British battleship HMS Irresistible abandoned and sinking, having been shattered by explosion of floating mine in Dardanelles during attack on Narrows’ Forts, March 18, 1915 (Royal Navy/Library of Congress)
The Gallipoli Campaign Learning from a Mismatch of Strategic Ends and Means
By Raymond Adams
orld War I began on July 28, and relatively inexpensive in terms of tactics in response to new, highly de- 1914, 1 month after the assas- blood and treasure. Almost immediately, structive weapons, resulting in massive Wsination of Archduke Franz however, the combatants faced each other casualties. Rising calls from British po- Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Austro- in a long line of static defensive trenches. litical leaders, the media, and the public Hungarian throne.1 Most Europeans The Western Front quickly became a demanded action to break the stalemate. expected the conflict to be short—“over killing ground of unprecedented violence British strategists responded by opening by Christmas” was a common refrain— in human history: combined British, a new front in the east with two strategic French, and German casualties totaled objectives: drive Turkey out of the war 2,057,621 by January 1915.2 by attacking Constantinople, and open 3 Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Adams, USMCR, is a The character of war had changed. a route to beleaguered ally Russia. The student at the National War College. Armies had not changed their battlefield decision to open a second front in the
96 Recall / The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 east in 1915 ultimately failed to achieve military officers to plan for the seizure Flawed Assumptions Britain’s strategic objectives during the of the Gallipoli Peninsula, “with a view Underpinning the first full year of World War I. British to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea British Strategy leaders pursued short-term, politically of Marmara” and eventually knocking The British designed their Dardanelles expedient military objectives in Turkey Turkey out of the war.9 Representatives plan on a series of faulty assumptions. that were both ancillary to their military of the War Office and the Admiralty Political leaders and military planners expertise and contrary to achieving the met and concluded that an attack on the alike assumed the Turks were deficient overall ends of winning the war by defeat- Gallipoli Peninsula was not a militarily in martial skill, grit, and determina- ing Germany. This article examines the feasible operation.10 Director of Military tion.19 Churchill displayed unbridled disastrous results of the attempt to open a Operations Major General Charles confidence in the ability of naval bom- second front and the disconnect between Callwell11 presciently observed that a bardment to destroy land targets.20 Allied strategic ends and means. campaign in Gallipoli was “likely to prove British war planners assumed that the an extremely difficult operation of war.”12 battle fleet would easily breach the Genesis of the He proffered that an operation in the enemy’s coastal defenses, float directly Dardanelles Decision Dardanelles would require a force of not to Constantinople, and seize the straits With combat in France and Belgium less than 60,000, with strong siege artil- without requiring a landing force. characterized by hopeless direct assaults lery, echeloned into Turkey in two large Kitchener assumed that, once through on entrenched enemy positions, British waves.13 Kitchener also disagreed with the straits, with naval guns pointing strategists began planning for a new opening a second front, but for different at Constantinople, the fleet would direction.4 First Lord of the Admi- reasons. He was reluctant to divert troops “compel Turkey’s capitulation, secure ralty Winston Churchill contemplated from the continent, which he viewed as a supply route to hard-pressed Russia, amphibious operations in the North Sea the primary focus of effort for the British. and inspire the Balkan states to join to increase pressure on Germany. He A dichotomy of opinion thus emerged: the Allied war effort and eventually to proposed a joint Anglo-French amphib- the politicians advocated for a second front attack Austro-Hungary, thereby pressur- ious assault along the Belgian coast on the Gallipoli Peninsula, while senior ing Germany.”21 designed to outflank German positions military officers argued against interven- Kitchener further assumed that on the Western Front, liberate the port tion in Turkey.14 The debate continued once news of the arrival of the British of Zeebrugge, and prevent Germany into winter. The dynamic changed on fleet reached Constantinople, the entire from using Zeebrugge and Ostende as January 1, 1915, when Russia formally Turkish army in Thrace would retreat, submarine bases.5 Ultimately, the British requested a “naval or military demonstra- leaving Turkey to British control.22 Sir failed to convince the French to par- tion against the Turks to ease the pressure Edward Grey, Secretary of State for ticipate, effectively scuttling Churchill’s caused by the Turkish offensive driving Foreign Affairs, argued that once the fleet North Sea plan. through the Caucasus Mountains.”15 moved through the Dardanelles, “a coup British political and military leaders British decisionmakers debated the d’état would occur in Constantinople, next focused attention on Turkey and the Russian request and the larger issue of the whereby Turkey would abandon the possibility of military operations to seize future strategic direction of the war effort Central Powers and join the Entente.”23 the Dardanelles,6 attack Constantinople, during a series of War Council meetings in All of the foregoing assumptions proved and open a line of communication to early January.16 The council decided that false, and their cumulative effect fore- Russia. Secretary of the War Cabinet the British would continue to fight side ordained the Dardanelles operation to Maurice Hankey, Chancellor of the by side with France on the Western Front, disaster. Exchequer David Lloyd George, and and the Admiralty would, commencing in Churchill advocated military operations February 1915, prepare operations “to in- Naval Operations in against Turkey on the Gallipoli Peninsula.7 vade and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with the Dardanelles They agreed that the Ottoman Empire Constantinople as its objective.”17 British naval forces shelled the forts was weak and that “Germany [could] per- Bureaucratic maneuvering and ne- at the entrance of the Dardanelles on haps be struck most effectively, and with gotiation were thus necessary to reach November 1, 1914, well before the the most lasting results on the peace of the a decision to launch the operation. The formal commencement of the Gallipoli world through her allies, and particularly next major task for senior British leaders campaign. The purpose of the attack through Turkey.”8 Thus, within weeks was designing the strategy to implement was more to punish Turkey for siding of the outbreak of war, British attention the War Council’s decisions. The final with the Triple Alliance than an attempt turned east. plan would call for a combined force of to secure the strait. The shelling had At the end of August 1914, Churchill six British and four French battleships, ac- a more pernicious effect, alerting the formally requested that Secretary of companied by a substantial naval escort, Turkish defenders that a future mili- State for War Field Marshal Herbert to push through the Dardanelles and tary operation in the Dardanelles by Kitchener organize a group of naval and fight to Constantinople.18 the British was likely. Mustafa Kamal
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams 97 force of British, Australian, New Zea- lander, and French troops. Hamilton faced a challenge of epic proportions. His task was to conduct the first opposed amphibious landing in an era of high-powered defensive weapons that included innovations such as the machine gun and highly accurate artillery firing a new generation of high explosives.30 At dawn on April 25, 1915, British, Dominion, and Allied forces waded ashore onto six landing beaches at Cape Helles.31 Amphibious operations contin- ued for 8 months, but the Allies never gained more than a foothold on the peninsula. The campaign to outflank the stalemate on the Western Front ironi- cally began to resemble the fighting in France and Belgium, although on a much smaller scale, with Hamilton committing his troops against an entrenched and forewarned foe at Gallipoli.32 Although Australian troops charging near Turkish trench, just before evacuation at Anzac, ca. 1915 (U.S. Kitchener and Hamilton recognized that National Archives and Records Administration) a central assumption about the Turks— that they were a second-rate fighting Attaturk, overall Turkish commander at Council to delay further naval action force that did not stand a chance against Gallipoli, and Otto Liman von Sanders, immediately. British arms—was clearly wrong, they did a German general and military advisor The council charted a new course not change course.33 In fairness to British to Turkey, focused on fortifying the and called for landing troops in a beach- military commanders, a major reason for Dardanelles after the British attack of hopping campaign from the Aegean to continuing the operation was political November 1.24 The Anglo-French naval the Sea of Marmara, eventually attacking expediency.34 David Fromkin observes, force attacked the Dardanelles in force Constantinople.29 However, 38 days “Constantinople and the Dardanelles, on March 18, 1915. The battle initially would pass before British commanders because of their world importance for favored the attackers. Naval bombard- were able to embark, transport, and land shipping, and eastern Thrace, because it is ment in the days preceding the assault military forces on the peninsula. In the in Europe, were positions that occupied a successfully destroyed several Turkish interim, the enemy seized the initiative. special status in the minds of British lead- defensive positions at the entrance to Turkey deployed six divisions, some ers.”35 As Churchill further argued, “the the straits.25 By midday, the British fleet 500 German advisors, and civilian labor line of deep water separating Asia from neutralized most of the Turkish mines units in a hurried effort to strengthen Europe was a line of great significance, at the mouth of the Dardanelles, leaving Gallipoli’s defenses in anticipation of the and we must make that line secure by nine more mine belts in the approach next round of fighting. every means within our power.”36 to Constantinople.26 The Clausewitzian Despite the perceived importance concept of chance in war then emerged. Amphibious Landings of the region to British war aims, the The fleet approached an undetected line on Gallipoli Allies withdrew from the peninsula on of 20 mines, which a Turkish steamer The British did not reassess their stra- January 9, 1916, dashing hopes of de- had laid just 10 days earlier.27 Three tegic objective of defeating Turkey feating Turkey and reaching the Russians. Allied warships struck mines and sank; and opening a line of communication British, Australian, New Zealander, and a fourth suffered severe damage and with Russia after the failure of the naval French casualties totaled 130,000, yet the was unsalvageable.28 The assumption attack. In fact, the historical record operation achieved none of the goals set that the Turks would surrender on sight shows just the opposite: British leaders by British political leaders. of the British naval force was incor- redoubled their efforts, eventually com- rect, and the prospect of a collapse of mitting nearly 500,000 Allied forces Mismatch of Ends and Means the Ottoman Empire by means of a to the Gallipoli operation. Kitchener The British experience in the Darda- naval assault alone died on March 18. appointed General Sir Ian Hamilton as nelles is a cautionary tale that highlights The setback caused the British War the overall commander of a combined the flaws inherent in a strategy charac-
98 Recall / The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 terized by improperly aligned ends and means.37 The initial plan—a navy-only effort to forcibly enter the Dardanelles, navigate the peninsula while destroying land-based targets with surface fires, and force the capitulation of Constan- tinople—is perhaps the classic example of imbalanced ends and means in World War I. Naval gunfire in 1915 was generally ineffective against land-based artillery and even static targets without ground-based spotters.38 Although the fleet had limited success in the opening days of the naval operation, decisively defeating Turkish defensive positions in the 35-mile-long strait with naval guns alone was not feasible. Furthermore, ships are by definition incapable of taking land and occupying terrain. In fact, neither Kitchener nor Hamilton had any sustainable plan to seize and hold terrain in March 1915. Ottoman soldiers and guns during Gallipoli campaign (Library of Congress) Another example of mismatched ends an amphibious task force. As a result, resistance which led to the disturbing lack and means occurred in the minesweeping Hamilton’s staff, what could be fitted of confidence by commanders, who felt phase of the first attack in Gallipoli. The aboard the Queen Elizabeth, was squir- that the men should be evacuated.”44 Allied fleet “applied its least capable set reled away throughout the ship.41 Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, chief of assets, that of fishing trawlers turned of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 minesweepers manned by civilian crews, The commander of one of the larg- to 1887, observed, “Strategy can direct against the most difficult part of the est, most complex amphibious assaults its efforts only toward the highest goal campaign, that of clearing mines under in history was thus virtually powerless that the available means make practically fire.”39 Even the amphibious landings of to exert his will over his own forces, possible.”45 British means in the Gallipoli April 25 lacked properly balanced ends let alone those of the enemy. Without campaign did not support British strat- and means. A total of five British, French, the means to command and control a egy. The imbalance between ends and and Commonwealth divisions landed at complex military operation, the ends means in the naval and ground campaigns five separate beaches against entrenched were all but unattainable.42 A lack of two in the Dardanelles doomed the overall defenders expecting an Allied attack.40 further means—amphibious doctrine and effort to failure. Although the number of forces in action previous army-navy joint training—also in the Dardanelles consistently grew dur- hindered Hamilton’s ability to orches- Conclusion ing the evolution of the operation, the trate the landings.43 The Clausewitzian The changing character of war, fact remains that the Allies never success- concept of friction, compounded by the embodied in the deadly intersection of fully held a beachhead for an extended lack of command and control, amphibi- 19th-century tactics and 20th-century period, largely due to the lack of means, ous doctrine, and previous army-navy weapons, created a staggering number that is, ground forces. training, took effect on the battlefield al- of casualties in 1914. The carnage Another imbalance in the ends-means most immediately. The historical record is prompted British leaders to seek a new paradigm was evident in British com- replete with first-hand accounts of prob- front to break the European stalemate. mand and control. Inadequate command lems exacerbated by weak command and Strategists looked east to open a new and control control. An Australian soldier succinctly theater of war. The plan to conduct described a frustrating scene undoubtedly operations against Turkey and open a handicapped Hamilton throughout the unfolding for thousands of men during route to Russia suffered from flawed campaign, but was especially evident the Gallipoli campaign: “Battalions dis- assumptions, which led first to an during the first, crucial days of the land- solved into separated groups of men, ill-advised, naval-only attack in the ing. Hamilton monitored the landing some making marvelous progress but Dardanelles. Six weeks later, this time from aboard the Queen Elizabeth. . . . without possibility of any support. It without the element of surprise, the [However], the Queen Elizabeth was was this and the strengthening Turkish Allies attacked again. The second round not configured as a headquarters for
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams 99 Warships near Gallipoli Peninsula landing 155-mm gun at Sedd-ul Bahr (Library of Congress) featured a larger naval fleet with an most challenging of military operations, conducted exercises, and structured forces embarked landing force of five divisions. were widely considered impossible after to overcome the problems associated with A series of amphibious landings over the failed Gallipoli landings. The seem- successfully assaulting fortified coastal the next 8 months, however, failed to ingly overwhelming challenges presented defensive positions. A generation after gain anything more than a foothold for by amphibious assaults—in command Gallipoli, the Allies successfully landed the Allies. The British lacked the means and control, amphibious operations tens of thousands of troops on beaches to achieve the desired ends in the Dar- doctrine (or lack thereof), interservice defended by entrenched and well- danelles, particularly in the command coordination, and maintaining a beach- equipped German and Japanese forces. and control, doctrinal, training, and head after landing—convinced military Allied amphibious operations in North manpower realms. The Allies ultimately and political leaders of the futility of Africa, Europe, and the Pacific were failed in their attempt to seize the Dar- operational maneuver from the sea. instrumental in the combined effort to danelles, force Constantinople’s surren- However, as Clausewitz observed, “His- defeat Nazism and Japanese imperialism. der, and open a link with their Russian torical examples clarify everything and Another lesson to emerge from ally. In the final analysis, a flawed strat- also provide the best kind of proof in the Gallipoli, despite failure there, was the egy, poorly executed, did not achieve empirical sciences. This is particularly importance of the indirect approach, Allied ends.46 true in the art of war.”47 which factored heavily into British During the interwar years, military strategy during World War II. Churchill Coda: Lessons Learned on planners and theorists validated the favored amphibious operations against Amphibious Assault Clausewitzian concept of the value of Germany in the North Sea in 1914 in The Dardanelles campaign was a disaster studying history. Planners and theorists an effort to bypass the main line of resis- for Great Britain. Amphibious assaults analyzed the reasons for the failure in tance on the Western Front. Less than against defended beachheads, among the the Dardanelles and developed doctrine, three decades later, Churchill opposed
100 Recall / The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 the U.S.-favored Operation Roundup, extend for 4 miles, then widen again to 3 miles. theory of war. Under this theory, “when people They continue for another 20 miles before believe they have crossed a psychological a cross-channel attack planned for entering the Sea of Marmara. This geographic Rubicon and perceive war to be imminent, they mid-1942. The prime minister instead information is from Victor Rudenno, Gallipoli: switch from what psychologists call a ‘delibera- advocated for operations in North Africa, Attack from the Sea (New Haven: Yale Univer- tive’ to an ‘implemental’ mind-set, triggering a Italy, and the Balkans—presumably sity Press, 2008), 27. number of psychological biases, most notably softer targets than Adolf Hitler’s Atlantic 7 Fromkin, 125. overconfidence.” This theory helps explain why, 8 Ibid. even when the commanders realized their cen- Wall—before a cross-channel assault 9 Graham T. Clews, Churchill’s Dilemma: tral assumptions about Gallipoli were wrong, against Fortress Europe. The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 British political and military leaders made no Finally, Churchill personifies the Dardanelles Campaign (Westport, CT: Praeger, change in the overall course of the Dardanelles greatest legacy of the Gallipoli campaign. 2010), 44. strategy. Information concerning the Rubicon A primary architect of the Dardanelles 10 Ibid. theory of war is from Dominic D.P. Johnson 11 Charles E. Callwell was an influential and Dominic Tierney, “The Rubicon Theory disaster, he managed to salvage his military theorist. He published a seminal work of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the reputation and career after Gallipoli, and on counterinsurgency titled Small Wars: Their Point of No Return,” International Security emerged as one of the most effective war Principles and Practice (London: His Majesty’s 36, no. 1 (Summer 2001), 7–40. leaders in history during World War II. Stationery Office, 1899). 35 Fromkin, 548–549. The lessons of Gallipoli, learned at great 12 Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and 36 As quoted in ibid., 549. the Dardanelles: A Dialogue in Ends and Means 37 Carl von Clausewitz devoted a significant cost in blood and materiel, were thus not (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 57. amount of discussion to the importance of in vain. JFQ 13 Ibid. properly linking ends and means in strategy. See 14 Fromkin, 127, observes, “The doctrine Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. of the generals was to attack the enemy at his Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Notes strongest point; that of the politicians was to at- Princeton University Press, 1984), 127–147, tack at his weakest.” This “politicians’ predilec- et seq. 38 1 Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy tion” for attacking at the enemy’s weakest point Jonathan Schroden, “Strait Comparison: forged the Triple Alliance in May 1882. France, would surface again in World War II. Lessons Learned from the 1915 Dardanelles 15 Britain, and Russia formed the Triple Entente Peter Hart, Gallipoli (New York: Oxford Campaign in the Context of a Strait of Hormuz in 1907 in an attempt to balance the growing University Press, 2011), 14. Closure Event,” Center for Naval Analyses, 16 German threat as Berlin’s economy and military Ibid., 16. September 2011, available at
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