Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: THA32946 Country: Thailand Date: 7 March 2008 Keywords: Thailand – Military Coup – Economy – Loan Sharks – Default – Police Corruption – Rape Victims – Women – State Protection This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Was there a military coup in Thailand in 2006? 2. What was the economic outcome for the Thai economy and business in general as a result of the coup? 3. Is there any information about the operation of loan sharks in Thailand, including how they are organised and whether their focus of operation is localised or broader throughout Thailand? 4. Are there any reports on the consequences for people who default on their borrowings from loan sharks in Thailand? 5. Is there any evidence that the activities of loan sharks are supported by corrupt police in Thailand? 6. Would a victim of loan sharks’ criminal activity be denied redress from the police or authorities? 7. Would a rape victim be able to seek and gain redress for the crime from the authorities in Thailand? 8. Please provide information on the attitude towards and treatment of rape victims in Thailand by their family and the community. 9. Please provide information on state protection for women in Thailand. RESPONSE 1. Was there a military coup in Thailand in 2006? The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Thailand for 2006 indicates that “[o]n September 19, in a bloodless coup d’etat, military coup leaders overthrew the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which had won reelection in February 2005 in an election viewed as generally free and fair but marred by widespread vote buying. The coup leaders repealed the constitution, abolished parliament, declared martial law, and issued several decrees limiting civil liberties. On October 1, the military coup leaders, taking the name the Council for National Security (CNS), promulgated an interim constitution and established an interim government” (US Department of State 2007, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Thailand, March, Introduction – Attachment 1). The Freedom House 2007 report on Thailand (Freedom House 2007, Freedom in the World: Thailand (2007) – Attachment 2), and a RRT research response dated 30 May 2007 (RRT Country Research 2007, Research Response THA31785, 30 May, (Questions 1-7) – Attachment 3), also provide information on the coup. An Economist Intelligence Unit country briefing on Thailand dated 12 February 2008 indicates that “[a]lmost a year and a half after the September 2006 coup, Thailand has a democratically elected government once more”, with the election of “[t]he new government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej, whose People Power Party (PPP) swept the December 23rd general election” (‘Thailand economy: Policy challenges’ 2008, Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, 12 February – Attachment 4). 2. What was the economic outcome for the Thai economy and business in general as a result of the coup? The Freedom House 2007 report on Thailand indicates that “[t]he September coup brought a shift in the country’s economic policy from Thaksin’s emphasis on economic expansion at all costs to a self-sufficiency model publicly advocated by [Prime Minister] Surayud [Chulanont] soon after he took office. Thaksin’s more controversial efforts toward privatization and trade liberalization were expected to be abandoned. The CNS government’s December attempt to impose capital controls to curb massive appreciation in the local currency caused Thai stocks to suffer their greatest plummet in a single day since 1980, taking a toll on the country’s credibility with international investors” (Freedom House 2007, Freedom in the World: Thailand (2007) – Attachment 2). An International Crisis Group report dated 15 March 2007 includes information on the effects of the 2006 coup in Thailand at the national level. The report indicates that the government had “come under constant criticism on the economic front”. According to the report: The government has come under constant criticism on the economic front, from the disastrous decision to impose capital controls in December 2006 and proposed amendments to the Foreign Business Act the next month, to the ongoing debate over Thaksin-style free market populism versus King Bhumibol’s philosophy of the “sufficiency economy”… Surayud attempted to reconcile the approaches and deal a blow to the former prime minister by appointing Thaksin’s chief economist, Somkid Jatusripitak, as economic spokesman. But Somkid resigned six days later amid a storm of criticism, and a week later Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Pridiyathorn Devakula likewise left… The episode also highlighted divisions within the CNS, with General Saprang supporting and General Winai opposing Somkid’s appointment (International Crisis Group 2007, ‘Southern Thailand: The impact of the coup’, ICG website, 15 March, pp. 4-5 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand___ the_impact_of_the_coup_web.pdf - Accessed 16 March 2007 – Attachment 5). A country profile of Thailand dated July 2007 by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress notes that “[t]he Bank of Thailand sought to stem the flow of foreign funds into the country in December 2006. This led within one day to the largest drop in stock prices on the Stock Exchange of Thailand since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The massive selling by foreign investors amounted more than US$708 million.” However, the country profile also indicates that “[t]he military coup that took place on September 19, 2006, has not had a serious impact on the economy. The baht and financial markets experienced brief declines but soon stabilized when investment experts speculated that the coup would help resolve a political standoff that was hurting the economy. Thailand’s bond ratings are unchanged; however, credit rating agencies have reported that they may be downgraded depending on future developments. According to investment experts, the economy is strong enough to overcome the temporary disruption caused by the coup” (Library of Congress Federal Research Division 2007, ‘Country Profile: Thailand’, UNHCR Refworld website, July, pp. 13 & 15 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=country&docid=46f9135c597c&skip=&c oi=THA – Accessed 6 March 2008 – Attachment 6). The Economist Intelligence Unit country briefing on Thailand dated 12 February 2008 indicates that “[t]he new government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej, whose People Power Party (PPP) swept the December 23rd general election”, had “made no secret of its plans to adopt the tried and tested populist policies previously pursued by Thaksin.” The article provides information on the performance of the Thai economy during 2007, including the following: The Thai economy recorded reasonably solid growth in 2007, expanding by an estimated 4.6%. Although this was slower than the 5.1% rate of growth in 2006, and well below the average of 5.8% in 2003-06, the main worry was the one-sidedness of growth. Exports were the main driver of the economy last year, with net trade contributing 3.5 percentage points of overall growth. Meanwhile, domestic demand suffered greatly as a result both of the political turmoil after the September 2006 military coup, and of the ensuing mismanagement of the economy by the military-appointed interim government. Private consumption is estimated to have edged up by only 1.4% year on year in 2007, compared with rates of 3.2% and 4.5% in the two preceding years. Gross fixed investment rose by just 0.9% (driven primarily by public investment in equipment), down from rates of 3.8% in 2006 and 10.6% in 2005. The article refers to factors which “raise concerns over the likely competence of the new government”, including Samak having “to accommodate the demands of smaller parties in his six-party coalition government” and the new cabinet containing “a large number of inexperienced policymakers”. The article also indicates that: Despite this, the new administration should still prove to be more effective than the military- appointed interim government that preceded it. Rather than minimising the negative impact of the political crisis on the economy, the interim government’s policies did much to undermine confidence. Talk of pursuing vague “sufficiency” principles created a great deal of anxiety amongst foreign investors, fearful that Thailand was taking an inward turn. But this was nothing compared to the alarm that plans to tighten controls over foreign ownership of Thai firms by amending the Foreign Business Act (FBA) caused foreign businesses. The interim government failed to push through its planned amendments to the FBA during its term in office. The likelihood is that the new government will shelve such plans or at least try to limit the potential damage to foreign investors, not only because it will be keen to avoid a backlash from foreign businesses, but also because it does not share the same agenda as the outgoing interim government. The military-backed government was determined to be seen to be taking action on this matter, partly because the controversial sale of the Shinawatra family’s shares in Shin Corp, a conglomerate, to Singaporean investors had helped to spark the coup (‘Thailand economy: Policy challenges’ 2008, Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, 12 February – Attachment 4). A Reuters News article dated 29 January 2008 notes that “[a]s growth is slowing, inflation is picking up” in Thailand.