Landfall.Pdf

LANDFALL This is a work of fiction. Draft manuscript: Copyright 2012 “A film is - or should be - more like music than like fiction. It should be a progression of moods and feelings. The theme, what’s behind the emotion, the meaning... all that comes later.” -Stanley Kubrick Introduction I am not a storyteller. My background is in journalism and when the opportunity came to write about the events surrounding the Gliese mission, I readily accepted, assuming I would would write a 10 page essay that could be used as a quick reference for college students. But what started as a 10 page essay turned into a massive research dissertation into the last 30 years of American foreign policy, black projects, and the shifting (often painful) motivations behind the choices we make as Humans. As I found myself growing closer the the people I interviewed, so too did my writing change. Narrative began to break up the stuffy academic writing and color the persons and places in a new light, one without the jaded filter of the American news media. My intent is not to confuse, but to illustrate. Much has been said and written about the Gliese mission over the past year. It is difficult to look beyond news headlines or a quote taken out of context and find a real Human being amid the chaos. I ask this: please try. None of us is perfect. Essential to the Human condition is the making of mistakes. How we choose to recover from those mistakes is what gives us character... not what Rachel Maddow says about us on MSNBC. Karsten Bjarke [email protected] Aurora “We only have a military-industrial complex until a time of danger, and then it becomes the arsenal of democracy.” -Ronald Reagan 1 In 1981, President Reagan met with a team of advisors comprised of officials from the US Air Force, Department of Defense, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the development of a replacement for the capable, but aging, Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird. At the time of its conception, the SR-71 was intended to be a high speed, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft capable of augmenting the reliable, yet slow (and therefore easily targeted), U2 spy plane. The USAF demanded a vehicle that could outrun surface to air missiles, refuel in mid-flight, and snap high quality pictures from altitudes above 50,000 feet. The contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin who promptly turned the entirety of the program over to their Advanced Development Program, Skunk Works. The aircraft was decades ahead of its time, made almost entirely of titanium (at the time, a “new” metal), with ramjets to provide power and a radical new design that drastically reduced its radar signature. At its introduction in 1966, the plane had already been performing covert test flights for two years and the awestruck American public greeted it with praise, assuming it would be the penultimate weapon against the Soviets. But as the fleet of Blackbirds aged and detente took precedent over the Cold War arms race, public opinion cooled and maintenance costs rose. Titanium in 1966 was relatively impure and forging processes had yet to be developed that could bond it into an alloy with other super- metals. As a result, the metallurgical flaws in the Blackbird were severe: as the plane expanded and contracted repeatedly with the heat of flying at Mach 3+, the titanium began to degrade with whole panels requiring replacement at considerable, unforeseen expense. Furthermore, emerging technology and diplomatic efforts during the 1970s were underway. Satellites capable of taking pictures were launched into orbit high above the earth, out of range of anti-aircraft missiles, requiring no jet fuel, and completely undetectable to the enemy. Nixon’s push towards detente and his visit to China undermined the primary conflict for which the Blackbird was built. And as if to put a nail in the coffin of the SR-71 program, by 1972, 12 of the original 32 Blackbirds had been lost in “accidents”, totaling over $1 billion in construction costs alone, not to mention research & development, maintenance, training, and general overhead. A replacement was needed that could meet and exceed the capabilities of the original aircraft. And so during Reagan’s meeting with the Air Force, it was decided that the new spy plane should be a hypersonic aircraft, capable of sustained speeds between Mach 4-6 with the ability to fly at an altitude of 200,000 feet, well out of range of antiaircraft missiles. It would have a newer, stealthier design capable of carrying a nuclear payload for a rage of up to 10,000 miles without refueling and the metallurgical processes used in casting the airframe would be rethought from the ground up to improve structural rigidity during repeated expansion and contraction. Computers would be used to help keep the aircraft aloft in a fly-by-wire system, lessening the reliance on pilots whose errors had caused the loss of several Blackbirds. And the airframe would be easily upgradeable to suit different purposes: nuclear payloads, surveillance, and even the ability to carry paratroopers. By 1982, research and development was underway on the project, chaperoned by DARPA and codenamed Copper Canyon. Initially, Copper Canyon’s aim was simply to replace the SR-71 with a faster, higher, better aircraft. But as the Space Shuttle program gained new ground in the early 1980s, cost assessments of the shuttle program provided a reason for Copper Canyon to expand its aims: at nearly $500 million per launch, the Shuttle Orbiter was hardly cost effective.1 And when Ronald Reagan gave his “Star Wars” speech in 1983, detailing his plans for a Strategic Defense Initiative that would include warfare from space, the Shuttle, with its design focused on scientific missions, satellite placement, and ferrying space station components, was not versatile enough to meet the demands of the SDI. DARPA chief Robert Cooper brought on Space Shuttle manufacturer Rockwell International for help converting the hypersonic spyplane into a spaceplane.2 1 http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/information/shuttle_faq.html 2 Unlike other high proﬁle projects like the B-2 stealth bomber, Copper Canyon was never put out for competitive bidding among the various defense contractors. The aircraft was considered, from the start, a technological stepping stone that would result in at most one or two functional prototypes before a new set of more ﬁnite requirements were drafted for a production version. As such, defense contractors like Lockheed, Boeing, and Northrup were largely unaware of the project until years into its development. But after two years of stagnation and technical difficulties on the project, Reagan decided to shake things up. In 1985, he replaced White House Chief of Staff James Baker with Treasury Secretary Donald Regan. Regan’s first duty as Chief of Staff was to protect the interests of the president in the face of flagging support on Capitol Hill, specifically on the issues of the SDI and the national security network. Meeting with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Regan pressured him to find a suitable replacement for DARPA chief Robert Cooper whose ignorance of politics had resulted in numerous appearances before congress regarding the B-2 Stealth Bomber, the development of supercomputers, and progress on the SDI. The administration had grown weary of constantly trying to mitigate Cooper’s unvarnished remarks while preserving his credibility and their support for increased defense spending in the midst of an impending economic crisis. Cooper’s replacement would need political savvy, engineering brilliance, and forthright leadership if Copper Canyon was to succeed. Weinberger selected Robert C. Duncan for the position and gave him specific instructions to retool the Copper Canyon project immediately. Duncan, an aeronautical engineer by trade, was best known for his work on the Apollo program and for the development of the collapsable Polaroid SX-70 camera. If anyone would be able to make a spacefaring spy plane, Weinberger reasoned, it was him. By mid-1985, Duncan had renamed the project Aurora and was already hard at work, pushing Rockwell to make the necessary changes to the airframe design. But with the Challenger disaster in January of 1986, Rockwell’s reliability as a manufacturer of spacecraft was immediately brought into question. With the fleet of Space Shuttles grounded for the next two years and an investigation into the cause of the accident slowing their progress, Rockwell’s focus shifted to their existing contract with NASA rather than the comparatively risky venture with DARPA. Progress on Aurora was halted on Rockwell’s end, leaving DARPA and the USAF working alone. Reeling from the Challenger disaster and knowing that the Cold War would not continue forever, Reagan pressed on with his vision of the SDI in the days that followed, deciding to merge military and civilian interests into one project: the aircraft would have to be able to carry a nuclear payload into space, deploy warheads at selected targets, and then return for a normal landing. Horizontal takeoffs would be mandatory as the Space Shuttle launches were easily seen by Soviet spy satellites and had massive radar signatures. And if the aircraft went into production, it would have civilian applications as well, both for NASA and the general public so as to ensure the program’s continued funding should the Soviet Union suddenly disintegrate. In his 1986 State of the Union, Reagan outlined these applications and his resolve to not abandon spaceflight: "[...] yes, this nation remains fully committed to America's space program. We're going forward with our shuttle flights.

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