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GAO-21-125, Accessible Version, DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION

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GAO-21-125, Accessible Version, DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees February 2021 DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION DOD Can Better Leverage Existing Contested Mobility Studies and Improve Training Accessible Version GAO-21-125 February 2021 DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION DOD Can Better Leverage Existing Contested Mobility Studies and Improve Training Highlights of GAO-21-125, a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found China and Russia are strengthening From 2016 through 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted or their militaries to neutralize U.S. sponsored at least 11 classified or sensitive studies on contested mobility— the strengths, including mobility—the ability of the U.S. military to transport equipment and personnel in a contested ability of U.S. military airlift and air operational environment. The studies resulted in more than 50 recommendations, refueling aircraft and sealift ships to and DOD officials stated they believed that some of the recommendations had rapidly move equipment and personnel been implemented. However, officials did not know the exact disposition of the from the United States to locations recommendations, as they are not actively tracking implementation activities. abroad to support DOD missions. Further, no single DOD oversight entity evaluated the studies’ recommendations Senate Report 116-48 included a and tracked implementation across the department. As a result, DOD may be provision for GAO to review DOD’s missing an opportunity to leverage existing knowledge on mobility in contested ability to operate in a contested environments across organizations, and strengthen its mobility efforts for major mobility environment. This report conflicts as envisioned in the National Defense Strategy. assesses the extent to which DOD has studied contested mobility and tracked DOD has updated aspects of wargame exercises and mobility training to prepare the implementation of study for a contested environment, but has not updated training for the surge sealift recommendations, assesses the extent fleet—ships owned by DOD and the Department of Transportation’s Maritime to which DOD has revised its training Administration (MARAD) and crewed by contracted mariners. These crews are to incorporate contested mobility primarily trained and qualified to operate the ship, but receive limited contested challenges, and describes the mobility training. While DOD has updated air mobility training and other aspects technologies that DOD uses to mitigate of mobility training, sealift crew training requirements have not been updated by contested mobility challenges. DOD and MARAD to reflect contested environment concerns because DOD has GAO identified contested mobility not conducted an evaluation of such training. Since sealift is the means by which studies conducted or sponsored by the majority of military equipment would be transported during a major conflict, it DOD; evaluated DOD’s processes for is important that crews be trained appropriately for contested mobility to help monitoring implementation of study ensure that ships safely reach their destinations and complete their missions. recommendations; analyzed training and exercise documents from DOD C-17 Performing Defense Maneuvers combatant commands, the Air Force, and the Navy; and reviewed DOD plans for technological improvements to its mobility forces. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD designate an oversight entity to track the implementation of study recommendations, and that DOD and MARAD evaluate and update sealift training. DOD and the Department of Transportation concurred or partially DOD has begun to mitigate contested environment challenges through improved concurred with each recommendation. technology and related initiatives. The Navy is acquiring improved technologies GAO believes each recommendation to deploy on surge sealift ships and replacement ships. The Air Force is should be fully implemented, as equipping current mobility aircraft (see photo above) with additional defensive discussed in the report. technologies and planning for the development of future replacement aircraft. According to U.S. Transportation Command, the command is revising its View GAO-21-125. For more information, contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or contracts with commercial partners to address cyber threats, and funding [email protected]. research and development projects that address contested mobility concerns. Many of these efforts are nascent and will take years to be put in place. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background 4 DOD Has Studied Contested Mobility but Has Not Systematically Addressed Recommendations 11 DOD Has Updated Aspects of War Game Exercises and Mobility Training to Prepare for a Contested Environment, but Has Not Updated All Training 18 DOD Has Begun to Mitigate Contested Mobility Challenges through Improved Technology and Other Related Initiatives 27 Conclusions 33 Recommendations for Executive Action 33 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 Appendix I: Department of Defense (DOD) Studies on Contested Mobility 37 Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 49 Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Transportation 53 Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56 Appendix V: Accessible Data 57 Data Table 57 Agency Comment Letters 58 Tables Table 1: GAO Identified Department of Defense (DOD) Studies on Contested Mobility 13 Table 2: Examples of U.S. Transportation Command Research and Development Programs 32 Table 3: Global Mobility Strategic Portfolio Review Final Report 38 Table 4: Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Survivable Logistics 39 Table 5: Protecting the North Atlantic Sea Lines of Communication 40 Table 6: USTRANSCOM Wargame 2016: Contested Environment, Final Report 41 Table 7: USTRANSCOM Wargame 2017: Final Report 42 Page i GAO-21-125 Defense Transportation Table 8: Evaluation of Vulnerabilities of Air and Sea Lines of Communication in Contested and Degraded Operating Environments 43 Table 9: Evaluation of Vulnerabilities and Mitigation Options for Strategic Lift and Tanker Operations within Denied Environments 44 Table 10: Future Deployment and Distribution Assessment FDDA VI, Assumptions and Attritive Effects: The Degradation of Mobility Capabilities in a Contested Environment 45 Table 11: Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018 46 Table 12: Options to Enhance Air Mobility in Anti-Access/Area Denial Environments 47 Table 13: Assessing Survivability Options for Air Refueling Tankers 48 Figures Figure 1: Mobility Aircraft and Their Roles 7 Figure 2: Examples of Military Sealift Command and Maritime Administration Sealift Ships and Their Roles 8 Figure 3: Projected Sealift Acquisitions and Retirements 28 Accessible Data for Figure 3: Projected Sealift Acquisitions and Retirements 57 Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command MARAD U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration OASD(S) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment AMC Air Mobility Command MSC Military Sealift Command This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page ii GAO-21-125 Defense Transportation 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 Letter February 26, 2021 Congressional Committees According to the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, changes at home and abroad are diminishing U.S. military advantages and threatening vital U.S. interests.1 Competitors—especially China and Russia—are seeking to project power globally. They are strengthening their militaries to neutralize or contest U.S. strengths, including “mobility”—the ability of U.S. military airlift and air refueling aircraft and sealift ships to rapidly move equipment and personnel from the continental United States to locations abroad to support Department of Defense (DOD) missions.2 The commission reported that it has serious reservations about the ability of DOD’s mobility forces to support the department’s global operations, particularly in the event of a high-intensity conflict or multi-theater operations. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is the DOD combatant command that provides air, land, and sea transportation to accomplish DOD’s global mobility mission. USTRANSCOM is supported by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD), which provides sealift capabilities in times of national emergency or war. U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are combatant commands that would receive the forces and equipment transported by 1Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, November 14, 2018. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 established the requirement for DOD to periodically issue the national defense strategy and a commission to examine and make recommendations with respect to the strategy. Pub. L. No. 114-328 §§ 941, 942 (2016). The National Defense Strategy describes, among other things, the priority missions of the Department of Defense and the
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