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Supposition Theory S 1229 Elements in Suhrawardı¯’S Writings

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Supposition Theory S 1229 elements in Suhrawardı¯’s writings. This last approach led Secondary Sources to a better grasp of the importance of Suhrawardı¯’s logical Amin Razavi M (1997) Suhrawardi and the school of illumination. Curzon Press, Richmond theories (it is interesting to note that only the parts on Corbin H (1971) En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques. metaphysics were included in Corbin’s edition of the Tome II: Sohrawardıˆ et les Platoniciens de Perse. Gallimard, Paris Talwı¯h:a¯t, Muqa¯wama¯t, and Masha¯ri‘, and that his transla- Ibra¯hı¯mı¯Dı¯na¯nı¯Gh H (1985) Shu‘a‘-i andisha va shuhu¯d dar falsafah-yi tion of the Kita¯bHikmat al-Ishra¯qı¯ skips over the first part Suhrawardı¯. Hikmat Tehran ˙ ˙ on general questions regarding logic and epistemology). Ha’iri Yazdi M. (1992) The principles of epistemology in Islamic philos- ophy: knowledge by presence. State University of New York Press, A few scholars have also pointed to other intellectual Albany traditions, which may have contributed to Suhrawardı¯’s Marcotte R (2001) Suhrawardı¯ al-maqtu¯l, the martyr of Aleppo. system, such as Isma¯ʿ¯lıı ¯ thought, opening new perspectives al-Qantara 22:395–419 still to be explored. Walbridge J (2000) The leaven of the ancients: Suhrawardi and the heritage of the Greeks. State University of New York Press, Albany See also: ▶ Ibn Sı¯na¯, Abu¯ ʿAlı¯(Avicenna) ▶ Isma¯ʿ¯lıı ¯ Phil- Walbridge J (2001) The wisdom of the mystic East: Suhrawardi and Platonic orientalism. State University of New York Press, Albany osophical Tradition ▶ Logic in the Arabic and Islamic Ziai H (1990) Knowledge and illumination: a study of Suhrawardi’s World ▶ Philosophy, Arabic ▶ al-Shahrazu¯rı¯, Muh:ammad Hikmat al-Ishraq. Scholars Press, Atlanta ibn Mah:mu¯d Shams al-Dı¯n Bibliography Primary Sources Supposition Theory Suhrawardı¯(1334/1955) Mant:iq al-Talwı¯h:a¯t, ed. Fayyad ‘A-A. Intisha¯rat-i Da¯nishga¯h-i Tihra¯n, Tehran CATARINA DUTILH NOVAES Suhrawardı¯ (1397/1977) Sih risa¯la al Shaykh-i Ishra¯q: al-Alwa¯h: ILLC and Department of Philosophy al-‘Ima¯diyya. Kalima¯t al-tas:awwuf. al-Lamah:a¯t, ed. Habı¯bı¯ N.-G. University of Amsterdam ¯ ˙ Anjuman-i Sha¯hansha¯hı¯-’i Falsafah-’i Ira¯n, Tehran Amsterdam Suhrawardı¯(1935) Kohlhammer W, Three treatises on mysticism, ed. and trans. Spies O., Khatak SK. Stuttgart (contains Lughat-i-Mu¯ran; The Netherlands Safı¯r-i Sı¯murgh; Risa¯lat al-t:ayr) ˙ Suhrawardı¯ (1945–1970) Opera metaphysica et mystica I–III, ed. Corbin H. (repr. (1993) oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques. Anjuman-i Abstract Shahanshahı¯-’i Falsafah-’i¯ Iran, Tehran) (t. I contains the metaphysical ¯ ¯ ¯ Supposition theory is one of the most important later part of al-Talwı¯h:a¯t, al-Muqa¯wama¯t, and al-Masha¯ri‘wa-l-mut:a¯rah:a¯t; t. II contains Kita¯bHikmat al-ishra¯q; Risa¯la fı¯i‘tiqa¯d al-hukama¯’; medieval semantic theories (in the Latin tradition). Sup- ˙ : Qis:s:at al-g˙urba al-g˙arbı¯ya; t. III contains the following short treatises position is the property of terms (occurring in proposi- in Persian: Partow Na¯me, Haya¯kil al-nu¯r, Alwa¯h:-i ‘Ima¯dı¯ya, Risa¯lat tions) of standing for things, so that these things can be al-t:ayr, ‘Aql-i sorkh, Ru¯zı¯ba¯ jama¯‘at-i s:u¯fı¯ya¯n, Fı¯h:a¯lat al-t:ufu¯lı¯ya, talked about by means of propositions, and supposition Fı¯h:aqı¯qat al-‘ishq, Lughat-i mu¯ra¯n, Safı¯r-i Sı¯murgh, Busta¯n al-qulu¯b, ˙ theory (in its different versions) is a theory codifying the Yazda¯n shinakht, al-Kalima¯tal-dhawqı¯ya aw Risa¯lat al-abra¯j) Suhrawardı¯(1976) L’archange empourpre´: quinze traite´setre´cits mys- different uses of terms in propositions, based on the idea tiques, trans. Corbin H. Fayard, Paris (French translation of most of that one and the same term can stand for different things the treatises in Opera metaphysica et mystica, t. III, plus a few others) when occurring in different propositional contexts. The S Suhrawardı¯(1982) The mystical and visionary treatises of Shihabuddin different kinds of supposition are attempts to capture the Yahya Suhrawardi, trans. Thackston W.M. Octagon Press, London phenomenon of semantic variation prompted by different (repr. (1999) The philosophical allegories and mystical treatises. A parallel Persian-English text. Costa Mazda Publishers) (the intro- propositional contexts. The theory emerged in the twelfth duction and translation are misleading on several counts. See century, and the two main traditions contributing to its H. Landolt’s (1987) review in J Am Orient Soc 107(3):475–486) development were the tradition of commentaries on Suhrawardı¯(1986) Le livre de la sagesse orientale. KitaˆbHikmat al-Ishraˆq. ˙ Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations and the tradition Commentaires de Qotboddıˆn Shıˆraˆzıˆ et Mollaˆ Sadraˆ Shıˆraˆzıˆ, trans. : commenting on the fourth-century grammarian Priscian. Corbin H. intro. Jambet C. Verdier (transl: Hikmat al-ishraˆq, Intro- ˙ duction and Part 2, with commentaries) Supposition theory acquired its first mature form in the Suhrawardı¯ (1996) Temples of lights, trans. Kuspinar B. ISTAC, thirteenth century, with the terminist/summulist tradition Kuala Lumpur (in the works of William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, Suhrawardı¯ (1998) The book of radiance (Partow Na¯meh). A parallel Roger Bacon, and Lambert of Lagny/Auxerre), and was English-Persian text, ed. and trans. Ziai H. Costa Mazda Publishers further developed in the fourteenth century by authors Suhrawardı¯(1999) The philosophy of illumination. A new critical edition of the text of Hikmat al-ishraq, ed. and trans. Walbridge J., Ziai H. such as Walter Burley, William of Ockham, and John ˙ Brigham Young University Press, Provo Buridan. 1230 S Supposition Theory Introduction Indeed, theories of supposition deal with four main Supposition is one of the properties treated within the kinds of semantic variation: doctrine of the properties of terms, a doctrine whose 1. Whether a term is taken literally or metaphorically. development started in the twelfth century and which 2. The different ontological kinds of the things that one then became the cornerstone of later medieval semantics and the same term can stand for – the supposita: (see Read 2006, and the entry on Terms, Properties of (extra-mental) individual entities, universal entities, in this volume). In fact, the development of this doctrine mental entities, or linguistic entities. from the twelfth century onward consists precisely in 3. The different temporal and modal statuses of the ‘‘the growing dominance of just one of the properties of supposita: present, past, future, actual, or possible. terms, supposition’’ (De Rijk 1982:161). Indeed, by the 4. The different quantities of entities required to verify or fourteenth century the concept of supposition had falsify a proposition. almost entirely superseded or absorbed the other prop- erties of terms for the purposes of semantic analysis. (1) The first kind of variation is usually codified by means Asection(oftenseveralchapters)specificallyonsuppo- of the distinction of proper vs. improper supposition. For sition is to be found in every single logical textbook of reasons of space, though, improper supposition will not be the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (not to mention analyzed in any detail here, and we shall concentrate on the several De suppositionibus treatises in the fourteenth proper supposition. (2) The second kind of variation is century). accounted for by means of the distinction of the main Very generally put, supposition is the property of kinds of proper supposition, usually personal, simple, and terms (occurring in propositions) of standing for things, material supposition (such as in Ockham’s Summa so that these things can be talked about by means of logicae). The contextual element usually thought to pro- propositions. Thus described, it may appear to be the voke this kind of variation is the ontological kind(s) of the medieval counterpart of the modern concept of refer- things of which the other term in the proposition is ence, and indeed such a comparison has often been put correctly predicated, as suggested by an oft-repeated forward. But there are also significant dissimilarities motto (Ebbesen 1981:41): ‘‘subjects are such as the pred- between medieval theories of supposition and modern icates permit’’ (see Sherwood 1966:113). (3) The third theories of reference, and in fact this comparison can be kind of variation is addressed by the concepts of quite misleading (see Dutilh Novaes 2007: chap. 1). ampliation and restriction, originally independent prop- Rather, it seems more appropriate to view medieval the- erties of terms that in later developments were absorbed by ories of supposition as having no exact modern counter- the supposition machinery. The contextual element usu- part – one must attempt to understand them in their own ally (though not always) thought to provoke this kind of terms. Moreover, throughout the centuries the concept variation is the tense (past, present, future) and the mode of supposition ‘‘developed in response to a variety of (actual, possible, necessary) of the verb in the proposition. needs, and one mistake of modern attempts at interpre- (4) The fourth kind of variation is dealt with by means of tation is to seek a unique rationale’’ for its various for- the distinction of the modes of (common) personal sup- mulations at different stages of its development (Read position, whose main modes are confused and distribu- 2006: Introduction). tive, merely confused, and determinate supposition (such Nevertheless, a fairly accurate general characterization as in Ockham’s Summa logicae). The contextual element of the different versions of supposition theory is as usually thought to provoke this kind of variation is the a theory codifying the different uses of terms in proposi- presence or absence of syncategorematic terms (i.e., terms tions; such variations of uses are important as such, but such as ‘‘every,’’ ‘‘some,’’ ‘‘no,’’ ‘‘not’’) and word order.
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