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The Role of Leadership and Development of Management Systems to Ensure Safety Performance in Energy Sectors

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The Role of Leadership and Development of Management Systems to Ensure Safety Performance in Energy Sectors THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE SAFETY PERFORMANCE A Thesis by SEYEDSHAYAN NIKNEZHAD Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Chair of Committee, M. Sam Mannan Committee Members, Efstratios N. Pistikopoulos Mahmoud El-Halwagi Michael Wesson Intercollegiate Faculty Chair, Efstratios N. Pistikopoulos August 2017 Major Subject: Energy Copyright 2017 Seyedshayan Niknezhad ABSTRACT Safety is one of the crucial issues that industry has aimed at improving for many decades and continues to progress. Discoveries show that organizations optimize their effort when they provide effective management systems to support front line employees, supervisors, and senior level managers. In this research, the role of leaders regarding safety in the energy industry is studied, and moreover, how to develop safety management systems to ensure an effective safety performance is surveyed. Leadership has the greatest impact on safety improvement. Leaders by different techniques can increase their influence on employees; set the mission and vision for staff; implement rules; provide resources; improve the teamwork; make effective communication from top to bottom, bottom to top and along the organization, educate staff, develop a safety management system, and create safety culture in the organization. By organizational safety culture, I mean the shared common values that drive organizational performance, more commonly defined as “the way we do around here.” While there are regulations regarding safety, every organization requires self-standard beyond the codified rules to have effective safety programs. Regulations should follow new research to develop new management systems to ensure the highest standards for safety. Developing safety systems to have a sustainable safety performance is an obligation. Hence, for the energy system, some components have to be considered in safety matters: type of resources, support characters, and their relation to safety issues. In addition, other components include the time frame for productions (exploration), the output shape and associated hazards, area that these resources are located at, and distribution systems and hazards. A safety management system helps leaders and managers control and evaluate safety by using safety metrics such as leading and lagging indicators. Management systems such as process safety management, risk management plan, and Seveso Directive are some management programs that organizations are still arguing for complete and correct implementation to become a zero- incident-organization. ii DEDICATION I would like to dedicate this research to all of the people who have lost their lives at work and their family left behind. These are people who lost their lives due to that lack of strong leadership and strong safety management systems. I wish to express here my sincere appreciation and thanks to my parents who were my first teachers and all teachers that have had, directly and indirectly, helped me throughout my life. iii CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES I humbly acknowledge the help, support, and input from many Professors and experts that contributed to the content of this research. Regents Professor Mannan is such a mentor who gave me unconditional support, Professor El-Halwagi and Professor Wesson who donated their time without hesitating, and Professor Pistikopoulos who motivated me from the beginning. My sincere thanks to those who performed much of the early research work to establish new knowledge in the field of job safety. There are no outside funding contributions to acknowledge related to the research and compilation of this document, but I would like to thank Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center and Texas A&M University, which aim unstoppable at improving organizational safety. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... ii DEDICATION .............................................................................................................................. iii CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES ......................................................................... iv LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... viii LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix NOMENCLATURE ...................................................................... ..................................................x 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 2. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................... 4 2.1 Process safety management………………………………………………………………....4 2.2 Safety culture ……………………………………………………………………………...6 2.3 Seveso directive ..………………………………...………………………………………...7 3. IMPACT OF MAJOR INCIDENTS ....................................................................................... 9 4. LEADERSHIP ...................................................................................................................... 13 4.1 Role of leadership in assuring personnel competency for process safety………………….15 4.1.1 Set direction by power and influence ..……...……………………………………….16 4.1.2 Resources ..…………………………………...……………………………………... 18 4.1.3 Align staff -teamwork and support ...…………...……………………………………19 4.1.4 Accountability ...……………………………………...……………………………...20 4.1.5 Communication ……………………………………...……………………………….20 4.1.6 Push and pull ………………………………………...……………………………….20 4.1.7 Educate employees …………………………………………….…………………….21 4.1.8 Understanding risk and communicating meaning of risk to others ……….…………21 4.1.9 Flexibility …………………………………………………………………...………..22 4.1.10 Control and evaluate effectiveness ……………………………………..…………..22 a 5. PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ............................................................... 25 5.1 Employee participation…………………………………………………………………….27 5.2 Process safety information…………………………………………………………………27 v 5.3 Process hazard analysis (Process Safety Analysis) ..…………………………………… 28 5.4 Operating procedures ...………………………………………………………………... 31 5.5 Training ..………………………………………………………………………………… 31 5.6 Contractors ..……………………………………………………………………………...31 5.7 Pre-start-up safety review ……...……………………………………………………….31 5.8 Mechanical integrity (MI) ...……………………………………………………………32 5.9 Hot work permit…………………………………………………………………………..32 5.10 Management of change………………………………………………………………….33 5.11 Incident investigation ..…………………………………………………………………. 33 a5.12 Emergency planning and response ...…………………………………….……………....33 5.13 Compliance audits …………………………………………………………………….34 5.14 Trade secrets …………………………………………………………………………….34 a 6. PROCESS SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH ............................................... 35 6.1 EPA Risk management program…………………………………………………………..38 6.1.1 Management system………………………………………………………………..44 6.2 SEVESO directive .……………………………………………………………………...45 a 6.2.1 Major accident prevention policy…………………………………………………….. 45 6.2.2 Safety management System…………………………………………………………...46 6.2.3 ARAMIS project 50 7. SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY METRICS ..................................................... 62 7.1 Lagging metrics…………………………………………………………………………… 63 7.2 Leading metrics…………………………………………………………………………… 64 7.3 Lagging versus leading…………………………………………………………………….65 7.4 Metrics systems……………………………………………………………………………67 7.4.1 Safety pyramid………………………………………………………………………...68 7.4.2 Swiss cheese model …………………………………………………………………...70 7.5 The role of leadership in implementing safety indicators………………………………….75 8. SAFETY CULTURE ............................................................................................................ 76 8.1 How to enhance safety culture……………………………………………………………..77 8.1.1 Leadership ...………………………………………………………………………….78 8.1.2 Safety as a core value ……………………………………………………………….79 8.1.3 Policy and rules ……………………………………………………………………..79 a vi 8.1.4 Commitment ...……………………………………………………………………..80 8.1.5 Safety reporting ...…………………………………………………………………..80 8.1.6 Staff involvement ..…………………………………………………………………...81 8.1.7 Learning culture ...………………………………………………………………….82 8.1.8 Positive staff recognition …..………………………………………………………83 8.1.9 Trust environment ………..…………………………………………………………..84 8.1.10 Effective communication ..…………………………………………………………85 8.1.11 Safety management system ..………………………………………………………. 85 8.1.12 Modern technologies and software ...……………………………………………..89 8.1.13 Verification and auditing…………………………………………………………….89 8.2 Safety climate……………………………………………………………………………...90 8.3 Barriers to safety culture…………………………………………………………………...91 9. ROLE OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT .................................................... 92 9.1 First-line supervision …………………..…………………………………………………92 9.2 Senior managers ……......………………………………………………………………...93 a 10. WHAT IF AN INCIDENT HAPPENED IN THE FACILITY? ........................................... 95 11. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER STUDY ........................................................................ 97 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................
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