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The Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy

Richard Cross, JT Paasch

Kinds of Argument

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315709604-5 Sara L. Uckelman Published online on: 13 Jan 2021

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Instead, it is more fruitful to look at at look to fruitful more it is Instead, arguments. of kinds all covers exhaustively that typology philosophy. medieval in occur that arguments of kinds the of tour our guide to these use we will and arguments, of typologies useful constructing for means the with us provide distinctions His did. logicians and philosophers medieval as just Aristotle, of authority the to back referring be constantly we will chapter, this in aresult, As Ages. Middle the in Europe western in method philosophical the for foundation the provided texts 1982). These Venice of (Dod James by translations new through or Boethius by translations lost of rediscovery the through either century mid-twelfth the in introduced were others while century, sixth early the from translations Boethius’s Arguments” “Sophistical section the (see tation ments” below); Topics the alytics truth. at directed effort acooperative in you’re if use engaged to appropriate not are that guments ar of types of use make to able be you will adebate, winning is about you care all if Similarly, knowledge. for foundations epistemological firm providing is goal your if than disposal your at types argumentative more have you might then possible, means any by views, your of opponent your persuading is about you care that all if context: the on depends argument a good as counts What others. than better are arguments of kinds which or arguments, of types best the are what of aquestion is itself this and best, are procedures argumentative what of a matter becomes sion persua for grounds best the as counts What this.) of atestament is Greece ancient in philosophy of study the and rhetoric of study the between relationship close (The grounds. of purest and best the on views, his of others convince to able was that one was philosopher agood Thus, positions. and views opposing with people, other many with interacting and to speaking people many also but armchair his in home at sitting person asingle merely not was Philosophy entwined. closely were rhetoric and politics, philosophy, where spheres, public and academic Greek the phi of in losophy nature multi-agent and dialectic intrinsically the of out falls argumentation on emphasis This so. doing for argument agood them give to is them “convert” to way expedient most the you do, as views philosophical same doesn’t the who hold someone with Faced argumentation. is day present the until Greeks ancient the from philosophy western in methodology central The Before we begin the tour, it is important to note that we will not be establishing a single asingle establishing be not we will that note to important it is tour, the we begin Before Aristotle discusses all these matters in a number of works, including the Prior the including works, of anumber in matters these all discusses Aristotle the section “Syllogistic Arguments” Arguments” “Syllogistic section the (see reasoning syllogistic and syllogisms discuss , which Sophistical Refutations Sophistical the ); and the section “Non-Syllogistic Argu “Non-Syllogistic section the (see reasoning non-syllogistic discusses , which KINDS OF ARGUMENT KINDS , which focuses on the merely persuasive aspects of argumen of aspects persuasive merely the on focuses , which Sara Uckelman L. Introduction ). Some of these texts were transmitted into Latin via via Latin into transmitted were texts ). these of Some 3 31 Posterior An Posterior and ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 apparent wisdom for himself, [and] he also intends victory over a respondent” (2009: 376). (2009: over arespondent” victory intends healso [and] himself, for wisdom apparent and glory acquire to “intends arguer the when it, puts Bacon or, as win, to merely is important is what where circumstances in used are they instead, truth; the to guide areliable not are They rubbish. produce actually, not but correct seemingly only is which away in argue which or able, prob seemingly only are which premises on based are they because hand, other the on arguments, Sophistical reliable. be to going part, most the for are, they stability; of adegree have them from arising conclusions the nevertheless, but arguments, demonstrative as strong as not are arguments Dialectical knowledge. scientific certain, produce arguments Demonstrative proves. argument the in any way except merely apparently. merely except way any in conclusion the to related causally not are premises the hand, other the on arguments, sophistical In conclusion. the of being the of cause the also are premises the argument, ademonstrative in conclusion; the proving and implying both of cause the are premises the argument, adialectical In 305). (2009: being its of it and proving and implying of (3) acause and it, proving and implying of (2) acause only, aconclusion (1) implying of acause causes: of sorts three are There conclusion. the cause to said are argument an of premises the which in ways the of basis the on arguments of types three these distinguishes century) (mid-thirteenth Logic of Science and Art his in Bacon Roger deployment. incorrect and correct their and purpose, and role their arguments, of properties and types the of discussions explicit and interesting most the we find that centuries fourteenth and thirteenth the in it is and argumentation, of development theoretical the on we concentrate employed, were they which in ways specific the to opposed as philosophy, medieval in used arguments of types the in interested we are Because Ages. Middle the in logic of period high the were centuries two these because above) rather but we noted what given contrary, the (quite periods other in used not were arguments because not is This centuries. fourteenth and thirteenth the specifically philosophy, medieval in period narrow arelatively on we focus chapter, this in Additionally, 3 2 (c. 1250): (c. Logic to Introduction his in explains Sherwood of William As it. adopted and division partite tri this on up picked authors Medieval sophistical. and dialectical, demonstrative, types: three into in Topics who Aristotle, from directly comes up take we typology first The 1 argument: the of characteristic relevant different a out or picks focus different a has which of each typologies, three We out. picks consider typology acertain that focus the to according differently described be can type argument asingle that such typologies, overlapping

This is a typology which divides arguments on the basis of their outcomes, or what it is that that it is what or outcomes, their of basis the on arguments divides which atypology is This victory. victory. or glory at aimed strictly it is case either in [premisses]; probable of basis the on syllogizes seemingly or [premisses] probable seemingly of basis the on syllogizes either that one is gism syllo asophistical Finally, [premisses]. probable of basis the on opinion produces that one is however, syllogism, Adialectical conclusion. the for reasons certain most the and [premisses] The goal or purpose of the argument ( argument the of purpose or goal The The form of the argument ( argument the of form The A demonstrative syllogism A demonstrative ( argument the of outcome The Arguments According to Their Outcome to Their According Arguments 1 is one that produces scientific knowledge on the basis of necessary necessary of basis the on knowledge scientific produces that one is the section “Arguments According to Their Form” Their to According “Arguments section the the section “Arguments According to Their Outcome” Their to According “Arguments section the 2 Sara L. Uckelman L. Sara the section “Arguments According to Goal or Purpose” or Goal to According “Arguments section the 32 I.1 divides arguments arguments I.1 divides ) (1966: 69) ) - - - ) Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 premises, we must rely on dialectical arguments. dialectical on rely we must premises, evident readily and true necessarily of assured be always we cannot where contexts, other In ing. reason scientific of means reliable only the are They disputed. be cannot that conclusions reliable propter quid propter shows demonstrations that ademonstratiofrom quia different way some in is which demonstration, erful pow most the by acquired anything of grasp “a mental being knowledge of type proper most the demonstration, be it demonstratio be quia demonstration, a of means by anything of grasp “a mental being next the case,” the be opposite the that danger a without necessary and true, anything of grasp “a mental being weakest the speaking, properly knowledge of gradations three distinguishes Gaetanus arguments. of types different and know” “to the phrase use we which in ways different between relationship the (1387–1465) explains of Dialectic Summaries fourteenth-century early Buridan’s John in distinction this see We also breathing. not wall’s the of cause aremote is animal” an “not being this in animal”; an not it is because breathe not does “A is second wall the of example 323). An (2009: angles” right two to equal angles three has it [because] figure aplane is “a or triangle twinkle” not do they because near are planets “the non- or demonstration A 304). (2009: necessary also but true only not be must premises the demonstration, of sort this aconclusion”; of for causes the and than, known better to, prior are and immediate, and true, primary, are that things “from Aristotle) and cause,”(quoting a through known made is effect an quid propter Ademonstration basic. most the is latter which.” of The “because quia demonstrations types: two identifies and guments ar demonstrative discusses Bacon instead. argumentation sophistical and dialectical/probable on focusing further, them discuss to on go not hedoes text, his in arguments demonstrative mentions weakness of the premises, and not from any defect in the type of argument itself. As Bacon says: Bacon As itself. argument of type the in defect any from not and premises, the of weakness the from stems argument the of weakness the true; necessarily than rather probable, merely are which conclusions to lead they that in ones, demonstrative than weaker are arguments Dialectical ( otherwise” be cannot this that and this, of cause the is it that is, thing the why cause the “[of] knowledge is knowledge scientific ­Aristotle, Analytics ­Posterior Aristotle’s of topic the are they knowledge; produces which one is argument A demonstrative than the form of the argument. Both Bacon and Sherwood focus on the non-syllogistic arguments arguments non-syllogistic the on focus Sherwood and Bacon Both argument. the of form the other than something in lies justification whose argument anon-syllogistic be it can or true necessarily than rather probable merely are premises whose asyllogism be either can argument view, adialectical this In As a class, demonstrative arguments are the “gold standard.” They provide us with utterly utterly with us provide They standard.” “gold the are arguments demonstrative aclass, As wise hold a contrary opinion. opinion. a contrary hold wise is What opinion. a contrary hold wise the nor crowd the neither which about that is all to probable is What notable. most the to or many to or all to probable .The truth of appearance the have that things but things, A dialectical syllogism dialectical proximate cause to effect (2009: 323). An example of the first is when it is argued that that argued is it when is first the of example An 323). (2009: effect to cause ­proximate (2001: 8.2, 8.8, 8.9), and again in the fifteenth century when Gaetanus of Thiene Thiene of Gaetanus when century fifteenth the in 8.9), again 8.8, and 8.2, (2001: quia , which discusses how scientific knowledge and discovery is possible. For For possible. is discovery and knowledge how scientific discusses , which , on the other hand, either reason from effect back to cause or from a remote remote a from or cause to back effect from reason either hand, other the , on arises from probable propositions because it does not seek necessary necessary seek not it does because propositions probable from arises Demonstrative Arguments Dialectical Arguments Dialectical or demonstratio or quid propter are stronger than demonstrations quia than stronger are Kinds of Argument Kinds APo. 33 I.2). Despite the fact that William of Sherwood Sherwood of William that fact the I.2). Despite propter quid propter demonstrations and “because” is that about which the the which about that is many to probable , be it universal or particular,” and and particular,” or it universal , be is what seems [to be true] true] [to be seems what is . ” (Boh 1985: 91).” (Boh This is “that by which which by “that is (2009: 325) (2009: - - -

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 “Topical Arguments” following Aristotle ( Aristotle following again happen, can this which in ways three distinguishes do” not (1988: 272).should Kilwardby reasoning something mind, of state a wrong produce to conclusion or premise a false introduces “it when is former the of (1988: example 272). An it should” what do not it does or do, not should it what does it either “for arise, can argument sophistical a ways different many are there that says (c. 1245–1250) Sciences the of Order the On his in logic on chapter the in Kilwardby 377). Robert (2009: elenchus and paraelenchus apparent and truth both and syllogisms, paralogical syllogisms, sophistical topics, sophistical fallacies, mentions Bacon kinds; many in come arguments Sophistical not, strictly speaking unsolvable, merely very difficult to solve). to difficult very merely unsolvable, speaking strictly not, insolubilia or use) would sophistically reasons who one or a Sophist sophismata philosophers medieval the by called variously were and sentences problematic otherwise or paradoxical from arguments are arguments Such clusion. con the of truth the guarantee to enough not is true are premises the that assumption the yet and correct, logically is argument the in step single however, every Sometimes, discussion). this up the in fallacies of kinds different of rization catego along gives (Aristotle afallacy contains or is argument the that we say case, this in good; actually, not but apparently, only are argument the in used steps the when either happen can This (1988: 272). matter and form both in err it can (iii) or believable); readily actually not but believable readily apparently only is premises the of one or unsound it is is, (that matter in obligationes called disputation of type medieval uniquely the of centuries fourteenth and thirteenth the in development the in manifest Refutations inSophistical defines Aristotle which disputations of types different the of influence tle’s or sophistical reasoning naturally led to the study of paradoxes— of study the to led naturally reasoning sophistical or fallacious recognize how to and fallacies teaching of task The time. any at but Ages Middle the during only not logic in novel developments most the of many for responsible indirectly and directly both was canon logical medieval the into text this of introduction 1982), the and Venice of (Dod James by utations Refutations (the Sophistical reasoning sophistical recognize how to showing to book entire an devoted Aristotle that wonder no it is and so, doing actually without truth to lead to appear can argument an which in ways many are There wise. being (1966: actually 133), wise” without appear can aperson which of means by that is therefore, disputation, sophistical wisdom; apparent is strives sophist the which for end “the says, Sherwood as truth; apparent merely rather but truth actual obtain Sop loci Latin the are to herefers that (1966: 69–70). “grounds” The grounds” [dialectical] from probability its it derives but [premisses], probable on based “is argument dialectical a that says Sherwood form. the than other something from justification their derive which Bacon gives a delightful explanation of sophistical arguments, saying that a sophistical argument argument asophistical that saying arguments, sophistical of explanation adelightful gives Bacon A sophistical argument, then, is one that apparently leads from truth to truth but doesn’t in fact. fact. doesn’t but in truth to truth from leads apparently that one is then, argument, A sophistical histical arguments are distinguished from the preceding two types in that they are employed not to to not employed are they that in types two preceding the from distinguished are arguments histical τοποι painted with bull-bile seem to be golden. be to seem bull-bile with painted things and brass of made objects and things, silver like look tin and litharge of made objects things: of case the in as just not, it is but syllogism, [a] dialectical being of appearance the gives were not translated by Boethius but were newly translated in the middle of the twelfth century century twelfth the of middle the in translated newly were but Boethius by translated not were (sing. τοπος (sing. Topics , and also in the discussion of disputations ( disputations of discussion the in also , and ), the subject of the Topics the of ), subject the I.1): (i) The argument can err in form (that is, be invalid); (ii) it can err err it can (ii) invalid); be is, (that form in err can I.1): argument The (i) the section “Arguments According to Goal or Purpose” or Goal to According “Arguments section the see (about which Sophistical Arguments Sophistical Sara L. Uckelman L. Sara Sophistical Refutations Sophistical the section section the in below arguments topical to . We return 34 (sing. locus (sing. the section “Dialectical Arguments” “Dialectical section the “sophisms” (that is, arguments that that arguments is, (that “sophisms” , and many medieval authors take take authors medieval many , and ­sophismata “insolubles” (though they were were they (though “insolubles” ), the translation of Aristo of ), translation the and insolubilia and - Ref ). Sophistical The (2009: 370) (2009: —and the the —and I.2 is is I.2 ). ). - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 gism is assertoric, modal, or otherwise, and we consider each in turn. in each we consider and otherwise, or modal, assertoric, is gism apparent. merely is middle the syllogism, asophistical in (1988: 266–267); middle” “a have necessary former the whereas term, middle” believable a readily “only have ter lat the that saying by syllogisms dialectical and demonstrative between difference the describes Kilwardby term.” “middle the called is conclusion the in not but premises both in appears which term The premise.” “minor the called is term minor the contains which premise the and term,” “minor the called is conclusion the of term subject The premise.” “major the called is term major the contains which premise the and term,” “major the called is conclusion the of term predicate The statements. three the in occur that terms three exactly are there together, taken and, term, apredicate and term asubject has statements three the of Each conclusion. the is which of third 4). 1966: 57; 2009: (cf., e.g., Bacon Sherwood syllogisms of discussion medieval every almost in Analytics Prior Aristotle, from verbatim almost is definition This Summulae Buridan’s of treatise final the see arguments, sophismatic of view a representative For ass. an be to someone proving at aimed arguments medieval many the as such ones, amusing merely the to paradox, Liar the as such ones, handle to difficult and deep logically the from range con sidered arguments of types The insolubles. and sophisms treatises—discussing distinct write even according to Buridan: to according is, syllogism A properties. special and form aspecific having arguments, of asubset are syllogisms speaking properly synonymously, “argument” and “syllogism” use authors medieval some While structure. their on based arguments of atypology up we take section, this In forms. argument of types of a variety is there categories, three these of each within But premises. the of basis the on conclusion the of probity the of basis the on sophistical or dialectical, demonstrative, as identified is argument An is two terms combined with one of the following four copulas: four following the of one with combined terms two is statement Acategorical statements. categorical of made is syllogism, categorical, or assertoric, An Further constraints are placed on the form of the statements on the basis of whether the syllo the whether of basis the on statements the of form the on placed are constraints Further the and premises the are which of two statements, three comprising argument an is A syllogism In the fourteenth century, it was quite common for logicians to include separate chapters—or chapters—or separate include to logicians for common quite it was century, fourteenth the In is an animal; therefore, every man is a substance”. asubstance”. is man every therefore, animal; an is man every asubstance; is animal “Every in as posited, been has what of account on occur to else something for necessary it is posited, been have things some after which, in expression an is not .” not is o “Some .” is i “Some .” e “No is .” are a “All (2001). Arguments According to Their According Form Arguments Syllogistic Arguments Assertoric Syllogisms Assertoric Kinds of Argument Kinds 35 I.1, and variations on it can be found found be it on can I.1, variations and (2001: 308) - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 are called “figures,” and we give schematic forms of the three figures in Figure 3.1. Figure in figures three the of forms schematic give and we “figures,” called are Sherwood’s Introduction ­Sherwood’s in occurs which of version extant earliest the poem, ahexameter into together put were names mnemonic story.) These (1963) full the for McCall (2013) and Malink to reader interested the rect di but here, rules conversion these of details the into go “m”). by (We cannot (indicated premises reductio or contradiction by proof by means of simple conversion (indicated by “s”), conversion “s”), by conversion (indicated conversion simple of means by them deriving of means the as well as derived be should they which from syllogism perfect the encode also but are, conclusion the and premise the statements of types which of indication an only not contain syllogisms valid the of names no. The is answer The coincidence. mere is this if wonder might “a,” and with above labeled were which statements, affirmative universal three contains name this by denoted mood syllogistic the “a”s, while three contains “Barbara” that fact the by struck be will reader thoughtful The “Barbara.” called was syllogism previous the by fied ones. perfect the of one from proven be could mood valid other any that such also and valid self-evidently is, that as“perfect,” out picked were moods first-figure the of Four following: the is statements affirmative universal with syllogism a first-figure of example An conclusion. and premises the of statement-types the both; or it can be the subject of both (cf. Sherwood 1966: 60; Buridan 2001: 310–311). 2001: Buridan 1966: 60; Sherwood (cf. both of subject the be it can or both; in predicate the be it can other; the of predicate the and premise one of subject the be can term middle The other. each to respect with arranged be can terms these which in ways three identify we can middle, the Mfor and term, major the Pfor term, minor the for Sstand Letting ments. particular). or (universal quantity and negative) or (affirmative quality its identifying by identified uniquely be an (i) type of statements while “universal,” (a) (e) called and are type of “negative”; statements called typeand are (e) (o) of statements while “affirmative,” called are (a) (i) and type of Statements Figure 3.1Figure Each valid syllogistic mood was given a name by the medieval logicians; the mood exempli mood the logicians; medieval the by aname given was mood syllogistic valid Each determine to copula of a insertion the by a into “mood” turned be can figures these of Each As noted above, each syllogism is made up of three terms, each appearing in two of the state the of two in appearing each terms, three of up made is syllogism each above, noted As Darapti felapton disamis datisi bocardo ferison. bocardo datisi disamis felapton Darapti Cesare camestres festino baroco Celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton All Greeks are mortal. are Greeks All men. are Greeks All mortal. are men All d (o) are called “particular.” Thus, the type of every statement in an assertoric syllogism can can syllogism assertoric an in statement every of type the Thus, “particular.” d (o) called are The three syllogistic figures. syllogistic three The (1966: 66): (indicated by “c”), along with possibly interchanging the two two the interchanging possibly with “c”), by along (indicated M S S __ 1st2 __ __ MS PS PP Sara L. Uckelman L. Sara ______36 nd MM MM PS 3r ______d P P S per accidens (indicated by “p”), by and (indicated 4 3 These ways ways These - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 turn, indebted to the Arabic logician Averroës (1126–1198; Averroës 2007). Thom see logician Arabic the to indebted turn, in was, 1279) (d. Kilwardby and Kilwardby’s, by Robert influenced heavily was theory his but (d. 1280), Great the Albert to due is account best-known the Perhaps sophisticated. remarkably are Analytics Prior the on com mentators thirteenth-century for concern important an was theory his Rehabilitating rehabilitation). (2013) a for Malink 1963);see 1957; but McCall (Lukasiewicz flawed fundamentally be it to lieve impossible). nor necessary neither is, (that contingent be it can or impossible); not it is is, (that possible be can it false); always is, (that impossible be it can true); always is, (that necessary be it can be: can statement a that ways or (hence “modal”) “modes” different is these of Each contingency. or possibility, impossibility, necessity, about does), rather but statement assertoric an (as falsity or truth about not astatement makes which one is statement Amodal statements. modal involve Analytics Prior the of bulk the Rather, focus. primary Aristotle’s not was syllogistic assertoric However, the after. millennia for mentators Analytics Prior the in syllogisms assertoric of account Aristotle’s only. assertion of level the at ments logic (Parsons 2014). (Parsons logic to contributions medieval new genuinely the of one is syllogism” “expository the of theory the of development the particular, In highlighted. arguments two first the in as such terms molecular or relational or donkey”), every sees man “Some (e.g., predicates quantified irrational”), is stone adonkey,” is “That being “A runs,” human “Man mortal,” is (e.g., “Socrates propositions inite indef or singular involving those as such inferences, complex more of avariety handle to gistic statements. categorical four the of one of form the has conclusion the nor premise minor the neither because isn’t asyllogism This speaking: strictly a syllogism, not is syllogistic, Aristotelian an of example canonical the be to considered often is which argument, following Even the form. syllogistic classical in represented be cannot mortal” is human every therefore mortal, is female every mortal, is male every female, or male is human “Every and animal” an of ahead is aman of head every therefore animal, an is man “Every arguments the example, For express. can they statements of constrained type the quite in are syllogistic, assertoric the on built syllogisms modal and syllogisms, Assertoric T (1847: made” were ever 130). that any than meaning of full more be to Itake which .words words “magic these called century nineteenth the in DeMorgan aresult, As syllogisms. valid prove all to heneeded everything tongue his of tip the at had to belonged mood each figure which with along poem this memorized who A student he syllogisms in the previous section were called “assertoric” because they deal with state with deal they because “assertoric” called were section previous the in he syllogisms Aristotle’s theory of modal syllogisms is deeply problematic (many modern commentators be commentators modern (many problematic deeply is syllogisms modal of theory Aristotle’s Medieval authors recognized these shortcomings and developed ways of extending the syllo the extending of ways developed and shortcomings these recognized authors Medieval Therefore, Socrates is mortal. is Socrates Therefore, aman. is Socrates mortal. are men All is clear and complete, and it is no surprise that it has been the primary focus of com of focus primary the been it has that surprise no it is and complete, and clear is , and some of the modal syllogistics developed during this period period this during developed syllogistics modal the of some , and Kinds of Argument Kinds Extended Modal 37 (chs. 3, 8–22) is devoted to syllogistics which which syllogistics to devoted is 3, 8–22) (chs. ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 able to deal with syllogisms concerning divinity. concerning syllogisms with deal to able be to power needed expressive the have not did theory formal—his are predications all in creation, syllogistic—because his in predication formal of statements admitted only Aristotle Because 177). 2009: (Uckelman things” divine in reasoning syllogistic and predication of mode special this consider not did divinity, in being of mode special this ignoring philosophers, other the and that “Aristotle says He trinity. the about reasoning when results incorrect provide to blush, at first seems, theory syllogistic Aristotelian that it is why explains even author The valid. is syllogism the predications, essential are all if or predication, essential an is conclusion the and predications personal are premises the if but formal; or personal is conclusion the and premises the in used predication of type the if invalid is syllogism above the that argues He then Essential. or Personal, Formal, contained: predication of type the of basis the on statements categorical of division fold its probability from [dialectical] grounds” (1966: 70), or grounds” [dialectical] from probability its Arguments” “Dialectical section the of reasoning Topics the from name their take Topical arguments logic. tional proposi as we know what for name amedieval rather but syllogisms, nor hypothetical (wholly) neither are which syllogisms,” “hypothetical so-called the and argument, of category dialectical the of prototypical as taken are which arguments, topical types: two on concentrating arguments, non-syllogistic at we look section, this In argumentation. good for possibility of range the exhaust not know, it does logicians modern as but developments, logical and philosophical medieval in place acentral occupied rightly Aristotle, of inheritance medieval the of part as syllogistic, The (Maier century fifteenth the of beginning the or fourteenth the of end the at written manuscript anonymous an in occurs accounts interesting most the of One fails. (apparently) argument valid (apparently) this why of question the answer to false. is conclusion the while true are premises two first the theology, trinitarian orthodox on but syllogism, (extended) avalid of form the has This syllogism: areal than rather aparalogism, be to consider people many which argument, following the Consider God. is, that divinity, concerning syllogisms are logicians eval medi interested deeply which but all at discuss not did Aristotle that syllogisms of class A special that derive their strength from one of the maxims discussed in the Topics the in discussed maxims the of one from strength their derive that topical arguments are best understood as enthymemes, that is, incomplete syllogisms (cf. Peter Peter (cf. syllogisms incomplete is, that enthymemes, as understood best are arguments topical many Thus, term. middle asuitable with premises introducing by syllogism aproper into bilitated reha be to able principle in is argument topical good any that in syllogisms, with affinity a close Medieval philosophers took seriously the challenge provided by these arguments and sought sought and arguments these by provided challenge the seriously took philosophers Medieval Such arguments can take many different forms, but for the most part, topical arguments share share arguments topical part, most the for but forms, different many take can arguments Such The Father is the Son. the is Father The God. is Son The God. is Father The Non-Syllogistic Arguments Topical Arguments Sara L. Uckelman L. Sara Divine 1988). In this text, the author introduces athree introduces author the text, ù 1988). this In 38 . A dialectical argument, per Sherwood, “derives “derives Sherwood, per argument, . Adialectical , and are closely connected to the dialectical dialectical the to connected closely are , and τοποι . Topical arguments are thus ones ones thus are . Topical arguments . - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 corresponding syllogism can always be constructed. be always can syllogism corresponding a that fact the and amaxim on basis their is argument of type acoherent into together all them ties what varieties; many in come arguments dialectical that mean maxims topical the of diversity and variety The syllogism. acorresponding construct to used term middle supplementary the of nature the on depending categories three these into divided be can arguments topical aresult, As contributions of medieval logic. medieval of contributions significant most the of one is logic propositional of Abelard Peter by 1991: 303–304) Martin cf. logic, of history the in time second (for the “discovery” the fact, in and logic, medieval in opments devel un-Aristotelian distinctly the of one is logic propositional of development The and conclusion. premises the of structure propositional the from arising validity formal in grounded is good ness whose arguments particular in and arguments, of forms non-Aristotelian the of all namely: far, so lacking glaringly as noticed have will readers perceptive what to we turn section, this In one: syllogistic a into argument topical the turn to order in “extracted” is which term middle the of nature the (1966: on 71), mediate or depending extrinsic, intrinsic, into divided be can grounds Dialectical follows: as argument asyllogistic into converted be can argument topical the and exists,” matter that then exists, matter the on depends what “if maxim the of basis the on justified is argument This (1966: 85): example illustrative an as one, proposition. implied the positing by perfected be can enthymeme An 300). (2009: implied” other the and posited actually proposition one from “argues enthymeme an because Bacon’s (to use description) “imperfect” or incomplete are 2014: 199). Logic of Enthymemes Summaries mid-thirteenth-century Spain’s of taken as the most important type of argument of this kind (because of the close relationship relationship close the of (because kind this of argument of type important most the as taken was conditionalization because It is conditionalization. and disjunction, conjunction, negation, of means by statements complex make to combined be then can blocks building These ments. state or propositions but syllogistic) the in done is (as terms not blocks, building basic its as took Logica Ingredientibus Logica his In give just We syllogisms. associated their and arguments topical of a number offers Sherwood when from a mediate property, the ground is called mediate. mediate. called is ground the property, amediate from when extrinsic; called is ground the property, extrinsic an from when intrinsic; called is ground the question, the of terms the of one of property internal an from extracted is argument the when iron. have who people are Moors the Therefore, weapons. have who people are Moors The iron. have weapons have who people All iron. have Moors the Therefore weapons, have Moors The 5 and Dialectica and Propositional Reasoning Propositional Kinds of Argument Kinds (1970), Abelard developed a theory of reasoning that that reasoning of atheory developed (1970), Abelard 39 (1966: 71) - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 ambiguity. an “no,” “yes” or either clarifying by or reply can other the and aquestion, proposes person one question-and-answer: of method the is disputation adialectic of method the Aristotle, For fashion. acooperative in matter, some of truth the determine to together work participants two the hand, other the on disputation, adialectical In knowledge. teacher’s the to student the lead to is tation dispu the of goal the and not, is who astudent, and knowledgeable, is who ateacher, between place takes disputation Adidactic above. noted as truth, than rather victory, and glory at directed them. Nevertheless, we can broadly classify obligational disputations into two types: those which which those types: two into disputations obligational classify broadly we can Nevertheless, them. governing rules the of details the and recognized he disputation of species specific the on pending de theory, idiosyncratic own his developed author each Instead, period. this throughout theory on. trated concen most authors that one the and important, most the far by was positing these, Of that.” true be it “let and petition, institution, doubting, withdrawing, positing, identified: be can species Six centuries. two next the for canon logical the of apart be to continued genre the and century thirteenth the of decades first the from date disputations these on treatises earliest The name). the follow, hence to “obliged” heis (which rules certain with accordance in about agnostic remain or deny, concede, then may Respondent the that propositions forward puts Opponent the disputation the during and aRespondent, and Opponent an participants, two are There eristic. and dialectic ( experiment and practice of ( learning and de obligationibus disputations logical the foundation: Aristotelian this on built was philosophy medieval in ments develop unique most the of one and rhetoric), and argumentation between connection the and persuasion, in argument of role the concerning above notes the (cf. setting amulti-agent in born was argumentation nature, disputational its of much lost has logic modern While more) people. (or two between adispute as “argument,” of meaning non-philosophical the to closer back us brings we introduce typology the section, this In properties. certain has that statements of lection col a the word: defines logician the as “argument” on focused have typologies two previous The consequentia syllogisms.” “hypothetical as known often was mentation argu medieval of branch this that consequences) logical and propositions hypothetical between (1951: 1–2). (1951: Logic of Art the of Purity the (1325–1328) Burley’s On in found all quolibet a verum and quodlibet falso ex of rules the or transitivity) of (a statement consequent” the to antecedent is antecedent the to antecedent is “Whatever that rule the as such today, well-known Summaries Buridan’s from taken are 61), (ibid.: which of consequent” all the without true be antecedent the that requires falsity Its consequence. necessary one to amount conditional true every hence consequent, the out with true be cannot antecedent the that requires aconditional of truth “The 63), (ibid.: and false” members its both that required is it falsity its for and true, be of it member one that sufficient is and required it is truth proposition’s] [a 62), disjunctive 2001: its “For (Buridan false” is them of either if it suffices falsity its for and true, be categoricals both that requires [proposition] a conjunctive of truth “The as such arguments, propositional for rules modern familiar the of all find we can Medieval disputations de obligationibus disputations Medieval Though most authors agreed on the general principles of obligationes of principles general the on agreed authors most Though In De De treatises in century, fourteenth the in detail great in developed was logic of branch This Topics “on consequences,” or as chapters in larger, generalist logic treatises. In these treatises treatises these In treatises. logic generalist larger, in chapters as or “on consequences,” VIII.4, Aristotle distinguishes three types of disputations: disputations for teaching teaching for disputations disputations: of types three distinguishes Aristotle VIII.4, didactic . ), disputations for competitive purposes ( purposes competitive for ), disputations Arguments A Arguments . Other rules express meta-properties of logical consequence that are are that consequence logical of meta-properties express rules . Other dialectic ). Eristic disputations involve sophistical reasoning and are are and reasoning sophistical involve disputations ). Eristic ccording to Goal or Purpose to Goal ccording Sara L. Uckelman L. Sara were a special type of disputation, somewhere between between somewhere disputation, of type aspecial were 40 eristic ), and disputations for the sake sake the for disputations ), and , there was no unified unified no was , there ------, Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 guments into four types: four into guments ar divide Spain of Peter and Bacon both example, For philosophers. medieval by discussed explicitly argument of type yet every even nor philosophy, medieval in used argument of type every discuss to chapter, this in able, we been have nor exhaustive, not are we’ve provided that typologies These 2012 Uckelman see info, (for further space of reasons to due here into enter cannot we sadly which problems own, its of problems in brought but issues original the removed relevance of conception static This neither. if irrelevant it is and following; relevantly is negation its if contradictory relevantly it is admitted; Respondent the that statement original the of consequence alogical it is if following relevantly is astatement only; statement initial the to respect with defined is relevance response, new the In “new response.” the as known be to came definition new the following disputations and definition, the modified Swyneshed so outcomes, counterintuitive introduced dynamicity This disputation. the of step each with ing chang potentially concept, adynamic is response, old way. the in either “Relevance,” in relevant not it is if irrelevant it is and following, relevantly is negation its if contradictory relevantly it is far; so denied been has that everything of negations the with along conceded been has that everything of consequence alogical it is if follows relevantly astatement century, thirteenth the from treatises early the in find we which response, old the Under defined. are contradictory” “relevantly and following” howin “relevantly lies response new the and response old the between difference The • • • must: Respondent the and individually, statements forward puts Opponent the disputation, the of rounds further In admits. Respondent the which on. agreed generally were which for rules the “positing,” species the considering by response new the and response old the between difference the illustrate 1977). (Spade 1330–1335 We Swyneshed, by Roger typified rules sponse” re the “new follow which those and (1988) Burley by typified rules “old response” the follow

2014: 199); we discussed syllogisms ( syllogisms 2014: 199); we discussed 3 2 with the hope to have whet the reader’s appetite enough for her to pursue the matter further. matter the pursue to her for enough appetite reader’s the whet have to hope the with applications, their and types, various the to introduction abroad provide to we have typologies the We 302). (ibid.: chosen have analogy by argument roughly is latter the 301), (ibid.: while conclusion universal to a premises singular from argument an as former the glosses briefly Bacon example. by “Topical Arguments” section 1 A positing disputation begins when the Opponent puts forward a contingently false sentence sentence false acontingently forward puts Opponent the when begins disputation A positing predicate, in the third both subject.” both third the in predicate, sub bis tertia secunda, pre bis prima, “ figures: the of arrangement the remember we can which by poem ashort us gives Sherwood 305). 2009: (Bacon b” cis every therefore a, cis b, every ais “Every as such (content), matter no but form a only have which ones arguments: in “skeletal” arises (a), case, first The syllogism. Aristotelian categorical the to is it restricted not “argument”; for word ageneric as term the using is he “syllogism,” of speaks here William While be false. be to known nor true be to known neither and irrelevant is statement the if agnostic Remain false. and irrelevant or contradictory relevantly it is if statement the Deny true. and irrelevant or following relevantly it is if statement the Accept 6 Syllogism, Enthymeme, Induction, and Example (Bacon 2009: 273; Spain 273; Spain 2009: (Bacon Example and Induction, Enthymeme, Syllogism, ) above, but have covered neither argument by induction nor argument argument nor induction by argument neither covered have but ) above, ” (1966: 66), i.e., “In the first, subject and predicate, in the second both both second the in predicate, and subject first, the ” (1966: “In i.e., 66), in the section “Syllogistic Arguments” “Syllogistic section the in Kinds of Argument Kinds Conclusion Notes 41 ; Dutilh Novaes and Uckelman 2016). Uckelman ; and ) and enthymemes ­ enthymemes ) and ( Sub pre pre Sub in the the in - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 04:39 03 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709604, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709604-5 The Art and Science of Logic of Science and Art The (2009) Roger Bacon, (1970) Peter Petrus Abaelardus Abelard, 6 5 4 Formal Logic: Or, the Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable and Necessary Inference, of Calculus the Or, Logic: (1847) Formal A. Morgan, De (1988), pp. 369–412. Stump and Kretzmann In (selections).” ———. (1988) “Obligations Logicae Artis (1951) Walter Burley, Puritate De Summulae de (2001) Dialectica John Buridan, of Journal Concerns.” Epistemic Late-Medieval Knowledge—Some and Justification, (1985) I. “Belief, Boh, Stanford Encyclopedia of Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia In P. Abelard.” “Peter (2015) King, (1988), pp. 264–277. Stump and Kretzmann In Logic.” of Nature (1988) “The Robert Kilwardby, (2016) “ Uckelman L. S. and C. Novaes, Dutilh The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy Medieval Later of History Cambridge The In Latinus.” (1982) G. B. “Aristoteles Dod, Aristotle’s Syllogistic: From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic Formal Modern of Standpoint the From Syllogistic: (1957) J. Aristotle’s Lukasiewicz, Texts, Volume 1: Logic Philosophical Medieval of Translations (1988) Cambridge eds. Stump, E. and N. Kretzmann, Maier Summaries of Logic, Text, Translation, Introduction, and Notes and Introduction, Text, Translation, Logic, of (2014) of Peter Summaries Spain, Logic to Introduction Sherwood’s of (1966) of William William Sherwood, T. Logic Medieval (2014) Articulating Parsons, (1963) S. Aristotle’s Syllogisms Modal McCall, Phronesis Boethius.” in Negation of (1991) J. C. Logic “The Martin, (2013) Aristotle’s Syllogistics M. Modal Malink, Spade, P. V. (1977) “Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes: Edition and comments.” comments.” and Edition Obligationes: P.Spade, V. Swyneshed’s “Roger (1977) . (2012) “Interactive Logic in the Middle Ages.” Logic and Logical Philosophy Ages.” Middle the in Logic “Interactive ———. (2012) Amsterdam. of University Thesis, PhD Logic.” Medieval in “Modalities (2009) S. Uckelman, Kilwardby Robert of Syllogistic the in Ontology and Logic P.Thom, (2007) 6: 87–103. 6: Association &Renaissance Medieval Mountain Rocky the Studies. Medieval eds. C. Dutilh Novaes and S. Read. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 370–395. Press, University Cambridge Cambridge: Read. S. and Novaes Dutilh C. eds. Waldon. N. ­ N. and the Philosophy of Language of Philosophy the and http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/abelard/. Press. Kluwer Academic Publisher, pp. 247–295. Publisher, Academic Kluwer Pinborg Jan of Memory in Studies Philosophy: Medieval in Inference and ing et Litteraire du Moyen Age Moyen du Litteraire et Press. Minnesota of University C. Normore and T. Parsons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. University Oxford Oxford: T. and Parsons. Normore C. To these four Kilwardby adds a fifth, “counterinstance” (1988: 268). (1988: “counterinstance” afifth, adds Kilwardby To four these made. been have that The superfluous. is (A follows: as is doesn’t he why for explanation Buridan’s arrangement. this not mention does Aristotle minor. the of subject the and premise major the of predicate the is where term figure, middle the afourth is there speaking, strictly that, noted have commentators modern and Medieval ù Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–79. Press, University Cambridge MA: Cambridge, Pinborg. J. and Kenny, A. Kretzmann, conclusion is indirect when the minor term is predicated of the major). As a result, the fourth figure figure fourth the aresult, As major). the of predicated is term minor the when indirect is conclusion De Modo Predicandi ac Sylogizandi in Divinis in Sylogizandi ac Predicandi Modo De in Theology Trinitarian and (1988) “Logic , A. be indirect in the fourth, and conversely. and fourth, the in indirect be would figure, first the in direct be would which conclusion, same that although other, the in as one in inferred be would conclusion same the and premises, the of order the in except figure, first the from different be not it would for it, discuss to care not did Aristotle but posited, be could figure] [a fourth Logica Ingredientibus Logica , 44: 243–285. 44: , has not yet been edited in full; see King (2015) for a list of the partial editions editions partial the of alist for (2015) King see full; in edited been yet not has . Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. University Cambridge MA: . Cambridge, : Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum. Assen: Rijk. de M. L. ed. : Dialectica, . Oxford: Oxford University Press. University Oxford . Oxford: , trans. Gyula Klima. New Haven, CT: Yale Haven, University. New Klima. Gyula , trans. . Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Publishing North-Holland . Amsterdam: , ed. P. Boehner. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute. Franciscan NY: The Bonaventure, St. P., ed. Boehner. Sara L. Uckelman L. Sara . Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press. University Harvard MA: . Harvard, References Obligationes , trans. T. S. Maloney. Toronto, OH: Pontifical Institute of Institute Toronto, Pontifical T. OH: Maloney. S. , trans. 42 .” Cambridge Companion The to Medieval In Logic 36: 277–304. 36: . Leiden: Brill. . Leiden: , trans. N. Kretzmann. Minneapolis: Minneapolis: Kretzmann. N. , trans. , ed. E. N. Zalta. Summer edition. edition. Summer Zalta. N. E. , ed. , ed. N. Kretzmann. Dordrecht: Dordrecht: Kretzmann. N. , ed. Archives d Archives , ed. B. 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