FOI-R—0859—SE May 2003 ISSN 1650-1942 Base data report

Vyachaslau Paznyak

Belarus Facing Dual Enlargement: Will the EU Squeeze Harder?

Defence Analysis SE-172 90 Stockholm

SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY FOI-R—0859—SE Defence Analysis May 2003 SE-172 90 Stockholm ISSN 1650-1942 Base data report

Vyachaslau Paznyak

Belarus Facing Dual Enlargement: Will the EU Squeeze Harder?

Issuing organization Report number, ISRN Report type FOI – Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI-R—0859—SE Base data report Defence Analysis Research area code SE-172 90 Stockholm 1. Defence and Security Policy Month year Project no. May 2003 A 1101 Customers code 1. Research for the Government Sub area code 11 Defence Research for the Government Author/s (editor/s) Project manager Vyachaslau Paznyak Approved by

Scientifically and technically responsible

Report title Belarus Facing Dual Enlargement: Will the EU Squeeze Harder?

Abstract (not more than 200 words) EU and NATO eastern enlargement raises a host of difficult issues for Belarus, the solution of which requires enhanced cooperation and financial and technical assistance, first of all in the meeting of new security challenges, the modernization of the border infrastructure and preparing a multilateral package of readmission agreements. A positive change in relations between Belarus and the EU/NATO depends on Belarus’ turn to democratic and market economic reforms. The dual enlargement has embraced also the OSCE and other European organizations, which promote institutional change by spreading common values, norms and practices. Paradoxically, Belarus relations with NATO have for some time looked better than those with the EU, even though they do not go beyond cooperation on “second-order” programs. Belarus has yet to accept the realities of the post-Cold War settlement in . It has remained the last European country in a “state of war” with the West, whereas its union partner concluded a “peace treaty” with NATO by signing the 1997 Founding Act and moved further towards a strategic partnership by instituting the NATO–Russia Council in May 2002. Belarusian authorities should acknowledge that a military response to the NATO “threat” is pointless. EU enlargement is a more comprehensive challenge than NATO enlargement. Keywords Belarus, EU, NATO, Russia, , Lithuania, TACIS, borders, trade, migration, crime, energy

Further bibliographic information Language English

ISSN 1650-1942 Pages 75 p.

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Utgivare Rapportnummer, ISRNKlassificering Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut - FOI FOI-R—0859—SE Underlagsrapport Försvarsanalys Forskningsområde 172 90 Stockholm 1. Försvar- och säkerhetspolitik Månad, år Projektnummer Maj 2003 A 1101 Verksamhetsgren 1. Forskning för regeringens behov Delområde 11 Försvarsforskning för regeringens behov Författare/redaktör Projektledare Jan Leijonhielm Vyachaslau Paznyak Godkänd av

Tekniskt och/eller vetenskapligt ansvarig

Rapportens titel (i översättning) Vitryssland inför östutvidgningarna: Kommer EU att pressa hårdare?

Sammanfattning (högst 200 ord) Östutvidgningen av NATO och EU reser en rad svåra problem för Vitryssland, vilkas lösning kräver ökat samarbete och finansiellt-tekniskt bistånd, främst i att möta nya säkerhetshot, modernisera gränsernas infrastruktur och underteckna ett multilateralt paket av avtal om återtagande av flyktingar. En positiv förändring i relationerna mellan Vitryssland och NATO/EU förutsätter att Vitryssland inleder demokratiska och marknadsekonomiska reformer. Den dubbla utvidgningen har också omfattat OSSE och andra europeiska institutioner, som befrämjar institutionellla förändringar genom att sprida gemensamma värderingar, normer och praxis. Paradoxalt nog har Vitrysslands relationer med NATO under några år sett bättre ut än med EU, även om de bara omfattar samarbete om sekundära program. Vitryssland har ännu inte accepterat realiteten av situationen i Europa efter det kalla kriget. Det har förblivit det enda europeiska land som har ”krigstillstånd” med väst, medan dess unionspartner Ryssland slöt ett ”fredsavtal” med NATO genom Founding Act 1997 och gick vidare mot strategiskt partnerskap genom att bilda NATO-Rysslandsrådet i maj 2002. Vitryska myndigheter torde se att ett militärt svar på ”hotet” från NATO är poänglöst. EU:s utvidgning är en mer omfattande utmaning än NATO-utvidgningen.

Nyckelord Vitryssland, EU, NATO, Ryssland, Polen, Litauen, TACIS, gränser, handel, migration, brott, energi

Övriga bibliografiska uppgifter Språk Engelska

ISSN 1650-1942 Antal sidor: 75 s.

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Sekretess

Preface

Since its emergence as an independent state in 1991 Belarus has largely been unknown to or disregarded by the Western public. However, with the eastern enlargement of NATO and EU reaching the borders of Belarus, the country has attracted growing attention, especially from its neighbors on the Baltic Sea. The political regime in Belarus and its reaction to the dual enlargement are in fact unique in the region. The publication of this report is intended to contribute to the understanding of the current security problems concerning Belarus and to stimulate discussion primarily in . The report analyses the official policy of Belarus with regard to the dual enlargement and the effects of the enlargement on its relations with Russia in a comparative perspective. It contains a wealth of factual information and assessments, based as it is on many sources, mainly Belarusian and Western websites, newspapers, scientific journals and research literature as shown in the bibliography. The report covers the developments up to January 2003, thus leaving out for example the possible effects of the recent war in Iraq. The author, Dr. Vyachaslau Paznyak, born in 1954, received his degree in 1988 after defending a dissertation on US foreign policy strategies in 1980–1985. He is Director of the International Institute for Policy Studies, a non-governmental think-tank in (see http://iips.virtualave.net/eng/publs.html.), and Associate Professor in political science at the European Humanities University in Minsk since 1997. Mr. Paznyak is also a well- known researcher, who has participated in numerous international projects and conferences, and has written many studies printed in the West. ([email protected]) This report is published by the FOI as support for a project on Russian foreign, defense and security policy (RUFS) and belongs to a series of reports about Russia and its neighbors (see back cover). FOI staff has adapted the report to its own publishing format and made the summaries above. Otherwise the author is responsible for the contents of the report. The fact that the FOI publishes the report in no way means an endorsement of opinions expressed in it.

Jan Leijonhielm

Manager

Contents

Introduction 3 1. Belarus and the : An Overview 5 1.1 Current status, problems and prospects for the TACIS program in Belarus 7 2. Russia’s, ’s and Belarus’ Relations with the EU in A Comparative Perspective 9 2.1 The Russian Federation 9 2.2 Ukraine 12 2.3 Belarus 14 3. Belarus and Its Neighbors: Regional Issues and Regional Cooperation 17 3.1 Border issues 17 3.2 Migration issues 20 3.3 Regional cooperation on combating organized crime and terrorism 23 3.4 Energy/gas/oil transit and transportation issues 26 3.5 The Kaliningrad question: a non-pilot project for Belarus 28 4. Belarus and EU Enlargement: Challenges with Narrow Opportunities in Sight 31 5. Belarus and NATO: It Takes Two to Tango 35 5.1 An archaeology of history: no post-modernist delight 35 5.2 Cooperation under the Partnership for Peace program 42 5.3 Misperceptions and ambivalent strategies vs. the expansion of the “new division lines” 43 5.4 Belarus, NATO and Russia: an unhappy ‘triangle’ 47 Conclusions 53 Appendices 57 Appendix 1. Migration to and from Belarus 57 Appendix 2. EU declarations on Belarus 58 Appendix 3 Public attitudes in Belarus 60 Appendix 4 Estimates of external threats in Belarus media 62 Bibliography 67 Websites 74 2 3

Introduction

The parallel enlargement of the European Union and NATO obviously plays a major role in the dramatic transformations that have swept Europe in the new millennium. It is aimed at meeting new challenges, but it is also a challenge in and of itself, not least for the countries which remain “outsiders” to this process, but which are becoming new direct neighbors of the enlarging entities. Belarus takes a special place amidst these kaleidoscopic events. It is the country in Central–Eastern Europe with the lowest-level relations and the highest-level tensions as regards both the EU and NATO, as well as some other European organizations for that matter. It may, therefore, find itself “out in the cold” and suffer rather than benefit from the ongoing expansion. By the same token, because of its important geopolitical position and its transit role for the European Union and Eurasia, Belarus is bound to exert a considerable influence over the climate of cooperation, and more specifically over the shaping of new border, trade and security regimes in the region and beyond. Therefore, from the perspective of the dual enlargement Belarus presents a dual issue: its particular problems are increasingly connected with and magnified by the expansion of the two most powerful European political, economic, and security institutions. While the developments at the new EU and NATO eastern borders are at a relatively early stage, it may be just the right time to evaluate the current situation and the emerging trends so as to facilitate tomorrow’s solutions. By a large margin the choice for the parties involved is between an adjustment and a radical change of policies. Is there a “third way” for Belarus or the European Union and NATO? This paper looks into the political entanglements in the “triangle” where Belarus has found itself cornered. Most attention is devoted to the relations between Belarus and the European Union. For obvious reasons the enlarging European Union will be having a greater impact than NATO on the country’s domestic situation and foreign and security policy. In this light the recent saga of efforts to prevent or hamper the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance looks most ironic. Whether that was the correct strategic focus or not, it does not apply any more. But is there anything different à la carte? Because of Belarus’ de facto alliance with Russia the latter’s role will always be a factor in any analysis involving Belarus. The paper briefly discusses the intrigue behind the diverging relations of the two close allies vis-à-vis NATO. 4

The sources utilized here include official documents of the governments of Belarus and Russia, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Belarusian and Russian printed and electronic media, the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Transitions Online reviews, as well as academic articles and books as presented in the Bibliography section. 5

1. Belarus and the European Union: An Overview

After the dissolution of the USSR the EU Council of Ministers in March 1992 carried a decision to replace the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EU and the USSR of 18 December 1989 with individual Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with every new post- Soviet state. As a result of negotiations between the EU and Belarus, which had been conducted in 1993–94 the first version of a PCA was signed on 6 March 1995. Progress in EU–Belarus relations was stalled in 1996, when a flawed referendum reformed the 1994 constitution by concentrating powers around the presidency and replacing the democratically elected parliament with a national assembly nominated by the president. The PCA has not come into force, because it has not been ratified by all of the Parliaments of EU member-states. Since then the situation has been marked by a general deterioration of judicial and administrative competences, repression of the opposition and the media. The EU did not recognize the new constitution. The Council of Ministers decided upon a number of sanctions against Belarus in 1997: the PCA was not concluded, nor was its trade-related part (Interim Agreement). Belarusian membership of the was not supported; bilateral relations at ministerial level were suspended; and the EU technical assistance (TACIS) programs were frozen (with the exception of humanitarian aid, regional programs and programs directly benefiting the democratization process). Acknowledging the lack of progress with respect to bilateral relations and the internal situation following the position taken in 1997, the EU adopted a step-by-step approach in 1999, whereby sanctions would be gradually lifted upon the fulfillment of four benchmarks set by the OSCE, namely the return of substantial powers to the Parliament; opposition representation in electoral commissions; fair access to the state media for the opposition; and electoral legislation conforming to international standards. Belarus has so far failed to meet the requirements of the EU and the OSCE regarding access to the state media for the opposition and the conduct of free and fair elections. The EU continues to assert the importance of the reestablishment of democratic conditions, human rights and legality in Belarus as a necessary condition for the restoration of full Belarusian participation in European affairs. Significant assistance was provided to Belarus within the framework of the TACIS Program and also through various aid programs and loans. The 6

TACIS program for Belarus for the period 1991–96 was funded at over € 54 million. Assistance in the framework of the national program was focused on enterprise support and private sector development and three priority areas: food production and distribution, energy and transport. Whereas the TACIS indicative program for 1996–99 could not be negotiated and the planned allocation of € 37 million was frozen due to the political reasons, the Commission in 1997 developed a special € 5 million Program for the Development of Civil Society in Belarus, targeted at the media, NGOs and youth. The Belarusian government agreed upon a slightly amended version of the program and formally endorsed the program in November 1999. In 2000, € 5 million in TACIS funds were allocated to the Small Projects Program for Belarus. 30 large-scale projects were devoted to the support of Belarus’ independent mass media, development of civil society, the training of business managers, educational exchanges (Tempus program), and providing information about the EU (the center of the European documentation was formed at the Belarusian State University in Minsk). As with other Newly Independent States (NIS), Belarus continues to benefit from the TACIS Cross-Border Cooperation Program, the Interstate Program and the Nuclear Safety Program. The European Community’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) provided € 6.7 million to Belarus for humanitarian assistance essentially linked to the effects of the Chernobyl accident. In addition, macroeconomic assistance has been provided. In 1995 a loan of € 55 million for ten years was agreed, the first tranche of this amounting to € 30 million being disbursed in December 1995. However, the remaining € 25 million remain frozen due to the absence of progress in economic reform. Belarusian civil society organizations have received assistance from the EU’s EIDHR program (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights): just over € 2 million in 1999 and € 0.4 million in 2000. The EU has on three occasions introduced anti-dumping measures against Belarus. These have applied to potassium chloride since 1992, polyester staple fibre since 1996 and polyester filament tow since 1997. A textile agreement with Belarus has existed since 1993 and a new agreement came into effect in 2000. The EU supports WTO membership for Belarus, although important questions are posed in relation to its customs union with Russia, , Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as its union with Russia.1 Since 1991 until now, 195 TACIS projects to the tune of € 138.6 million have been implemented in Belarus. 15 percent of the amount (€ 20.79 million) was used for the import of equipment.

1 Website of the European Commission, External relations. The EU’s relations with Belarus (http://europa. eu.int/comm/external_relations/belarus/intro/index.htm) 7

1.1 Current status, problems and prospects for the TACIS program in Belarus

At present, about 40 TACIS projects are in progress, 30 of them aimed at supporting civil society. The implementation of the TACIS Program ”The Development of Civil Society in Belarus” was evaluated by the European Commission as ”the activity accompanied by many hardships but, nevertheless, successful and fruitful.” Most of the projects on the formation of civil society were to be completed by the end of 2002. At the next stage mini-grants will be given under 30 projects with a budget of € 5,000–50,000. Besides, the program on the development of institutional cooperation will probably be launched in the near future. The European Commission has expressed its full approval of the mini-projects and the 17 new projects at an amount of € 3.5 million. They are mainly aimed at developing cooperation between local authorities and public organizations in Belarus and EU counterparts. The Commission, however, has not yet signed contracts on the new projects. The stumbling blocks are the diametrically opposite views of the EU and Belarusian government on national and international legal norms. The legal basis for the functioning of the TACIS programs in Belarus is the “General Rules, Applicable to the Memorandum on Funding” of 10 May 10 1994 – an international agreement between the European Commission and the Belarusian government. In accordance with the Rules, individuals and legal entities working under the TACIS program in Belarus are exempt from taxes and other levies. But the Rules are not a priority legal norm for the Belarusian taxation bodies according to the Presidential Decree No. 8 of 12 March 2001 ”On Some Measures to Improve the Procedure of Receiving and Using Foreign Gratuitous Assistance” At the moment, Belarus’ tax inspection can exempt taxes from grant recepients. Therefore, additional national legal acts confirming the Agreement have to be issued. A draft Presidential decree on tax-exemption for the technical assistance programs, levies and other duties has been prepared and is awaiting presidential approval. Obviously, no contracts on implementing new TACIS projects in Belarus will be concluded until the decree has been signed.2 Because of the originally negative stance of the Belarusian authorities regarding the ”Program for the Development of Civil Society in Belarus” negotiations on it went on for two years – from 1997 to 1999. Recently, however, the news was made public that this TACIS program in Belarus will be continued until 2006.3 The position of the Belarusan authorities remains

2 Website of Belarus Today, “TACIS Program Depends on President’s Decree”, 10 Dec. 2002. (http://www.belarustoday.info/news/news.php?id=13824&lang=eng) 3 Website of Belorusskii rynok, Biryukova O. “YeS ne khochet finansirovat’ nash budzhet.“ No. 45, 2002. ( http://www.br.minsk.by/archive/2002-45/ob5658.stm) 8 ambivalent. EU assistance in civil society-building is perceived as an unwelcome interference in the internal affairs, while assistance in the resolution of border and transborder issues is deemed vital. The role of the TACIS programs goes far beyond ”technical” matters. They are beneficial, among other things, also for Belarusian economy. For example, a TACIS project on the demarcation of Belarusian–Lithuanian border is being implemented by a Belarusian general contractor, the construction company Minskvodstroi, which means that it is not only bringing funds to the Belarusian budget, but also creating employment opportunities.4 To conclude, delays and attempts at manipulating with TACIS projects entail not only a waste of time, but decrease their cumulative effects and prolong and aggravate the existing problems, which otherwise could be resolved or mitigated.

4 Website of Belorusskiy rynok, Orlov L. “Proekt byl isklutchitel’no uspeshnym.”, No. 48, 2002 ( http://www.br.minsk.by/archive/2002-48/_ta3789.stm) 9

2. Russia’s, Ukraine’s and Belarus’ Relations with the EU in a Comparative Perspective 2.1 The Russian Federation

The legal basis for EU relations with Russia is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994, which came into force in December 1997 and covers: • trade and economic cooperation: liberalization of trade based on MFN treatment and the elimination of quantitative restrictions; legislative harmonization; and provision on the establishment and operation of companies, services, current payments and the movement of capital, competition and intellectual property; • co-operation in science & technology, energy, environment, transport, space and a range of other civil sectors; • political dialog on international issues of mutual concern and on cooperation relating to the observance of the principles of democracy and human rights; • justice and home affairs: co-operation to prevent illegal activities, trafficking in drugs, money laundering and organised crime. (The Action Plan on combating organised crime of June 2000 has further strengthened the cooperation between Russia and the EU in this area.) • The EU has laid down its basic approach to relations with Russia in a ”Common Strategy” of 1999, which is valid for a period of four years. It is intended to ensure more coherence between the EU and the Member States’ policies vis-à- vis the Russian partner and provides for an overall policy framework in the priority areas of: • consolidation of democracy, rule of law and public institutions; • integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space • stability and security in Europe and beyond; • common challenges on the European continent (including environment, crime and illegal immigration).

Technical assistance under the TACIS program has been granted to Russia since 1991, totalling € 2.4 billion until 2001 and € 90 million allocated for the TACIS national programme in the indicative budgets for both 2002 and 2003. In addition, Russia benefits under TACIS regional programs in the fields of justice 10 and home affairs, environment and nuclear safety. The EU has been the largest provider of economic and technical assistance to Russia. Steel and textiles are the main industry sectors covered by bilateral trade agreements. Cooperation agreements have been concluded on science and technology, nuclear safety and nuclear fusion. In addition, negotiations on a Fisheries Cooperation Agreement are currently being held. Other international agreements such as the Aarhus Convention and the International Humane Trapping Standards Agreement have been signed by both the EU and Russia, and are awaiting ratification by Russia. The bilateral institutional contacts are to a large extent determined by the PCA. They include:

• Two summits each year (Presidency, President of the Commission, President of Russian Federation). Ten summits have been held until 2003. • Cooperation Councils (ministerial level) once a year. • Cooperation Committees (senior official level). This body can meet as often as necessary. In previous years one meeting has sufficed. • Nine Sub-Committees (working level) deal with technical issues. • A Joint Parliamentary Committee has also been established, where members of the European Parliament and from the Russian Duma meet on a regular basis to discuss current issues.

Political dialog with Russia takes place at the summits, Cooperation Councils and in various meetings in the Troika format (Presidency, CFSP High Representative/Council Secretariat, future presidency and Commission). Meetings in this context take place at the level of Ministers (twice a year), Political Directors (four times a year) and experts (some fifteen CFSP working groups Troikas meet with their Russian counterparts twice a year). In addition, at the October 2001 Summit it was agreed that the Troika of the Political and Security Committee would meet with the Russian Ambassador to the EU on a monthly basis to discuss ongoing international issues. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 added urgency and specific content to cooperation on international terrorism. In the economic field, negotiations on Russian accession to the WTO gained momentum. Both sides intensified their energy dialogue and Presidents Prodi and Putin launched the EU–Russia Common Economic Space (CES) project. The EU in May 2002 granted Russia full market economy status, and Russia confirmed its intention to complete reforms aiming in particular at the gradual elimination of trade restrictions, liberalization of energy markets and implementation of market principles, including energy pricing. It was agreed that the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership Fund should become 11 operational as soon as possible. Russia and the EU agreed to cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including the Transdniestria issue in Moldova.5 The relations with the European Union are a high priority of Russia’s foreign policy. The EU is Russia’s main political and economic partner. After the forthcoming wave of EU enlargement with ten Central and East European states becoming new members, the EU will account for over 50 per cent of Russia’s foreign trade. Nevertheless, Russia apparently is not considering joining the EU. It perceives itself as a Eurasian country, whose interests and degree of dependence on the EU do not force it to seek EU membership.6 Besides, as Russian officials acknowledge, the costs of preparing for accession to the EU would be too high for Russia and would call for restructuring the entire socioeconomic organism of the country so as to conform with the union’s rules and standards, and for giving up national sovereignty in numerous fields. Russia sees economic cooperation with the EU as a process leading to the formation of a common European economic space that will facilitate their economic integration and remove obstacles in trade and economic links. On the political and security side they have already reached an unprecedented level. Moscow has been preoccupied primarily with humanitarian issues coming as a result of EU enlargement, like the freedom of travel, visa regime, etc.7 While it is believed that the enlarged EU should promote Russia’s cooperation with the new members and the EU as a whole, so far the preparations of candidate states for accession have brought about certain negative effects for Russia, among them the tightening of visa regulations against Russian citizens, changes in customs tariffs and the extension of the EU anti-dumping policy against Russian commodities to them.8 At the Brussels EU–Russia Summit on 11 November 2002 the two sides came to an agreement on two outstanding issues: they signed a Joint Statement on Transit between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation and a Joint Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism. President Putin stressed that the EU and Russia are reaching a level of ”strategic partnership and systemic interaction.” Discussed were the prospects for the joint management of

5 Website of the European Commission, External relations. The EU’s relations with Russia (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm) 6 This argument is formulated by Russian ‘eurosceptics’ in the much stronger terms of defending an independent great-power status. See, for example, Ivanov, I. “Rashirenie Yevrosoyuza: stsenarii, problemy, posledstviya [EU enlargement: scenarios, problems, consequences]’ Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya [World Economy and International Relations]. No. 9, 1998, p. 31. 7 Comments by Vladimir Chizhov, director of the Foreign Ministry’s All-European Cooperation Department. Website of Interfax (http://www.interfax.ru/press_mid_dalee _din_en.html? lang=EN&tz=0&tz_format=MSK&id_news=5601364) accessed 6 May 2003. 8 Comments by Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusarov. Website of Interfax, http://www.interfax.ru/press_mid_dalee_din_en.html?lang=EN&tz=0&tz_format=MSK&id _news=5597267) accessed 6 May 2003 12

crisis situations and the use of Russian aircraft for carrying armed forces into zones of conflict. It is planned that beginning 1 January 2003 Russian police forces will be engaged in joint police operations in the Balkans.9 Russia will participate in the first EU crisis management operation set to start from 1 January 2003, which will replace the UN International Police Task Force. This is the first EU Police Mission (EUPM) taken under the European Security and Defence Policy. Although the Russian officers will only make up a small part of the 500-strong EU police force, it marks an ever-closer relationship between EU and Russia in matters of security and defence.10 Russia thus does not wish to join the EU and cannot be admitted, but prefers to become a strategic partner and become integrated in the EU’s economic and security space – also an objective of the EU ”Common Strategy on Russia.”11 However, the Russian government does not have a clear vision of its future relations with the EU.12

2.2 Ukraine

A Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Ukraine was signed on 14 June 1994 and entered into force on 1 March 1998. The PCA established the following bilateral institutions, which meet on an average once a year: • the Cooperation Council meets at Ministerial level. Representatives of the EU troika and the Ukrainian government participate. It has overall responsibility for the running of the PCA – including the political dialog; • the Cooperation Committee meets at senior civil servants level. It is supported by sub-committees specializing in specific sectors and deals with more technical issues; • the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, on which sit members of the European and Ukrainian Parliaments.

In 1999, the European Atomic Energy Community and Ukraine signed agreements on co-operation in the fields of nuclear safety and controlled thermonuclear fusion. In December 1999, the European Council in Helsinki adopted an EU Common Strategy on Ukraine. The Common Strategy aims at

9 Pechen’ko T. “Zapusk Kalinigradskogo Tranzita,” Belorusskii rynok, No. 45, 2002 (http://www.br.minsk.by/archive/2002-45/tp5204.stm 10 Website of EU Observer,”Russia to participate in the first EU police mission.” , 11 November 2002 (http://euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=22&aid=8313) 11 Schnaider-Deters, W. “K konkretizatsii ‘Bol’shoi Yevropy’ ” [Specifying the concept of the “Big Europe”]. POLIS [Political Studies]. No.6, 2000, pp. 94-95. 12 Transcript of the TV program by Vladimir Pozner ”Vremena” (the First Russian TV channel) of 22 December 2002. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Department of Information and Press. 24 November 2002. 13

developing a strategic partnership between the EU and Ukraine on the basis of the PCA, while acknowledging Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcoming the country’s European choice. The strategy sets three principal objectives: • supporting the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine; • meeting common challenges on the European continent (stability and security in Europe, environment, energy and nuclear safety); • strengthening co-operation between the EU and Ukraine in the context of enlargement (assisting Ukraine’s integration into the European and world economy; enhancing co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs).

While the EU is Ukraine’s main trading partner outside the New Independent States (around 20 % of Ukraine’s foreign trade flows are with the EU), the EU trade flows with Ukraine are marginal (0.3 % of EU trade). Russia and the CIS as a whole remain Ukraine’s largest foreign trade partners (accounting for 35 % of Ukraine’s merchandise exports and 60 % of its imports in 2000). The EU is the largest international donor to Ukraine. Its assistance covers the technical field through the TACIS program, macro-financial and humanitarian areas. Since 1998, the Commission has contributed about € 10 m from TACIS to the Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine. With the closure of Chernobyl at the end of 2000 and pending alternative sources coming fully on stream, EU assistance in the energy sector has included additional support for Ukrainian fuel imports. The first priority in EU – Ukraine relations is full PCA implementation. Much remains to be done, in particular in the domain of trade and investment. This is of crucial importance from the perspective of a possible EU–Ukraine Free Trade Area and with regard to the approximation of legislation. Cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (combating illegal migration and transnational organised crime, including trafficking in drugs and human beings) appears particularly promising.13 At the 4th EU–Ukraine Summit in Yalta on 11 September 2001, the EU leaders and the , Leonid Kuchma, reaffirmed their commitment to reinforce the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the EU. The Seville European Council adopted the arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the EU and Ukraine on crisis management. President Kuchma’s address of 18 June 2002 to the Parliament on ”The European Choice – A Strategy of economic and social development in Ukraine till the year 2011” and the parliament resolution following this address underlined the desire of Ukraine to bring the EU–Ukraine partnership to a qualitatively new level.

13 European Commission, External Relations, Relations with Ukraine (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm) 14

In the Joint Statement signed at the EU–Ukraine Copenhagen Summit on 4 July 2002 the EU acknowledged the progress made by Ukraine towards democracy, in the implementation of economic reforms and the positive performance of its economy and its strong pro-European choice. The two sides stated that the best way to use the opportunities of enlargement is for Ukraine to intensify its work in aligning its legislation, norms and standards with those of the European Union. They agreed to intensify discussions on the effects of enlargement in the framework of the relevant PCA bodies, including issues related to trade, the movement of persons and visas. In this context, they also encouraged the development of regional and cross-border cooperation, including the human dimension. To facilitate contacts between the enlarged Union and Ukraine, border crossings by the citizens of Ukraine and EU member states will be made ”as easy and efficient as possible.” The EU reiterated that it will continue to provide substantial assistance to the Ukrainian efforts to develop a system of efficient and comprehensive border management on all Ukrainian borders and to support Ukrainian efforts to conclude readmission agreements with its neighboring countries. The EU also pledged to continue to provide assistance for Ukraine’s rapid accession to the WTO.14 Because of the domestic political and economic situation in Ukraine and its alleged involvement in dubious foreign transactions15 today’s EU–Ukraine relations are far from ideal. When EU commissioner for enlargement Günter Verheugen told the audience at the Salzburg conference that he could not see Ukraine joining the EU in the next 10–20 years, the Ukrainian president’s anger was ill concealed, to say the least.16 Unlike Russia, Ukraine by declaring its ”European choice” signalled its desire to become a full-fledged member of the EU. The 1999 European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine, however, foresees for the near future the achievement of more modest intermediate tasks.

2.3 Belarus

Compared with both Russia and Ukraine, Belarus has the lowest level of relations with the European Union. This was confirmed in November 2002, when 14 European Union countries – all member states except – imposed a travel ban on Lukashenka and his seven top ministers for his administration’s human rights abuses. Unlike Russia Belarus is not seeking to become the EU’s strategic partner. Neither is it trying to prepare for future membership, like Ukraine, although it claims to be ”part of Europe.” Belarus

14 European Commission (http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/er/71439.pdf) 15 Ukraine was implicated in selling air defense and radar systems to Iraq. 16 “Kuchma’s Land.” Transitions Online Weekly Newsletter. 11 November 2002. (http://tol.cz/look/) 15

still remains neither a would-be partner nor a candidate, without its own coherent strategy and it is not becoming a target of any specific cooperation strategy on the part of the EU (unlike Russia and Ukraine). Yet again, Belarus presents an interesting case compared to the triangle Ukraine–Russia–the EU, in which Ukraine is not directly dependent on Russia in developing its relations with the European Union.17 Ukraine and Russia have different, but positive agendas and they are not integrated to the extent of Belarus–Russia Union. Belarus, on the other hand, is ”negatively” independent from the EU (self- isolated in terms of political dialog and institutionalized political, economic and legal cooperation). A further advancement in the creation of a Russia–Belarus Union will inevitably sharpen the asymmetry of relations between the two parts of the and the EU and is more than likely to complicate Russia’s growing cooperation both with the European Union and Belarus. Another notable distinction of the two ”triangles” is that it is Ukraine that has eventually benefitted most from Russia’s rapprochement with the West (and with Ukraine as well), rather than Belarus, in spite of Moscow’s attemps to lobby its ally’s interests on many occasions. At least the former role of Ukraine as both an object and an instrument of rivalry between Russia and the West has become less obvious.18 Ukraine has started to exchange views and co-operate with Russia on matters of their relations with the EU, whereby the Ukrainian–Russian relations are regarded as a ”key element of Ukraine’s European policy.”19

17 Schnaider-Deters, W. “K konkretizatsii kontseptsii.,” p. 97. 18 See, for example: Dergachev A. “The Ukrainian-Russian Relations: European and Eurasian Context.” POLIS [Political Studies]. No.6, 2000, p.114. 19 “On the Consultations of Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation V. Choshov with State Secretaries of Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry Yu. Sergeev and A. Chaly,” Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 21 December 2002. 16 17

3. Belarus and Its Neighbors: Regional Issues and Regional Cooperation

Belarus is a transit country. In 2001 alone its border authorities registered 22 million border crossings by people (two per one Belarusian citizen) and 5 million – by vehicles. In the same year Belarusian border guards detained 60 groups of illegal migrants totaling 1,500 persons, disrupted about 30 illegal channels for migration, confiscated contraband worth 800 million Belarusian rubles (about $500,000), and 65 kilograms of narcotics.20

3.1 Border issues

Starting from 1 January 2003 Lithuania, Latvia and Poland are going to introduce a full-fledged visa regime with Belarus. It is estimated that about 300 000 Belarusian citizens will apply for Lithuanian and Latvian visas annually. The Polish authorities have reported that on the average there are about five and a half million border crossings by Belarusian citizens every year.21 Last summer Poland concluded the Administration of Justice and Internal Affairs Chapter in its European Union accession talks in Brussels. Under this chapter it pledged after joining the EU to strengthen control of its 1,200– kilometer border with Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, Belarus, and Ukraine in order to prevent illegal migration, as well as the smuggling of goods and the trafficking of drugs and arms. Interior Minister Krzysztof Janik said Poland needs to spend € 250 million to beef up control of its 1,200-kilometer eastern border – which will become the EU’s external border upon Polish accession to the union – in order to qualify for joining the Schengen agreements. Janik said that some 75 percent of the costs related to the tightening of the border will be covered by various EU programs.22 committed itself to increasing its current border-guard force of some 12,000 servicemen and civilians to 18,000. By 2006, the country will increase the force by 3,200, hiring 5,300 professional frontier guards and 1,000 more civil servants while phasing out 3,100 army conscripts who are currently

20 Komsomol’skaya v Belorussii. 10 January 2002. 21 7 Dnei, 29 June 2002. 22 “Poland Needs $ 245 Million to Strengthen Control of Eastern Border.” RFE/RL Newsline. 2 August 2002.(www.rferl.org) 18

deployed. The government plans to buy and equip seven helicopters and two light aircraft for the border guards, as well as night-vision surveillance devices and other necessary equipment. The number of border watch-towers will be increased in order to space them at a distance not exceeding 20 kilometers.23 Poland’s accession to the EU will mean tougher restrictions on travelers from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Warsaw will introduce visa requirements for them as of 1 July 2003. As the Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe analyst Jan Maksimiuk points out, today nobody is able to imagine the scale of technical difficulties or the political and socioeconomic consequences of border tightening. There may occur ”local economic disasters” in the borderland regions of the four countries. In 2000, Poland was visited by 5.9 million , 2.8 million , and 6.1 million Ukrainians. (The same year Polish consulates all over the world issued only 185,000 visas.) The absolute majority of these visits were made by people engaged in petty cross-border trade, which is the main source of their livelihood. Besides, Poland hosts about 500, 000 migrant workers, many of whom come from the FSU.24 If Brussels focuses on tightening Poland’s frontiers and fails to draw up comprehensive assistance programs for Belarusian and Ukrainian border areas, Maksimiuk warns, not only Poland but the entire EU will be unable to influence the transformation processes in the ”forgotten Europe” – Belarus and Ukraine.25 Lithuania has contemplated closing 23 out of 29 border posts with Belarus and modernizing border posts at Lavoryshki, Medniki, Raiharadz and Salech- niki, as well as railroad border control posts at Hadutsishki and Kyane.26 Following its obligations before the EU on the introduction of a full-scale visa regime beginning on 1 January 2003, Lithuania denounced the 1994 Belarusian– Lithuanian agreement on mutual travel of their citizens. On 27 November 2002 Lithuania and Belarus signed a new interim agreement on mutual travel of citizens, setting regulations for entering, exiting, transit and border crossing, as well as procedures for obtaining visas and traveling across the territories of the two states which came into force on 1 January 2003. The document defined the groups of citizens who do not need invitations to get a visa, citizens enjoying privileges and those who enjoy visas free of charge, in particular, aircraft and sea vessel crews. Citizens of border areas (numbering 75–80, 000 people) will be granted visas with 70 % discounts. Free visas will be granted to cultural figures, athletes, persons of 16 years of age

23 Maksymiuk, Jan. “Warsaw Obliges Itself to Build EU’s ‘Berlin Wall’.” RFE/RL Newsline. Vol. 6, No. 149, Part II, 9 August 2002. .(www.rferl.org) 24 Global Assignment Americans Abroad. The Adams Report “Back to the Wall.” (http://www.globalassignment.com/1-21-2002/backtothewall.html) 25 Maksymiuk, Jan. “Warsaw Obliges Itself…” 26 Nasha Svaboda. 15 October 2001. 19

and younger and 70 years old or older and those making culture trips.27 As Belarus’ deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Gerasimenko stated, the two sides have done their best to take into account the interests of all categories of citizens and find good solutions to facilitate the conditions for border crossing. In nine months of 2002 Belarusian citizens were issued 66,000 Lithuanian visas – about the same figure as for Lithuanians going to Belarus. Beginning on 16 November 2002 Lithuania raised the cost of entry visas for Belarusian citizens. A one-entry visa to Lithuania now costs € 20 (formerly 15 USD), a special visa – € 60 (formerly 50 USD), a transit visa – € 10 (formerly 8 USD), and a group visa – € 15 per person (formerly 10 USD). According to a Belarusian Foreign Ministry spokesman Belarusian is going to apply ”adequate” measures and raise the cost of visas for Lithuanian citizens.28 Of special importance are the new economic projects between Belarus and the neighboring countries within the framework of the transborder cooperation program, e.g. the project on the renovation of the checkpoint at the Belarus– Lithuania border ”Kamenny Log–Myadininkai”. Equipped in the latest fashion, it can now process up to 3,000 vehicles a day. The traffic here is expected to increase twofold in the near future. Additionally, another vital project is under way at the moment – on the demarcation of the entire Belarus–Lithuanian border. The project budget is €1,298 million. It was planned to be completed by April of 2003 and will be followed by another one – on the demarcation of the 143 kilometers-long Belarusian–Latvian border. The TACIS office in Minsk evaluated this project as one of the most important TACIS projects in Belarus, contributing to regional cooperation and to combating illegal migration. Belarus–Poland cooperation has been successful on water evaluation and improvement measures in the Western Bug basin, on ensuring the safety of water supply to the population in the Neman basin area, on assisting the development of the areas that suffered from the Chernobyl disaster in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, on building a system of international data exchange on the current contamination situation. Plans are being developed for the construction of the Kozlovichy-2 border customs terminal. This is one of the busiest at the Belarus–Poland border. The new terminal will include a restricted zone for implementing state control of the goods and vehicles entering the country and a servicing zone with warehouses. Its value is estimated at € 16 million. Tender terms are being prepared. The auction and signing of the financing memorandum are scheduled for the first half of 2003.

27 “Lithuania and Belarus Sign Interim Agreement on Border Crossing” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, 27 Nov. 2002. (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm) 28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus (http://www.br.minsk.by/archive/2002- 48/vad3203.stm) 20

3.2 Migration issues

Belarusian authorities are fully aware of the need to deepen transboundary cooperation on migration and refugees, especially in the light of the forthcoming EU enlargement. According to Mr. Bohdan Nahaylo, Head of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Liaison Office in Belarus, this country is taking part in the international system of the refugee protection and is actively involved in the regional process initiated by the UNHCR office in order to develop transboundary cooperation between Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. Recently, Latvia and Moldova expressed their interest in joining this process. As of 1 June 2002, 623 persons were officially recognized as refugees, including 479 from Afghanistan, 64 from , 27 from Tajikistan, 17 from Azerbaijan. Other refugees came from Iran, Iraq, India, Camerun, Liberia, Rwanda, Pakistan and Palestine. Belarusian border troops have been actively confronting the activities of transnational organized criminal groups. In 2001 more than 40 channels of illegal migration were revealed. The combined efforts of the Belarusian, Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian border guards resulted in the detention of more than 700 persons. 400 more persons were detained when they were attempting to illegally cross the state border. About 30 organizers and accomplices in illegal migration, who were nationals of Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, were arrested. Political asylum in Belarus was asked for by only 34 persons out of nearly two thousand illegal migrants detained in 2001 by the Belarusian border guards. Among other reasons, these migrants were attracted by the fact that Belarus, though not being a rich country, offers them a calm environment for living, studying and working.29 Nationals of Afghanistan present the utmost potential danger in terms of illegal migration. 300 of them were detained last year alone. Illegal migration is combined with drug and human beings trafficking, organized crime and terrorism and is itself one of the ”attractions” for criminal groups. The tactics followed by illegal migrants usually implies state border crossing on foot and not at official border checkpoints but elsewhere. Trying to cross the border, illegal migrants make use of somebody else’s or forged documents. In 2001 they attempted the following ways of crossing the border: travel in a freight railway van (16 Vietnamese nationals were detained),

29 “Belarus’ attitude to refugees merits high appreciation, asserts Mr. Bohdan Nahailo, Head of the UNHCR Liaison Office in Belarus.” Ibidem, (http://www.president.gov.by/eng/president/ comment/esc.shtml 21

overcoming the electrical alert installations by a rope-way (25 individuals), overcoming the electric alert installations by using ladders (20 individuals).30 To cope with migration issues Belarus has introduced a number of legal, institutional and organizational instruments. The laws ”On Refugees” and ”On Immigration” were adopted, and the Department on Migration was set up under the Ministry of Labor, which has been cooperating with the UNHCR Office, and with the International Organization for Migration.31 On 26 October through 1 November 2002 the Belarus Ministry for the Interior conducted a special operation code-named ”Nelegal” (a serial operation). As a result, administrative sanctions for the violation of the rules of residence on the Belarusian territory were applied to 816 foreigners, 3, 009 citizens of the CIS states and 489 Belarusian citizens, including 36 officials. 11 groups of illegal migrants were detained. Overall, in 2002 alone sanctions for the violation of residence and transit have been applied to 35, 000 foreign citizens and individuals with no citizenship.32 Belarus is, so to speak, a secondary (or even a tertiary) transit country for illegal migrants. Many of them are coming via Russia. Vladimir Zorin, the Russian minister responsible for nationalities, told reporters in Moscow on 16 December 2002 that there are about 3 million illegal foreign workers in Russia and that the number of legal foreign workers increased by 19 per cent during the first half of that year, compared with the same period of 2001.33 According to an analysis of the Belarusian security services the flow of refugees from the territory of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the territory of Russia, caused by the operation ”Unlimited Freedom,” may amount to one to two million people, out of which up to 10,000 may attempt to penetrate Belarusian territory aiming further to illegally enter the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. The number of illegal migrants detained in Belarus in 2001 was 50 per cent higher than it was in 2000. Already in September–December of 2001 – following the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation – the number of detainees sharply increased. Currently, like in previous years, the main flow of illegal migrants is made up of the citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Vietnam.34

30 “Illegal migration in the Republic of Belarus remains a factor that influences seriously the situation in the country.” National Press Center of the Republic of Belarus. Ibidem (http://www.president.gov.by/eng/president/comment/migr.shtml 31 Ibid. 32 Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, 8 Nov. 2002 (http://www.bdg.by/news/news.htm?34487,1) 33 RFE/RL Newsline. 17 December 2002. 34 Poddubny P. & Verlup S. “Aktualnye voprosy protivodeistviya terrorizmu na gosudarstvennoi granitse i prigranichnoi territorii Respubliki Belarus [Topical issues of countering terrorism on the state border and border area of the Republic of Belarus]. In: Terrorism kak ugroza natsional’noi bezopasnosti Respubliki Belarus [Terrorism as a threat to the national security of the Republic of Belarus]: Proceedings of an interagency scientific and practical conference. Minsk: Institute of National Security of the Republic of Belarus, 2002, p.97. 22

Although Belarus’ border with Russia is the easiest to cross because of the absence of regular passport control, the Belarus–Ukrainian border is also porous enough. Over the five years since the establishment of the Homel border unit, it detained about 1, 500 illegal migrants from 30 countries of Asia and Africa on the Belarus–Ukraine border.35 According to officials, Belarus holds up 150–200 thousand illegal immigrants on its territory, who ”strive to penetrate Europe and who flooded the country after the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan.”36 On the whole, population growth through migration in 2001 compared to 2000 went down by 3, 000 people (by 24.8 %) amounting to 9,100 people. The migration saldo in 2001 remained positive with all CIS and Baltic states. Meanwhile, Belarus has its main migration exchange with Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, making up 87 per cent of the total (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Citizens from 36 countries of the world settled in Belarus in 2001. The majority of them were Ukrainians (1,075 people or 66.2 %).37 Aside from Belarus’ porous borders – first of all with Russia and Ukraine – another key issue in coping with illegal migration is the absence of bilateral readmission agreements with the neighboring countries. Moreover, as a Lithuanian expert observes, readmission agreements with expanding EU’s eastern neighbors require a broader approach, including foreign policy tools and technical-financial assistance. They are unlikely to be adopted on a bilateral basis, initiated by a single future or present EU member-state, and had better be addressed on the Community level. Negotiations on readmission agreements can lead to a realistic result by linking migration management, foreign policy and technical aid and by engaging simultaneously both Belarus and Russia.38 Alexander Lukashenka in 2002 expressed confidence that the Europeans themselves would plea for Belarusian support and cooperation in combating drug and illegal migration problems, given the strategic situation of Belarus in the center of Europe.39 He emphasized that although illegal migration is a threat to Europe, Belarus has to deal with it alone and spends considerable assets. ”The West wants to utilize our material and human resources without offering any compensation,” Lukashenka claimed. Therefore, he tasked the Belarusian foreign minister to inform the ”relevant states” that beginning with the next year Belarus will detain illegal migrants

35 Narodnaya Gazeta. 13 June 2002. 36 Statement by Ambassador Sergei Martynov, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Belarus at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Plenary Meeting, 22 November 2002. (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm) 37 Belorusskii rynok, No. 9, 2002 ( http://www.br.minsk.by/archive/2002-09/sc1444.stm) 38 Slavenas, Erikas. “The Issue of Illegal Migration through Lithuania’s Eastern Boreders: Current State of Affairs.” In: Lithuania’s Eastern Neighbors: Politics and Security. International Conference Materials. Vilnius: General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, 2002. 39 President of the Republic of Belarus. 13 November 2002. (http://www.president.gov.by/rus/president/press/13.shtml) 23

only on the condition that Belarus’ expenditures are compensated for. Similarly, Belarusian interests will guide the solution of the issues pertaining to the need for border delimitation and demarcation. Lukashenka assigned the government with the task of improving the border infrastructure.40 However, ”from now on Belarus is not going to shoulder the full burden of ensuring European security”, he stated.41 Meanwhile, Russia pledged to sign a readmission agreement with Lithuania and negotiate such agreements with EU states in 2003. The European Commission, for its part, has proposed the establishment of a basic common legal framework and the gradual convergence of legislation, policy and practice which will result in a common EU migration policy. Substantial direct and indirect Community assistance (totalling some € 935 million for the period 2000–2006) has been programmed to provide support to third countries in their efforts to address legal and illegal migration issues. These programs have recently been put into effect and their results are expected to become visible in the medium and long term.42 On 3 December 2002 the European Commission adopted a Commu- nication on Integrating Migration Issues in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries, which pioneers the approach that concerns related to legal and illegal migration need to be integrated into the external policy and assistance programmes of the EU. The long-term priority of the Community is to address the root causes of migration flows with its development programmes aiming at poverty eradication, institution and capacity building and conflict prevention. Regional co-operation on migration issues is given particular importance, notably in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the former . The Commission is in the process of negotiating several readmission agreements between the European Community and third countries in which both parties reciprocally agree to accept the return of illegal migrants into their territory. The European Council has adopted decisions to negotiate readmission agreements between the EC and Russia, Pakistan, Morocco and Ukraine. The Commission proposes to give greater weight to migration aspects within the Regional and Country Strategy Papers. These papers form the basis of the EU’s assistance programmes to third countries and their mid-term review is scheduled for 2003.

3.3 Regional Cooperation on Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism

Belarusian officials state that each and every day an ”unprecedented flow of drugs riding to the West at the crest of the migration avalanche is stopped on the

40 Ibidem, 2 October 2002. (http://www.president.gov.by/rus/president/press/p10_2.shtml) 41 Ibidem. 24 October 2002. (http://www.president.gov.by/rus/president/press/p10_2.shtml) 42 European Commission: Integrating migration issues into the EU’s external relations, DN: IP/02/1793. 3 December 2002. (http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt =gt&doc=IP/02/1793|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display=) 24

Belarusian border, and the flow of arms and nuclear materials coming the opposite way and destined to wind up in the hands of terrorists is suppressed.” They reported that only over a period of a few months three attempts were prevented to smuggle through fissile materials.43 Indeed, Belarus has on many occasions become a route for contraband of all sorts. At the beginning of 2002 a criminal group of three Belarusians and one Ukrainian were arrested for an attempt to sell one and a half kilograms of uranium-235 and uranium-238 dioxide, stolen from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.44 Customs officers from the Polish–Belarusian border crossing in Kukuryki (Lublin Province) on 7 August foiled an attempt to smuggle three kilograms of heroin and 13 kilograms of opium worth an estimated 400,000 zloty (96,000 USD). The drugs were hidden in a truck that was traveling from Iran to the Poznan Province (western Poland) with a 20-ton cargo of raisins.45 Russian border troops and customs officers also foiled an attempt to smuggle through the Russian–Belarusian border a large amount of red phosphorus, which can be used for preparing explosives. A Belarusian citizen was bringing about 18 tons of this substance worth about 40,000 US dollars in a truck to Russia.46 According to the Chairman of the Belarusian State Border Committee Alexander Pavlovskii the most problem-prone section is the Belarusian– Ukrainian border, which has the record of 43 per cent of all border violations. The flow of contraband, however, in 2001 was distributed more or less evenly among the Belarusian–Ukrainian, Belarusian–Lithuanian and Belarusian–Polish sections of the Belarusian border – 33.8 per cent, 33 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively, the most common commodities being alcohol, gasoline and icons.47 Another serious issue is the possible growth of the influence of the ”shadow economies” on Belarus territory and their interaction with other criminal groups in the region. Statistics on ”shadow” economic actors is scarce and imprecise. What is certain is that Belarus is most likely to be affected by such negative trends primarily due to Russia. In 2000 Russia’s Chief Directorate for Combating Economic Crime registered 1, 600 criminal groups with 80,000 Chechens controlling over 40, 000 economic actors, including 1,500 state enterprises, 4,000 share-holding companies, over 500 joint ventures, about 500 banks and 500 wholesale and retail markets.48 About 2,000 tons of cargo is

43 Martynov, 22 November 2002. (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm) 44 Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta. 17 September 2002. 45 “Polish Customs Seize Heroin, Opium at Belarusian Border.” RFE/RL Newsline. 8 August 2002. 46 Reported by RIA-Novosti. Cited by Belarus’ segodnya, 6 August 2002. 47 Belorusskii Rynok, 10-16 December 2001. 48 Belorusskii Rynok, 17-23 June 2002. 25

transported via Belarus territory to Russia, only 5 per cent of which are of the Belarusian origin. Belarus has signed intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements with a number of countries, among them Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Britain, Turkey, , Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and China, on crime prevention. In June 2002 a wider intergovernmental Agreement between Belarus and Lithuania was prepared on cooperation in combating crime, illegal drug trafficking and terrorism.49 On 11 July 2002 a Protocol on cooperation was signed between the Investigation Departments of the Belarusian and Lithuanian Ministries for the Interior, providing for regular operative information exchange, inter-state assistance in the investigation of crimes against individuals and property, in the spheres of economy, computer information, combatting organized crime, illegal drug and arms trafficking.50 Belarus has also cooperated with the Polish police and other security agencies on matters of organized crime and terrorism. Illegal migration problems are dealt with by the two countries’ border troops in consultation on a daily basis. In June 2002 the Chief of the German Federal Border Guard General Klaus Severin visited Belarus and held talks to elaborate a joint strategy of dealing with illegal migrants from the East.51 Additionally, multilateral information exchange among the police structures of the countries of the region is being maintained through Interpol. Further, Belarus is party to the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as well as other relevant international legal instruments. However, there is a gap between membership in international legal frameworks and the domestic legislation. Only in January 2002 the Law of Belarus ”On Fighting Terrorism” came into force to define the legal foundations, principles and organization of combating terrorist challenges. Additionally, Belarus’ banking system has been empowered to check, in appropriate cases, the accounts and financing so as to establish whether funds belong to a terrorist network. Some efforts have been taken to enhance information security.

49 7 Dnei. 15 June 2002. 50 Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, 12 July 2002. 51 Sovetskaja Belorussiya, 13 June 2002. 26

Belarus–Russia cooperation on regional challenges is the most advanced. The ministries of the interior, customs agencies and border troops, as well as special services and national security councils exchange information, hold regular meetings at various levels and conduct joint operations. At the initiative of the Belarusian KGB and the Russian FSB, a Committee on the issues of the Union State security was created in 1997 for the purpose of establishing interaction and strengthening cooperation in all areas of joint activities. A treaty on joint efforts in the protection of the state border of Belarus was signed as far back as in February 1995. Special joint border protection programs have been launched, including the construction of border infrastructure at the Belarusian– Lithuanian and Belarusian–Latvian borders. The Russia–Belarus Union’s Customs Committee is working on the unification of the two countries’ customs legislation. Belarus has also been engaged in anti-terrorist measures within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A treaty on cooperation among the CIS member-states in combating terrorism was signed in June 1999. Its provisions stipulated concrete areas of cooperation: exchange of information, elaboration and adoption of concerted anti-terrorist measures, dispatching (upon agreement with the states concerned) special anti-terrorist groups, staff training, delivery of special means (e.g. gas agents) and equipment, etc. However, as a result of the existing political tensions a regular and especially an institutionalized cooperation between Belarus and the EU on the “soft security” matters has so far been lacking. While EU–Russia cooperation has been steadily advancing, especially on combating terrorism, Belarus turns out to remain important but still a weak link in the shaping system of cooperation on trans-European security threats. 52

3.4 Energy/oil/gas transit and transportation issues

Belarus must import nearly 80 % of its oil. Most of this comes from Russia, as the northern branch of Russian Druzhba oil export pipeline runs through Belarus on its way to the oil terminal in Ventspils, as well as to Poland and Germany. Oil exported from Russia via Belarus (approximately 50 % of Russia’s net oil) is not subject to export duties due to the Russian–Belarusian Union agreement, which, along with high oil prices in 1999 and 2000, contributed to a significant increase in the amount of oil flowing through the pipeline and to Belarussian refineries. Belarus also has been granted licenses for oil exploration and production in Russia.

52 The areas and objectives of EU-Russia cooperation on combating terrorism were set forth in bilateral declarations adopted in 2001 and 2002. See, in particular: European Commission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_11_02/js_terr.htm) 27

Belarus has sold its 10.83 per cent stake in the Russian oil company Slavneft at the equivalent of 207 million USD to Russia’s Sibneft, which is controlled by oligarch Roman Abramovich, the governor of Chukotka. The Belarusian government reportedly wanted to use part of the money earned to pay debts for the supply of Russian energy resources.53 Belarus is heavily reliant on natural gas imports from Russia. Despite Belarus’ debts to Russia for natural gas supplies, Gazprom continued to supply Belarus with natural gas at the low price of 30 USD per 1,000 cubic meters until the end of 2002, since Russia receives reduced tariff rates for its natural gas that transits Belarus to customers in Western Europe. Beltransgaz, which operates 3,780 miles of natural gas pipelines in Belarus, charges Russia a transit tariff that is approximately one-third of the tariff in other countries. It is estimated that the Belarusian natural gas transportation system is developing so that when the third extension of the Yamal–Europe-I gas pipeline becomes operational, and new compressor stations are built, the pipeline’s capacity will more than double. By 2005, analysts say, natural gas transit to Europe via the transcontinental Yamal pipeline alone may exceed 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf).54 The construction of the Belarusian section of the transcontinental Yamal– Europe gas-main has been completed. Thereby, the Belarusian section (575 km) has been assembled and is now the only uninterrupted section from the border with Russia in the East to the Polish border in the West. The Yamal–Europe network, two branches of which will cross borders of Belarus, Poland and Germany will double the export of Russian gas to Europe. The net production capacity of the lines is expected to amount to 68 billion cubic meters a year as soon as all compressor stations have been put into operation. The total length of the Yamal–Europe pipeline from Yamal peninsula to the eastern border of Germany exceeds 4,100 kilometers. On the territory of Poland the pipeline was constructed by EuroPolGas, created by Russia’s Gazprom and the Polish state oil and gas company, on the territory of Germany – by Wingas, a joint venture of Gazprom and Wintershall. The total cost of the project for the annual transportation of 50 billion cubic meters of gas is $36 billion.55 On 7 October 2002 Moscow and Kiev signed an agreement on the creation of an international consortium including Germany, a key market for Russian energy companies, as well as Italy and France. The consortium would upgrade, extend, and manage Ukraine’s current gas pipeline. The project would provide Russia with a strategic stake over the key westward route for its gas, while for Ukraine it could possibly have the dual benefits of renovating its existing pipelines and swelling the state coffers with transit fees. The vast majority of

53 RFL/RL Newsline. 9 December 2002. 54 Energy Information Administration, official statistics from the U.S: Government, November 2002. (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russexp.html 55, “Construction of Belarusian Yamal-Europe Gas-Main Completed” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, 17 December 2992, (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm) 28

Russia’s gas already reaches Western Europe through Ukraine, adding $2 billion to Ukraine’s annual budget. At present, Gazprom sells roughly 130 billion cubic meters of gas in Europe. However, Ukraine’s pipelines are working at half their capacity and could potentially carry far more.56 On 10 December 2002 Ukraine’s Naftohaz Ukrainy and Russia’s Gazprom signed a package of agree- ments on mutual cooperation and Russian gas transit through Ukraine. The accords stipulate that Russia pump 110 billon cubic meters of gas via Ukraine’s gas-pipeline system in 2003. Gazprom is reportedly to provide 26 billon cubic meters of gas to Ukraine as a fee for the use of transit pipelines, while the rest of the fees will be paid in cash. Both companies also agreed that Gazprom will replace Itera next year as the operator of Turkmen gas exports to Ukraine. According to the agreement, Ukrainian expenditures on the transit of Turkmen gas in 2003 will fall to 38 percent of the cost of the gas, compared to 41 percent in 2002.57 Belarus electricity consumption still exceeds its production, forcing the country to import about 20 % of its needs. As of September 2001, Belarus’s debt for imported electricity stood at $69 million, including $19.4 million owed to Russia and $49.6 million owed to Lithuania. Also the European transport corridors across the Belarusian territory need modernization. According to TACIS estimates the upgrading of transport flows along two trans-European corridors requires about 840 million USD, while the total Belarusian budget for maintaining and constructing roads in 2002 was about 350 million USD.58 The solutions of transit and related issues can hardly be found in isolation from Belarus’ fiscal and customs policies, the openness and commercial compatibility of its economic space, etc. But yet again, in the end they may depend on the normalization of political relations with the European Union – or on a large-scale privatization of the Belarusian economy by Russian capital.

3.5 The Kaliningrad question: a non-pilot project for Belarus

Kaliningrad is one of the main trade partners of Belarus among the Russian regions together with Moscow, the Tyumen oblast, St Petersburg, the Moscow oblast, the Ingushetiya Free Economic Zone, the Smolensk and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts and Tatarstan. People of more than 97 nationalities live in the Kaliningrad region. Most numerous are Russians – 78 %, Belorusians – 7.7 %, Ukrainians – 7.4 %, Lithu- anians – 1.9 %, Armenians – 0.8 %. Germans – 0.6 %, Poles – 0.5 %. The total number of Belarusians is over 100, 000 people.

56 Kuznetsova, Nataliya. “Russia: The Ukrainian Connection.” Transitions Online. 14 October 2002. 57 RFE/RL Newsline, 11 December 2002. 58 Belorusskii Rynok. 13-14 April 2002. 29

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Kaliningrad intensified its trade with regional counterparts. Whereas in 1990 the Kaliningrad oblast imported from the Russian ”mainland” 74.5 per cent of material resources, 10 per cent from Lithuania and 3 per cent from Belarus, already in 1995 it imported only 38 per cent from Russia, 33.3 per cent from Lithuania, and 13 from Belarus.59 This is accounted for mainly by transportation costs. A Belarusian governmental delegation headed by President Lukashenka visited the Kalinigrad oblast in October 1999, and an agreement on a long-term cooperation between the governmental bodies of Belarus and the Kaliningrad oblast was signed. A branch of the Belarusian Embassy in the Russian Federation was opened in Kaliningrad, and a representative office of the Kaliningrad oblast – in Minsk. After a multilateral agreement on the parallel operation of energy systems was signed in February 2001 by the heads of national energy companies of Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Belarus and the Kaliningrad oblast are part of a unified electric energy system.60 Also, according to the Russia–Belarus Agreement on the Creation of a Regional Grouping of the Armed Forces together they form the common defense area of the Russia– Belarus Union, including Air Defense. In recent years Belarusian air defense units have on a number of occasions come to the Kaliningrad oblast for training and exercises. A special Belarus–Russia council on co-operation between Belarusian regions and ministries with the Kaliningrad region was created in compliance with a Belarus–Russia intergovernmental agreement. Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economy Andrey Kobiakov chairs the Belarusian section, and Kaliningrad Governor Vladimir Yegorov – the Russian section. A meeting in Kaliningrad in 2000 discussed the fulfilment of the signed agreements and the further development of trade and economic cooperation, as well as the issues of creating favorable conditions of transit for passengers and cargo going to Kaliningrad through the Belarusian territory, the participation of Belarus in the implementation of the project on the construction of a second power-plant in the Kaliningrad region, the creation of a Belarus–Russia fishing company and co- operation in the sphere of construction. However in January–September 2002 the trade turnover between Belarus and Kaliningrad region was $ 58.5 million, 13 per cent less than the same period of 2001.61

59 “Answers by Governor Vladimir Yegorov of the Kaliningrad Oblast’ to the questions of the magazine Ekspert-Severo-Zapad.” Administratsiya Kaliningradskoi oblasti (http://www.gov.kaliningrad.ru/intervws.php3?uid=2) 60 Medvedev A. “Litva pust’ volnuyet litovtsev. A nas – Kaliningrad.” Soyuz: Belarus – Rossiya. 15 February 2001, No. 5 (11). 61 “On the meeting of Belarus-Russia Council for Co-Operation with the Kaliningrad Region. A Report by Belarus’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Secretary at a briefing on 5 December, 2000.” (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm) 30

Although there seems to be an understanding that Belarus has a role in the future of the Kaliningrad oblast, which, in turn, is an important access to the Baltic Sea and an additional market for Belarus, a more important thing is often overlooked. This is the fact that for Belarus Kaliningrad is only yet another potential gateway to the EU, as well as the Baltic and Nordic regions, and clearly not the best one. The Kaliningrad oblast has already been engaged in many EU and subregional programs and projects, the Northern Dimension, in which Minsk has indicated its interest, being one of them. Moreover, the whole of the Kalinigrad oblast is sort of a”pilot project,” an experimental model of how far relations between the extended EU and its new neighbors can be developed. The first test – the resolution of the visa issue between Russia and the enlarging EU in November 2002 – was rather successful, but it left out Belarus and qualified it as Russia’s second-rate ally. If the rights of the citizens of the Russia–Belarus Union are declared to be equal, then they are to be equal everywhere. President Lukashenka dismissed the visa compromise between the EU and Russia as a ”big love with no result” and said that Russia has lost.62 However, there seems to be a different loser. The Kaliningrad question has become a test-case also for Belarus, which has lost a chance to promote its interests.

62 Pechen’ko T. “Zapusk Kaliningradskogo Tranzita.” Belorusskii rynok (http://www.br.minsk.by/archive/2002-45/tp5204.stm) 31

4. Belarus and EU Enlargement: Challenges with Narrow Opportunities in Sight

To date only some initial steps have been made by policymakers in Belarus to analyze the challenges of EU enlargement. The government used to see only short-term negative effects of EU enlargement and was uncertain about the long- term consequences.63 In an earlier analysis The Belarus Foreign Ministry predicted among the consequences of EU enlargement only the emergence of multiple tensions among the existing world power centers.64 Close economic co-operation with the EU has an increasing importance for Belarus. In 2001, the country’s trade turnover with the EU came to 37 per cent of its total trade turnover with non-CIS countries, and this share keeps growing. The EU’s share in imports to Belarus from non-CIS countries has increased and reached 52 per cent.65 According to Belarusian officials, the EU’s ongoing policy of ”isolation” towards Belarus is counterproductive and must be ended. Apparently as part of a planned public relations campaign, a series of articles on the subject with principally the same arguments has been published recently in various printed and electronic media.66 They claim that there has been a ”wide misperception” on the part of the EU about the human rights situation in Belarus, when ”constant improvements” in civil society are being disregarded, whereas in some cases Belarus is ”more developed in terms of its OSCE commitments than other countries.” It is assumed, therefore, that both sides must attempt to make efforts gradually to improve the EU–Belarus relationship by following a ‘twin track’ approach, which should consist of dealing with criticisms through dialog, as well as co-operation in areas of mutual interest, such as illegal migration and trafficking in drugs and human beings, terrorism, and energy policy. As for EU enlargement, this could bring positive and negative effects. Lower trade tariffs in neighbouring countries would be an advantage, but the extension to new EU members of the existing anti-dumping rules (on fertilisers, for example) would

63 Biryukova, Olga. ”Evropeiskii Vektor” [The European Vector]. Belorusskii Rynok. 29 April – 05 May 2002. 64 “Vozmozhnye posledstviya rasshireniya Evropeiskogo Soyuza dlya Respubliki Belarus.” Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del Respubliki Belarus No. 3 (1999), p. 57-58. 65 Martynov, Sergei. “European Union - Belarus: Demands of the Time.” Belarus in the World. No. 2, 2002. ( http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm 66 Idem. 32

impact negatively on business. The introduction of visa regimes linked to the Schengen zone would also hinder free travel for passengers and business travelers. Finally, the concept developed by the EU and Russia for a Common Economic Space would not be feasible without Belarusian involvement, it is suggested.67 The peculiarity of the current Belarusian position is that what it really offers to the EU is to abandon its ”policy of isolation” toward Belarus, engage the country in interaction on as many topics as possible and focus on the practical resolution of the most acute common problems, which ”should not be made hostage and victim to political disagreements”. This agenda, however, is one-sided. It suggests reassessment of EU’s policy, but does not imply a reassessment of Belarus’ own policies. On the contrary, it states that ”in many ways Belarus is more politically advanced than some other states of the region” and that it is a ”net contributor to stability and security in its sub-region and thus in Europe.” Nothing is said about Belarus’ own readiness to meet the requirements that the EU has long put forward as starting points for positive changes in bilateral relations. Well-known arguments are furnished about the growing importance of Belarus’ strategic location for trade and oil and gas transit.68 This message, however, misses the point. Although the strategic location may be advantageous, this is only a potential, the use of which depends on many internal and external factors. The thesis that that the EU and Russia will not be able to implement their oil, gas and electric energy projects without Belarus is highly disputable. The recent trilateral agreement among Russia, Ukraine and Germany on the transit of gas to Europe is an illustration of the existing alternatives. As for the question of the feasibility of creating a common economic area between the EU and Russia without Belarus, it is well-pointed. Formally speaking, it cannot be done if Belarus is not engaged. But it cannot be done either if it is engaged, because Belarus’ current economic and legal systems fall behind the required standards, and its domestic political situation and international behavior are putting constraints on cooperation. Indeed, under the current conditions it might be easier to create a common economic space without Belarus – if only it was possible. At this point in time Belarus’ economic system is incompatible even with that of Russia. Reversed as if in a

67 Ambassador Calls for ”Isolation” Policy to be Ended. Interview of Permanent Representative of the Republic of Belarus to the EU Sergei Martynov to the European Report magazine. 23 October 2002. (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm See also Martynov, Sergei. Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus to Belgium, Head of the Mission to the European Communities, and Head of the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “The EU and Belarus: the Need for New Solutions.” Web-site of the European Policy Centre (www.theepc.be) Reproduced at: http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm 68 Martynov, Sergei. “The EU and Belarus: the Need for New Solutions...” 33 camera obscura, about 70 per cent of property in Russia in the private sector correspond to about the same 70 per cent owned by the state in Belarus. Further on, it is true that the fight against illegal immigration and terrorism is inconceivable without the active participation of Belarus, located as it is on a key route between Europe and Asia. Yet, here the Belarusian side again needs to prove that in exchange for common benefits and in addition to the provision of material assistance it is not seeking some additional gains, like the legitimization and recognition of its present political practices by the European community – which it is clearly doing. 34 35

5. Belarus–NATO Relations: It Takes Two to Tango 5.1 An archaeology of history: no post-modernist delight

On 10 March 1992 Belarus as one of ten new members joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at a special session. In May 1994 a delegation of the Supreme Council of Belarus took part in a session of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), where Belarus was granted the status of an Associate member. In 1993–1994 a discussion on the merits and demerits of Belarusian membership in the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) was underway.69 Eventually, in November 1994 the Belarus Security Council took a decision to join the PfP program and on 11 January 1995 Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko signed in Brussels the Partnership for Peace framework document. Belarus became the 24th country – one of the last – to join the program. On 6 June 1995 Lukashenka entrusted Belarusian Ambassador to Belgium Uladzimir Labunou to sign on behalf of Belarus the Agreement between NATO and NACC and the PfP partners, and the same month Belarus took part in a NACC session in Oslo as an independent state. Until an official Belarusian representative was sent to NATO, communication between the two parties was maintained through the Belarus embassy in Brussels. In mid-1996 the former Defense Minister Anatoli Kastenka was appointed Belarus’ representative on political-military affairs in Brussels, and a Belarusian liaison officer was accredited with the NATO headquarters in Mons. A permanent representative office of Belarus at NATO was opened on 22 April 1998. However, the Belarus–NATO relations deteriorated parallel to their development, most noticeably after Alexander Lukashenka was elected president of Belarus in the summer of 1994 and started drafting his foreign and security policy. The main preoccupation of the Belarusian authorities has since been the enlargement of NATO. On 23 February 1995 Lukashenka declared that Belarus temporarily suspended the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) due to be completed by 15 November 1995. At first this decision was explained by the danger of NATO expansion. Later, however, the lack of funds for arms reductions was cited as the main reason. NATO responded with a

69 See, for example “Po karmanu li Belarusi partnerstvo?” Vo Slavu Rodiny. 5 August 1994. 36

statement, which was reciprocated with a corresponding note from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry. On 6 July 1995 Lukashenka suspended the withdrawal of the Russian strategic missiles from Belarus. He criticized the decision of the former Belarusian leadership on the withdrawal claiming it to be a serious political mistake in view of the future integration between Belarus and Russia. On 11 September 1995 the Belarus Foreign Ministry issued a statement which condemned NATO bombing and called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During his visit to the 50th session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1995 the Belarusian president confirmed his negative attitude toward NATO enlargement and expressed an interest in the elaboration of a treaty on European security. On 19 October 1995, when NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs von Moltke visited Minsk to discuss the opportunities for cooperation between NATO and Belarus, it was reiterated that Belarus was not interested in NATO eastward expansion. Cooperation within the PfP was possible on condition that the two parties discussed their positions with the participation of Russia. 1996–99 were marked by a continuous and often overtly hostile anti- NATO campaign undertaken by the Belarusian authorities in a vain attempt to prevent the expansion of NATO. At the same time, after the decision by the EU to freeze relations with Belarus because of the flawed November 1996 referendum and as a result of the international conflict that developed over the residences of foreign diplomatic missions near Minsk, NATO suspended the implementation of the agreement on information security. Following President Lukashenka’s warnings about finding “adequate responses” in case nuclear weapons were stationed on the territory of new NATO members, similar comments were made by Defense Minister Leanid Maltsau.70 It was to be understood that “adequate measures” included another halting of the withdrawal and the return of Russian strategic SS-25 missiles and/or the redeployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus territory. In an attempt to counter NATO enlargement on 3 July 1996 Lukashenka revitalized an earlier initiative on the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central-Eastern Europe and proposed to spend the money designated for the enlargement process on the solution of ecological, social and humanitarian problems.71 On 29 January 1997 the Belarusian president received a letter from NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, which indicated, in particular, that

70 Vo Slavu Rodiny. 19 April 1996. 71 Zvyazda. 7 July 1996. For an analysis of some of the implications of this initiative see: Paznyak, Vyachaslau.“Vstupit li NATO v bez’yadernuyu zonu?” Belorusskaya Gazeta. 20 August 1996. 37

NATO member-countries welcomed the withdrawal, completed at the end of November 1996, of the formerly Soviet nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus to Russia. Thus the country fulfilled the commitments entered into under the Lisbon Protocol of 1992. On the other hand, the letter said that NATO could not support the Belarus proposition on the establishment of a nuclear- weapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Solana said that the Alliance would like to see Belarus as a full-fledged participant of the European security network which is based on the principles of true cooperation and stressed that the development of relations between NATO and Belarus would largely depend on the progress of democratic reform in the country. In conclusion, the NATO Secretary General expressed the hope that NATO–Belarus relations would continue to develop in the context of the Partnership for Peace program.72 Even after the withdrawal of Russian nuclear weapons Lukashenka repeatedly mentioned the possibility of returning them to Belarus.73 He also proposed to create an anti-NATO pact to include Belaarus, Russia, China, India and Iran.74 Following Russia’s decision taken in protest to NATO’s military action in Yugoslavia at the end of March 1999 Belarus halted all its cooperation with NATO including the PfP program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Lukashenka decided not to send an official delegation to participate in the Washington EAPC summit. In the summer of 1999 the alleged “Yugoslav scenario” against Belarus was first evoked in a statement made by the Chairman of the Committee on Security of the Russian Duma Viktor Ilyukhin, who claimed that NATO was preparing plans for instigating an ethnic conflict in the Hrodno oblast of Belarus so as to justify a subsequent military intervention. This served to foment anti- NATO sentiments in both countries for some time, but also to increase the political influence of hard-liners.75 However, following Russia’s lead, in August 1999 Belarus decided to restore full-fledged relations with NATO Yet another area of tensions between Belarus and the Alliance since Lukashenka’ presidency has been the violation of democratic standards in the country. Already at the 41st annual North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) session in Turin (Italy) on 5–9 October 1995 the question was raised of withdrawing Belarus’ status as an NAA’s Associate member due to insufficient democracy and failure to elect a new Parliament. Belarus’ Associate status was suspended in 1997, following a constitutional referendum in November 1996 that enabled the recently elected President Lukashenka to “change the rules of the game”,

72 Vestnik ministerstva inostrannykh del Respubliki Belarus. No.1, 1997, p. 101. 73 See, for example, “Rakety dlya presidenta.” Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta. 17 January 1999. 74 “Lukashenka izobrel novy protivoves NATO.” Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta. 24 February 1999. 75 Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta. 18 June 1999. 38

putting an end to the term of the existing Parliament and hand-picking an acquiescent National Assembly. The NAA (renamed NATO Parliamentary Assembly) has discussed the Belarusian issue on a number of occasions. In 1999 it issued a declaration on the situation in Belarus urging the Lukashenka government to restore democracy and to ensure human rights and freedom of mass media.76 At its Berlin session in 2000 NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly (PA) adopted a resolution on Belarus, in which it condemned the intimidation, harassing, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of members of the political opposition and the failure of the Government to account for the disappearance of several opposition leaders. It expressed concern over the continued restrictions on the freedom of the press, the constant threats to non-state newspapers as well as the denial of access by the opposition to the state mass media. It noted that the 15 and 29 October 2000 parliamentary elections failed to meet international standards for a free, fair, accountable and transparent poll, declared its support for the Belarus democratic opposition and urged the Belarusian government to restore democracy and the rule of law.77 A delegation of the NATO PA, co-chaired by its Vice-President Markus Meckel and Alice Mahon, Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance, visited Minsk on a fact-finding mission on 25–27 March 2001 to evaluate the prerequisites for the democratic presidential elections due later that year. In its concluding communiqué the delegation voiced concern that some political developments in the country, such as Decree No. 8 submitting international aid to NGOs and civic organizations to exacting government control, were not conducive to the goal of democratization. The Assembly failed to recognize the National Assembly of Belarus as its legitimate interlocutor, given the conditions in which it had been elected and how it operated, therefore, the suspension of Belarus’ Associate status had to be further upheld.78 At its annual session in Ottawa on 9 October 2001, the NATO PA adopted a special resolution on Belarus, in which it severely criticized Lukashenka’s policies. It took note that the presidential election failed to meet international standards defining a free, fair, verifiable and transparent ballot, condemned the tactics of intimidation, harassment and repression employed against opposition candidates, the non-governmental press, representatives of

76 Declaration on the Situation in the Republic of Belarus, adopted by the Standing Committee. North Atlantic Assembly (NATO Parliamentary Assembly). AS 179 SC (99) 38 rev. 1 Original: English. 77 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 2000 Annual Session. Resolution on Belarus presented by the Committee on the Civilian Dimension of Security Berlin, 21 November 2000. ( http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/resolutions/00-berlin-297.asp 78 Standing Committee Fact-Finding Mission to Minsk, Belarus 25-27 March 2001. Secretariat Report. International Secretariat, 2 April 2001. Annex 3-e. Press Release. “NATO Parliamentarians conclude visit to Belarus”. Brussels, 27 March 2001. ( http://www.nato- pa.int/publications/press/p020530a.html 39

Belarusian civil society and independent national observers. It denounced in particular the difficulties experienced by the opposition in obtaining access to state-controlled media and the presidential decrees promulgated in order to curtail the basic freedoms of expression and association. The resolution expressed deep concern over the disappearance of regime’s political opponents and called upon the re-elected President Lukashenka and his government: • to restore democracy and the rule of law in Belarus and to guarantee the protection of human rights, the independence of the judiciary, the freedom of the press and private enterprise; to initiate a real political dialog with the opposition without delay; to free all political prisoners immediately and to promptly set up impartial in-depth enquiries into the fate of persons who had disappeared and into the existence of ”death squads”; • to return to a legal constitution; • to extend the powers of parliament to give it the nature and character of a democratic institution capable of exercising legislative authority and political control over the government in accordance with the principle of separation of powers; • to end the systematic smear campaign to which the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Minsk was subjected and to co-operate fully with it.79 Until the tragic events of 11 September 2001 the stalling relations between Belarus and NATO went along with strengthening the politico-military alliance between Belarus and Russia. On the one hand, the two countries were practically unanimous in their opposition to NATO enlargement. On the other, the official Minsk often even outstripped Moscow in its unrestrained rhetoric – if not the argumentation. Speaking from a position of a defender of the Slavic nations and of consistent integration with Russia, President Lukashenka on one occasion stated that sometimes Belarus had to run ahead of Russia on the military issues, especially with regard to NATO eastward expansion. “If Russia, as it seems, takes some vacillating stand, I for one thing declared on behalf of my people once and forever: ‘We are categorically against NATO eastward movement’.”80 The years of 1997–2001 saw an intensified cooperation between Belarus and Russia in the military sphere. It was repeatedly stated by both Belarusian and Russian political and military figures that the two states were creating a joint anti-aircraft defense system to counter the expanding NATO.81 After the

79 Resolution on Belarus presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security Ottawa, 9 October 2001. NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2001 Annual Session. ( http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/resolutions/01-ottawa-307.asp) 80 President Lukashenka’s speech at the Russian Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow. Narodnaya Gazeta. 13 February 1996. 81 See, for example, Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief Anatolii Kornukov’s statement in April 2001. Cited in “Belarus would like to sign a Treaty on Security with NATO.” 40

signing of the Belarusian–Russian treaty on the creation of the Community a more vigorous military cooperation between the two states involved the coordination of measures in response to NATO eastern enlargement. Lukashenka put on the table ideas about creating a powerful joint Belarusian–Russian military grouping to offset the enlarged NATO and expressed his readiness to realize them. Building on several successive bilateral treaties a number of military agreements were signed, including the Treaty on Military Cooperation and the Agreement on the Joint Safeguarding of Regional Security in the Military Sphere, both signed in December 1997. The latter was almost explicitly directed against NATO enlargement, and the fact that it has since been only a “paper tiger” is yet another proof of its political purpose. In 2000–2001 Minsk enjoyed customary low-key relations with NATO and it was clear that they would not blossom very soon. True, the departure of Yeltsin and the ascension in the Russian politics of the Putin generation, which has a broader world outlook, have contributed, to some extent, to the abandonment of the most orthodox anti-NATO clichés in the Belarusian political establishment. During 2001 the Belarusian Foreign and Defense Ministries attempted to begin the reevaluation of relations with NATO proceeding from the premise that both the previous and the coming enlargements were faits accomplis. However, the tense relations with the West over the election campaign and the presidential elections in 2001 prevented any definitive decisions from being taken. In response to the NATO exercise “Amber Hope 2001” in Lithuania in August-September 2001 Belarus armed forces conducted a large–scale military exercise “Neman-2001” (the largest since the breakup of the USSR) near the Lithuanian border. Lukashenka deemed that because NATO exercise was scheduled close to the time of presidential elections it posed a major security threat. “On the eve of presidential elections our country is on the brink of war according to the Yugoslav scenario”, he said. He further referred to an “outrageous funding” of both “unprecedented pressure from the outside” and a “fifth column” inside the country.”82 The “Neman-2001” was followed by the “Berezina-2002” exercise. Reportedly, such large-scale exercises will become “traditional.” Despite all this the formally institutionalized dialog within the EAPC has been maintained. Several cooperation programs have been in operation, and Belarusians have been taking part in various partnership activities including the NATO Science Program. Since 1993 over 75 Science Fellowships have been awarded to Belarusian scientists to study in NATO countries. Over 30 research

Belarusian Telegraph Agency BelTA. 1 July 2001. ( http://www.belarustoday.info/news/news.php?id=3682&lang=eng) 82 “V ozhidanii voiny.” Belorusskii Rynok. No. 19, 2001. 41

teams from Belarus received support under the NATO Science Program in 1999–2001.83 The “incredible rapprochement” between Russia and NATO in 2001– 2002 and Ukraine’s decision in May 2002 to seek membership in NATO left Belarus “out in the cold”. At the Security Council meeting on 10 July 2002 Lukashenka admitted that Belarus cannot disregard the new realities: the irreversibility of NATO enlargement, the positions taken by Russia, Ukraine and other neighbors, as well as the threat of international terrorism as a factor encouraging military and political cooperation. He underscored the importance of assessing the country’s place and role in the context of the current European integration and of elaborating new approaches to relations with NATO. 84 He pointed out, however, that a fundamental change of policy is out of the question. Only certain adjustments are possible. “Russia and Ukraine seem to have rushed into NATO, but we are not obligated to follow them”, Lukashenka said.85 The Belarusian president tried to downplay the importance of the new relations between Russia and NATO by calling them a “myth” and claimed that Belarus– Russia integration remains a priority for both states.86 Apparently, the intention to work out a new policy that replacing confrontation with real partnership has come as a result of the realization that the continuation of the former would be disadvantageous. It is doubtful, though, that minor adjustments will be enough. Ironically, against the backdrop of the crisis in Belarusian relations with the OSCE and the EU by the end of 2002, the relations with the long-time enemy bloc turned out to be almost normal. But for a couple of things – visa denial for Lukashenka for the Prague NATO summit and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s later remark that the Alliance believes ”several aspects” of Lukashenka’s activities ”in the human rights sphere are unacceptable for a democracy in the present-day conditions. NATO, the European Union and the USA share this opinion”, he said.87 Still, this is nothing new and has not caused a serious crisis. After pathetic official speeches88 and yet another passionate anti-NATO campaign in the media

83 “Belarus and NATO.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/policy/10.htm) 84 “Policy Adjustments on NATO Possible.” BelaPAN. 11 July 2002. (http://www.belarustoday.info/news/news.php?id=10808&lang=eng See also “NATO bolshe ne strashnyy monstr.” Belorusskii Rynok. No. 27, 2002. 85 Izvestiya. 12 July 2002. (http://izvestia.ru/politic/article20966) 86 “Prioritety prezhniye.” Belorusskii Rynok. No. 22, 2002. 87 NATO Secretary General George Robertson’s remarks at a press conference in Moscow on 10 December 2002. RIA-Novosti 10 December 2002. (http://www.belarustoday.info/news/news.php?id=13840&lang=eng) 88 “Belarusian Envoy Slams NATO for not Inviting President.” RFE/RL Newsline. 25 November 2002 and Statement by Ambassador Sergei Martynov, 22 November 2002. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. Information Bulletin No. 177, 22 November 2002. 42

Belarus has not frozen its relations with the Alliance and has not called back its ambassador ”for consultations”. Notwithstanding NATO’s decision Belarus will “continue and intensify its contribution to the common cause of the coalition [against terrorism].”89 Planned activities proceed according to schedule. Judging by the reports posted on the ”news” rubric of the website of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, for a year or so MOD officials have been participating in the PfP activities much more frequently than before. On 31 December 2002 the then Foreign Minister of Belarus Mikhail Khvastou promised that Minsk’s relations with NATO will be more constructive in 2003. ”We are going to take into consideration the changing situation both in Europe and the whole world, and the need for firm and clear relations,” Khvastou said. ”We can see how the NATO expansion affects the interests of neighboring states, and we can see the expanding presence of this military and political organization, so we would like [to] – and we will – ensure our coun- try’s safe existence.”90 Still, it is so far difficult to imagine how relations can become constructive between the political actors with their present often diametrically opposite political agendas.

5.2 Cooperation under the Partnership for Peace Program

According to its Foreign Ministry, Belarus attaches special significance to the implementation of the PfP program, which is considered to be “one of the most important mechanisms for practical cooperation both with the North Atlantic Alliance and individual countries of Europe and North America.”91 Initially, Belarus intended to address only minor, not financially burdensome issues within the PfP program. In November 1995 Belarus decided to activate its participation. The presentation program of cooperation under the PfP was elaborated by the Security Council and the Foreign Ministry. Belarus officially submitted its Presentation Document for participation in the PfP program on 29 April 1996. At the initial stage all Belarus’ activities were entrusted to be coordinated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Eight years later it is clearly seen that some major areas of cooperation indicated in the document have remained unfulfilled. Among them are: • the creation of an efficient national security system adequately meeting defense requirements;

Also: Leschenya, Igor. “NATO’s Leadership not Enough Democratic.” Charter97. 11 November 2002. (http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2002/11/11/23) 89 Martynov, 22 Nov. 2002. 90 “Belarusian Foreign Minister Vows More Constructive Relations with NATO.” RFE/RL Newsline. 6 January 2003. 91 “Belarus and NATO.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/policy/10.htm) 43

• using the experience of NATO members and partner countries in the drafting of defense legislation, as well as in the optimization of the national security and national defense structures; • defense planning and budget management; • command, control and communications systems; • armaments, military equipment and hardware development and production; • adjustment of special terminology; • intelligence information exchange. The document also stressed that Belarus would establish and develop contacts with the West European Union. This, however, was not accomplished either. By submitting its PfP Presentation Document Belarus undertook some important obligations to meet the PfP political objectives. It pledged to: • promote political cooperation, coordination and information exchange; • engage in consultations on European, regional and global security; • strengthen democratic control of the armed forces; • facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; • harmonize its defense policy and strategies; • expand scientific and technical cooperation with appropriate NATO structures, NATO member-states and partner countries. Also these obligations remain to be fulfilled. As regards democratic control of the armed forces, today there is even a regression compared to what was planned according to the legislation drafted in 1997.92 Belarus has implemented its Individual Partnership Program (IPP) with NATO on a bi-annual basis since 1997. In July 1997 the NATO Council approved the Belarus IPP for 1997–1999. In 2001 Belarusian representatives took part in 59 events organized by NATO within the framework of the partner- ship program.93 Belarus’ IPP for 2002–2003 – the third such program – was adopted by the Security Council State Secretary in December 2001. On 20 February 2002 it was approved by the North Atlantic Council and came into force. Five principal participants in the IPP implementation are involved on the Belarusian side: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry for Emergency Situations, the Ministry for

92 Paznyak, Vyachaslau. ”Problems of Democratic Control over the Military Sphere in the Republic of Belarus.” In: Democratic Control over the Military Sphere in Russia and the CIS. Ed. by A. Nikitin. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow). Moscow: Eslan Publishers, 2002. 93 “NATO Council Adopted Individual Partnership Program with Belarus.” Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the of America (http://www.belarusembassy.org/us/news/ digests/110302.htm) 44

Foreign Affairs, the State Committee of Border Guards and the National Academy of Sciences. Compared with the previous IPPs the current one has 19 (five more) areas of cooperation with NATO members and partner-states. The new areas of cooperation are planning, organization and management of national defense research and technology, military geography, global humanitarian mine clearing, political and defense efforts against NBC proliferation, small arms and light weapons. The 2002–2003 IPP gives first priority to the following fields: civil emergency planning, crisis management, language training, military education, training and doctrine, democratic control over the armed forces and defense structures, conceptual planning and operational aspects of peacekeeping, and small arms and light weapons. Concerning the fourth IPP Minsk proposed to conduct in Belarus an exercise on combating a radiological theat and some other joint activities.94 Perhaps democratic control over the defense structures remains the litmus test of good faith. However, a de facto intensified cooperation short of the political level has already been noticeable.

5.3 Misperceptions and ambivalent strategies vs. the expansion of the “new division lines”

The Belarus approach with regard to NATO has always been marked by some schism. While the PfP program has been viewed more or less positively, at first even as a “humanistic program,” NATO enlargement has been perceived as an unwelcome development, due to its “enemy image” in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.95 One of the first versions of the official foreign policy concept of Belarus, adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in 1996, contained no direct repudiation of NATO, but declared an intention to develop partnership relations with the biggest military powers and their military alliances, including NATO, NACC, WEU and the CIS.96 At the same time, the document said that ”there still exists a possibility of geopolitical changes unfavorable for Belarus, first of all, with regard to the possibility of a rapid advancement of NATO military infrastructure to the East. As a state which declared in its Constitution an intention to achieve a non-nuclear and neutral status, the Republic of Belarus holds that a new system of European

94 Statement by Ambassador Sergei Martynov, 22 November 2002. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. 95 Tsepkala, Valerii. “Stremleniye Belarusi k neitralitetu ne zapreschayet yei ukreplyat’ mir vo vsyom mire.” Narodnaya Gazeta, 10-12 September 1994. 96 Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta. 20 May 1996. 45

security is incompatible with a massive growth of any military bloc on the continent.”97 Instead of an ”accelerated” enlargement process Belarusian officials have favored an alternative ”evolutionary” way, one of the reasons being that “in case Belarus would enter a close military union with Russia a potentially possible confrontation with the West would involve the republic as well.”98 However, the inertia of the “cold war” thinking has been driving “certain forces” into pushing forward NATO enlargement toward the Western borders of Belarus and Russia. Since NATO is allegedly an embodiment of “an old atavism of the bi-polar confrontation,” Belarus is bound to oppose its eastward expansion.99 Belarusian authorities have repeatedly referred to greater insecurity for Belarus in case of a new confrontation between the military alliances in Europe.100 President Lukashenka, in particular, has on many occasions expressed concern over the Alliance’s nearing Belarusian borders, the danger of finding Belarus in between the two opposing blocs etc.101 He also cautioned against a military misbalance in Europe because of ”attempts to expand NATO by bringing in the former Warsaw Pact countries and warned that for Belarus this would lead to the militarization of the economy and slash social programs.102 Presidential adviser Sergei Posokhov anticipated that NATO advancement to Belarusian borders would trigger off an campaign and a preparation of the military theater which, in its turn, would make economic reforms impossible.103 Meanwhile, Belarus has always been an active participant of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, and it supported its transformation into the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty in May 2002. NATO enlargement has been perceived by Belarusian authorities as a revival of geopolitics in western policies. Moreover, it has been viewed as an attempt to take advantage of weaknesses and tensions among the CIS states and to “defeat them completely” by putting them out of active European politics and by redistributing forces in favor of the West.104 Chief of the President’s Secretariat Ural Latypau held that NATO enlargement might lead to a new confrontation, and the “line of fire” would be

97 Belorusskaya Gazeta 10 June 1996. 98 Zvyazda. 20 April 1996. 99 Hryb, Mecheslau. “Respublika Belarus u Intahratsyinym Pratsese Suchasnasti,” Statement by the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus in Madrid. Zvyazda. 7 April 1995. 100 See, for example, Zvyazda. 21 February 1995 and Zvyazda. 11 May 1995. 101 Ibidem. 102 Zvyazda. 12 March 1995. 103 Svaboda. May 17, 1996. 104 Interview with the First Deputy Foreign Minister Valery Tsepkala: “Dekoratsii na mirovoi stsene mogut izmenyatsya, no chelovecheskaya priroda ne izmenitsya nikogda” Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 13 June 1996. 46 drawn across Belarus. The main merit of the PfP agreement for Belarus, in his opinion, was an access to full information on NATO development.105 NATO enlargement has also been associated with an increased nuclear threat. At the Non Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in April–May 1995 the Belarus concern “about possible risks of more and more places in Europe being used for nuclear weapons deployment in case of NATO’s geographical expansion” drove it into reinitiating the creation of a nuclear- weapons-free zone in Central Europe – first advanced in the late 1950s.106 The idea, however, met with a lukewarm response from the potential participating states in the region. On 12 May 1997 Belarus handed in to NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Gebhardt von Moltke a draft of a bilateral Belarus–NATO Charter. The idea of the charter was further elaborated upon at the EAPC meeting in Madrid on 9 July 1997. According to the official statement made there (in fact, one of the few attempts at conceptualizing the country’s foreign and security policy) Belarus, soon to border on NATO, had the right to raise the issue of an “institutional codification” of its relationship with the Alliance. Hope was expressed that the signing of an agreement regulating relations with the Alliance would objectively be in the interests of both Belarus and NATO.107 In July 2001 Belarus’ Defense Minister Leonid Maltsau confirmed that Belarus would like to sign a treaty on security with NATO that would allow Belarus to have transparent relations with the neighboring countries and to obtain “perfect security.”108 To date, however, there has been no positive response to this proposal. Belarusian authorities believe that “from an historical perspective the decision to expand NATO eastward has no solid grounds and is a faulty one,” because a “mechanical enlargement of military unions” will not ensure security, but will instead create new dividing lines in Europe, and thus will be counter- productive. In their view, a European security model should be based “not on mutual containment, but on the concept of cooperation and mutual security guarantees.”109 Meanwhile, NATO has no way or record of concluding a treaty on security guarantees other than granting membership. Belarus is not after that. At the same time, there are no prerequisites at present for signing an agreement between Belarus and the Alliance along the similar lines as between NATO and

105 Narodnaya Gazeta. 18 October 1995. 106 Syan’ko, Uladzimir. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, 18 April 1995, p. 3. 107 Statement by Mr. Victor Sheiman, Official Representative of President Lukashenka, State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus. Meeting of the EAPC, Madrid, 9 July 1997. (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709j.htm 108 “Belarus would like to sign a Treaty on Security with NATO.” BelTA. 1 July 2001. (http://www.belarustoday.info/news/news.php?id=3682&lang=eng 109 Sheiman, 9 July 1997. NATO, (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709j.htm) 47

Russia or Ukraine, because the political ground for any strategic partnership has been lacking. The political leadership of Belarus has held that it is not NATO, but the OSCE that has a priority in building a security model for Europe in the XX1st century. This logic rests on the fact that all EAPC members function within the OSCE region. Therefore, the emerging OSCE model of European security must take into account, and rely upon, the EAPC and NATO while general rules or principles should be forged by the OSCE as a unique and universal transatlantic organization. Meanwhile, a division of functions among the two organizations is deemed possible. For example, the OSCE may limit itself in some cases to preventive diplomacy and post-conflict building, while the management of violent crises may be taken care of by the EAPC strictly within the OSCE and the UN Security Council mandate.110 It is extremely ironic, that despite Belarus frequent declarations to the effect that it is the OSCE, but not NATO, that should serve as the basis for the post-cold war European security, of late Belarus has been in conflict not only with both of them, especially bitterly – from 1998 until the end of 2002 with the OSCE. The new National Security Concept (NSC) that was adopted in July 2001 and replaced the 1995 version is explicit about the dangers for Belarus allegedly associated with NATO. It states, that “due to its independent foreign and domestic policy Belarus has been the target of unfounded political and other pressure on the part of the U.S. and other NATO members. Owing to their support the activities of destructive forces inside the country is growing, aimed at destabilizing the social and political situation and forcefully changing the constitutional order.”111 The NSC further identifies as the main causes that complicate the military and political positions of Belarus: NATO eastern enlargement, adoption by NATO of a new strategic concept, “providing for the use of the military force without UN or OSCE mandate,” the creation of European Rapid Reaction Forces, the building by the neighboring states of military formations in the vicinity of the Belarusian border, as well as their increased military expenditures.112 “The creation or expansion of the military-political alliances, the activities of which may be detrimental to Belarus’ interests” is listed among the major factors threatening the security of Belarus. At the same time, among the priority ways of ensuring Belarus’ security in the political sphere are “cooperation with

110 Ibid. 111 Kontseptsiya natsional’noi bezopasnosti Respubliki Belarus. Sovetskaya Belorussiya. 18 July 2001. 112 Ibid. 48 the European Union” and “participation in the EAPC with a view to constructing a new European architecture that would take into account Belarus’ interests.”113 The new Military Doctrine, adopted in January 2002 is concerned, in its turn, that there are “no efficient mechanisms to prevent military threats and to safeguard the interests of all international actors on the European continent,” and that some unidentified “regional centers” are seeking to “gain political leadership in the shaping of security-providing mechanisms, disregarding the interests of all international actors. “The enlargement of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of Belarus and counteracting the creation of collective security systems including Belarus” are defined as “major external military threats.” The Doctrine specifies as destabilizing for the military-political situation the practice of “political and economic blocking of interests” of particular states and attempts to open interference in their internal affairs on the part of unidentified international actors.114 The cited documents clearly demonstrate the distance that has to be covered from the cold-war mentality to the thinking corresponding to the present-day reality.

5.4 Belarus, NATO and Russia: an unhappy ‘triangle’

The alleged NATO threat has been exploited by the Belarusian leadership for pragmatic political and economic purposes: to obtain all possible support from Russia as a reward to the single most reliable ally. As one analyst notes, “Lukashenka survived by playing Russia and NATO off against each other. He needed Russia–NATO competition for influence in Belarus: that way he could sell himself to Russia as the guarantee against NATO influence, and could sell himself to his people as the guarantor of ties with Russia. Now, with the adversarial Russia–West competition fading away, he has less space to play with.”115 Minsk relations with Moscow have visibly worsened since Vladimir Putin replaced Boris Yeltsin as Russia’s president in 2000. The most obvious dip came in August 2002, when Putin suggested that Belarus and Russia hold a referendum in May 2003 on “ultimate unification.” Belarus’ six regions would have the same rights as the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation, and the new state’s constitution should be based on Russia’s, Putin said. Lukashenka later

113 Ibid. 114 See: Zakon ob utverzhdenii voennoi doktriny Respubliki Belarus [The Law ”On the Adoption of the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Belarus. Adopted by the houses of the Belarusian National Assembly (parliament) in December 2001 and approved by president Lukashenka on 3 January 2002]. Website of Ministerstvo Oborony Respubliki Belarus’ (http://www.mod.mil.by/zakon/zrb20020103.html) 115 Strauss, Ira. “Belarus: Russia as Liberator?” RussianObserver.com 27 June 2002. (http://www.russianobserver.com/stories/02/06/25/1179/15684.html 49 called Putin’s unification plan unacceptable. According to many commentators, the Lukashenka–Yeltsin idea of building the Russia–Belarus Union as a suprastate with supranational governing bodies is dead forever. Putin’s Kremlin has apparently set a course toward full economic control over Belarus.116 When Gazprom announced that it would halve its gas supplies to Belarus starting on 1 November 2002, the government-controlled Belarusian Television went so far as to call the step “economic terrorism.” Lukashenka said at a government meeting on 6 November that the Kremlin was blackmailing him because Gazprom wanted to take over the Belarusian state-owned gas pipeline and storage company Beltransgaz. The Gazprom decision was motivated by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who no longer wants to subsidize Belarus and the Belarusian president has shown himself to be an unpredictable partner in recent months.117 For several years the motto “With Russia into Europe!” has been circulated in Belarus, partly to support integration between the two countries, but also as a recognition of the reality that the Lukashenka regime is incapable of normalizing relations with the rest of Europe on its own. Some observers, however, point out that this may be a wrong reading. The fact of the matter is that there are only two ways to follow: “Belarus into Europe!” or “Belarus into Russia!” Indeed, the motto “With Russia into Europe!” is misleading and disguises the loss of sovereignty, bringing it into Russia and not necessarily into “Europe.” The meaning of the speculation about Russia as “Belarus liberator” is the hope that Putin will play the good imperialist in Belarus with behind-the- scenes actions to deliver the society from its dictator and restore the government to the people, or at least to a more moderate elite.118 It should be noted, though, that despite Russian President Putin’s popularity in Belarus, his idea of its accession to the Russian Federation is not supported by the majority of Belarusians. Although about an equal number of Belarusians want to join the EU and Russia, there is a remarkable rise in pro- Western sentiments, while the number of supporters of unification with Russia has decreased over the past two years. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Minsk-based Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) 53.8 per cent of Belarusians are supportive of the unification of Belarus and Russia and 53.4 per cent would vote for Belarus’ accession to the European Union. The number of people who deem that NATO extension eastwards bears no threat to Belarus has

116 Maksymiuk, Jan. “Lukashenka Subdued.” RFE/RL Newsline. 17 December 2002. 117 Znatkevich, Alex. “Belarus Accuses Russia of ‘Economic Terrorism’,” 5-11 November 2002. Transitions Online, (http://www.tol.cz/look/TOLnew/article) 118 Strauss, Ira. “Belarus: Russia as Liberator?” 50 increased since 1999 by more than twice. At the same time, only 32.2 per cent of Belarusians support Putin’s idea of Belarus’ incorporation by Russia.119 There is an obvious association by the Belarusian government of the state’s security interests and concerns with those of Russia.120 This is a clear manifestation of a de facto security and military alliance between the two states and of the attempts at coordinating their security policies. Internationally, Moscow has supported Lukashenka on many occasions, as in the case of his demand for a stronger OSCE mandate. Moscow has also blocked any OSCE move to condemn Belarus for its undemocratic practices. But this support is gradually eroding. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have marked a watershed in world politics. Before 9/11 there was an inertia of Russian negativism regarding the enlargement of the Alliance and skepticism on the possibility of a productive cooperation with it. Those attitudes were enthusiastically supported by the Belarusian ally. Russia was also voicing its concerns about Ukraine’s possible furtherance of relations with NATO to the point of seeking a formal membership. The political and economic situation in Ukraine, on the other hand, prompted President Kuchma to make a sharp turn in his foreign policy and radically improve relations with the Russian neighbor.121 While, to an extent, these tendencies remained after 9/11, they acquired principally new meanings. To paraphrase a well-pointed remark that the NATO the new members are joining ”will not be the NATO that they thought they were joining… precisely because they are joining,”122 it would be correct to admit that the NATO that Russia and Belarus had been trying to prevent from enlarging is no more, and the previous concerns and phobias do not apply. On the other hand, Russia’s critical stance to enlargement remains.123 Russia is not going to join the Alliance.124 What has brought Russia and NATO closer together is the realization that neither of them alone can cope with the threats of terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and other global

119 “Appendix 4” to this paper: “Belarusians Don’t Fear NATO and Want to Join Europe.“ Charter ‘97. On-line. 10 October 2002. (http://www.charter97.org/eng/ news/2002/10/10/18) 120 For a structured representation of external security threats perceptions of Belarus government and the opposition, see Appendix 5 in this report. 121 See, for example, Peterson, Scott. “Diplomatic Tug-of-War has Ukraine Playing Both Sides.” Christian Science Monitor. 11 July 2001. 122 Lindley-French, Julian. Terms of Engagement. The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post-11 September. Chaillot Paper No.52. Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies (May 2002), p.76. 123 Borisov, Sergei. “Russia: My Neighbor, My Friend?” Transitions Online. Weekly Newsletter. 19-25 November 2002. 124 “Russia won’t join NATO.” Belarus Today. News. 18 July 2002. (http://www.belarustoday.info/news.php?id=10928&lang=eng) 51 challenges.125 Unlike Russia, Belarus has nothing to “sell” to NATO or the West in exchange for their tolerance of an undemocratic regime with inscrupulous international connections and unpredictable foreign policy. Whereas Russia’s strategic partnership with NATO and the EU rests on calculated pragmatism, Belarus’ current situation may be best described as a reluctant inevitability of adjustment to the unwanted new environment.

125 Borisov, Sergei. “Russia, NATO Continue ‘Incredible Rapprochement’.” Transitions Online, 10-16 December. 52 53

Conclusions

As a result of the dual enlargement Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova will have common borders with both the EU and NATO. Belarus will have to deal with new EU/NATO members, which will have unified basic legislation and which will pursue unified policies in the domains of economy, finance, trade, security, defense, etc. The possible negative effects of the new situation for Belarus may be summarized as follows:

a) the current tensions continue: ♦ toughening of visa procedures by new EU members ♦ ensuing difficulties for travel, contacts, exchanges and, generally for transborder/subregional cooperation ♦ lack of efficient transport/customs corridors on the border – hindrance for trade/transit ♦ ”new division lines” are in effect

b) the current tensions will be exacerbated if: ♦ the new direct eastern neighbors of the EU have no will and funds to meet the new challenges (hence demands by Belarus that EU finance the protection of Belarusian–Polish border against illegal migrants) ♦ EU countries are reluctant to provide larger assistance

c) if scenario (b) evolves, it may contribute to a situation (with regard to one or more non-EU members) where due to minimal economic cooperation and foreign investment, etc., the economic modernization in a ”direct neighbor” state slows down to a halt; the economic and technological gap between the EU and such a state widens, thus making them almost incompatible – i.e. the relationship collapses into a vicious circle.

d) Complicating the regional setting, the interaction of the enlarged EU and its direct neighbors would produce complex configurations of outcomes, e.g.: ♦ pressure on Belarus, both unintended/indirect and direct to liberalize and reform its political and economic systems ♦ provided Russia and the EU manage to agree on a special status of Kaliningrad exclave to become a pilot project for finding new cooperation models between them, that, in turn, may provide a strong incentive for Belarus and other non-members to follow suit 54

♦ the current Belarusian leaders may be non-responsive to the opening prospects, which would protract the negative status quo (for a period of time) until some compelling internal and/or external variables factor in.

The EU continues to recognize the importance of Belarus. Political stability in the region is one of its priorities, since the new enlargement of the EU is creating a shared border with Belarus. Serious concerns remain over the political conditions in the country with incidents of repression of opposition forces. The endorsement of the TACIS civil society programme has been a positive step, fulfilling a benchmark set by the EU. The EU is closely monitoring political developments in Belarus. The EU continues to encourage dialog between the Belarusian government and the opposition in order to advance towards democratization. The EU is ready to resume normal relations with (and full assistance to) Belarus providing the EU/OSCE criteria for free and fair elections are met.126 On behalf of the European Union the Danish EU Presidency on 16 October 2002 issued a Declaration regarding Belarus, which was supported by the Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus and Malta, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, all members of the European Economic Area. The Declaration expressed the EU’s alarm at the deterioration of the situation regarding freedom of media and freedom of expression in Belarus, the censorship and harassment of independent media by the Belarus state, the repression of journalists, trade unions and others critical of President Lukashenka. The EU urged Belarus to adhere to its international commitments concerning the freedom of media and freedom of expression, and called upon the authorities to revise the provisions in the Criminal Code that affect these freedoms. The need was underlined for improvements in the situation regarding human rights and democracy before relations between the EU and Belarus could move forward.127 Since 2001 another point of controversy has existed in EU–Belarusian relations – the status, mandate and the very possibility of a normal functioning of the Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) of the OSCE in Belarus that was formed in Minsk in February 1998. During 2002 Belarusian authorities gradually pressed the AMG to the point of closure formally by refusing to prolong visas for its foreign staff. The grounds for such actions, however, were overtly political and they caused a new crisis in EU–Belarus relations.

126 European Commission (http://Europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ belarus/intro/index.htm) 127 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union regarding Belarus. 16 October 2002. See EU2002.dk, the Danish Presidency (http://www.eu2002.dk/news/news_read.asp?i InformationID=23675) 55

Following their trip to Minsk in November 2002, a European Parliament delegation composed of Jan Marinus Wiersma of the Netherlands, Elisabeth Schroedter of Germany, and Robert Goodwill of the noted the lack of progress Belarus had made toward democracy since the 2000 parliamen- tary and 2001 presidential elections.128 One of the consequences of the low level of relations between the EU and Belarus and between Belarus and the leadership of the neighboring countries entering the EU is the fact that there have been no bilateral or multilateral summits in the region involving the Belarusian president with his Polish, Lithuanian or Latvian counterparts since 1997 (not to mention the decision by the EU countries in 2002 not to issue entry visas to the top Belarusian officials). Needless to say, this is both an illustration of the situation, but also a hindrance to solving common problems in the region. Serious problems in the way of developing regional cooperation and providing assistance and thus mitigating the negative consequences of EU enlargement for Belarus are posed by the Belarusian political system and legislation. Regional cooperation cannot develop without granting greater authority to regional bodies of power. Meanwhile, according to the 1996 Constitution even the powers of the Belarusian parliament are very limited, and the executive branch, first of all the president, firmly stands for the preservation of the existing distribution of authority, which puts it in an overwhelmingly privileged position. This said, the prospects for the elaboration of a code of local governance and self-governance based on the European Charter in the Belarusian parliament look dim.129 Belarusian authorities are trying to decouple the common position of the EU and the OSCE on Belarus. They believe that the nature of relations between the OSCE and Belarus should not be defined by the European Union. They consider what they call ”the attempt of the EU countries to substitute the OSCE by themselves” as absolutely unacceptable.130 The official Minsk does not want to reconcile itself with the simple fact that it cannot easily improve relations with individual European organizations while staying ”in quarrel” with others. The Prague NATO summit in November 2002 clearly demonstrated that advances to NATO produced no reward in the situation of an unresolved conflict around the OSCE Advisary and Monitoring Group in Belarus. Likewise, any normalization of Belarus relations with the

128 “European Parliamentarians Note Lack of Democratic Progress in Belarus.” RFE/RL Newsline. 2 December 2002. 129 See, for example an interview with Pavel Shipuk, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Regional Policy of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus, Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta. 17 January 2002. 130 Comments by the Press-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus in Relation to the Consideration by the Council of the European Union of the Issue on Belarus on 19 November 2002. 764-20-11-2002. (http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.htm 56

European Union must happen as part of wider process of improving relations with Western European and transatlantic institutions. This in turn, depends in the first place on the Belarusian government meeting the European political standards. EU and NATO eastern enlargement raises a host of complex and difficult issues for Belarus, ranging from political, military, security, economic, legal, socio-cultural to what used to be termed before as “secondary” humanitarian aspects. Moreover, it complicates a lot of outstanding strategic domestic and foreign policy options for the Belarusian state. The solution of many of these problems requires enhanced cooperation and interaction of the states in the region and the EU, including the provision of financial and technical assistance in many areas. This concerns first of all a coordinated dealing with the new security challenges, modernization of the border infrastructure and the prepa- ration of a multilateral package of readmission agreements. The keystone for all cooperative efforts is obviously a positive change in relations between Belarus and the EU/NATO, which, in turn, depends on Belarus’ turn to democratic reforms in the country’s political and economic systems. The other part of the story is that relations between Belarus and an individual European institution – the EU, the OSCE and NATO – cannot be pur- sued any more in isolation from the rest of them. In a sense, the dual enlarge- ment has embraced also the OSCE and other European organizations, promoting an institutional change by spreading common values, norms and practices. It is a paradox that the relations of Belarus with NATO for some time have looked better than with the EU. Although there has been a shared view among the EU, the OSCE, and NATO on the ”Belarusian question,” the Alli- ance has been seemingly more ”liberal” to Minsk than others. This “liberalism,” though, does not go beyond cooperation on “second-order” programs, however important. NATO does not and cannot acquiesce with the political and strategic prescriptions for European security that have been issued in Minsk for the simple reason that they promise no future for the Alliance. Belarus has yet to accept the realities of the post-Cold War settlement in Europe. It is a historical misfit that Belarus under the Lukashenka regime has remained the last European country “in a state of war” with the West. While the “peace treaty” between Russia and NATO was concluded by the signing of the 1997 Founding Act and the former adversaries through the Rome accords of May 2002 instituting the NATO–Russia Council, moved further to embark upon building a strategic partnership, Belarus has left itself far behind in the past, fighting with the old ghosts, struggling with the old, but still unresolved problems, and puzzled with the new ones fast piling up. Belarusian authorities should acknowledge the fact that any military response to the customary NATO “threat” is missing the point. EU enlargement is a more comprehensive challenge, which may squeeze harder than NATO enlargement. 57

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Migration to and from Belarus. Main flows

2000 2001 No. of No. of Migration No. of No. of Migration persons persons incriment or persons persons incriment or arrived left decrease (-) arrived left decrease (-) Migration with 25,943 13,812 12,131 23,355 14,270 9,085 foreign countries Including: CIS and 24,229 7,418 16,811 21,824 8,296 13,528 Baltic states Russia 14,424 5,854 8,570 13,041 6,808 6,233 Kazakhstan 3,590 110 3,480 2,671 143 2,528 Moldova 391 37 354 428 26 402 Ukraine 3,546 1,137 2,409 3,361 966 2,395 Transcaucasia 531 43 488 408 48 360 Azerbaijan 197 23 174 153 11 142 Armenia 126 15 111 127 11 116 Georgia 208 5 203 128 26 102 States of Central 1,010 68 942 1,062 158 904 Asia Kyrghyzstan 132 6 126 143 3 140 Tajikistan 136 4 132 144 9 135 Turkmenistan 295 36 259 322 126 196 Uzbekistan 447 22 425 453 20 433 Baltic states 737 169 568 853 147 706 Latvia 291 50 241 299 49 250 Lithuania 384 109 275 503 82 421 Estonia 62 10 52 51 16 35 Migration with 1,714 6,394 -4,680 1,531 5,974 -4,443 other countries Including: 62 1,560 -1,498 70 1,318 -1,248 USA Germany 57 918 -861 47 1,306 -1,259 Israel 198 2,500 -2,302 207 1,701 -1,494 Poland 42 81 -39 51 83 -32 Source: http://www.br.minsk.by/archive/2002-09/sc1444.stm 58

Appendix 2. EU declarations on Belarus

European Commission, General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC) (extracts)131

21 OCTOBER 2002: BELARUS - COUNCIL DECLARATION

The Council adopted the following declaration on Belarus and its relations with OSCE:

1. At its meeting on 21 October 2002, the Council of the EU expressed serious concern about the situation of democracy and human rights in Belarus and adopted the following declaration: 2. Recalling the conclusions of the Council of 15 September 1997, the EU reiterates once again the hope that Belarus would take place among European democratic countries, not least since Belarus will become a direct neighbour after EU enlargement. 3. The EU emphasises the importance for all European States of respect for human rights and freedoms, as guaranteed in the UN Charter and embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. In Belarus, the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) in Minsk has a vital role to play in assisting the and civil society in promoting democratic institutions and in complying with other OSCE commitments as well as monitor and report on this process. 4. The EU has consistently supported the Portuguese Chair of OSCE in its efforts to solve the impasse regarding the AMG in Minsk. It believes that the Chair has already shown great flexibility in trying to find a solution to the problems that have arisen as a result of Belarus’ treatment of the AMG. The EU cannot accept the Belarusian position that the AMG should be formally closed before negotiations on a new OSCE presence can begin. It supports the Chair’s view that the AMG’s 1997-mandate remains in force, in full, until there is consensus in the OSCE Permanent Council to amend or replace it.” 5. The EU has noted the commitment made in September by FM Khvostov to enter into negotiations with a view to the continued operation of the AMG. The EU urges the Belarusian authorities to enter into immediate, meaningful and result-oriented negotiations. In addition, the EU requests the Government of Belarus immediately to extend the accreditation of the remaining member of the diplomatic staff of the Mission beyond 29 October 2002, or alternatively to extend accreditation to a replacement, with a view to avoiding disruption to the activities of the Mission.

131 European Commission (http://Europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/belarus/intro/ gac.htm) 59

6. If the Government of Belarus fails to indicate its agreement to this request by 29 October, this will seriously effect not only relations with the OSCE, but also the development of relations between Belarus and the EU. The EU remains deeply concerned at the lack of progress in democratic reform and the growing deterioration of individual freedoms and rights of expression in Belarus; should, in addition, the AMG be unable to continue its work, the EU will be obliged to review its relations with Belarus and envisage further specific measures. If, on the other hand, an adequate solution allowing for the effective and lasting operation of the AMG was found, the EU could take this as a new starting point for discussions on the improvement of its relations with Belarus. 7. The EU expresses readiness to continue to work closely with the Chair to ensure that the OSCE can contribute to the development of genuine democracy and full respect for human rights in Belarus, including through an active OSCE presence. 8. The Council of the EU will consider the evolution of the situation in Belarus at its meeting on 18/19 November 2002.

15 APRIL 2002: BELARUS RELATIONS WITH THE OSCE

Under ”any other business” the Council dealt with the decision taken by the Bielorussian authorities not to renew the visa of the acting Head of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Minsk. The Council expressed its great concern about this decision and its support for the efforts of the OSCE Chairman in office. It underlined the need to convey an urgent message to the Bielorussian authorities urging them to reconsider the announced decision as well as to accept the new Head of Mission. 60

Appendix 3. Public attitudes in Belarus

Table 1. Popular perceptions of relations with other countries132

Mutually friendly A neutral stance A hostile attitude relations exist % is taken by % toward Belarus is % between Belarus adopted by and Russia 70 Ukraine 53 Moldova 44 Kazakhstan 43 Poland 41 China 40 France 36 Armenia 32 Czech Republic 35 USA 32 Kyrghyzstan 31 Greece 33 Latvia 18 Germany 30 Italy 33 Lithuania 15 Turkmenistan 28 Turkey 33 Great Britain 14

Table 2. Public attitudes to the EU133

Question: ”Given today there was a referendum on Belarus’ accession into the European Union, how would you vote?” (September 2002)

Answer Per cent For 53.4 Against 8.1 Would not vote at 13.0 all

132 Based on the the results of a sociological poll conducted in Minsk in 2002, published in 7 Dnei, 13 April 2002. 133 “Belarusians Don’t Fear NATO and Want to Join Europe”, Charter ‘97. On-line. 10 October 2002. (http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2002/10/10/18 61

Table 3. Dynamics of public attitudes to NATO enlargement134

”Does NATO enlargement pose a danger to Belarus?”(in per cent)

Answer June Nov 1999 April Sept 2002 1999 2001 No 17.6 20.2 23.5 41.2 Yes 47.7 43.7 36.8 31.3

Table 4. Distribution of public attitudes to unification with Russia135

”The Russian president proposed to hold in spring 2003 a referendum on the issue: ‘Do you agree that Russia and Belarus should merge into a single state on the basis of the following principles: a) equal rights and freedoms of all citizens b) equality of the Russian regions and Belarus c) formation of the union’s bodies of power under the Russian Constitution?’

In case such a plebiscite takes place, how would you vote?” (September 2002)

Answer Per cent I will say that I agree 32.3 I will say that I do not agree 26.3 I do not know yet/depending on the 31.7 situation Would not take part in such a 8.0 referendum

134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 62

Table 5. Public attitudes to unification with Russia over time136

Question: ”If today there were a referendum on the unification of Belarus and Russia, how would you vote?” (in per cent)

Answer March April April April 1999 2000 2001 2002 For unification 41.8 55.7 56.6 53.8 Against unification 40.4 27.6 28.4 23.0 Would not go to the 14.7 15.6 14.6 11.6 polls

Appendix 4. Estimates of external threats in the Belarusian printed mass media137

The perceptions of external threats to national security in Belarusian state- owned and non-governmental printed mass media can be subdivided into two broad categories: official and alternative (opposition). Due to the specifics of the problem itself, as well as because of the non-specialized popular genre of the mass media, oriented toward the mass audience, external threats, featured both in the official and the alternative discourses are not covered in a systematic manner. They are often not differentiated from their own sources (i.e. a threat and its source may pose as interchangeable concepts), and present an evaluation of the priority of international issues and their relevance to the national security of the country from the vantage point of the government or the opposition. At the same time, an integrated image of national security or sectoral threats is being fragmented into concrete perceptions of threats to specific political values. For the purposes of the Project some interpretations of external threats to Belarus’ national security most typical both for the government and the opposition have been selected from state and non-state printed mass media. They have been summarized along the criteria of explicitness, topicality and reference frequency in the competing political discourses. The selection has been made with regard to the most debatable issues of the international position

136 Ibid. 137 Paznyak, Vyachaslau. “Estimates of external threats to national security in the Belarusian printed mass media.” In: The Mass Media in the Political System of Belarus [in Russian]. Ed. by Vyachaslau Paznyak. IIPS Information and Analytical Materials, Issue No. 3. Minsk: International Institute for Policy Studies, 2000, pp.14-16. The latter publication came as a result of a research project, implemented by the International Institute for Policy Studies in 1996-2000. 63 of the country: the state of its relations with the international community as a whole, with the West, with Russia, the consequences of NATO eastern enlargement, the Belarusian perspective of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The main task has been to determine not the quantitative, but some comparative qualitative (value) characteristics of the official and alternative discourses of national security.

According to the official estimates external threats to national security may be presented as follows: a) civilizational, cultural, geopolitical, information etc. threats by the West, manifest in the interference in the domestic affairs and support of the opposition, the danger of economic and political dependence of the country on the West as a result of its integration in the international community on unequal conditions; b) NATO enlargement; c) isolation on the part of the international community; d) failure of the Russo–Belarusian Union; e) failure of the CIS; f) new transnational threats: international terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc.

Alternative (opposition) political forces in Belarus perceive the external threats to national security as follows: a) Russia (“Russian imperialism,” instability in Russia and its setback to authoritarianism); b) Russo–Belarusian union as a threat to the sovereignty of Belarus; c) isolation of Belarus on the part of the international community; d) NATO enlargement as a factor consolidating the political regime in Belarus; e) new transnational threats: international terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc.

The parameters of an analytical framework “estimates of threats to national security” may be defined as follows: 1. threat identification 64

2. threat source

3. threat target (area)

4. corresponding political values (explicit or implied), that are threatened 5. implications, which can be interpreted as threats in their own right. This framework, used for a comparative analysis of the estimates of threats found in the official and alternative discourses, makes it possible to represent them in a table format (see Tables 1 and 2). The tables reflect the key points in the security discourses in recent years. The official security discourse stresses the West as a major threat source, while integration with Russia is perceived as an unequivocal value to be defended. The opposition discourse is suspicious of Russia, negative to Russo–Belarusian integration in the political sphere and stresses sovereignty as an absolute value. For the opposition the CIS is not a security issue. Comparisons of the two security discourses show some formal similarities which are, nevertheless, essentially different. This is true, for example, of the principally different interpretations of the causes and consequences of international isolation. New transnational risks are also perceived differently with regard to Russo–Belarusian integration. Thus, the official and opposition interpretations of external threats to national security reflect diametrically opposite approaches, which are being circulated through the mass media and serve to preserve and reinforce this juxtaposition in the public consciousness.

65

Table 1. Official discourse on external threats to Belarus security

Table 2. Alternative discourse on external threats to Belarus security

66

67

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