History of Renaissance and Modern Logic from 1400 to 1850
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GREEK and LATIN CLASSICS V Blackwell’S Rare Books 48-51 Broad Street, Oxford, OX1 3BQ
Blackwell’s Rare Books Direct Telephone: +44 (0) 1865 333555 Switchboard: +44 (0) 1865 792792 Blackwell’S rare books Email: [email protected] Fax: +44 (0) 1865 794143 www.blackwell.co.uk/rarebooks GREEK AND LATIN CLASSICS V Blackwell’s Rare Books 48-51 Broad Street, Oxford, OX1 3BQ Direct Telephone: +44 (0) 1865 333555 Switchboard: +44 (0) 1865 792792 Email: [email protected] Fax: +44 (0) 1865 794143 www.blackwell.co.uk/ rarebooks Our premises are in the main Blackwell bookstore at 48-51 Broad Street, one of the largest and best known in the world, housing over 200,000 new book titles, covering every subject, discipline and interest, as well as a large secondhand books department. There is lift access to each floor. The bookstore is in the centre of the city, opposite the Bodleian Library and Sheldonian Theatre, and close to several of the colleges and other university buildings, with on street parking close by. Oxford is at the centre of an excellent road and rail network, close to the London - Birmingham (M40) motorway and is served by a frequent train service from London (Paddington). Hours: Monday–Saturday 9am to 6pm. (Tuesday 9:30am to 6pm.) Purchases: We are always keen to purchase books, whether single works or in quantity, and will be pleased to make arrangements to view them. Auction commissions: We attend a number of auction sales and will be happy to execute commissions on your behalf. Blackwell online bookshop www.blackwell.co.uk Our extensive online catalogue of new books caters for every speciality, with the latest releases and editor’s recommendations. -
Petrus Ramus Y El Derecho
Petrus Ramus y el Derecho Rafael Ramis Barceló Petrus Ramus y el Derecho The Figuerola Institute Programme: Legal History The Programme “Legal History” of the Figuerola Institute of Social Science History –a part of the Carlos III University of Madrid– is devoted to improve the overall knowledge on the history of law from different points of view –academically, culturally, socially, and institutionally– covering both ancient and modern eras. A number of experts from several countries have participated in the Programme, bringing in their specialized knowledge and dedication to the subject of their expertise. To give a better visibility of its activities, the Programme has published in its Book Series a number of monographs on the different aspects of its academic discipline. Publisher: Carlos III University of Madrid Book Series: Legal History Editorial Committee: Manuel Ángel Bermejo Castrillo, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Catherine Fillon, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 Manuel Martínez Neira, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Carlos Petit, Universidad de Huelva Cristina Vano, Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II More information at www.uc3m.es/legal_history Petrus Ramus y el Derecho Los juristas ramistas del siglo XVI Rafael Ramis Barceló Historia del derecho, 40 © 2015 Rafael Ramis Barceló Editorial Dykinson c/ Meléndez Valdés, 61 – 28015 Madrid Tlf. (+34) 91 544 28 46 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.dykinson.com Preimpresión: TALLERONCE ISBN: 978-84-9085-683-3 ISSN: 2255-5137 D.L.: M-2486-2016 Versión electrónica disponible en e-Archivo http://hdl.handle.net/10016/22197 Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España Para Antonio Planas Rosselló ÍNDICE Introducción . -
Index Nominum
Index Nominum Abualcasim, 50 Alfred of Sareshal, 319n Achillini, Alessandro, 179, 294–95 Algazali, 52n Adalbertus Ranconis de Ericinio, Ali, Ismail, 8n, 132 205n Alkindi, 304 Adam, 313 Allan, Mowbray, 276n Adam of Papenhoven, 222n Alne, Robert, 208n Adamson, Melitta Weiss, 136n Alonso, Manual, 46 Adenulf of Anagni, 301, 384 Alphonse of Poitiers, 193, 234 Adrian IV, pope, 108 Alverny, Marie-Thérèse d’, 35, 46, Afonso I Henriques, king of Portu- 50, 53n, 93, 147, 177, 264n, 303, gal, 35 308n Aimery, archdeacon of Tripoli, Alvicinus de Cremona, 368 105–6 Amadaeus VIII, duke of Savoy, Alberic of Trois Fontaines, 100–101 231 Albert de Robertis, bishop of Ambrose, 289 Tripoli, 106 Anastasius IV, pope, 108 Albert of Rizzato, patriarch of Anti- Anatoli, Jacob, 113 och, 73, 77n, 86–87, 105–6, 122, Andreas the Jew, 116 140 Andrew of Cornwall, 201n Albert of Schmidmüln, 215n, 269 Andrew of Sens, 199, 200–202 Albertus Magnus, 1, 174, 185, 191, Antonius de Colell, 268 194, 212n, 227, 229, 231, 245–48, Antweiler, Wolfgang, 70n, 74n, 77n, 250–51, 271, 284, 298, 303, 310, 105n, 106 315–16, 332 Aquinas, Thomas, 114, 256, 258, Albohali, 46, 53, 56 280n, 298, 315, 317 Albrecht I, duke of Austria, 254–55 Aratus, 41 Albumasar, 36, 45, 50, 55, 59, Aristippus, Henry, 91, 329 304 Arnald of Villanova, 1, 156, 229, 235, Alcabitius, 51, 56 267 Alderotti, Taddeo, 186 Arnaud of Verdale, 211n, 268 Alexander III, pope, 65, 150 Ashraf, al-, 139n Alexander IV, pope, 82 Augustine (of Hippo), 331 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 311, Augustine of Trent, 231 336–37 Aulus Gellius, -
Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic
GYULA KLIMA EXISTENCE AND REFERENCE IN MEDIEVAL LOGIC 1. Introduction: Existential Assumptions in Modern vs. Medieval Logic “The expression ‘free logic’ is an abbreviation for the phrase ‘free of existence assumptions with respect to its terms, general and singular’.”1 Classical quantification theory is not a free logic in this sense, as its standard formulations commonly assume that every singular term in every model is assigned a referent, an element of the universe of discourse. Indeed, since singular terms include not only singular constants, but also variables2, standard quantification theory may be regarded as involving even the assumption of the existence of the values of its variables, in accordance with Quine’s famous dictum: “to be is to be the value of a variable”.3 But according to some modern interpretations of Aristotelian syllogistic, Aristotle’s theory would involve an even stronger existential assumption, not shared by quantification theory, namely, the assumption of the non-emptiness of common terms.4 Indeed, the need for such an assumption seems to be supported not only by a number of syllogistic forms, which without this assumption appear to be invalid, but also by the doctrine of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione concerning the logical relationships among categorical propositions, commonly summarized in the Square of Opposition. For example, Aristotle’s theory states that universal affirmative propositions imply particular affirmative propositions. But if we formalize such propositions in quantification theory, we get formulae between which the corresponding implication does not hold. So, evidently, there is some discrepancy between the ways Aristotle and quantification theory interpret these categoricals. -
Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M
Z Zabarella, Jacopo chair of logic, succeeding Tomitano. On 4 January 1569 he secured the second extraordinary chair of Born: 5 September 1533, Padua natural philosophy. There was likely a pause in his Died: 15 October 1589, Padua teaching from 1574 to 1576 on account of the severity of plague in Padua. On 26 March 1577 Marco Sgarbi he acquired the first extraordinary chair of natural Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy philosophy, and in 1578, he published his Opera logica in Venice, thus opening a large debate on the Abstract order and method of knowledge among his con- temporaries – especially with Francesco Jacopo Zabarella (1553–1589) is considered Piccolomini (1520–1604) and Bernardino Petrella one of the most acute and brilliant logicians (1529–1595). In 1580 Zabarella published his of all time. He made an important contribution Tabulae logicae and also founded the Accademia to the interpretation of Aristotle and developed degli Stabili. In 1584, he came under attack in two original ideas especially in the field of logic directions: from Piccolomini in his Universa and epistemology, opening up the pathway of philosophia de moribus, and from Petrella in his early modern science. Logicarum disputationum libri VII. The same year, Zabarella’s reply to Piccolomini was his De doctrina ordine apologia. In the meantime, on Biography 6 September 1585, he became professor of the second ordinary chair of natural philosophy, and He was born in Padua on 5 September 1533, the the following year he published his De naturalis eldest son of Giulio Zabarella. He was well-versed scientiae constitutione. -
Obligations, Sophisms and Insolubles∗
Obligations, Sophisms and Insolubles∗ Stephen Read University of St Andrews Scotland, U.K. March 23, 2012 1 Medieval Logic Medieval logic inherited the legacy of Aristotle: first, the logica vetus, Aristo- tle's Categories and De Interpretatione, which together with some of Boethius' works were all the logic the Latin West had to go on around 1100. Subse- quently, over the following century, came the recovery of the logica nova: the rest of Aristotle's Organon, all of which was available in Latin by 1200. The medievals' own original contribution began to be formulated from around 1150 and came to be known as the logica modernorum. It consisted of a theory of properties of terms (signification, supposition, appellation, ampli- ation, restriction etc.); a theory of consequences; a theory of insolubles; and a theory of obligations. This development was arguably stimulated by the theory of fallacy, following recovery of De Sophisticis Elenchis around 1140.1 It reached fulfilment in the 14th century, the most productive century for logic before the 20th. In this paper, I will concentrate for the most part on the theory of obligations|logical obligations. My focus will be on some logicians at the University of Oxford, mostly at Merton College, in the early fourteenth century, in particular, Walter Burley (or Burleigh), Richard Kilvington, Roger Swyneshed and William Heytesbury. I will contrast three different approaches to the theory of obli- gations found in these authors, and some of the reasons for these contrasts. The standard theory of obligations, the responsio antiqua, was codified by Burley in a treatise composed in Oxford in 1302. -
Approaches to the Extramission Postulate in 13Th Century Theories of Vision Lukáš Lička
The Visual Process: Immediate or Successive? Approaches to the Extramission Postulate in 13th Century Theories of Vision Lukáš Lička [Penultimate draft. For the published version, see L. Lička, “The Visual Process: Immediate or Successive? Approaches to the Extramission Postulate in 13th Century Theories of Vision”, in Medieval Perceptual Puzzles: Theories of Sense-Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries, edited by E. Băltuță, Leiden: Brill, 2020, pp. 73–110.] Introduction Is vision merely a state of the beholder’s sensory organ which can be explained as an immediate effect caused by external sensible objects? Or is it rather a successive process in which the observer actively scanning the surrounding environment plays a major part? These two general attitudes towards visual perception were both developed already by ancient thinkers. The former is embraced by natural philosophers (e.g., atomists and Aristotelians) and is often labelled “intromissionist”, based on their assumption that vision is an outcome of the causal influence exerted by an external object upon a sensory organ receiving an entity from the object. The latter attitude to vision as a successive process is rather linked to the “extramissionist” theories of the proponents of geometrical optics (such as Euclid or Ptolemy) who suggest that an entity – a visual ray – is sent forth from the eyes to the object.1 The present paper focuses on the contributions to this ancient controversy proposed by some 13th-century Latin thinkers. In contemporary historiography of medieval Latin philosophy, the general narrative is that whereas thinkers in the 12th century held various (mostly Platonic) versions of the extramission theory, the situation changes during the first half of the 13th century when texts by Avicenna, Aristotle (with the commentaries by Averroes), and especially Alhacen, who all favour the intromissionist paradigm, were gradually assimilated.2 It is assumed that, as a result, 1 For an account of the ancient theories of vision based on this line of conflict see especially D. -
The History of Logic
c Peter King & Stewart Shapiro, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (OUP 1995), 496–500. THE HISTORY OF LOGIC Aristotle was the first thinker to devise a logical system. He drew upon the emphasis on universal definition found in Socrates, the use of reductio ad absurdum in Zeno of Elea, claims about propositional structure and nega- tion in Parmenides and Plato, and the body of argumentative techniques found in legal reasoning and geometrical proof. Yet the theory presented in Aristotle’s five treatises known as the Organon—the Categories, the De interpretatione, the Prior Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, and the Sophistical Refutations—goes far beyond any of these. Aristotle holds that a proposition is a complex involving two terms, a subject and a predicate, each of which is represented grammatically with a noun. The logical form of a proposition is determined by its quantity (uni- versal or particular) and by its quality (affirmative or negative). Aristotle investigates the relation between two propositions containing the same terms in his theories of opposition and conversion. The former describes relations of contradictoriness and contrariety, the latter equipollences and entailments. The analysis of logical form, opposition, and conversion are combined in syllogistic, Aristotle’s greatest invention in logic. A syllogism consists of three propositions. The first two, the premisses, share exactly one term, and they logically entail the third proposition, the conclusion, which contains the two non-shared terms of the premisses. The term common to the two premisses may occur as subject in one and predicate in the other (called the ‘first figure’), predicate in both (‘second figure’), or subject in both (‘third figure’). -
Continental Books
CONTINENTAL BOOKS Bernard Quaritch Ltd List 016 / ALBERTI IN SPANISH 1. ALBERTI, Leon Battista. El Momo. La moral e muy graciosa historia del Momo; compuesta en Latin por el docto varon Leon Baptista Alberto Florentin. Trasladada en Castellano por Agustín de Almaçan ... Alcalá de Henares, Joan Mey Flandro, 1553. Small folio, ff. [xiv], 71 + one leaf; gothic letter, title printed in red and black within a composite woodcut border of renaissance ornament, printer’s woodcut device in the centre, woodcut initials, headpieces; last leaf (blank except for printer’s device on recto) in deceptive facsimile, wormhole in lower blank margins of three gatherings carefully filled in, one leaf (I1) remargined on three sides with loss of a few letters, some light browning; otherwise a very sound and large copy with some uncut edges, in recent limp vellum wrappers. £3800 First edition in Spanish of Alberti’s Momus (or De principe) translated by Augustín de Almaçan and with an introductory Exposición by the Toledo ascetic writer and scholar Alejo Venegas (1495?–1554?). An indispensable source for Alberti’s political thought and a supremely interesting example of how the comic spirit of the early Renaissance expressed itself in literature, Alberti’s Momus is a political and social satire set in the form of an allegorical/mythological fable. Its mood is that of a light- hearted humanist jeu d’esprit; its humorous and even farcical manner was intended, as Alberti states in his preface, to make readers laugh while at the same time confronting them with serious political and social issues, in particular, with the question of what makes a good ruler. -
Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes As As Many, Groups, and Plurals
Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as as Many, Groups, and Plurals Nino B. Cocchiarella Abstract Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his sub- sequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter complex as well as simple common names. Names, proper or com- mon, and simple or complex, occur as parts of quanti…er phrases, which in conceptual realism stand for referential concepts, i.e., cognitive capaci- ties that inform our speech and mental acts with a referential nature and account for the intentionality, or directedness, of those acts. In Russell’s theory, quanti…er phrases express denoting concepts (which do not include proper names). In conceptual realism, names, as well as predicates, can be nominalized and allowed to occur as "singular terms", i.e., as arguments of predicates. Occurring as a singular term, a name denotes, if it denotes at all, a class as many, where, as in Russell’s theory, a class as many of one object is identical with that one object, and a class as many of more than one object is a plurality, i.e., a plural object that we call a group. Also, as in Russell’stheory, there is no empty class as many. -
Paolo Sarpi, the Absolutist State and the Territoriality of the Adriatic Sea
Erasmo Castellani Paolo Sarpi, the Absolutist State and the Territoriality of the Adriatic Sea The years between the second half of the sixteenth century and the first few decades of the seventeenth constituted a period of general reconfiguration throughout the Mediterranean. The hegemonic position held by Venice from centuries on the Adriatic Sea, or “the Venetian Gulf”, as it was called, started to be disputed persistently by other powers. The Dominio da mar, the Venetian territories in the Mediterranean – and Venice itself – were not living their best times: Venice was still recovering from the terrible wounds inflicted by the Ottoman Empire in the 1570s, and trying to solve the tragic loss of Cyprus, extremely significant for the Republic not only in terms of resources and men, but also for its political value and reputation. The Turks, who had represented the main threat for the Venetian maritime territories from the end of the fourteenth century, were worn-out too by the intense and truculent decade, and after 1573 (the so-called war of Cyprus), did not engage in seafaring wars with Venice until 1645 with the Cretean wars. The Uskok corsairs, who enjoyed the support of the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, officially to fight the Turks, tormented Venice and its territories on the Dalmatian coast between the 1580s and 1610s, raiding villages, cargos and, in general, making the Adriatic routes less and less secure. The Uskoks, as the Barbary corsairs, represented not only a harmful presence on the sea, but also an economic and political threat for Venice: corsairs activities in fact offered to the Venetian subjects on the 1 Dalmatian coast opportunities to engage in small commercial enterprises without being submitted to the Serenissima’s regulations. -
Philosophy May 20, 2013
Outline of Philosophy May 20, 2013 Contents SOCI>Philosophy .............................................................................................................................................................. 3 SOCI>Philosophy>Aesthetics ....................................................................................................................................... 3 SOCI>Philosophy>Aesthetics>Beauty .................................................................................................................... 4 SOCI>Philosophy>Aesthetics>Theory .................................................................................................................... 4 SOCI>Philosophy>Epistemology ................................................................................................................................. 5 SOCI>Philosophy>Epistemology>Possibility ......................................................................................................... 6 SOCI>Philosophy>Epistemology>World ................................................................................................................ 6 SOCI>Philosophy>Epistemology>Object Properties .............................................................................................. 6 SOCI>Philosophy>Epistemology>System Properties ............................................................................................. 6 SOCI>Philosophy>Epistemology>Representation .................................................................................................