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Case 4:14-cv-01087 Document 1 Filed in TXSD on 04/18/14 Page 1 of 208 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ MDL 2185 RETIREMENT SYSTEM, TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TEXAS, ING Case No. 4:10-MD-2185 (L) SICAV, for and on behalf of ING (L) INVEST ENERGY, ING (L) INVEST EUROPE HIGH DIVIDEND, ING (L) INVEST EUROPE OPPORTUNITIES, and COMPLAINT ING (L) INVEST GLOBAL HIGH DIVIDEND, ING FUND MANAGEMENT DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL B.V. and ING BEWAAR MAATSCHAPPIJ I B.V., for and on behalf of ING ENERGY BASIS FONDS, ING EUROPA BASIS FONDS, ING DIVIDEND AANDELEN BASIS FONDS, ING GLOBAL EQUITY BASIS FONDS, ING INSTITUTIONEEL DIVIDEND AANDELEN BASIS FONDS, STICHTING PENSIOENFONDS ABP, STICHTING DEPOSITARY APG DEVELOPED MARKETS EQUITY POOL, STICHTING TOT BEWARING CORDARES SUBFONDS AANDELEN EUROPA ACTIEF BEHEER, STICHTING BEWAARNEMING APG-IS 1, and NORGES BANK, Plaintiffs, v. BP p.l.c., BP AMERICA, INC., BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ANTHONY B. HAYWARD, ANDREW G. INGLIS, ROBERT MALONE, DAVID RAINEY and DOUGLAS J. SUTTLES, Defendants. Case 4:14-cv-01087 Document 1 Filed in TXSD on 04/18/14 Page 2 of 208 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................... 7 III. THE PARTIES.................................................................................................................... 9 A. Plaintiffs .................................................................................................................. 9 B. Defendants ............................................................................................................ 11 C. Relevant Non-Parties ............................................................................................ 17 IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................... 19 A. Overview Of BP’s Operations .............................................................................. 19 B. BP Seeks To Increase Earnings By Cutting Budgets At The Expense Of Safety ............................................................................................................... 20 C. BP Suffers A Decade Of Catastrophic Safety Failures In Its Deepwater Drilling Operations ............................................................................. 23 V. DEFENDANTS’ SCIENTER ........................................................................................... 45 A. Defendants’ Scienter Concerning Process Safety Deficiencies In BP’s Deepwater Drilling Operations .................................................................... 45 1. Faulty Cementing Jobs And Other Stability Issues Were Known As The Most Frequent Causes Of Well Control Problems ................................................................................................... 47 2. Defendants Knew Or Recklessly Disregarded That BOPs Were Known To Fail ................................................................................ 48 3. BP Received More Than A Hundred Safety Warnings For Safety Protocol Lapses In North Sea Deepwater Drilling Operations ................................................................................................. 52 4. BP’s Internal Reporting Structures Required The Chief Executive And Board To Review Process Safety And Risk ..................... 54 5. Defendants Consciously Limited The Scope Of Safety & Operations To Not Apply To The Majority Of BP’s Deepwater Drilling Fleet ........................................................................... 55 B. Defendants’ Scienter Is Further Established By Their Disregard Of Safety And Operational Concerns ........................................................................ 57 -i- Case 4:14-cv-01087 Document 1 Filed in TXSD on 04/18/14 Page 3 of 208 1. Defendants Knew Of, Or Recklessly Disregarded, Significant Process Safety Deficiencies With Third-Party Rigs, Including Rigs Leased From Transocean ........................................ 57 2. Concerns About The Integrity Of Safety Processes In Alaska ................................................................................................................... 58 3. Afraid-A-Spill E-mail Raises Complaints About Alyeska’s Operations ................................................................................................. 60 4. Aftermath Of BP’s 2007 Criminal Plea .................................................... 61 C. Defendants’ Scienter Is Further Established By BP’s Retaliation Against Whistleblowers ........................................................................................ 63 D. Defendants’ Scienter Concerning Post-Spill Misrepresentations ......................... 69 1. Defendants’ Public Estimates Of Oil Spilling Into The Gulf Were Contradicted By Contemporaneous Internal BP Documents And Information .................................................................... 69 2. Defendants Misrepresented The Size Of The Leak To Try To Minimize The Amount BP Would Owe In Fines ................................ 72 3. BP Agreed To Pay The Third-Largest Civil Fine In SEC History....................................................................................................... 73 4. BP Pled Guilty To Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes, And Obstruction Of Congress, And Agreed To Pay The Largest Criminal Fine In U.S. History............................................... 74 5. The EPA Barred BP From New Contracts With The U.S. Government............................................................................................... 78 VI. MATERIALIZATION OF THE UNDISCLOSED RISKS .............................................. 80 A. BP’s Pervasive And Systematic Failures Caused The Deepwater Horizon To Explode And Sink ............................................................................. 80 B. BP Was Wholly Unprepared To Contain The Resulting Oil Spill ..................... 102 VII. DEFENDANTS’ FALSE STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS ..................................... 114 A. February 7, 2007 ................................................................................................. 116 B. November 8, 2007 ............................................................................................... 118 C. February 22, 2008 ............................................................................................... 118 D. February 27, 2008 ............................................................................................... 119 E. March 4, 2008 ..................................................................................................... 120 F. April 17, 2008 ..................................................................................................... 121 -ii- Case 4:14-cv-01087 Document 1 Filed in TXSD on 04/18/14 Page 4 of 208 G. December 17, 2008 ............................................................................................. 122 H. February 24, 2009 ............................................................................................... 124 I. March 4, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 125 J. March 10, 2009 ................................................................................................... 128 K. April 16, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 133 L. June 30, 2009 ...................................................................................................... 134 M. February 26, 2010 ............................................................................................... 135 N. March 5, 2010 ..................................................................................................... 137 O. March 18, 2010 ................................................................................................... 139 P. March 22, 2010 ................................................................................................... 140 Q. March 23, 2010 ................................................................................................... 143 R. April 15, 2010 ..................................................................................................... 143 S. April 24, 2010 ..................................................................................................... 146 T. April 28-29, 2010 ................................................................................................ 149 U. April 29-30, 2010 (SEC Filings) And April 30, 2010 (Company Website) .............................................................................................................. 150 V. May 4, 2010 ........................................................................................................ 154 W. May 5, 2010 ........................................................................................................ 154 X. May 14, 2010 ...................................................................................................... 155 Y. May 17, 2010 ...................................................................................................... 157 Z. May 19, 2010 ...................................................................................................... 157
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