From Crisis to Confidence? The Canadian Forces since the end of the Cold War prof. dr. DJ. Bercuson* he years since the end of the cut, to be implemented over a four law must govern relations between Cold War have been tumul- year period, was to reduce the regular states; Ttueus for the Canadian Forces, establishment of the Canadian Forces - Canadians deern their own security especially for the Canadian Land from 86,700 to 60,000. The reserve indivisible from that of their allies; Forces, and the Canadian Department force was to remain more or less the - Canadians have long had a strong of National Defense. Massive budget same size, but the number of civilian sense of responsibility to alleviate cuts were to be expected with the dis- employees in the Department of suffering around the globe and appearance of a plausible Soviet National Defense was to be cut from respond where their efforts can threat. But those cuts came after years 36,500 to 20,000. In addition, several make a difference.' of underfunding and were larger than major bases across Canada were Chapters 4 to 6 of the White Paper might have been expected due to the ordered closed. The army was to con- spell out in some detail the overall federal government's decision, made centrate at four bases (Canadian three-phase mission of the Canadian in late 1993, to tackle Canada's sig- Forces Base (CFB) Edomonton, CFB Forces within the context of the basic nificant debt/deficit crisis. Budget Petawawa, CFB Valcartier and CFB values laid out above: to defend cuts were not the only major source of Gagetown), the navy at CFB Es- Canada and Canadian sovereignty; in upheaval, however. They only com- quimalt on the west coast and CFB partnership with the United States, to plicated other problems arising of the Halifax on the Atlantic coast, and defend North America; in partnership military's increasing distance from the air force's operational fighter with Canada's NATO allies, or under Canadian society, an acute overtask- squadrons were to be reduced and UN auspices, to take part in multila- ing crisis, the mear-disaster of the based at CFB Cold Lake (Alberta) teral operations 'anywhere in the Yugoslavian peacekeeping mission and CFB Bagotteville (Quebec). world' which promote Canada's (UNPROFOR) and a major crisis of broader interests. Among the latter command and leadership exposed in The second important initiative missions are 'traditional' peacekeep- the wake of the Somalia mission of launched by the new government was ing operations (such as have been 1993 (UNITAF). a comprehensive review of Canadian mounted under Chapter VI of the UN defense policy carried out by a joint Charter), and peace maintenance and House of Commons-Senate commit- enforcement operations such as Two Initiatives tee which formed the basis of the Operation Deliverance to Somalia. To J 994 Defence White Paper and the these ends the government pledged In the fall of 1993 the Liberal Party Report to the Prime Minister on the itself to maintain 'multipurpose, com- was elected to govern in Ottawa Leadership and Management of the bat-capable forces' which would give under the leadership of Jean Chretien. Canadian Forces issued by then min- Canada 'the necessary degree of flex- It immediately launched two initia- ister of National Defense M. Douglas ibility and freedom of action'.4 tives that were to have a profound Young on 25 March, 1997.2 Among The policy laid out in 1994 is still impact on the Canadian military. the main points made in the 1994 officially in place. In his March 1997 The first was a reduction by some 25 White Paper were these: Report to the Prime Minister on percent of the overall budget devoted - Canada is committed to remain an Leadership and Management of the to the Department of National De- active participant in multilateral Canadian Forces, minister of Natio- fense and the Canadian Forces.' This efforts to promote collective secu- nal Defense, Hon. M. Douglas rity because this commitment is a Young, registered his strong belief * Dr. DJ. Bercuson is professor of History and reflection of Canada's basic values that it was „essential" that the govern- Director, Strategie Studies Program, The and interests; ment „Maintain the direction set out University of Calgary, Canada. - Canadians believe that the rule of in the 1994 Defence White Paper".5 118 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 167 3-98 That was, in fact, the very first of fiscal year 1990/91 the Conservative armed forces were increasingly called 65 recommendations contained in government began to make major upon in the years after 1990 to sup- Young's report. The current minister defense budget outs after the f al I of port a growing number of UN peace- of National Defense, Art Eggleton, the Berlin Wall. The closure of keeping and peace enforcement ope- has also reaffirmed his support for Canada's bases in Germany, the with- rations. The so-called 'new world both the 1994 Defence White Paper drawal of 4th Canadian Mechanized order' turned out to be more myth and Mr. Young's March 1997 report.6 Brigade from Lahr and No. l Cana- than reality, but the early nineties did dian Air Group from Zweibrucken see an exponential increase in UN and Baden-Soellingen, followed activity in trouble spots around the Budget Cuts rapidly. world. The Canadian government seemed to want to take part in every To announce policy is one thing, to single one. execute if another and Canada has Credibility Crisis been caught in a self-made defense 'commitment/credibility' gap since As the Cold War ended, the Canadian Peacekeeping Missions the late 1950s. It was at that time that Forces were already in grim shape. Canadian governments, particularly Canada was caught in a 'commit- Modern peacekeeping is generally those formed by the Liberal Party, ment-credibility' crisis of its own acknowledged to have starled during began a long series of defense budget making. The Canadian Navy still had the 1956 Sinai/Suez crisis when cuts that presaged the even more dras- no modern vessels (the first patrol Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. tic cuts of the post-Cold War era. frigate was yet to be delivered). The Pearson proposed the United Nations From a post-war defense-spending Canadian Air Force had the only up- Emergency Force (UNEF) to be inter- peak of some 8.5 percent of Canada's to-date major piece of equiopment in posed between Egyptian and Israeli Gross National Product in 1955-1957 the entire Canadian Forces inventory troops, and as a temporary occupation (that was more than 50 percent on the in the CF-18 fighter, but it's CF-18s force in the Suez Canal Zone. At first entire federal budget, making Canada were not equipped for modern air- peacekeeping operations such as the fourth largest per capita spender ground operations. The Canadian UNEF, UNFICYP (on Cyprus). on defense among all NATO mem- Army's 4th Canadian Mechanized ONUC (the Congo) were a minor bers), the defense portion of the fe- Brigade in Germany was under- component of the Canadian mulitary deral budget was reduced to about 2 strenght and equipped with the obso- mission, but the peacekeeping idea percent of GDP, or just under 9 per- lete Leopard I tank and the M113 caught on with the Canadian public cent of the federal budget, by 1970. armoured personnel carrier. The who came to believe, wrongly, that For the last two and a half decades, Canadian militia was under-strength, blue heimet operations were a unique Canada consistently ranked tenth or poorly paid, and incapable of combat Canadian concept and mission. More lower in per capita defense spending operations. The 'total force' ideal, than 100,000 Canadians have served among all NATO members. Although largely copied from the US, in which on traditional 'peacekeeping' mis- some modest defense budget increas- Canada's regular soldiers, sailors and sions since 1956, most under UN es occurred during the 1970's they air personnel were to be augmented mandate, and as of this date over 100 feil below the then-steep rate of infla- by individual reservists or reserve have been killed on active service in tion, causing a severe equipment units in times of emergency, was far thopse missions.7 'rust-out' crisis in the Canadian beyond reach. With full-blown, mechanized war in Forces. When Canada was approached by the Europe disappearing as an apparent A Conservative government elected United States and Great Britain to raison d'etre for the Canadian Forces, in 1984 made sweeping promises send the 4th Brigade from Germany the Canadian military, the Depart- about bringing the Canadian military to Saudi Arabia in the months leading ment of National Defense and the back to acceptable standards of ope- up to Desert Storm, Ottawa was Department of Foreign Affairs was rational readiness but the only major forced to refuse because there were determined to find a new raison commitment it carried through was not sufficient manpower reserves to d'etre for a Canadian military in the initiation of the twelve ship, support operations and the brigade's peacekeeping and peace-enforcement multi-billion dollar, Canadian Patrol equipment was out-dated. That was a operations. By mid-1994 Canada had Frigate program (just recently com- tacit admission that at the close of the more troops serving overseas on ope- Pleted), and the refurbishment of four Cold War the Canadian army was also rational missions than at any time aging Tribal Class destroyers. A pro- completely unprepared for what had since the end of the Korean War in Posal in the 1987 White Paper to pur- been its primary mission since the 1953.