Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 69 | Issue 2 Article 10 Spring 3-1-2012 Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation Robert Mayer Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 807 (2012), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol69/iss2/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation Robert Mayer* Abstract The specter of the loan shark is often conjured by advocates of price deregulation in the market for payday loans. If binding price caps are imposed, the argument goes, loan sharks will be spawned. This is the loan-shark thesis. This Article tests that thesis against the historical record of payday lending in the United States since the origins of the quick-cash business around the Civil War. Two different types of creditors have been derided as “loan sharks” since the epithet was first coined. One used threats of violence to collect its debts but the other did not. The former has been less common than the latter. In the United States, the violent loan sharks proliferated in the small-loan market after state usury caps were raised considerably and these loan sharks dwindled away as a source of credit for working people before interest-rate deregulation began to be adopted at the end of the 1970s.