From Crisis to Confidence?

The Canadian Forces since the end of the Cold War

prof. dr. DJ. Bercuson*

he years since the end of the cut, to be implemented over a four law must govern relations between Cold War have been tumul- year period, was to reduce the regular states; Ttueus for the Canadian Forces, establishment of the Canadian Forces - Canadians deern their own security especially for the Canadian Land from 86,700 to 60,000. The reserve indivisible from that of their allies; Forces, and the Canadian Department force was to remain more or less the - Canadians have long had a strong of National Defense. Massive budget same size, but the number of civilian sense of responsibility to alleviate cuts were to be expected with the dis- employees in the Department of suffering around the globe and appearance of a plausible Soviet National Defense was to be cut from respond where their efforts can threat. But those cuts came after years 36,500 to 20,000. In addition, several make a difference.' of underfunding and were larger than major bases across Canada were Chapters 4 to 6 of the White Paper might have been expected due to the ordered closed. The army was to con- spell out in some detail the overall federal government's decision, made centrate at four bases (Canadian three-phase mission of the Canadian in late 1993, to tackle Canada's sig- Forces Base (CFB) Edomonton, CFB Forces within the context of the basic nificant debt/deficit crisis. Budget Petawawa, CFB Valcartier and CFB values laid out above: to defend cuts were not the only major source of Gagetown), the navy at CFB Es- Canada and Canadian sovereignty; in upheaval, however. They only com- quimalt on the west coast and CFB partnership with the United States, to plicated other problems arising of the Halifax on the Atlantic coast, and defend North America; in partnership military's increasing distance from the air force's operational fighter with Canada's NATO allies, or under Canadian society, an acute overtask- squadrons were to be reduced and UN auspices, to take part in multila- ing crisis, the mear-disaster of the based at CFB Cold Lake (Alberta) teral operations 'anywhere in the Yugoslavian peacekeeping mission and CFB Bagotteville (). world' which promote Canada's (UNPROFOR) and a major crisis of broader interests. Among the latter command and leadership exposed in The second important initiative missions are 'traditional' peacekeep- the wake of the Somalia mission of launched by the new government was ing operations (such as have been 1993 (UNITAF). a comprehensive review of Canadian mounted under Chapter VI of the UN defense policy carried out by a joint Charter), and peace maintenance and House of Commons-Senate commit- enforcement operations such as Two Initiatives tee which formed the basis of the Operation Deliverance to Somalia. To J 994 Defence White Paper and the these ends the government pledged In the fall of 1993 the Liberal Party Report to the Prime Minister on the itself to maintain 'multipurpose, com- was elected to govern in Ottawa Leadership and Management of the bat-capable forces' which would give under the leadership of Jean Chretien. Canadian Forces issued by then min- Canada 'the necessary degree of flex- It immediately launched two initia- ister of National Defense M. Douglas ibility and freedom of action'.4 tives that were to have a profound Young on 25 March, 1997.2 Among The policy laid out in 1994 is still impact on the Canadian military. the main points made in the 1994 officially in place. In his March 1997 The first was a reduction by some 25 White Paper were these: Report to the Prime Minister on percent of the overall budget devoted - Canada is committed to remain an Leadership and Management of the to the Department of National De- active participant in multilateral Canadian Forces, minister of Natio- fense and the Canadian Forces.' This efforts to promote collective secu- nal Defense, Hon. M. Douglas rity because this commitment is a Young, registered his strong belief * Dr. DJ. Bercuson is professor of History and reflection of Canada's basic values that it was „essential" that the govern- Director, Strategie Studies Program, The and interests; ment „Maintain the direction set out University of Calgary, Canada. - Canadians believe that the rule of in the 1994 Defence White Paper".5

118 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 167 3-98 That was, in fact, the very first of fiscal year 1990/91 the Conservative armed forces were increasingly called 65 recommendations contained in government began to make major upon in the years after 1990 to sup- Young's report. The current minister defense budget outs after the f al I of port a growing number of UN peace- of National Defense, Art Eggleton, the Berlin Wall. The closure of keeping and peace enforcement ope- has also reaffirmed his support for Canada's bases in Germany, the with- rations. The so-called 'new world both the 1994 Defence White Paper drawal of 4th Canadian Mechanized order' turned out to be more myth and Mr. Young's March 1997 report.6 Brigade from Lahr and No. l Cana- than reality, but the early nineties did dian Air Group from Zweibrucken see an exponential increase in UN and Baden-Soellingen, followed activity in trouble spots around the Budget Cuts rapidly. world. The Canadian government seemed to want to take part in every To announce policy is one thing, to single one. execute if another and Canada has Credibility Crisis been caught in a self-made defense 'commitment/credibility' gap since As the Cold War ended, the Canadian Peacekeeping Missions the late 1950s. It was at that time that Forces were already in grim shape. Canadian governments, particularly Canada was caught in a 'commit- Modern peacekeeping is generally those formed by the Liberal Party, ment-credibility' crisis of its own acknowledged to have starled during began a long series of defense budget making. The Canadian Navy still had the 1956 Sinai/Suez crisis when cuts that presaged the even more dras- no modern vessels (the first patrol Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. tic cuts of the post-Cold War era. frigate was yet to be delivered). The Pearson proposed the United Nations From a post-war defense-spending Canadian Air Force had the only up- Emergency Force (UNEF) to be inter- peak of some 8.5 percent of Canada's to-date major piece of equiopment in posed between Egyptian and Israeli Gross National Product in 1955-1957 the entire Canadian Forces inventory troops, and as a temporary occupation (that was more than 50 percent on the in the CF-18 fighter, but it's CF-18s force in the Suez Canal Zone. At first entire federal budget, making Canada were not equipped for modern air- peacekeeping operations such as the fourth largest per capita spender ground operations. The Canadian UNEF, UNFICYP (on Cyprus). on defense among all NATO mem- Army's 4th Canadian Mechanized ONUC (the Congo) were a minor bers), the defense portion of the fe- Brigade in Germany was under- component of the Canadian mulitary deral budget was reduced to about 2 strenght and equipped with the obso- mission, but the peacekeeping idea percent of GDP, or just under 9 per- lete Leopard I tank and the M113 caught on with the Canadian public cent of the federal budget, by 1970. armoured personnel carrier. The who came to believe, wrongly, that For the last two and a half decades, Canadian militia was under-strength, blue heimet operations were a unique Canada consistently ranked tenth or poorly paid, and incapable of combat Canadian concept and mission. More lower in per capita defense spending operations. The 'total force' ideal, than 100,000 Canadians have served among all NATO members. Although largely copied from the US, in which on traditional 'peacekeeping' mis- some modest defense budget increas- Canada's regular soldiers, sailors and sions since 1956, most under UN es occurred during the 1970's they air personnel were to be augmented mandate, and as of this date over 100 feil below the then-steep rate of infla- by individual reservists or reserve have been killed on active service in tion, causing a severe equipment units in times of emergency, was far thopse missions.7 'rust-out' crisis in the Canadian beyond reach. With full-blown, mechanized war in Forces. When Canada was approached by the Europe disappearing as an apparent A Conservative government elected United States and Great Britain to raison d'etre for the Canadian Forces, in 1984 made sweeping promises send the 4th Brigade from Germany the Canadian military, the Depart- about bringing the Canadian military to Saudi Arabia in the months leading ment of National Defense and the back to acceptable standards of ope- up to Desert Storm, Ottawa was Department of Foreign Affairs was rational readiness but the only major forced to refuse because there were determined to find a new raison commitment it carried through was not sufficient manpower reserves to d'etre for a Canadian military in the initiation of the twelve ship, support operations and the brigade's peacekeeping and peace-enforcement multi-billion dollar, Canadian Patrol equipment was out-dated. That was a operations. By mid-1994 Canada had Frigate program (just recently com- tacit admission that at the close of the more troops serving overseas on ope- Pleted), and the refurbishment of four Cold War the was also rational missions than at any time aging Tribal Class destroyers. A pro- completely unprepared for what had since the end of the Korean War in Posal in the 1987 White Paper to pur- been its primary mission since the 1953. The following table8 lists those chase a small fleet of nuclear sub- early 1950s - helping the NATO missions to which 50 or more rnarines quickly feil by the wayside as allies defend western Europe. Canadian military personnel were Canada's budget crisis deepened. In Despite these deficiencies, Canada's assigned since 1990. ->

JRG 167 3-98 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 119 tionship between Canadians and their Mission Location avg.# Start End state and governmental institutions. The military did its best to ignore the UNIIMOG Iran/lraq 550 1988 1991 Charter and to carry on as it has done UNTAG Namibia 301 1989 1990 since time immemorial, but it could ONUCA Central America 174 1989 1992 not. Judges upheld the validity and Op Banier Persian Gulf 250 1992 1992 the necessity of a separate code of UNTAC Cambodia 240 1992 1993 military discipline and the military UNITAF Somalia 1250 1992 1993 courts needed to enforce that code, UNOSAL El Salvador 55 1992 1995 but strongly maintained that military UNSMIH Haiti 600+ 1993 1997 exemptions from Charter-based law Passage Rwanda 245 1994 1994 had to be minor and had to be fully UNPROFOR Fmr Yugo 2200 1992 1995 justified by the special requirements IFOR/SFOR Bosnia 1030 1995 no of a democratie military.

Major offshore deployments since 1 990 Complaints Much of the military responded nega- tively to the new slant put on military Current participation is down consi- indirectly. The small size of the total justice by the Charter. NCOs and derably from the mid-1990s. As of this forces, combined with the increase in junior officers especially seemed to writing Canada has just under 1900 missions, created a crisis of overtask- blame all slackness of discipline on armed forces personnel on operations. ing which undermined morale. the Charter and to complain that the The largest contingents are 188 ser- Family difficulties soared. So did Charter unreasonably fettered their ving with UNDOF (5the Golan Critical Incident Stress (CIS) reac- ability to maintain good conduct and Heights). 317 still with UNSMIH tion. In fact, it is fair to say that duty discipline. The public, in general, had (Haiti) and 1307 with SFOR in with UNPROFOR uncovered a CIS and has little patience for such special Bosnia-Herzegovina.' problem that had existed among many pleading. The complaints were not, Canadian peacekeepers for decades, after all, much different from those but which had been largely ignored. once heard from the police regarding Difficulties Canadian soldiers had gone from the the Charter's potential impact on the safe and sane environment of Canada criminal justice system. The police The rapid increase of overseas opera- into war zones such as the Congo, or claimed that the right of an accused to tional deployments beginning in the Sinai desert, or Yugosloavia, and have counsel present during question- 1989/90 created a raft of difficulties had been exposed to the aftermath of ing, and new and tighter rules to pro- for the Canadian Forces. Some of war at its cruelest. They had then tect individual rights during the evi- these problems were directly related returned to Canada without any sort dence collection process, would be a to the years of budget cuts and other of adjustment to Canadian life. The boon to crime in Canada. It was not; deficiencies of personnel and equip- Canadian military was not up to the the police simply got better at their ment. Canadian troops went to former task of dealing effectively with the jobs. Yugoslavia lacking basic necessities large number of CIS cases brought to such as a modern APC, kevlar hel- its attention when soldiers first began Racism mets, full protection armoured vests, returning from Bosnia and Croatia. The military also failed to reach out to sufficient bulldozers, up-to-date maps the rapidly growing immigrant and aerial reconnaissance pho- Gap coomunity in Canada to attract a rea- tographs. Reservists serving with re- In Canada the gulf between the sonable share of these largely 'visible gular force units performed unevenly. Canadian Forces and the voting pu- minority' Canadians (Latin Ameri- Reserve officers were generally found blic widened considerably starting in cans, Asians, Blacks et cetera) to its to be too old, too lacking in modern the mid-1980s; the end of the Cold ranks. Even though the face of training, too unable to make quick War exacerbated that separation. Canada was changing rapidly - the and intelligent decisions under pres- While the people and government of evidence is particularly striking in sure. But reserve non-commissioned Canada moved rapidly towards a major urban centres such as Toronto members were generally as capable as 'rights-driven' society in the late and Vancouver - the face of the mili- their counterparts after 1970s and early 1980s, the military tary was not. It continued to be domi- additional refresher training. lagged behind. In 1982 Canada adop- nated by personnel drawn from the Many other problems arising from the ted a written Charter of Rights and old English-origin and French-origin increase in operational deployments Freedoms which has had a revolution- part of the Canadian population. were also budget related, but only ary impact on civil rights and the rela- Periodic incidents of racism occurred

120 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 167 3-98 and were tolerated within the armed This does not necessarily fol- From March 1993 to March 1994, forces, and no substantial bridges low the division of function between CANBAT 2 temporarily provided were built between the armed forces commander and staff officer. A truly troops to guard the UN so-called safe and these millions of new voters. accomplished commander must com- haven of Srebrenica. bine his or her in-born leadership Canada's contribution to UNPRO- A Crisis of Leadership skills with administrative training. FOR proved to be the largest overseas A crisis of leadership began to emerge Great commanders know that leader- military operation mounted by in the Canadian Forces, especially ship and administration must exist Canada since the Korean war. Some within the Canadian Army, in the late symbiotically because talent in both is 10,000 Canadian troops served with 1980s and early 1990s. The crisis was necessary to 'get there first with the UNPROFOR from the start of the in part caused by the erosion of the most men' in the words of Con- mission in Croatia until its disband- primary NATO-oriented mission and federate General Nathan Bedford ment and replacement by IFOR in a consequent loss of direction among Forrest. In Canada the division 1995; eleven Canadians were killed in the officer corps. It was also rooted in between soldier-warriors and soldier- action with UNPROFOR or died on the growth of a strong bureaucratie bureaucrats was a division of attitude, active service. Although Canadian mentality among many senior officers not function, and it began to show up troops performed a large number of who forgot they had joined the mili- early in the 1980s when surveys done military tasks that were unrelated to tary to be warrior-leaders and who by the Canadian Forces Personnel any combat role, the bulk of the began to act as corporate executives. Applied Research Unit (CFPARU) Canadians who served with UNPRO- To a certain extent the Canadian com- began to detect a disturbingly large FOR were regular army troops of mand and control system lends itself number of officers with distinctly Canada's permanent infantry, armour, to this bureaucratization process. unsoldierly attitudes towards war and and reconnaissance regiments, aug- Canada's National Defense Head- combat." mented by members of the reserve quarters (NDHQ) is a binary system Such attitudes were fed by the grow- (militia). which combines the functions of the ing bureaucratization of NDHQ and civil Deputy Minister (DM) if the public's perception - encouraged The UNPROFOR mission is some- National Defense with the military by the government - the Canada's times referred to as a 'Ch VI 1/2' UN Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS). armed forces were intended to per- operation in that it was initially esta- What began to occur more and more form peacekeeping missions, not blished to perform a 'classic' separa- often at NDHQ in the late 1980s and fight wars. The government took tion-of-forces peacekeeping mission early 1990s was that military advice great pains to hide, or at least down- but was forced to carry out its man- to the cabinet, which is supposed to play, the brutal and bloody realities of date in the middle of an active war be within the sole purview of the so-called peacekeeping in places like zone. To do that it sometimes needed CDS, became 'blended' with civilian the former Yugoslavia. Given these to resort to the tactical use of force in advice trom the Deputy Minister. It many difficulties that the Canadian both offensive and defensive opera- was as if the DM had somehow been Forces had to cope with in the early tions.1- In the performance of their inserted into the chain of command at 1990s, it ought to have come as no various tasks, Canadian troops in for- the very highest level. This erosion of great shock to the Canadian public mer Yugoslavia were often the targets the authority of the CDS had reper- that significant mission problems of hostile fïre, threatened with being cussions throughout NDHQ and all arose on operations in former Yugo- taken hostage or actually taken hos- down the chain of command. Many slavia, Somalia, and other places. tage, or fully engaged in combat. The senior officers at NDHQ began to most serious of these events occurred curry favour with the DM and the in Croatia in September 1993 when largely civilian Assistant Deputy UNPROFOR CANBAT l fought a pitched battle Ministers (only one ADM - responsi- for 24 hours with Croatian govern- ble for personnel - is a soldier)."1 Put At the peak of its commitment to the ment forces in the area known as the simply, Canada's military forces at UN Protection Force in former Medak Pocket. the end of the Cold War had too many Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Canada The men and women of the Canadian officers doing too little command contributed two battle groups desig- Forces did a good job in former Work and too little thinking about nated CANBAT l and CANBAT 2 (a Yugoslavia; no doubt many civilian strategy, operations, tactics, training, Canadian battle group consists of one lives were saved because of them. and other strictly military concerns. battalion and supporting arms such as They escorted hundreds of humani- engineers, et cetera). CANBAT l was tarian relief convoys, cleared large Bureoucrats based at Daruvar, Croatia from March numbers of mines, and stood tast in The Canadian military, like many 1992 to September 1995. CANBAT 2 the Medak Pocket when Croatian militaries, contains its share of sol- was based at Visoko, Bosnia from troops had demanded unauthorized dier-warriors and soldier-bureaucrats. October 1992 to November 1995. entry. But the UNPROFOR experi-

JRG 167 3-98 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 121 ence also revealed important weak- based at Belet Huen, for most of the Belet Huen, some members of the nesses in Canadian defense policy. An mission. This battle group was pri- Airborne Regiment began to demon- original commitment of one battle marily made up of troops from the strate grossly undisciplined behav- group for peacekeeping duties had Canadian Airborne Regiment and the iour. There was excess drinking, somehow become two battle groups Royal Canadian Dragoons (an excess belligerence towards Somali in the middle of a shooting war with armoured regiment). They were sup- civilians in what had turned out to be no real idea of what their mission ported in their initial insertion into a non-combat operation, and abuse of objective was. Canada's troops were Belet Huen by troops of the US lOth prisoners caught sneaking into the continually hampered by unsuitable Mountain Division. The specific camp to steal various items. Officers rules of engagement, a ponderous and Canadian task was to secure a and senior NCOs looked the other bureaucratie UN command structure, Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS) of way. After a month or so, racist atti- lack of heavy weapons and air sup- several thousand square kilometres, tudes towards Somalis starled to port, and shortages of the most basic using Belet Huen as an operational become common among many mem- kind of equipment, from Kevlar hel- base. This was to be done in a two- bers of the contingent. One Somali mets to proper raingear. Canada was fold operation; by disarming Somali was killed and another wounded on fortunate in that 'only' eleven of its warlord gangs in and around Belet the night of 4 March, 1993 in an soldiers were killed or died on active Huen, then by patrolling the main ambush-style operation. A Canadian service, but as the three-cornered war roads of the HRS to guard against army doctor who examined the dead between Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs attacks on relief convoys." man was convinced that hè had been dragged on, Canadians were increas- UNITAF began descending on shot dead while lying helpless on the ingly challenged to answer why Somalia at the end of 1992 when the ground after being wounded. On the troops had been sent in harm's way in first US troops went ashore near night of 16 March, 1993 a Somali a mission impossible. Mogadishu, the capital. The Canadian teenager was beaten to death over a Airborne Regiment Battle Group was period of several hours while in cus- preceded into Belet Huen by the tody, in the middle of the Canadian UNITAF Airborne's No. 2 Commando (compa- camp, and there could be no doubt his ny), which was tasked with providing killing was known to many personnel Yugoslavia revealed the weaknesses security for the Canadian base and for and that the beating had been sanc- in Canadian policy-making, com- patrolling the town itself. In and tioned by the company commander. mand and control, and equipment; around Belet Huen, the warlord mili- Somalia revealed the failure of tia quickly went to ground and there Inquiries leadership. On 3 December 1992 UN was almost no armed opposition to The relevations of wrong-doing in Security Council Resolution 794 the Canadians. The Canadians Somalia caused the gravest peacetime authorized UNITAF (the Unified worked with local Somali leaders to crisis of confidence ever to afflict the Task Force) under Chapter VII of the re-establish a civil police, re-build Canadian Forces. Two subsequent UN Charter. UNITAF's mission was and re-start the local school, and investigations, one conducted by the to enforce peace on warring factions repair damaged or destroyed bridges Canadian Forces, the second by an in Somalia to enable international and other key structures. They also independent judicial inquiry commis- relief agencies to bring food and medi- provided free medical services and sioned by the government, raised seri- cal supplies to starving Somalians in imposed law and order in Belet Huen ous questions about the mission. Why that country's interior. UNITAF did and most of the HRS. They enabled was it accepted when Canada was not operate with the sanction of the the relief agencies to resumé their already heavily committed in former Somali government because there operations and basically accom- Yugoslavia and other places? Why was no effective government func- plished the mission they were was the Airborne selected when it was tioning in Somalia at that time. With assigned to carry out. known to have had a legacy of disci- US naval, air and ground support, and plinary problems? Why was the mis- a heavy commitment of US troops, Undiscipiined behaviour sion not cancelled when premission the mission (Operation Deleverance) Nonetheless, the Canadian operation disciplinary problems persisted and was mounted as a combat-type troop in Somalia was marred by a number many members of the Airborne insertion into potentially hostile of clashes with Somali demonstrators, Regiment proved exceedingly reluc- areas. The troops were armed and pre- sporadic shooting encounters between tant to engage in mission-specific pared for the possibility of fighting Somali irregulars and Canadian training? Why had the regiment's their way into the major relief distri- troops, and the death of a US soldier officers and senior NCOs not im- bution centres in Somalia. operating in the Canadian sector posed good order and discipline on Canada's major contribution to when nis vehicle was blown up by a their men when the mission began? UNITAF consisted of the Canadian mine. Within only weeks of the esta- Why was abuse of prisoners tolerated, Airborne Regiment Battle Group, blishment of the Canadian base at even sanctioned, by a number of offi-

122 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 167 3-98 cers? What had happened on the Recommendations trol of the army from the soldier-war- nights of 4 March and 16 March riors who seem so useless and anti- 1993? All these experiences have forced quated when guns are not firing in While the inquiries proceeded, seven much recent soul searchiong on the anger. Even before the end of the courts martial were held; one soldier Canadian Forces, the Departement of Cold War, Canada was fielding an was convicted of complicity in the 16 National Defense, and the govern- army in which warfighting was of March incident and sentenced to five ment. Beginning in late 1996 the secondary or even tertiary importance years in prison. A sergeant pleaded Minister of National Defense began behind peacekeeping, disaster relief, guilty to negligent performance of his to marshall the resources of his and aid-to-the-civil-power in Canada. duties and was dismissed from the department to attempt to deal with the The government, senior defense offi- Forces. The main perpetrator of the low morale, leadership failures, and cials, even senior Canadian Forces 16 March beating death was declared other major difficulties afflicting the commanders apparently forgot that unfit tbr court martial after a bungled forces. In a report to the Prime armies exist to fight wars, or to pré- suicide attempt. One officer was Minister submitted in late March, paré to fight wars, and therefore must demoted, reprimanded, and impris- 1997, the minister targeted the trai- be led by officers and NCOs of in- oned tbr three months. But that was ning and preparation of leaders, the tel ligence, honestly, charisma, and all, even though for more than two military justice system, and the incul- honour. years, the mission was dissected daily cation of ethics, morals and values The erosion of leadership in the by the press and revelations of alleged into individual members of the Forces Canadian Forces took place against a scandal, corruption and cover-up for sweeping reforms. The impetus to backdrop of change. Canadian society among the high command of the reform was given a further push by changed; the Cold War ended; the Forces and the top bureaucrats at the report of the Commission of Canadian Forces were cut back and DND were widely circulated. The Inquiry into the Deployment of their missions re-defined. Prolonged Canadian Airborne Regiment was Canadian Forces to Somalia, issued at peace is always a time of trial for any declared to be incorrigible by the fe- the beginning of July, 1997. That military but in Canada, where the deral government and disbanded in report contained 160 recommenda- armed forces are not held to play an January 1995.14 tions for changes in training, com- important role in asserting national mand and control, mission prepara- interests, it is particularly testing. It It soon turned out that the leadership tion, military police and justice sys- has always been hard for Canadians failures revealed in the Somalia tems, and other matters pertinent to during times of peace to face the bare mision were all too common in the the Somalia mission.16 In October fact that an independent nation must Canadian Forces. Despite a generally 1997, the new Minister of National have a well-run, effective, and profi- excellent job in former Yugoslavia, Defense accepted 134 of those 160 cient military capable of answering a revelations that Canadian soldiers had recommendations and established a call to arms quickly and efficiently. It abused mental patients in Bosnia sur- Minister's Monitoring Committee on is the 'Canadian way of war' not to do faced in 1996. After initial denials by Change, headed by former Supreme this. The Canadian soldiers sent to the army commander Lt.-Gen. Court of Canada Justice Willard Estey Somalia were not ready to perform , they proved to be true. to oversee the implementation of the the mission assigned to them, but then He was forced to reverse course and recommendations. neither were the Canadian soldiers launch an investigation of the affair sent to France in 1914, or to the UK in but most of those involved had Why had the Canadian Forces suf- 1939, or to Hong Kong in 1941 or to already left the Forces. In late 1997 fered these problems? The answer is Korea in 1950. Col. Reno Vanier, former commander rooted in the larger story of the crisis of the Canadian military mission in that has been developing in the Haiti, was charged with corruption Canadian army for at least a decade. Changes and accepting bribes while leading That crisis was initially caused by the the mission there. Controversy also bleeding to near death of the defense It was obvious even before the continues to dog Major-General establishment by successive federal Somalia Commission got down to Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian officer governments. It was greatly exacer- work in 1995 that major changes were who commanded the UNAMIR (UN bated by the growth of structures and required in the preparation, training, Assistance Mission for Rwanda) in institutions within the Canadian equipping, and command and control late 1993 and early 1994 when the Forces and the Department of of the Canadian Forces, not to men- civil war was raging. A Belgian National Defense designed to ease tion their relationship to Canadian Senate commission of inquiry into the political and bureaucratie burdens, society. The Department of National killing of ten Belgian paratroopers in not promote military effectiveness. It Defense and the Canadian Forces that war in April 1994 has accused is always easy in an army at peace for have now starled down the path to Dallaire of negligence." soldier-managers to wrest took con- implementing those changes. The

JRG 167 3-98 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 123 defense policy first enunciated in the new helmets, armoured vests, gre- does not re-think the decades-long 1994 White Paper - to maintain nade launchers and other new kit. A Canadian practise of committing to multipurpose, combat-capable, armed major purchase of tactical helicopters virtually any and every UN mission, forces - has been repeated and has been completed. The Leopard I anywhere, at any time. There was one reiterated. In order to ensure that that tanks have been upgraded. Three light disquieting sign in late 1996 that the policy is carried out, there has been a infantry battalions have been effec- ultimate political master of the mighty effort to cut back drastically tively been re-activated putting some Canadian Forces - the cabinet and the on the administrative 'tail' of the 3000 additional soldiers into combat Prime Minister's Office - is not pre- Canadian Forces. Command struc- capable formations. The reserves are pared to do that. When the attention tures and support services have been being re-organized and have received of the international media focussed on rationalized and downsized in favour a major pay increase. So has the regu- the plight of starving Hutus living in of more soldiers, better equipped, at lar force enlisted ranks. A Request refugee camps just inside the eastern the 'sharp end'. Training, officer edu- for Proposals for 35 shipboard mari- borders of Zaire, Prime Minister cation, and standards for commission- time helicopters will be announced Jean Chretien decided to volunteer ing have been toughened up. There shortly. The Standing Committee on Canadian troops to lead an interna- have been major reforms to the mili- Defense and Veterans Affairs will tional rescue mission.'7 The fact that tary justice system and to the operat- start nationwide hearing on the living eastern Zaire was then a civil war ing procedures of the military police. conditions of Canada's soldiers in the zone, raising the spectre of another New wheeled APCs are being pur- new year. UNPROFOR-like debacle, did not chased and many of the old M113s All these improvements will mean appear to dampen the Prime upgraded. The soldiers are receiving little, however, if the government Minister's enthusiasm for the mis- sion. In the end, the refugee problem solved itself and Canadian troops Notes were not placed in harm's way in the middle of someone else's civil war. 1 Details are available in '1995 Budget Impact Update', 12 December, 1977. Yet the episode seemed to indicate Statement, National Defense' issued February "' This subject has been especially well treated that the government had learned little 1995. It is available at www.dnd.ca/dinto/ by Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence; dgpa/budget%5F95%5Feng/e95bud.htmI. Government and the Unified Command of the or nothing from the Yugoslav experi- ' 1994 Defence White Paper: Hon. M. Douglas (Toronto: Canadian ence. Young, Report to the Prime Minister on the Institute of Strategie Studies, 1995). Leadership and Management of the Canadian " C.A. Cotton, 'The Cultural Consequences of The Canadian Forces have had a dif- Forces (Ottawa, 1997). Defence Unilication in Canada's Military', ficult time since the end of the Cold 1 1994 White Paper, p. 12, unpublished paper presented to the Inter- 4 Ibid., pp. 15ff. University Seminar on Armed Forces and War. But reluctantly or not, the ' Submitted to the Prime Minister 25 March, Society Conference, Chicago, 1983. government seems to have finally re- 1997, p. 7. 12 Joseph P. Jockel, Canada & International cognized that Canada is a part of an ' Department of National Defense, press Peacekeeping (Washington: Center for international system that depends on release of 14 October 1997: 'The Minister's Strategie and International Studies, 1994), p. Monitoring Committee on Change'. 75; Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road the free flow of people, ideas, trade, ' CFP 300: Canada's Army (DRAFT), An to Sarajevo (Toronto: Douglas & Mclntyre, and technology, and that it is some- example of a non-UN peacekeeping mission in 1993), pp. lllff. times necessary to shed blood to pre- which Canada participates is MFO (Multi- " David Bercuson, Significant Incident: serve that system. To that end the lateral Force and Observers) based in the Sinai Canada's Army, the Airborne and the Murder government is also recognizing that a peninsula which monitors an Israeli-Egyptian in Somalia (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, separation of forces agreement. 1996), Introduction and Ch 9. better prepared and led, though * Information compiled from Department of 14 Ibid., p. 240. smaller, Canadian Forces is neces- National Defense, NDHQ, 'Canadian Forces " Globe & Mail, 12 December, 1997. sary. It is too early to teil, however, if International Operations' Ottawa; September "' Dishonoured Legacy: Report of the Com- future decisions to send Canadian 1966, which has complete information in tabu- mission of Inquiry into the Deployment of troops in harm's way will be made on lar form for all Canadian international opera- Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Minister tions since 1945. of Public Works and Government services, 1997). the basis of shrewd evaluations of * DND, 'Canadian Forces Current Operations " Edmonton Journal, 15 November, 1996. Canadian national interests, or on mere political whim.

124 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 167 3-98