Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: THA32946 Country: Thailand Date: 7 March 2008

Keywords: Thailand – Military Coup – Economy – Sharks – – Police Corruption – Rape Victims – Women – State Protection

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions 1. Was there a military coup in Thailand in 2006? 2. What was the economic outcome for the Thai economy and business in general as a result of the coup? 3. Is there any information about the operation of loan sharks in Thailand, including how they are organised and whether their focus of operation is localised or broader throughout Thailand? 4. Are there any reports on the consequences for people who default on their borrowings from loan sharks in Thailand? 5. Is there any evidence that the activities of loan sharks are supported by corrupt police in Thailand? 6. Would a victim of loan sharks’ criminal activity be denied redress from the police or authorities? 7. Would a rape victim be able to seek and gain redress for the crime from the authorities in Thailand? 8. Please provide information on the attitude towards and treatment of rape victims in Thailand by their family and the community. 9. Please provide information on state protection for women in Thailand.

RESPONSE

1. Was there a military coup in Thailand in 2006?

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Thailand for 2006 indicates that “[o]n September 19, in a bloodless coup d’etat, military coup leaders overthrew the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which had won reelection in February 2005 in an election viewed as generally free and fair but marred by widespread vote buying. The coup leaders repealed the constitution, abolished parliament, declared martial law, and issued several decrees limiting civil liberties. On October 1, the military coup leaders, taking the name the Council for National Security (CNS), promulgated an interim constitution and established an interim government” (US Department of State 2007, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Thailand, March, Introduction – Attachment 1).

The Freedom House 2007 report on Thailand (Freedom House 2007, Freedom in the World: Thailand (2007) – Attachment 2), and a RRT research response dated 30 May 2007 (RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response THA31785, 30 May, (Questions 1-7) – Attachment 3), also provide information on the coup.

An Economist Intelligence Unit country briefing on Thailand dated 12 February 2008 indicates that “[a]lmost a year and a half after the September 2006 coup, Thailand has a democratically elected government once more”, with the election of “[t]he new government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej, whose People Power Party (PPP) swept the December 23rd general election” (‘Thailand economy: Policy challenges’ 2008, Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, 12 February – Attachment 4).

2. What was the economic outcome for the Thai economy and business in general as a result of the coup?

The Freedom House 2007 report on Thailand indicates that “[t]he September coup brought a shift in the country’s economic policy from Thaksin’s emphasis on economic expansion at all costs to a self-sufficiency model publicly advocated by [Prime Minister] Surayud [Chulanont] soon after he took office. Thaksin’s more controversial efforts toward privatization and trade liberalization were expected to be abandoned. The CNS government’s December attempt to impose capital controls to curb massive appreciation in the local currency caused Thai stocks to suffer their greatest plummet in a single day since 1980, taking a toll on the country’s credibility with international investors” (Freedom House 2007, Freedom in the World: Thailand (2007) – Attachment 2).

An International Crisis Group report dated 15 March 2007 includes information on the effects of the 2006 coup in Thailand at the national level. The report indicates that the government had “come under constant criticism on the economic front”. According to the report:

The government has come under constant criticism on the economic front, from the disastrous decision to impose capital controls in December 2006 and proposed amendments to the Foreign Business Act the next month, to the ongoing debate over Thaksin-style free market populism versus King Bhumibol’s philosophy of the “sufficiency economy”… Surayud attempted to reconcile the approaches and deal a blow to the former prime minister by appointing Thaksin’s chief economist, Somkid Jatusripitak, as economic spokesman. But Somkid resigned six days later amid a storm of criticism, and a week later Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Pridiyathorn Devakula likewise left… The episode also highlighted divisions within the CNS, with General Saprang supporting and General Winai opposing Somkid’s appointment (International Crisis Group 2007, ‘Southern Thailand: The impact of the coup’, ICG website, 15 March, pp. 4-5 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand___ the_impact_of_the_coup_web.pdf - Accessed 16 March 2007 – Attachment 5).

A country profile of Thailand dated July 2007 by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress notes that “[t]he Bank of Thailand sought to stem the flow of foreign funds into the country in December 2006. This led within one day to the largest drop in stock prices on the Stock Exchange of Thailand since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The massive selling by foreign investors amounted more than US$708 million.” However, the country profile also indicates that “[t]he military coup that took place on September 19, 2006, has not had a serious impact on the economy. The baht and financial markets experienced brief declines but soon stabilized when investment experts speculated that the coup would help resolve a political standoff that was hurting the economy. Thailand’s ratings are unchanged; however, rating agencies have reported that they may be downgraded depending on future developments. According to investment experts, the economy is strong enough to overcome the temporary disruption caused by the coup” (Library of Congress Federal Research Division 2007, ‘Country Profile: Thailand’, UNHCR Refworld website, July, pp. 13 & 15 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=country&docid=46f9135c597c&skip=&c oi=THA – Accessed 6 March 2008 – Attachment 6).

The Economist Intelligence Unit country briefing on Thailand dated 12 February 2008 indicates that “[t]he new government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej, whose People Power Party (PPP) swept the December 23rd general election”, had “made no secret of its plans to adopt the tried and tested populist policies previously pursued by Thaksin.” The article provides information on the performance of the Thai economy during 2007, including the following:

The Thai economy recorded reasonably solid growth in 2007, expanding by an estimated 4.6%. Although this was slower than the 5.1% rate of growth in 2006, and well below the average of 5.8% in 2003-06, the main worry was the one-sidedness of growth. Exports were the main driver of the economy last year, with net trade contributing 3.5 percentage points of overall growth. Meanwhile, domestic demand suffered greatly as a result both of the political turmoil after the September 2006 military coup, and of the ensuing mismanagement of the economy by the military-appointed interim government. Private consumption is estimated to have edged up by only 1.4% year on year in 2007, compared with rates of 3.2% and 4.5% in the two preceding years. Gross fixed investment rose by just 0.9% (driven primarily by public investment in equipment), down from rates of 3.8% in 2006 and 10.6% in 2005.

The article refers to factors which “raise concerns over the likely competence of the new government”, including Samak having “to accommodate the demands of smaller parties in his six-party coalition government” and the new cabinet containing “a large number of inexperienced policymakers”. The article also indicates that:

Despite this, the new administration should still prove to be more effective than the military- appointed interim government that preceded it. Rather than minimising the negative impact of the political crisis on the economy, the interim government’s policies did much to undermine confidence. Talk of pursuing vague “sufficiency” principles created a great deal of anxiety amongst foreign investors, fearful that Thailand was taking an inward turn. But this was nothing compared to the alarm that plans to tighten controls over foreign ownership of Thai firms by amending the Foreign Business Act (FBA) caused foreign businesses.

The interim government failed to push through its planned amendments to the FBA during its term in office. The likelihood is that the new government will shelve such plans or at least try to limit the potential damage to foreign investors, not only because it will be keen to avoid a backlash from foreign businesses, but also because it does not share the same agenda as the outgoing interim government. The military-backed government was determined to be seen to be taking action on this matter, partly because the controversial sale of the Shinawatra family’s shares in Shin Corp, a conglomerate, to Singaporean investors had helped to spark the coup (‘Thailand economy: Policy challenges’ 2008, Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, 12 February – Attachment 4).

A Reuters News article dated 29 January 2008 notes that “[a]s growth is slowing, inflation is picking up” in Thailand. “Stoked by high oil prices and food costs, annual inflation in December rose to one year high.” It is stated in the article that:

The Bank of Thailand, which revised its 2008 inflation forecast to 2.8-4.0 percent last week from 1.5-2.8 percent due to high oil costs, insists inflation is manageable.

But it doesn’t look that way on the streets of Bangkok, where consumer confidence is at a five-year low and people are feeling the pinch of rising production costs.

The article refers to the comments of a Bangkok store clerk, who “is paying more for food and transport, but she doesn’t expect a pay rise this year because the economy is sluggish” (Sriring, Orathai 2008, ‘Fix the economy, crisis weary Thais tell new govt’, Reuters News, 29 January – Attachment 7).

Another article in the Bangkok Post dated 5 February 2008 indicates that “Supachai Panitchpakdi, head of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad)” had said that “[t]he past 16 months, during which Thailand has been governed by a coup- installed administration, has resulted in a more balanced economy”. According to the article:

The country’s economy has not totally lost out under the administration as it helped slow down the imbalance in the economy, including a stream of bilateral agreements, said Mr Supachai.

The economic adjustment helped reduce public burdens which had been driven by the Thaksin Shinawatra government’s populist policies and views on bilateral trade agreements.

The coup-installed government has tried to work for the fairness of several issues, added Mr Supachai (Ashayagacha, Achara 2008, ‘Supachai: Past 16 months a blessing in disguise for Thai economy’, Bangkok Post, 5 February – Attachment 8).

A Reuters News article dated 29 February 2008 provides a chronology of key economic policy steps taken in Thailand since the coup in 2006 (‘CHRONOLOGY – Thailand’s post- coup economic policy steps’ 2008, Reuters News, 29 February – Attachment 9).

3. Is there any information about the operation of loan sharks in Thailand, including how they are organised and whether their focus of operation is localised or broader throughout Thailand?

An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 29 January 2008 provides information on loan sharks in Thailand. It is stated in the response to information request that:

According to a Thai magazine, the practice of loan-sharking [the practice of lending money at exorbitant rates of ] is widespread in Thailand and interest rates can vary between 36 to 60 percent a year (Citylife May 2005). Following a nation-wide survey entitled the Chamber Business Poll, The Nation reports that household debt in Thailand hit an all-time record high of 31 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in August 2007, and that 32 percent of people were using loan sharks, indicating an increase from 26 percent in the previous year (24 Aug. 2007). Another survey conducted in Bangkok in October 2007 by the Kasikorn Research Center reveals that 21.1 percent of households with monthly incomes lower than 15,000 Thai baht (THB) [1 THB = $0.03 Canadian dollars (Canada 2 Nov. 2007)] owe money to loan sharks (The Nation 3 Nov. 2007). Loan-sharking is illegal in Thailand (ibid. 8 Dec. 2007; ibid. 16 Feb. 2006; Citylife May 2005; thaisnews.com 30 Sept. 2005). An article from the Thai magazine Citylife indicates that, even though loan sharking is illegal, “no one cares” as many people make use of it, and that it is such a widespread practice that it has become ingrained in Thai society (May 2005).

An article in The Nation describes tactics used by loan sharks (The Nation 8 Dec. 2007). Sometimes loan sharks operate through shops, which sell for example gold and electrical appliances (ibid.). Customers buy products on credit cards and then obtain money instead of the product, minus an agent’s fee which goes to the shop; the borrower must then pay the credit card invoice for the whole amount (ibid.) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008, THA102734.E - Thailand: Nature and extent of loan sharking; protection available for victims of loan sharks, 29 January http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451691 – Accessed 5 March 2008 – Attachment 10).

4. Are there any reports on the consequences for people who default on their borrowings from loan sharks in Thailand?

An article dated 8 February 2008 indicates that loan sharks in Thailand “were aggressive with debtors”. The article, which refers to ministers in the Samak Cabinet announcing policies on “their first day in office on February 7”, notes that “PM’s Office Minister Choosak Sirinin said he would be in charge of legal issues as well as the Office of the Consumer Protection Board. The job was particularly interesting because loan sharks demanded high interest rates and were aggressive with debtors as if the country were lawless” (‘Thailand: New government to revive Thaksin-era populist policies’ 2008, Thai News Service, 8 February – Attachment 11).

The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 29 January 2008 refers to “[a]n article published in November 2007 in The Nation” which reported “on a case where a woman was shot at by a who was trying to collect money owed to him by her husband; the woman had received threats from the loan shark a few days prior (30 Nov. 2007).” The response to information request also indicates that:

In an article on loan sharks, the Thai magazine Citylife interviewed several lenders on their business practices (May 2005). One lender is reported to have “friends in the police force who have visited borrowers reluctant to pay back a loan” (Citylife May 2005).

The Bangkok Post reports that the Centre for Protection of Consumer Rights, a private group consisting of 4,700 members who are in trouble with , has lodged a complaint against creditors with the Crime Suppression Division (CSD) claiming that creditors are using “heavy-handed tactics” to get debtors to repay their (27 Aug. 2007). The article adds that creditors threaten debtors with criminal charges, even though defaulting on a loan is not a criminal offence, and that some debtors feel they have no choice other than to take out loans with loan sharks in order to pay their credit card debts (Bangkok Post 27 Aug. 2007). Corroborating information on the complaint lodged by the Centre for Protection of Consumer Rights could not be found among sources consulted by the Research Directorate (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008, THA102734.E - Thailand: Nature and extent of loan sharking; protection available for victims of loan sharks, 29 January http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451691 – Accessed 5 March 2008 – Attachment 10).

An article in the Bangkok Post dated 19 March 2007 indicates that “[p]eople wilting under the burden of credit card debt” in Thailand had set up a “club, supported by the Foundation for Consumers… to allow debtors to share their problems and jointly find legal protection from creditors and from loan sharks who use violence to force people to repay debts” (Bunnag, Sirikul 2007, ‘CREDIT CARDS; Debtors gang up to fight unfair charges’, Bangkok Post, 19 March – Attachment 12).

An article in The Nation dated 3 February 2006 indicates that “AMLO [Anti-Money Laundering Office] officers, police and other related agencies” had “joined forces to tackle the problem of loan sharks” in Thailand. It is stated in the article that:

They are particularly targeting “dark influential figures” who charge exorbitant interest rates and use intimidatory debt-collecting methods. [AMLO deputy secretary-general] Apichart [Thanomsap] said there had been some instances in which they had managed to seize the assets of loan sharks with powers already available to them.

There have been cases of fraud, in which debtors have been lured into signing blank loan contracts and some cases of criminal , such as in the “Bo Bae Mafia” case, where a gang charged huge interest rates and then seized a debtor’s shop.

Both of these are fundamental offences upon which the AMLO can act (‘AMLO sets its sights on the assets of loan sharks’ 2006, The Nation, 3 February – Attachment 13).

Another article in the Bangkok Post dated 31 October 2005 refers to debtors to loan sharks “who were unable to keep up with repayments” being “subjected to physical assaults by loan sharks and their men.” It is stated in the article that:

Pol Maj-Gen Peeraphan [secretary-general of the Anti-Money Laundering Office (Amlo)] said the government was concerned that an increasing number of people were turning to loan sharks because they were not given access to banks and other legitimate financial institutes.

Worse still, debtors who were unable to keep up with repayments had been subjected to physical assaults by loan sharks and their men.

“Loan sharking is an illegal business because they charge debtors more than 18% interest a year.” The government had tried to crack down on these businesses, but problems remained.

Amlo investigators also found that another group of loan sharks had made low-income debtors sign loan contracts that increased the real amount of the loan that they were to receive eight-fold.

Most of the debtors felt compelled to sign because they needed the money. Those who were unable to repay debts faced lawsuits leading to deduction of salaries or confiscation of their remaining assets for auctioning.

There are hundreds of such cases in the civil court and most loan shark victims were state enterprise officials, the Amlo secretary-general said.

Amlo was working with debtors, the Law Society of Thailand and the Office of the Attorney- General to tell judges of this unscrupulous practice (Charoenpo, Anucha 2005, ‘Amlo seeks help for poor debtors; Loan sharks, victims urged to negotiate’, Bangkok Post, 31 October – Attachment 14).

5. Is there any evidence that the activities of loan sharks are supported by corrupt police in Thailand? 6. Would a victim of loan sharks’ criminal activity be denied redress from the police or authorities?

As previously mentioned, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 29 January 2008 indicates that “[i]n an article on loan sharks, the Thai magazine Citylife interviewed several lenders on their business practices (May 2005). One lender is reported to have “friends in the police force who have visited borrowers reluctant to pay back a loan” (Citylife May 2005).”

The response to information request also provides the following information on the protection available for the victims of loan sharks in Thailand:

In January 2006, The Nation reported that then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra initiated a new program to eradicate poverty, including the implementation of a fund of three to four billion bahts to “take care of the loan-shark problem” (21 Jan. 2006). In May 2007, the Finance Ministry announced an “economic stimulus package” which would help low-income borrowers obtain loans from banks and prevent them from resorting to loan sharks (The Nation 3 May 2007); however, additional or corroborating information on these programs could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

In December 2007, the Bank of Thailand and four state agencies launched a crackdown on illegal loan providers and anyone collaborating with them (The Nation 8 Dec. 2007). People putting up posters or handing out pamphlets advertising illegal loans could be subject to a maximum fine of 2,000 THB, and those placing advertisements in newspapers could be subject to a maximum sentence of three months' imprisonment and a 30,000 THB fine while newspapers could be fined half of this amount for indirectly supporting illegal loans (ibid.). Operators of stores providing illegal loans could be subject to a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 THB (ibid.). According to The Nation, 32 illegal loan providers had already been arrested, and people involved with 31 of these 32 illegal loan providers had been sentenced (ibid.).

According to two media sources, new legislation (The Nation 16 Feb. 2006) or a new plan (thaisnews.com 30 Sept. 2005) has been proposed that would allow the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) to seize the assets of lenders who charge illegal interest rates (i.e., over the limit set by the Bank of Thailand) (ibid.; The Nation 16 Feb. 2006). Additional and more recent information on this proposed legislation or plan could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008, THA102734.E - Thailand: Nature and extent of loan sharking; protection available for victims of loan sharks, 29 January http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451691 – Accessed 5 March 2008 – Attachment 10).

A Reuters News article dated 18 February 2008 indicates that “Thailand’s new government set out its economic priorities on Monday… as it revived the populist policies of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.” Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej’s promises include replacing “loan sharks with a state-owned “Peoples’ Bank”” (Wong-Anan, Nopporn 2008, ‘New Thai govt revives populist economic policies’, Reuters News, 18 February – Attachment 15).

Although not specifically referring to whether the activities of loan sharks are supported by corrupt police, other articles indicate that police corruption is widespread in Thailand. An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 18 December 2007 refers to an article in the Bangkok Post that indicates “that many police officers accept bribes, resort to extortion and work for “gangsters” as their salaries are insufficient to support their families (5 July 2007).” It is stated in the response to information request that:

The South China Morning Post reports that “police corruption remains a problem in Thailand” (6 Jan. 2007) while Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 describes police corruption as “widespread” (US 6 Mar. 2007, Sec. 1.d) and two human rights organizations state the Thai police is “highly corrupt” (ALRC Mar. 2005, Para. 13) or “thoroughly corrupt” (AHRC 14 Dec. 2006). Similarly, the Bangkok Post states that police corruption is one of the “fundamental problems” with regard to the Thai police (14 Dec. 2006) while The Nation describes the national police force as “corruption-prone” (19 Nov. 2006). According to The Nation, a Bangkok-based independent newspaper, law enforcement is perceived as one of the most corrupt government entities in Thailand (10 July 2007). Transparency International's (TI) Global Corruption Barometer 2007, a survey assessing the public’s perceptions and experience of corruption in 60 countries, states that, for Thailand, the police received a rating of four out of five, where one represents “not at all corrupt” and five represents “extremely corrupt” (6 Dec. 2007, 22).

Freedom House reports that many authorities, including police officers, are involved in human trafficking or will ignore the problem on payment of bribes (2007). Similarly, Country Reports 2006 states that police were “involved in trafficking directly or took bribes to ignore it” (US 6 Mar. 2007, Sec. 5). The Bangkok Post indicates that “forced disappearances, torture and extortion have become the main tools used by the police to extract confessions and distort justice in favour of those who pay” and that many police officers accept bribes, resort to extortion and work for “gangsters” as their salaries are insufficient to support their families (5 July 2007). Similarly, The Nation indicates that many police officers engage in corrupt practices to supplement their income such as taking bribes to “turn a blind eye to petty crime” and that other police officers are sometimes hired by politicians to “intimidate rivals or bribe them to avoid court action over illegal activities” (19 Nov. 2006). The Nation expresses the opinion that even though part of the problem is the low salaries of police officers, police corruption is rooted in the patronage system which is entrenched in society and therefore, increasing police officers' wages would not solve the problem (19 Nov. 2006). Media sources indicate that politicians have a history of using the police force to advance their political (ibid. 10 July 2007; Bangkok Post 5 July 2007).

The response to information request also includes information on efforts taken by the government to curb police corruption (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, THA102694.E - Thailand: Police corruption particularly in the state of Udon Than, 18 December http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451644 – Accessed 5 March 2008 – Attachment 16).

The Freedom House 2007 report on Thailand indicates that “[a]necdotal evidence suggests that official corruption is widespread, including bureaucrats demanding bribes in exchange for routine services and law enforcement officials being paid to ignore trafficking and other illicit activities” (Freedom House 2007, Freedom in the World: Thailand (2007) – Attachment 2).

The Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads report on Thailand for 2007 also notes that:

Both the military and the police enjoy close relationships with a range of actors engaged in legal and illegal business activities. The Asian Human Rights Commission has claimed that making complaints against the police is virtually impossible: they cite the case of a Saraburi man trying to pursue serious charges of extortion, illegal detention, and other offenses against a group of police officers. Although he complained to more than nine different institutions and agencies, he was unable to obtain any redress (Freedom House 2007, Countries at the Crossroads 2007: Country Report – Thailand http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=8&ccr page=37&ccrcountry=171 – Accessed 4 March 2008 – Attachment 17).

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Thailand for 2006 refers to widespread corruption among Thai police officers. It is stated in the report that:

Corruption remained widespread among police officers. Police officials suggested that low pay made them susceptible to bribes. There were reports that police tortured, beat, and otherwise abused detainees and prisoners, generally with impunity. Complaints of police abuse can be filed directly with the superior of the accused police officer, the Office of Inspector General, or the police commissioner-general. The NHRC, the Law Society of Thailand, the NCCC, and the Office of the Prime Minister also accept complaints of police abuse and corruption, as does the Office of the Ombudsmen. When the police department receives a petition, an internal investigation committee first takes up the matter and may temporarily suspend the officer during the investigation. Various administrative penalties exist, and serious cases can be referred to the criminal court. The Police Department reported that as of August, 255 officers were charged with criminal offenses during the year. Of these 97 were charged with murder or attempted murder. Through August the NHRC received 68 complaints of police abuse compared to 132 such complaints in 2005.

Some police officers were involved in facilitating prostitution and trafficking in women and children (see section 5). On August 25, a police lieutenant colonel from Doi Luang police station in Chiang Rai was arrested and charged with trafficking nine Burmese laborers.

The section on trafficking in persons in the report indicates that “[o]fficials found complicit in any part of the illegal economy rarely were prosecuted but instead were moved to positions thought to limit opportunities for future corruption.” According to the report:

Official corruption facilitating the most severe forms of trafficking in persons was generally at the low- and mid-levels. Police personnel were poorly paid and were accustomed to taking bribes to supplement their income. There was no evidence that high-level officials benefited from or protected the practice. Compromised local police protected brothels and other sex venues, as well as factories, from surprise raids. Officials found complicit in any part of the illegal economy rarely were prosecuted but instead were moved to positions thought to limit opportunities for future corruption.

The report also indicates that “[d]uring the year there were newspaper reports of numerous cases in which citizens accused police of using brutality, threatening false charges, and extorting bribes. Investigations were undertaken in most of the cases, including several in which the accused police officers were suspended pending the results of internal investigations” (US Department of State 2007, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Thailand, March, Sections 1(c) & (d) & 5 – Attachment 1).

The RRT research response dated 30 May 2007 (RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response THA31785, 30 May (Question 14) – Attachment 3), and a RRT research response dated 3 November 2006 (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response THA30895, 3 November – Attachment 18), include information on police corruption in Thailand.

7. Would a rape victim be able to seek and gain redress for the crime from the authorities in Thailand?

An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 20 December 2007 indicates that “in June 2007, the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand passed a law criminalizing marital rape” and broadening the definition of rape “from a very limited definition to include other forms of forced sex”. It is stated in the response to information request that:

Country Reports 2006 indicates that Thailand does not have specific laws addressing domestic violence nor provisions for prosecuting spousal rape (US 6 Mar. 2007, Sec. 5). However, in June 2007, the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand passed a law criminalizing marital rape (Feminist Majority Foundation 25 June 2007; BBC 21 June 2007). The new law also protects male, homosexual and transgendered victims (Bangkok Post 6 Sept. 2007). The definition of rape has been broadened from a very limited definition to include other forms of forced sex (ibid.). Those found guilty of rape may receive sentences of up to 20 years in prison and a 40,000 baht fine [1.00 Thai baht = 0.03 Canadian dollars (Canada 28 Nov. 2007)] (BBC 21 June 2007).

Also, on 12 November 2007 the Domestic Violence Victim Protection Act came into effect (The Nation 13 Oct. 2007; Bangkok Post 12 Nov. 2007). Under the new law, victims and witnesses of domestic violence have a legal obligation to report it to police (ibid.). The police then have an obligation to pass the case to a prosecutor who, if the victim agrees to press charges, has 48 hours, after arresting the accused, to decide whether or not to take the case to court (ibid.). If convicted, abusers face jail sentences of up to six months and/or a fine of up to 5,000 Thai baht (ibid.), or 6,000 baht (Thai News Service 14 Sept. 2007).

The response to information request also indicates that “[a]lthough the Domestic Violence law requires police to act to protect victims, several people were cited in an article by the Thai News Service as saying that police attitudes would have to change for the act to be effective (14 Sept. 2007). Chatchawal Suksomjit, deputy chief of the Legal and Litigation Office of the Royal Thai Police, was quoted as saying “[t]he attitudes of police, and their heavy workload, have traditionally discouraged them from following up complaints related to domestic violence. They tend to regard them as personal matters and do not take complaints seriously” (Thai News Service 14 Sept. 2007)” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, THA102669.E - Thailand: Domestic violence; state protection and resources available to victims of domestic abuse, 20 December http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451641 – Accessed 5 March 2008 – Attachment 19).

An Associated Press Newswires article dated 22 June 2007 also notes that “[a]ctivists said it will still be difficult for women to report rape cases despite the new law” on rape in Thailand. ““The attitudes of the police, prosecutors and doctors are very important in facilitating the process and making it easier for women to report rape cases,” Usa [Lertsrtsanthad of the Foundation for Women] said. “A lot of women still choose to remain silent because they are threatened by the legal process and what may happen to them before the rapists are brought to justice”” (‘Thai Law Expands Definition of Rape’ 2007, Associated Press Newswires, 22 June – Attachment 20).

The Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads report on Thailand for 2007 notes that “[a] number of constitutional provisions support gender equality, but changes in both legislation and practice are needed in relation to issues such as rape and domestic violence, which are often not taken seriously or handled sensitively by the police” (Freedom House 2007, Countries at the Crossroads 2007: Country Report – Thailand http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=8&cc rpage=37&ccrcountry=171 – Accessed 4 March 2008 – Attachment 17).

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Thailand for 2006 indicates that “[r]ape is illegal” in Thailand and that “[t]hrough November the police reported 5,060 rape cases nationwide, including five cases where the victim was killed. Suspects were arrested in 2,047 of these cases, including four of the cases resulting in the victim’s death. There were 4,693 reported rapes in 2005.” The report also indicates that “[a]ccording to academics and women’s rights activists, rapes and domestic assaults were underreported, in part because law enforcement agencies were perceived to be incapable of bringing perpetrators to justice. Police sought to change this perception and encouraged women to report sexual crimes through the use of female police officers in metropolitan Bangkok and in three other provinces.” It is further stated in the report that:

The law specifies a range of penalties for rape or forcible sexual assault, depending on the age of the victim, the degree of assault, and the physical and mental condition of the victim after the assault. The minimum penalty is from four to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of $200 to $1,000 (8,000 to 40,000 baht). If firearms or explosives are used, or if it is a gang rape, the penalty increases to 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of $750 to $1,000 (30,000 to 40,000 baht). Life imprisonment or execution is possible for cases in which the victim is injured or killed. A sentence of four to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from $200 to $1,000 (8,000 to 40,000 baht) is imposed for statutory rape of a child less than 15 years of age. If the victim is less than 13, the jail term ranges from seven years’ to life imprisonment. The law also provides that any individual convicted for a second time for the same criminal offense within two years is liable to increased penalties for recidivism. Victims of sexual abuse were eligible to receive state financial aid of up to $750 (30,000 baht) (US Department of State 2007, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Thailand, March, Section 5 – Attachment 1).

An article in the Bangkok Post dated 18 March 2006 refers to the comments of “a member of the Office of National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRC), Naiyana Supapeung,” at “a seminar entitled “Women and Sexual Violence”” held by the National Council of Women of Thailand. According to the article:

Naiyana criticised the legal procedures in Thailand as being unfriendly to rape victims to the point where they violate their human rights. Since most of the victims are afraid to report the crime, the country’s justice system doesn’t provide a safe place for them to take legal action. Naiyana likened the humiliating questioning process at the police station to being raped a second time. She concluded that Thailand needs to develop legal procedures that are more respectful and fair toward victims of sex crimes (Amranand, Amitha 2006, ‘COPING WITH RAPE; Thai society has yet to come to terms with this brutal fact of life’, Bangkok Post, 18 March – Attachment 21).

8. Please provide information on the attitude towards and treatment of rape victims in Thailand by their family and the community.

The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 20 December 2007, in a section on social attitudes towards domestic violence in Thailand, indicates that “Assistant Professor Somchai Preechasinlapakun, dean of the Faculty of Law at Chiang Mai University who has researched the verdicts of Thailand’s Supreme Court on cases of rape and domestic violence, expressed his opinion that there is a “gender bias” in the judgements handed down by the courts.” According to the response to information request:

Commenting in the Bangkok Post, Assistant Professor Somchai Preechasinlapakun, dean of the Faculty of Law at Chiang Mai University who has researched the verdicts of Thailand’s Supreme Court on cases of rape and domestic violence, expressed his opinion that there is a “gender bias” in the judgements handed down by the courts (Bangkok Post 6 Sept. 2007). He provided examples of cases that demonstrated his point, including cases where men who raped former lovers were acquitted and a case where a woman who killed her abusive husband was convicted (ibid.).

The Social Development and Human Security Ministry was quoted in an article in the Bangkok Post as saying that there were 14,000 documented cases of domestic abuse in 2006 (12 Nov. 2007). The previously mentioned WHO study found that 37 percent of “physically abused” women in Bangkok and 46 percent in Nakhonsawan had never spoken to anyone about the physical violence they suffered from a partner (WHO 2005). In addition, of the women who were physically abused by their partners, only 20 percent in Bangkok and 10 percent in Nakhonsawan ever sought help from formal services (health, police, religious or local leaders, etc.) (ibid.) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, THA102669.E - Thailand: Domestic violence; state protection and resources available to victims of domestic abuse, 20 December http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451641 – Accessed 5 March 2008 – Attachment 19).

The article in the Bangkok Post dated 18 March 2006 refers to “Kom Chud Leuk’s international news editor, Boonyarat Apichatkraisorn” speaking at “a seminar entitled “Women and Sexual Violence”” held by the National Council of Women of Thailand, and mentioning “instances where rape victims themselves, not the perpetrators, were the ones persecuted by their own communities or families”. It is stated in the article that:

Thai society holds many misconceptions about sexual violence and Kom Chud Leuk’s Boonyarat Apichatkraisorn holds the media partly responsible for the mistreatment of sexual assault victims. She gave an example of a news headline that condemned a female teacher accused of raping her male student. The headline criticised women as being hypocritical for always complaining about being raped by men. Boonyarat said that news stories regarding rape cases often pander to men.

According to Boonyarat, rape stories are written about in newspapers on a daily basis, yet the root causes of these problems are still misunderstood by the consumers of the media. To many people, rape only happens to a certain kind of woman, of a certain age, of a certain appearance, in a certain kind of place and is committed only by strangers, when in reality, it can happen to a person of any age or sex, even at home with their own family members.

She spoke of rape cases where live witnesses did nothing to stop the crime; or the time when a judge dismissed the case of a woman who happened to be wearing jeans when she got raped on the grounds that it had to be consensual sex since she wasn’t wearing anything “sexually tempting”; or instances where rape victims themselves, not the perpetrators, were the ones persecuted by their own communities or families (Amranand, Amitha 2006, ‘COPING WITH RAPE; Thai society has yet to come to terms with this brutal fact of life’, Bangkok Post, 18 March – Attachment 21).

9. Please provide information on state protection for women in Thailand.

As previously mentioned, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 20 December 2007 indicates that “in June 2007, the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand passed a law criminalizing marital rape” and broadening the definition of rape “from a very limited definition to include other forms of forced sex”. The Domestic Violence Victim Protection Act also came into effect on 12 November 2007. The response to information request also indicates that “[a]lthough the Domestic Violence law requires police to act to protect victims, several people were cited in an article by the Thai News Service as saying that police attitudes would have to change for the act to be effective (14 Sept. 2007)” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, THA102669.E - Thailand: Domestic violence; state protection and resources available to victims of domestic abuse, 20 December http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451641 – Accessed 5 March 2008 – Attachment 19).

The Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads report on Thailand for 2007 provides the following information on the situation of women in Thailand:

Under the 1997 constitution, the state was committed to promoting equal rights between men and women (Article 80) and to supporting individuals with disabilities and underprivileged people. Thailand has a very high level of female participation in the labor force—65 percent—but in 2005 around 10 percent of MPs and senators were female, and only 2 out of 36 cabinet ministers... In the Surayudh government, only one ministry was headed by a woman... While around two-thirds of civil servants are female, only 20.2 percent of those in the top three civil service grades (nine, ten, and eleven) were women, and only 9.7 percent in the top grade (eleven)... Some women are now serving as ambassadors (nineteen percent),… but the important positions of provincial governor (1.4 percent) and district officer (0.3 percent) remain overwhelmingly dominated by men... Only ten of the 100 members of the new constitution-drafting assembly were women.

A number of constitutional provisions support gender equality, but changes in both legislation and practice are needed in relation to issues such as rape and domestic violence, which are often not taken seriously or handled sensitively by the police. According to a labor ministry survey, women are paid around 17 percent less than men—a figure that compares favorably with those in many developed countries. Despite legislation forbidding trafficking in people, Thailand is a major nexus for human trafficking, notably from Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, and to a lesser extent, Vietnam. Much of this trafficking involves placing women and children in the lucrative Thai sex industry, though some of those trafficked are employed in sweatshops, agriculture, construction, and fisheries. The state has made some efforts to tackle the problem by prosecuting offenders and protecting some victims, but there have been no recent prosecutions of police officers or other government officials, some of whom are believed to be implicated in the trade (Freedom House 2007, Countries at the Crossroads 2007: Country Report – Thailand http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=8&ccr page=37&ccrcountry=171 – Accessed 4 March 2008 – Attachment 17).

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Thailand for 2006 notes that “[p]rior to the September 19 coup d’etat, the constitution provided for equal treatment without respect to race, gender, religion, disability, language, or social status; however, in practice, some discrimination existed, and government enforcement of equal protection statutes was uneven. Following the September 19 coup d’etat, specific laws pertaining to the provision of equal treatment without respect to race, gender, religion, disability, language, or social status were unaffected and there were no credible reports of increased discrimination based on these factors. The interim constitution contained provisions that provided for basic human rights, although equal rights and protections against societal abuses were not specifically addressed.”

In relation to the situation for women, the report indicates that “[d]omestic violence against women was a significant problem” that “often went unreported, and the police often were reluctant to pursue reports of domestic violence. Reliable statistics on rates of domestic violence were difficult to obtain, but in November 2005 the public health minister noted that the number of reported cases of abuse had increased from five per day in 2002 to 28 per day in 2005. Approximately half of these cases involved sexual abuse. It was unclear whether the increase reflected an increase in violence or an increased public awareness of the problem and an increased willingness on the part of battered women to report it to authorities. Also in November 2005 the World Health Organization released findings of a study that showed 41 percent of women in Bangkok and 47 percent of women in rural areas had experienced physical or sexual abuse by an intimate partner. NGO supported programs included emergency hot lines, temporary shelters, counseling services, and a television program to increase awareness of domestic violence, HIV/AIDS, and other issues involving women. The government’s “one-stop” crisis centers, located in state-run hospitals, continued to care for abused women and children but faced budget difficulties.”

The report also indicates that “[r]ape is illegal” in Thailand and that “[a]ccording to academics and women’s rights activists, rapes and domestic assaults were underreported, in part because law enforcement agencies were perceived to be incapable of bringing perpetrators to justice. Police sought to change this perception and encouraged women to report sexual crimes through the use of female police officers in metropolitan Bangkok and in three other provinces. The law specifies a range of penalties for rape or forcible sexual assault, depending on the age of the victim, the degree of assault, and the physical and mental condition of the victim after the assault… Victims of sexual abuse were eligible to receive state financial aid of up to $750 (30,000 baht).”

It is also stated in the report that:

Prostitution is illegal, although it is practiced openly throughout the country. Local officials with commercial interest often protected prostitution (see sections 1.d. and 5, Trafficking). Trafficking in women and children for prostitution was a serious problem (see section 5, Trafficking)… NGOs and government agencies provided shelter, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for children and women involved in the sex industry.

…The law makes sexual harassment illegal but covers only persons working in the formal sector. NGOs claimed that the legal definition of harassment was vague and prosecution of harassment claims difficult. Between July 2005 and August 2006, the civil service commission’s sexual harassment and bullying hot line recorded approximately 250 cases. All complaints were investigated, but prosecution or disciplinary action was rarely sought because most callers only wanted to seek consultations. Some complaints may have been settled out of court.

The law provides for the equality of all citizens; however, some inequalities in the law remained. For example, a man may sue for divorce on the grounds that his wife committed adultery, but a woman faces the additional legal burden of proving that her husband publicly has acknowledged another woman as his wife.

…The National Human Rights Commission Act specifies that at least one-third of the members of the NHRC be women; during the year, five of the 11 commissioners were women. The Women and Constitution Network, a league of more than 50 women’s organizations, advocated legal reforms to address inequities in the treatment of women (US Department of State 2007, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Thailand, March, Section 5 – Attachment 1).

The concluding comments on Thailand by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in a report dated 3 February 2006 refers to both positive aspects and areas of concern in relation to the treatment of women in Thailand. The Committee continued “to be concerned about the prevalence of violence against women and girls” and expressed “concern at the persistence of strong stereotypical attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and in society. Such stereotypes undermine women’s social status, present a significant impediment to the implementation of the Convention and are a root cause of the disadvantaged position of women in a number of areas, including in the labour market and in political and public life.” The Committee’s recommendations included “gender-sensitivity training for law enforcement personnel, the judiciary, health service providers and teachers to ensure that they are sensitized to all forms of violence against women and can respond adequately to it. The Committee also calls on the State party to take measures towards modifying those social, cultural and traditional attitudes that are permissive of violence against women” (UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2006, ‘Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Thailand’, UNHCR website, CEDAW/C/THA/CO/5, 3 February, Paragraphs 23-25 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.pdf?tbl=RSDCOI&id=441183460 – Accessed 21 December 2006 – Attachment 22). List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Government Information & Reports Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/ US Department of State http://www.state.gov/ United Nations (UN) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refworld website http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain United Nations website http://www.un.org/ Non-Government Organisations Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/ Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org Freedom House website http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 International News & Politics BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk

Region Specific Links Search Engines Copernic http://www.copernic.com/

Databases: FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIMA Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) MRT/RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. US Department of State 2007, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Thailand, March.

2. Freedom House 2007, Freedom in the World: Thailand (2007).

3. RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response THA31785, 30 May.

4. ‘Thailand economy: Policy challenges’ 2008, Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, 12 February. (FACTIVA)

5. International Crisis Group 2007, ‘Southern Thailand: The impact of the coup’, ICG website, 15 March http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand__ _the_impact_of_the_coup_web.pdf - Accessed 16 March 2007.

6. Library of Congress Federal Research Division 2007, ‘Country Profile: Thailand’, UNHCR Refworld website, July http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=country&docid=46f9135c597c&skip=&c oi=THA – Accessed 6 March 2008.

7. Sriring, Orathai 2008, ‘Fix the economy, crisis weary Thais tell new govt’, Reuters News, 29 January. (FACTIVA)

8. Ashayagacha, Achara 2008, ‘Supachai: Past 16 months a blessing in disguise for Thai economy’, Bangkok Post, 5 February. (FACTIVA)

9. ‘CHRONOLOGY – Thailand’s post-coup economic policy steps’ 2008, Reuters News, 29 February. (FACTIVA)

10. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008, THA102734.E - Thailand: Nature and extent of loan sharking; protection available for victims of loan sharks, 29 January http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451691 – Accessed 5 March 2008.

11. ‘Thailand: New government to revive Thaksin-era populist policies’ 2008, Thai News Service, 8 February. (FACTIVA)

12. Bunnag, Sirikul 2007, ‘CREDIT CARDS; Debtors gang up to fight unfair charges’, Bangkok Post, 19 March. (FACTIVA)

13. ‘AMLO sets its sights on the assets of loan sharks’ 2006, The Nation, 3 February. (FACTIVA)

14. Charoenpo, Anucha 2005, ‘Amlo seeks help for poor debtors; Loan sharks, victims urged to negotiate’, Bangkok Post, 31 October. (FACTIVA)

15. Wong-Anan, Nopporn 2008, ‘New Thai govt revives populist economic policies’, Reuters News, 18 February. (FACTIVA)

16. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, THA102694.E - Thailand: Police corruption particularly in the state of Udon Than, 18 December http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451644 – Accessed 5 March 2008.

17. Freedom House 2007, Countries at the Crossroads 2007: Country Report – Thailand http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=8&cc rpage=37&ccrcountry=171 – Accessed 4 March 2008.

18. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response THA30895, 3 November.

19. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, THA102669.E - Thailand: Domestic violence; state protection and resources available to victims of domestic abuse, 20 December http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=451641 – Accessed 5 March 2008.

20. ‘Thai Law Expands Definition of Rape’ 2007, Associated Press Newswires, 22 June. (FACTIVA)

21. Amranand, Amitha 2006, ‘COPING WITH RAPE; Thai society has yet to come to terms with this brutal fact of life’, Bangkok Post, 18 March. (FACTIVA)

22. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2006, ‘Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Thailand’, UNHCR website, CEDAW/C/THA/CO/5, 3 February http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.pdf?tbl=RSDCOI&id=441183460 – Accessed 21 December 2006.