liberals benefit democratic political activist. from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer Against these views, Doyle holds that there are from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions good reasons to view Kant as the founding figure may be accurate. Each, however, may in particular of modern , and he inter­ cases. also be self-fulfilling. prets Kant as requiring that peace must be estab­ Finally, Kant's cosmopolitan law, discussed in lished by a rightful constitution involving all three his "Third Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace,'~ definitive articles. Most current scholarship on the adds material incentives to moral commitments. democratic peace focuses either exclusively on the The cosmopolitan law and the tela ted right to hos­ role of liberal-democratic institutions, liberal pitality permit the spirit of commerce to take hold norms, or economic interdependence. But Kantian of every nation sooner or later, thus creating incen­ liberal peace theory, as developed by Doyle, is tives for states to promote peace and try to avert neither solely institutional, nor solely ideological, war. Building on this classical liberal intuition, nor solely economic: It is only together that the modern economic theory holds that under a coop­ three specific strands of liberal institutions, liberal erative international division of labor and free ideas, and the transnational ties that follow from trade according to comparative advantage, each them plausibly connect the characteristics of lib­ national economy is better off than it would have eral polities and economies with sustained liberal been under autarchy-hence, each participant peace among states that meet the three criteria acquires an incentive to solve disputes peacefully embedded in the three definitive articles. Statistical and avoid policies that would lead others to break data sets on the liberal peace do not adequately mutually advantageous economic ties,. Further­ code for these three factors together. As noted by more, the international market removes difficult Bruce Russett and John Oneal, the most thorough decisions of production and distribution from the recent empirical test of the liberal peace hypothe­ direct sphere of state policy. As a result, a foreign sis confirms the separate positive effects of demo­ state does not appear to be directly responsible for cratic institutions and international trade (as well unfavorable economic outcomes-states can stand as membership in international organizations), aside from, and to some degree above, contentious but it does not separately code for liberal norms market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve and related interdemocratic trust, which may crises. Finally, the interdependence of commerce indeed be difficult to measure through quantita­ and the related international contacts of state offi­ tive analysis. cials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. The Global Governance and Cooperation variety of ties among liberal states across numer­ Among Democracies ous issue areas also ensures that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral Classical liberals such as Bentham, Kant, and of reciprocated retaliation. Mazzini anticipated that international institutions In recent years, some scholars, such as Georg (especially arbitration courts but also more Cavallar and John MacMillan, have taken issue advanced international federations with their own with Doyle's interpretation of Kant as the father of parliamentary assemblies) would reduce uncer­ modern democratic peace theory. According to tainty and improve mutual trust among sta tes, Liberalism in International Relations 1437

thereby attenuating the security dilemma and (EU), North Atlantic Treaty actively promoting international cooperation and Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO world peace. In recent decades, international rela­ (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & tions theorists have systematically developed and Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make corroborated this intuition. liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about Relying on new insights from game theory, international cooperation are manifold: First, scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized transnational actors such as nongovernmental that so-called international regimes, consisting of organizations and private corporations thrive in agreed-on international norms, rules, and deci­ liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate sion-making procedures, can help states effec­ increased international cooperation; second, tively coordinate their policies and collaborate in elected democratic officials rely on delegation to the production of international public goods, such multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to as , arms control, and environmental commit to a stable policy line and to internation­ protection. Especially, if embedded in formal mul­ ally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitu­ tilateral institutions, such as the World Trade tional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal Organization (WTO) or North American Free democracies, such as the and its Trade Agreement (NAFTA), regimes crucially allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex improve the availability of information among global governance arrangements to demonstrate states in a given issue area, thereby promoting strategiC restraint and create incentives for other reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, maintaining international order. institutionalized multilateralism also reduces stra­ Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles tegic competition over relative gains and thus Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the further advances international cooperation. classical liberal intuition that formal international Most international regime theorists accepted institutions, such as the (UN) or Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neorealist assurription of NATO, independently contribute to peace, espe­ states as black boxes-that is, unitary and rational cially when they are endowed with sophisticated actors with given interests. Little or no attention administrative structures and information-gathering was paid to the impact on international coopera­ capacities. In short, research on global governance tion of domestic political processes and dynamics. and especially on the relationship between democ­ Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded racy and international cooperation is thriving, and the arguably crucial question of whether pro­ it usefnlly complements liberal scholarship on the longed interaction in an institutionalized interna­ democratic peace. tional setting can fundamentally change states' interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed The Ethics of Military Intervention: to preferences over strategies), thus engendering Should Liberal Democracy Be hnposed? positive feedback loops of increased overall coop­ eration. For these reasons, international regime Liberal thinkers on international relations have theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the always displayed a keen interest in the ethical term neoliberal institutionalism frequently used to dimension of foreign policy, based on the assnmp­ identify it is somewhat misleading. tion that ideas, as well as material interests, ulti­ It is only over the past decade or so that liberal mately determine state behavior. Thus, questions international relations theorists have begun to sys­ about the admissibility and desirability of military tematically study the relationship between domes­ intervention to spread or uphold liberal values tic politics and institutionalized international coop­ abroad were central to the political thought of eration or global governance. This new scholarship seminal figures, such as Kant, Mazzini, and Mill. seeks to explain in particular the close interna tional The classical realists, for their part, did not neces­ cooperation among liberal democracies as well as sarily dismiss normative concerns entirely (unlike higher-than-average levels of delegation b)' democ­ their contemporary followers); yet they were skep­ racies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the tical about the possibility for moral behavior in an

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anarchical environment where state survival was military intervention as a last resort in the face of assumed to be constantly at stake. the worst human rights violations, such as state­ Contemporary liberal theory on military inter­ sponsored slaughter or genocide, suggesting that vention consciously builds on the classics. At the sovereignty can be disregarded under similar cir­ risk of oversimplification, one can identify two cumstances. But they crucially insist that military groups of liberal scholars in the ongoing normative intervention ought to be multilaterally authorized debate on military intervention and regime change: and overseen, ideally by the UN Security Council, cosmopolitan interventionists, on the one hand, if it is to be legitimate. The underlying assumption and liberal internationalists, on the other. is that collective authorization and oversight Cosmopolitan interventionists typically build reduce the risk of usurpation by powerful states on Kant's moral theory, but they only loosely fol­ (Doyle, 2006). Most contemporary liberal interna­ low his political thought. They assert that every­ tionalists follow their classical forebears and reject one who has the ability to intervene militarily in policies of forcible democratization on both prin­ the face of systematic human rights violations also cipled and consequentialist grounds. Democratic has a moral duty to do so, subject to criteria of transformation is best fostered peacefully and indi­ effectiveness and/or proportionality. For cosmo­ rectly through trade, investment, and foreign . politans, if a state is tyrannical and systematically These can help diversify societies, and diversified, oppresses its own population, it "forfeits any growing societies tend to demand responsive gov­ respect for its independence. "i As noted by Brian ernance in the long run. Barry (1998), by implication, "international [mili­ Finally, most contemporary liberals agree that tary1 intervention to displace the government and, becoming a democracy is hardly a cure-all. if necessary, place the country under international Research suggests that overall and on average, the trusteeship" (p. 160) is always prima facie morally diffusion and consolidation of liberal democracy justified and indeed required, although prudential within countries reduces the chances of both inter­ considerations might ultimately counsel against national and civil war. However, there is also evi­ the use of force. (See also David Luban, 1980.) dence that transitions to democracy often produce Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, political turmoil at the domestic level, unless they have tended to place greater value on state sover­ are carefully managed. Where the and eignty and the attendant international duty of public institutions are weak, political elites will be nonintervention. Kant favored absolute noninter­ tempted to use nationalist rhetoric and violence to vention as a matter of principle: He thought it achieve and hold office, which may result in inter­ necessary to stabilize international relations and to national or civil war. Furthermore, as Doyle ensure that each political community could freely (1983) pointed out, the very respect for individual determine its own way of life. Mazzini and Mill rights and shared commercial interests that estab­ were not categorically opposed to military inter­ lish grounds for peace among liberal democracies vention (e.g., they justified it to end protracted may establish grounds for additional conflict in civil wars and to save helpless populations from relations between liberal and nonliberal societies. outright slaughter); yet they vigorously opposed Evidence of this can be found today in relations the use of force for the purpose of promoting lib­ between the United States and its liberal allies, on erty and democracy more generally. They sensed the one hand, and a resurgent , emerging that unless tyranny was defeated domestically, China, or defiant Iran, on the other. In short, lib­ with economic and diplomatic assistance from the eral internationalism is no recipe: It merely offers outside but crucially without foreign military a set of normative guidelines and empirical hypoth­ intervention, any liberty achieved would remain eses-some of which are indeed supported by solid exceedingly fragile and could be hardly sustained evidence-and it needs constant, prudent vigilance in the long run. to avoid crusades and misguided interventions. Contemporary liberal internationalists such as Michael Walzer (1977) and (1999) Michael Doyle and Stefano Recchia typically justify (but contrary to the cosmopolitan Columbia University interventionists do not require) humanitarian New York City, New York, United States Liberalization 1439

Further Readings LmERALIZA nON Babst, D. V. (1972). A force for peace. hldustrial Research, 14, 55-58. Barry, B. (1998). International society from a Liberalization is a process that reduces state control cosmopolitan perspective. In D. R. Mapel & over the lives of persons subject to the authority of T. Nardin (Eds.), Internatiollal society: Diverse ethical a state. It may have both economic and political perspectives (pp. 144-163). Princeton, NJ: Princeton dimensions. Economic liberalization reduces state University Press. intervention in the marketplace. Politicalliberaliza­ Boehmer, c., Gartzke, E., & Nordstrom, T. (2004). Do tion expands individual liberty and rights, includ­ IGOs promote peace? World Politics, 57(1), 1-38. ing the right to speak freely against state authorities Cavallar, G. (1999). Kallt alld the theory aud practice of and to organize with others to oppose those illternatiollal right. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. authorities. Economic and political liberalization Doyle, M. (1983). Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign mayor may not go together. Political liberalization affairs: Part II. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12(4), mayor may not lead to democratization, which 323-353. also enables a broadly inclusive electorate to unseat Doyle, M. (1997). Ways of war and peace. New York: an incumbent government. W. W. Norton. Doyle, M. (2006). The ethics of multilateral intervention. The concept of liberalization must be under­ Theoria, 53, 28-48. stood in the context of liberalism, the dominant Farber, H. 5., & Gowa, J. (1997). Common interests or modern political philosophy. Liberalism first common politics? Reinterpreting the democratic peace. emerged in the 17th century as a challenge to the Journal of Politics, 59(2), 393-417. notion that monarchs had God-given, absolute Ikenberry, G. J. (2001). After victory: Institutio1lS, authority. Thomas Hobbes defended absolute strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after authority but grounded it not in divine will but major wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. rather in the hypothetical agreement of the sub­ Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony. Princeton, NJ: jects to yield entirely to a sovereign their natural Princeton University Press. rights to defend life and property. Luban, D. (1980). Just war and human rights. Philosophy John Locke rejected Hobbes's argument. While and Public Affairs, 9(2), 160-181. agreeing that governmental authority is indeed MacMillan, J. (2006). Immanuel Kant and the democratic grounded in the consent of the governed, Locke peace. In B. Jahn (Ed.), Classical theory in held that people would leave the state of nature international reiati01lS (chap. 3). Cambriilge, UK: Cambridge University Press. and set up I a cOl11111onwealth only if they could Milner, H., & Moravcsik, A. (Eds.). (2009). Power, thereby protect their natural rights to life, liberty, interdependence, and l1011state actors in world politics. and property. Rather than cede their natural rights Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. to a sovereign, the people became the sovereign by Rawls, J. (1999). The law of peoples. Cambridge, MA: virtue of the through which they Harvard University Press. established the commonwealth. Monarchs were no Recchia,S., & Urbinati, N. (2009). Giuseppe Mazzini's more than magistrates who could be removed by international political thought. In S. Recchia & N. the sovereign people if they failed to protect natu­ Urbinati (Eds.), A cosmopolitanism of nations: ral rights. Giuseppe Mazzints writings on democracy, nation Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in turn, rejected Locke's bui/ding, and i1llertlatiou~1 relations (pp. 1-30). emphasis on individual rights, returning instead to Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. the Hobbesian concept of ceding natural rights to Russett, B., & Oneal, J. (2001). Triangulating peace. an absolute sovereign. But Rousseau also rejected New York: W. W. Norton. Hobbes's idea of a sovereign separate from the Streit, C. (1938). Vnionnow: A proposal for a federal union of the leading democracies. New York: Harper. people. He envisioned the whole people, acting Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of illternational politics. together, a radically democratic polity in which Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley .. individual rights had no place. Locke's liberalism Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjllst wars: A moral was thus bracketed by two absolutisms. argument with historical illustrations. New York: Liberalism after Locke remained committed to I Basic Books. protecting individual liberty, but it left behind the I j I ..~