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THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA,

AUGUST 20, 1968

A Collection of Background Materials I ", and

Samples of Congressional Statements

41,k and Speeches for Use in the Preparation of Commemorativ e Statements and

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE INVASION, August 20, 1968------1

1. Czechoslovakia Invaded by Russians and Four Other Forces; Prague Urges People Not To Resist, New York Times, August 21, 1968------2

2. Text of Prague Broadcast, New York Times, August 21, 1968------4

3. Strength of Invasion Force Estimated at Ten Divisions, New York Times, August 23, 1968 ------5

4. Chronology of the Crisis, New York Times, August 25, 1968------6

5. Said to Have Felt Dubcek Broke Vows, New York Times, August 24, 1968------7

6. Czechoslovakia's Beginnings. . . and the Roots of Crisis, Washington Post, August 22, 1968------8

II. WORLD REACTION------11

I. World Reaction: Anguish, Demonstrations, and Anger, Washington Post, August 22, 1968------12

2. Wave of Anger Sweeps World; Some Soviet Embassies Raided, New York Times, August 22, 1968------14

3. Russians, Go Home! New York Times, August 22, 1968- 16

4. Bullying from Weakness, Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 1968------17

III. THE CZECH INVASION AND THE ------18

1. Czech Delegate at UN Defends Course Followed by Reformers, New York Times, August 22, 1968------19

2. Invasion Illegal, Hajek tells U.N., New York Times, August 25, 1968------21

3. Czechs Dropping U.N. Debate Role, New York Times, August 27, 1968------23 CRS-ii

0CONT ENTS Continued T (

Page

IV. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ThK I ATr N ------24

1. A Savage Challenge to Detente, Time, August 30, 1968------25

2. Czechoslovakia Invaded, Facts on File, August 22-28, 1968------40

3. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1970 pp. 369-385------46

4. Czech Editor Tells of Events Leading to Invasion, New York Times, August 28, 1968------

5. The Whys of Soviet Invasion, Washington Post, September 15, 1968------65

V. SOVIET JUSTIFICATION OF TIE INVASION------67

1. Soviet Denies It Wol xi Sovereignty of the Czechs New York Times, September 27, 1968------68

2. Text of Pravda Article Justifying Invasion of Czechoslovakia, New York Times, September 27, 1968 70

VL. SAMPLES OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENTS ANj SPEECHES COKMEMORATING T=E INVASION------73 CRS-i

I. TIHE INVASION

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oBud/pesL Text of the Prague broadcast UNGARY PAAN A ' appears on Page 14.

o k Timj By TAD SZULC lt"I k Tinv-x AiI.2 llZ pre~.tiI!rt The New Yoi k Timoc Vt planes landed in Prague (cross). Ground forces PRGIWednesrav. c'e re ported crossing All; CzPChoslovak borders (heavy lines). 2 1 RA E ensly r-r-e --- Cc(eay -Troops of the SovicL Ur on, Poland, Ea; Germany, fur gary and Bulgaria began cross ing the -Czechoslovak fvontie early this morning while :,v( Reproduced with permission aircraft landed at the Pragu NewR eproduc York wTimes im e airport in a military mov against the liberal Comnmnis August 21, 1968 regime here. CRS-3

The Prague radio in an emei The nlewp'_pf .'id todas penry broadcast at 1:30 A.M fhat "the rngmem of tuidif Announced that Soirt irno Piavo resolutely oppises 1Is w're crossing the Czechosiova qi in h*iiracless provocalion, whicli orders and appealed to t[ iiri hrionie the pre \t for ; - Wncrins press cai in, n'pulation not to resist the ac iiIode Pr:1 5 a "iil iancv- ti:t "it is indli hitable that Thc residents of Prague cot inn is he unconcealed effo:I hear the a rcraf approactn 0i ntefrie with our internal Ruzine Airport. Telephone imev ,T'oadcast Exhorts Publc affa irs." Mr. 'estka, however, came abroad wcre immediately cu :o Remain Calm-Planes in(Ier a! ti k himself in I e The Prague radio abrupttls ver lieral we'-! ' leporr, \i h off the air shortly after 1:3 Land in the Capital in its Cruli 11 .o rerportd inii A. at it was in the iddl he had iii(I '(ltow,'n the l ito if an "appeal to the peopI 1lh,- ii:12a/ine isatd tat Ccntinued From Page 1, Col. Mr. Sve'.i 'has"' set up a SOI I of the Socmlist Republic c of internal 'tre which watched Czochoslovakia." M Duhcek's -hairmanship, pre S cr'vin'vtung i. oes into Hints of New Tension su'nahlv to discuss the new pIi lt." le- sions. The Soviet move 1h Rude Pravo Replies ca At a confidential meeting (Izlcoslovahs , -by surprise( Sa turday with five progressive A Rude Pravo's countr:at- alt thoughI all dayyesterday thrr inmbers 'of the Presidium. s1ck today included a fron- 'a:e article signed by Mr.; were indications of new wiy (7 choslovak editors were tokld extka, in effect defend ing the sions. Last evening the Presi i0. t a suessul party con- gr ss next month the conservative position. He wrote 11m of the Czechoslovak Corn wax most ur ;rnt priority in the country that uncss the Communis: munisi party met in cmergenc: in I that. therefore, their coop- narty regained its "antihurrau- Session but no communiqu c r. tion was needed. cratic" character and returned Was issued. to the aims of the workers the Internal Battle Continues new "demagogic slogans" could Al 2:45 A.M., as this dispatci nternalyl, however, the poli t turn against the party itself. .s being filed, the city ap . tug iif war between tile, In an alhision to the pr(- 'eared calm, though the ron ' ':rcs' r's and 'the conserva- 'cressives' efforts to oust con- 's continued. K aircraft and the broadcasl servaties from key johs, Mr. tde Pravo, the party's offi- ward by many, had awakened svestka wrote that democrat' organ, whose edior, Old- was not served "by making Ife he population. iich Svcstkm. is regarded as a iserabie for the honest off- The radio announcement sail: inig conservative , published Its and 'members who have the Soviet, Polish and 1Iast Gr re ii ti'tis tiday critical of discredited themselves. bW '1 1 Ir1,(11)'; began crwlOssiln, t i i Ill Poiicics.pe5' lining them away from politi- Onrdlrs at I1 o'clock last nijht at actisits'.'' ing politi-al "ensitiveness wyas IL had been estimated carhelt 1 A Sc' nd article took to an announcement by the For- kqkn a Weetvision commentator. hal 18 Soviet and 2 East Ger eign Ministry, published in Rude r Fantuick, for what it said oan divisions were massec Pravo and later distributed by, crc attempts to discredit Mi. the official press in'( July on the Czechosloval- agency, that, ' e'slka. Henry Kamm, a irders at the time of cop correspondent A third article charged that of The New York Times, "will "secrel. rorrmittee" had been !rontationat Cierna, in ea'aerr not he allowed to .return to 'dovakia, between the Pragul: ti t lck the pen- Czechoslovakia." pir's militia, a paramilitary or- md Moscow leadership. Mr. Kanim, who left Prague nanization wildly considered to The radio announcement ex- for the and a va- controlled by the conserva- ( ation Saturday, he horted the population to remnair was chargers The article referred criti-' h-" Rude Pravo with "slander- ives. alm and officials to remain ai cahly to the signing of petitions C information" and "fahrica- in Prague last week for the 'their jobs. ionns concerning its editorial aholition of the militia. Groups of people began ap. Stiff. nearing in streets after .3 A.M. Dispatches by Mr. Kann i)Ut in the center or Pragut published in The Times on Aug. 14 and 15 described a con- ilhere was still no sizht o01 tinning struggle between Mr. Soviet troops. $Sestka and the progressive Earlier Concern Expressed members of the staff. One dis' ptclh said that Yesterday Mr. Svestki. the Czechoslovah s'ho is a member of the party'.s erdriership was reported Ic Presidium, had curlled cover- hive been seriously cont Trmed dge of the vo oi earlier iis over renewed Soviet pr':- at. month by President Tito of ti'ks on the lherahi'n pio. Yugoslavia, who is a backer of ramn of Alex dcr Di) 'l<:tfihc the Dubcek faction 'fc'loSlovak party chief. Last night the party Pre. sidium met unexpectedly under CRS- 4

Text of Prague Broadcast

W'ASHINGTON-FolldXwing is tie teAt of the Prugtc radio anilouncrment of a Soviet-hloc invaSion of Czccho- slovcdkir.. To the entire people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Ysterday,. on 20 August, around 2300 [11 P.M.], troops of the , Polish People's Republic, the G.D.R. []. the Hungarian People's R-public and the Bulgarian People's Republic crossed the frontiers of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. This happened without the knowledge of the President of the Repuhlic, the Chairman of the National Assemhly, the Premier, or the Fir-t Secretary of the Czechoslovak Commu- nist party Central Committee. In the evening hours the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party Central Committe [had] held a session and discussed preparaitions for the 14th Czechoslovak Communist party congress. * The Czechoslovak Communist p"arty Ccntral Committec Presidium appeals to all citizens o'f- ur republic to maintain calm and not to offer resitance'to tc troops on the march. ,Our army, security coris and pcop!'s militia have not re- ceived the command to defend the country. The Czechoslnvak Communist patvy Central Committee Presidium regard this act as contrary not only to the funda- mental principles of relations between Socialist states but also as contrary to the principles of international law. All leading functionaries of the state, the Cotmunist party and the National front: Remain in your functions as, represnntati-es of the state, elected to the laws of the Czecho- slovak Socialist Republic. Constitutional functionaries are immediately convening a session of the National Assembly of our republic, and the Presidium is at the same time convening a plenum of the central committee to discuss the situation that has arisen. Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee.

Reproduced with permission New York Times August 21, 1968 CRS-5

Strength of Invasion Force Estimated at 10 Divisions

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AUG2 " "K Tiir N.% Yonrk Tim'-, i t)c'I - N ew Yomk Timr% moved toward Prague from An unspecified number of WASHINGTON, Aug. 22- -rc;is around Dresden, Karl Soviet troops, plus what were The invasion of Czechoslova- Marx Stadt and Plauen in described as kia was cairied out by about East Germany. "token forces" 10 divisions of Soviet troops, About two divisions of So- of Hungarian troops, moved supported by elements from viet troops, plus elements of from near Budapest to Bra- four other Warsaw Pact a Polish division, moved from tislava and Nitra in Czecho- Countries, according to relia- the Baltic states and areas slovakia. Bulgaria also moved ble information received here. around Wrochv, Katowice, "token forces" Some reports from Hungary from Prague and Cracow in Southern Po- to the Carpathians, according put Ihe total invasion force land to the Czechoslovak to these reports. at about 200,000 men. A So- cities of Prague, Brno and The bulk of the viet division is movements believed to Ziliun.- were said to have been on comprise 12,000 to 15,000 At least one Soviet division the ground by troops sta- twn. was said to have moved from tioned, or on maneuvers, The informants here gave the Carpathian Mountain re- near the Czechoslovak this picture of the invasion: bor- gion of , where it had der. Several thousand troops About seven divisions of been on maneuvers near the were airlifted into Czechoslo- Soviet troop.; and elements border, to Cierna and Kosice vakia on more than 200 of an East German division in Czechoslovakia. transport planes.

Reproduced with permission New York Times August 23, 1968 CRS-6

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS

Jan. 5-Reform-minded Alexander end to Czechoslovakia's liberaliza- Dubcck replaces Stalinist Antonin tion. Novotny as Czechoslovak Commu- Ju'y 18-Dubcek regime rejects nist party chief, signaling start of rcbulte from Warsaw Pact nations liberalization. tnd insists reforms will continue. March 5-Dubcck regime lifts cen- July 29-Czechoslovak leaders sorship. meet with Soviet Politburo at Cierna,. April 4-Oldrich Cernik, a middle- and Russians appear to give in after of-the-road economist, is named Pre- three days of talks. mier and forms new Cabinet. Aug. 3-Czechoslovak and War- saw Pact leaders sign unity; docu- April 9-P- egnim issues manifesto ment at Brnlislnva, and promising fu1er civil Soviet troops rights. lingering after the June maneuvers May 8-Party leaders of Russia, finally leave Czechoslovakia. East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Aug. 9-Yugoslav President Tito Hungrary begin talks in Moscow visits Prague in gesture of support about Czechoslovaki's democratiza- for Dubcek and receives enthusiastic. tion. Rumania stays aloof. popular welcome. May 17-Soviet Premier Aleksei Aug. lI-East German party leader Kosygin arrives in Prague for "a con- Walter Ulbricht, mainstay of Com- tinuing exchange of views." Dubcek munist orthodoxy, arrives in Czecho- Government agrees to Warsaw Pact slovakia for talks with Dubcek, re- maneuvers in Czechoslovakia, ceives cool ;- -eption. June 20-Warsaw Pact maneuvers, Aug. 15-Rumanian President Ni- involving Soviet troops and tanks, colac Ceausescu arrives to dramatize begin in Czechoslovakia. his regime's support ror Duhe K. July 9-Czechoslovakia rejects de- Aug. IG-Soviet press resumnioa at- mand from Soviet Union, Bulgaria, tacks on Czechoslovakia, charging East Germany, Hungary and Poland that "anti-socialist forces" are stir- for Warsaw Pact summit meeting. ring dangerously in the country. Aug. 20-Sovict, Bulgarian, East July 15-Five Warsaw Pact na- German, Hungarian and Polish forces tions, in a stinging letter, demand invade Czechoslovakia.

Reproduced with permission New York Times August 25, 1968 I (D

o~zo Moscow 0 Said to Have Felt Dubcek Broke Vows 0 Sa to TheNtw YoATrmtn charging the Prague leadershipithe two leaderships on July 31 vould rc move from the Prague PRAGUE, Aug. 23 - The with having breached the and Aug. 1. leadership p at least two of the Soviet intervention in Czecho ecret agreements was re-! The Eastern European liberals most cbjectionable to (D d slovakia was decided by the ceived by Alexander Dubcek sources said that at Cierna Mr. Moscow: Cestmir Cisar, a sec- Kremlin, and supported by its b Dubcek had agreed: retarv o f the Ccntral C mnw- four allies, because Moscox the First Secretary of the (To establish control of the tce, -and Frantisek Kriegel. a believed that the Dubcek re.Czechoslovak Communist partv Czechoslovak press, freed of member of the Fiesidium and gime broke six secret promises late last Monday. censorship last January. chairman of the National reportedly made at Cierna and A Czechoslovak account of OITo prevent the organzaz: on Front. Bratislava. the pre-invasion events, broad. of any political groups ousde Aside from the absence of According to highly authorita- cast yesterday by Radio Free the Communist-controlled Na official permission for non- tive Eastern European sources Czechoslovakia, one of h tioal Front. Commun ist parties to orge- here, this conclusion ref:ec:s clandestine stations supporting To take measures z, no :hing had happned in the confidential ii Soviet ver- the deposed regime, reported strengthen the militia arc oth Pr a along the lines of the Cl) sion of the events. It cannot that Mr. Dubcek had received er security forces. points. be confirmed by the deposed a letter from Mr. Brezhnev on U.To assure the protect on of The s ources said that the Czechoslovak leaders. who are Monday, but it did not give conservative Communts 0p final dec ision to intervene v:n s I imprisoned, in hiding or any details. It said that Mr posed to the liberahzat:on pro- - ade in Moscow sometime last abroad. Dubcek called his Presidium gram. .Frida. The en.suing days wcc Letter from rrezhnev anto session Tuesday afternoon Tohend the pess polemIcs devoted to final consultatioaM . because of the letter. the Soet non thin t he Warsa'. Pact Z:d The reasoning for the de- The meeting ended at 11 Ratified at Bratislava military preparations, eVen vision to intervene, according P.M. when the members re- These pOints, it was re- though the invading forces hIid to this information, w.as pre- ceived word that the Warsawv ported, were ratified on Aug. sented b.- Len:d 3 teen po' Ked on the Cze&uI - I. P 1zbnev, Pact forces were crcssir C-ii: Bratisla%-a, when the Dbec-: yak bm dhrs since rnid-Julv. Grtnera! Suretary of tde Soviet Czechos'ovak borders. group met with the Suivt Inforn action from Sv\ - Commuri.t party, in telephone The official Soviet explana- Uron, East Germany, Bulgaria, itary personnel here this %cek converaiUons last Sunday and tions for the intervention have Hungary and Poland. indicated that actual prep-ra- Mrndav with the Polish, East not mentioned the six secret,L Tne sixth point was a per- tions f(or a possible mio e German, Hungarian and Eul- points of the agreements Mos- sonal promise said to ha-.o n a nst Czechoslova-ia be-an garian leaders. cow says were made at Cierna been made to Mr. Brezhve-: b.' o units, went on A bitter whzn th en- from ''r. Brer:'hev during the meetings between Mr. Dubcek at Cierr.a th1La eral aler t Aug. 11. CRS-8

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7Ir-T) ,f*% * O .. a: a f e World Wir Left Its Mark Czechoslo';akia became a land and Hungary also took unified courtry 50 years ago chunks of territory. In all, when the Unio~n of Czech Czechoslovakia lost about a Lands and Siovakia was pro- third of its land. claimed a republic on Nov. In October, 1938, Nazi 14. 1918. three days after the troops occupied the Sude- Armistice ended World War tenland. President Benes 1. then resigned and fled to Thomas lasaryk and Ed- London, where he set up a uard Benes were the first provisional government in and second Presidents of thle nation, 1,111ch today has n.March, 1939, Hitler dis- solved Czechoslovakia, in- a population of about 14 mil- ,corporated lion, comp rising mainly Bohemia and Mloravia into Germany as Czechs and Slovaks, but protectorates, and supported with hundred Is of thousands the autonomy of Slovakia of Magyars, Germans and -with Josef Tiso as President. Poles. In 1944 and 1945, the Rus- The new ntion's territory sian armies, assisted by consisted of Czech lands of American forces in the west, the ancient l;ingdom of Bo- freed Czechoslovakia. hemia, 'Mora' ia and Slovak- Territories taken by the ia (all three were once parts Germans, Poles and lHungar- of the great Moravian em- ians were restored to Czech- pire). oslovakia and subcarpathian Tl'he 118 Cz-c woslovak Ruthenia was transferred to constitil ion vaS liberal and Russia -by the Treaty of Mos- dilemocra' , ; d up to 1 9:o0 cow in ,luly, 1945. Czecho' yak a was one 4)1 Benes returned as Presi- the mio7 prrpvrou and in- dent in May, 1945. d(i l .. cd couni -s ill In elections in 1946, 'the El'astorne ;U ro 1C. Communists won 38 per cent \With the ii 0 of .\ if lit- of the votes and Bones, who ler in Gern any. i- Ger- was re-elected President, man-speaking ' mi ity in had to accept a coalition the Sudeten errito, began government under Commu- to increase heir cmands nist Premier Klement Gott- for union witl. Gerinmny. wald. T h c government re- A threat by Hitler to go to mained in power until Feb. war over the Sudel en led to 20, 1948, when 12 non-Com- he Munich r act of Seplei- munist ministers resigned. 'er, 1938, be.wen Britain, In elections in May a pre- , (Gcrrrany and Italy. dominantly Communist gov- /'hlioslovaki was ordered ernment formed by Gott- 'rde all district of Bo- wald received 89 per cent a 'nd N )ravia with a of the votes and Bimnes re- i nan-spea ing population signed. oI 50 pir cen . or more. ~o- Regarded as the bridge

Reproduced with permission Washington Post August 22, 1968 CRS-9

N E. GERMANY PRAGUE POLAND *Prague W. CZECHOSlOVAKIA GERMANY Vnlvorska ------AUS TRIA

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Demands for Reforni Surfaces in '07 Lndon obcrmer April 4-idrich Cernik July 17-Strong Ie t Icr Under President Antonin becomes Premier and forms from other Pact members Novotny, who was installed new Cabinet. meeting in Warsaw demand- in 1953. the Czechoslovak April 9-Manifesto prom- ing that the balance of Communist Party resisted ising civil rights to Czecho- power remain unchanged in de-Stalinization, which pro- slovaks, including the rig't Europe. gressed in some other East to travel abroad. J u 1 y 29-Czechoslovak European Communist states May 4-Dubeck leads a leaders meet Soviet polit- (luring and after the surprise visit to Moscow. huro at border villages of Khrushchev era in Russia. May 8-Party leaders of Cierna and Tisou. Three First rumblings of crisis East Germany, Poland, Bul- (lays of talks. came more than a year ago. garia and Hungary arrive in A u g. 3-Czechoslovak 197 Moscow. leaders meet Warsaw Pact June 27-29-Criticisms of May 10-Soviet military powers at Bratislava. Last regime', internal and for- maneuvers in southern Po- Soviet troops leave. Dubcek eign policy voiced at Czech- land near Czechoslovak bor- says Czechoslovak sover oslivak Writers' Union. d(e r. eignty is assured. Oct. .30-Student (lemon- May 17-Somiet Premier Aug. 9-President Tito of sirat ions in Prague, ostensi- Alexel Kosygin arrives in Yugoslavia given warm wel- come in Prague. h'IY over conditions in stu- l'roue with Defense Minis. dent h1ostels. Aug. 10-More Soviet ma- tInr M a r s h a I - Andrei DleC. 8 - Sovi(t P neuvers in the Ukraine, and a r ty Greehko. Czechs reluctantly rader Leonid Brezhnev vis- later along Czechoslovakia's its Novotny in Prague. agree to Warsaw Pact ma- neuvers on Czech soil. northern borders. 1968 May 30-Novotny sus. Aug. 11-East Germany's Jan. 5 - N o v o i n y, 63, pvndcd from Party member. Walter U!hrich, arri -cs in Iiited fromt Party loader- ship. Czechoslovakia; is .en : ). Ivpl(eVd by Alexander June 6--liussian tanks cool reception. Divihek, 46, who brings sighted in Czechoslovakia. I 'a111Y po rge. Aug. 14-Soviet press rt July 9-Czechoslovakia March 5-Cen-orshIp re- sumes attack on Czechoslo- turns down demand for reforrns. Warsaw Pact summit meet- vak March 22 - Novotny re- ing. Aug. 15-President Nico- ns as head of state and is lac Ceaucescu of Rumania --u'e-eded six days later by July 10-Concern that Rlussian troops have not left given friendly reception in Icn. Ludvik Svoboda. Czechoslovak soil after April ma- Prague. 3-Official inquiry ncu vcrs. omnounced into death in Aug. 20-Secret mectinj 1948 of Foreign Minister Jan July 15-Gen. Vaclav of Soviet leaders believed to Masaryk, amid rumors that Prchlik criticizes Warsaw have discussed Czechoslovak he (lid not commit suicide Pact structure; later dis- crisis. Soviet and Warsaw but was murdered by Soviet missed by Czechoslovak Pact forces Invade Czecho- agents. leadership. slovakia. CRS-11

IT. WORLD REACTION CRS-12

7 ort d ReaCion: Anguish9 sIns and Ainger:)' india does not have diplo- Kiesinger lold Tsarapkin Matic iClations with the fifth, West Germany was deeply By Bernard Nossiler member of the invasion force, concerned about contradic- WAohinxton rc5L foreign Fervlco Elst Germany. tions between Soviet state- NIKW ll-1A I, Aug. 21- It is too early to measure ments and news accounts of Prime ministerr Indira Gan- Ihe impact of the events on the invasion. The Soviet en- thi today expressed "pro- any wide sector of Indian voy was f o r c e d to leave found concern" and "an- opinion. However, it is al. Kiesinger's office by a side ai-h" over the Soviet inva- ready clear that the Russians door after their meeting, Son of Cweih'-ovakia. In a ar e going to lose a great deal to avoid angry crowds in ,statenent to India's Parlia- of the enormous credit they the street. lient. she urIIcd the Soviet hdve carefully built up in this Cnion and its allies to with- cou ntry. Biiaiii draw li'ir Iroops "at the Scurlist pW'.ihdC moment." hivasiont, Evokes 'We have ialays stood for West, Germany th' right of every country to Memories of Munich develop its personality ac- Action Condemnied; By Robert L. Mott coriding to its own tradi- Envoy Is Jeered WA\hington Post Focign Service tions. aptitudes and genius." LONDON-"After mid- Gandhi said. "India has rrom News DioiAtches TONN-Nearly 2500 den- night, Prague is like a city .1 twayvs raised her voice under a cloud of mourning. onstrators snas'hed windows wheneverr Iliese principles Months of fierce propa- have been violated." of the Soviet Embassy with ganda from over the fron- In fact. her statement was stones, and pelted the build- tier and weeks of crisis end- in marked contrast with the ing with tomatoes and eggs. ing. in complete acceptance .silence of her father, Jawa- About 150 demonstrators of what is required seems at harlal Nehru, during the So- last to 'have broken the peo- viet invasion of Hungary in blocked Soviet Ambassador ple's nerve." . 1956. It was regarded here Semyon Tsarapkin's car Those sombre words were as unusually outspoken for from leaving the Embassy written by the Prague corre- on a nation so dependent and had to be removed by spondent of the Times of Soviet aid and good will, police. London. The date was Sept. and for a leader with a repu- Some 250 police cordoned 22, 1938. -Ten days later, tatior. mr timidity. off the shuttered embassy, with the official acquiesc- 'Y' l'cinur Minister said, 10 miles south of Bonn, as ence of the British govern- "I', with a heavy heart and the crowd continued to ment, Hitler's troops "i a profound sense of con- grow. The demonstrators marched into the Sudeten- i called Tsarapkin, a "mur- land. anreportthatIhaveto certain events taking place in derer," and chanted, "Rus- There were haunting (0echoslovakia - - . sians out of Prague," and memories today of those "Oor relations with the So- "Dubcek. Dubeek." days 30 years ago, but Brit- viet 'n.Q. Poland, l1nugary C h a n cellor Kiesinger, ain's ability to ater or at and Vnmmk;mida are close and after conferring with his least influence events has mani-ided. We value these Cabinet in emergency ses- friendships and wish to pre- passed. sion, issued a statement con- The Soviet occupation, an !.A e'cd extend tihem. Iow- demning the invasion as "a official statement from 10 , . -aonot Out cive ex- clear violation of Czechoslo- Downing pressio1 i our street said, was "a anguish at vak sovereignty and inter- flagrant violation of the tile e. in (Czechoslo- in its internal af- ference United Nations Charter vakia fairs." and of all accepted standards of international b c 11 a v I o r." "This is a treagedy not only Reproduced with permission for Czechoslovakia but for Europe and the whole Washington Post world." August 22, 1968 CRS-13

Prime Minister Wilson, France did not take part in 1he government canceled try a liberation movement Foreign Secretary Michael the 1945 Yalta Conference. plans for next week's sign- h;.s been stopped by vio- Stewart and other senior and de Gaulle previously has ing of the nuclear nonprolif- lence." members of the government. blamed that meeting for oration treaty, sponsored Stockholi, about 50 In t cut short their vacations and much of Europe's tensions by the Sovict Union and the persons (lemons rat Od out- hurried back to London. since Wo:ld War 11. United States. A spokesman side the office of Intourist, Wilson announced that a Police dispersed several said Italy will have to recon- the Soviet travel agency, special Cabinet meeting hundred demonstrators who sider its position on the ,and smeared the agency's would be held Thursday andl marched through Left Bank treaty, in light of the inva- windows with the slogan: that Parliament would be streets carrying banners with sion. "This is p a i n t, but in called back from its summer such slogans as, "Enough of Premier Giovanni Leoni Czechoslovakia it's blood." this morn- recess on Monday. violence," anid "fDownj with returned to Rome Premier Per confer with members Norwegian scattered dem- iiig to - There were S o v I e t imperialism." The of his Cabinot. The Foreign .Borten said he was disap onstrations. Police cordoned marchers chanted, "Liberate pointed at the action takrn off the Soviet and Czecho- Ministry issued a statement Union and its Soviet move by the Soviet slovak Embassies. Ironically, Prague." criticizing the Warsaw Pact allies, and an attempt to "suffocate the State Orchestra of the as added: "It is most regretta- tie forces of democratizda- Soviet Union was perform- iOfl' ill Czechoslovakia, and ble that force is being used of a coun- ing tonight at the Albert "a hard blow to against the will that in. News of Invasion said it dcalt Hall in program the process of detente." try." eluded a cello concerto by Goes Unreported Pops Paul VI, preparing Canada's External Afrairs 'Dvorak, perhaps the great- Mitchell S h a r p By Colin McCullough to fly'to Bogota, Colombia, Minister est of Czech composers. A for the closing of the 39th called the invasion "a flag- spokesman at Albert I1all Toronto Olobe and Mail breach of the principle few International Eucharistic rant said the program would go. PEKING-Probably brief nonintervention," and 700 million peo- Congress, rewrote a of on as scheduled, but the of China's final audi- "All Canadians feel ple are aware that the So- address for his said, BBC cancelled a reception ence upon learning of the the deepest concern for the for the Soviet orchestra "to viet Union and its allies p e o p 1 e of have moved military forces invasion. Addressing himself courageous avoid mutual embarrasse- to a group of Czechoslova- Czechoslovakia in this hour ment." into Czechoslovakia. hi The news arrived too late kian. pilgrims atteding of trial." Police cordoned off a So- audience at Castel Gandolfo, Australian Prime Minister to be included in tie capi- Parlia- viet trade exhibition after tal's tliiee inam newspap~ers, the pontiff said: John Gorton told in Sydney that the in- nearly 2000 demonstrators, People's Daily, Peking Daily "We learn from the press ment vaks, tried to force their way. the events which weigh vasion was "saddening to :21 and Kwangmin Daily. those who had hoped lcire into the exhibition hall. The A guide to the probable upon your country and the demonstrators then burned danger which they take on might be in the Comun reaction of the Chinese lead. world some relaxation a Soviet flag in front of the ership, however, is indicated, and which disturb public building. opinion. This appearance of this central tyranny in an article issued last Sun- freedom yould be allo ed day by hlsinhua News Serv- . power cannot but provoke in those countries which trepidation in our spirit, lo e France ice. The article, reprinted which shares the feeling of now r nar cicarly De Gaulle Blames from an Albanian newspa-. your entire nation." colonies of the U.S.S.R." por, expounded the theory Youthful demonstrators Prime \minis- :he that events in Czechoslova- threw eggs at the Soviet ter Keith Holyoake said Yalta Conference kia are a natural result of moved back :he By Erie Wentworth Embassy today and staged a invasion Soviet Union and United clock in Europe to the duir- washinxton Post Foreign Service brief sitdown in front of the States cooperation that pro- carried kest days of the Cold WI Wa, PARIS-PresVdcn t de building. Police motes world capitalism them away. and recalled the suppressionl Gaulle conferred with his while maintaining certain of freedom in Hungary. top aides at his country. sphercu of influence, "It is quite incomprehen- Colombey-l x-Dcux- estate, e The article found both the Elsewhere sible to me that the Soviet Egliscs, then issued a state- leaders should be unawla re mient s,,.ying: Soviets and the Czechoslo-- Denunciations vaks guilty of reviionism. of the deep revulsion w 1ich "Armed intervention by reaction wil provoke thle Soviet Union in Czecho- "Bandits settle accounts And Protests their among themselves in ban. throughout the worl.' slovakia shows that the Mos-, News of the Soviet action The Japanese gover-nmcnt cow government has not dis- dit-like ways," It com- niented. brought student protest expressed "grave concern" engaged itself from the pol- in Tokyo, at the news, and the Philip- Jcy of blocs, which was Im- demonstrations Italy Sydney, Oslo, Copenhagen pine government termed the poscd on Europe by the and Bern, while government invasion "an outage" and a Yalta Agreeiment, is incom- Cabinet, Vaticwit leaders expressed shock. repetition of "Hungary's rpatible with the right of peo- The governments of the Calvary." ple to self-determination and Sharply Critical Scandinavian countries con- In Kuala Lunpur, Malay- can only lead to internation- vened emergency sessions to sian Prime Minister Tunku By Louis B. Fleming debate the crisis. A Swedish Abdul Rahman said the So- al tension," Los Angeles TimeA The presidential statement government statement said: viet action was unfortunate added that France, "deplores ROME-The Italian gov- "Once again it has happened and "could also make them the fact thftt; the events of ernment and the Vatican that in a Communist coun- a dangerous country as far ],,.ague, apkrt from being an both expressed shock and as we are conecrued." %la- attack on thz rights and des. sharply criticized the Sovi- laysia only r-eccntly estab- tiny of a friondiy nation, are et-led invasion of Czechoslo- lished diplomatic relations of a nature that runs con- vakia. with the Soviet Union. trary to the European de- tente." CRS-14

Wave of Anger Sweeps World; Some Soviet Embassies Raidec

Britain and France Assail Invasion- Mrs. Gandhi. Expresses 'Anguish -3 Arab Lands Back Moscow

By LAWRENCE VAN GELDER Nations around the world re- Britain Denounces Move actecd to thle ' Mrs. Gandhi's appeal fot Occupation ofl Britain withdrawal Czechoslovakia yesterday denounced the inter- of Soviet troops first vention. In Paris, President was echoed in Sydney, where with shock, and then with ex. de Gaulle deplored the attack on; the 'Australian Communist par- eTSions Of dismay and con- the ights and executive (1Cml nation. destiny of a', ty's committee, meet- triend 'I nation." ing, in emergency session, also In the storm of In lome, Popc called for reproach angry Paul expressed respect the agree- that broke with the concern over the developments ment reached in Bratislava ,uddrn car- evasion by the Soviet in Eastern Europe, and ler this month and-recognition Union Italian the and four of its Warsaw Premier, Giovanni Leoni, of the Czechoslovak Govern- Pact allies, Governmen met with ment t leaders the Soviet Ambassa' and respect for liberty, issoted formal statements of dis- .ior. Nikita Ryjov, to express and person. approval statesmen and news- nitgmion. At Drttislava. the Czecho- pa hr s voiced regret at Isroalis heard accounts of slovak Communist leaders the the and dama;o done to hopes for a invasion with feelings of those of the Soviet Union and relaxation of East-West sympilhy for the Czecho- orthodox -ions, ten- slovalcs Eastern European and some Soviet embas- and concern for their v-u .s apparently reached an sies hecame targets for own future. Recalling the Arab- agreement ending demon-1 Israeli their con- is t ra rs. war last year, one of- frontation and acknowledging Il Communist parties said: .Czcchoslovakia's n irope deplored of ficial right to pur- the, , "The Russians did not inter- sue her domestic policies un- 1;, r mim rvention. vene a year ago for a number hindered. T'I Cairo. Ba pdad and (f reasons, but it is worth con- New Zealand's Prime Minis- Dam ;ocus radios, using sidering that they are obvious- ter, Keith J. Holyoake, from reports said Tass, the Sovwt press ly capable of doing so no mat- that the invasion was the e 'n Pravda, the Soviet wr how unpopular such a move most depressing news omom nist appears he had party newspaper, to he."I heard for 'took the So-vi(.t Union's In New Delhi, Prime Mini'ser many years. "It side in: Indira turns their broadcasts to the people Gandhi expressed In- the clock back to the of 'gvpt, Iraq dia's "anpiimh" and called for, darkest days of the and Syria. the ," TI' Uiiban radio cave withdrawal of Soviet he said. vari the in- on extensive news cover- troops. ler statement, recall- In Africa, the Congo an- age, and ing the Nazi broadcast the official and speaking invasion of 1939 nounced her intention of with- Prague statement that o' 1) Czecho- drawing all her students tervention the in- from constituted a slovak, as valiant people, con- the five countries-the Soviet tion viola- of international law. But trastod strikingly with India's Union, East Germany, Poland, the radio made no editorial reaction to the Soviet invasion Bulgaria and Hungary - that conment on the situation. The of Aungary 12 years ago. participated in the occupation. Cuban Government adopted 1 In Nigeria, once a 'dance a againstaAt that a resolutiontime, India in votedthe& staunch of apparent neutrality member of the Western camp during the nonmilitary United r'ntions for the with- but phase rrawal of Soviet now receiving arms from of the Czechoslovak-Soviet troops. the Soviet Union confrontation. to prosecute the civil war against Biafra, the Government-owned radio dropped all references to the events in Eastern Europe after ija few early-morning news- Reproduced with permission casts. New York Times August 22, 1968 CRS-15

Trudeau Returning In Rome, left-wing radicals Canada's reaction was sharp. splattered eggs on "We condemn the outer this use of force," walls of the Soviet Embassy Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State compound. And In Tokyo, where for External Affairs, said the newspaper Mainichi Shim- in a statement. He charged that bun called the that invasion "tanta- the Soviet Union was mount to a violating a principle confession by the of no in- Soviet Union that it has' 'tcrvention to whichi lost fessd t had pro- confidence in ideology and inust to subscribe. resort to armed The statement was force to sup- approved PlNss the liberalization of her by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott iwighljor," a heavy Trudeau, who cut short cordo of a holi- poUice was thrown around the day in Majorca and will return Soviet Embassy. to Ottawa about dawn tomor- The newspaper asked: "How can the Soviet Union now Some Ottawa observers spec- criticize the United States ulated that the Soviet invasion actions in Vietnam?" might cause Mr. Trudeau to American military revise his earlier suggestion men in South- Vietnam heard the re- that Canada consider reducing her contributions to North ports of the invasion with sur- prise. Atlantic Treaty Organization - ,forces in Europe. "My first reaction when I Sweden condemned heard the news was that the the in- spectre vasion as "a clear violation of of World War III was assurances of nonintervention just around the corner," said a senior in other countries' internal af- naval officer. "Then I fairs." The Norwegian heard a later report saying that Foreign the Czech Minister, John Lyng, said that army had been or- the invasion was an open vio- dered not to fire and I realized lation of international law, and that we couldn't assist a coun- in Denmark, a left-wing dem- try that would not attemp to onstration in Copenhagen took defend itself." a new turn after it re- For others, however, the pos- ceived news of the invasion. sbility of a war in Eastern Eu- . The Socialist Peoples party, 101 seemed a remote Ahstrae- picketing in the town hall t".m. "We're too busy fighting square against American policy this one to worry bout what's in Vietnam, dropped its signs going on in Europe," a young and moved to the Soviet em- officer said. bassy to protest. At noon, the police and .the demonstrators clashed and. there were sev- eral arrests. CRS-16

Russians, Go Home! The illegal and immoral conquest of Czechoslovakia Against this background the weak and inadequate by Moscow and its satellites provides a time of testing reactions of the United Nations can only create for many peoples, governments, individual leaders and bewilderment and disillusionment. The White House, international institutions. mired down in Vietnam and eager to keep alive its Like the rape of Hungary In 1956, it represents an efforts at detente with Moscow, waited over twelve unprovoked attack on a defenseless nation by powers hours before President Johnson publicly condemned whose combined strength made any thought of resist- the despicable Soviet move. Still more hours passed ance senseless. Every basic guarantee of the United before the Security Council was called into tedious, Nations Charter has been violated by this cynical, wrangling session at the request of the United States carefully prepared military thrust whose key objec- and five other nations. tives were attained within hours of the first violation Up to then United Nations Secretary General Thant of Czechoslovakia's borders. had contented himself with a timorous appeal to The people of Czechoslovakia met the test with stoic Moscow to exercise "the utmost restraint" toward resolve. Their discipline, their open contempt for the the Czechoslovak Government which it had subjugated invaders, their undiminished support of their own so crudely and unprcvokedly. Are the people and imprisoned leaders were as admirable as the quest for Government of Czechoslovakia less worthy of United greater freedom that had unleashed the Soviet assault. Nations protection, passion and concern than those The political and moral unity of the Czechoslovak of African or Asian states whose plight in the past has people was most vividly evidenced by the unmis- so often produced quick Security Council meetings takable Soviet difficulty in finding any politicians of and vehement U.N. statements? guf'fctent stature to play the role of a Prague Quisling The most pressing need, however, goes far beyond or Kadar. mere verbal denunciation 'of the Soviet outrage. The statement by When Tass transmitted yesterday the need is for effective United Nations action to force allegedly called the Czechoslovak politicians who had the prompt evacuation of Czechoslovakia by the occu- names. for Soviet intervention it failed to give their pying troops and the restoration of the legal Govern- is The suspicion i inescapable that either the group ment of Czechoslovakia to its full freedom of action revelation out of a fictional or I I. its members fear and sovereignty. treachery they committed. sense of guilt over the .An immediate problem is presented by the fact Many Communists also passed yesterday's test.with that reports from Prague indicate Czechoslovakia's top high marks. The denunciations of the Soviet crime by leaders are Soviet prisoners. The United Nations could Yugoslav President Tito and Rumanian President and should defy that Illegal act of detention by inviting Ceausescu were clearcut and unambiguous, even President Svoboda, Premier Cernik and Communist. though both those nations adioin countries whose Dubcek to come to the U.N. and state their troops participated in the shameful invasion of party chief could be done as a procedural mat- Czechoslov. a.13 nation's case. This the veto; the invitation so extended TheC minunist parties in Italy. France, ter, exempt from would immediately put Moscow to the test, and some other lands ako expressed the revulsion that to all decent min-irleardless of politics or ideology- The United Nations will be judged and deserves must feel at this act of bestial imperialism. Moscow, be judged by the effectiveness and vigor-or the lack Warsaw, East Berlin. iudapest and Sofia may still be thereof-with which it acts to secure rectification ruled by men with Stalinist reflexes, but much of the of a blatant international crime-the resubjugation of rest of world Communism finds the unscrupulous tac- Czechoslovakia by a Kremlin leadership that has tics of the 1940's and 1950's no longer tolerable. retrogressed twenty years in deed and spirit.

Reproduced with permission New York Times, August 22, 1968 CR S-17

Bullyhig from weakness So the Soviet leaders have panicked morning bringing joy -and the fresh air after all. For a few weeks it looked as if of freedom - this is it. the new leadership in Prague had 'out- For the Russians and for communism, mancuvered them and that the proposed the balance-sheet has yet to be drawn up. liberai.:ing reforms in Czechoslovakia The cost will prove considerable. List for would stick. But presumably Messrs. a moment some of the debit entries: Brezhnev and Kosygin realized when they o Proof to the outside world of the got back home to Moscow that they were bankruptcy of communism -in its Mos- still in a cleft stick. cow version, at any rate - when it cones to adjusting government Within the Soviet Union, and society to it was getting men's yearnings in the modern world. obvious that they had been forced to back o Shattering of any outside faith in down at Cierna nad Tisou and at Brati- Moscow's protestations that it practices slava, and that they were in danger of noninterference in other people's affairs being made scapegoats for a Russian and respects the right of self-determina- humiliation. Certainly they had avoided tion. the odium - until now - which Moscow o Knocking to smithereens Moscow's brought upon itself through its ruthless pretension to be the erflightened. leader action in Hungary in 1956. But they still of the world Communist movement and had to live with the danger that the appe- the guardian of world tite for fr edom in Communist unity. Czechoslovakia might o The almost certain abandonment of spread ;cross the frontier into the Ukraine Moscow's scheduled world Communist and sweep into the great Russian heart- unity meeting in Moscow this fall. land itself. One can imagine debate within o Widening of the gap between Mos- the Kremlin about the need to grasp the' cow and the Communist parties in West- nettle after all - and this is what the So- ern Europe - particularly in Italy and viet leadership has apparently sought to France - and a simultaneous dashing of do with Tuesday night's cynical invasion hope that any of those parties might ef- of Czechoslovakia. fectively enhance its hold on the elec- Yet the Czcchoslovak appetite for free- torate within any democracy. d(hm cannot thus be quenched. Neither is o Second thQughts in Western Europe it likely in the long run that the Russians about pressing further for d6tente - or will find that they have any firm grasp on for any cutbacks in NATO's commitments the nettle which was troubling them. on the European side of the ocean. What they are dealing with is a Europe * And even more important, the different in many ways from that of 1956. likely stalling -if not a more permanent The Czechoslovaks are not alone: they are interruption -in the process of building but out in the van of all the peoples of the bridges between Moscow and Washington. Europuan Communist world -incluling This in itself is a tough price for the men the Soviet Union itself -demanaing in the Kremlin to pay: this process was as greater freedom of choice and a greater much a keystone in their foreign policy say in the running of their own affairs. as it was in that of the United States. In this moment of anguish, such reflec- Altogether, these entries could add up tinns may be of little comfort for the one day to an even bigger setback for Ctechoslovaks themselves. But if ever overall Soviet policy than the one which there was a-case where the return of dark the present leadership saw, on reflection, night must inevitably be followed by a in Cierna and Bratislava.

Reproduced with permigsion Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 1968 CRS-18

III. THE CZECH INVASION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

:j

1 CRS-19

Czech Dclcrate at U.N. Defends Course Followed by Reformers Bv DREW MIDDLETON AUG 22 1968 eril.1 to Th#e New Ynrk Timpi UNIT.D NATIONS. N. Y., delivery, was largely devoted to Aug. 21-The voice or the re-,reading into the record two pressed liberal regime inimessages received from Czech- Czechoslovakia sounded in the oslovakia and circulated to the chamber of the Security Council United Nations and to govern- tonight when Jan Muzik, her ments with which Czechoslo- acting chief representative, de- vakia has' relations. He also fended the course taken by the commented on a statement read Communist reformers. in Prague tonight by President Recent changes in his coun- Ludvik Svoboda. try, he said, were designed only . The Presidium of the Na. - to bring the republic "closer toitional Assembly in Czechoslo- the lofty goals of real social- vakia, in one of ism." the messages, retaining the "human received here by radio, de- rights and liberty which are an handed the withdrawal of oc. integral part of any socialist cupation forces and told Czech- system." oslovak workers that they Mr. Muzik's speech to the would be able to defend ' Council, delivered in halting selves, "if necessary," by a gen- English that enhanced rather than reduced the dignity of his Continued on Page 21,Column 1

Reproduced with permission New York Times August 22, 1968 CRS-20

Missing Delegation Cited Text of the Messane !,.e (,.ClcZation of the Na- The following is the declara- READS A AESSAGE' .~e:2hlvA2 sent to the zin of the Minister of Foreign mwct Emibany this morning .-%iairs of Czechoslovakia of to protest "has not returned Aug. 21, 196.. According to the so far," the Presidium said. Czchoslovak mission, the text FROM PRESWuIM "We protest against the fact received by radio, could be in- that the National Assembly. complete. "but it correspend,,s -Government,institutions of tie to the ,sense of the message." It Tells Workers They ^Can' National Front and their rep- "Today, the Ministry of For- resentatives are prevented from; eign Affairs, with the endorse. Defend Themselves, if exercising their legitimate ment of the President of the rights." the statement con- Republic, informed the amhas- Need Be, by a Walkout tmnued. sadors of the U.S.S.R.. Pohsh The Presidium requested the' People's Republic. German complete withdrawal of ' the Democratic Republic, Hungar- Continued From Page 1, Col. 8 armed forces of the invading ian People's Republic and Bul states and "full respect for the garian People's Republic a'- eral strike. The first message sovereignty. of the Czech-' credited in the Czechoslovak received here, signed by For- slovak Socialist Republic." lit Socialist Republic to transmit Jiri HaIjek, in- appealed to the parliaments of to the * governments of. the cign Minister . Polish People's Repid- Am- all countries and to world oin S.S.R., structed the C/echoslovak ion to "support rur 'legitimte hI, German Democratic Repub- hassadors in the Soviet Union, Tcquirements.". lic', Hungarian People's Repub- Poland. Hungary and East Ger- The Presidium aTso called on hc and Bulgarian People's Po- many to issue a "resolute pro- all Czechoslovaks "not to re-. public a resolute protest, with Vest." sort to forcible measures': the requirement that the illegal It also urged that "the illegal against the occupation armies occupation of Czechoslovakia or to be "provoked" by "various be stopped without delay and occupation of Czechoslovakia forces, which try to get proofs all armed troops be withdrawn be stopped without delay", and. justifying the intervention." froni Czechoslovakia. that "all armed troops be with - The finab paragraph noted "In this historical moment, drawn from Czechoslovakia." that the Czechoslovak workers we express our hope that th" The Czechoslovak mission might,, "if necessary," be able' governments and peoples of the yopirself. by a gen- the message, to "defend U.S.S.R., Polish People's Re- noted at the end of cral strike." nyhlk, C-rman Democratic Pc- that although the text was i- public, Hungarian People's Re- complete when received, "it cor-, public 'and Bulgarian People's responds to the sense of the Republic will understand the message." seriousness of the situation Minister ex- created by this act which can- The Foreign not 1e explained in any way, pressed the hope that those to and all the less made stand to whom the protest was ad- reaso,, and will make it im- dressed would "understand the med i: tely possible for th- qriousness of the situation." Czecl oslovak pCOPiC and its This act of invasion, he added, lgiii n.te represrntat:ves to cont. heir activities with- "cannot be explained in any Aut ("elav." way." He also asked that they make it possible for the Czech- oslovak people and "its legiti- mate representatives" to con- tinue their normal activities "without delay." The second message, received at 2 P.M. New York time, was the declaration of the Presidium of the National Assembly, pro- v telng "the occupation of ( .choslovakia by armies of ti.; five countries of the War- .r.w Treatv." The invasion was a -.11ed as a violation of in- 1, intitonal law, the Warsaw Tie.itv and "he principles of equality helwc'mn nations." 'li he Pre'idmi asked the re lease of all those under ho.ve arrest. meluiding President Iod vik Sxoboda and Alexander Duhcek. 1-irst Secretary of the %Communist party. I CRS-21

;Withdrawal Demanded To his drinand for the within drawal of the occupying forces of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and East Ger-' HARIJK many, TELLS IJ.IN1the Foreign Minister added an accusation. If any- thing endangers the cause of Minister Rejects Contention socialism in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere, by Moscow That Prague he said, it Is the "in, sepsitive and illegal" occupa- Sought Intervention tion of his country. AUG His defiant 'speech came 25 13 after three hours of -a virtual filibuster by Yakov Texts of Dr. -a jck's comments A. Malik of the Soviet Union. will be found on Page 37. The ostensible object of Mr. Malik's oratory was to win the By. DREW MIDDLETON. participation of East Germany Special to The Ncw York Mmes in the Council deliberations on UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., C:;echoslovakia. The real rea- Aug. 21-Dr. Jiri Hajek, speak- sons. Western sources said, ing before the Security Council were to delay or perhaps post- in behalf of liberal Czechoslo- vak Communism, todaydissect- cd' and' rejected as baseless the Soviet Union's reasons for the occupation of his country. Dr. Hajek, the Foreign Min- iter, attacked point by point, the explanation for the inva- sion put forward by the chief representative of the Soviet Union. Dr. Hajek's English was halt- ng but his meaning was clear:' There was no need for the in- vasion and' occupation, no re- 5ponsible .Czech had asked for it, the popular liberal 'regime of Alexander Dubcek had and would handle the country's rolblems.

Reproduced with permission New York Times, August 25, 1968 CRS-22

Czech- Aide, at U.N., Tcrms the Occupation IIegal Dr. Hajek's central theme was . Continued From Page 1, Col. 7 that the occupation was a blow Responsihility Placed pone Dr. Hajek's speech until that he described as "even more It is the occupation, Dr. Hai theth e Drs H spech M s w cruel because it came from jek emphasized, that endangers conclusion of the Moscow countries from which we had socialism, because it disrupts! meeting between the Soviet not expected it in the least and economic, social and political and C7echoslovakia leaders andifrom which we did not deserve life and impedes the constitz-! to make propaganda for the it in the least." tional Government in the ex-; legitimacy of the East German "This is an act of use of crcise of its functions. More- Government. force which cannot le justified over, he said, it "seriously dam-1 hy any reason," he added. ages and profoundly hurts" re- Mr. Malik, seconded by Milko - On Wednesday and Thursday lations between the Czechoslo- Tarahanov of Bulgaria and Jo- Mr. Malik explained the inva-,vak people and those of the zsef Tardos, the deputy chief sion and occupation on the: occupying powers. representative of Hungary, grounds thta it was necessary spoke on and on. In the end, to quell counter revolutionary If the cause of world peace at the urging of Joao Araujo forces and tht it had heen re-has deteriorated Castro and tensions of Brazil, this month's quested by unidentified Czech-1have been growing, President of the Council, bf. Dr. Hajek' oslovak Ctommunists. said, the, responsibility lies not. asked for a vote on his motion Neither the Czechoslovak with his country but with for E..st Germany's admission Government nor any other con- wth to the meeting. stitutional organ had requested "those who decided upon the, The motion was defeated by or demanded intervention, he occupation." 9 votes to 2 with 4 abstention. said and no one in the other Czechoslovakia's T he strict ad- Soviet Union and Hungary Communist countries has yet herence to "socialist principles" voted in favor. The United named any person as having Statre, was the basis for his demand .ritnin. Canada, France, done so. for withdrawal "without ra ri2, inv, Nit ionn alIis t C h inl delay." Denmrk, EthiopiaDminrk.ElhopilandSengalfive and Senegal Dager Is Denied The solution, he noted, lies with voted acainst. Governments and "in ne- India, , As for the argument that the gotiation with Bra7il and Algeria abstained. the constitution- country had been in imminent al authorities" of Czechoslo- Otto R. Borch of Denmark danger of foreIgn military ag- vakia. said of the prolonged There was no mention speech by gression, the Czechoslovak of the United Nations in con- th- Soviet delegate on the East Army "was prepared and cap- nation with a soluti n. German question that "partici- able" of defending itself, he The Voice of America broad. pation in an invasion should said. cast Dr. Hajek's speech around not be a passport to the United Dr. Hajck presented a rosy the world. Nations." view of developments since The Council adjourned t 4:15 While the long speech was Alexander Dubcek's liberaliza- P.M. after a four-hour session. dragging to an end, members tion program was begun in . will et again at 10 AM. of the Soviet delegation pressed January, when Mr. Dubcek re- Monday. Most diplomats ex C7echoslovak diplomats in the placed Antonin Novotny 'as pct that by thsn the Soviet- orrmuiors to induce Dr. Hajek Czechoslovak talks in Moscow to postpone his speech. Their First-Secretary of the Czech- will hav k been concluded and errors were fruitless and Mr. oslovak party. ' that, with some agreement Malik's attempt to answer the "Positive, truly patriotic and reached, Mr. Malik will moven Foreign Minister by reading an t sme, tr dly oial- thathe Mnldk wisuve appeal issued three days ago by at the same time deeply social. that the Council drop the issue. the Soviet, Bulgarian, Ilungar- ist" developments made anti- ian, Polish and East German socialism "entirely secondary" Governments had equally little he declared. effect. . Under the leadership of Mr. The Foreign Minister made it Dubcek, the Foreign Minister clear on leaving the meetin~gsaid, the Communist party has achieved an authority and lead- that he had not received a mes- ership almost unprecedented in ,age from President Svoooda the history of the Czech and instructing him to ask the Coun- 'Slovak nations. He said the cil not to continue discussion of party's position sufficed to iso- 'the Crisis because the q late "negative forces" and re- erhqUstin pel any real attack on the must be settled among the so- foundations of socialism. cialist countries. There had been reports to that effect. He had no communications with the President, he said. CRS-23

Comment Withheld No Solutions Offered Earlier in the day the Czech- The delegates generally CZECHS DROPPING oslovak- mission and the For- seemed unable to suggest any- eign Minister, Jiri Hajek, said thing stronger than moral con- 'I that they had received no in- demnation when asked what U.N. DEBATE ROLE structions on their future con- the United Nations could do tol duct. A spokesman for the mis- save Czechoslovakia. Statement by Mission sion refused to comment fur- Even if a satisfactory solu- Cites, ther tonight . tion were found, one American Negotiations in Moscow This morning the Security source said, we cannot lose Council suspended action Yon sight of the fact that the action the Czechoslovak situation would have been taken under By SAM POPE BREWER while awaiting the outcome of duress. .Sweelil to The New Yorrk Tl t the negotiations in Moscow. The American also stressed UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., The Council canceled today's the fact that the rest of the Aug. 26--Czechoslovakia has session but remained ready to world could never be sure that instructed her delegation convene on short notice while it knew all the terms of what- to the private United Nations to drop par- its members continued ever agreement was made st ticipation consultations.. the Kremlin. in the Security Coun- con- cil debate on The Council has been Americans conceded that the occupation of sidering a resolution sponsored her territory by forces of the they could not suggest any ef- by eight countries that would fective practical action but, as Soviet Union and other War- to dispatch im- saw Pact ask Mr. Thant one said: "We cannot just pre- nations. mediately to Prague a special A statement to the press is- tend this has never happened." -representative "to seek the re- Some observers felt that the sued last night by the Czecho-, lease and insure the personal slovak mission here said: Soviet Union had won a round safety of the Czechoslovak, of gamesmanship A statement issued by the leaders under detention." by producing Czechoslovak mission to the the Moscow talks as evidence press said: Many Delegates Skeptical of goodwill before Dr. Hajek ar- "Direct top-level negotiations rived here to present his case with the aim to Many delegates here tended in the 15-member Council. end the occu- to be skeptical of reports pation have been going on in that, Whatever the long-term re- a compromise was being sult of the charges made in the Moscow between the Cncho- worked out slovak Socialist Republic and in Moscow between Council, there is no doubt that the countries that had occupied Czechoslovakia and the others from Friday to Siturdcy Mos- Warsaw Pact countries. They cow succeeded the Czechoslovak territory. clearly in rendering the "In view intended to give close Council's proceedings less of this, it is not the scrutiny to any agreement opinion of the to meaningful. Government of decide just how equitable it -From the Czechoslovak Socialist a- serle.s of all-night Re- was. meethigs with sharp public that the debate in the exchanges, One American said: "It is not the Council turned to adjourn- Security Council could be con- our disposition to join in rati- ment ducive to the solution for conultation and today of this fication of a rape." to outright postponement of the significant question, and it has Another American comment meeting. asked its delegation not to con- that summed up the feelings of tinue its participation in the many delegates from various debate." countries was that while Mos- Western sources did not be- cow might talk of settling a lieve that this indicated a set- family matter within the fam- tlement of the crisis between ily, the Soviet family had "a Czechoslovakia and the allies of long record of fratricide.", the Soviet Union. '

Reproduced with permission New York Times, August 27, 1968 CRS-24

IV. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE INVASION

'1

~1

I A

n

I CRS-25

A SAVAGE CHALLENGE TO DETENTE

A FLW, hours after it happened. the perhaps the chief fact about the in- aimed entirely at restoring ordcr inwid / - Czechoslovaks staged a hiaunting vasWin is tihat, far from strengihening lussia's astern European tomn Is protest. They froze. Wherever they were, Soviet-style Communism, Moscow has the Soviets were careful to point nut- at work or in the streets, they stood further crippled it. Acting on the flim- and is not necessarily a sign of all- still for a minute, in a silent outcry siest and most cynical of pretexts, War- round aggressiveness against the rest of against the invaders. When news spread saw Pact troops throttled the infant the world. On the contrary, it is po;- of what the Russians had done, the independence of a state that had reit- sible that the move has so weakened world, too, froze for an instant. erated its fidelity to Moscow and Com- Russia's prestige and so strained its re- It was an instant of fear and in- munism. To retain its grip on Eastern lations with other Communist parties- credulity. The event, though discussed Europe-perhaps only for a few years that adventures elsewhere are the last and weighed as a possibility, had seemed more-the Soviet Union had sacrificed thing that Moscow can now affor.. unlikely. After all, it was 15 years after much of its influence among Commu- That is the assumption on which the Stalin's death, twelve years after Hun- nist parties elsewhere. Not since the Hit- U.S. has operated. Washington's rcc- gary. The West had come to accept the lcr-Stalin pact of 1939 had the Krem- tion had about it an almost dream ike "new maturity" of Russia's leaders. The lin acted so palpably from fear and unreality in its restraint. The U.S. relative liberalization of Soviet society weakness. Under present-day conditions, knows, of course, that in a .nuclear 7C and the increasing autonomy of Mos- Moscow's treatment of Prague makes it has no way whatsoever of ai cow's erstwhile satellites in Eastern Eu- for a very poor prognosis for the fu- Czechoslovakia. But ihe relative lC8e rope had also been taken for granted ture of Communism. The thrust that of polemics was remarkable. as an irreversible reaction to the harsh made the Duboek regime possible will Lyndon Johnson's statement ('The rigidities of the Stalinist past. The soft- not die with that government. tragic news from Czechoslovakia socks ening of Communism ("They are get- Predawn Assault. For the U.S., the the conscience of the world") was con- ting more like us, and we are getting chief immediate question was: Have the paratively mild. The Administranon more like them") had become one of Russians renewed the cold war? A pri- went through the motions of appeal the dubiously hopeful clichs of the ma-facie case can be made to the ef- to the United Nations to condemn Mos- day. In one brutal night's work, Mos- fect that they have; that Moscow has cow, and the Soviets cast their iOith cow undercut, if it did not erase, all once again substituted force for reason, Security Council veto. U.N. Amh.\- such assumptions. For all the 'changes, and that a seemingly businesslike re- sador George Ball injected some dram.-, the Soviet Union still could not bear gime is in fact dangerously unstable. with an eloquent predawn assault on the contagion of freedom from Czecho- The answer will not be clear until it Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik's ve,. slovakia spreading into other Eastern is known whether the invasion was "What your government has done.' Balli European countries and into Russia it- caused by or will be followed by a declared, "is self-destructive. Their rc- self (see THE WORLD). power shift inside the Kremlin. But the pressive action will some day be re- From the international point of view, chances are that Moscow's blow was pudiated by their successors with the

Reproduced with permission TIME, August 30, 1968 CRS-26

hIII Ihe xiOieC. \unh the suimes. S hemince5 wien it \\.is to thlir mut it l taue.hia ed %% ) Ociw iI si 0 creeping ,, km cl ,Ind piessi c its el Sti- I ess Ih.m1 .1 scic utter the 1962 Cuban- couniiteirirSolitiOCi in 1 C). I 1hc So- an CIiLth.iea 1.V hisIii success i missile shiosl down. the partial ban on cialist Part\y ltCediership j(incd \wih iti I l 1.5 ic tel is it Jidl nuele\ir tests wis signed and ratified. prominent lIhcra Is to trge, alih g with the U.N. demand an :n par beca imse the ( icchoslova k t rae- Embargo. Congress was out of ses- Washington. that But con- eds c c ed dimg in iipss rdl sswino sion. hut a meeting of legislative lead- end to Soviet intervention. in Smi ci \meticau relations. ibis year ers supported the President. More varied demnation of Russia scarcely reached th two nations crecid to rescue each reaction may come next month when the pitch that generally goes with con- other's istronaots. extended the cultur- the Senate considers ratifi-ation of the demnation of the U.S. in Vict Nam. al exchange pact. ruitied a cosilar con- nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Approv- Leadine war critics like Dr. Benjamin veniion, and opened a direct civil i al of the pact may well he delayed. but Spock lumped Soviet aercssion with air link. The most inpor tant opening it is unlikely that the Senate will kill the the U.S. role in Viet Naim. Senators of all was the sienine of a nuclear non- agreement. One clue to Congress' atti- McCarthy and (corc McGovern oroliferatioin treats aid the agreement tide came from Senate NIajority Lcad- joined in this view. a rgiiing that Amer- to openii negot i iots to restril the pro- er Mike Mansfield, who had been press- ican interventions,. whether in the Do- duction and deployient of olensive ing for additional reductions in the U.S. minican Repnhlic or Southcast Asia, en- and defensive nuclear missiles. Seventh Army in Europe. Further cut- couraged the Russians to act and also For Johnson. this dJite was to be backs "at this time" are not feasible, he robbed the U.S. of moral authority. the historic foreign policy achievement said last week. His Republican counter- Dean Rusk dismissed parallels be- of his Administration. It was known at part. Everett Dirksen, suggested an em- tween Viet Nam and Czechoslovakia wcek's end that Washington and Mos- hargo on trade with the Soviets. In the as "moral myopia." Yet the question de- cow had agreed to tatks some time nation, there was a notable lack of hys- served to he considered. Here and there next month. probably in Geneva. The teria. The mood was one of disappoint- in Washington. amid genuine indiena- White House was apparently ready to ment and resignation rather than rage. tion. there was also an occasional lick- announce the agreement. and perhaps Despite the relative calm of both the er of professional sympathy for Russia, much more. last Wednesday. That was Administration and the public. Senator as between one world power and an- another victim of aceession. Etigene McCarthy insisted that the Gov- other ("There are. after all, not many It was swidclv believed that the an- crnment had overreacted. He carped at in the club." said one official). In both nonceictnt that never came was also Johnson's decision to call a late-night the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam, to have disclosed details of a meeting meeting of his National Security Coun- the U.S. intervened in what it con- between Johnson and Alcksei Kosygin cil to review the Czechoslovak situ- sidered a legitimate sphere of influence. -perhaps with Hubert Humphrey and ation. Arguing that the invasion did But in the Dominican Republic, the gov- Richard Nixon present for continuity's not amount to a "major world crisis," ernment had been ousted and civil w.'ar sake. Johnson had been hinting pri- the Senator said that in Johnson's place, threatened anarchy and, quite possibly, vately about the possibility of a sequel he would have "listened. to the news a new dictatorship. The U.S. interven- to (iasshoro. Such a meeting would and checked it out with one or two peo- tion restored peace. saved lives. and re- doubtless cover far more ground than plc to see whether it was accurate. sulted finally in re-establishment of elec- missile deployment. For one thing. it And then I would have said, 'Let's tive government. Thus it can hardly he might represent Johnson's final big at- ieep informed, and we'll meet in the equated with Soviet aggression against tempt to obtain Soviet assistance in set- morning.' " It was at best ill-timed fri- Czechoslovakia. tiine the Viet Nam war. Obviously, last volity to needle the Administration. at In Viet Nam, a legitimate-though week's ac!ression inhibits any imie- worst an instance of absurd misjudg- dependent-government in Saigon re- niate follow-up. Nonetheless. the White ment. At the suggestion of more real- quested U.S. assistance and continues House has refused to rule out the pos- istic advisers, McCarthy subsequently to do so. The U.S. originally entered sibility of a Johnson-Kosygin meeting. "amended" his statement to criticize on a very small scale and only after The President himself still wants to go Russia and make clear that he did con- fighting had already started. South Viet through with it. sider the invasion a serious matter. Nam was under very real attack from History suggests that the Soviets have Moral Myopia. Reaction from the within and without. These circum- an instinct for pulling back from crisis near to the far left, and antiwar groups stances hardly duplicate those in -)efore it becomes catastrophe. Besides, in general, was intriguing. The left pro- Czechoslovakia, quite apart from the past Soviet transgressions have not pre- vided some of the most outspoken crit- fact that U.S. and Russian aims in the vented Moscow and Washington from icism of the Russians (exception: the world are fundamentally and philosoph- reaching limited, specific agreements American Communist Party, which sid- ically different. To establish a real par- CRS-27

atlt withIi Sovict bschavior. one would yond which neither side darcs to go hl c to imagine Franlce's being taken without the serious risk of nuclear war. c'r through a Communist coup and re- The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are the nouncing all its military and economic sole members of the superpowers' club . lances, prompting a concerted move in which the chief rule is survival. y NATO forces against Paris. If the two giants can continue to Nor is there much basis for argument reach specific accommodations, it will that the Soviets felt free to act because not prove that either is turning soft. the U.S. is tied down in Asia. The U.S. Each respects the other's power. Each had 0no such preoccupation in 1956 knows the price and the risks of ain end- when the Russians moved with far less arms race and repeated confron- greater savagery to suppress the Hun- tations. Thus each concedes to the other, garian uprising. And the involvement in however bitterly, a degree of latitude Viet Nam was insignificant in 1962, within its own sphere. The system is when the Rtssians sanctioned erection not ideal, and it is certainly not moral, of the Berlin Wall. In all three cases, but it has one unassailable virtuC: so the only kind of effective U.S. response far, it has worked. Also, it can buy would have involved the threat of large- time for men like Alexander Dubeck. scale military action-and the proba- and others inside and outside the Com- bilit\ of World War 111. Few would munist domain, to continue striving, in arue that the stakes were worth it. some form, for freedom.

Still, the feeling persists that the U.S. might have done more to protect How the U.S. Got the Word Prague. Before the invasion, the Ad- Unknown to the world outside, War- ministration had made clear to the So- saw Pact troops were pouring across viets that the use of force might se- Czechoslovakia's borders. In his White riously jeopardize Soviet-American re- House basement office, Wait Rostow lations. Missile rattling would have been was routinely examining the backlog of meaningless because there was no will- paper that accumulates each evening ingness to back it up. The Soviets knew on the desk of the President's special as- that; Washington knew that they knew sistant for national security. The first it. Almost any overt U.S. involvement hint of crisis came at 7:05 p.m., when could well have given the Russians a Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin further excuse to crack down on Prague. told Rostow by telephone: "I have a Washington could not help being im- message from Moscow which I am pressed--and concerned-at the speed translating. I have been instructed to and efficiency with which the Soviet give it orally to the President." army had moved. No one could be In Russian-American intercourse, this sure of what would now happen in East-. ranks just below the hot line in crn Europe. ur- Would Rumania be next gency. Rostow arranged an 8 p.m. ap- on Moscow's list? Nor was it clear pointment with Lyndon Johnson. how, if at all, Moscow's new preoc- Meanwhile Johnson and Rostow con- cupation with events in Eastern Europe ferred by phone with Secretary of State would affect the Viet Nam negotiations. Dean Rusk. They were not sure the sub- What the invasion and the U.S. re- ject was Czechoslovakia, but they sus- sponse (or non-response) to it proved pected as much. At the President's reg- once again was one hard fact: the U.S. ular Tuesday luncheon a few hours and Russia still live, as they have with some modifications since World War 11, at the center of their own spheres * With Dean Rusk, U.N. Ambassador George Ball and General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of of influence. There are certain lines be- the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CRS-28

was relatively rou- earlier, a malor topic had been S kt The NSC meeting military preparedness for an invasion. tine. Ihe participants reviewed the speculat- Rusk went ahead to a Democratic Plat- skimpy information available, decided form Committee hearing. ed on the Soviets' motives, Inevitable Pause. Dobrynin arrived that a response be given to Dobrynin on time. While waiting for the pres- immediately. Rusk summoned the am- for idential summons, he complimented bassador to the State Department hear a strong- Rostow on his tan, recently acquired in an 11:30 p.m. meeting to the Virgin Islands, and complained ge- ly worded U.S. protest against the in- the nially about the capital's damp heat. vasion. Rusk specifically rejected in- "But Moscow does not regard Wash- contentions that Prague invited the been any ington as a hardship post," he chuck- tervention and that there had Be- led. Then they went upstairs to the external threat to Czechoslovakia. Washington's all first-floor Cabinet Room. Johnson twccn the lines was it could joined them after a few minutes. He or- too apparent awareness that it could openly dered a Scotch and soda for his guest, do as little in secret as its fate. a Fresca for himself. He took his cIIs- to save Czechoslovakia from tomary seat at the table's center, with Rostow on his left to take notes. Do- brynin. across six feet of dark mahog- any. settled down in Hubert Humphrey's chair. There was some more small talk, then the inevitable pause in such a meet- ing, signaling the transition to serious business. It was about 8:30. For the next five minutes, Dobrynin read from two pages of handwritten notes. What he said paralleled the mes- sage released later that night by Mos- cow: the occupation was in response to a Czechoslovak invitation: Czechoslo- vakia's security had been threatened from within and without; the entire af- fair was strictly internal Communist business. Overtaken by Events. Johnson ap- peared impassive throughout. While he gave no hint of his innermost thoughts. White House correspondents guessed that his feelings were ambivalent. The invasion damaged his master plan for further accommodation with the Rus- sians. But it also put him back in the center of action and, all too clearly. dis- comfited the Democrats who most loud- ly condemn his war policy. Johnson called a National Security Council meeting for 10 p.m., then set- tied back to watch Rusk's televised tes- timony, expecting the Secretary to make the announcement. Instead, a news bul- letin from Prague was handed to an NBC reporter in the hearing room mo- ments before the White House message reached Rusk. It was passed to Rusk and then to Platform Chairman Hale Boggs, who read it to the committee. Back at the White House, Johnson told Rostow: "Our plans have been over- taken by events." CRS-29

There was pressing new business as well. The Kremlin, after a two-week "RUSSIANS GO HOME!" truce following the reformers' triumph at the Cierna summit with the Soviet T had been a lilting summer day Ukraine rolled across from the cast. Pol- Politburo, was talking tough again. An t EasteCrn Eu rope. In the and Russian troops quickly throeUhoui ish seized editorial in Pravda two days hcfore cool of a starry evening in the Czccho- the industrial city of Ostrava in north- had accused the Czechoslovaks of "or- slovak capital of Prague. vast Wences- crn Czechoslovakia. Some 250 Soviet ganized persecution" of pro-Soviet Square was alive with couples stroll- T-54 tanks raced from Hungary into las workers and renewed the Kremlin com- ing arm in arm, tourists and Czecho- the Slovak capital of Bratislava. They plaint that Prague was failing to con- slovaks hustling homeward. Then, just hit the city at an awesome tank speed trol anti-Communist "reactionary" before midnight, telephones began to of 35 m.p.h., their smoking treads forces in the country. Also, Dub6ek jangle as friends and relatives churning the asphalt as they knocked living in up had just received a letter from Soviet border towns frantically put in calls to down lampposts, street signs, even au- Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev warning in their way. the capital. The alert was spread by tomobiles that stood that he had not lived up to his agree- taxi drivers and owners of private cars, Prague was first from the assaulted ments at Cierna. In the midst of the dis- who raced through the medieval streets air, as giant Tupolev transports, cov- cussion, a Czechoslovak military officer with their horns wailing warning. Soon cred by MIG jet fighters, began landing telephoned the news that the Soviets the roar of jet engines reverberated every minute at Ruzyn6 airport. The had invaded. Premier Oldrich Cerrk through the night skies; Russian first passengers were the paramil- planes clite took the call. "This is impossible," he were flying ominously low. At 1:10 KIKG, the Soviet se- a.m., itary units of the said. When Defense Minister Martin Radio Prague interrupted a program of cret police, whose mission was to se- Dz6r in a second call insisted that it music to confirm the worst: "Yesterday, cure the capital's airfields, railroad sta- was all too possible, Cernik hung up on August 20, about I I p.m., troops of tions, cable offices and broadcast cen- with a hoarse cry: "Treason, betrayal!" the Soviet Union. the Polish People's ters. It was perhaps at Ruzyn6 that the "How could they do this to me?" Republic and the Hungarian People's first sign of Czechoslovakia's remark- asked a dazed Dubeek. "I have served Republic, the German Democratic Peo- able campaign of passive resistance ap- the cause of the Soviet Union and Com- ple's Republic and the Bulgarian Peo- peared. The airport officials refused to munism all of my life." Only Indra, ple's Republic crossed the frontiers of supply the -Soviet planes with fuel. At Kolder and Bilik seemed unsurprised the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." nearby Pardubice airport, the Russians by the invasion, raising the suspicion Striking with stunning speed and sur- had to set up their own control tower that it was they who had provided Mos- prise, some OO,000 soldiers of the five after Czechoslovak air force officers re- cow with the slim pretext for the in- Warsaw Pact countries punched across fused to guide the arriving armada down vasion. That pretext, as described by the Czechoslovak border to snuff out to the landing strip. Forbidden by the Tass, was "that party and government the experiment Dubeek government to shoot back eight-month-old by Al- at leaders" of Czechoslovakia "have asked exander Dubeck's regime in humanizing the overwhelming force of invaders, the the Soviet Union and other allied states Communism. Russian and East German Czechoslovaks, from high army officers to render the fraternal Czechoslovak units smashed southward from East' down to shoeshine boys, quickly es- people urgent assistance, including as- Germany. Forces thrusting from the tablished a principle and stuck to it sistance with armed forces." through the days that followed: any- Bilik, in fact, admitted as much and, thing that the Warsaw Pact intruders along with Kolder, urged the Presid- wanted done they must do themselves. ium to cooperate with the Russians.- With few exceptions, the invaders found But the reformers were adamant. Na- no collaborators. tional Assembly President Josef New Business. As Moscow undoubt- Smrkovsky hastened off to convene an cdly knew, Dubeck's Presidium was as- sembled in the yellow stucco headquar- ters of the Communist Central Com- mittee at the very moment the invasion began, It met regularly on Tuesday eve- nings, ;I circumstance that saved the So- victs the trouble of tracking the Czecho- slovak leaders to their homes to arrest them. On the agenda of the session was the special party congress duc to be held on Seot. 9. at which Duheck and his colleagues dedicated to reform and liberalization attended to oust the list of the hard-core conservatives on the Central Committee, among them Presidium Members Alois Indra, Dra- homir Kolder and Vasil BilAk. Kolder and Indra brought to the session a mem- orandum stating that the party was los- ing control of the country and that s >.Cithing had to be done. Dubeck's ma- jority on the Presidium rejected it.

IMPIP, 'g.paq I ""I. , WI I z -11 1 CRS-30

Whenever the tanks stopped, the in- Ic ss s arrested his wife carrying a (,/ecloslovak flag emnercencs session. terrogations bcgan-surely some of his- .\A emulv coniiniurd to ped a Soviet pirirupcr near the there. 1,i the tory's most curious confrontations be- juil meet throiighou ihe ' cek, \\ith 169 of Central (ommittec h iihhrm2an l'raue. twccn conqueror and conquered. its 300 l)epuities in defiant sessiOi. Cer- Another paratrooper qucly turned and Hounded by questions, many of the to r.dis jh. 'lelrnment, and shot the man to dfeith: his blood soaked rilk leti Russians-some of whom were youths was into custody at his office. the flag, which was lat er passeId ;imong tAken no older than 18-looked nervous and crowds of street protesters aisa symbol Dubeck refused to irs to escape %and, stared blankly into the distance to avoid members, waited of Russian brutality and C/echoslovak wIth other Presidiumni further embarrassment. A few told ring the build- for the Russian troops to crowds in the street that they were in heroism. of- The only pitched battle in the first in: he was seized 1v 15 Soviet Czechoslovakia to protect the people ficers and plainclothesmen in his hours of occupation occurred when ollice. from "cotinterrevolution" or the "re- Russian troops tried to invest the of- Vise of Power. It was morning be- actionaries in West Germany. But ficcs of Radio Prague. About 40 staff fore most Czechoslovaks came face to many had little notion of their mission members were barricaded inside, and face with the reality of the invasion, and were apologetic. "We are only fol- snipers fired from the perches in and and by then thinks were lumbering lowing orders," a youitihfil paratrooper around the building. Three municipal through the streets of Prague and the said to an iratc questioner in Prague. bus drivers placed their vehicles at the entire c01untry lay in the vise of Soviet "*We have our orders. Surely you, too, corner of Italian and Vinohradski power. The occupation force was large- Wcre once a soklier and know what it streets, near the Radio Prague building, ly in place: twelve Russian mechanized means. The political decisions are not as barriers to keep Soviet tanks from divisions, one division of troops from our affair." getting near the building. Street crowds Poland and one from East Germany, Then, Tirte Correspondents Peter watching the battle managed to drag along with token units from Hungary Forbath and Friedel Ungeheucr report- two giant steel derricks in the path of and a few from Bulgaria that had been ed from Prague, the Czechoslovaks' the tanks as well. Youths lobbed Mol- brought in ships to Russia across the mood began to change. Mobs of youths otov cocktails at the armor stalled along Black Sea. The Germans were pru- mounted squat tanks, forcing their crews the street. dently kept out of sight in the coun- to disappear inside the hatch. Like el- Finally, the tanks clanked over the tryside. because Czechoslovaks remem- ephant trunks swatting at flies, their obstacles, crunching them out of the her all too vengefully the last visit by gun turrets swung around eerily in an way and moving within short range of German troops in 1939. effort to knock off the screaming, chant- the building. Paratroops darted inside The long guns of tanks swiveled from ing Czechoslovaks, who also bombarded and the battle was over. The station, side to side in the baroque alleyways the tanks with bricks, painted their which had been calling for support of of Prague. The Russians surrounded flanks with swastikas, and dumped gar- the legal government, signed off by play- the presidential palace on Hraddany bage on their hot engine covers to cre- ing the national anthem, but came back Hill, planted artillery on the heights of ate a stench. Daring youths in Prague on the air a short while later, trans- Letni Hill, where a mammoth statue and Bratislava even charged the tanks mitting from a secret studio. Flames of Stalin once overlooked the city. In and set a few afire with flaming pieces poured not only from the Radio Prague Old Town Square. they even placed of carpet and bottles of gasoline. In re- office but also from other buildings six antiaircraft guns by the Jan Hus sponse, the tanks chased the youths along Vinohradski. In a scene recalling monument, the symbol of Czechoslo- into alleys and side streets with volleys fiercer battles in the streets of Buda- vakia's historic quest for liberty. Ev- of machine-gun fire. One tank retali- pest in 1956, a Russian tank and two ar- crywhere, paratroops in purple berets ated by blasting away at the fagade of mored ammunition carriers burned in stood guard alongside tank crews in the National Museum in Prague. the streets. full battle dress. cradling automatic ri- Socked in Blood. Though the Rus- Throughout the country, black flags fles in their laps. In swiftness of exe- sians had obviously been ordered to of mourning appeared on buildings, stat- cution, the invasion had been a model .shoot only if seriously provoked, they ties and monuments. On walls, barn military operation. But the occupation had also been told not to brook any se- doors. highway signs, car and store win- was soon to prove quite another matter rious challenge to their authority in the (lows, the Czechoslovaks tacked up post- in ways that the Sovicts had not fore- streets. In Brno, an industrial city in ers and chalked messages demanding seen. The Czechoslovaks, as the invad- Moravia, Soviet troops opened fire on in all the languages of the Warsaw ers discovered to their discomfiture, a jeering worker and killed him. In Pact that the invaders go home. One were simply not impressed. Prague, a Soviet tank blasted a truck- message scrawled on a wall in Prague On the first day of the occupation, load of workers with machine-gun fire, read: "Lenin, wake up. Brezhnev has Czechoslovak crowds surged around the blowing off the head of one and killing gone mad!" Said another: "Hungarians, alien tankers and sentries and virtually three others. A middle-aged man and go home. Have you not had enough of smothered them in fraternal attentions. these things?" Wenceslas Square turned As the tanks moved down Wenceslas into a lect of Czechoslovak flags bob- Square, youths marched to their front bing on a sea of demonstrators, who and rear, shouting in chorus, "Long shouted in the direction of the 20 tanks live Dubcek! Russians go home!" The parked among them: "Russian murder- statue of King Wenceslas was covered crs, go home!" with boys waving the red, white and blue Czechoslovak flag. Atop the king's head, they erected posters proclaiming HURRAH, DU1HEK and U.S.S.R., GO HOME. WE ARE A FREE NATION, CRS-31

Thousands of foreign tourists were any arresIs.) "You know where yoI.i out of the 1,500 delegates elected last caught in Czcchoslovakia when the Rus- no live," said a [rc: rcidii. "Thei ics July to attend the congress managed to sians camc. Among them were 4,000 ge- need for the rascals to know.' When So- reach the secret meeting place. Many the International Gco- ologists attending viet ollicers asked residents of Brati- were smuggled inside dressed in blue logical Congress. The Russian delegates slava where the clandestine radio st;a- wcre so by the invasion overalls and carrying fake identity embarrassed ol was, they were sent in every di- cards; a few with familiar faces were their name tags. The Railway work- that they removed rection hut the righi one. brou>h to the plant hidden in factory U.S. in eastern embassy hired 20 buses to help ers and local miiliiimen ambulances. They promptly elected not transport some 1.500 stranded Amcr- every method Slovakia reportedly tried only a liberalized Central Commitee onetime Film Star Shir- with icans, including to prevent the arri val of a train but a new party Presidium-minus such Temple Black and TV Actor Rob- would enable ley electronic equiii pmne nt that hard-liners as Kolder and Indra. Dub- 'ert (U.N.C.L.E.) Vaughn, to West Ger- to locaite and jam the se- the Russians 6ck, who was in Russian custody, was many and Austria. Tourists streamed cret radio transmitters. again named party chief by the del- out of the country in their cars, often Hidden in Ambulances. Indeed, it egates, who also issued a declaration de- driving past menacing Soviet tanks look as though the whole re- began to manding that the Soviet armies leave parked at lonely countryside junctions sistance effort had been well plotted by the country and threatening a general with their guns pointed at the road. before the invasion. the government strike on Friday if they did not. The Czechoslovaks at first begged the sole- Clearly, people were not operating After the clandestine radio network tourists to stay and aid them in their initiative. The studios ly on their own broadcast the declaration, virtually the struggle, then put them to work car- and equipment for the secret stations entire nation stopped work for one hour rying out mail for relatives abroad and must have been set up in advance. and film to show the world what was hap- at noon the next day. Many joined scores of journalists and techniciani had in solemn demonstrations. About 60 pening. As the tourists left the country, what to do and where been briefed on youths linked arms and walked through Czechoslovak frontier guards urged to go. Thc clandestine printing presses Wenceslas Square in Prague, asking the them to mobilize opinion against the had also been primed. Taxi drivers were crowds to leave the square to the tanks. Russians when they got home. Mean- ten-point leaflet of soon distributing a A deadly hush fell over the square as while, many Czechoslovaks on vacation instructions that said: hurried home to join the struggle. "I) Until oar leaders are released, go the people drifted away, cea rly irm- Stronger than Tanks. That struggle into passive resistance and go on strike nerving the Russians. ' hen the city siid- grew more and more coordinated-and if necessary. 2) Do not collaborate with denly exploded in noise as drivers in cunning-as the Czechoslovaks mobi- the forces of occupation. 3) Talk to cars leaned on their horns, factory whis- lized all their resources to baffle, sty- the soldiers in Russian [to persuade tles sounded and church bells rang. mie and frustrate their occupiers. The them of the Czech point of view], ex- Soviet Viceroy. Meanwhile the So- campaign was directed and inspired by plain, paint slogans, print lealets. 4) If vict ambassador to Praauc. Stepan radio stations that continued to operate threatened, claim that you do not un- Chervonenko, acting like a Soviet vice- secretly throughout the country-re- derstand Riussi an or any other Language. roy, feverishly tried to put together a portedly with transmitters provided by 5) If pressed, play the fool. 6) Support workable government. The R ussians im- the Czechoslovak army-after the Rus- free TV and radio stations. 7) Try to posed a 10 pi.-to-5 a.m. curfew in the streets, sians had shut down the regular gov- prevent Russian propaganda and jam tore down inflainmatory ernment transmitters. "We have no their stat ions. 8) Support all our pro- posters, and issued stern warnings weapons, but our contempt is stronger gressive leaders. 9) Expose collaborators against provocations. They also set up than tanks." proclaimed one such sta- and those that are weak in character, their ovn newspaper and a radio sta- tion near Bratislava. The station sug- 10) Prepare your setlf to take further tion called Radio Vltava. which couilid gested that its listeners "switch around steps should the occupation not come hardly- compete with the free. stations. street signs, take house numbers from to an end." Russian security men hcgan arresting the doors, remove nameplates from pub- So resourceful were the Czcehoslo- liberal intellectuals who had caused cha- lic buildings and, when a Soviet sol- vaks that they held a conference that grin in the Kremlin. Among those held dier asks you something, say that you was one of the irritants leading to the in- inder house arrest was Ladislav Mna. don't understand Russian." vasion right under the RussIans' nose. ko, author of the novel The Taiu' of The people did just that. They moved With Russian troops everywhere in and Power, who was locked up. along with so many road signs and town markers around Prague, the special party con- the editors of Svohodn Slovo in the newspaper's otlice in order to misdirect Soviet troops that Lress that had been set for Sept. 9 con- in Prague. it was impossible for a stranger to find vened in the CKD machine-tool factory his way without constantly consulting a in a Prague suburb. More than 1,200 map. They also switched number and name signs on hoiises and apartments So thal Stiviet secriii y police coiled not find Czechoslovaks whom they sought to arrest. (The Czechoslovak Interior Ministry had already refused to make CRS-32

License Numbers. Back home, the Back in Moscow, the Soviet propa- Pr.i: iC, and from the first his words at- to show ganda machinc, slow in starting, had tem ted to reassure. "There is no way Czechoslovak people continued finally begun cranking out excuses for bac, from freedom and democracy. The the same sort of solidarity with Dub- of the military action. In a I 3.000-word ed- situ; tion must he solved rapidly and cek as Svoboda had shown. Many itorial, Pravda offered detailed criticism the troops must leave." them wore red, white and blue cor- IVAN GO HOME! plac- of the behavior of the leading Prague A ternoon Off. Svoboda soon de- sages and carried progressives, describing Duhbek as a cided that he wanted to talk directly ards. They burned propaganda leaflets "betrayer of Communist ideals." Pravda with the Kremlin leaders; Moscow dropped from Soviet helicopters. Hun- was particularly severe in condemning are .d that he could come, but insisted dreds of thousands of citizens in fac- the plans for a party purge; it spoke of tihat representatives of the conservatives tories, sports clubs and professional as- an atmosphere of real pogrom and on the Presidium must also be rep- sociations signed petitions calling upon moral execution." After the takeover, resented. Bilik and Indra ioincd the del- Svoboda to declare Czechoslovakia neu- Tass even claimed that the secret party section. as did another conservative, tral and withdraw from the Warsaw congress in Prague was a reactionary at- Jin Piller. the party boss of Middle Bo- Pact. Radio Prague began broadcasting tempt to take over the government-a hemia. To balance the line-up, Svo- the license-plate numbers of secret po- feat that was hardly possible while So- boda was also permitted t:o bring along lice cars so that people could slash viet tanks were in the streets. To prevent three Dubeck loyalists: Defense Min- their tires. the real story from reaching their own sister Di'r. Minister of Justice Bohus- In this frustrating atmosphere, some people, the Russians began to jam the lav Ktiira and Central Committeeman Russian soldiers were getting triggcr- Voice of America broadcasts for the Gustav Husaik. It began to look like happy and tough. Retaliating against first time in five years. Cierna all over again-but on the Krem- lone snipers who took potshots at them Reassuring Words. While the So- lin's terms. Before leaving. Svoboda during the night, they sent up flares victs were trying to create at least a asked the nation via clandestine radio and raked whole neighborhoods with modicum of government over the re- to "*have trust in me." small-arms fire. After they spotted some calcitrant Czechoslovaks, the destiny of Unreality ruled once more when Svo- armed men on the roof of the Rud6 the nation's reformist vision of Com- boda arrived in Moscow. The white- Pravo newspaper office, Soviet machine munism was being debated behind haired general was given a 21-gun sa- gunners opened fire, riddling the build- closed doors in both Prague and Mos- lute, presented with flowers and bussed ing's facade and shattering windows; cow. Dubeek and Cernik were flown on both checks by Brczhnev. Kosygin their targets turned out to be Russian off to Moscow in a Soviet military jet. and President Nikolai Podgorny, who troops. The soldiers began firing with- The Czechoslovaks at first broadcast re- had come to the airport to greet him. out warning at anyone seen in the streets ports that Dubek had been killed, but Together the four rode in an open car, after the 10 p.m. curfew. In Prague, that was cleared up in one of the many waving to thousands of Russians who they killed at least three people and weird, almost unreal vignettes of the had been given the afternoon off, odd- wounded two in one night, bringing week. Dubeek's mother marched in to ly enough. to hail the conquered hero. the total number of those killed in the see the local Soviet commander in Bra- When Svoboda sat down with Brezh- capital during the occupation to 20 and tislava, demanding to know what the ncv in the Kremlin. he discovered that the wounded to 300. As many as 30 Russians had done with her son. Slight- the Russians wanted to talk only with more may have been killed in the rest ly dumfounded, the Russian officer told. him and the six men that had come of the country. her: "We are negotiating with him." with him from Prague. Svoboda de- In the streets, conversation between The Russians were also negotiating manded that Dubeck and Cernik be in- the people and the troops suddenly in Prague with President Ludvik Svo- cluded. When Brezhnev demurred, Svo- ceased. Free radio broadcasts and leaf- boda, who as head of state could pro- boda threatened to break off all nego- lets advised that the Soviet press was vide a stamp of legitimacy for a pup- tiations. and Brezhnev gave in. Svo- printing photos of Czechoslovaks and pet government-and who commands hoda then informed the Czechoslovaks Russians talking in Prague as proof immense popular prestige in both in a message broadcast over Prague's that a warm reception was being given Czechoslovakia and Russia as a World free radio station that Dubeck "was at the troops. Any Czech caught speaking War I1 leader of the Czechoslovak army his side" in the Kremlin confrontation. to the soldiers, these messages said, that fought with the Soviets against Hit- would be branded a traitor. Though 1cr. Though troops ringed his residence the people had little notion of the prog- in Hradeany Castle, Svoboda was able ress of the Moscow negotiations, they to broadcast over the free radio in C"RS-33

knew that their fate hung on them. more than an hour." One report said Nearly 15,000 of them lined the route that Svoboda wa- promising to reim- from Ruzyn6 airport to the city, wait- pose a degree of censorship and brake ing in vain some four hours to wel- the democratization a bit as part of a po- conic back their leaders and get some litical compromise. The Russians, in re- clue to the outcome of the talks. turn, would permit not only Dub6ck For a time last week, rumors raced but also Cernik and Smrkovsky to con- through Europe that the Soviets might tinue in office. This would leave mat- straighten out a few more ideological ters pretty much where they stood after frontiers while they were at it in Cierna-except that Soviet tanks would Czechoslovakia. Pravda ominousLy still be in Czechoslovakia as enforcers charged that both Rumania's Ceausescu of the agreement. There were even re- and Yugoslavia's Tito were siding with ports that the party bosses from Hun- the "reactionaries" in the Prague re- gary, Poland, East Germany and Bul- gime. But both Communist leaders made garia might conic to Moscow to give it clear that if their countries were at- their endorsement to such an accord. tacked, the invaders would have a shoot- Whether the Czechoslovak people ing resistance on their hands, unlike would accept it remained to be seen. the situation in Czechoslovakia. The ar- Having tasted the heady air of free- mies of both countries were put on dom the past eight months and in their alert. Tito and Ceausescu were con- own way tested their mettle against So- cerned enough over Czechoslovakia. in viet tanks last week, they might .well in- fact, to get together for talks in the Yu- sist on a greater say in their own des- goslav village of Ursac. The two con- tiny in the future. Passive resistance is sidered calling for a European Com- an art that, once mastered, can be ap- munist Party summit to deal with the plied in more than one situation. crisis. That might prove to he a highly uncomfortable gathering for Moscow (set' following story). What sort of bargain Svoboda and Duhbek might be able to strike in Mos- cow remained problematical. Pravda's massive editorial sounding the warning on the invasion made it clear that the Kremlin wants to he assured of several things before it withdraws its army. The Russians insist that the old-line cad- res he kept in their jobs in the party and government. They want press free- doms curtailed. They want guarantees that Czechoslovakia's economy will re- main oriented toward the Soviet bloc. Many Czechoslovaks were encour- aged by the length of Svohoda's stay in Moscow. "If the Soviets had been convinced that they were right," said Agriculture Minister Josef 13orvka, "the negotiations would not have lasted CRS-34

WHY DID THEY DO IT?

aslolih)ig as. lh e C\Ciis of th So there was never any argument in "w\eek werclc. they\ x\ere no more mv the Kremlin over the necessity of bring- terious than the motiVes 'nd timing'c,f ing the Czechoslovaks to heel, only a the men who triggecred thcem ill M, dispute about how best to do it. The cow. One of the real dramas of the in precedent of Hungary in 1956 provid- vasioi of Czechoslovaka. took place iin ed a proven way, but one that carried the Krenlin. whose leaders have beci opprobrium. Nonetheless, the Soviets locked in debate for weeks about wheth took it, well aware that the world was er to strike down Alexander Dubeck' s certain to cry shame, and in the full liberal reforms. Why did Russia's lead- knowledge that it would destroy any ers finally decide to use fists instead of chance of the conference of Communist flexibility? parties scheduled for this winter. In The a swser is that fihe dangers coil - that conference, Moscow had hoped to Situated by Dubeck' c Vechoslovaki, demonstrate once and for all to Peking fitilly catie, in their estiiation, to out -its lcldcrship of world wcigh CommunisIii. all the dangerous con- WVestern experts have sequences assembled four of invasion. The theories to explain why Russia Kremlin leaders chose the must have violent tactic now. One possibility come to the conclusion is that that the Soviets never considered Czechoslovakia's experiment seriously any other solution to the Czechoslovak would sooner or later prove problem. The sweet reasonableness fatal to the system at that they Cierna was all a feint. They had so carefully constructed could also have come to Cierna in the hope of find- Since World Wair IL. Freedom ing-and aiding-a (4 speech and of the rebellious rump press, the group in Dubeck's right of free assembly, party leadership, and criti- failed. Or they might have decided, cism both from within after the watching post-Cierna Czechoslovakia, party and political clubs out- that Dtih&k side it-all simply could not or (i( not threatened to un- wnt to deliver dermine and on their demands of eventually de- holding stroy Eastern European Com- down his reforms. Finally, the invasion could munism. Poland, Hungary, have been a by-product East Germany of a power shift inside the Kremlin, an were all suscep- excuse tible to the Czechoslovak ex- to expose the failure of the cur- rent leadership ample and in danger of even- to cope with Russia's tually going their -problems. If so, the change need not own ways. necessarily A Domestic Issue. appear immediately; Brezh- To the nev Soviets. that was a threat and Co. might have to repair their far mistakes more direct than any matter before stepping down. of Marxist Rendering unto Moscow. The most orthodoxy or ide- telling ology. From Czarist clue lies not in what the Rus- days. the sians Russians have sought to did bring with them to Czecho- mold slovakia a hufTer between themselves but what they did not: a new and Western Europe from the government. Had the political decision to bring Dubdek Baltic to the Black Sea. under control or to oust him outright Czechoslovakia runs like a been in readiness long, the Soviets dagger from Europe into the would have followed up their efficient Soviet Union and sits next military takeover with an door to East Germany, equally efficient installation of a ruling the order shield of the Soviet bloc's de- more to their liking. Instead, they placed fense system. In a sense, Dub~ek's grow- the country in a state of sus- pended ing unruliness-and the invasion of his political animation, letting a sur- rounded Parliament country to bring it back in line-was a continue to meet, near-domestic issue for Moscow, not an international one. This was all the truer because, inside Russia, the youth and intellectuals-among others- seemed electrified by the spectacle of Czechoslovak reform. CRS-35

The pcrmhitting "detained" leaders to theory that a new, go on hard-line bargaining. Having gone all the wav mil- group has gained as- itarily, cendancy In the Kremlin's the Russians then hesitated po- lab- litically. Having forcibly grasped their yrinthine power politics is in- victim, the Russians seemed to he try- triguing, but far from de- ing to bring oil a rape with consent. monstrable. As the theory The caution evident politically last goes, Russia's ruling troika- week would seem to suggest that the Kosygin, Brezhnev and Pod- Russian leaders had approached their gorny-were called back from dramatic meeting with Dtibdek. at OCir- their Black Sea vacations by na with the hope of regaining sway the party's new upper hand over Czechoslovakia nonforcibly. if not and presented with the deci- sion to invade amicably. It is quite likely that they ex- as a fail ac- pected to find a clique of dissidents in comp/i. Aleksandr Shelepin, former chief Dubck's entourage through whom they of secret police and a long- could work for subversion. Duhbek, time Brezhnev rival, is rumored to have however, was able to draw the line so put together the new alliance, which clearly between the right of Czecho- would probably include army leaders slovaks to run their own na- and militant young technocrats. tional affairs and Russi a's in- At any rate, the Soviets pounced, ternational claims as bloc lead- and now must try to translate their mil- er that just before the con- itary takeover of Czechoslovakia into a realization ference opened he won a of the political ends that in- unanimous vote of commit tee spired it. It will not be easy. At best, confidence. To the Russians, the invasion was too clumsy and too late chagrin, the entire Czechoslo- to rescue a vacillating policy. At vak delegation came to Cier- worst, it may prove a disaster destroy- na determined to renJer unto ing forever Moscow's claim to lead- ership Moscow only what was Mos- in the Communist world. It may cow's. Two weeks later. East temporarily halt the trend toward more Germany's Walter Ullbricht freedom in Eastern Europe and shore journeyed to Karlovy up Russia's buffer against the outside Vary world and presumably reported to for a little longer. But ultimate- Moscow that the Czechoslo- ly, the invasion can only serve to en- courage vaks had been completely Lin- the strong forces of nationalism chastened by C'ierna, that the and liberalization that arc at work contagion of reform was sure throughout the former Soviet empire. to spread, both within and without Czechoslovakia. CRS-3 .

THE REACTION: DISMAY AND DISGUST The protests were laced with a deep the opportunity to OR once. the (Coiuii,1i1st and ton- rip Moscow. "This is sense of disappointment that the So- the most barefaced and typical specimen Communist \Oi ltks-and ome victs had regressed to their bad old of faecist power politics by countries that finld 11benisel Ies im be- the Soviet ways. "It turns the clock back to the scabs," said China's Premier tsw een--inmd Chou En- in a centerd condenn- darkest days of the cold war," said lai. As Peking saw it, the whole tion of So\ iet foicc. I he Irec world is episode New Zealand's Prime Minister Keith J. was the result of a plot accustomed to condemnint Russian in- by the U.S. and Holyoakc. Most Western experts saw the Soviets to divide up the world be- roads and iIt rasieen:e. itom the brit- the invasion as a cruel blunder. Said tween themselves. Still, it was indeed tal putdown of the11 unearin revolt to British Sovietologist Victor Zorza: "The an extraordinary experience the erection of the berlin Wall In the to find rape of Czechoslovakia, which was in- Communist China condemning a coun- most Conimunist countries and Past, tended to preserve the old order, will try's loss of freedom in stronger terms parties have either whoicheartedly s'ip- only speed up its disintegration." than did the U.S. ported such transgressions-or at least In Eastern Europe, Alexander Dub- The Russian invasion, in fact, em- closed their es es to them-but no long- &ek's two Communist allies were, if any- barrassed Communists most in areas cr. Last week, in one country after an- thing. stronger in their protest. "The where local feeling runs high against other, Communists found themselves atack on Czechoslovakia," said Yugo- on the side of the Czechoslovaks. slavia's Marshal Tito, foreigninterven and where t e "is a significant Communists themselves, Of the world's 88 C communist par- historical rupture in the relations haid poundcJ among away hardest at U.S. ties,. only ten endorsed the Soviet ac- Socialist countries." Rumanian involvcent II Presi- Viet Nam and the Dominican Repub- tion. and many of those were Eastern dent and Party Boss Nicolac Ceausescu lic. Throughout Asia, Communists fclt European countries within range of So- called it "a great mistake, a grave dan- uncomfortable viet tanks. Never in the 100-year his- about the Ru ssin ac- ger to peace." tions. 'With the exception of CastroS tor\ of the international Communist Though the Warsaw Pact countries movement had a single act so stunned, party in Cuba, I alin American Com that joined the Soviets in the invasion munists broke dismayed and divided the followers of with Moscow. Bit ith issued only official communiques of self- most agonized reaction M\1ar\ and Lenin. 'Commiunism as an in- of all came from congratulation. their people clearly did the Communist parties of Western Eu- strument of Soviet foreign policy is not share that sentiment. In East Ber- rope. In the early 1950s, the Western dead." said a former European Am- lin, for example, hundreds of people flat- bassador to Moscow. New Left Phi- European parties abandoned their rev- ly refused the demand of party work- olutionary tactics and went respectable. losopher Herbert Marcuse spoke for ers to sign petitions in support of the Since then, they have been trying. with many sympathizers of Leninism when intervention. instead, they came to the only a fair amount of success. to con- he called the Russian invasion "the most Czechoslovak cultural center, where Yince voters that a Communist gov- tragic event of the postwar era" they left bouquets and thought, as some ernment does not necessarily entail a Flagrant Violation. The reaction said. "souvenirs of Dub~ek." throughout the free world was predict- suppression of political opponents or Broader Appeal. Beyond the range loss of freedom. Dub'ek's Czechoslo- ably hitter. Charles de Gaulle, his bridge of Russian guns, only three Communist building to the East in ruins, deplored vakia, if only it had lasted, would have governments endorsed the Soviet action. been their best the attack on "the rights and destiny of advertisement. When a f:-iendly nation" and rapped the Rus- Two of them, North Viet Nam and the Russian tanks rumbled in, sians for still beine so old-fashioned as Cuba, are heavily dependent on Russian that hope evaporated. For the first time since its to think of Europe in terms of blocs. arms and aid. The third. , founding in 1920. the French Communist Prime Minister Harold Wilson called customarily sides with the Russians in Party denounced the So- the attack "a flagrant violation of all ac- the Sino-Soviet dispute. On the other viet line. "The French Party expresses its surprise cepted standards of international be- hand, the most biting protest of all came and reprobation," bannered L'Humanit6, havior." In New Delhi. Prime Minister from, of all places, China. Mao and Co. the Paris Communist pa- would Indira Gandhi expressed her "concern not think of tolerating a Dubeek per. The Italian Communist Party, in which won and anguish," but her statement was China, and they have berated Mos- more than a quarter of the votes in not strong enough to please members cow precisely because it has been soft the last national elections. ex- of Parliament, who filled the chamber on reformers and "revisionists." Logical- pressed "grave dissent" with the Rus- sians. In with cries of "Dubeek! Dubeek!" Dem- ly, therefore, the Chinese should have fact. every major Communist onstrations took place throughout the given the Russians good marks for party in Western Europe turned its back free world. In Bonn. German students learning their lesson. But Peking seized on Moscow. That may turn out to he a mobbed the car of Soviet Ambassador very wise move. If they retain their in- Tsarapkin. In Tokyo, leftist students dependence, the Communist parties in Western Europe for the might finally have a first time in history marched on chance the Soviet embassy in protest. to develop into truly national parties. As such. they might have more appeal to a broader spectrum of voters' than they have had in the past, when hey owed their ultimate allegiance to a foreign power. What they would have :o offer the voters in the way of a pro- gram that goes beyond antiquated Marxism is another matter. CRS-37

HISTORIC QUEST FOR FREEDOM Love; tin' Trth. 1,t Others ha'e their Even so, the land passed into 3( 0 'As Hitler rose to power in Ger- ItIlh. (111d th , th wii prevail. 1 years of- Habsburg domination. In hop)e many. the Germans in Czechoslo- of quelling the country's continuous ui "I- vakia saw a redeemecr who would T HOSE Nsords of Czechoslovakia' rest, Joseph If in 1781 granted an Edii them home. Hitter was de- national :t bring icro. Jan Hus. arc en - of Toleration, an agreement that gave lighted to oblige. He charged that craved on the base of his statue ii the people the right to speak their Jar the country's citizens of German or- Prague. Last week. as Soviet tanks guage and to have a mcaure of being mistreated and must clanked into the capital, a haveigin werehis protection. someone tonomy under Bohemian kings. A Bencs, who by limned the graven letters flos in red chal k ring of art and literature followed Vd then had succeeded Masaryk as so that they stood out sharply on th Czech national d. President, needed international sup- grey granite. feelings reached a biig The words were spoke I pitch in the 19th century, port in order to stand up to Hitler. 550 years encouraged F' ago, at a time when the Bo. a historian named Frantisek 'y But the mood in Europe was one of hemians. who Palack now are known as Czechs who emphasized his Y, appeaseIment. British Prime Minister were trying to people's identity h Y Neville win a measure of rc- writing about their long Chamberlain observed that ligious struggle fc r and national autonomy within freedom. "The Hussite he did not see why England should the Holy war," Palack Roman Empire. But they wrote, "is the first war Y go to war "because of a quarrel in remain a in history tha a faraway poignant reminder of a de- was fought not for material country between people termined people's interest s of whom we long search for but for intellectual ones-for ideals." know nothing." freedom. At the Munich Conference Despite such long striving, Czecho in "Whoever is master of Bohemia, - 1938, France and Britain forced slovakia is, politically speaking, a is master of Europe," declared youn g Czechoslovakia to Bis- country that did not gain its cede to Germany marck. Between periods of self-rule indepen - its western border areas, the Su- dence Bohemia fell to the Avars in the until 50 years ago. Even then, ii t detenland where most of the Ger- 5th took World century. later to the German em- War I and two remarkable man-speaking population lived. In re- men to perors of the Holy Roman Empire achieve that. They were Thom. turn, Hitier promised to make as no and finally to the Habsburgs Garrigue Masaryk, a philosophy pro- more territorial demands of the fessor, in Europe. Austro-Hungarian Empire. and his colleague and ultimate Six months later, however, German The successor, Czechs and the Slovaks were per- Eduard Bene', who had been tanks stormed into Prague without one of his haps the first people in Central Eu- students at Prague.' When warning, and Nazi Propaganda Chief rope to develop the war broke out, they slipped out of a sort of- natural. their Joseph Goebbels read Hitler's de- identity, and their first homeland to work abroad for cree to stunned Czechoslovak weapon was Czechoslovak radio religon. They won from Rome the freedom. A master of listeners: "Czechoslovakia has ceased right to conduct their religious ser- public persuasion, Masaryk traveled to to exist!" Benes, who fled the U.S. and abroad, vices in Slavonic in the 9th century. argued the case for his tried to make people outside his country's freedom Partially as a result of this inde- so well that Presi- country see that what dent Wilson included had happened pendencc. the Czechs started the Ref- autonomy for the there soon would be repeated else- peoples ormation 100 years before Luther. of the Austro-Hungarian Em- where. Soon enough, all the world The pire among his 14 points for revolt was led by Jan Hus. who tlement a peace set- realized that he was right. called for a reform of the Catholic in Europe. Church and encouraged laymen to Feeling guilty about the Czechoslo- participate in thc sacrament of the In 1918, as the German and Austro- vaks, the British allowed Benes to form Eucharist. Hungarian empires crumbled in defeat, a wartime exile government in London. Hus Masaryk was burned at the stake as a and Bene. went home to put Meanwhile, though they had offered no heretic. their concepts Taking the chalice as their of freedom into practice. resistance at the time of the German in- symbol. his followers founded the From the first. the Czechoslovaks vasion, the Czechoslovaks waged an un- Hussite sect. which was based on sec- proved that they could indeed govern derground war against 9 the occupiers. ular religion and nationalism. In themselves. During the turbulent 1 20s In one of their retaliation moves. the 1618, after and early Emperor Matthias tried 1930s, while democratic gov- Germans wiped out the entire village to check the growth of Protestantism, ernments gave way to dictatorships in of Lidice. After Germany's defeat. Czech patriots in Prague tossed two neighboring countries. the Czechoslo- Benes took his regime to Prague and imperial officials from the windows vaks retained a parliamentary govern- started anew. He faced tremendous ob- mient. of Hradeany Castle. In retaliation, the pursued moderate policies and stacles. At the Yalta Conference in Habsburg armies crushed the Hussites, enjoyed relative economic stability. Eth- 1945, Roosevelt and Churchill acceded executed their leaders, burned Czech Bi- nically. however, the nation was a me- to Stalin's demand that Czechoslovakia bles and outlawed the language. Though lange of peoples-the dominant Czechs, fall into his sphere of influence after overwhelmed, the Czechs and Slovaks restive Slovaks and some 3.000,000 the war. As a result, when General waged a passive resistance. As Frie- Germans who wanted to be united with George Patton's tanks prepared to lib- drich Schiller later reflected: the Reich. This Bohemian land for which we fight has no love for its master, who con- quered it only by force of arms and not by coftnon consent. It seethes against the tyranny of faith. CRS-38

History has molded the Czechoslo- cr0ic l(.(:o inI hI w Jr \irin L Ortd'rs Ceni mi nim \tticd Jicad jarte ~ inmaks a very special way. As their to hlt. 1hI RI s cot the honor of folk hero, they exalt the Good Soldier Schweik, who is freeing the ciplatl. In thcir wake camne a sort of fictional monument to their cadres of ('/eChoslox k Communists own native ability \ho had spent the war in Moscow. to outsmart their oppressors by playing Aided by the presence of the Soviet dumb. Schweik always pretends that army, the Communists infiltrated he is willing enough to obey orders, the but his bumbling behavior government bureaticracy and completely went to undoes his superiors. It was a work propagandizing the C7cchoslovak trait that annoyed Hitler. "The more they curb people. In the 1946 elections, the Com- themselves," he ranted, "the more dan- munists emerged as the country's larg- gerous they become." Last week, est single party. Benes formed a co- as new oppressors came into their land, alition government with them. In 1947, the Czechoslovaks when Benes fell back upon that wanted to accept the U.S. old and honored tactic. offer of Marshall Plan aid. Stalin said no. Next year, in a Soviet-aided coup, the Czechoslovak Communists seized to- tal power. Czechoslovakia's Western-ori- ented Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, the son of the country's founder, was killed in a fall from a window in the Foreign Ministry. Many Czechoslovaks believed that it was murder, and saw in his death the demise of their own freedom.

The first Czechoslovak party boss, Klement Gottwald, was a harsh ruler. He nationalized the country's entire in- distry, including even small artisans' shops. collectivized all farms, and sub- jected the people to a* withering suc- cession of arrests, show trials and ex- ecutions of "Titoists" and "traitors." Fittingly, Goitwald caught a chill at Stalin's funeral in 1953 and died a few months later. An almost equally un- iending Stalinist took his place: An- tonin Novotnf. who had been Com- munist boss of Prague. As the slight winds of liberalism blew throughout the East bloc following Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin. Novotnf tried his best to ward them off. Even so, the pressure for change built up. Art, es- pecially literature and film making, ex- perienced an underground renaissance. Artists and students demanded freedom of expression. Industrial planners and economists asked for freer and more ef- fective ways of doing business. Last Jan- oary, the new forces surging within Czechoslovak Communism culminated in the person of Alexander Dubdek, who ousted Novotnf from power and instituted a series of liberal reforms. For eight memorable months, Czecho- slovakia was one of the most exciting and hopeful places in the world. CRS-39

Menacing War Games. Two days be- The Litnits of Intelligence: fore tanks rolled, Western intelligence Why No One Knew logged an unusual concentration of mil- this Ilhe inrvasi itary flights across Poland. Could of Czcchoslo\akia he the prelude to an attack? It was So- caught the UJ.S with it guaid down. viet Air Force \\hen Day. Perhaps the flights Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Do- were part of the ceremonies? hrynn relayed the first details to Presi- The day before there had been a dent Johnson, key foreign-policy mak- steady stream of Soviet aircraft ers were scattered. Secretary flying of State to East German landing strips near the Dean Rusk was preoccupied with a sum- Czechoslovak border. Scanning radar mation of Viet Nam policy for the Dem- screens, NATO intelligence officers were ocratic Party Platform Com mit tee. worried. Were the planes Under participating Secretary of State Nicholas in the menacing war games that War- Katzenbach was vacationing at Martha's saw Pact armies had Vineyard. been playing for U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn more than two months? When the Thompson had left Moscow for a hol- iday pla cs took& off, heading awa y from in Venice that earlier tensions in Czechoslovakia-for Prague had delayed. the time being- European allies of the watchers relaxed. the U.S. were no better prepared. NATo The maneuvers were tailored envoys meeting the next day in Brus- as a mask for aggression. Yet at no sels had little more than newspaper re- time did U.S. intelligence analysts ports for guidance. Not a single from the ad- CIA, Defense Intelligence vance word of warning had reached Agency, Na- tional Security Agency or the Slate the West from its intricate web of in- De- partmentrs Bureau of Intelligence telligence agents and spies. and Research advise the President that Another clanging defeat for Western an in- vasion would definitely intelligence? Not really. It was a fail- occur. They ure not of intelligence but of evalu- could n.ot. The decision to strike lay ation and judgment. The failure, more- locked inside the minds of a hamndf of Soviet leaders. As one over, was shared by intelligence ser- State De- partment official vices, diplomats, journalists and assort- observed: "They are a ed experts the world over. government that knows how to keep its mouth shut better than ours does." In fact, it was on Aug. 2 that U.S. Presi- intelligence experts now believe dent Johnson had received pinpoint that the in- Soviet leadership reached its irrevocable formation on the massive Warsaw Pact decision on Tuesday, just a few forces poised at seven hours potential entry before the first Russian tanks rumbled points. Two East German divisions, the into Czechoslovakia. Soviet Eighth and Twentieth. Guards commanded by Soviet General Armies, the First Soviet Guards Tank Ivan Yakuhovsky. The swiftness Army and the Twenty-Fourth Soviet and secrecy that spooked the Tactical Air Army were mustered in spooks also jolted the Pen- East Germany. Hard by Poland's fron- tagon into the unhappy awareness that its defense plans tier was a detachment of Polish Sile- for Western Europe were outmoded. For more sian infantry and more than 3.000 So- than a dec- viet tanks and troop-carrying ade, they have hinged on the premise vehicles hat wary eyes were less than 25 miles focused on a cumber- from the Ome Czechoslovak rail center of Zilina. Soviet military machine would Part frnish at of the Soviet Third Army manned Rus- least two weeks' warning of sia's Carpathian border ny warlike thrust-time essential to ac- with Czecho- ivate the slovakia, while to the south, U.S. Army's Big Lift of troops a huge o Europe and Soviet troop convoy waited inside Hun- to mobilize NATO forces. Any gary. Token forces from Bulgaria, Po- westward-aimed Soviet buildup would certainly have produced land, East Germany and Hungary a mas- had ive and almost simultaneous also been put on battle-ready status. response. s !onetheless, top U.S. strategists Air bases in Poland and nearby Baltic could ot conceal their respect states were crowded with Soviet war- for the shat- planes. The missing, cring speed and efficiency of the So- crucial fragment v iet takeover of information was whether the Krem,- when it finally came about. There should' lin had mustered these forces have been some little in- as a bluff d ication," or a preliminary for invasion. lamented one senior Pentagon lanner. One tip-off might have been a port that Soviet tanks were switching rom* blank shells used for maneuvers ) live"o ammunition. "We got no word 01 it. CRS- 2,C

WORLD AFF AIRS invasion, iockcd itLsef in the parliament from the B;tic states and arcas around building and pildged unanimously not to Wroclaw, Katowice and Krakow in Crochoslovakia Invadod adjourn until a: cccuying troops icft southCrn Poland to the Czechoslovak Rxd Forces Occupy Country. Armed thc country. The sr.;de unions backed the c:Jcs of PraguC. Brno and Zilina. About forci:s of the Soviet Union. East Ger- assembly's denucJ will bhe 1 hre;t of an on, Sovict division moved from the Car- man,, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria in- unlimited genc-tl strike pathian Mountain region of the Soviet vadcA C.cchoslova .1a in a swift military uAlthough tocrc were rIo formal armed Union (Wcsicrn Ukrame), where it had action during the night of Aug. 20-21. clashes, iinva ino trcoons fired occa- becn on mancuvcrs near the hordcr, to TI'e invaders quickly occupied the siou, .i ly,'at, cd fcw ioiaeIcs, circular dis- Cicrna and Kosice in Czechoslovakia. country and seized several leading triu lori and.ot r pss ve resjstc3s of An unspccificd number of Sovict lihcial members of the government, the the invasion. AS a Ce.l'2Otersons were troops, along with what was described as National Assembly and the Czechoslovak killed and rto- ,ai 300 wounded in "token forces" of Hungarian troops, Con-nitinist Party, including CP First Prague by according to Czecho- moved from near Budapest to Bratislava Aiexander Dub~ck. and fiew them slovak govcrnme-nt and Communist and Nitra in Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria Secs. also to Moscow. Party calculations. deployed to the Carpathians "tokcn forces" that had been stationed in Hun- TI-c Ciechoslovak CP Central Com- 200,04il in liva6g -*rc.An estimated mitt-c warned Czechoslovaks not to re- 200.000 troops of 5 Warsaw-Pact nations -ary. Most of the troops who moved into sist the armed invaders. Although the crossed the Czechoslovak borders f'om Czechoslovakia overland had reportedly occus)ing troops met with no organized been stationed, or on maneuvers, near 5East Germany, Poland, Western Ukraine the Czechoslovak border. oppi sition, the population, guided by and Hungary about i i p.m. Aug. 20. Unspecilied clani estine radio broadcasts, re- numbers of troops were airlifted into (The nmber of the invaders continued Czechoslovakia spon ied with passive resistance, inter- to on more than 200 trans- increase during the following week planes. sper ed k ith scattered violence in several and ultimately reached an cstirmatcd port cil .c 650.000.) By early Aug. 21 the 4-pronged pincer T! c in% ision was condemned not only P'rague, the capital, was seized movement, comprising armored and in an artillery divisions, by n i-Comniunist countries but by most air-borne operation as military trans- had taken control of the whole of Czechoslovakia. of I ic world's Communist parties not ort planes, backed by MiG jet fighters, ino vcd in the crisis. Among major re- becan landing troops in great numocrs Czechoslovaks Protest Invasion. The perci sstons: beginning shortly after I a.m. Aug. 21. Czechoslovak CP Central Committec oTh UN Security Council, by 10-2 vote Among the first units to land at pre- declared in a statement broadcast before Aug. 22, supported a 7-nation resolution viously secured airports around Prague dawn Aug. 21 that the invasion was condemning the invasion and calling were detachments of the KGB, the taking place "without the knowledge" for the withdrawal of the occupying Soviet security police, and paratroopers of Czechoslovakia's leaders. Partial forces. The USSR vetoed the resolution. who spearheaded the occupation of air- text of the mncssa.e (broadcast repeatedly During the debate Aug. 22, the acting fields, railroad stations, cable offices, by Radio Prague early Aug. 21 as coming head of the Czechoslovak delegation to broadcasting centers and buildings of the directly from the Czechoslovak CP Pre- the I N called the invasion illegal and un- government, the CP Central Commit- sidium): Justlt able. tec, the National Assembly and Hrad- To thc entire pcoplc of the COechoslovak Social- saMnor Communist parties condemning Castle, the presidential palace, ist Rcpublic:. Yc.Ncrday, on Aug. 21. around 2300 dany R1p.rn.l. troops of the Soviet Union. Polsh the i evasion as unjustified included those The invasion was carried out by about teopie'. Republic. the GDR IGerman Democratic of F -ance. Italy. Rumania, Yugoslavia 10 divisions of Soviet troops, supported Repuhlc). the ftunParian People's Republic and the and ('hina. by units from 4 other Warsaw Pact Bulgarian People's Republic crossed the frontiers of Czechoslovak Communist Party the Czechosloyak Socialist Republic. mTht countries. According to intelligence Thin happened -without th knowledge of the presi- Aug. 21, on the day the invasion was information originating from Washington dent of the republic, the chairman of the National completed, secretly convened its 14th Aug. 22, about 7 divisions of Soviet Assemby, the prcrnier or the ,irst secretary of the extraordinary congress in Prague, Ceevhoslokva Communist Party Central ommit- troops and some units of an East German te.... lccted a new, predominantly liberal division had moved toward Prague The Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Central Committee and reflected DubdIck from areas around Dresden, Karl Marx Committee Presidium appeals to all citizens of our as the first secretary of an enlarged Pre- republic to maintain calm and not to offer resistance Stadt (Chemnitz) and Plauen in East to the ;roops on the march Our army. security corps s'diurn. Germany. and people's militia have not received the command oThe Czechoslovak National Assembly, About 2 divisions of Soviet troops, to defend the country. convened during the early hours of the plus elements of Polish troops, moved

AtEFFR EfN CE S t brackst gave cwatham of hackir.ound nfoem.- Sn I th A preeng vwhm a3

Reproduced with permission Facts on File August 22-28, 1968 CRS-41

I he('rcho ik (iommunit riIy CenIrn ICo-n The major arrested Czcehoslovak polemics with the Sovict Union and all s oMi n c O.nl' a r > n o t c l r c ' i r cf . i d i eiu leaders were later lown to Moscow, other Warsaw Pact countries.) jSrer pp. oakmIn l W the tund.minili principics% o( rclii ii, be- 305A1-307 1 twc'n S,'cat'l 'iict but alto s contrary it thc Occupiers Upholdinvasion. In a state- princpIc of iniernai n.0 law. All Icading (uncion- The Sovict Communist Party had ment justifying the invasion, the Soviet dc- aric' of the oile. the Conimunri i Parly and the No- clared Aug. 20. shortly before the Invu- onal I r'nt: Ren.in in %ourftin on% n% rresent- government claimed Aug. 21 that the sion bcgan, that "it was a matlcr of ur- ;M'c of thc slai. clcletd by the lawi of the Czecho- armed forces of 5 Warsaw Pact nations Socialti Republhc. gency that imperialist intrigues slosak had actcd after Czechoslovak "party and against Constitutional funclionaric arC immediately con- Communist rule in C'cchoslovak a be vening a se'nion of the National Ascmhly of our government leaders" had requested "ur- nippedd in the bud." The warning, ap- Preidsum al the tamc time is con' repubbc, and the gent assistance" to repulse the threat pcaring in Pravda. said that "Marxists- n'ig a plenum of tiac Ceniral Committee to dii. "emanating from the countcr-revolu- cus the situation that has artic". Lcninists arc not and can nevcr be in- tionary forces" within Czechoslovakia. differcnt to the fate o! Socialist construc- The statement, distributed by Tass, the tion in other countries and the general Leaders Seied. One of Soviet news agency, C0echolosiak said: "The further cause of socialism and communism on actions of the invaders was to aggravation of the situation in Czecho- the first earth." Pravda also charged Aug. 20, in arrest key state, party and legislative of- slovakia affects the vital interest of the a dispatch interned in undis- from Prague, that Czecho- ficials. Some were Soviet Union and other Socialist states, slovakia was in danger from West Ger- closed places. Others were put under the interests of the security of the states many, especially from Sudcten Germans house arrest. of the Socialist community. The threat to expelled from Czcchosov&!i' a cr The unsuspecting Presidium of the the Socialist system in Czechoslovakia World War 11. (The anii-Cacchoslovak Committee, which had been constitutes at the same time a threat to CP Central campaign in the Soviet press had b:en in session since the afternoon of Aug. 20 the mainstays of European peace." The resumed Aug. 16 after being suspended to discuss preparations for the 14th ex- statement did not name those who had by the Cicrna confrontation.) traordinary congress scheduled for purportedly asked for the invasion. Sept. 9. had received the news of the in- In a statement published in the East Czechoslovaks Oponse anadcrs. Re- vasion shortly before midnight. Dubtek, German CP organ Neues Deutschland ports from Czechoslovakia indicated on learning the news, was said to have Aug. 21 the East German government de- deep, widespread resentment of tnc m- remarked with tears in his eyes: "How clared that "personalities of the party and vasion. Although there was no organized occupa- could they [the Soviet Union and their state of Czechoslovakia turned . . . to the resistance to the overwhelming allies] do this to mc?' "I have served the governments of the allied Socialist [War- tion forces, Czechoslovak citizens, sr)car- cause of the Soviet Union and commu- saw Pact] states" for "instantaneous headed by students, rescortcd to a wide nism all of my life." Premier Oldiich help, including military aid." The state- variety of means to hamper the invaders, Cernik. who had received the news by ment said that the allied states responded and several gencril strikes of up to an phone from'Defense Min. Martin Dz6r, to the appeal "in view of the danger cre- hour's duration took place. was said to have cried: "Treason! Be- ated by the agitation of counter-revolu- Starting in the early hours of tre I- trayal!" tionary elements and intervention efforts vasion Aug. 21, crowds roamed the (It was reported Aug. 21 that Dubieck by imperialist powers" within Czecho. streets of Prague, Bratislava, Kosice and had received a letter from Soviet CP slovakia. other major towns. TIhcy shouted support Gen. Secy. Leonid I. Brczhnev during In another article Aug. 25, Neues for Dub.'ck and insults (n Russian) at thc the Presidium session Aug. 20. The re- Deutschlandcharged that "Zionist forces Soviet soldiers. Some citizens, cspecialiy port said that the letter had accused the have taken over the leadership [of older ones, wept in the streets; others. Czechoslovak leaders of having per- Czechoslovakia)." mostly students, painted swastikas on the mitted a campaign of malice against the In Trybuna Ludu, the Polish CP news- tanks and armored cars. in open but pas- workers militia [see p. 344AI), , but paper, Maj. Gen. Jan Czapla, the first sive defiance, groups of students re- the letter made no mention of the oc- deputy political chief of the Polish army, pcatedly sat in front of tanks and raised cupation, which was then taking place. charged Aug. 25 that "Zionist forces" barricades. Angry jeers of "Russians. go Reportedly it was the absence of warn- were to blame for the "real threat of home," "Dirty fascists," and "Freedom" ing about the invasion at such a late transition from socialism to capitalism" could be heard in various parts of Prague hour that prompted the Presidium, in- in Czechoslovakia. and Bratislava Aug. 21-26. cluding conservative members Vasil The Hungarian CP newspaper Ncps- Stubborn, spontaneous resistance was BilAk, Drahomir Kolder and Frantisek zabadsiag asserted Aug. 22 that "hardly put up in Prague near the rauio s .ti01 Barbirek, to approve a protest against had the ink dried" on the Aug. 3 Brati- the National Museum and around t'e the occupation.) siava declaration than "counterrevolu- statue of St. Wenceslas. Shortly hcforc On learning of the invasion, the Pre- tionary forces organized meetings in dawn Aug. 21, students erected bar.ricads sidium called the CP Central Committee Prague . . . , slandering the Soviet Union in the streets around the radio ni lding. into emer::ency session, and National [and] taking issue with the Bratislava Buses and trolleys were pilcd up and pv- Assembly Pres. Josef Smrkovsky con- declaration." The article implied that the ing stones dug up to strengthen he de- vened the National Assembly. Shortly Czechoslovak regime had failed to put an fense against the tanks. Students threw thereafter 2 cars from the Soviet em- end to such provocations although it had stones and garbage at soldiers on the ve- bissy led tanks toward the building of pledged secretly in Bratislava to do so. hicles. Prague radio maintained its pro- the Central Committec. The Soviet se- (According to East European claims, gram until about I1 a.m., when tars curity forces entered the building early the invasion was necessitated by Dubtek's were able to penetrate the barricades Aug. 21 .nd ordered several leading failure to carry out 5 secret pledges he The broadcasts, however, were resumed officials to ntand facing the wall for several allegedly had made during the July 29- later in the day from a secret studio and hours und::r the threat of a machine Aug. I Cierna confrontation. In the continued uninterruptedly by constantly gun. Later, Dubeck, Cernik, Smrkovsk9 secret agreement, ratified at the Aug. 3 switching frequency. and Presidium members Josef Spa"ck conference in Bratislava, Dubck re- Before the radio building was seized, and Franti;ck Kriegel were handcuffed portedly promised: [1) to re-cstablish youths had charged onto the road to set and taken to a military ba: rack in central censorship of the Czechoslovak press, [2) Slovakia. Among the other Czechoslo- to prevent the organization of any politi- FACTS o Fit a is published weekly by Facii on F ic. Inc vakian leacers scied were Interior Mm. cal groups outside the Communist-con- 119 w. sth St.. New York. N.Y. l00i jCOiumbu' n0 I Committec trcied "National Front," [3] Subscription si30 a year: Ycarboki ('cind Josef PaveI and Central to take 1943 53 eAch, Cwinialii Index pia~fi% rd ivi~c a nvl~ Secy. Ccstmir Cisir. Pres. Ludvig Svo- measures to strengthen . the people's Ldw. Van Westertort. Prcsidirni; Louis A, \kC1,clec Trcbn. boda was kept under house arrest in militia and other security forces, [4] to tter: Howard M. Eraiern. Laecsuire vwc Prc',drn;. i the Hradcany Castle presidential office, assure the protection of conservative A. Sobel. Vice Presideni A Licr-in.-0c(, 3

t~wlks, hr c %ihNolotov cocktails. "liberation stations," which formed a prisals" and the threats to #human burnm ncssspjpcrs .tnd hranche s of network from Marianske Lazn6 in the of ltilin recs. rights" resulting from the occupation Others threw mattresses, west to Kosicc in the cast. Among stations Czechoslovakia. It called for the im- oodicr cr.itcs iandgarhdge cans onto the that broadcast almost continuously were mediate withdrawal of all foreign forces ttnk\. )nc tnk %as left in flames on the Radio Free Czechoslovakia, operating from the country and for a halt to "all *-rcec neiar the radio building, and 2 near Prague, and Radio Ccsky Bude- other forms of intervention in Czecho- txamiinng Soviet munitions trucks set ofT a jowice, broadcasting from southern slovakia's internal affairs." series )f explosions, rocking the entire Bohemia, some 30 miles from the Aus- The resolution said: arca ani Injuring scvcratl people. trian border. Scve rat buildings near The Sccuriiy Council.. the radio station The governments of the Soviet Union Gravely concerned thai . . . troops of the Soviet were burned by tank lire. Store windows and its 4 allies in the invasion had ap- Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact were biokcn by explosiOns. but there was pealed to the Czechoslovak people Aug. have cntcred . . IC/cchoslovakial without the Sa rcporz oi lootmg. Lxcept for food knowledge and against he wishes of ihc C/ccho- 23 to help them overthrow "counter- slovak ian governmcni. stores, nearly ;1 business in Prague was revolutionary forces." The message, ad- Considering that the action taken by the govern- shui so me pow ncs wcrc down. dressed to "our brothers, Czechs and ment of the Union of Soviet Sociatist Repuhlcs and Somic pcopic during the early phase other members of the Warsaw Pact in invading the Slovaks," and broadcast over Moscow Czechoslovak Socialisi Republic is a violation of the of the (ccupation attempted to convince radio shortly before Pres. Svoboda's ar- United Nations Chl;rtcr and, in particular, of the the sok crs that there had been no "prov- rival in Moscow, told Czechoslovaks principle that all members shall refrain in their in- ocation justify ing the invasion. that the invasion forces had been sent to ternational relations from the threat or use of force or political inde. An estimitcd 20,000 peaceful demon- their country "so that no one can take again%( the territorial integrity pentence of any state. ... stratorn marched to St. Wenceslas Square your freedom away from you." The state- Considering that the people of the sovereign state in Praijuc Aug. 22 to demand the with- ment said that "the enemies were pre- of the Cicchoslovak Socialist Repuhitc have the dr.iwal of the occupying forces. Passing paring to plunge the country into chaos, right in accordance with the charter freely to c- in fron. of the long row of Soviet tanks crcise their own nelf-dermina ton anr to arrange to sacrifice the freedom and independence their own ilrairs without external intervention. and soldicrs with toted bayonets at thcir of their homeland to their mercenary 1. Altirms that the sovereign. political indepen- side. tl c demonstrators shook their fists aims." dence and territorial integnty of the Ciechosiovak and sloutcd "Russian murderers go Socialist Republic must he fully respected: 2. Condemns the armed intervention of the Union home' .nd -Dubck, Svoboda." Secret Party Congress. Some 1,200 of Soviet Socialist Repubtics and other members of Wall writings denouncing the invasion delegates to the Czechoslovak CP's 14th the Warsaw Pact in the internal affairs of the Ciecho- quickly appeared throughout Prague and slovak Sociatkis Republic and calls upon them to take congress met secretly Aug. 21-22 and no action of violence or reprisal that could result in other cities. Leafcts circulating through- elected a new 160-man Central Commit- further suffering or loss of life. forthwith to with- out Priguc urged Czcchs and Slovaks tee, which in turn named a new 27-mem- draw their forces. and to cease all other forms of in- to havc nothing to do with those who ber Presidium. The congress, it was re- t'.rvcntion in Crcchoslovakia's internal affairs.... wanted to collaborate with the invaders. ported, was held in a large industrial The Council, called into emergency ses- By Aug. 23, rumors spread in Prague of plant, identified Aug. 23 by the London sion Aug. 21, had voted 13-2 to include arrests by the secret police. In. late Times as the CKD factory, on the out- the Czechoslovak crisis on its agenda. morning , hsts suddenly went up in the skirts of Prague. The delegates entered The USSR and Hungary opposed the cit st ribbled on doorways or in shop the factory clad as workers, doctors, adoption of the motion, but the veto did window - giving the licensc-plate num- nurses or patients. According to an Aug. not apply to a procedural question. bcrs of thc cars used by the secret police. 24 N. Y. Times report, the meeting had During Council debate, Jan Muzik, rhroug )out the day. sniper fire could be been called less than 4 hours after the Czechoslovakia's acting -chief represen- herd t ut 'here were no reports of casu- Soviet invasion had begun. The congress tative at the UN, delivered an address aties. \ onc-hour general strike took had been originally scheduled for Sept. 9. devoted largely to reading into t c rec- olace at noon. Later, a throng of long- A list of the secretly-elected Presidium ord 2 messages received from /Czech- naired youths, responding to instruc- was circulated in Prague Aug. 23. Its oslovakia and circulated to the UN and to tions given through the clandestine radio, members: Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich governments with which Prague had re- urged a crowd at St. Wenceslas Square Ccrnik, Josef Smrkovsk , Josef Spacek, lations. to tear down all street signs to hamper the Frantitek Kriegel, Ccstmir Cisar, Gustav The first message, received from For- secreL police in their hunt for leaders of Husak, Ota Sik, Eduard Goldstuccker, eign Min. Jiri Hi'jck, demanded that the resistance movement. Bohumil Simon, Vanek Silhan, Peter "the illegal occupation of Czechoslo- 3 young men were shot and killed by Colotka, Milan Hubl, Stefan Sadovskj, vakia be stopped without delay" and Soviet soldiers in Prague Aug. 24 after Zdenck Hcjzlar, Libuse Hrdinova, that "all armed troops be withdrawn" they had been caught distributing anti- Vladimir Kabrna, Josef Zrak, from the country. HAjek said he had in- Soviet Viktor lealets. In dcfianee of a Soviet- Pavienda, Anton Tazk5, Jaromir structed the Czechoslovak ambassadors imposed Litera, cui-few, 30 youngsters Aug. 25 Vdciav Simidek, Julius Turek, Vijtcch to the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland held a 24-hour vigil around the statue of Matejidek, Bohumil Vojaeek, Zdcnek and East Germany to file strong pro- St. Wenceslas in memory of the 3 slain Moc and (first name unavailable) Samuel. tests with those governments and to de- men. (Sec p. 151B-D31 mand that they permit the Czechoslo- A train coming from the Soviet Union vak people and their "legitimate repre- wIth radio-direction-finding equipment UN Majority Condemns USSR. A 7- sentatives" to continue their normal was derailed 60 miles outside Prague nation resolution condemning the Soviet governmental functions "without delay." Aug. 23 by members of the resistance. Union and its 4 Warsaw Pact allies for The 2d message read by Muzik came Tne same train was halted Aug. 24 when invading Czechoslovakia was supported from the Presidium of Czechoslovakia's current on the electrified rail line was cut. by a 10-2 vote (3 abstentions) of the UN National Assembly. In a formal declara- Soviet troops finally lifted the equipment Security Council Aug. 23 but was de- tion the Presidium assailed "the occupa- ;nio the capital by helicopters Aug. 25, feated by the USSR's 105th veto. tion" of the country as a violation of when. for the 3d time, anti-Soviet Hungary joined the USSR in casting a international law, the Warsaw Treaty Cicchoslovaks had made it impossible to negative vote. Approving the resolution and "the principles of equality between ring by train. were its 7 sponsors--Brazil, Canada, nations." It demanded the release of all By Aug. 25 the number of clandestine Denmark, France, Paraguay, Britain and government officials detained by So- radio stations was estimated at 10 to :2. the U.S.-and Nationalist China, Ethio- vict forces in Prague, the withdrawal "Radio Free Prague," operating fromn a pia and Senegal. India, Pakistan and of all the invading troops fr.: the coun- sccrc location near Prague, gave con- Algeriaa.a - granting of "full respect for iinuouscommentary try and to the nation and re- I c at-on, introduced Aug. 22 by the sovereignty" of the Czechoslovak layed official messages from the arrested 01o W. -orch, representative of Den- government. The Presidium warned the Czechoslovak leaders negotiating in mark, expressed the Council's concern Czechoslovak people not to resort to Moscow. It also coordinated the other over the d.anser of "violence and re- violence to justify the occupation. But CRS-43

it advise I the workers, "if neccssa ry. these brutal acts of your government." resolution was an attempt to get Thant to "defer J you rslcf by a general strike."' lie then cited opposition to the Soviet to support the Western plot of "reaction Dcllvering his own statement, Muzik actions by such "imperialists" as Indian and counterrevolution" in Czcchosio- declared that his government's liberali- Prime Min. Indira Gandhi, Pope Paul vakia, Malik said. zation program. which had prccipitatcd VI, Rumanian Pres. Nicolac Ceausescu, Caradon assailed Malik's reaction to the Sovict move against Czcchoslovakia, Yugoslav Pres. Tito, Tanzanian Pres. the resolution as a "contemptuous pe'r- was aimcd at bringing Prague closerr to Julius K. Nyerere and the leaders of sonal insult" to the Council mernhmrs. the lofty goals of rcal socialism" and at the Communist parties in France and The resolution prompted Caradon to "retaining the human rights and liberty Italy. challenge Malik again on the where- which are an integral part of any Socia- Soviet Amb. Malik, in reply, assailed abouts of the missing Czechoslovak list system." the U.S. and its Western allies for "drag- leaders. In debate prior to the Aug. 21 vote, [ging) this question into the Security Czechoslovak Foreign Min. .inf fHjck Yakov A. Malik, chief Soviet delegate, Council." Recalling that in his address flew to New York Aug. 23 and reported asserted that there was "no basis" for Aug. 21 Czechoslovak representative to U Thant on the situation in his coun- Council discussion of the crisis. The Jan Muzik had not requested Council try. Hjek had arrived from Belgrade, USSR and its allies, Malik said, had action, Malik asserted that it was NATO where he was vacationing at the time of moved their forces into Czechoslovakia countries "who suddenly made a show the invasion of Czechoslovakia. "at the request" of the Prague govern- of themselves ... and started playing In an address to the Council Aug. 24, ment "in view of the threats created by the role of defenders of socialism and fHjek asserted that there was n'. justi- the external and internal reaction" communism, arrogated to themselves fication for the occupation of his coun- against the country's "Socialist system" the role of protectors of Socialist Czech- try. Contrary to Moscow's explanations, and "statehood." The Communist mili- oslovakia." Malik reasserted the claim the invasion had not been carried out tary move was "in accordance with the that Moscow and its allies had moved "at the request of the Czechoslovak existing treaty obligations and on the their forces into Czechoslovakia "to government" or any otiier agency basis of of the relevant provisions of the help it protect (its) Socialist system . . . the republic, '1jek stated. Alluding United Nations Charter," Malik said. from the threat of reaction and to Malik's charges of counterrevolu- He wsarncd that the Soviet Union would counterrevolution." Addressing him- tionary activity in Czechoslovakia, not tolerate "the attempts of the impe- self to Ball and Lord Caradon, chief Hjek insisted that the Prague regime riahst reaction to interfere" in the do- British delegate, Malik asked: "What had had the situation "firmly in hand mestac affairs of Czechoslovakia and in Czechoslovakia arc you defending? and sufficient means to repel any attack "the relations between all Socialist The elements which tried to make it upon the foundations of socialism." count ries. subservient to. your design or that So- Prior to Hiijck's speech, Malik had U.S. Amb. George W. Ball, defending cialist Czechoslovakia which is truly a delivered a 3-hou'r address lauding East the Council's right to take up the crisis, Socialist country." Malik said: "Rela- Germany and denouncing West Ger- called the invasion "an affront to all tions between Czechoslovakia and other many. Malik then introduced proposal civilzed sensibilities." The aim of the a Socialist countries are determined, have (in the form of a motion) requesting Communist incursion was the "to impose by been and will be determined and decided participation of East Germany, which force a repressive political system which by the peoples and countries of the So- was not a UN member, in Council Ce- is plainly obnoxious to the people and cialist community themselves. And no liberations. The proposal was defealcc leadership of Czechoslovakia," Ball said. interference from outside will be toler- by 9-2 vote (4 abstentions). Voting The USSR's explanation of its actions ated by the peoples of the Socialist coun- was "a feeble and futile against the resolution-U.S., Britain, effort at self- tries. And against those who attempt to France, Paraguay, Denmark, justification." The Council, Ball as- Ethiopia, interfere, necessary, and effective mea- Senegal, Nationalist China and Canada; serted, must require the Soviet Union to sures will be taken. for it-USSR and Hungary; abstaining remove its troops from Czechoslovakia (Yugoslav Amb. Anton Vratusa told and to "cease interfcrence -Algeria, India, Pakistan and Brazil. in that coun- the Council Aug. 23 that "no principles The Council recessed try or anywhere else." until Aug. 26, of socialism whatever can be used as but decided that day to suspend meetings Amb. Ball declared Aug. 22 that the a screen for a gross violation of sover- 7-nation resolution pending the outcome of the negotiations introduced that day eignty.") in Moscow between "makes 3 simple points: An Soviet and Czecho- inexcus- Earlier in the debate Aug. 22 Caradon slovak leaders. able international crime has A statement issued by been com- had lauded Muzik and "all the leaders the Czechoslovak mitted"; the Czechoslovak people had UN mission Aug. 25 of his brave country who have refused said it had instructed its delegates' not the right to conduct their own affairs to bow down before the forces of in- without external intervention, to participate in Council debate because and the vasion and suppression." Caradon then it would forces that invaded their not he "conducive to the solu- territory must called on Malik to tell the Council that tion of this significant be withdrawn; the Council must question" in vie'W demand Czechoslovak Pres. Ludvig Svoboda, of the Moscow that the Soviet Union, Poland, talks. On the conclusion Bulgaria, CP First Secy. Alexander Dubdck of the Moscow Hungary and East Germany "refrain negotiations and the is- and other Prague leaders were "free suance of a joint Sovict-Ciechoslovzk from further killings and tortures" that and safe" and would "be permitted to communique Aug. 27, Forei gn Mm would further exacerbate the situation continue to speak and work for in Czechoslovakia. their HIjek formally announced at UN head- people." uarters Ball called on the 5 Communist states that day that his country's dclcgat ion would not participate in fur- to adhere to the principles of the UN Thant Intervention Asked. A resolu- Charter and to abide by the "principles tion introduced by ther Security Council discussion of Canadian delegate the invasion.' The Moscow sanctimoniously reaffirmed at Bratislava George communique- Ignatieff Aug. 23 proposed had said that Czechoslovakia had "dc- . . . in an agreement concluded between that UN Scey. Gen. U Thant dispatch manded" the removal of the subject Czechoslovakia and the same 5 parties a representative to Prague "to scck the that from the Council's agenda. are cynically engaged in the rape of release and ensure the safety" of the that unhappy country." "The world is detained Czechoslovak (The Indian delegate's abstention leaders. The on the Council's Aug. 23 vote on the disgusted," Ball said, by the USSR's draft was sponsored by the U.S., Britain, resolution condemning the invasion had "pious assertion that this invasion and France, Denmark. Nationalist China, prrcipitated a sharp antigovernment occupation ... arc merely 'fraternal Paraguay and Brazil. Malik charged that assistance. '""The kind of Soviet assis- the resolution, 1:e the one cin&urst by opposition members in !he he had vetoed Indian tance that the Soviet Union is according in the early '.crs of Aug. parliament later Aug. 23. Prime 23, was a plot Min. Indira Gandhi entered to Czechoslovakia is exactly the same to pave the parliament way for British and U.S. "i-P after the demonstration subsided kind that Cain gave to Abel,' Bala 2er)ai and ex- ists and counterrevoiutionaries" plained that Ball scoffed at Mai's c .irc Czechoslovakia away from its India's abstention was based on its objection io the word "condemns" "only imperialists oppose and dcporc Co;.; nist allies. Furthermore, the in' t.he resolution, it would have preferred CRS- 44

the s4erd deploress." Acccptance of the The Soviet delegation included C? The RumanianGrand National Asnembly (parlia- rcsolution would have restricted India's Gen. Secy. Lconid hrczhnev, Premier ,nen"). at a speciall "m^on hcld Aug 22" unanimously diplonatic nanctvcring in the crisis, approved Ccaisescu's rcatirmation of his program Alcksci N. Kosygin, Prcs. Nikolai V. of national sovereignty coupled with strict adhercnce Nlrs.,.tandhi said.) Podgorny, Defense Min. Andrei A. tosocialism. Grrchko Czech-Sos ict Confe'rcnce. Pres. Svo- and Forcign Min. Andrei A. X A Yugoslav CP sta cement issiucd Aug. 22, follow. Nda and other Czechoslovak offctals Gromyko. ing a mccting of the CP Presidium and Pres. Tito. Clandestine Czechoslovak radio re- called the invasion an act of aggression. It said: "in- wcrc llown to Moscow Aug. 23 to dis- volved is not only an attack on the Ciechoslovak had disclosed cuss with Sovict officials means of ports Aug. 24 that Dubck, people but a significant. historical point of rupture, resolve in g the crisis. Rcprcsentativcs Premier Cerrifk and National Assembly hearing on the relationship among Sociahlst countries Pres. Smnrkovsky had joined the talks in gerac'l. - . as well as on pcacc in Europe and in of Plant. Bulgaria. East Germany and the worl3" A ' atly in support oCicechoslovakia after Svoboda threatened to walk out or -as Hung irv. whose armies had participated held in iigrade A ug. 22. Organized by the Yugoslav in the invasion. joined the parley Aug. the negotiations unless they were allowed CP. an estimated 200.000 persons marched for hours through the streets "Frcedom 25. A communique issued at the conclu- to participate. These reports said that showing for Ciecho- Svoboda's ultimatum was in response to slovakia," "Tanks Must Go" and "Tiio-lDuricek." sion Demonstrators gathered in front of the talks Aug. 27 announced an a Soviet ultimatum of the Czecho- agreement. demanding that slovak embassy and were grceied by Foreign Min. Svoboda appoint a pro-Moscow Jift The joint statement said: govern- Hajck, who expressed gratitude for their display ment or form one himself. Among con- of sympathy. (Hajck had artived in Yugoslavia with n3oth sides agrccd to carry out the "mu- other servative Czechoslovak leaders men- dzechoslovak oftcia:s Aug. 21 for a vacation.) tual cecisions reached at Cierna and A resolution adoptei by the Yugoslav Cl's Cer.- Brat islava. tioned in connection with the new tral Committee Aug. 25 called for an immediate end a"Thc Soviet side stated its understand- government were: Alois Indra, who was of the Soviet occupation of crechoflovakia. It said to have suffered a heart attack after warned that Yugoslavia was ready to put up armed ing of and support for" the resistance to any threat against its Czechoslovak other Czechoslovak leaders territorial in- CP c.idership's decisions of the January accused him tegrity. of being a traitor; Vasii a Presidents Tito and and Niay plenary meetings "with a view Bil"k, Slovak CP Ceautcscu were reported to to improving first secretary; and Drahomir Kolder, have discussed the last European crisis Aug. 24 at the methods of guiding Presidium member. Vrsac, a Yugoslav border town. society. developing Socialist democracy a The Soviet government newspaper I.vesioe The details of the immediate events and strengthening the Socialist system charged Aug. 24 that Ceaulescu's vpccchcs had g;ven on the basis leading to the Moscow conference had aid to "the Crechoslovak counterrevolution." Ceau- of Marxism-Leninism." been 5escu's speeches also were assailed by 2 Hungarian ta"Agireemnt was reached on measures recounted by Svoboda in an address over Radio Free Prague Aug. 23, just newspapers Aug. 24. One paper. Afogyar Memzet, zimed at the speediest normalization of said: "There is a strange similarity between the prior to his departure tone and content the siluation in the Czechoslovak So- for the Soviet ofCeauaescu's (Aug. 21) speech and capital. the phrases repeated a hundred times a day by cialist Republic. Czechoslovak leaders Western Svoboda said he had requested the radio stations." informed the Soviet side on w Ccausescu softened his criticism or Moscow in a the planned direct talks with the Soviet leaders after immediate measures they are carrying speech delivered in the industrial city or trasov Aug. 26. He said all Communist sltes out w th these aims in view." (These his discussions with USSR representa- must seck common tives in Prague Aug. 22 had "failed to cause in opposing imperialism and must try to measures reportedly included smooth over their differences. Ceausescu a return yield satisfactory results." real'irmed to par:.y Those talks, Rumania's friendship with the USSR, control of the press, radio and according to Svoboda, Hungary, TV. the long-term stationing of Soviet had dealt with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as well as with Czechoslo- "the situation that has arisen due to the vakia. The Rumanian leader's apparent retreat from and oiher Warsaw Pact his troops on the entry of Soviet and other countries' rigid position followed a meeting he had held Czechoslovak-Wcst German border and troops into Czechoslovak Aug. 25 with Soviet Amb.-to-Rumania Alcksandr V. the di banding or halting of any group territory, and nasov. particularly with respect to i The Albanian Fovernment Aug. 23 condemneid the that the occupying powers considered restoration of an orderly functioning of constitutional Sovict-led invasion but atno denounced Crecho- antisoctalist or counterrevolut slovak C11 Firsi Secy. Dubdck a traitor "to ion ary.) organs" of the government. as the in- oThe troops of the occupying powers terests of his people." Pending the negotiations in Moscow, v North Vietnam Aug. ,will nit interfere in the internal affairs" 21 upheld Soviet interven- Svoboda appealed to his people "to con- tion in Czcchoslovakia as a "noble" act. The in- of Cz':choslovakia. "Ag.rcement vasion. was tinue to support my actions" and urged Hanoi said. was justified by the "increased reached on the terms of activities against socialism" by Crechoslovakia's the withdrawal them "to avoid any action or contacts of these troops from its territory as the counterrevolutionary forces sincc January. that would a Cuban Premier situation in Czechoslovakia exacerbate the atmosphere in Fidel Castro conceded Aug. 23 normalizes." our country and our relations with the that there was no legal basis for the Communist uThe Czechoslovak armies' occupation representative representatives of the foreign armies." of Czechoslovakia. But he sup- stated that his country "had not re- ported the action as a necessary step to prevent the questec the submission [to Czechoslovak ClP from "marching toward a counter- the UNJ of Communists Vs. Invasion. The invasion revolutionary situation, capitalism and into the this question for consideration by the aroused widespread condemnation and embrace ofimperialism." Security Council and demanded its resentment in the Communist world. The * Among statements made by West Europenn Com- removal from the agenda." munist parties Aug. 21: The Italian CP called the most vehement criticism was leveled by invasion "unjustilied" and expressed aThe 2 sides agreed to pursue a foreign "grave dis- Prague's 2 staunchest allies-Rumania sent"; the French CP's Poltburo voiced "surprise policy "meeting the interests of strength- and Yugoslavia-and by Communist and reprobation" and disclosed that its leaders had cning the solidarity of the Socialist China. Sympathy for Czechoslovakia's cautioned Moscow against the usc of rs;tary force; community upholding the cause of peace similar sentiments were voiced by Communist Party plight reportedly was also voiced by leaders in Britain, Austria, the Netherlands. Den- and international security." private citizens in 3 of the invading coun- mark and Belgium. aThe repreicntatives agreed to fulfill tries-the USSR, Poland and East Ger- I'uigi Longo, lialia CP first secretary, who had the commitments "concluded between been in Moscow at the time of the invasion. delivered many. But Communist support for Mos- a speech in Rome Aug. 23 in which he denounced the Sociali!,t states, to strengthen the defen- cow's move came from Cuba, North Soviet Union's actions in Czechoslovakia. sive m ght of the Socialist community, Vietnam and North Korea. a The U.S. Communist Party was split in its attutde to rais the effectiveness of the defensive toward the Soviet Union. The party'a -encral secre- Among major statements and actions: tary, Gus Ifall. said Aug. 21 that the, govict Union Warsa Treaty Organizat ion." and its allies had to employ force to avert a 'counter. Czec oslovak CP First Secy. Dub- a Addressing a crowd or more than 100,000 persons revolutionary take-over' in Czechoslovakia. The eck. wI o had been seized and flown to in Bucharest's main square. Rumanian Pres. Nicolae CP's N.Y. State chairman. Gilbcrt Green, said he Ceauescu Aug. 21 denounced Mosco%. at the start of the invasion, the invasion as "a and a large number of party oicers and members great mitake and a grave danger to peace in Europe, disagreed with Hall's views and opposed the attack participated in the Moscow talks. to the rate or socialism in the world." Asserting that on Czechoslovakia. Among other Czechoslovak officials there was "no juslification whatsoever" for the in- w Communist China Aug. 23 denounced the inva- attending were Defense Min. Gen. Mar- vasion. Ceauscscu warned that Rumania would use sion as "a shameless act." An article in the CP armed force to protect itself from a similar attack. A newspaper Jenmin Jih Poo said the invasion pointed tin Dztr. Slovak CP First SFcy. Vasil communique of the Rumanian CP's Central Com- up the "total bankruptcy of Soviet revisionism." Bilik, Presidium member Jan Piller. mittee read at the rally expressed "profound anxiety" Deriding the Soviet contention that the invasion was Justice Min. Bohuslav over the invasion. voiced "full solidarity" with the designed to protect the fruits of socialism, the ne-s- Kucera, Central Czechoalovak people Committe Secy. Alois Indra and SI,- and urged the speedy with- paper asked: "Who capitulated to United States ir- drawal of the forieljn Communist soldiers from the pe rialism and so lost the fruits of Soviet socialism? vak Dcpity Premier Gustav Hussak. country. Who was it who peddled soviet revisionism to CRS-45

'irope The Chirinec statementt accttscd Soviet pressed hope to U.S. officials that U.S.- The 'ertimaneit Council of the North Alrinic cailers of w rting "hand-in-plove" with the U.S. Treaty Organi/iatin (NA 10) met in irussc. A,!,. Anil s. d tht (',echiislovtk revisionists' had hoped Soviet "state relations" would not be 21 23 to consitcr the possible prolerns r.iiscu y to A ork out inilar cooperation with the U.S. and adversely affected by the invasion.) the Communist invasion of C/cu hnsluvakci A Wct (crni .. Following a cabinet discussion of the NATO !ipokesmin 'itid after the Aug. 21 mcciinn a Sescral Sctact intellectuals preparing a Moscow situation Aug. 22, State Sccy. Rusk that the Council had unanimousy aprced th.;t the rallv to denic ince the invasion of Crechoslovakia Communist movc constituted : "clicr violnor, if 'here arreveid in Red Squarc Aug. 25. Police seired 9 confirmed that the U.S. was not planning the United Nations Charter and inicrnaional law." persons, including NIrs Yuli I. Danic, wife of the any "retaliatory actions or sanctions" NATO'S forces, however. had t;iken no extriord- imprisoned Ariter. and 'avel Y. Livinov. grandson against the Soviet Union. Rusk called nary military precautions. NATO diplomats re- of the late c4 foreignn Mtin. Maxim M. itvnov. 5 on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw ported that Soviet envoys had informed memhcr '% tmcn in th( dissilent group. vit h the exception or' governments that the invasion would he confined to Sirs). Daniel. %%crc released. But one of the freed Pact allies "not to engage in punitive Czechoslovakian territory and would pose no women, poc Natal aGorbancvskaya. was rear- or excessive measures" against the menace to NATO. rested Aug. 2. The Soviet action against Crechoslo- Czechoslovaks and "to bring about West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesirgcr vakia had hein denounced earlier Aug. 25 at a mect- a prompt withdrawal of their forces. Aug. 25 called for a summit coitferene of heilds of ing ol' the At idemn of Sciences' NATO countries to alert them to "witch over lthcrty Institute. Sim ilr rAlli.s had been staged by Soviet Rusk said: The U.S. had no "direct and security." The purpose oi such a conscren~e. intellectual' it other institutes. including one in responsibility . . . in the sense that we Kicsinger said, would be to determine "what one can Leningrad 'a I erc 4 persons wcre arrested have no bilateral commitments to do to lii this tired workaday operation with life." Criticism if the invasion was kept from Soviet He warned west Germans to stay alert and to "make citizens. Thu USSR Aug. 21 hegan jamming the Czechoslovakia"; but the U.S. had a the necessary sacrifices for our defense." Russiai-lanv itge programs of the Voice of America deep concern for the interests of a UN The invasion had spurred widespread anti-Sovict and other \ i 'tcrn stations for the first time in more demonstrations in West German cioes Aug 21. than 5 scars Jamming-began member that were "so desperately 2 hours after the an- periled as they are at the present Rallies were held in Bonn, West iBerln. frank- nouncement if the ins asion, (The Soviet Union had time"; furt, Hamburg. l:nover ard Cologne. The Soviet stopped iam ning Westcrn stations June 19, 1963; the Soviet military action "cannot help embassy building near Bonn was the tar:ct of demon- Poland did t in tO)tI. Rumania in 1963, Hungary but damage East-West relations-get in strators throwing rocks and other missiles. Denton- and Circhoi'% i ikia in 1964. Bulgaria had not ceased the way of possible moves to more de-. strators also gathered before. the Soviet military its ammirF ,i \ estcrn broadcasts.) mis-ton in I-rankfurt. w 1at cern in workers were said to have refused lent.i . .... :rench Pres. Charles dc Gaulic Aug. 21 dentinced Aur .': to ! gn petitons "approving" the invasion Rusk took issue with the view that the U.S. had the invasion as "an attack on the rights and destiny of Cze hosfl.akia. The petitions were said to have no moral right to criticize the Russians because of of a friendly nation." Dc Gaulle said the action was been circul. ted by CP officials amor$ factory. U.S. military intervention in Vietnans and the Do- a continuation of the policyy of bhits. which wa office and f. rm workers. East Derlin citizens were minican Republic. "There is all the difference in the imposed on Europe by the effects'' of the 1945 Yita said to hao -'gned a document at the Czechoslovsk world between acting to meet the common danger Conference at which the U.S . Driain and the So- cfiihass) esg ressing sympathy with the Prague re- under a treaty of mutual security." a, in the case of vict Union had agreed on the'division of responi' gime. Vietnam, and "an attempt to prevent the people of P bilitics in post-war Europe. country from having their own government." as in British Prime Min. Haro'd Wilsin Aug. 2l con- U.S. R 'action. Pres.- Johnson sum- the casc ofCzcchoslovakia, Rusk explained. demned the invasion as a flagrant vilanon of the Pres. Johnson's United Nations Charter and of all accepted standards moned thi National Security Council in handling of the Czech of international behavior." The Soviet move was Washington into emergency session Aug. crisis was backed by 27 Congressional not only a tragedy for the wholc worlo, Wtlson 20 to discuss the invasion. The meeting leaders after he had briefed them in the pointed out, but it also h.d dealt a "scrous blow" was callcc immediately White House Aug. 23. One member of to future East-West relations. The ritish govern- after the Presi- men' informed the Soviet emh;issy in London that dent had rcccived an aidc-memoirc in the group, Chrmn. Richard B. Russell it rejected Moscow's explanation 1hat the Communist which Scvict Amb.-to-U.S. Anatoly (D. Ga.) of the Senate Armed Services armies hid marched into Czechoslovakia on the Dobrynin informed him of the Com- Committee, said that the U.S. was not invitation of the t'rague regime. Violent tnti-Soviet demuini rAt ois were %I.i;,cd munists' a :tion. (The President was said called on to cope with the Soviet-led Aug. 22 in londin f'.ris. Venice and Rome. A tnib to have cceived the message before 'invasion through force or through shatlcred the window of the Stovict embassy in Rio Prague ra lIo had broadcast the news of NATO. He added: "I hope we'll pursue de Janeiro. Government protests were voiced in the invasi an.) Following the National it in the UN," although Nepal, Burma. Malta and Norway. "we've lost so UN Sccy. Gen. U Thant Aug. 22 characterized Security Council meeting, Dobrynin held much ground there that we can't even the invasion as "another serious blow to the con- .a separate meeting with State Secy. Dean get a denunciation" of the Soviet Union, cepts of international order and morality" and "a Rusk. A State Department statement Aug. grave setback to the East-West dilee which seemed to he re-emerging in recent months." In his first public comment on the 23 denounced reports that Soviet inter- Briti'sh philosirpher Itert rand Rusell. 9fi. called crisis, Mr. Johnson said in -a brief TV vention in Czechoslovakia had been on the USSR Aug. 25 to immediately end its occupa- address Aug. 21: "The Soviet Union and made possible through a tacit under- tion of Czechoslovakia. In a message to Moscow. its allies have invaded a defenseless coun- standing on the U.S.' and USSR's re- Russell said: "The left cannot recogni/c negotiation I under duress. The taking of htstages and occupa- try to stamp out a resurgence of ordinary spective "spheres of influence." The tion by hundreds of thousand, of trotp, re entirely human freedom. It is a sad commentary statement said: "The U.S. has never unacceptable." The Soviet move "strcngthcns re- on the Communist mind that a sign of entered into any sphere-of-influence actionary actors in the West and throughou. the liberty is deemed a fundamental threat to agreements or undertakings with anyone world." tFrench philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre Aug. 25 the security of the Soviet system." anywhere in the world"; suggestions to called the invasion "pure agression, such as rs de- The invasion was a violation of the that effect were "malicious and totally fined in terms of international law as a war crime." UN Charter and the Soviet Union's justi- without foundation." But Sartrc said the invasion could not be compared with the U.S.' military intervention in Vietnam, fication for the action was "patently con- Demonstrations in protest against the which he tabeled "ignoble genocide." trived." M r. Johnson said. The President invasion were held Aug. 21 at the South Victnamcsc Pres. Nguyen Van Tnicu Aug. appealed to Moscow and its allies to USSR's UN mission and in front of UN 23 deplored "the brutal repression of the budding withdraw their troops from the country. headquarters aspirations of the Czccholovak people for freedom. in New York. About 300 independence and human dignity." Hc said he had instructed U.S. Amb.-to- persons, including Dr. Benjamin Spock, African states Aug. 22 voiced strong opposisin to UN George W. Ball "to join with others gathered in front of the Soviet mission the invasion. The Congo (Kinshasa), which had re- in the Security Council to insist upon the and later marched to the UN building. ccntly resumed diploinaic relations with the USSR, charter rights of Czechoslovakia and its Their places at the UN were nid in a broadcast thaut "1Mscovite communism is later ttia degraded once again in the eyes% of the world." people." by about 400 demonstrators represent- (It was reported in Washington Aug. ing the Conference of Americans of 22 that the U.S. and Soviet Union had East European Descent, a group repre- reached agreement just prior to the So- senting Eastern European political refu- viet invasion of Czechoslovakia on the gees. detail of the opening of bilateral talks on missile disarmament. Discussion of Other Reaction. The invasion provoked the arrangements had been in progress virtually universal condemnation in the for more than 6 weeks, but announce- non-Communist world. The reactions ment of the agreement reportedly was ranged from critical statements issued being delayed because of the Czecho- by various governments to anti-Soviet slovak crisis. Soviet diplomats had ex- demonstrations held in major capitals. CRS- 46

New Pressures on Prague and the July Crisis In early April, after a brict relaxation of tensions following the Dr ccn meeting, the Soviet Union displayed its first open disapproval of Prague's new course. On April 12, a few days after a CPSU plenum in Moscow had sounded the alarm about ncw threats of "subversion" from the West,"" Pravda for the first time condemned "rightist excesses" that allegedly were showing up in Prague."' A hasty trip to Moscow in early May by Dubcek (who among other things sought, unsuccessfully, to obtain a hard-currency loan from the Soviet Union') apparently failed to reassure the Soviet leadership that the process of democratization in Czechoslovakia was fully under control, for on May 6, upon his return to Prague, Dubcek disclosed that the Soviet leaders had "ex- pressed anxiety" on this score."" At this. point, as if to underline the Soviet Union's growing impatience with liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia, a meeting of hard-core Warsaw Pact allies was convened in Moscow to discuss the Czech 5 situation.' At the same time, Soviet propaganda stepped up its Gierck, while not notable advocates of "democratization" in the Czech sense, were mostly interested in pragmatic solutions to Poland's economic problems. Their less doctrinaire outlook might Icad them to scek wider contacts with the West, away from Pol.ind's close tics with the Soviet Union. lor backgrounds on the history of these factional groupings, see J. F. Brown, The New Eastern Enrope (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966), pp. 50-64. liSee 4:1chtr Xl, pp. 25-55. ilh Miiui Apl Plenum of CC Czrch Cl," Pravda, April 12, 1968. This account of the Czech (entr.l Committee plenum which adopted the nev "action program" withheld criticism of the program twqlf, but cast doubt on the ability of the Czech leadership to keep the reform move- ment under coool. Perhaps 6 the rst harsh critique of developmentss in Czechoslovakia to appear publilsv in the Soviet Union was an article in Sovetlskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia) on April 4, 1968, in which it w.i asserted that "nationalism" and "revisionism" in Prague posed a threat to the unity of the Communist camp. 103 Sec Anatolc Shub, "Czech-Russian Sessions End Coolly," Washington Post, May 6, 1968. See also fn. 109 below. 104 See Duhek interview on May 6, Rude Pravo, May 7, 1968. On May 8, Pravda quoted Dubcek to convey to the Soviet public that official concern over Czechoslovak developments was now felt at the highest level in Moscow. . 1"' Party leaders from the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary met in Moscow on May in what was evidently 8 a new phase of the Soviet effort to mount collective pressures upon Prague. See "Arrival in Moscow of Leaders of Fraternal Parties," Pravda, May 9, 1968. It was reported at this time that the Hungarian leadership sought to moderate the stand toward Prague urged by such hard-line Pact leaders as Ulhricht and Gomulka, a report made credible by the generally sympathetic attitude of Kadar, as displayed publicly during Dubek's visit to Budapest in June. Later in the summer, as the collective squeeze on Prague tightened, the Hungarian leadership also shifted, though perhaps with some reluctance, to a tougher stance. See "Prague Warned," Washing. ton Poil, July 4, 1968; speeches of L. 1. Brezhnev and Janos Kadar, in Pravda, July 4, 1968.

Reproduced with permission Rand Corporation

Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press. 1970. pp. 369-385. CRS-47

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attacks around the general theme that activities by "antisocialist" clements in Czechoslovakia were being exploited by the West to sow discord within the Warsaw bloc.'"" Despite the increasing severity of Soviet propaganda assaults upon Prague in mid-May, there was some indication that the Soviet leadership was not of a single mind on shifting to an undiluted hard-line approach to the Czech prob- lcm. This was perhaps best brought out by Kosygin's surprise arrival in Czechoslovakia on May 17 for a ten-day "work-and-cure" sojourn at Karlovy Vary, concurrent with the appear nce in Prague of a Sovict military delegation under Marshal Grechko for a six-day round of conversations with Czech defense olcials. The seemingly conciliatory nature of Kosygin's visit, which the Czechs said had been arranged at short notice on his initiative, "" suggested that at least some elements of the Soviet leadership were still hopeful that Dubcek could be prevailed upon to assert stricter party control over the reform movement, and thus spare the Soviet Union the onus of having to crack the whip itself.'"* While Kosygin was still taking the waters at Karlovy Vary, and presumably trying through personal diplomacy to persuade Dubcek to muzzle the increase ingly outspoken Czech press and otherwise to set his house in order,'" it wss announced simultaneously in Moscow and Prague in late May that Warsaw Pact maneuvers would take place on Czechoslovak territory in June under the 1"Sce, for example, Mikhail Alckscev commentary in Literaturnaia gaze/a, May 15, 1%)8; editorial, "Charters of Brotherhood," Izestia, May 18, 1968. Similarly, in an article on the War- saw Pact, Marshal lakubovskii warned of Western "subversive" activitiCs and "bridge-building" ettorts aimed at driving a wedge into "the combat alliance" of the Warsaw Pact countries. (Krasnaia z'ezda, May 14, 1968.) Other issues over which a sharp increase in polemics arose at this time included the Czech investigation into Ian Masaryk's death and a Soviet article by M. Shirianov in Soraetas/a Rossia of May 14, attacking the alleged crimes of Thomas Masaryk which aroused in, i0uationisn mPrague. 10' aue r1aia lradcast, May 17, 1%08. Kosvizin apparently alidaa to pick up an invitation whih hitad.n cenda dlo him .uher by Dubck. The poa\ilihiv that a dogama.a11st faition is the Souiat ( n tainu as h aic aamptaald to 111m udice the climiaite fai Koaa i n's visit 1,\ ptablla.taon af ste St isI.iaV aracle attacking Thomas Masarvk h.as 1,(n saiggestrad bv some analysts. See "USSR Attittaes to Czechoslovakia, May 13th-i9th," Radio Free Europe, May 22, 1968. '' In this connection, although the Moscow propaganda apparatus toned down its attacks on durauaring the Kosygin visit, it pursued one line suggestng that ie Soviets were still hopeful n if Dubck should falter. totakeahandinrestoringCommunistauthority Specifically, on May 22 a Moscow radio broadcast cited approvingly a snturaaa.tthealthyyforces'*inCzcchodovakia resolution adopted by a Prague People's Militia group to the cffcct that "we will not allow a disruption of our socialist system." The People's Militia, commonly regarded as a stronghold of support for the orthodox party outlook in Czechoslovakia, subsequcnuly became the obicct of more direct Soviet appeals to take up battle against "counterrevolutionary forces" in Czechoslovakia. See p. 373. I" The Kosgin visit took place at 'a time when Prague was increasingly troubled by Soviet foot-dragging on the Czech request for a hard currency loan of 400-500 million gold rubles, as indicated by a Prague radio broadcast of May 16, 1968. It may be surmised that Kosygin expected the Czech necd for a loan to serve as bargaining leverage for curbs on the reform movement, but that the terms he set were too steep for Dubcek's taste. For the Czechs, there was doubtless bitter irony in the fact that Moscow refused to help out with a hard currency loan, despite Czechoslo- vakia's having previously granted the Soviet Union credits worth a half billion dollars for develop- ment of extractivc industry in the USSR. Scc Burks, The Decline of Communium in Czecholovakia, p. 4. CRS- 48

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command of Marshal lakubovskii."" Czech agreement to these maneuvers, apparently extracted during th Grechko delegation's Prague visit,"' proved later to have been a tactical error, for the maneuvers permitted the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and gave the Soviet Union a major instru- ment of pressure for the climactic phase of the war of nerves against the Dubek regime which was to unfold in July. Before we come to the July crisis, however, a few intervening developments in the contest of wills between thc I)ubcek regime and the Soviet leadership deserve mention. At the end of May, immediately after Kosygin's return to Moscow, .i thrce-dty Cntral ('ommittee plenum was held in Prague, evidently to weigh whatever propositions the Soviet leader had advanced for settling the conflict. The results were a setback for Moscow and a victory for the Czech progressives, who won endorsement for convoking an extraordinary party congress in September 1968, two years ahead of schedule-a move which Moscow had opposed for fear that it would resuk in the removal of the.remain- ing "orthodox" members from the top echelons of the party in Prague." 2 The plenum also made known that implementation of the action program would proceed without delay, although it again gave notice that no opposition parties would be tolerated. "3 In Moscow a two-week period of hesitation ensued, during which the Soviet leadership apparently reached a consensus to tighten the screws on Prague a few more turns, for on June 14 a new barrage of anti-reform propaganda opened with a Pravda article in which Academician F. Konstantinov attacked Cestmir Cisar, a secretary of the Czech Central Committee, as a revisionist."" Although the German Democratic Republic, in its own heated polemics with Prague, had already launched personal diatribes against a number of prominent

21 See "Mutual Maneuvers," Krasnaia zvezda, May 25, 1968. I In a Mis 21 intrview on Prague radio and television, the new ('cch defense minister, General Martin tm- ittd th.it the question of maneuvers in Czechoslov.i k i on a"reduced scale" had been ilkN'cdrl oiarm: the Grrchko visit. A dav later, Dziir deiid that there was any hi. for westrin 'ic'' i pots that the Soviet Union also raised the qu ctiin ot stationing 11-12,000 Warsaw Pact troop, as i prm.nret garrison in Czecho'Aovakia. D)'pite D)ur's denial, it seems

itGians hcrder, nut also st-i grzater pihiicai ;cerige agains? Psgue. A sinriar Soviet desire to put Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia had, according to long-standing rumor, previously been rebuffed by the Novotny regime, and therefore was hardly likely to be palatable to the Dubcek regime. 112 Although alignrsents within the Czech party Ieadcrship could hardly be specified with precision, it was generally felt that about one-third of the 169 Central Committee members con- sisted of firm Dubcek supporters, about one-third of orthodox conservatives, and the remainder of waverers. The decisionn to convoke the Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9, 1968, seemed to augur a cleaning out of the conservative faction before it could muster enough strength for a comeback, hence the Soviet disapproval. 1t3 The text of the proclamation to party members and all the people, issued by the Czechos!ovak Communist party Central Committee on Jine 1, was broadcast by Prague Domestic Service, June 1, 1968. See also "Czech Reds Promise Safeguards, Plan Congress," Wa/hington Pot, June 2, 1968; report of Alexander Dubcek to Brno Aktiv, Prague Domestic Service, June 3, 1968. 114 F. Konstantinov, "Marxism-Leninism-The Only International Doctrine," Pravda, June 14, 1968. CRS-49

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CIczcchos!ovak figures,'" the Konstantinov article was ile first from Moscow Co single out a high Czech official for criticism. It was followed, in thc latcr part of June, by even more vituperative attacks on Czech reformers,"' while mass meetings of factory workers were organized throughout the Soviet Union to pledge support to the People's Militia and other "healthy forces" in Czechoslovakia."' At this juncture, two developments bearing upon the Czech democratization process occurred in Prague. On June 27, the National Assembly voted to abolish censorship, formalizing one of the key promises of the party's action program. That same day a manifesto entitled "2000 Words," written by Ludvik Vaculik and signed by seventy prominent scientists, artists, athletes, and other public figures, was published iri several Prague papers."' This document, which called for a radical speed-up of the reform program by grass-roots action, was deplored by some Prague party leaders, including Dubcck,"* but it seemed to confirm Soviet forebodings about what could be expected once the Czech censorship apparatus had been dismantled. If any single turning point in the Soviet response to the Czechoslovak chal- lenge during the first six months of 1968 can be identified, it probably came at this time, for from the early days of July throughout the remainder of the month Moscow mounted a steadily intensified war of nerves against the Dubek regime, against the backdrop of military moves which implied that the Soviet Union was preparing for armed intervention should the Czechs persist on their democratization course. As the first step in this heavy-handed phase of pressure against Prague, Moscow delayed the departure of its troops from Czechoslovakia upon completion of the joint Warsaw Pact exercises on "s Among prominent Czech stipportcrs of the reform movement attacked by the East press were Professors Antonin Germn Sncjdarck and Jindrich Filipec. For typical Czech reformers, to which GDR diatribes against Prague made strong ripostes, see Kurt Hager's speech congress on Marx, to a philosophy in Neues Deutschland, March 27, 1968; H. H. Angermueller, J. Streisand, "Prof. G. Kroeber, and Sneidarck and the European Concept of F. J. Strauss." Hclmut Baicrl ibid., May 11, 1968; addressing "Some Authors in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," 1968; Dr. Hajo Herbell, ibid., May 12, "Bonn Between Fcar and Hope," ibid., May 24, 1968. 143On June 21, for example, two well-known Czech liberals, Alexander Kramer and Ivan Svitak, were attacked for advocating reforms which would "allow full freedom for political demagogy" and undermine the party's leading role': Gr. Ognev, "What Does 'The Student' Teach?" Komsomol/s'aia pravda, June 21, 1968. See also V. Platkovskii, "The Major Force in the Struggle for Communism," Izvestiia, June 25, 1968. "7 "Strengthen Fraternal Unity," lzvesiia, June 27, 1968. "ISFor text of the "2000 Words" manifesto by Ludvik Vaculik, a popular Czech novelist, see East Europe (): 25-28. In addition to being widely published in the Czech daily press, the manifesto also appeared in Literarni Listy, weekly organ of the Czech writers' union vocal supporter of the reform and a movement. See also "Czech Aide Urges Tougher Opposing Reforms," Washington Post, July 6, 1968; Anatole Shub, "Soviet journal Decries Liberal Czech Appeal," ibid., July 11, 1968. 21ODubcek on June 27 referred to a Czech party Presidium statement issued immediately after the appearance of "2000 Words," censuring the document for trying to push the pace of erocra- tization too rapidly. Some other Czech officials, however, including Premier Oldrich Cernik ard National Front chairman Frantisek Kriegel, expressed a more moderate view odf the document. Henry Kamm, "Prague Spurns Plea for a Draxtic Purge," New Yor Timet, June 29, 1968. CRS-50

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June 30. Using a variety of flimsy pretexts, including a reported finding by Marshal Iakubovskii that the exercises showed Czech troops to be incapable of manning their defenses against West Germany without the presence of out- side help,"' the Soviet Union kept a sizable force in the Czech countryside, much to the embarrassment of Czechoslovak authorities, who repeatedly announced that the Soviet troops were to be withdrawn "without delay.""' On July 11, following Dubcek's rejection of a peremptory summons to attend a Warsav bloc summit meeting in Poland on the Czclhoslovak sitiuai tion,'2 Moscow sounded another stern warning to Prague with the publication of a Pravda article by I. Aleksandrov which not only attacked the "2000 Words" manifesto as evidence of "the activation of right wing and counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia" but, more ominous still, laid down essentially the same rationale for intervention as that used in Hungary in 1956."3 Then, on July 15, the Soviet Union and its four most orthodox Warsaw bloc partners, in a joint letter couched in almost brutal language, delivered what amounted to an ultimatum to the Dubek leadership to mend its ways or face the conse- 120 Warsaw dispatch, "Poor Showing Held Cause," New York Times, July 17, 1968. According to Professor John Erickson of the University of Manchester, England, the Soviet general staff had already concluded, after previous joint exercises, that Czechoslovak forces would be unable to contain a conventional NATO attack, and had therefore raised the question of introducing Soviet forces permanently along the Bavarian border. See statement of Erickson's views in R. T. Rocking- ham Gill, "Europc's Nilitary Balance After Czechoslovakia," East Europe (October 1968): 19. See jkc fn. I11 above. 121 On July 10, Czech Drfcnse Minister Martin Dzur said that 35 per cent of the Warsaw Pact forces engaged in the Junc maneuvers had left Czech soil, and that the remainder-which ap- parently included all of the Soviet forces involved-would be withdrawn without delay. How many Soviet troops were prcscrnt was never accurately established. "Authoritative" Czech sources were reported to have named a fgure of 16,000, while other estimates ranged from 6,000 to 24,000. The first of these Soviet troops began to leave Czechoslovakia on July 13, according-to Prague, but their departure was halted tie next day. Thereafter, throughout July, despite several an- nouinliincrts by Czech spokesmen giving deadlines for their withdrawal, most of the Soviet troops app.u m1v stuved on. Set' "Prague Uoccr Iin on Soviet Troops.' New York Timrs, July 11, 1968; "Solet Tioops Start Leaving Cyech Solil ." l'a/singon /'off, luilv i, 1%68; licnry Kamm, "Soviet Trop \Vohdraw.d IlAted in CNeCVslvlkia," Xew York- 'T'iomc, July IS, 1%8; idmi, "Russian Forrs Smrccl To Put Oil Leaving Slovakia," ibid., July 22, 1%6S. See, also fn. 130 below. t" Separte letters were sent to Prague during the first week in July by the Central committees of the Soviet, Polish, East German, Bulgarian, and Hungarian parties, demanding that the Czechoslovak leaders attend a joint meeting in Warsaw to explain why they had not dcalt'more 6rmly with "counterrevolutionary" elements. The Czechs, declined this summons, but offered to hold bilateral meetings with each of the other parties. See Henry Kamm, "Prague Bars Call for Bloc Parley" and "Prague To Offer Bilateral Talks on Reform Steps," New York Times, July 10 and 12, 1968. 123 1. Aleksandrov, "The Attack Against the Socialist Foundations of Czechoslovakia," Pravda, July 11, 1968. In 1956 the rationale advanced for Soviet intervention in Hungary had been that "counterrevolutionary" elements- supported by the West were threatening the "foundations of the socialist order" in a fraternal country, whose "true patriots" had rallied to face this "mortal danger" and called upon the Soviet Union for assistance. (See, for example, Pravda, October 28, November 4, 1956.) The Aleksandrov article not only pictured Czechoslovakia as similarly threatened, but made the parallel explicit by charging that the tactics of those plotting. to over- throw socialism in Czechoslovakia were the same as those previously used by "countetrcvolutionary clements in Hungary who attempted to undermine the Hungarian peoplc'S socialist achicvcments in 1956." CRS-51

374 BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN: FIRST HALF-DECADE

quences.'" Spelling out the dangers to Communist rule posed by the Czech reform movement, the letter enjoined the party leadership in Prague to reimpose control over mass media, to suppress all "anti-socialist" forces and organizations, and to observe the principles of Marxism-Leninism and "demo- cratic centralism." It also invoked an appeal to "healthy forces" in the country, such as the People's Militia, to "mobilize" for "battle against the counter- revolutionary forces in order to preserve and consolidate socialism in Czecho- slovakia." But the letter's central message seemed to be that the Soviet Union, with the assent of at least its hard-core Warsaw allies,' would no longer hesitate to intervene as it saw fit in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, for by fiat these affairs had now become the business of Prague's; Communist neighbors. Said the letter:

This is no longer your affair alone.... We shall never agree to having imperialism, by peaceful and non-peaceful methods, making a breach in the socialist systems, from inside or outside, and transforming power rela- tions in Europe to its own advantage.

Upon the heels of this letter, which was followed by a demand from Moscow for an immediate meeting of the full Soviet Politburo and the Czecho- 26 slovak Presidium on Soviet soil, several menacing new moves set the stage for intervention. One of these, discussed in a previous chapter, was the "revela- tion" on July 19 of the alleged discovery of arms caches and secret documents "proving" that American and West German agencies were conspiring to aid. subversive and counterrevolutionary elements in organizing uprisings in Czechoslovakia.' Another was the announcement on July 23 that Soviet forces were engaged in extensive maneuvers all along the western frontiers of the USSR, including the border with Czechoslovakia.' Shortly thereafter it was

I The July 15 ioint letter by the Soviet, East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Ilungarian Communist parties was delivered to Prague on July 16. 1968. It was published in Moscow on July 18. For the texts of this letter and the Czechoslovak reply of July 18 disputing its charges, see New York Timer, July 19, 1968. 125 It was generally bclicved that Hungary, though a cosigner of the five-party letter of July 15, was not altogether enthusiastic about the squeeze being applied to the Dubcek regime. See, for example, "Current Dcvelopments," East Europe (August 1968): 35. 52 On July 18 the Soviet Union madc public a message to the Communist Party Presidium of Czechoslovakia demanding that the top ruling bodies of both Communist parties meet on July 22 or 23 in Moscow', or alternatively in Kiev or Lvov. This summons for a gathering of the membership of full the Politburo and Presidium was unprecedented. See "To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," Pravda, July 18, 1968. 12T In the opinion of many Western observers, including this writer, the turning point indicating that the Soviet Union might in fact be on the verge of repeating its military intervention of 1956 in Hungary came with Soviet disclosure of alleged "evidence" purported to reveal "the perfidious plans of American imperialism and West German revanchism" to assist "insurgent elements" East Europe and in Czechoslovakia. See "The Defense of Socialism Is Our Common Task," Krasnaia zvezda, July 19, 1968; "Documents of Great Urgency" and "Arms Caches on Czech ibid., July 21, 1968; V. Ragulin Territory," and 1. Chushkov, "Adventurist Plans of the Pentagon and CIA," Pravda, July 19, 1968. 128 "Rear Services Exercises," Izvexiiia, July 24, 1968. These maneuvers, nicknamed "Ncmen" and originally said to involve personnel of regular army units and reservists in logistics exercises CRS-52

RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE: 1966-1968 375

made known that East Gcrman and Polish troops also wcrc co-operating in the exercises;' 2 ' at the same lirnc thcrc wcre reports that Sovict forces stationed in tnese countries and in Hungary were moving closer to Czechoslovakia, within whose borders other Soviet troops were still encamped."' Finally, to ensure that Prague would gct the message, Pravda published letters from two of Czech groups factory workers asserting that the presence of Soviet troops in Czecho- slovakia would make "every honest man feel more secure in his work," while an article in the Soviet press recalled the welcome extended to the Soviet forces that liberated Czechoslovakia from German occupation in 1945."1 Presumably, as the last days of July approached and the world became un- comfortably aware that a momentous new crisis had arrived, Moscow counted upon the Czech leadership's nerves to crack under the strain. They did not. Apart from what appeared to be a minor concession or two, such as the "demotion" of a defense official who had openly criticized Soviet domination of the Warsaw 2 Pact military setup, the Dubcek regime held firm, winning along the USSR's western borders, were scheduled to last until August 10. An unusual amount of publicity was given the "Nemen" maneuvers, including several interviews with General Sergei S. Mariakhin, logistics chief of the Soviet armed forces and commander of the exercises, who described them on one occasion as the "largest" of their kind ever held in the Sovict Union. On another occasion he stated that simulated nuclear attacks were a part of the maneuvers, and it was also announced that major air exercises, named "Sky Shield," were carried out in conjunction with he war games. All of thi, tended to draw attention to the flexing of Soviet military muscle at time when a showdown meeting a with the Czechs was approaching. See Lt. Col. V. Andrianov, "They Inspect the Field," and "Kilometers of Courage," Krasnaia zvezda, July 25 and 31, 1968, respectively; Col. P. Kniazev and Lt. Co!. V. Zaivorodinskii, "The Duty of Those Who Go, in First," ibid., July 28, 1968; V. Gol'tsev, "On the Military Skill of the Expert," Iztieia, July'30, 1968. For a later Soviet account of the "Nemen" and "Sky Shield" exercises, see So'iet Review, no. 9 (September 1968): 22. Mili.ary 1" On July 29, the day when the confrontation at Cierna began, the Soviet Union disclosed that East German and Polish troops had joined in the border maneuvers. TASS Interna ional Service, Moscow radio broadcast, July 29, 1968; "At the Rear Services Exercises," Krasnaia Xvuida, July 3 1. 1968. 0 13 The number of Soviet troops still within Czechoslovakia was uncertain; some accounts'gve a figure of around 8,000 out of the original force which had entered the country in June. See Raymond . Anderson, "Moscow Continues Prague Pressure," New York Times, July 28, 1968; Richard Eder, "A Tense Test of Will," ibid.; "Soviet Troops in Germany Are Reported on ibid., July 30, 1968; "Prague Reported Alert," Tense: Soviet Troops on Move," Washington Post, July 1968; "Red bloc Forces 30, Near Czech Border," ibid., July 31, 1968; Richard B. Watch on the Stolley, "The Tense Red Army," Li/e, August 2, 1968, pp. 24-27; James H. Beaver Biilington, "Czech Stand: Against Rhinoceros," ibid., pp. 28-28C. See also fn. 121 above. 131 Letter of Czechoslovak Workers, "We Look to Our Friends," Pravda, A. July 30, 1968; Lt. -Col. Dudko, "Greetings, Friends," Krasnaia zvezda, July 30, 1968. saa The official was Lt. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, head of the military department of the Central Committee, whose call for a basic revision of the Warsaw Pact in a July 15 interview, sharply criticized by the Soviet Union, led to the abolishment of his post and his assignment to "other duties" on July 25. Subsequently, Czech liberals rallied to Prchlik's defense, and, following the Cierna-Bratislava meetings, a partial step toward clearing his name was taken when on August a previous government statement 9 rebuking him was repudiated. However, conservati, i;a Czech Defense Minstry's Military the Council struck back on August 15, reaffirmin he p MOUS rebuke to Prchlik and criticizing him for allegedly having disclosed secret informia'% Warsaw Pact military structure. aboait the It thus appeared that the Prchhik case had become focal points of controversy one of several between conservative a:d reform-minded groups. "Czechs Demand See Henry Kamm, a Basic Revision of Warsaw Pact," NcaA York Times, Does July 16, 1968; "Whom General V. Prchlik Satisfy?" Krarnaa ivzeda, July 23, 1968. CRS-53

376 BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN: FIRST HALF-DECADE

the first round of the July crisis by successfully insisting that a showdown meeting with the Soviet Politburo be held at Cierna, on Czcchoslovak'soil."' What is more, as the crisis entered its sccond round at Cierna on July 29, it bccane apparent that Moscow's heavy-handed methods had backfircd, causing the party in Czechoslovakia to close ranks behind Dubcck and unifying the country as a whole in solid support of his regime." This national rallying around the lbelc;-gured party leadership, which the Sovict leaders must have regarded with a mixture of chagrin, envy, and respect, was probably a key factor in the showdown at Cierna, together with warnings to Moscow by Ceausescu, Tito, and a number of West European Communist leaders against trying to bludgeon the Czechs into submission."' The display of internal Czechoslovak solidarity upset any Soviet hopes of splitting the Prague leadership and finding withinits ranks a group of men more amenable to Moscow's bidding than Dubcek and his close associates."' The warnings from other Communist parties, on the other hand, served notice on the Soviet Union that an attempt to force the Czechs to submit to its dictate might tear the Communist movement wide open and torpedo the world ,conference of parties scheduled for the following Nov;1 -ber. Temporarily, at least, the Soviet effort to bring the Czechs to heel faltered before these obstacles. After a tense four-day confrontation at Cierna, the Soviet leaders backed down, ordering withdrawal of their troops from Czechoslovakia and dropping for the time being the more blatant demands of the July 15 letter.1"

133 Soviet agreement to meet the Czechoslovak leaders on the latter's territory was disclosed on July 22. At the time, it was indicated that the entire eleven-member Politburo would attend the meeting, which would have marked the first simultaneous absence of the top ruling oligarths from the USSR. As it turned out, two Politburo members stayed behind, D. S. Polianskii and A. P. Kirilenko. See "The Forthcoming Soviet-Czcchoslovak Mceting," Pravda, july 23,,J968. Sec also Raymond H. Anderson, "Soviet Poiitburo Yields to Prague on a Parley Sitc," New York Times, July 23, 1968. 1.4 Typical of the backing given .i the party leadership was a manifesto published by Literarni L.sty on July 26, which was widely circulated among Czech citizens as a petition picdging the country s support for a firm stand in the Cierna talks. For its text, see New York Times, July 1968, 27, 3 While the rallying of Rumania's Ceausescu and Yugoslavia's Tito behind Prague may have given the Soviet leaders momentary pause, it also may have strengthened Soviet suspicions that a new version.of the Little Entente was rapidly coming into being, with poteitiaily disruptive im- plications for Soviet hegemony in East Europe. A revival of Czech-kRurnanian-Yugoslav ties also would have had unpleasant connotations for Hungary, against which the original Little Entente historically was aimed, thus perhaps persuading Kadar to look somewhat less benev6fketly developments in Czechoslovakia. upon 1as The Soviet press later asserted that there had been a split in the Czech leadership at Cierna between a minority of "right-wing revisionists" led by Dubek and a majority favoring "principled line" against "anti-socialist forces" a in Czechoslovakia, but this apparently was largely an attempt to uphold the Soviet contention that "healthy" forces within the country had finally found it necessary to call for Soviet help. See "Defense of Socialism Is the Highest International Duty," Pravda, August 22,.1968. "8 The brief and uninformative communique issued at the close of the Cierna mecidng on August 1 gave no indication of what agreements were reached, but it was generally regarded as an armistice document, signifying a Soviet backdown from the demands of the five-party letter of July 15 in exchange for exercise of "self-restraint" by the Czech reformers. For the full text of the communique, see Washington Posa, August 2, 1968. CRS-54

RELATIONS WIli LAST EUROPE: 1%6-1%8 377

Thus, the uliy crisis ended, as was confirmed on August 3 at Bratislava, where the leaders of the Soviet Union and of its four orthodox Warsaw Pact partners met with the Czechs to endorse the truce agreed on at Cierna. The Bratislava communique, while somewhat more wordy than the cryptic Cierna announcement, was couched in broad platitudes which told,little about any specific understandings reached."' It was a document whichi the Czechs could interpret as a license to continue their reform program on a circumspect basis, while the other parties could regard it as a Czech commitment to restrain the reform movement and as a reaffirmation of Warsaw bloc solidarity. On the face of things, however, the outcome of the Cierna and Bratislava meetings seemed to signify that Prague had successfully defied the power and authority of the Soviet Union. A Short-Lived Truce

Soviet spokesmen sought to salvage something from the collapse of the effort to intimidate Prague by asserting that the Cierna-Bratislava compromise was proof that the members of the Warsaw alliance were able to settle their differences in a "fraternal" manner."' But throughout the world it was gen- erally felt that the July confrontation had produced a serious setback for the Soviet Union. True, some observers cautioned that the Soviet leaders had driven a hard bargain with Dubeek without giving up the continuing threat of intervention if he should let things get out of hand;"* however, the prevail- ing impression was that the world had witnessed another David-over-Goliath victory. If we thought this was the last chapter in the contest of wills between Prague and Moscow, many deemed it likely that the Dubcek regime had at least won a breathing spell, for the Soviet leaders-having brandished the threat of military intervention and then backed away-presumably were not prepared to repeat this crisis scenario immediately. From the Soviet viewpoint there were certainly good arguments for honor- ing the Cierna-Bratislava truce until at least after the scheduled world party conference in Moscow, the success of which would depend in large measure on the Soviet Union's display of readiness to accept "mutual accommodation" of conflicting positions within the Communist camp. Given this circumstance and the characteristic vacillation of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime toward the Czechoslovak problem during the preceding seven months, one might have 1 For the full text of the Bratislava communique, see Pravda, August 4, 1968. There was, however, one prophctic point in the Bratislava declaration: it substituted "non-intcrference for the traditional phrase in each other's internal affairs" the words "fraternal mutual assistance." 23 Editorial, "The Call of -the Times," Izvestiia, August 6, 1968; editorial, "Strength in Unity," Pravda, August 5, 1968. 140 For a challenge to the generally held view that the outcome of the July crisis represented a Soviet setback and demonstrated that the Kremlin leadership lacked the stomachto use military force against Czechoslovakia, see Crosby S. Noyes, "Czechs Will Find Terms of Soviet Accord Stiff," Washington Star, August 15, 1968. For a presentation of the vzrious arguments, prior to the July-August crisis situation, that the Soviet leadership was unlikely togusq armed force to impose its will uyon Czechoslovakia, see R. T. Rockingham Gill, "Czechoslovakia: Will the Soviet Army InterveneW East Europe (July 1968): 2-6. CRS-55

378 BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN: FIRST HALF-DECADE

expected Moscow to adopt all interim policy of watchful waiting to see What changes would be registered at the Fourtcenth Czechoslovak Party Congress in September, as well as to ascertain whether the Czechs would actually adhere to their side of the Bratislava agreement with regard to Warsaw Pact co- operation, a common line on Germany, the exercise of discipline in the press, and other restr-ints upon the reform movement."' Even a modest period of grace, however, apparently was more than Moscow could abide, for within less than two weeks after the Bratislava armistice it became evident that a new round of political-military pressures had been launched against the Dubek regime. Soviet polemics against Prague reopened on August 14 with an article attacking reform-minded elements of the Czech press,... followed the next day by a lurid account of the details of an alleged West German plot for a two-pronged military offensive against East Germany and Czechoslovakia, intended "to confront the Warsaw Pact countries with a fait accompli.""' The "slanderous" anti-Soviet activities of the Czech press again became the target of a Pravda diatribe on August 16,"' the same day that Dubcek-on the occasion of a visit by Ceausescu to Prague-appealed to the Czech people not to move too fast toward reform, so that the country might still enjoy freedom of action to go ahead with the "democratization process.""" During the next four days the Soviet press charged in mounting crescendo that the Dubcek leadership was not acting vigorously enough to suppress "subversive activities by anti-socialist forces" within the country."' The military aspect of this renewed Soviet pressure upon Prague first became manifest on August 11, when it was announced that still another Warsaw

141 That the Dubcck regime's side of the compromise at Cierna and Bratislava demonstrating self-restraint had called for was rather soon made evident by the Czech Party on August 14 against Presidium's warning political activity which violated "law and ordcr," and by other free efforts to keep discussion in line, such as the dismissal of liberals party, on the editorial staff of Rude Pravo, the dall', for alleged "lack of discipline." See Henry Kamm, "A Discussion Curb Asked in Prague. New York Ti'es, August 15, 1968. '' The article marking the renewal of the pressure campaign against Prague, "Zhurnalist," appeared signed by in Literalurnaja gazeta, August 14, 1968. Literarni Listy," Entitled "The Political Milk of it directed its fire against editors of the liberal Czech urged the West weekly for having allegedly -to send "rescue divisions" into Czechoslovakia "if something 1 Ernest, should happen." Henry, "What Kind of New Policy Has Bonn Devised?" Iz:estia, August 15, 1968. 4 urii Zhukov, "Instigators," Pravda, August 16, 1968. 145 Prague radio broadcast, August 16, 1968. 14w3 The keynote article in this last-minute prc-invasion propaganda campaign came on August it was by 1. Aleksandrov, whose byline 18; (belicvc to >e a pseudonym) had appeared over on July T Icontaining a rationale an article for intervention sim Ilar to that used in Hungary. above.) The new art Icle charged tlse Dubcck (See fn. 123 regime with failure to curb "rightist react and warned that the "fraternal" ionary" forces countries which signed the Bratislava agrecmet were "fully resolved to rebuff the schenes of internal and external reaction.". Soviet propagane a at this time also raised the threat posed to Czechoslovakia by the Sudeten Germans and zeroed in on the of the Prague case factory workers who had written a sympathetic fn. 131 letter to Moscow on July 30 (see above), with Moscow, charging that these workers were being "persecuted" by elements seeking to damage Czech-Soviet Mlbversive relations. See I. Aleksandrov, "Brazen -Thrst of Re- action," Pravda, August 18, 1968; Viktor Maevskii and Vasilii Zhuravskii, "aeAgjin on the Letter of the Czcchoslovak Workers" ind "A Volcano That Is Not Extinct," Pravda, 20, 1968. 'Avgot 19 and CRS-56

RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE: 1%W -1%W 379

Pact excrcisc along Czchosovakia's borders had begunn immediately aftcr the conclusion, on August 10, of the large-scale "Ncmen" logistics excrciscs carried 4 out during the July crisis." Visits by several of the Sovict Union's highest-ranking military leaders to Poland and East Germany within the next fCSV days in connction with the new maneuvers gave further evidence that MOSCOW was againIm flexing its military muscic.'" As it later becaW1 known, the maneuvers inspected by Marshals Grcchko, lakubovskii, and others' had in cilect scrvcd as a dress rehearsal for the inipcnding invasion,""' but atihe time there was no public hint that the Soviet leadership had made up it4 mind to take the fateful step from which it had drawn back in July. There remains considerable uncertainty as to the sequence of the Soviet leaders' decisions on military intervention both before and after the Cierna- Bratislava meetings. According to anonymous East German sources cited in the Western press, plans had been made to intervene before the Cierna meet- ing; the July pressures and troop maneuvers were said to be the prelude to this intervention, which was to take place after a "cry for help" from the Novotny wing of the Czech leadership. Soviet failure to find anyone to call for help allegedly caused this move to be canceled "at the eleventh hour, " just before the Cierna gathering."' In the opinion of Ota Sik, the Czech economic leader who took temporary refuge in Yugoslavia after the invasion, the inter- vention had been decided on before Cierna and Bratislava, and these meetings were merely a "smoke screen" while final preparations were being made."' The Soviet version, of course, is that the intervention decision came with great reluctance only after the Czechs had failed to live up to the Bratislava agree- ment of August 4, but the brief interval of truce, hardly enough to allow a fair test of Czech performance, tends to cast doubt on this contention. Whether the intervention decision was made well in advance or was reached only on the eve of the invasion,"' it does seem plain that preparatory steps for such a-

147 The new maneuvers, described as "joint exercises of communication troops," began on August 10 along Czechoslovakia's northern and castern borders with participation by Soviet, Polish, and East German forces. On August 16 the maneuvers were extended to Czechoslovakia's southern border, and Hungarian troops joined Soviet forces therc. Among the participants in suhscquent invasion, only Bulgaria, The which has no common frontier with Czechoslovakia, -was not publicly included in the exercises. See "At the Headquarters of the Joint Forces of the warsaw Pact Countries," Krasnaia zvezda, August 11, 1968; "Communication of the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency-MTI," Krasnaia z'czda, August 17, 1968. 1 The Soviet visitors included Marshal A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defensc; Marshall. 1akubovskij, commander-in-chief I. of the joint Warsaw Pact forces; General A. A. Epishev,-chicf of the main political administration of the Soviet armed forces; General S. M. Shtemenko,, chief of staff of the joint Warsawv Pact forces; and Marshal P. K. Koshevoi, commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). See "A. A. Grechko Meets with H. Hoffman," Pravda, August 17, 1968; "in an Atmosphere of Friendship," ibid., August 18, 1968. "1 See, for example, David Lawrence, "U.S. Knew of Buildup for Invasion," Washington Star, September 4, 1968. ,50 David Binder, "July Plan To Oust Dubcek Reported," New York Time,, August 9, 1968 1m2 "Brezhnev a Bureaucrat, Ota Sik Says," translation of Sik interview ' with Itilian writer Alberto Moravia, Radio Free Europe, September 12, 1968, p. 4. 152 It might be surmised that the final invasion decision was taken on A6gust '17. This was the day oi a Politburo meeting in Moscow, following the return to the Soviet capital on August 16 CRS-57

380 BREZHNEV-KOSYCIN: FIRST HALF-DECADE

contingency had bcgun as carly as the July border maneuvcrs and rcar-arca nobihzaton,-nd that by August 10 (thc start of the "cr ianications troop" cxcrciscs that proved to be ihcdrcss rehearsal) the iliikary phase of prepara- tion was vel in hand.

The Invasion of Czechoslovakia

On the night of August 20-21, the blow fell. Striking with surprise, virtually complete Soviet-led invasion forces rolled across Czechoslovakia's their several borders from maneuver areas,153 while Soviet airborne troops began ianditg at Prague's main airport, whence they penetrated eight miles to the heart i& the city to invest such key points as radio, parliament, and other government buildings."' Dubcek and other leaders of the stunned nation, after appealing to the population to remain calm and offer no resistance, were taken into custody in their offices. Meanwhile, the Czech armed forces, which in the words of the Prague radio had "not received a command to defend the country," stood by as the occupation of Czechoslovakia was quickly consummated.'" of most of the senior leaders who had been "officially" on vacation not seem to be in the Crimea. There does any basis, however, for rumors to the effect that summoned back to Moscow the senior leaders had been to be presented with a decision arrived their absence. What at by subordinates during the triggering factor in the invasion decision a matter of speculation. may have been remains entirely According to one view, the critical circumstance of a new date by Praguc may have been the setting for holding the Co rss the c Slovak wing August, prior to of the party at the end of the September Congress of the entire Czechoslovak would have party. The August heetng threatened to unseat such Slovak conservatives touch with as Vasil Bilak, who was in constant Soviet Ambassador ChrCervonenko in Prague. party In this view, Bilak and other cons.-rvative figures had managed to persuade Chervonenko mounting, that internal dissatisfaction with Dubcek and that once Soviet troops arrived they would was (i.e., of be "welcomed" by a reversed majority conservatives) within the Prague leadership. For Richard Lowenthal, a presentation 'of this argument, aic "The Sparrow in the Cage," Pro/ems o/ Communism 1968): 21-22. With respect to (Nnovemberhs r cmer the question of when military intervention first seriously contemplated, some observers may hve been have traced the likely (ate back to April, General A. A. Epishev, chief of 1968, wh en the main political administration of the Soviet reportedly declared at 6 wfes a Moscow party meeting that the Soviet army whenever "loyal Communists" was ready o armedd forces, in Czechoslovakia might appea for Soviet Union," help. See Michl T'tu "Te Interplay (November s1968):5. H Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria -lso furnished cor.tingcnts tailed discussion to the invading forces. For more de- theGDR, of the forces involved, see chapter XVII, theinvasionforces, 154 The seizure pp. 466-71. thebulkof of Prague's Ruzyne International Airport whichcomprised to provide an airhead for the troops toSoviettroops, ho invested the capital's key points and took Inaddition of the meticulous the Dub k ledership iinto custody was illumative planning which went into the military vakia. For an phase of the operation against Czechosio- account of the airport's capture, whichnvolved personnel in Prague, co-ordination with Soviet Embassy see Kenneth Ames, "Coup at Airport August 31, 1968. For other Led Invasion," WasAing-i" Post, accounts of the invasion itself see Officials Tad Szuic, "Broadcast A-peals to Remain at Their jobs," New Yor4 Times, to More Confident," August 21, 1968; Dan Mrgan, "Prague WasAington Post, August 25, 1968; Is tons Paul Wohi, "One of thorStalthest Opera in Modern History," CAristian Science Monitor, Editor August 26, 1968; Stanislav Budin, 'Czech Tells of Events Leading to Invasion," New "A Czech York Times, August 28, 1968; Harold Jackson, History of the Occupation," Washirgton Post, 155 Details of how August 29, 1968. the Czech armed forces were immobilized have Presumably, the decision not been forthcoming, not to hnake a fight' of it against hopeless belief of the Czech leadership cdds' grew out )f the general that no provocation should be them of an ex, post factor offered the invaders, thus depriving justifica on for the intervention. Although no organized military resistance, and in'a sense the Czech, forces put up may have "co-operated" to keep the population CRS-58

RELATiONS WITH EAST EUROPE: 1966-1968 381

T the military phase of the intervention gave every sign of having kecn cart- Cwlly planned and decisively conducted, the same could not be said for the political aspects of the operation. Nothing pointed up more vividly the con- trast between the chilling emfciency of the military seizure of Czechoslovakia and the poor po]itical preparation for its occupation than the collapse'of the Soviet Union's original alibi that it acted with other "fraternal socialist coun- tries" to satisfy a "request by party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces."' Despite denials from all responsible Czechoslovak authorities that any request for assistance had been made,'" the Soviet Union sought for several days to present the invasion as a legitimate response to a call for help from loyal Communists in Prague, stressing that Communist rule in Czechoslovakia was in dire peril from "counterrevolutionary forces" within the country, which had "entered into collusion with external forces hostile to socialism."15 it became apparent almost immediately, however, that Moscow had again failed to reckon with the uncompromising solidarity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Not only were the Russians unable to produce a single Czechoslovak leader to authenticate the alleged call for help, but, more embarrassing still, no one could be found in Prague to form a puppet government--even among the most orthodox party conservatives who were considered to be in Moscow's pocket.' In those first days of the occupation, Ludvik Svoboda, the old soldier and from engaging in more than sporadic clashes with the invaders, the Czech military establishment apparently did make a notable contribution to the operation of a clandestine radio network, which hClped to sustain the unity of the country during the early days of the occupation. See Constantine Menges, Prague ReArnance, 1968: The Ingenuily o/ Conviction, The RAND Corporation, September 198. P-3930, 153The first Soviet announcement of the invasion-a TASS statement over Moscow radio in the early morning hours of August 21, which appeared later the same day in Pravda and Iatesta-began with reference to the alleged request for armed assistance. 'Is Beginning with an initial announcement over Prague radio, shortly after midnight' of August 21, that the P.ict forces had entered Czechoslovakia around 11 P.M. on August 20, Czechoslovak authorities issued a series of statements during the following hours. These included declarations by the party Presidium and the National Assembly denouncing the invasion as an aggression which was taking place without the knowledge of the Czechoslovak leadership, personal appeals from Dubcek and Svoboda for calm, and a request to the governments of the invading Warsaw Pact countries to withdraw their troops. I Soviet attempts to portray the invasion as a response to a call for assistance included.'publica- tion of an unsigned appeal, which was then repeatedly referred to as having "fully substantiated" the "historic decision to request assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries-a fine example of circular logic. See "Appeal by Group of Members of the'CCP Central Committee and C.S.R. Government and National Assembly," Pravda and Izvestija, August 22, 1968. See also lurit Zhukov, "What Did They Strive For? The Calculations and Miscalcula- tions of the Enemics of the Czechoslovak People," Pravda, August 21, 1968; editorial, "Defense of Sociihsin Is the I ighest International Duty," ibid., August 22, 1968. Among the orthodox stalwarts within the Czechoslovak Communist leadership who were consiulered likely collaborators with the Russians but who nevertheless held back from trying to form a government were Vasil Bilak, Alois Indra, Drahomir Kolder, and Antonin Kapek. One reason for Soviet reticence in naming potential collaborators immediately after the invasion may nave been to avoid isolating them until their ranks grew and an alternative pro-Sovict govern- ment was formed. But when the potential collaborators found that they had in fact been isolated, they proved unwilling to form government a which could get no stamp of legitimacy from the Czechoslovak party, the National Assembly, or President Svoboda. See Lowenthal, in Problems of Communism (Novcmber-pecember 1968): 22. CRS- 59

382 13REZHNEV-KOSYGIN: I lkRS r I Al V -Of CAlr

President of Czechoslovakia who flew to Moscow, was virtually the sole link between the occupied nation and its occupiers-the party channel of communi- cation and the intergovernment relationship between Prague and Moscow having been severed. Faced with the incongruous situation of having.a military pro-consul ensconced in Prague without a government to give orders to, Soviet the leaders tried to prevail upon Svoboda to put together a makeshift regime. Failing in this, they were obliged to turn again to Dubcek, whom only a few days before they had imprisoned and denounced as a traitor."' Surely, there is no more bizarre chapter in the whole sorry invasion episode than the abduction of Dubcek and his close associates, who, after being taken to Moscow in manacles, were freed so that they might "negotiate" with their captors, because no one could be induced to form a puppet government. Svoboda's insistence that the Soviets deal with Dubcek and Cernik was an act of high courage, but in the end it also spared the Russians the political em- barrassment of having to set up their own, alien military regime to rule the Czechoslovak people directly. As one perceptive observer has put it, the Soviet ,leaders evidently came to the belated realization that their best bet was to return Dubcek and his colleagues to Prague to serve, temporarily at least, as a protective political cushion" between Soviet power and the Czechoslovak people.' Once the Moscow agreement of August 26 was concluded and the Dubcek regime reinstalled in Prague,"' the Soviet Union's diplomatic and propaganda effort to justify the invasion took a new turn. Around the end of August, the line shifted toward laying the blame at the door of NATO in general and West Germany in particular."' Preinvasion allegations that NATO and Bonn had drafted plans for subversive intrigues and military operations, against Czechoslovakia were revived, and emphasis was placed on the right -and the duty of the Soviet Union and its hardcore Warsaw allies to intervene in Czechoslovakia to keep it from being "torn away" from the bloc arid-thereby upsetting the power balance between the West and the Communist camp" The theme that the danger of war had been averted by the preventive occupa-

I" Svoboda arrived in Moscow on August 23 for talks with the Soviet leaders, heading a delegation which did not include Dubcek, small Oldrich Cernik, Josef Smrkovsky, Frantisek Kegcl, and other Czechoslovak leaders who had been arrcstcd in Prague and taken to Moscow. Cryptic Soviet statements on Svoboda's arrival and on the August 23-26 talks did not mcn.ion that the in- carccrated Czech leaders had been released to Join the talks until aftcr the talks were over. Prada, August 24, 25, 26, 1968; editorial, "The Svoboda Mission," New York Timecs, August 24, 1968; Anatole Shub "Czech Talks Are Shrouded in Secrecy,' Wa''inglon Post, August 27. 1968. For an account of the treatment of Dubcek, see Vincent Buist, "Soviets Flew Dubcek Out in Manacles," ibid., August 29, 1968. 161 James H. Bilington, "Cost to the Soviets: Loss of Their Dazzling Myth of Infallibility," Life, September 6, 1968, pp. 60-61. 162 See "Communiqu6 on Soviet-Czechoslovak Talks," Pravda, August 28, 1968; 'Text of Speeches by Svoboda and Dubek on Moscow Talks," New York Tirnes, August 28, 1968. 165 Michael Hornsby, "Moscow Decided To Put the Blame on West Germany," Tirne, London, August 31, 1968. 164 See chapter XV, pp. 409-10. See also the White Book, K sobylijar v CAhostooakii (On Events in Czechoslovakia), issued by "Press Group of Soviet Journalists," Moscow, 1968. CRS-60

RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE: ;83-1%8183

tion of the country, which had becn bricfly sounded at the outset, also reap- peared in the statements of Soviet spokesmen. Perhaps the principal fruit of the Soviet effort to justify the invasion, how- ever, was the emergence of vhat came to be labeled the "Brezhnev doctrine."""' in it, the Soviet Union claimed the right, in the name of the "class struggle" and "proletarian internationalism," to intervene forcibly in the affairs of any member of the "socialist corrmonwealth," despite such "abstract" notions as national sovereignty and sclf-dctermination. Although this doctrine struck many observers abroad as sormC:hing new, its antecedents in Soviet history go back quite far;"- its reformulation in the aftermath of the Czechoslovak inva- sion, therefore, was more a reversm.n to orthodoxy than the enunciation of a novel concept. Either way, however, its implications were disturbing. The outlines of the Brezhnev doctrine were laid down in September 1968 by several Soviet writers, one of whom, Sergei Kovalev, dismissed the "formal- legal arguments" of ."those who speak about the 'illegality' of the actions of the socialist countries in Czechoslovakia" and declared that the socialist states

The original TASS statement of August 31 on the entry of Warsaw Pact troops ii implied that in meeting a "threat to the socialist system in Czechoslovakia" the Soviet Union was averting ' prcscrvation of peace was later reintroduced by various oftheinterventionwith Soviet spokesmen, including Gromyko at foundationsofpcaccinEurope."Thecoupling United "threattothe the Nations on October 3, 1968. The critical point- that was skirted in thcse allusions to ircscr%.iiion of peacc was: who was likely to break tie peac? Since the West had shown un- mistak.kbly that it did not intend to go to war over CzeGhislovikicto inly implication left was (hit dth S iv it Uion was prepared to start a war to prevent CXchol 'va-kit-or any other country wihin ihr Soviet bloc-from moving out of the Soviet orbit. Sce M. Mikhalilov, "Don't Be Con- lii d, (G;entloemn," lrresiia, September 4, 1P)68. ditorti, "To Strtngtlen the Peace in Europe," I'irid.:, Sct'tctiler 20, 1968; "Excerpts from Gromtyko's Address llrfore the United Nations General .\srmti'yv." New Yor/ Time, October 4, 19 8. ""6 Brczhncv's natne came to be associated with the postinvasion doctrine of intervention after lie exlsiunleld some of its features at the Polish party Congress in Warsaw on November 12, 1968, aitjoueg by that time both Soviet theoreticians and other Kremlin leaders had already begun to ,Il out lie doctrine. "17 l'erhaps the ongins of the intervention doctrine go back to the concept of "proletarian inter- nationalism" as it was understood in Lenin's latter days and in most of the Stalinist period, when all Communist parties abroad were obedient instrumen:s of Kremlin policy, recognizing loyalty to only one "workers' homeland," the Soviet Union. Versions of the doctrine were later advanced under Khrushchev to legitimize the Soviet Union's "obligation" to intervene in Hungary in 1956, and to serve notice that once Communist regime& came to power they were to be regarded as irreversible. In a speech on August 14, 1958, for example, Khrushchev had said: "We are faithful to our obligations and our international duties ... in the event of any new outside effort to change the order in a socialist country ... we will not be mere bystanders and will not leave our friends , in the lurch." Again, the document issued by the 1960 world meeting of eighty-one Communist parties in Moscow had stated thaz every ruling Communist party was "accountable" not only to lie working people of its country" but to "the Communist movement as a whole," and that under the reciprocal obligations of proletarian internationalism it was the responsibility of the combined forces of the socialist camp to "safeguard every socialist country against encroachments by imperialist reaction." Similar doctrinal assertions that the individual sovereignty of Communist states is subordinate to the security of the "socialist commonwalth"-a term which came into use -around 1955-were to be found in abundance before the intervention doctrine was elaborated to fit the Czcchoslovak case. For a Soviet treatise in May 1968 which expounded the notion of limits on national sovereignty within the "socialist commonwealth" and foreshadowed the use of the principle of "mutual friendly assistance" to justify Czechoslovak intervention, see 1. Dudinskii, "V. I. Lenin's Ideas on the Socialist Commonwealth," Kommunirl, no. 8 (May 1968): 26-37. CRS-61

384 BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN: FIRST HALF-DECADE

could not "remain inactive in the name of some abstract idea of sovereignty when they saw how the country was exposed to the danger of anti-socialist degeneration."1" The keystone of the intervention doctrine as elaborated after the invasion was the assertion that "counterrevolution" with Czechoslovakia, abetted from without by "world imperialism," had threatened to open the gates of the "indivisible" socialist system. This, it was alleged, would have resulted in Czechoslovakia's becoming a corridor through which NATO troops could approach the Soviet frontier, as well as in carving up the commonwealth of ,European socialist countries and in violating the right of these countries to socialist self-determination."'* Obviously, this theoretical edifice would col- lapse if it were to be established that no real counterrevolutionary danger ever existed in Czechoslovakia. Hence the Soviet Union's attempt to wring from the Czechoslovaks themselves a confession that counterrevolution was rampant in their country prior to the invasion."' Although the Brezhnev doctrine justified the invasion as fulfilling an inter- national "class" duty to suppress anti-socialist elements who had "step by step - prepared a counterrevolutionary coup" in Czechoslovakia, it did not stop there. Its expositors also suggested that socialist countries which toyed with "new brands" of socialism that "play on the national sentiments of the people,"' 7 and even socialist countries "seeking to adopt a 'non-aligned' position," should be aware that they, too, were subject to the doctrine of preventing "a weaken- ing of any link of the world socialist system.""' The suggestion that there was to be no middle ground in the struggle betwCen "two opposing social systems" was accompanied by a reminder that nonaligned socialist states owed their "national independence" to "the might of the socialist commonwealth and primarily of its main power-the Soviet Union and its armed forces.""' Needless to say, the implications of this argument were not lost on such countries as Yugoslavia, whose long adherence to the principle of multiple roads to communism was clearly put in jeopardy by the Soviet Union's asser- 16-Sergei Kovalev, "The Sovereignty and International Obligations of the Socialist Pravda, September 26, Countries," 1968. For other contributions to the new theoretical rationale tion, see Kovalev's for interven- earlier article, "On 'Peaceful' and Nonpeaceful Counterrevolution," September 11, 1968; Professor Pravda, N. Farberov, "General Laws Governing the Building of Socialism," izrestija, September 28, 1968. 169 Kovalev, in Pravda, September 26, 1968. 170 The Soviet Union's attempt to beat down the Czechoslovak leadership's argument had been no counterrevolution that there tended tp center on the question of putting counterrevolutionaries on trial. Prague resisted the staging of political trials, while the Russians reportedly pressed for them to demonstrate that the invasion was justified. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Russian at Justice Ministry," New Yor/k Times, October 8, 1968. 11 Farbcrov, in Izvetiia, September 28, 1968. 72 Kovalev, in Pravda, September 26, 1968. A similar point aimed at "nonaligned" Yugoslavia appeared in the CPSU's theoretical journal in October 1968, in an article warning that no state can be "absolutely independent of M e system of states in which it exists" and that "proletarian internationalism . . . considers it necessary to guarantee the defense of any socialist sovereignty when it state's is threatened by the machinations of the imperialists," slavia: 'New Variant of Socialism'?" Kommunist, no. 15 (October 1968): 96-97.Iu. Georgicy, "Yugo- 173 Kovalcy, in Pravda, September 26, 1968. CRS-62

RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE: 1966-1968 385

tion that it had the right to set itself up as the final arbiter of Communist development in another socialist state and to intervene whenever it deemed communism to be "threatened" there. This was tantamount to saying that the Soviet Union refused to recognize the sovereignty of any Communist state within the reach of Soviet military power.'I' Edward Kardelj, Yugoslavia's leading theoretician, promptly sounded his country's concern that the Soviet Union was promulgating "a very dangerous doctrine.""' But misgivings about the pernicious character of the Brezhnev doctrine were voiced in the non- Communist West as well. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, warned the Soviet Union that it would damage any chance of a renewed detente if this doctrine meant that such principles of the United Nations Charter as the sovereign equality of nations and the prohibition against use of force did not apply to Soviet relations with the countries of East Europe."' The Soviet Union for its part did not concede one inch to its critics. Having covered up Soviet self-interest in maintaining control over East Europe with an ideological cloak that elevated the principle of class struggle above any forms of bourgeois "legality," the Soviet leaders took the position that no one had grounds to reproach them "in connection with the events surrounding Czecho- slovakia."'" Nevertheless, it was clear that the invasion of Czechoslovakia, whatever the reasons that prompted Moscow to launch it, had created as many new problems for the Soviet Union in Europe as it may have solved. "74 As expounded in the fall of 1968, the Soviet intervention doctrine was understood to apply to states in which communism had already established itself a% the ruling order. This left ambiguous the question Of the doctrine's application to any previously non-Communist country in which the Communist party might in the future come to power, by parliamentary means or otherwise. Obviously, if the doctrine were construed to apply in such cases, evcn a temporaryy" Communist electoral victory in a Europcan country accessible to Soviet military powcr would have to be regarded as irrversible. Needless to say, under the shadow of this logic the West European Communist parties could hardly expect to 6nd themscivcs welcome in the domestic political arena. "7 Speech commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the people's uprising in the Slovene Primoric, Liuhblana radio broadcast,'September 15, 1968. "7 See Robert H. Estahrook, "Russians Lectured by Rusk," Washington Post, October 3, 1968; Bernard Gwertzman, "Rusk Says Soviet Hinders DMtente," New York Times, October 11, 1968. "7 See speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at the United Nations, New York Times, October 4, 1968. , CRS-63

Czech Editor Tells of Events Leading to Invasion P'ollowingrl- 1" "n accou" t of recent eee ns in Czetinsiov ahi Restraint Urged This is why they asked the1 party avoid written by Stanislav fudin, lib. They asked journalists not press to help the to reply to attacks that .were all provocation that could be! eral editor of the weekly Re- beginning to come from the exploited by enemies of the porter, organ of the Czechoslo. Soviet press, despite the de- gzechoslovak reforms and vak journalists' union,-. and cision taken at Cierna to stop would make new meetings of published in the Paris daily Le the polemics. the Cierna type necessary. Monde. The journalists declared on- . 'This is something that we do not wish to see again C 1% by t. Wnde--0cra Mund animously that they supported as PRAGUE, the Presidium, or more pre- long as we live," remarked one Aug. 28-On Sat- of them with sadness. urday, Aug. 17, members of the cisely the liberal part of it; that they felt it was below In the afternoon of Tues- Presidium of the Communist th6ir dignity to answer their day, Aug. 20, the Presidium of' party met with about 40 Czech- attacks of Yuri Zhukov in the. Communist party met oslovak journalists. Alexander Pravda, the again to discuss preparations' Sovict party organ; 1 Dubcek, the First Secretary, that they understood the prin- for the congress. was not there although 4cipal tasks was to create a * Drahomir Kolder and Alois this Indra, meeting had working atmosphere for the two conservatives, been described the asked night . congress of the , Communist instead that the Pre before as representing sidium discuss a declarationi specifically his desire to ex- ,party, scheduled for Sept. which was to prepared by the Central Com- 'plain the situation to the stabilize the pro- press. ,cess of democratization and mittee department 'His lace headed by serious, Cestmir .isolate the conservatives. Me. Indra, reviewirfg eVidence Cisar, one of the Communist They accused the Presidium of anti-Communist prp6 gandal party secretaries, announced pessi- ;of being excessively land proposing measures to sup- -that Mr. Dubtek had ;mistic and demanded an ex- been. press it. obliged to leave by plane for a planation of the grave dis- turbing tone meeting with a person not of the speeche.. Dubcek Is Accused All the leaders present, Pre- In a heated identified, in a place not mier discussion, in Cernik, Josef Smrkovsky, which the conservatives known. [It was learned later President of the National ac- cused that this was A meeting with Assembly; Frantisek Kriegel, Mr, Dubcek of seeking Janos Kadar, the Hungarian President of the Nationai Front, personal " popularity among leader.] the Communist-led popular the intelligentsia . and the Premier Oldrich Cernik then front organization, and the "counterrevol\itionaries" it tried to explain others answered that a military was decided;that the gravity of intervention was out of thle thIs declara- the situation in Czechoslova- question, that the reason for: tion would tend to reverse the kia. Then other members of their fears was the possibility results of the January plenary the Presidium spoke. Only the of a provocation that would meeting [on democratization] liberal members were present. oblige them to call on the and sap the party congress. police forces and that this pos- All were very pessimistic, all sibility was drawing the atten- The declaration .was re- spoke of a serious crisis, of a tion of the party congress toi jected, and the Presidium sword of Damocles hanging the need of discussions on the' members began discussion of over our heads by a thread dangers posed by "counter the preparation 'of the con- not revolutionaries." much stronger than before the I gress. I Soviet-Czechoslovak negotia- Several 'minutes before mid- tions at the end of July at night, Premier Cernik left the Cierna, and a thread that meeting to have several tele- .threatened to break at any phone conversations. He came minute. back with the news that the Warsaw Pact forces were in- vading the south, east and north. Reproduced with permission New York Times, August 28, 1968 CRS-64

Emotion reached a peak. Mr.' Dubcek had tears in his eyes pen. Karel tloffmnnn, whoi wna filled their patriotic d(ity. The, and spoke of a tragedy for in-l Minister of Information at the radio resrud It-, hroadrast s ternational communism. He tin,, of. Antonin Novotny, the in the enrly houri of thn morn- personal also evoked nis own Communist party ing to send out the protest of tragedy. But several present, deposed leader, Is now director.nd ofithe party, and the radio has Mr. Indra. Mr. Kolder and Old- eadelgra and te direcm- onot stopped its clandestine rich Svestka, conservative edi- Lhe, telegraph .and telecom- operations+prt.n since.sne tor of Rude Pravo, the party, munications office, gave orders The editors of Rude Pravo, paper, did not show any sur. as of midnight to cut prise or emotion, as if they had aH tee- after a long and fruitless fight phone connections with foreign against their editor in chief, known all along what was in countries store for their country. were helped in an unexpected Mr. Dubcek read a fetter from At the moment when the dec- manner by the Soviet soldiers Brezhnev, the Soviet latation of the Presidium was who took Mr. -Svestka. to the Lronid I. brought to p rtV lrader. which he had re- the radio station at Soviet embassy for negotia- 2 A.M. to be broadcast imme- tions on the formation of a ,,livcd a few minut-, rarlirr. diately, Thi, the Czecho- he ordered the station government acceptable to the lrt-r accused to close its slovak leaders of not krppinp transmitter. Soviet Union. On the other hand. Mr. Sv- In the early their word and of permitting ,tka, the editor of Rude Pravo, hours of the persecution of 99 signatories of! tried to get the declaration pub- morning, two cars- of the' So- a pro-Soviet letter published m 1 lished in the morning edition of vict embassy'led tanks toward Pravda during the Cierna nego- the newsp aper. . th6 building of- the Central tiations. . Mr.. Sulek, director of the Committee of the. party. The truth is that the workers C.T.X. press agency, .n forced In the best tradi- of the factory where the sign- Hollywood the letter worked hadl leave because of political ad tior1,' all thcse-present, includ- esof personal accusations-, toado ing spontaneously demanded that Messrs. bubtek, Cerrik and against him by the . their jobs be taken away from' party. orghn- Smrkovsky, were kept stand- ization within the agency, ap- ing for several 'hours, under them. The entire press, how-, peered ever, had unanimously rejected suddenly in the eveening the threat of machine guns, and demanded thot rll the. dis- faces turned to the wall, hav- such an anti-democratic point patches sent of view and had defended the out by 'the Ing been ordered not to make right of the signers to hold and agency be subriitted- to him a move, not to say a word. to profess publicly an opinion' fof his approval.-"' Then thay-wtra:. teken to an different from that of the ma- .Meanwhile, -journalists ful- unkn'wrn destinaildn. Jority. Note Silent on Invasion Mr. Brezhnvv's letter als ac- cused the Czechoslovak leaders! of having permitted a campaign of malice against the workers' militia, a conservative organiza- tion of armed workers. But the letter contained not a single word about the MIG's that were landing at that moment at Prague's Rwzyne airport or a word about the tanks that were crossing the frontiers of an in-' dependent and allied state. This is how the Presidium approved its protest against the occupation of the country and decided to stay in session and to wait for the uninvited guests. Only Premier Cernik left for the Government build- ing. Strange things began to hap. CRS-65

W 4Th h By Dan Morgan nalst expressed the view to WsAhinxton Post Foreign Service Western friends this week PRAGUE-The conviction 1POLAND that "the invasion was com- is growing among both Com- pletely necessary. Had it not mninist and non-Communist taken place, Czechoslovakia officials in this occupied GER'AANY Ost0 would have gone over to capital that Sovet strategic your side in eight to ten and military considerations, months, upsetting the bal- including the East-West . ance of power and making power balance, were the de- UTI H UNGARY real trouble for you and the ciding factors in the inva- Soviet Union." sion of Czechoslovakia Aug. 20. RUMANIA Ile then went on to do- nounce the United States With the dust beginning to YUGOSLAVIA for moral phoniness, saying clear, Soviet diplomatic it had done and nothing through Communist sources are the crisis and, in a curious BULGARI twist of logic, adding that Ners Analysis America had no business in- volving itself in a "socialist" coming to the conclusion affair anyway. that the much-discussed So- Viewed from the stand- viet fear of a liberal infec- September 15. 19611 The Washington PO8t point of East-West power tion from Prague may have Czechoslovakia-"The politics, observers from both played only a secondary role dagger in the heart of Eurol sides concede the Kermlin wiih strategic concern about at least a measure of success losing the "dagger in the Germany down the line on argument of a count errevo- in its decision to intervene, heart of Europe" of more ac- all its claims to sovereign lution here and now defend for several reasons. tual importance. recognition, but reserve the the intervention This idea forrseasons Maintain Policy was buttressed right as an independent of exander Dubeek, in which pure power polite cs. First, the action has com- state to work out its foreign It is this display of pletely blocked the West he conceded that Czechoslo- policy Soviet with West Germany, colonial and imperial drive German "Ostpolitik," which vakia had "underestimated" .a country the new Czeeho- by a recent speech of Czech- that is most frigh tening was threatening to give Eu- slovak leaders said was leaders of the "revis rope an alternative form of oslovak Party Secretary Al- showing ionist" evidence of some Rumanian and Yu from the "pax Sovi- the strategic and military "progressive" tendencies. goslav detente importance Moscow placed states. High YugoslaV offi- etica-Americana" which Mos- But while Russia encour- cials, for instance, have cow favors. West German of- on Czechoslovakia. And aged the Czechoslovaks to been quite openly e xpress. ficials now see little there has been a steady flow look for economic help from hope of reports ing fear that the Soviet for an opening with Eastern that Prague's in- ^West Germany during the istence on working out, its Union still intends a "com. Europe-a fact certain to regime of Stalinist Antonin plete cleanup" of th e revi. weaken the West German relations with West Ger- Novotny, dealings with Bonn sionists and a return to the Social Democratic Party, many panicked Communist took on a sinister cast as leaders in East Berlin, Po- postwar Soviet-dominated which was beginning to soon as Prague's Soviet-ori- empire. have a powerful attraction land and Moscow. ented party leaders were Nremlin Unconvinced ousted. Speaking freely at one of for many East European the many late evenin g par- Communists. It has been learned, for The fear of Germany in ties where East still The likelihood, Western the invasion calculations meets instance that Foreign Minis- West in this strangely quiet sources say, is that Bonn's ter Jiri llajek completely was underlined last week by city, an East Europea failed to convince Moscow Polish diplomats here, who n jour- See rRAGUE, K3, Col. 1 le.dcrs that Czechoslovakia insisted that Bonn and would stay in the Warsaw Washington were "buying" Military Defense Pact. Dip- Czechoslovakia and cited lomatic officials believe one the parade of West German reason for this was that bankers and politicians to lajek, with the best inten- Prague in the last few Reproduced with permission tions, may have overplayed months as evidence, This is Washington his hand regarding future typical of the unsubtle Post, relations with Bonn when he switch in arguments by September 15, 1968 visited Budapest, East Ber- Eastern Communist officials lin and other East European and journalists for justify- capitals before the invasion. ing intervention. Most of Hajek's position was that them have now stopped Prague would support Enst using the patently ridiculous CRS-66

TeW ys o: SoVIetihe Invas@ion PRAGUE, From KI Czechoslovakia before the vention might have given invasion. the Soviets Grand Coalition government Further, second thoughts of conservatives the invasion and Social- blocked Czechoslovak ambi- had the same policies been ists will continue a geared- tions to become applied before Aug. 20 in down the Eastern "peace policy" of de- mover in a detente Czechoslovakia. tente, rather not of than revert to Moscow's making. Some The hands-off U.S. the rabid anti-communism saw policy of in Foreign Minister in Czechoslovakia may the Adenauer Hajek, also era. But ob- an East European version of have deepened the other lin- servers fear this is sure to West German Foreign gering conviction enhance Min- in Bonn the only party still ister Brandt, an apostle justified or unjustified, retaining a rigid of that anti-Com- European unity. Washington is overly con- munist stance, the right- Finally, the Soviet inter- cerned with cultivating its wing National Democrats, vention deepened, rather Moscow relations at the ex- and this in turn will aid Rus- 'han healed, some of the di- pense of European allies. sian propaganda. vsion ih NATO. Authorita- This is almost certain to cre- Since the invasion, the tive reports reaching here ate new pressures against East German party paper tell of irritation in Bonn, West Germany's signing the Neues Deutschland charged particularly on the part of nuclear non-proliferation a conspiracy involving a re- the Christian Democratic treaty. cent meeting in Vienna be- Party of Chancellor Kurt It was presumably these tween Hajek and West Ger- Kiesinger, that the United considerations man Foreign of strategy, Minister Willy States failed to use more added to the military Brandt. The costs same paper persuasion with Moscow not of chamed that Bavarian losing a large hunk of real to intervene. Western diplo- estate in Central strongman Franz Josef mats Europe, feel that the kind of which the Soviets weighed Strauss had secret plans to U.S. diplomatic et moves un- against the costs they are up a right-wying bour- dertaken to deal with the geois political party in threat of Rumanian inter- now paying in world oppro-

bruJ

I- 11 110 1. MIRM-1-MMON, r1wmr." __ -_ CRS-67

V. SOVIET JUSTIFICATION OF THE INVASION CRS-68

Soviet Denies It Vi lated Sovereignty of th C

In Ideological Justification of Invasion,i Pravda Says Warsaw Pact Forces Defended Communist Cause

By HENRY KAMM A-,A,1 in The New York Timeg M )SCO\ , Sept. 26 - An five-power invasion, with more ideol ical ,tification for the generally held ideas of legality. inter -enti.i in Czechoslovakia The Pravda writer left un- w adu. rked t oda hv clear the question of who de- Pray0a. ,new aper of the So- viet communistt party.. Text of the article in Pravda Nct to li!ve done so, Pravda will be found on Page 3. expl ined. would have been act- ing !ccorw,4 to the dictates at what point the socialist of "i bstrafly understood sov-1legality had to be applied. ereig ity." The real sovereignty The signed article, while im- of ( zechoslovakia demanded portant because it appeared in: that the "fraternal countries" the Soviet Union's principal prote 't her from those whO newspaper, did not carry the 'threa ened to undermine "the degree of authority of an un- very foundations of the coun- signed article, which would be Itry's independence and sov- an expression of the party lead- ereig ity." ership's views. A major ideological article by Mr. Kovalev appeared at Seraci Kovalev, a Pravda staff pains to draw a distinction be- specialist on propaganda. de- tween formal legality, valid in veloped at length a doctrine principle, and actual legality, 'hat contrasted the special so- -_____ :ialist legality, upholding the ContInued on Page 3, Column

Reproduced with permission New York Times, September 27, 1968 CRS-69

SovietDeniedInvasionVio1aaed Sovereignty oi Czechoslovazians

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3 1ciple that no Communist state. or group of states had the right such as applied to Czechoslo- to intervene in another Corm- vakia by her allies. munist country against its People of socialist countries wishes. "certainly do have and should In an editorial that will ap- have" freedom to determine pear tomorrow, the paper said the affairs of their country helit hoped that Sergei Kovalcv's said. However, Mr. Kvalev thesis "will be speedily and said, "none of their decisions ofnially repudiated." should damage either socialism "As far as the British, French. in their own country or the Itaiian and other Communist fundamental interests of other parties, which have deplored socialist countries." Each Con- tne intervention, are concerned, munist party, Mr. Kovalev con- Mr. Kovalev appears to be com- tinued. Is responsible not onlyipletely ignorant of their posi- to its own people but also toltion and their arguments," the all the socialist countries. Morning Star declared. Whoever forgets this, the1 It described the Pravda art;- Pravda commentator declared, de as "an insult to those who and stresses only the independ- agreed on the principles" nonintervention of ence of Communist parties falls tetCommunistin relationsparties andbe- into the error of "one-sided- teen ness." states. "Marxist dialectics are op Czech Leaders Meeting posed - to one-sidedness," Mr. Cpech Lead rk TMetn Kovalev said, in underpinning- this argument. PRAGUE, Sept. 26 - The- Interpretation of Law Czechoslovak leadership met all' Mr. Kovalev declared thatIday and well into the evening the socialist states respected in- today to consider its next move tesoinalst sat redshpted nin efforts to speed ternational law and had proveoiwithdrawal the gradual 0 of Soviet-led occu- their devotion to it by oppos-pation forces. ing "the attempts of imperial- The unusually lengthy meet- ism to violate the sovereignty in athe rsiye mid t- and independence of niatins.,, pga the riverside building of~ andindpenenc ofnatons." tcprty's Central Committee! "However, from a Marxist has enyrs Cmttee point of view," he continued, was attended by President Lud- "the norms of law, including vik Svoboda; Alexander Dub- the norms of mutual relations cek, the party leader, and all of the socialist countries, can- the other members of the 21- itcrrct not d-narowly dition to a number of cabinet benot interpreted e narry, man ruling Presidium, in ad- formally and in isolation from ministers. the general contet of class m__strs. struggle in the modem worid."I The Pravda ideological spe-I cialist reiterated the doctrine that each Communist party was, free to apply the principles of socialism in its country. But, he continued, "it cannot depart from these principles." British Reds Critical Special Lo The NCw York TImOs LONDON, Sept. 26 - The! Morning Star, newspapers ofi the British Communist party,f criticized the Pravda article as a "red herring" designed to di- vert attention from the Soviet - violation of the oft-stated prin- CRS-70

Text CL VUraVc AcA, justfyig

nvasicn LOVakia However, none of their de- SPeca to The New York Times cisions should damage either ternational law. They have MOSCOW, Sept. 25-Fol- socialism in their country or proved this more than once lo wmg is the text of n article the fundamental interests of in practice, by coming out titied ''"Soveroignty and In.. other socialist countries, and resolutely against the at- ternational Duties of So- the whole working cIass tempts of imperialism to ci uhst Counnt ies," published movement, which is 'working violate the sovereignty and to duv in 'Provda. Soviet Com- for socialism. independence of nations. In unist purty newspaper, and This means that each Com.. It is from these same posi- translated by Novosti, Soviet munist party is responsible tions that they reject the press agency: not only to its own people, leftist, adventurist concep- In connection with the but also to all the socialist tion of "exporting revolu- ev ents in Czechoslovakia, the countries, to the entire Coin- tion," of "bringing happi- question of the correlation munist movement. Whoever ness" to other peoples. anddinofthe interdependence ofo thehe thfor-ets this, in stressing only However, from a Marxist na tonal interests of the si t independence of the Com- point of view, the norms of cia list countries and their is- munist party, becomes one- law, including the norms of ternational duties acquire par- sided. He deviates from his mutual relations of the so- tic ular topical and acute international duty. cialjst countries, cannot be im portance. One-Sidedness Opposed interpreted narrowly, formal- I d : ie measures taken by tle Marxist ,y, an n Isolation from the Soviet Union, jointly - with dialectics are op- general context of class other socialist countries, in posed to one-sidedness. They struggle in the modern world. defending the socialist gains demand that each phenome- The socialist countries reso- of the Czechoslovak people non be examined concretely, lutely come out against the in general connection with are of great significance for exporting and importing of st rengthenin g the socialist other phenomena, with other counterrevolution. processes. community, whicl is ie ma in Stresed achievement of the interna- Just as, in Lenin's words, Opposing Systems tional working class. a man living in a society Each Communist party is We cannot ignore tle as- cannot be free from the free to apply the basic prin- sert ions, made in some society, a particular so- ciples of Marxism-Leninism places, that the actions of cialist state, staying in a and of socialism in its coun- the five socialist countries system of other states com- try, but it cannot depart from run counter to the Marxist- posing the socialist commu- these principles (assuming, leniniut principle of sover- nity, cannot be free from the naturally, that it reisains a eignty and the rights of na- common interests of that Communist party. tions to self-determination. community. Concretely, this means, Abstract Approach Seen The sovereignty of each first of all, that, in its activ- socialist country cannot be ity, each Communist party The groundlessness of such cannot but take into account reasoning opposed to the interests. of consists primarily the world of socialism, such a decisive fact of our in that it is based of on an ab- the world revolutionary time as the struggle between stract, nonclass approach to two opposing social the question movement. Lenin demanded systems of sovereignty that all Communists -capitalism and socialism. and the rights of nations to fight self-determination. against small-nation narrow- This is an objective struggle, mindedness, a fact not depending The peoples of the social- seclusion and on the isolation, consider the whole will of the people, and stip- ist countries and Communist ulated parties certainly do have and and the general, subordinate by the world's being should -he particular to the general split into two opposite social have freedom for de- interest. termining the ways systems. Lenin said: "Each of ad- man must vance of their respective The socialist states respect choose between countries. the democratic norms of in. joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking sides in this issue must end in fiasco."

Reproduced with permission New York Times, September 27, 1968 CFS-71

,It has got to be empha "We tell those friends and What the right-wing anti- sized that when a socialist t comrades of ours n the other socialist forces set out to country sens to adopt o countries who zhiuk they are achieve in recent months in 'non-affiliated" stand, it re upholding the righteous cause Czechoslovakia did not refer taims its national indepen of socialism and the sover- to the specific features of so- dence, in effect, precisely be eignty of the peoples by cialist development or the cause of the might of the condemning ano protesting application of the principle socialist community, and against the entry of our of Marxism-Leninism to the above all the Societ Union as troops into Czechoslovakia: concrete conditions obtaining a central force, which also When the enemy wines our in that country, but consti- includes the might of its house, the community of so- tuted encroachment on the armed forces. The weakening cialist states, with dynamite, foundations of socialism, on of any of the links in the it is our patriotic, national the basic principles of Marx- world system of socialism di- and international duty to ob- ism-Leninism. rectly affects all the socialist struct this by using the This is the nuance that countries, which cannot look means that are necessary." people who have fallen for the indifferently upon this. People who "disapprove" of hypocritical nonsense of the actions of the allied the antisocialist and The antisocialist elements so- revision- in cialist states 1st elements still cannot Czechoslovakia are ignoring the un- actually cov- the decisive fact that these derstand. Under the guise of ered up the demand for so- countries are defending the "democratization" these ele- called neutrality and Czecho- interests of all of world so- ments were little by little slovakia's withdrawal from cialism, of the entire world shaking the . socialist state, revolutionary movement. seeking to demoralize the the socialist community with Communist talk about the right of The system of socialism party and befog exists in concrete form in thle minds Of the masses, nations to self-determination. stealthily hatching However, the implementa- a counter- tion of such "self-determina- some countries, which have revolutionary coup, and they were not duly rebuffed inside tion," in other words, Czech- their own definite state the country. s oslovakia's detachment from boundaries; this system is de- Naturally the Communists the socialist community, veloping according to the of the fraternal would have come into con- countries flict with its own vital in- specific conditions of each could not allow the socialist country. Furthermore, nobody states to be inactive in the terests and would have been name 'detrimental to interferes in the concrete of an abstractly under- the other so- stood sovereignty, when they . cialist states. measures taken to improve saw that the country stood Such "self-determination, the socialist system in the dif- as a result of in peril of antisocialist de- which NATO ferent socialist countries. generation. troops would have been able The to come up to the Soviet However, the picture actions in Czechoslo- border, while the community changes fundamentally when of European socialist coun- a danger arises to socialism vakia of the fiv iied-so.- cialist tries would have been split, itself in a particular country. countries accords also in effect encroaches upon the As a social system, world so- with the vital interests of the vital interests of the peoples cialism is the common gain people of the country them- of these countries and con- of the working people of all selves. flicts, as the very root of it, lands; it is indivisible and its Socialism, by delivering a with the right of these people defense is the common cause nation from the shackles of to socialist self-determination. of all Communists and all an exploiting regime, insures Discharging their interna- progressives in the world, in the solution of the funda- tionalist duty toward the the first place, the working mental problems of the na- fraternal peoples of Czecho- folk of the socialist countries. tional development of any slovakia and defending their country that 'Rightist' Aim Described has embarked own socialist gains, the upon the socialist road. On U.S.S.R. and the other social- The Bratislava statement the other hand, by encroach- ist states had to act deci- of the Communist and Work- ing upon the main stays of sively and they did act against ers' parties says of socialist socialism, the counterrevolu- the antisocialist forces in gains that "suoport, consoli- tionary elements in Czecho- Czechoslovakia. dation and defense of these slovakia undermined the very gains, won at the price of Gomulka Is Quoted foundations of the country's heroic effort and the self- independence and sover- Comrade W. Gomulka, First sacrifice of each people, rep- eignty. Secretary of the Central Com- resents a common interna- mittee of the Polish United tional duty and obligation for Workers party, commented all the socialist countries." figuratively on this score when he said: CrS-72

Formal observance of Tose whV pa aout thct The interests of the socmi- freedom of seif-detcrmination " C'1'C!1,s" of the allied ist community and of the of a nation ir; the concrete sociaust countries in Czecho- whole revolutionary move- situation thit arose in Czech- slovckia forget tat in a ment,.the interests of social- oslovakia would mean free- claSs sO iCCy there is not ism in Czechoslovakia de- dom of "self-determinaton" and there canno, be non- mand complete exposure and not of the popular masses, class lws. political isolation of the re- the working people, but of L an-' Ital ;orrms are acticnary forces in that coun- their enemies. su jected to tne laws of the try, ansolidation of the The antisocialist path, "neu- class stauggi, the laws of working people and con- trality", to which the Czech- sac development. These sistent implem' ntation of the oslovak people were pushed laws a:re clearly formulated Moscow agreement between would bring it to the loss in Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Soviet and Czechoslovak of its national independence. in the documents jointly leaders. World imperialism, on its adopted by the Communist There is no doubt that the part, supported the anti- and Workers' Parbis.- actions of the five allied so- socialist forces in Czechoslo- Formally juridical reason- cialist countries in Czecho- vakia, tried to export coun- ing must not overshadow a slovakia directed to the de- terrevolution to that country class approach to the matter. fense of the vital interests of in this way. One who does it, thus losing the socialist community, and The Real Sovereignty the only coretct class crite- the sovereignty of socialist The help to the working rion in assessing legal nonms, Czechoslovakia first and foremost, will be increasingly people of Czechoslovakia by tr7'tms to measure events other socialist countries, supported by all those who with a yardstick of bourgeois have the interest of the' which prevented the export law. of counterrevolution from present revolutionary move- abroad, constitutes tne real Such n o a rOZch to the ment, of peace and security sovereignty of the Czecho- question of sove-e ignty means of peoples, of democracy and slovak Socialist republic that, for empl the pro- socialism at heart. against those who would like gressive forces of the word to deprive it from its sover- would not Lc arne to come cignty and give up the coun- out aga-inst the revival of try to imperialism. neo-Nazismr in h Federa! The fraternal Communist Republic of Germany, against parties of the socialist coun- the actions of butchers tries were for a long time Franco and Siiazar, against taking measures, with maxi- reactionary ar imtrary actions mum scif-restraint and pa- of "black colonels" in Greece, tience, to help the Czechoslo- because this is "the internal vak people with political affair" of "sovereign" states. means to stop the onslaught It is characteristic that of antisocialist forces in both the Saigon puppets and Czechoslovakia. And only their American protectors when all such measures were also regard the notion of exhausted did they bring sovereignty as nrohibitinr armed forces into the coun- support for the struggle of try. progressive forces. The soldiers of the allied Vietnam Example Cited socialist countries now in They proclaim at every Czechoslovakia proved by crossroads that the socialist their actions indeed that they count ies, which are render- have no other tasks than the ing help to the Vietnamese tasks of defending socialist people in their gains in that country. struggle for independence and freedom, Noninterference Pledged are violating the sovereignty They do 'not interfere in of Vietnam. Genuine revolu- the internal affairs of the tonaries, heing internation- country, are fighting for the alists, cannot but support principle of self-determina- progressive forces in all tion of the peoples of Czecho- countries in their just strug- slovakia not in words but in gle for national and social deeds, are fighting for their liberation. inalienable right to think out profoundly and decide their fate themselves, without in- timidation on the part of counterrevolutionaries, with- out revisionists and national- ist demagogy. CRS-'73

VI. SAMPLES OF CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES COMMEMORATING T14E INVASION, CRS-74

Second, the rape of Czechoslovakia THE AGONY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA- should also lay to rest the theory that. 1 YEAR LATER Communist nations become more liberal their (Mr. ADAIR asked and was given per- as economics improve. Communist mission to address the House for 1 min- Czcchoslovakia became restless as their economy dipped to its lowest ebb since ute and to revise and extend his World remarks.) War II. In other words the un- Mr. ADAIR. balanced trade they were and are forced &r. Speaker, nearly a year to carry on with ago on August 21, 1933, the combined the Soviet Union and Comecon so imp: -ished them as to forces of the Soviet Union and several cause discontent which led many Czechs of the Warsaw Pact nations invaded to conclude that Marxian economics are Czechoslovakia to extinguish the forces bankrupt. groping toward freedom there. In a Third, the theory that the Soviet partial reenactment of Munich, Com- Union has mellowed and can be now munist German troops crossed the bor- expected to live up to international ders of Czechoslovakia in company with agreements. ThIs myth should certainly units of the Red army, the Polish army, now be seriously questioned. As we pre- and the Hungarian army. In spite of the pare again to sit down with the Soviets fact that the Czechs offered no armed and seck to negotiate arms limitation resistance, at least 23 persons were killed agreements possibly involving the ABM. and scores injured in the first day of the we should look well at the evidence and invasion by nervous Soviet soldiers. To- not be deceived by wishful thinking, or day a Soviet army of occupation still sits their pious statements. in Czech army barracks in order to insure Last of all, we as a nation should con- that the Czechs hew to the Moscow line. tinuously express our cut-ige over this What are the lessons to be learned diminution of freedom in the world. from this tragic event? There are several Communism does not change ii any myths that need to be laid to rest, in my basic sense. It will not tolerate dissent view. First, the myth that the Soviet of any kind, wiheLher it be irreverent Union invaded Czechoslov, ._a in order writings by Daniel and Sinyavsky or the to prevent the development of a "hu- longing of the Czech people for freedom mane" or more liberal form of socialism and the right to enjoy the fruits of their in Czechoslovakia. A better case can be labors. Having been in Prague last year made that the Soviets invaded because shortly after the invasion, I can only say of the emergence of anticommunism. that my heart goes out to the Czech particularly among the young people of people. the nation. As a result of the Soviet invasion, a serious "generation gap" has arisen in Czechoslovakia. The older people are not inclined to challenge the autocratic gov- ernment; whereas the young cannot envisage a whole life ahead of them un- 6 der communism.

Source: Congressional Record, August 11, 1969, p. 23154. CRS-75

Css:clxosLovAKIA: 1 YEAR LATER are also CZECHOSLOVAK The proponents of neo-Stalinism INDEPENDENCE A year ago this August, the Soviet jugger- underestimating the human element. Dom- DAY naut rolled over the hopes and aspirations of inik Tatarka, one of the leading Slovak defenseless Czechoslovakia. During the en- writers, wrote in the January 1969 issue of suing months, the fresh air of the "Czecho- Reporter-then one of the most outspoken HON. GLENN CUNNINGHAM slovak Spring" was gradually but systemati- voices of dissent: OF NEBRASKA cally polluted by the suffocating, noxious "To be human is not a calculated end; IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES fumes of neo-Stalinism. The uncertain man cannot be used as building material flicker of freedom sought in vain a harbor for the construction of history . . . It is Tuesday, October 28, 1969 from the gusts of repression emanating from quite possible for whole armies, armed to the Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. Speaker, the Kremlin; the once daring and imagina- teeth, suddenly to disintegrate, as if they though they are suffering tinder an tive press, radio and television were recon- had been destroyed from inside by white implacable and unrelenting totalitarian- verted into droning instruments of the re- ants. Even in the biggest tankz, under the ism in their homeland, the Czechoslovak gime; dissent was muzzled; and the Czechs strongest armor, in every uniform, there people today mark the and the Slovaks were seemingly once more are human beings. Sooner or later they must 51st anniversary condemned to a drab, monotonous existence. behave like human beings . of their Independence Yet the dark post-August 1968 days have i The men and women of East and Central It was on October 28, 1918, that the also brought to the surface a number of Burope have lived in an age of darkness for Czechoslovak National Council in Prague built-in weaknesses of totalitarian rule. The over two decades. They, and thcir ch!ldren- proclaimed the independence of the USSR had believed that the invasion and now grown to manhood-look at the pazt and Czechs and Slovaks and establishment occupation of Czechoslovakia would nip all shudder. Whce.'o are the prcrises of yester- of the Republic of Czechoslovakia heretical tendencies in the bud. A closer look 'year? What has become of the earthly para- This was the culmination of at today's Czechoslovakia belies such un- diso the advent of Communt rule was to the cen- qualified "optimism." turies-old struggle which these sturdy bring into ezistencs? Why Is c tiv Eura'so and True, the new regime in Czechoslovakia merely plodding along while the rest of the stout-hearted people carried on appears to be firmly in control, and there are world Is making significant strides against the overlords of their historic ominous indications of new, in so homeland. far-reaching many areas of human endeavor? And what purges of "liberals" and "reformers." The has become Czechoslovaks of man's right to free choice, per- enjoyed their hard- country, however, is not nearly as docile as sonal dignity, and the pursuit won freedom the Soviets of happy nese? for only two decades, had hoped. Are the Comrmunist leaders serious in for There are no free elections, be- the catastrophic events beginning but the work- lieving that they can make ptopiO forget ers are votingg" the in 1938 proved disastrous. First, their with slowdowns. In many sorry record of their misrule and guide them country was dismembered. They then plants, they have stopped paying union dues. back into yet another era of Big Brotherism, were robbed of their Party cards are being returned or torn up. with no regard as to the Individual's dreams freedom and, with According to regime the beginning of World War II, their spokesmen, the drop in, and legitimate aspiratIons? The neo-Stalin- fate productivity has reached alarming propor- ists should have their ear closer to the was in the hands of the Nazis. tions. Discussions in factory canteens focus We all know what has been their ground. Young people in their twenties and lot on personal problems and outside interests; thirties view communism as the most reac- since the end of World War II, especially a conversation on "building Socalism" is tionary of ideologies. They considered in have had first- since 1948, when they were forced to sub- bad taste and a waste of time. hand experience with applied Marxism- In brief, the worker is serving notice mit to Communist totalitarianism. on the Lcninism, as "updated" by Stalin and his regime that he is prepared to use all the tools And in August 1968, the Soviet jugger- successors. They have found it obsolete, ret- at his disposal to prevent a return to the rogressive, naut rolled over defenseless Czechoslo- conditions existing before and unresponsive to man's fun- January 1968 when damental needs and desires, To this vakia, snuffing out its "liberalization the Dubcek regime assumed power. younger movement." generation, communism i s no wave of the The voices of the students and writers may future; it is only a symbol Just last month, have been of a wasted past. the Soviets purged temporarily muted by censorship Thus orthodox CommunIsts and the sun- reformer Alexander Dubeek and many and intimidation, but the flame of dissent dry opportunists has not been extinguished. who have latched onto of his followers to further tighten their As one observer their coattails are little more than relics of grip. It is my hope puts it, you cannot show a man a ray of hope the past. that one day Czecho- and later tell They stIll cling to their monopoly slovakia him it was a mirage. The So- of power; they still can cow will again enjoy independ- viets and hard-line Communists or terrorize the ence. in general vast majority Into outward submission. But indulge in the wishful thinking that they Mr. Speaker, can they are the dinosaurs of today; the body I call to the attention, always turn back the clock, that the mem- 1s grown to gigantic of my colleagues the ories of a greater measure of proportions, but the following editorial freedom will Iead has not adapted to change They may which appeared in the July-August issue wane with time. Repressive policies may at possess the times arrest means for protecting their vested of Assembly of Captive European Na- the revolution of rising expec- I ntercsts, but once again-as tations that has been sweeping in Stalin's tions-ACEN-Newis: . the world. time-they must spend their nights wonder- History attests, however, that any attemp to reestablish Ing about their future. Surely, in the rigid a status quo ante ends in failure. society they are trying Time is rarely on to reinstall. Some- the side of tyranny, and c no will inevitably appear empires-even one as closely policed as that who will "out- orthodox" their orthodoxy and claim their of the Soviet Union's-are subject to cen- place. trifugal forces that weaken their outer core August and hasten their disintegration. 1968 was Indeed a crushing blow f or all who had hoped the "Czechoslovak pring" would usher in a new era, not only or the Czechs and the Slovaks, but even- ually for the other captive peoples of East nd Central Europe as well. The forces of ret- ogression, however, may have won a Pyrrhic victory. They have tightened their hold on ower, but they have alienated further the people over whom they rule. Their cycle, hat of the as dinosaur, is bound to come to an nd. They have lived on borrowed enough. time long

Source: Congressional Record, October 28, 1968, pp. 31978-31979 CRS--76

THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY in 1963, contravened the independence of OF sovereign CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INVASION states and the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination; and Whereas such intervention is in violation HON. JOHN BUCHANAN of the United Nations charter which states that "All Members shall refrain in their in- OF ALABAMA ternational relations from the threat or use IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES of force against the territorial sovereignty or Friday, August 14, 1970 political independence of any state"; and Whereas such intervention is further evi- Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, on dcnae of the perpetuation of colonialism as Aujust 21 freecdom-lovlng people evcry- practiced by the Soviet Union; and where will be saddened again by the Whereas the agreement in Moscow between memory of one of the blackest marks in representatives of Czechoslovakia and the So- the world's viet Union was reached under duress; and more recent history-the Whereas the continued occupation of brutal invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Czechcslovaklia by the Soviet Union is an- military forces of the Soviet Union and other crIme against the rights of the free peo- its satellites. This date will nark the ple of a small country to determine their second anniversary of the Sovlet-led in- own destiny and aspirations; and vasion of a small and peaceful nation, Whereas the people of Czechoslovakia are whose citizens are still not resigned to the oppressive plans of the living under the Soviet oppression of complete Soviet domina- Union, and continue to resist and re- tion. In Czechoslovakia ject Soviet domination: Now, therefore, be August 21 will be it commemorated as the "Soviet Day of Resolved by the House of Representatives Shame." (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense In addition to the endless personal suf- of the Congress that, with respect to the fering brought to the Czechoslovak peo- Soviet Union and those states which partici- ple, the Soviet aggression and occupation pated in the intervention In Czechoslovakia, the President was a direct violation of the United Na- should take such steps as may tions Charter provisions prohibiting ho necessary- all (1) to prohibit the extension members from the threat or of any Gov- use of force ernment trade credits or guaranties to any against the territorial sovereignty or po- of the intervening states; litical independence of another state. (2) to prohibit sales, either for dollars or The continued Soviet presence in Czecho- local currency, and grants under any title slovakia constitutes still another heinous of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of crime against the right of the Czecho- 1954, to any of the inter- slovak people to freedom vening states; and self-deter- (3) to suspend all commercial air traffic mination. between the United States and the Soviet As our thoughts turn once again to this Union; and tragic violation of human rights, it is the (4) to express support for the people of profound hope of those of us privileged Czechoslovakia (as they commemorate Au- to live in freedom that through gust 21, 1970 as the "Soviet Day of Shame") our ex- in their efforts pressions of support the brave people of to achieve the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia will be strengthened in the troops of the Soviet Union from their Czechoaslovakia. rightful quest for freedom and self- Szc. 2. It is further the sense of the Con- determination. gress that the President, acting through the Because of continuing support for this United Nations and other international or- goal of freedom for the people of Czecho- ganizations, should take such additional slovakia, I have joined with several of steps as may be necessary to end as quickly my colleagues in the House as possible the continuing intervention in of Represent- Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union. atives in sponsoring a concurrent reso- lution on their behalf. This resolution- House Concurrent Resolution 718- clearly indicates our condemnation of the brutal aggression against the Czecho- slovak people, our deep concern over the continued oppressions suffered by them, and our conviction that certain steps Source: Congressional Record should be taken toward helping the Czechoslovak people to obtain their free- August 17, 1970, dom. The resolution is as follows: p. 29242 H. CON. R.S. 718 Concurrent resolution exprezsing the sense of the Congress with respect to the inter- vention in Czechoslovakia in 1993 by the milItary forces of the Soviet. Union and its catellites Whereas the intervention in Czechoslova- kia by tho mIlitary forces of the Boviet Union, CRS-77 .

SECOND ANNIVERSARY Through this act 2 years ago, the occupation. American and Soviet forces OF THE Soviet Union violated the fundamental INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA rules of international left Czechoslovakia before the end of law as accepted 1945. In the summer and of 1968, in blatant Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I practiced by civilized nations, and violation of that agreement so essential have long held a high regard for the embodied in the Charter of the United to the balance of power on the continent courage and strength of character found Nations. Czechoslovakia is a sovereign state. of Europe, Soviet Armed Forces invaded among the people of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet invasion and occupa- Czechoslovakia and tion violated her stationed themselves After the outbreak of World War I, I sovereignty and inde- on her territory permanently requested combat pendence. The Soviet invasion service overseas and of Czecho- Since then, Czechoslovakia has been was assigned slovakia to the 97th Division. This made a mockery of the hope no more than a Soviet colony. The So- division saw action as that the Soviet Union a part of the 1st had become a law- viets forced upon the Czechoslovak peo- Army in the Rhineland when the pow- abiding member of the family of na- tions. ple, as their rulers, a group of nmen who erful Allied armies raced across Europe have no By legitimacy whatsoever. The only to attack Hitler's Germany. The 97th invading Czechoslovakia and oc- source of their power was subsequently cupying her is their willingness shifted to General Pat- territory, the Soviet Union to carry out the orders of their Soviet ton's 3d Army, where it spearheaded the violated the treaty of friendship that masters. The morale of the drive Czechcslovak to liberate Czechoslovakia. The had bound the two countries together people, once among the highest in Eu- people of since 1943. In that treaty Pilsen rose in defiance against the partners rope, is again at its lowest. The purpose- the Nazi occupation forces on May 4, promised to respect each other's sover- ful demoralization eignty, independence, of the nation through 1945, when students and workers took and territorial in- purges, persecution, over tegrity, and not and threats is st:! the radio station and city hall. The to interfere in one an- being carried out at full speed. next day, May 5, 1945, the liberation was other's internal affairs. The Soviet Union The Czechoslovak invaded and occupied people are bec consummated by the victorious tanks of Czecaoslovakia to bled white. Faced with tne oVerWhel- the U.S. Army which definitively ended change certain internal developments In Czechoslovakia ing and brutal presence of the Sov'i! the rule 9f the swastKa over West Bo- so as to fit Soviet inter- Armies, they cannot raise esgis. Not their own voic hemia. I am proud to have a single Czechoslcvak could in protest. I had a small legitimze urge my coieag-es on role in this noble effort. the Soviet Union's conduct. Senate to appeal to the consc"Once 02 Unfortunately, the Finally, the Soviet invasion and oc- the entire world Czechoslovak peo- cupation of Czechoslovakia not to leave the Cz& o- ple were not long to enjoy the freedom destroyed the slovak people at the mercy of the Soviet of choice which they so richly deserved. arrangements that the United States and Union. The time has come for the Czech The demise of Nazi the Soviet Union had made with regard people Germany left a vac- to to determine their own destiny. uum into which the Soviet Czechoslovakia in 1945. The United Union was States soon to step. During the summer of and the Soviet Union had agreed 1968, after a long series of frustrations, that their Armed Forces, which liberated there appeared to be cause for hope. The Czechoslovalka from the Nazi rule and people of Czechoslovakia were engaged had been stationed on her territory in a vigorous struggle to prevent the through the first postwar months, would lamp of liberty's faint glimmer of light evacuate the country and that Czccho- from being extinguished. The Czecho- sluvakia would not be subject to Allied slovak citizenry, after over 20 years of oppression, had a real chance to restore some of their basic human rights. Un- fortunately these hopes, like all the others, were soon to be dashed by the Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovak Re- public on the night of August 20, 1968. I was in Prague for one day visit during April of 1969, 24 years after the country's liberation from Nazi Germany. At that time I witnessed the great sadness in the faces of the people who had again lost the freedoms that they had worked so hard to restore. By the morning of August 21, 1968, the Soviet Armed Forces had completely invaded and occupied the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. In order to make her brutal act appear more spectable, re- the Soviet Union was joined Source: by the armies of four other members of Congressional Record, August 20, 1970 the Warsaw Pact in this Infamous ven- p. 29625-29626 ture. Since then, only her own forces have remained stationed in Czechoslo- vakla-a symbol of Soviet oppression and exploitation. CRS-78 -

FREEDOM FOR CZEChOSLOVAKIA THE SOVIET INVASION OF of Soviet support for the elerncn' ry (Mr. VIGORITO a:.kcd and was CZI;C11OSLOVAKIA norms of International -svernty, given noninterference pierimiission to address the House for 1 (Mr. FASCELL asked and was and non nter-.enton- given and for minute, to revSC and extend his re- ixtrmission to extend his reinarks at detente with the West. Tlie Czc-ch this invasion has marks aId include extraneous matter.) point in the RFconar and to include ex- served to rem id us of the Mr. VIGORITO. Mr. Speaker, the traneous matter.) true nature of the Sovict . rnet.s of Pra-ue will he quiet today. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, Aufust 21, While the invasion * Qadei lvit itehitL til Voie (f Caeucii 1 7 1, t r s! Ft 1, ird i 1i v of (r f' P arnv suceerd ina' " C' sllvakia arCContent, but beca use the brutal Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. po htlea und * )., o:./ tanks and soldiers of the Soviet. Army The continued Soviet military presence strengthened the Czech people's fath in cx tinsnuished all hope of freedom and there is a grim reminder of the events of and desire for, real democracy. liberty 3 years ago. This cali may de- that tragic day. ceive the casual observer, but for t he mil- In the spring of 1903 a r.ew spirit-the lions of people who remember that tra gic spirit of freedom-was evident in Czech- day, August 21 will he a reminder of the oslovakia. In January the entire Nation t.vran ny of the Soviet Union. Alexander joined hands to depose a leader who had Source : CorngressionaI Dubcck ruled Cziechoslovakia for only one been a mere pawn of the Soviet Union, brief "spring of freedom," while he tied Novotny. The election of Alexander Dub- Record, Aus't to givO CzeCioslovakian commiuim "a cek, a new and creative leader, resulted 5, human face." Even this limited objective in the reestablishmetnt of some tradition- proved to be too darn for the reaction- al political freedoms in Czechoslovakia. ary and encrusted leadership in Moscow. Dubcek's reforms were not radical. They Anything other than abject subservience were an attempt to restate the traditional to the Soviet Union could not be tol- democratic heiritage of Czechoslovakia. erated. Moscow, sensing thal, its reactionary If the Soviet system had any real va- order was on the verge of collapse, ulti- lidity, the people of Czechoslovakia mately resorted to mnilIlary force to re- would have accepted it long ago. For solve the political dulemnma presented by over 20 years the Soviet Union imposed a truly social-democratic Czechoslovakia. thvir strict rule over the Czechs, but The occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Czechls r-Jected the Russian leader- more than a half million Warsaw Pact ship lt tho'l lirs1 chance. Only vili the troops effectively reestablished tight So- 'iid of tanks ani soldiers could Moscow viet control over Czech political develop- hrh and tyrannical rule. rC-'xi t * rent. The ('ech 'eoie have shown their dis- In what sense did the Czech reforms nst t it. aid E.ra wtli work stoppases pose a threat to the Soviet Union? The and o1itirl'. da (I. The puppt regime successful implementation of Dubcek's of GiUtaV Ili I ist coliiitiue to bend liberal refoi:ms presented two dangers to to every Sa iwxhun, reaiziii his onily the Soviet regime. The reforms were a hot e for poiltcii survival is the never- direct challenge to the Soviet ideological enditg thieat of a return of Soviet line. In addition, they threatened to un- Lroi ps. dermine the strict and unrelenting So- Ses, the streets of Praue will be rela- viet control over the govenments of tively quir' today, but, behind the facade Eastern Europe. Tne success and popu- of ueace lIes the continued resistance of larity of the Czech experiment might Czech patriots. The Czechoalovak Na- have inspired other Eastern European tional Council of America has named governments to relax their tyranny and Autut 21. 1971, a Day of Soviet Shame. permit increased political frei'dom. In On this day let us remember and support the( final iv the Soviet Union could the1noble people of Czechoslovakia as not. cope xih, unid iI fawt, f'ii red, lilny they continue to resist the repression of chauine il tho ( xisling political nid ,o- cili order. 'he the Soviet Union and to light for the invasion of Czichosio- freedom they so richly deserve. vakia was intended as a warning to all potential deviators-a warning that the Soviet Union would resort to force to preserve tight control over the destiny of Eastern Europe. Source: Congressional Record, That the Soviet Union still puts greater August 5, 1971 reliance on the resort to force, that she sees peaceful political change as a threat (Daily Edition) to her position of dominance in Eastern p. H8064-H8065 Europe, is of grave concern to the entire international community. The Czech in- vasion again casts In doubt the sincerity CRS-79

DAY OF SOVIET SHAME sW' had bc a: A FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA HON. JCL T. BROYAILL Mr. CURTS. sM. .luesdt, western OF VIRGINIA civ4iJie,- lion in the 2ac( ..ltury har; ine. fantastic tec noloical advances. Yet for IN THE HOUSE OF r:EPRESENTATIVES wc I~tp&COI ' U" S 1" 3 CI tne proud and ancient peop'ie of central t e e o Thursday, August 5, ae a e pe 1971 and eastern Iuroie, .to may welI be the An0Iird S , , : 0 1 c p Mr. DROYHILL of Virginia. cruelest century in m en hi.story. Mr. Speak- % .to er, August 21 marks the anniversary of In a period of less than 50 years they a rmcne. trey wouldccc' mm . the most blatant instance of Soviet iin- achieved political and cultural in depen- perialism since the end of the Secninl dence only to be smashed down thrice by Wo'ld War. On that day in 1963, a half- the Nazi and Communist despoth:-ms. million troops under Russian control Czechosloakcia 1 jais ps thl supremee tra-ic crushed out the stirrings of liberty which and most example among these a' ' mo v'h m:e cp e oi had emerged that spring in Prague. Lest martyr na''t's. we forget, that day has been con.,eao- Possessed of an ancient Christian cul- rated as a Day of Soviet Shame by the ture, it Contributed as welt to the great Czechoslovak National Council of Amer- technical1 surl-c that made Europe the ica. most adva-ced of al continents. tl- er losso';s fro,': ta The invasion of peaceful and freedom Betrayed by toe infamous great-sower decit -en terror. Cze os' . loving Czechoslovakia violated at least agreement at Munmch in 1038, is was par- va~ded by the 21,r~ live of the main principles of interna- tially and then almost entirely occupied T esisLedvwceonz:n tional law continued in the United Na- by the Nazi machine. After the Hitler- Czech Governm n 1_ tions Charter-a document to which the Stalin pact of 19329, it was ripped apart maed;tS le-dcC Soviet Union claims to adhere. The sov- by the two tyrants and suffered their to th e sreyo r c . erciunty of a member state of the com- calculated infamies until its liberation at pri-sen. A few Mi w'a_~ 5LI 'r nunity of nations was wantonly violated the end of World War II. lt e lan s by the use of military force. Further- Thereafter an obvious and growing August 21, :56Sr Cis ev more, the invasion sovakla was an aiTronL to the breach developed between the Russian was once r" 0 'c0 n"a ~ principle of self-determination of peo- Communist empire and the free nations. ples, a principle which this country has Czechoslovakia saw itself as a kind of for exp b theon wans eu; rs C-o : supported since its beginning. And, by bridgec between these two worlds. resioedn \Vas rned.o p . the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet Union This was not cough for the Kremlin ThuS it is that I sa th nd6t5i, has reserved the permanent right to in- Communist leaders. In 1948 they en- ma y well he ji e n ki'it'd co Iet tervene in the affairs of other Comu- gineered a brutal overthrow of the frec il the rlieytv (o C.cchosov.d rr s nist states which might try to allow their Czech government and, with Soviet divi- people more freedom. We must not. let sions at the ready, installed the first of a bie son. A m1101anX itoIl. Lilt I t m this doctrine stand unchallenged. series of puppet regimes in Prague. W~e ill A i Crica rCt it an' L o'IIk In the spring of 19G8. a new Czech For 20 grim, depressing years there- been i Isrul :such a: ly01 e C t1y". Government, led by Alexander Dubeek, after, Czachoslovakia groaned under the and hopie ad work for a an Q. had begun to draw their country away cold and deliberate economic exploita- SoVakia. And onl Aut 21 o C est f om the repressive Soviet past, granting tion of Soviet communism. ye canl unlite inl calling1"' attention t th the Czech people more freedoms. liberal- In 1968, changes became evident. There- Soviet Day Of Sham, when, the 11ari: of iz.ng censorship, and creating structures emerged in the spring of that year a new the Communist beast was once m-o to respond to the real needs of the people. leadership determined to establish a more brindd into the minds andc boCdesin These efforts were ruthlessly crushed by humane, open society in Czechoslovakia. - hCsWhose only fault whas thact they Soviet tanks on the night of August 21. These men, such as Alexander Dubcek. yvould be free. The history of the Czech and Slovak peo- were realists. They attempted no do- ples over the last 53 years mestic or has been that foreign political adventures that the Comns of a continuous struggle for independ- could offer the least challenge or threat ~ P 33a9 wa onc% mo ence, freedom, and democracy. This to the enormous power of the Soviet Source: Con ressionly Record, struggle was brutally set back by the Union. August 6, 1971y Munich sellout in 1938, and then in 1948 The response in Czechoslovakia was when the Conunists came to power breathtaking. One could sense the re- Daily, Ein m after a coup. In August 1968, for the naissance of spirit and hope throughout tlird time in 20 years, Czech aspirations the country, atnong factory workers, to freedom were blighted when the Rus- farmers, students, the professions, among sian tanks put an end to the Prague men, women and children. spring. Represonta tives of all free peo- pIes the vorld over inust continue to press for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, and the vin- dication of the legitimate rights and na- tional aspirations of all East European peoples. I jumi with them today to d- mand thu withdrawal of Soviet troops alid the re.toratioii of Czech ircedom.

Source: Congressional Record, August 6, 1971 (Daily Edition) p. E9118-9119 CRS-80

THE THIRD ANNIVERSAY O T E ZEEDOM FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INVASION

H3N. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI. E0N . 'MU UCIIANAN OV ILLINOIS OF ALABAMA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, August 5, 1971 Thursday., August 5, 1571 Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, a year Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, it is ao I addressed the House directing the with profound saciness that I reiterate my Members attention to a resolution calling support for the oppressed people of for certain economic and diplomatic Czechoslovaki', as once again this year sanctions against the Soviet Union and they conmia. .1.arate Aurust 21 as the "So- their Warsaw Pact puppets who occupied viet Day of Shame." On this third anni- Czechoslovakia in August 1968. , versary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, at this moment, could her people are not forroilen as they con- be called the most captive of the Captive tinue in their efforLs to achieve an end to Nations since it suffered the great trag- the oppressive occupation of their small, edy and dubious distinction of being freedom-loving country by the Soviet pounced on by its Communl:;t neighbors Union. when faint stirrinrs of democracy and It is indeed conimendable that in spite freedom developed in the country. of the many setbacks for the cause of It is my intention, Mr. Speaker, to freedom, the fundamental aspirations of raise my voice art every opportunity in the people of Czechoslovakia or ecqual support of the restoration of freedom for justice, personal dignity, and self-deter- the people of Czechoslovakia. mination have remained unimpairec. I wish to insert at this time part of the The intensive and far'-reaching Sovie: documents adopted by the Czechoslovak Intervention into the internal affairs cf National Council of America at a rally Czeczhoslovakia continues *unabated, in here in Washington in May 1970; the d direct violation of the UrLted Nations points made are as valid today as they Charter provisIons pr'ohi'tin any a were at that time: ba:sfror. the threat or -us of Iorc3 Hopes that Czechoslovakia would resume against the territorial sovereginry - its splendid progress toward a modern democ- political racy were independence of another st shattered by a communist coup in I cannot adequately February, 1948. For the next twenty years the express the prc- communist regirme lived on reserves arcuniu- found hope of those of us privile &d to liated by the i018 generation, deceiving the live in freedom from this endless per- very ones in whose name communist revolu- sonal suffering, that our expressions of tions occur-the working class. Czechoslovak support Will encotLae and strengthen workers were never given the promised fac- the brave people of this small country in tories and became instead the prey of com- their i'ightful quest for freedom and self- munist state-capitalism and Soviet neo- determinat ion. colonialnsm. Their wages were gradually At few times in history have the people reduced to about one-half of an adjusted of pre-war level, as compared to earnings the world so longed for peace and the enjoyed by fellow-workers in-the West. The end to all forms of agression. Yet the whole nation was politically manipulated Brezhnev doctrine is an open adlnission and there was no freedom of press, expres- of imperialismn and neocolonialisn. 'To- sion, or avsembly. day, when self-determination is a univer- The glorious spring of 19063 put an end to sally accepted right of all nations, it is oppression and hypocrisy. Without violence, indeed shocking that the Soviet Union uin i ed behind new, young leaders. Czechs continues to violate the Chaster of the and Slovaks began to expo:e and correct past United Nations by treating tue east and blunders . . . until the Soviet war machine central European countries as mustered half a million troops, and..subdued colonies- a small, peace- and freedom-loving country. kept in check by military might. World In Wsshington, on the anniversary of that War II ende-d more than 25 years ago. humiliating aggression and occupation, Surely Europe and the world can at long Cacehoslovak democratic organizations called last begin to look to a new era of peace. a Protest Meeting which was attended by But this goal of all mankind is unlikely many representatives of other exile fnd eth- to be realized unless peace is based on nic groups and won strong endorsement of self-determination, personal and na- many U.S. Governors, Senators, and Con- tional freedom, and equal justice. greasmen. By acclamation, the Meeting voted: August 21st rhall henceforth be Mr. Speaker, once again I would like called the "Soviet Day of Shame." At home a to clearly indicate condenination of the valiant struggle for independence goes brutal agressions against the Czechoslo- on . . . vakian people, our deep concern over the continued Oppressions being suffered by them, as well as our support for their continual resistance and rejection of Soviet dominance.

Source: Congressional Record, August 6, 1971 (Daily Edition) pp. E90 4- E9049.