Four

A Creative Misunderstanding: Ludwig Binswanger

No discourse on the exchange of ideas between Freudian psychoanalysis and philosophical phenomenology would be complete without mentioning the works of psychiatrist, Dr. Ludwig Binswanger. As a one-time mentor to Medard Boss, an acquaintance of Martin Heidegger, and a close friend to Sigmund Freud, Binswanger was thoroughly immersed within the historical context of the time. His continued loyalty to Freud as well as his interest in Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology make him an especially pivotal figure in the early intersection between these two domains. Unlike many of the intellectuals who fervently opposed Freudian psychoanalysis, Binswanger never entirely rejected the importance of Freud’s work. He considered Freud’s metapsychology to be a success within the limits of scientific theory, and praised its contributions for offering a thorough and complete description of homo natura. However, Binswanger also contended that Freud’s depiction of humans as “primal” was not “the source and fount of human history,” but rather “a requirement of natural-scientific research.”1 Here, Heidegger’s philosophy was ideal in demonstrating the limitations of science when practically applied to the realm of human inquiry. His phenomenological approach also offered a means for expanding beyond science in order to understand the whole person in an effort to create a more holistic therapeutic approach. Early on, (c. 1922–7) Binswanger believed that it was Husserlian phenomenology that could provide the proper method for therapy. With the publication of Being and Time in 1927, Binswanger, without entirely abandoning Husserl, modified this somewhat when he suggested that it was Heidegger’s ontology from which “existential analysis received its decisive stimulation, its philosophical foundation and justification, as well as its methodological directives.”2 Binswanger was particularly struck by Heidegger’s critique of science as well as his elaboration of the universal and fundamental structures of human Dasein.

1 Binswanger, Being-in-the-World, 154. 2 Ludwig Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis School of Thought,” trans. Ernest Angel, in Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, ed. by Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri Ellenberger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), 191; see also, Binswanger, Being-in-the-World, 206; Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, 304. 120 OF PHILOSOPHERS AND MADMEN

Heidegger’s analysis, when applied to the field of psychiatry, revealed a great deal about the particular nature of psychiatry in its attempts to become a science. For it is the business of science to separate out what it intends to study, to remove it of any subjective elements, and to demarcate the territory for scientific research. By adopting this approach, psychiatry runs up against a peculiar problem. Since its “object” of study is that which conducts the research, that is, human beings, it must strip away all that is human in order to approach humans scientifically. Yet, its purpose is not just to “fix” the human organism, but also to heal the human being. The questions arise: is psychiatry to work exclusively within a biological framework, conceiving humans as organisms? Or is psychiatry to deal with humans on a level of human relations? After all, every participant involved is human! Hence, psychiatry appears to engage two “incompatible conceptual horizons”3 whereby a peculiar dualism, a “mind-body” problem arises. Binswanger believed that the theoretical problem of the mind-body dualism inherent in science introduced a “fatal defect”4 into all of psychology. Heidegger’s “Being-in-the-world,” however, provided the saving connection among “subjects” and “world” which would allow for communication and understanding in a shared experience. Heidegger’s underlying universal structure of Being-in-the-world as well as his analysis of the threefold Care structure5 provided a thorough description of the richness of human existence in “normally” functioning humans. Binswanger was confident that if psychiatry were to begin with Being-in-the-world, it could better understand human interactions that deviated from this “norm.”6 It could shift its focus to consider possible constrictions in the patients’ world designs, opening up new channels for relating to “mentally ill” patients who were previously considered unreachable.7 Such an alternative attitude would also allow psychiatry to

3 Binswanger, Being-in-the-World, 209. 4 Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis School of Thought,” 193. 5 Binswanger described his patients’ concrete mode of existence in terms of Heidegger’s threefold Care–structure. [See, Binswanger, Being-in-the-World, 25-31, 61, 88-91, 101, 116, 211, 250-1; Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis School of Thought,” 201, 269, 191, 212, 328; Ludwig Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (“Basic Forms and Cognition of Human Dasein”), (Zurich: Niehans, 1964), 136ff.] Throughout his writings, he analyzed patients in terms of their idiosyncratic modes of being–in–the–world, their modes of existence in terms of their UmWelt (biological world), MitWelt (communal world), and EigenWelt (self–world) (see, Ludwig Binswanger, “The Case of Ellen West,” trans. Werner Mendel and Joseph Lyons, in Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, ed. by Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri Ellenberger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), 328-29. As such, Heidegger’s existentialia were always understood in terms of a concrete process of lived experience. 6 Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis School of Thought,” 201. 7 Ibid., 192, 200-01.