Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology © 2010 American Psychological Association 2010, Vol. 30, No. 2, 79–93 1068-8471/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0021570 A Hermeneutics of Exploration: The Interpretive Turn From Binswanger to Gadamer

Roger Frie Simon Fraser University

The interpretive turn in psychology is strongly indebted to the hermeneutic philoso- phies of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. What is less known is the degree to which the interpretive turn is already initiated in the 1920s by the Swiss psychiatrist, Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1965). For Binswanger, the objective of psychology and psychopathology is to understand how the person exists and relates to others in the world—and this can only be achieved through a situated understanding of the person in his or her life-world. Binswanger is one of the first to recognize and work out the contributions of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophies for psychology. Using an approach that combines elements from phenomenology, hermeneutics and dialogical philosophy, Binswanger views the person not as an object, but as fundamentally immersed in a world of human relating. Yet Binswanger is not a Heideggerian, and does not identify his work as existential. Instead, he develops a dialogical perspective on human experience that parallels important aspects of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Drawing chiefly on untranslated texts, I maintain that Binswanger’s hermeneutics of exploration forms an important, if relatively unknown chapter of the interpretive turn in psychology.

Keywords: interpretive turn, hermeneutics, phenomenology, dialogical philosophy, psychotherapy

In every psychology that makes the person, as such, chotherapist, Ludwig Binswanger (1881– into an object—particularly those psychologies 1965), whose primary objective was to over- founded by natural scientists . . . we find a rift, a gap through which it is clear that what is being scientif- come what he referred to as the “fatal defect” ically studied is not the whole person, not human- ([1946] 1958, p. 193) of psychology: namely, being as a whole. Everywhere we find something the division between subject and object that that overflows and bursts the bounds of such a led to a reductionist and objectifying account psychology. of the person. For Binswanger, the task of Ludwig Binswanger ([1936a] 1947, p. 179). psychology was to understand how the person The interpretive turn in psychology is exists and relates to others in the world—and strongly indebted to the hermeneutic philoso- this could only be achieved through the her- phies of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Ga- meneutic exploration of the person in his or damer. What is less known is the degree to her life-world. which the interpretive turn was already initiated Binswanger sought to forge a new discourse in the 1920s by a group of European psychia- of the person that was grounded in the human trists who are broadly identified in North Amer- sciences and could bridge the disparate terrains ica as “existential analysts.” Chief among them of psychiatry, philosophy, and psychoanalysis. is the Swiss psychiatrist, philosopher and psy- He was arguably the first to substantively apply ideas from phenomenology, hermeneutics and dialogical philosophy to psychiatric and psy- chotherapeutic endeavors. Turning to the works Roger Frie, Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser Univer- sity. of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, Max This is an expanded version of a paper presented to Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Martin Buber, Division 24 at the American Psychological Association among others, Binswanger refashioned the dis- Annual Convention in Toronto, Canada, in August, 2009. ciplines of phenomenology and interpretive in- Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, 8888 Uni- quiry to understand the lived experience of the versity Drive, Burnaby, BC, Canada V5A 1S6. E-mail: roger person. Binswanger referred to his psychologi- [email protected] cal approach as “phenomenological anthropol-

79 80 FRIE ogy.”1 It was this cross-disciplinary undertaking psychotherapy that draws on the ideas of Martin that the young Michel Foucault lauded in his Heidegger. Binswanger was first introduced to book length introduction to Binswanger’s arti- English speaking audiences by Rollo May, cle Dream and Existence ([1930] 1994a). Ac- Ernst Angel and Henri Ellenberger in their path- cording to Foucault ([1954] 1993): “To reject breaking book: Existence: A new dimension in such an inquiry at first glance because it is psychiatry and psychology (1958). A few years neither philosophy nor psychology, because one later, Jacob Needleman translated and intro- cannot define it as either science or speculation, duced a selection of Binswanger’s essays and because it neither looks like positive knowledge case studies in Being-in-the-world: The selected nor provides the content of a priori cognition, is papers of Ludwig Binswanger (1962). to ignore the basic meaning of the project” It is noteworthy that the small selection of (p. 32). Binswanger’s essays and case studies that have This essay will explore the “basic meaning” been translated into English are chiefly those of Binswanger’s phenomenological anthropol- that deal with the application of Heidegger’s ogy and demonstrate its relevance for the inter- philosophy to psychology and psychotherapy. pretive turn in psychology. I will examine Binswanger’s oeuvre is much broader than his Binswanger’s ideas in light of their connection English translations, however, and his interest to the hermeneutic perspectives of Heidegger in Heidegger forms only one phase of his work, and Gadamer. I will begin by considering albeit an important one. As a result, Binswanger Dilthey’s work, which provides Binswanger continues to be identified in the English- with an initial model for understanding the per- speaking world as an “existential” psychologist, son without resorting to the dichotomization of a moniker he was careful to avoid. My objective outward explanation and inner understanding. here is to broaden the reception of Binswanger In turn, Binswanger’s critique of reductionism by focusing largely on his untranslated work in psychiatry and psychoanalysis draws on Hus- (translations are my own, and in some cases I serl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s inter- have changed existing translations) and con- pretive account of being. Binswanger’s notion sider its importance for, and connection with, of “world-designs” (Weltentwuerfe) – the struc- the interpretive turn in psychology. I will only ture of a person’s lived experience—provides briefly examine Binswanger’s critique of Hei- the impetus for a phenomenological and herme- degger, which I have examined at length else- neutic account of psychopathology and psycho- where (Frie, 1997), and I will suggest that Hei- therapy. Using Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notions degger’s later refutations of Binswanger in his of “horizons of understanding” and “conversa- recently translated Zollikon Seminars ([1987] tion,” I will expand on Binswanger’s theories 2001) tell only part of the story (see Frie and elaborate their connection to the interpre- 1999b).2 Indeed, Binswanger’s turn to the phi- tive turn. Binswanger’s work anticipates Gada- losophy of dialogue provides an important mer’s hermeneutics on several counts. I will counterpoint to Heidegger’s inadequate treat- conclude by suggesting that Binswanger’s chief ment of the social dimension in Being and Time contribution is a hermeneutics of exploration ([1927] 1962). that is grounded in a dialogical view of the The question of why so little of Binswanger’s person. work is known today is perhaps best answered by considering the context of his ideas. Situating Binswanger in Contemporary Binswanger belonged to a continental European and Historical Contexts

1 Before examining Binswanger’s work, it is Binswanger was interested in anthropology in the word’s true etymological sense: the study of the situated important to situate him historically and philo- human being. sophically. If the name, “Ludwig Binswanger” 2 Indeed, it is only with the recent (2001) English- is recognized today, it is usually in connection language translation of Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars (a with the emergence of humanistic and existen- series of transcribed seminars Heidegger gave to psychia- trists in Zollikon, Switzerland, during the 1950s and 1960s tial psychology during the 1960s. Binswanger is at Boss’s behest), that Binswanger’s critical stance vis a vis commonly known as a founder of “Dasein- Heidegger has generally become known to English speaking sanalysis,” or existential analysis, a form of readers. A HERMENEUTICS OF EXPLORATION 81 tradition of intellectual thought that freely com- As director from 1910 to 1956, Binswanger bined insights from philosophy and clinical dedicated much of his time to the integration of practice. Much of Binswanger’s work is philo- theoretical and clinical insights from philoso- sophical in scope, save for a relatively small phy, psychoanalysis and psychiatry, drawing number of case studies, and as such, remains above all on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, distant from the concerns of most contemporary and Buber. Binswanger’s broad theoretical in- psychologists. Academic psychologists today terests were reflected in his personal associa- chiefly define their work within a natural scien- tions with major thinkers of the time. Among tific paradigm. Similarly, training and practice the prominent figures who visited Binswanger for most clinical psychologists is grounded in in Kreuzlingen were Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, the medical model. The study of psychological Buber, Karl Löwith, Ernst Cassirer, Alexander objects and the increasingly narrow technical Pfa¨nder, and Scheler. Bellevue Sanatorium it- and clinical focus on symptom reduction is at self became a famous center for psychiatric odds with the tradition of interdisciplinary treatment. Included among its patients were scholarship and practice that Binswanger repre- such well-known personalities as the Swiss art- sents. Indeed, Binswanger began his career as a ist Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, the Russian dancer, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, and eventually Vaslav Nijinsky, and the German sociologist, became a continental philosopher of European Max Weber. Binswanger retired in 1956, but renown (see Theunissen, 1977). In German remained an active writer, publishing his last speaking countries there is considerably more major work just one year before his death in interest in what Binswanger has to say, as evi- 1966. denced in the publication of his Selected Works (Binswanger, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b). In The Challenge of Naturalism and the addition, Binswanger’s chief work on the nature Psychology of the Personhood of human interaction, Grundformen und Contemporary psychologists increasingly Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (generally look for neurological and biophysical explana- translated as Basic forms and knowledge of hu- tions to answer questions about human behav- man existence), was published in 1942 and has ior. They argue that psychological phenomena gone through five subsequent editions, yet it can be accounted for by “more basic” neurolog- remains untranslated. This work also contains ical and biophysical events. This approach is Binswanger’s important critique of Heidegger’s part of the wider naturalistic project in psychol- Being and Time. ogy, which views human activity in terms of Binswanger was born in Kreuzlingen, Swit- physical causes and laws and increasingly af- zerland, in 1881, into a family of prominent fects psychological inquiry and practice, as il- psychiatrists. Binswanger attended the universi- lustrated in the rapid growth of evidence-based ties of Lausanne, Heidelberg and Zurich, and treatments. By contrast, the interpretive turn in received his medical degree from Zurich in psychology questions to what extent a natural- 1907. He trained as a psychiatrist under Eugen istic framework can account for the situated Bleuler and Carl Jung at the Burghoelzli Hos- nature of psychological phenomena in general, pital in Zurich. It was there that he became and the experience of the Other in particular. acquainted with the burgeoning field of psycho- The naturalistic project is consistent with the analysis and, in 1907, accompanied Jung to broad mechanistic perspectives underlying the Vienna to meet Freud for the first time. reigning conceptual paradigms of North Amer- Binswanger developed a friendship with Freud ican psychology over the past century. The dif- that continued through personal visits and a ficulty is that the application of the methods and large correspondence until the latter’s death in values of the natural sciences to human behavior 1939 (see Fichtner, 1992). Binswanger was of- implies that psychology often deals with individ- fered the directorship of the Burghoelzli Hospi- ual components, such as cerebral responses, neu- tal when Bleuler stepped down, but chose in- ral structures, and other physiological mecha- stead to remain director of his family’s famous nisms, and not with the phenomenology of lived Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen, which experience. The problem is that when the under- was founded by his grandfather in 1857. standing of individual components is equated with 82 FRIE asystemascomplexashumanbehavior,wein- of Dilthey’s ideas to the process of understand- evitably end up with reductionism. ing in psychiatry. But Binswanger also felt that In contrast to the dominant naturalist frame- Jaspers did not go far enough, arguing that work in contemporary psychology, the interpre- Jaspers reverted back to naturalistic explana- tive perspective in psychology does not strive tions when his attempts to understand others by for decontextualized facts. Rather, it empha- means of empathic projection and a genuinely sizes meaning as experienced by persons whose descriptive psychology failed him (see Lanzoni, actions are rooted in the life-world. From a 2003, pp. 167–168).3 hermeneutic perspective, moreover, human be- Above all, Binswanger objected to any at- havior can never be fully analyzed apart from tempt to understand the other that objectified or the contexts in which it emerges. If the study of generalized the experience of the person. For psychology is understood as making sense of Binswanger, the subject-object division is an the world as it is experienced by human beings, abstraction that bears no relation to the totality then any analysis that does not sufficiently ac- of everyday lived experience. Following count for contexts is necessarily incomplete. Dilthey, Binswanger sees our everyday experi- The hermeneutic approach is indebted to ence as shaped by structures, which according Wilhelm Dilthey, who sought to formulate a to Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon’s (1999) methodological basis for the human sciences reading of Dilthey, are “recurring patterns that based largely on a psychology of understanding display fundamental connections and interrela- (Verstehen). In his classic work ([1894] 1977), tionships characteristic of psychological life. Dilthey contrasted his descriptive psychology, Every human experience, for example, involves which employed the method of “understand- a dynamic interplay of cognitive, affective, and ing”, with analytic psychology, which utilized “explanation”. Dilthey proposed that psycholo- volitional elements that reflects an underlying gists use their everyday experience as a basis for structure of experience” (p. 203). On this view, interpreting and understanding psychological structures of experience provide a way of mak- meaning. He argued that psychological phe- ing sense of human phenomena without re- nomena not only require interpretation, but are course to standard causal explanations. The no- also constituted by human interpretive prac- tion of structures was only briefly elaborated by tices. Dilthey’s descriptive psychology began Binswanger at this early stage, but would later with the examination of the totality of life ex- form the basis for his notion of world-design. perience: the lived reality that precedes distinc- In the preface to Introduction to Problems of tions between mind and body and self and General Psychology, Binswanger articulates the world. He argued that it is only against this ever- broad objective of his work: “to achieve clarity present, mostly unarticulated, background of their about the conceptual foundation of what the experience that humans are able to perceive and psychiatrist perceives, reflects on and does with understand things, including themselves. Psychol- respect to psychology and psychotherapy, at the ogy, on this view, must always consider person bedside” (1922, p. v). In other words, within a shared, practical life-world. Binswanger sought to elaborate a science of the In his first major work, Einfuehrung in die Probleme der Allgemeinen Psychologie (Intro- 3 Susan Lanzoni has published a series of important re- duction to the Problems of General Psychol- cent articles (Lanzoni, 2003, 2004) on Binswanger’s early ogy), Binswanger (1922) singles out Dilthey as work from the perspective of the history of science. Her “the first to demonstrate the way to a psychol- articles provide a useful English-language resource for un- ogy of the person” (p. 247). Drawing on derstanding the historical scope and nature of Binswanger’s Dilthey, Binswanger suggests that it is pre- early work in psychiatry. For an analysis of Binswanger’s mature work, particularly his (as yet untranslated, cisely the structural connection (Stuktur- Binswanger, 1942) elaboration of intersubjectivity and love zusammenhang)ofliveexperiencedthat and his critique of Heidegger, see Frie, 1997. In addition, makes understanding possible. In the same Theunissen (1977) provides an excellent and very thorough sense, understanding of the Other is grounded in discussion of Binswanger’s theory of intersubjectivity, yet his work on Binswanger is only available in the original our involvement with others and the world in German language ed. of his landmark book, The Other (Der which we live. Indeed, Binswanger (1913) was Andere). The English translation (Theunissen, 1984) is an appreciative of Karl Jaspers initial application abridged version of the German original. A HERMENEUTICS OF EXPLORATION 83 person (Personwissenschaft)basedonthepossi- against the background of an I, of a person. In bility of direct, intersubjective understanding. other words, we always see it as the expression or Above all, Binswanger was concerned with how declaration of a person of a certain kind” (p. 37). we understand and experience the other person According to Binswanger, then, phenomenol- prior to any division between subject and object. ogy is an indispensible tool for understanding For Binswanger, understanding could not be de- pathological phenomena. Indeed, by drawing on rived from the isolated subject standing over and Husserl, Binswanger begins to understand psy- against an object world. Such an objectified chopathology itself in terms of a person’s “altered worldview would require that we are entirely sep- world-experience.” ([1923] 1947, p. 38). Psycho- arate from what we perceive and experience. For logical phenomena exist within the person’s life- Binswanger, it is precisely how we perceive and world. And it was precisely the structure of this experience the other that is of central importance person’s experience of the world that Binswanger to the practice of psychiatry and psychology. will seek to identify in his later notion of “world- In the Introduction to Problems of General designs.” Psychology, Binswanger (1922) draws on nu- merous thinkers, from Dilthey, Henri Bergson Critique of Psychoanalysis and William James to Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, in order to outline his critique of a Binswanger’s turn to phenomenology also naturalistic psychology. Of these, the work of forms the basis of his critique of Freudian psycho- Husserl and Scheler become particularly relevant analysis. Binswanger established a friendship with to Binswanger’s development of a psychology of Freud that lasted over three decades, but he was personhood based on “direct access” to the other. never a Freudian, and his reception of psychoan- Indeed, Binswanger’s interactions with leading alytic ideas remained critical throughout their re- phenomenologists of the day proved decisive. lationship (Fichtner, 1992). Early in his career, Binswanger met Alexander Pfaender in 1923, and Binswanger perceived psychoanalysis as a novel through Pfaender met Husserl a year later. At the means of understanding behavior that might oth- time, Binswanger ([1923] 1947) remarked that erwise appear incomprehensible. Binswanger be- Husserl’s phenomenology provided a foundation lieved that psychoanalysis correctly emphasized for his work, opening up new dimensions for a the developmental trajectory of human experi- descriptive approach in psychology. ence. In contrast to reductionist accounts of the Binswanger ([1923] 1947) argues that Hus- person in psychiatry of his day, Binswanger serl’s phenomenology abstains from explaining lauded psychoanalysis for its emphasis on the perceived phenomena, instead providing a de- individual’s personality. At the same time, how- scriptive approach. For Binswanger, Husserl’s ever, Binswanger opposed the determinism of the analysis of intentionality, by showing the link psychoanalytic theory of mind, rejected the cau- between the subjective act and the intentional sality of drive theory and introduced a radical object to which it was directed, effectively reformulation of the unconscious. For bridges the gap between subject and object. Binswanger, the naturalistic basis on which Freud- Phenomenology enables phenomena to “ex- ian psychoanalysis was founded was ultimately press themselves” and to appear immediately to inappropriate to the study of lived experience.4 the investigator. Adopting a nonjudgmental at- According to Binswanger, Freud’s models of titude, the psychiatrist explores the patient’s the mind were prey to the same kind of natu- experience, as described by him or her, without ralistic and reductionist dilemmas that charac- clinically reducing its phenomenal expressions into “symptoms” (Binswanger [1923] 1947, 4 1957). Above all, phenomenology allows the psy- It is important to distinguish here between classical Freudian psychoanalysis and contemporary revisionist chiatrist to appreciate and understand the nature of forms of psychoanalysis, especially the intersubjective, re- lived experience without reverting to theoretical lational and interpersonal schools. These schools have con- preconceptions. As Binswanger states: “What is siderable parallels with the position Binswanger is outlining essential in the phenomenological observation of and trace their roots to similar historical critiques of Freud, leveled by such early revisionist psychoanalytic critics as the psychopathological phenomena is this, that Ferenzci, Sullivan, Fromm and others. On the parallels one never glimpses an isolated phenomenon. between Binswanger and Sullivan’s interpersonal psycho- Rather the phenomenon always presents itself analysis, see Burston & Frie, 2006 and Frie 1999a. 84 FRIE terized psychiatry. In his early Project for a It is a question of attempting to understand and to Scientific Psychology (written in 1895 and pub- explain the human being in the totality of his or her existence. But that is possible only from the perspec- lished posthumously in 1953), Freud (1953b p. tive of our total existence: in other words, only when 295) wrote that the intention of the project was we reflect on and articulate our total existence, the to “furnish a psychology which shall be a nat- “essence” and “form” of being human. Only then can ural science; that is, is to represent psycholog- a time-, environment-, and goal-oriented, “constitu- ical processes as quantitatively determined tive” idea, be replaced by an actual self-understanding of “human existence,” an insight into authentic onto- states of specifiable material particles, thus logical potentialities—in sum, by an authentic anthro- making those processes perspicuous and free pology. ([1936b] 1955, p. 84) from contradiction.” While Freud eventually abandoned the Project, he held fast to his belief Binswanger was interested in anthropology that the scientific Weltanshauung was the only in the word’s true etymological sense: the study legitimate one, stating in Beyond the Pleasure of the situated human being. Binswanger’s phe- Principle ([1920] 1953a) that “The deficiencies nomenological-anthropology thus set out to de- in our description [of the mind] would probably scribe and understand human experience in its vanish if we were already in a position to re- context, or “totality.” place the psychological terms by physiological or chemical ones” (p. 60). Given Freud’s ex- From Phenomenology to plicit predilections, it should not be surprising Being-in-the-World that Binswanger’s primary critique of psycho- analysis was directed at its naturalism. In his seminar, Ueber Phenomenologie, According to Binswanger, not only does (About Phenomenology)Binswanger([1923] Freud reduce psychic life to a set of mecha- 1947) argues that “the foundation of psychopa- nisms that have little relation to actual lived thology is primarily the intersubjective percep- experience, he mistakenly conceives of the tion of another, unfamiliar I” (p. 34). entire psychic apparatus in quantitative terms. Binswanger’s use of Husserl’s concept of inten- Even Freud’s metapsychological theories fall tionality allows him to suggest that the person prey to reductionism: “Freud, the natural sci- actively acquires knowledge of the world, in- entist, or to put it differently, the philosopher cluding the existence of others, through her or of nature, seeks to explain the multiplicity of her meaning-bestowing acts. Here “world” is life by one,andiftheform-destroyingprin- considered the system of all possible objects of ciple of the death instinct is included, by two consciousness. While the Husserlian ego has unitary principles” ([1936a] 1947 p. 179). For access to the world of its own consciousness, it Binswanger, this metapsychological construct does not have direct access to the transcendental presents a distorted view of human experi- reality of another person. Husserl does not con- ence; this amounts to a depersonalization of sider knowledge of others as an immediate the person through natural science and tele- given. ology ([1936a] 1947). Binswanger, by contrast, suggests that aware- In an article entitled “Freud and the State of ness of another person’s existence and mental Clinical Psychiatry” ([1936b] 1955), Binswanger states is acquired directly, through perception. questioned the degree to which scientific study In order to justify this claim, Binswanger turns could provide an account of lived experience. Ac- to the work of Scheler. He credits Scheler with cording to Binswanger ([1936b] 1955), the nar- having shown that “even intersubjective cogni- rowness of a purely natural scientific conception tion is a kind of (inner) perception, with which of consciousness and human behavior “results in we grasp the occurrence of the other mind di- the depersonalization of the human being” (p. 88). rectly” ([1923] 1947, p. 34). By establishing the The process of depersonalization is especially ap- possibility of understanding the other directly, parent in the fact that a scientific explanation of an using Scheler’s notions of the “lived body” and entity, process or occurrence described its object “inner perception,” Binswanger is able to intro- as a whole constructed from various parts. For duce empathy and inference as aids in interpret- Binswanger, the unique personality of a human ing the other’s words and actions. On this basis, being can only be accounted for if its parts were Scheler’s work enables Binswanger to elaborate not viewed prior to the whole: a preliminary approach to intersubjectivity. It is A HERMENEUTICS OF EXPLORATION 85 only after he encounters Heidegger’s Being and degger places in the psychiatrist’s hands a Time, however, that Binswanger is able to de- methodological key by means of which he velop an approach to intersubjectivity, based on can, free of the prejudice of any scientific the notion of being-in-the-world, which over- theory, ascertain and describe the phenomena comes the monadological nature of Husserl’s he investigates in their full phenomenal con- and Scheler’s philosophies. tent and context” ([1949] 1955 p. 264). In According to Heidegger, fundamental ontol- other words, Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse is ogy provides an analysis of the primary struc- based not on a theory of natural causation, tures of human existence, and thus constitutes a but on the study of the person in his or her necessary foundation for the human sciences. life-world. Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is oriented to- For Binswanger, human experience can only ward an ontological end: the return to the mean- be comprehended within the context of being- ing of Being as such. Heidegger refers to Dasein in-the-world. Binswanger enlarged Heidegger’s as a being that questions Being. As a preper- ontological conception of world to include the sonal and preegological form of existence, Da- horizon in which human beings live and sein is neither autonomous nor self-contained, through which they understand themselves. In- but always already situated in the world in the deed, Binswanger was careful to distinguish the structure of care. Heidegger is concerned with “ontic” nature of his analysis from Heidegger’s expounding a more fundamental involvement of fundamental “ontology.” Binswanger distin- Dasein in the world: guished three simultaneous modes of being-in- the-world: the Umwelt, constituting the environ- It is not the case that the human being “is” and then ment within which a person exists; the Mitwelt, has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being toward the “world” – a world with which he provides himself or world of social relations; and the Eigenwelt, occasionally. Dasein is never “proximally” an entity the private world of self. According to that is, so to speak, free of Being-in, but which some- Binswanger, the three modes together constitute times has the inclination to take up a “relationship” a person’s world-design—the general context of toward the world. Taking up relationships toward the meaning within which a person exists. The use world is possible only because Dasein as Being-in-the- world, is as it is. ([1927] 1962, p. 84) of these different descriptive categories enabled Binswanger to develop more precise accounts Ontologically there can be no self and no of his patients’ experiences. separate distinct world. Rather, Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, in a way that other World-Designs Beings do not. For Heidegger, being involved with the world, as being-in, is definitive of As interpreted by Binswanger, the notion of Dasein. being-in-the-world signifies that we are not iso- Drawing on Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik, lated, encapsulated egos, but beings who are Binswanger develops a unique anthropological- always and already in relation to other humans ontological approach to psychiatry, entitled and the world in which we are situated. “Daseinsanalyse.”5 For Binswanger, Heideg- Binswanger’s aim is not to subsume his appli- ger’s notion of being-in-the-world was the cation of Heidegger’s ideas to fundamental on- key to overcoming the Cartesian split be- tology. His objective, rather, is to apply the tween subject and object in psychiatry. In- anthropological concepts such as “world” and deed, according to Binswanger, “Heidegger, “Dasein” to clinical settings and case material in in his concept of being-in-the-world . . . has order provide a more satisfactory method of opened a new horizon of understanding for, interpreting and understanding the experience and given a new impulse to, the scientific of the other. exploration of human Being and its specific Binswanger’s expanded, anthropological modes of being. The split of Being into sub- (rather than ontological) notion of being-in-the- ject (human being/person) and object (thing, environment) is replaced by the unity of 5 It is interesting to note that Binswanger did not initially Dasein and world.”([1946]1958,p.193). choose this term himself, and adopted only it after it was Binswanger remarks further that “In thus in- applied to his work by other commentators at the time (see dicating the basic structure of Dasein, Hei- Herzog, 1992). 86 FRIE world forms the basis of his notion of world- tasks of psychiatry to investigate and establish these designs. He seeks above all to achieve an un- variations ([1946] 1958 p. 194). derstanding of his patient’s world-designs: that is, to see how persons relate to the people and And in contrast to the natural science the environment around them, and thus to un- model of psychopathology, which reduces a derstand how they structure the world in which patient’s life experience to a symptom or set they exist. The “main goal of psychopathol- of symptoms, Binswanger states: “we do not ogy,” Binswanger ([1946] 1958, p. 213) states, stop at the single fact, the single disturbance, is to achieve “knowledge and scientific descrip- the single symptom, but we keep searching tion of those world-designs . . . a task which can for an embracing whole within which the fact be performed only with the help of Daseinsana- can be understood as a partial phenomenon lyse.” Binswanger does not interpret a person’s ... wecannotprogressfarenoughinour experiences in terms of intrapsychic drives, understanding of anxiety if we consider it brain functions or a general mental apparatus. only as a psychopathological symptom per Rather, he suggests that the psychology of the se” ([1946] 1958, p. 205). In other words, a person can only be understood within the par- symptom, or single experience, cannot be un- ticular life-world in which it exists and takes derstood as separate from the world in which form. it takes place, nor can it be used to describe or Using a phenomenological approach to at- characterize a person’s experience as a whole. tend to a patient’s linguistic, affective, and Similarly, the contemporary emphasis on bodily expressions, Binswanger seeks to under- symptom reduction may fail to account for the stand his patients in terms of their world- very contexts in which the symptom is expe- designs: the particular worlds they inhabit. Be- rienced. cause the world of a person constitutes a visual In his case studies, Binswanger uses the reality, Binswanger is able to describe a per- notion of world-designs to describe the expe- son’s experiences within the particular world- riences of his patients, many of who suffered design in which they take place. Binswanger from severe forms of mental illness. His case describes his approach as follows: studies of mania and schizophrenia were not We do not—as the psychoanalyst systematically records of therapeutic successes per se, but does—focus merely upon the historical content, nor interpretative accounts meant to help the psy- upon references to facts pertaining to life function as chiatrist understand the varied “worlds” of does the psychopathologist in focusing on disturbances psychosis (Lanzoni, 2003). In the first of his of speech or thinking functions. Rather, what attracts our attention in Daseinsanalysis is the content of lan- existential analytic studies, Dream and Exis- guage expressions and manifestations insofar as they tence ([1930] 1994a), Binswanger described point to the world-design or designs in which the dreams in terms of the dreamer’s world- speaker lives or has lived, or in one world, their world- designs, rather than unconscious psychic pro- content. By world-content, then, we mean the content of facts pertaining to worlds; that is, of references to cesses. Similarly, in his study U¨ ber Ideen- the way in which the given form or configuration of flucht (On the Flight of Ideas) ([1933] 1992), existence discovers world designs and opens up Binswanger used the world-designs of his pa- world. . . . a certain organized structure can be recog- nized from which each world, each idea, drawing, tients to elaborate manic experience, and in action or gesture receives its peculiar imprint ([1946] his later study Schizophrenie (1957), he ex- 1958, pp. 201–202). plored the spatial and temporal structures of schizophrenic existence. By investigating the structure of a person’s In all of these studies, Binswanger views the being in the world it becomes possible to un- person, or Dasein, not as a static being, but as derstand the nature of his or her experience of fundamentally embodied. Indeed, for the world. As Binswanger states: Binswanger the person is imbued with an em- In this context we do not say: mental illnesses are bodied sense of agency and is always involved diseases of the brain (which, of course, they remain in ways of moving through the world. Given from a medical-clinical point of view). Rather we say: Heidegger’s almost complete oversight of the in mental diseases we face modifications of the funda- mental or essential structure and of the structural links body in Being and Time, Binswanger’s early of being-in-the-world as transcendence. It is one of the perspectives ([1930] 1994a, [1933] 1992) on A HERMENEUTICS OF EXPLORATION 87 embodiment are noteworthy.6 Binswanger dem- For Binswanger (1959) and Gadamer (1991) onstrated different ways of living and moving alike, we are born into preexisting social worlds through space, using such terms as rising, fall- that consist of collective practices, especially ing, skipping, sliding or jumping—all of which language; it is through engagement in these were exemplified most strikingly in manic social activities that we develop frameworks for forms of Dasein. Binswanger thus pays partic- understanding and create order and meaning in ular attention to the characteristic kind of the world around us. As communal practices are “worldliness” or articulation of the world, passed from one generation the next, life is through its temporal and its spatial structures. made intelligible and meaningful to new mem- bers of a society. According to Gadamer (1991), Relational Worlds of Experience this process forms our “horizon of understand- ing,” a largely invisible, backdrop of “preunder- With his notion of world-designs, and his cri- standing” that both provides and sets limits on tique of the naturalistic basis of psychopathology our interpretations of ourselves as well as the and psychoanalysis, Binswanger shares many of world around us. Each person is therefore a the concerns that are currently articulated in the manifestation of history, albeit one that is con- interpretive turn in psychology. In fact, the degree tinually evolving. Our horizons of understand- to which Binswanger’s ideas parallel those of the ing are primarily tacit, and, accordingly, remain hermeneutic perspective becomes particularly largely unarticulated and unexamined. clear through a consideration of the work of Ga- While Binswanger specifically sets himself damer. Having examined Binswanger’s relation to the phenomenological task of uncovering and Heidegger, I will expand on his notion of world- describing the world-designs, or horizons, of his designs by using Gadamer’s more familiar notion patients, Gadamer’s hermeneutics takes a cru- of horizons of understanding. Both of these con- cial further step. In contrast to Binswanger, one cepts—world-design and horizon of understand- of Gadamer’s specific aims is to show that any ing—refer to our contexts of experience and our description of another person’s world-design is possibilities of understanding, and each hails from inevitably affected by the hermeneuticist’s own the same philosophical tradition. As Weinsheimer preconceptions and prejudices. In other words, (1985), paraphrasing Gadamer, suggests, “horizon our understanding of the other is always is another way of describing context. It includes achieved through the lens of our own situated- everything of which one is not immediately aware ness. Gadamer thereby underlines the inevita- and of which one must in fact remain unaware if bility of the preconceptions and prejudices that there is to be a focus of attention; but one’s hori- are inherent in our horizons of understanding. zon is also the context in terms of which the object At the same time, from the perspective of of attention is understood” (p. 157). psychotherapy, Binswanger’s and Gadamer’s Like Binswanger, Gadamer (1991) sees the viewpoints intersect. Drawing on Binswanger’s phenomenological concept of “horizon” as in- approach, we can say that the suffering patient herent to the process of understanding. Our ho- has experienced a disruption of his or her life- rizon of understanding is “the range of vision world. For Binswanger, this disruption takes the that includes everything that can be see from a form of a narrowing or constriction of one’s particular vantage point” (1991, p. 143). Inter- world-design—in other words, of the possibili- pretation and understanding always take place ties we have for being and relating. Accord- within specific horizons that are determined by ingly, the goal of psychotherapy is to help open our contexts. It is, as such, our very situatedness up a space for new ways of being and relating to that affects our ability to understand. For others and the world in which we exist, despite Binswanger, this situatedness is captured by our fundamental thrownness. Indeed, therapeu- Heidegger’s ([1927] 1962) concept of “throw- ness.” Following Heidegger, Binswanger ([1942] 1993) suggests that we are continually 6 In fact, in the early 1930s, Binswanger wrote to Hei- thrown into situations, and it is this state of degger to invite him to a lecture he was planning to give on the theme of embodiment (see Frie 1999b). Heidegger later “throwness”—a basic and irreducible facet of corrects his oversight of the body in Being and Time with our being—that we are forced to come to terms extended discussions of embodiment in the Zollikon with. Seminars. 88 FRIE tic change not only depends upon an openness hermeneutic therapist needs to accept the inev- to explore new forms of relating, but also an itable incompleteness and biased perspective acceptance of what is not possible as a result of she brings to her understanding of the patient. our situatedness.7 The process by which this occurs is captured by For Binswanger, as for any hermeneutic psy- Gadamer’s (1991) concept of the “fusion of chotherapist, the experience of the patient can- horizons.” According to Gadamer, our contexts not simply be made to “fit” into a preexisting set the parameters for how we understand the theoretical model as this would result in the world around us. However, through dialogue reduction and depersonalization of what the pa- we can work to articulate and make explicit tient says and experiences. Rather, the psycho- those contextualized meanings and values that therapist must hold her theories lightly as she are largely implicit. A “fusion of horizons” attends to, and allows the patient’s experiences takes place between a speaker and listener when to unfold, in the mutual setting of therapy. The they are able to interpret each other’s perspec- psychotherapist, on this view, is engaged in an tives in a way that yields new meanings and interpersonal process of interaction with the new perspectives. In other words, the fusion of other. Indeed, according to Binswanger, the horizons is the moment at which a preconcep- therapeutic process is dependent upon a thera- tion and its alternative can be differentiated, pist’s attitude of loving openness to the patient thereby fostering mutual understanding and that can allow the therapy to evolve in an at- opening up greater possibilities for dialogue. mosphere of uninterrupted, direct communica- The fusion of horizons, like the process of psy- tive interaction. As Binswanger puts it, chotherapy described by Binswanger, is a fun- damentally social process, the emergent nature This communication may in no way, as the orthodox psychoanalysts believe, be conceived as mere repeti- of which is captured in Gadamer’s notion of the tion, in the positive case as transference and counter- “conversation.” Indeed, the conversation is an transference, or in the negative case as resistance and apt description for the hermeneutic perspective counterresistance; much rather, the relationship of pa- on psychotherapy. tient and doctor represents always also an independent communicative novelty, a new linking of fate, and In contrast to the natural science perspective namely not only regarding the patient-doctor relation- on psychotherapy, which assumes the possibil- ship, but also and above all regarding the pure rela- ity of uncovering and knowing preexisting ob- tionship of being-with in the meaning of a genuine jective truths, Gadamer suggests that genuine “with-one-another.” (Binswanger, [1935] 1994a, conversation or dialogue always involves “not p. 215) knowing.” According to Gadamer, to truly con- Binswanger’s intersubjective account of the verse with someone is to enter into relationship therapeutic setting, precisely the “genuine with- with another person without knowing in ad- one-another” between the doctor and patient, or vance where this will take us: therapist and client, places him alongside other Agenuineconversationisnevertheonethatwe early critics of psychoanalysis such as Sa´ndor wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct Ferenczi. Like them, Binswanger is promoting a to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we therapeutic relationship modeled on a more in- become involved in it. The way one word follows timate connection than that of traditional psy- another, with the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be con- choanalysis or psychiatry. It also places ducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far Binswanger in close proximity to contemporary less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows in intersubjective, relational and interpersonal tra- advance what will “come out” of a conversation. Un- ditions of psychoanalysis, which reject tradi- tional Freudian theory and technique and see the 7 person as relationally constructed. As such, the goal of a therapy is not strictly an existen- tialist version of helping the other achieve the “freedom of An important distinction between the early letting the world occur,” as Binswanger’s account of ther- interactive models of psychotherapy (or psy- apy is sometimes presented (see cf. Richardson et al., 1999, choanalysis) of Binswanger, Ferenczi, Sullivan, p. 122). This “existentialist” reading of Binswanger is and others, and more recent hermeneutic ac- largely due to the fact that Binswanger’s writings on relat- edness and intersubjectivity have never been translated. As counts, is the recognition that the therapist a result, this crucial facet of Binswanger’s oeuvre is essen- needs to acknowledge the limitations of her tially unavailable to English-speaking readers and interpret- horizon of understanding. In other words, the ers of his work (see Frie, 1997). A HERMENEUTICS OF EXPLORATION 89

derstanding, or its failure, is like an event that happens Binswanger’s critique of Heidegger fol- to us.” (Gadamer, 1991, p. 383) lows on an earlier arguments developed by For Gadamer, the notion of uncertainty is Heidegger’s one-time student, Karl Löwith always inherent to human experience. It is pre- ([1928] 1981), and has similarly been elabo- cisely this “not knowing,” the recognition that rated by more recent German philosophers the world is greater than we are, that experience (Theunissen, 1977 and Habermas, 1985). Ac- consists of more than we can ever put into cording to Binswanger, Heidegger’s elaboration words or actions, which is crucial to an appre- of being-with is an important aspect of the re- ciation of the therapeutic process. Even if we lational turn. The issue, according to think we already know, our engagement with Binswanger, is not that Heidegger overlooks the other opens up new possibilities, new ave- human sociality, but that his account remains nues of thinking, seeing, and feeling, that may underdeveloped, a view shared by many observ- not have been available to us before. ers (cf. Bernstein, 1991 and Tugendhat, 1986). For Binswanger as for Lo¨with, the difficulty lies Sociality and the Possibility for in the fact that Dasein achieves its authenticity Human Relatedness in essential isolation from others. Although a full analysis of Binswanger’s critique is beyond Psychotherapy, on this view, is a form of the scope of this discussion (see Frie, 1997; hermeneutic dialogue, through which under- Theunissen, 1977), Binswanger essentially standing can evolve, and a space for new pos- maintains that Heidegger does not account for sibilities of being-in-the-world can emerge. The the possibility of direct engagement with the openness to new or different possibilities of other in the attainment of authenticity. As being follows from alterations in one’s world- Binswanger ([1942] 1993) states, “Heidegger design that emerge through dialogic interaction. sees only the inauthentic They-self besides the It is through dialogue with the other, precisely authentic self, and omits the authentic positive the notion of conversation, that it becomes pos- possibility of Being-with-one-another (Mitein- sible to experience and consider different mean- anderseins): that is, the being in one another of ings, thus creating a space of emergent possi- first and second person, of I and Thou, the bility. The process of therapy is thus inherently We-self” (p. 217). social and rests on a view of human experience By contrast, Binswanger understands Da- that sees the person as a social being. Indeed, it sein’s authentic existence as fully relational. is important to emphasize that the notions of Binswanger ([1942] 1993) suggests that authen- world-designs, horizons, the fusion of horizons ticity does not follow from Dasein’s ownmost and conversation are all grounded in a funda- potentiality for being itself, but is attained in mentally social ontology. relation with the other: “we do not agree that the Binswanger initially turned to Heidegger in ‘authentic truth of Dasein’ can be achieved only search of developing his conception of human in this manner of resolute ‘authentic self,’ be- sociality. However, just as he dismisses Freud’s cause this truth lacks love—the original being- metapsychological thinking, Binswanger finds with-one-another” (p. 218). Following Heideg- Heidegger’s conception of the interpersonal di- ger, Binswanger acknowledges that in certain mension to be lacking. In his chief theoretical situations authenticity may follow from a con- work, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschli- frontation with the possibility of one’s own chen Daseins Binswanger ([1942] 1993) argues death (what Heidegger refers to as being- that Heidegger’s treatment of the social dimen- sion in Being and Time does not sufficiently 8 account for the role of other human beings in Binswanger’s theory of intersubjectivity finds contem- 8 porary echoes in the emergence of intersubjectivty (or re- the development of authenticity. While it has lationality) as a key them in psychotherapy and psychoanal- not been translated into English, Binswanger’s ysis. Most importantly, his views on social interaction and book has gone through multiple German edi- his critique of Heidegger place him outside the historical tions since it’s original publication and is rec- and ethical debate about Heidegger’s involvement with Na- tional Socialism (see Frie & Hoffmann, 2002). Indeed, ognized as a key philosophical work in the Binswanger’s Grundformen ([1942] 1993) also speaks to European literature on intersubjectivity and oth- the versatility and breadth of his work as a thinker and a erness (Theunissen, 1977). clinician. 90 FRIE toward-death), but he sets out to demonstrate from the perspective of individual conscious- that authenticity is also achieved through reci- ness. Quoting Nietzsche’s remark that “con- procity and openness with the Other. sciousness is actually only a relational web be- Binswanger’s objective in the Grundformen tween one person and another,” Binswanger (1942) is thus to supplement Heidegger’s mine- ([1942] 1993) contends that “Only because hu- ness of Dasein and notion of concernful solici- man Being, as understanding-affectivity in be- tude with a fuller account of dialogic interaction ing in the world, in the ground of its Being, is and interpersonal love. dialogical being, namely begin-with, is speech As a psychotherapist, Binswanger believed and sociality, is something like self-conscious- that it is precisely the possibility of relating to ness, is relating through communication and the Other in terms of mutuality, openness and structuring of this relation in talk and reply, immediacy that is crucial to the therapeutic pro- possible at all” (p. 300). cess. Indeed, he sees relatedness not only cen- For Binswanger, then, the primacy of relation tral to well being, but as the vehicle of human points to the fact that authenticity must also be development and therapeutic change. constituted in relationship to the other. Binswanger’s emphasis on relatedness sharply Binswanger ([1942] 1993) maintains that ac- distinguishes him from both Freudian psycho- knowledgment of the other person, not as a analysis and orthodox psychiatry. His view- means to an end, but in his or her totality, as a point is also relevant to the contemporary Thou, is the condition of possibility for authen- critique of manualized, evidence-based forms tic existence. As Theunissen (1984) suggests: of practice that emphasize symptom-reduc- “according to Heidegger, the self can only come tion and technical knowledge, sometimes at to itself in a voluntary separation of itself from the cost of recognizing the centrality of the the other self” (p. 284). By contrast, for the therapeutic, healing relationship. dialogical tradition to which Binswanger be- Binswanger’s (1942) arguments against Hei- longs, “the self has its being solely in the rela- degger provide the stimulus for his develop- tion. . . . Personal subjectivity does not possess ment of a philosophy of intersubjectivity that its substantial fullness beyond the relationship draws on the work of dialogical philosophers to the Other in the same sense as the subject its from Feuerbach to Buber. The impact of Bu- being present-at-hand. Rather, its fullness is en- ber’s philosophy on Binswanger’s theory is par- tirely encompassed by the relation” (Theunis- ticularly apparent, and in the preface to Basic sen, 1984, p. 284). Forms and Knowledge of Human Existence, From this perspective, then, Binswanger sug- Binswanger acknowledges his indebtedness to gests that the psychiatrist or psychotherapist is Buber, in addition to Loewith and other dialog- not simply treating the patient, but sharing in ically oriented thinkers. the existence of the patient. Only thus is it The problem of relation, or dialogical life, is possible for the psychotherapist to understand central to Buber’s entire philosophy. Buber ar- and appreciate the patient’s world-designs, and gues that the human being can never be fully to enter into dialogue with the Other that can understood apart from relation. As Buber open up a space for new possibilities of being. (1965) states, each component of a relation Psychotherapy, on this view, is a process of “considered by itself is a mighty abstraction. expanding possibilities of relating to others and The individual is a fact of existence insofar as the world. he steps into a living relation with another in- dividual. . . . The fundamental fact of human Conclusion existence is human being with human being” (p. 203). Following Buber (1970), Binswanger sug- I have suggested that Binswanger’s phenom- gests that it is the possibility for relating that enological-anthropology forms an important, if characterizes well being. relatively unknown chapter of the interpretive Like Buber, Binswanger emphasizes the dia- turn in psychology. Binswanger was one of the logical nature of human experience, arguing first to recognize and work out the contributions that the person develops and exists through in- of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophies for teraction with others. Human experience, ac- psychology. Using a novel approach that com- cording to Binswanger, cannot be understood bined elements from phenomenology, herme- A HERMENEUTICS OF EXPLORATION 91 neutics and dialogical philosophy, Binswanger viewed the person not as an ob- 9 It is worth noting the radically different tone of Hei- ject, but as immersed in a world of human degger’s, 1947a, 1947b letter and his later recriminations of Binswanger in the Zollikon Seminars. In my view, this relating. Once Binswanger encountered Hei- difference can be explained by the fact that during the degger’s ontology, it formed the basis for his intervening decade between his letter and the start of the notion of world-designs and provided him seminars in Zollikon (which were given at Boss’s behest), with a conceptual system for integrating his Heidegger sought to distance himself from anthropological renderings (like Binswanger’s) of his early philosophy in phenomenological anthropology into a more Being and Time. Indeed, following the Kehre (or turn) in systematic whole. Yet Binswanger was never Heidegger’s work, Heidegger makes relatively little use of aHeideggerian;nordidheidentifyhiswork the concepts and terms he espoused in Being and Time. as existentialist. Instead, he maintained a crit- From 1947 onwards, Heidegger worked closely with Binswanger’s one-time colleague and student, Medard ical stance vis a vis Heidegger and adopted a Boss, in developing an understanding of psychotherapy that dialogical perspective on human experience was based largely on his later philosophy (see Frie 1999b). that parallels aspects of Gadamer’s herme- The historical distinction between Binswanger and Boss can neutics in important respects. still be found in contemporary German-speaking Dasein- sanalysis, among therapists who align themselves more In 1947, Heidegger wrote a gracious letter to closely with either Binswanger or Boss, but not usually Binswanger in which he lauded Binswanger’s both. There is also the significant issue of Heidegger’s recently published Grundformen for its insights complicity with National Socialism. Whereas Binswanger’s into human experience: ideas and his personal background place him largely outside the Heidegger controversy (see Frie & Hoffmann, 2002 for Your main work is so broadly conceived, and so rich an extended discussion of this issue), the same cannot be in phenomena, that one should think that anyone said of Boss. Nor, to my mind, has the issue of Heidegger who can see must recognize where you locate the and National Socialism been sufficiently addressed in rela- entirety of psychopathology. However, because it tion to Boss and Daseinsanalysis. deals with something simple, most readers will have overlooked the fact before they begin to read. . . . Science, which is addicted to facts only, sees neither References the issue (of the inconspicuous region of immediate and authentic human encounter), nor the feat that Bernstein, R. (1991). The new constellation. Cam- you have accomplished in taking the step from the bridge: Polity. subject-object relation to being-in-the-world. . . . I Binswanger, L. (1913). Bermerkungen zu der Arbeit thank you for the existence of your great work and Jaspers’: Kausale und “verstaendliche” Zusam- that you have given it to me. (Heidegger, [1947a] menhaenge zwischen Schicksal und Psychose bei 9 1993, p. 339) der Dementia Praecox. Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Psychoanalyse, I, 383–90. Only a few months later, Heidegger wrote Binswanger, L. (1922). Einfuehrung in die allge- to Binswanger again to encourage him to meine Probleme der Psychologie. Berlin: Julius “write a hermeneutics of exploration,” based Springer-Verlag. on his clinical experience, which would en- Binswanger, L. (1923). Ueber Phaenomenologie. In able psychiatrists and psychologists to move Ausgwa¨hlte Vortra¨ge und Aufsa¨tze, bd. I: Zur pha¨- beyond subjectivism (Heidegger, [1947b] nomenologischen Anthropologie. Bern: Francke, 1993, p. 339). In fact, as I have sought to 1947. Binswanger, L. (1930). Traum und Existenz. In Lud- demonstrate in this essay, by the time Hei- wig Binswanger Ausgewa¨hlte Werke Band 3: Vor- degger wrote his letter, Binswanger had al- tra¨ge und Aufsa¨tze. Heidelberg: Asanger Verlag, ready worked out a substantive hermeneutics 1994a. of exploration over the course of his career. Binswanger, L. (1933). Ueber Ideenflucht. In Ludwig And indeed, when Binswanger later shared Binswanger Ausgewa¨hlte Werke Band 1: Formen Heidegger’s letter with Wilhelm Szilasi, Hei- mi␤glu¨ckten Daseins. Heidelberg: Asanger, 1992. degger’s successor to the chair of philosophy Binswanger, L. (1935). Ueber Psychotherapie. In at the University of Freiburg, Szilasi replied: Ausgwa¨hlte Vortra¨ge und Aufsa¨tze, bd. I: Zur pha¨- nomenologischen Anthropologie. Bern: Francke, “This hermeneutic of exploration is that 1947. which you have already masterfully worked Binswanger, L. (1936a). Freuds Auffasung des Men- out theoretically. It can be read in your col- schen im Lichte der Anthropologie. In Ausgwa¨hlte lected essays” (quoted in Herzog, 1994, p. Vortra¨ge und Aufsa¨tze, bd. I: Zur pha¨nomenolo- 175). gischen Anthropologie. Bern: Francke, 1947. 92 FRIE

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