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฀฀฀ ฀ International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters November 2005, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 27-54 The Phases of Disaster as a Relationship Between Structure and Meaning: A Narrative Analysis of the 1947 Texas City Explosion Brian K. Richardson The University of North Texas The Department of Communication Studies P.O. Box 305268 Denton, TX 76203-5268 [email protected] Developing disaster phase models has been useful, particularly for understanding response efforts to emergencies and disasters. However, such models are limited in their ability to explain the phases encountered by a social collective, or community, as it progresses through response and recovery efforts. This study examined phases of disaster response and recovery as a sociological problem. A grounded-theory analysis was used to examine 60 personal narratives of the 1947 Texas City explosion, which is an example of a cosmology episode (Weick 1985). Survivors of the explosion provided narrative accounts describing their memories of the incident. Results support the idea that social collectives depend upon a transactional relationship between structure and meaning to make sense of events. The study develops a phase model depicting four phases experienced by the Texas City community prior to, during, and after the disaster. This study reveals contributions gained through analysis of personal narratives to illuminate the relationship between disaster and human activity. Both scholars and practitioners have routinely described disasters as occurring in phases (Neal 1997). Indeed, phase models have been developed in order to assign order and rationality to the very messy, complex reality of natural and technological disasters, and human responses to them. The most popular of these phase models stems from reports of the National Governor’s Association (1979) and Drabek (1986), which suggested that disasters can be delineated into four phases, specifically preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. While intended to aid in the organization of disaster research, this phase model, and others like it, have generated just as ฀ ฀฀฀฀฀฀ much frustration for researchers (Neal 1997). In his review of the disaster phase literature, Neal recognized other scholars’ critiques that phases are arbitrary and have limited utility (Haas, Kates, and Bowden 1977), that different groups go through phases at different times (Phillips 1991), and that activities thought to be isolated to one phase often occur in other phases (Neal 1984). Neal (1997) argued that “continued current use of the phases of disaster may continue to stifle how researchers define and study disasters, and how practitioners manage disasters ” (p. 253; emphasis in original). For these reasons, Neal called for researchers to employ fresh perspectives in their development of phase models of disaster. This case analysis of the Texas City disaster of 1947 seeks to develop a phase model built upon the relationship between structure and meaning. Structure, in this case, does not refer to physical facilities. Rather, it characterizes the communicative ways in which social collectives organize themselves. Examples of this type of structure include assigning roles, assembling, making rules, and sharing norms and values. The term “meaning” refers to the individual and social collective process of making sense of some phenomenon. While this is an individual behavior, it is influenced through our interactions with others. This model will propose that, for some types of disasters, a social collective will move from one phase to the next based upon their capacity to rebuild structure and assign meaning. Significantly, this model will not address functional activity of disaster phases, but rather the human behavior within disaster response and recovery phases. Thus, the study addresses and makes a contribution to literature examining the sociological problem of a community’s reconstruction during disaster. The paper begins with a description of the Texas City disaster followed by a description of cosmology episodes. Next, the study’s method and data analysis procedures are discussed. Results of the analysis are then presented. The paper concludes with implications of the study. The Texas City Disaster of 1947 On April 16, 1947, a cargo ship carrying a large amount of ammonium nitrate in its hold exploded in the port of Texas City, Texas. About 15 hours later, while response and recovery efforts for ฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀ the first explosion were underway, another ship carrying ammonium nitrate also exploded. Estimates by the Red Cross and the Texas Department of Public Safety counted 468 fatalities, 100 persons missing and never found, and approximately 3,500 injured. Property and product loss, including 1.5 million barrels of petroleum products, totaled almost $5.5 billion in 2003 dollars. Finally, two thousand townspeople were left without homes at least temporarily, after one- third of the town’s 1,519 houses were condemned. After contending that “the disaster and surrounding circumstances have never been investigated in their totality,” (p. xii), Stephens (1997) described the events leading up to and subsequent to the Texas City explosion. He suggested that four precursor conditions fostered the opportunity for such an explosion. First, the physical location and circumstances of the city provided a likely environment for disaster. Four major oil refineries, two aviation gas units, two chemical companies, and a deep-channel port trafficked by ships carrying crude oil and other petroleum products each carried a substantial hazard risk. Second, the proximity of these elements heightened the chances for disaster. He suggested that an accident at any one of the above sites could have resulted in a “chain reaction among facilities” (p. 10). Third, the social climate of Texas City was not oriented toward crisis preparation or management. Refineries and port jobs paid well and few community members wanted to upset the local economy by suggesting disaster could occur (see also Minutaglio 2003). Fourth, successful use of chemicals in World War II had created an ingrained trust in this scientific commodity. Such conditions contributed to insufficient safety and emergency preparation for both plants and the city. In the event of major crisis, a fragmented, uncoordinated response was likely. These conditions created a “powder keg” for the Texas City community that lacked only an ignition source. That ignition source arrived in the form of two ships, the Grandcamp 1 and the High Flyer . The Grandcamp was docked at Pier “O” in the port’s north slip (Wheaton 1948); its cargo included 16 cases of small arms ammunition, 59,000 bales of sisal binder twine in large balls, 9,334 bags of shelled peanuts, various oil and farm equipment, and an estimated 2,300 tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The High ฀ ฀฀฀฀฀฀ Flyer , docked in Pier “A,” held 9,000 tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, a large amount of sulfur, and railroad cars. As the Grandcamp was loaded with additional cargo, a dockworker smelled smoke that was eventually seen ascending between the cargo boards and the ship’s hull (Stephens 1997). The captain of the Grandcamp ordered crewmembers to batten the ship’s hatches to in order to suffocate the fire. However, at about 8:30 a.m., the pressure in the Grandcamp’s hold was so intense that it blew the hatch covers into the air and smoke poured from the ship. While curious onlookers began gathering to gaze at the colorful smoke, fire crews from the Volunteer Fire Department and the Republic Oil Refining Company set up their hoses and began applying water to the ship’s deck. The heat was so intense that the water was vaporized upon contact with the deck. At approximately 8:47 a.m., additional fire fighting equipment arrived. At 9:12 a.m., the heat on the Grandcamp reached “boiling point” and the ship violently exploded (Wheaton 1948). The explosion was heard from as far as 150 miles. Stephens (1997) described the explosion as follows: “A huge mushroom cloud billowed more than 2,000 feet into the morning air, the shock wave knocking two light planes flying overhead out of the sky. A thick curtain of steel shards scythed through workers along the docks and a crowd of curious onlookers who had gathered at the head of the slip at which the ship was moored.” (p. 3). Few people on the wharf at the time of explosion, including 27 Texas City Fire Department members, were ever found. Many of those closest to the explosion disintegrated. Large fragments of the ship, some weighing several tons, rained down upon the port and sections of Texas City. Numerous periphery fires started as pipelines and storage tanks at nearby refineries were torn open by shrapnel. People within 20 miles of the explosion instantly knew something terrible had happened. Ten miles away, in neighboring Galveston, the force of the blast knocked residents from their feet as they walked through town. Stephens stated that “many agonizing ฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀ hours were to pass before a semblance of order began to replace the shock and confusion” (p. 4). To meet the overwhelming need for medical attention, the city auditorium was used as a first-aid center. In less than an hour after the explosion, doctors and nurses arrived unsolicited from Galveston and a nearby military base. Law enforcement officials from nearby towns came to assist with search and rescue efforts and to help maintain order. At about 1:10 a.m., almost 15 hours after the first blast, the High Flyer exploded with a force estimated by many to be stronger than that of the original explosion. Witnesses described the explosion as like a “firework display” (Stephens 1997, p. 5) with incandescent chunks of steel reaching high into the air and falling miles from the explosion site. After-shocks of the explosion included fires on nearby crude oil tanks and other industrial structures. As dawn arrived, thick, black columns of smoke were seen by individuals 30 miles from the explosion site.

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