Final Environmental Impact Stabement
for the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada
Volume 1
Appendix I
U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Las Vegas, Nevada NEVADA TESTSITE Flh'AL ENV1ROh'ME.NTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS ...... iv
SUMMARY ...... S- l
1 .O INTRODUCTION ...... 1. I Purpose and Scope ...... 1.2 Background Information ...... 1.3 Summary of Results ...... 1-6 1.3.1 Defense Pro ...... 1-6 1.3.2 Waste Man ...... 1-6 1.4 Conclusions ...... 1-1
2.0 PUBLIC ISSUES ...... 2-1 2. I Public Involvement ...... 2-1 2.2 Stakeholder Issues ...... 2-7 2.2. I Transportation Management Operations ...... 2-7 2.2.2 Local Segments of Concern ...... 2-8 2.2.3 Routing ...... 2-11 2.2.4 Rail Option , , ...... 2-11 2.2.5 Health Risks ...... 2.2.6 Transportation Protocol Working Gr 2.3 American Indian Issues ...... 2-16 2.4 Conclusions ...... 2-16
3.0 TRANSPORTATION RISK ...... 3-1 3.1 General Information ...... 3-1 3.2 Defense Programs Transportation ...... 3.2.1 Defense Programs Transp y and Data ...... 3.2.2 Defense Programs Transportation Risk System Description ...... 3-4 3.2.3 Defense Programs Transportation Risk Results ...... 3.2.4 Defense Programs Transportation Risk Conclusions ...... 3.3 Waste Management Activities Transportation Risk ...... 3.3.1 Methodology ...... 3-5 3.3.2 System Description ...... 3-8 3.3.3 Data Values ...... 3-22 3.3.4 Waste Management Transportation Risk Results and Conclusions ...... 3-26 3.3.5 Waste Management Transportation Risk Conclusions ...... 3-32 3.4 Hazardous Materials Shipments Transportation Risk ...... 3-32 3.5 Summary ...... 3-35
4.0 REFERENCES ...... 4-1
I Volume 1, Appendix I .TEVADA TESTSITE FIIVAL E.VC'lROSME,VrAL IMPACT SlATEMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Attachments
A . Applicable Federal. State. and Local Laws and Regulations ...... A- i B . Proccdures and Regulations Relating to Transportation of Hazardous Materials ...... B- i C . Public Participation in the Transportation Study ...... C- 1 D . Emergency Response Procedures and Training ...... D- i E . Nevada Test Site Rail Access Study ...... E- 1 F . National Generator Routes ...... F-l
List of Figures
Figure 1-1 NTS EIS Transportation Study Waste Generator Locations ...... 1-3 Figure 1-2 NTSMap ...... 1-4 Figure 3-1 National Interstate System ...... 3-13 Figure 3-2 NV-I, Eastern Route 7 ...... 3-15 Figure 3-3 NV-2, Eastern Route X ...... 3-16 Figure 3-4 NV-3, Northern Route 5 ...... 3-17 Figure 3-5 NV-4, Eastern Route 9 ...... 3-18 Figure 3-6 NV-8, Eastern Route 10 ...... 3-19 Figure 3-7 NV-6, Southern Route 6 ...... 3-20 Figure 3-8 NV-7, Southern Koute 8 ...... 3-21 Figure 3-9 NV-8, Southern Route 1 ...... 3-23 Figure 3-10 NV-9, Southern Route 2 ...... 3-24 Figure 3- I 1 NV- 10, Southern Route 5 ...... 3-28 Figure 3-12 Nevada In-State Traffic Fatality Risk ...... 3-28 Figure 3-13 Nevada In-State Traffic Injury Risk...... 3-28 Figure 3-14 Nevada In-State Incident-Free Radiation-Induced Cancer Fatality Risk ...... 3-29 Figure 3-15 Nevada In-State Radiation-Induced Cancer Fatality Risk Due to Accidents ..... 3-29 Figure 3- I6 Nevada In-State Incident-Free Radiation Induced Detriment Risk ...... 3-30 Figure 3- I7 Nevada In-State Radiation-Induced Detriment Risk Due to Accidents . .... 3-30 Figure 3- I8 Nevada In-State Chemical-Induced Cancer Risk ...... 3-31 Figure 3-19 Nevada In-State Chemical-Induced Noncancer Hazard Index ...... 3-31
List of Tables
Table 2- I Transportation meetings held on the NTS EIS Transportation Study ...... 2-2 Table 2-2 Results of Transportation Protocol Working Group Issue Ranking ...... 2-8 Table 3-1 Defense Programs Transportation Risk for Alternative 1 ...... 3-6 Table 3-2 Defense Programs Transportation Risk for Alternative 3 ...... 3-6 Table 3-3 Comparison of Defense Programs Transportation Risk Between Alternative I and Alternative 3 ...... 3-6 Table 3-4 Low-Level Waste and Mixed Waste Volumes and Shipments for Alternative ... 3-10 Table 3-5 Low-Level Waste Volumes and Shipments for Alternative 1 ...... 3-11 Table 3-6 Mixed Waste Volume and Shipments for Alternative 3 ...... 3-12
Volume 1. Appendix I II
~ ~~ .VEVAD.4 TEs1'SITE FI!VAL EA'VlRO.VME.VTAL Mf'ACT~YL4TEVEVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
List of Tables (cnntinued)
Table 3-7 Expected Number of Occurrences in 10 years (National Route) ...... 3-32 Table 3-8 Expected Number of Occurrences in 10 years (within Nevada) ...... 3-32 Table 3-9 On-site Transportation Risk for NTS-Generated Waste ...... 3-34
111 Volurnc I. Appendix I
~ ~~ ~ A l/SSl Armored TrdctoriSafe-Secure 'Trailer ac acres ADROIT Potential risk associated with Defense Programs Transportation Activities ANL-t Argonne National Laboratory - East BAPL Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory Bq Becquerel CGTO Consolidated Group of 'I'rihes and Organizations dBa a weighted decibel DoD IJ.S. Department of Defense VOE U.S. Department of I-hcrgy DOEINV 1J.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office EIS Environmental Impact Statement EM Einergxicy Materials EI'A U. S. Env i r~ntnentalProtect ion Agency FEMP ternald Environmental Management Project FORTRAN A computer programming language for problems that can he addressed in algebraic terms g gram Hr hertz HIGH WAY A computer program used for evaluating routes for transporting hazardous inaterials in the United States hoursikr hours per year INEI. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory KAPL Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory km kilometer LANI, Los Alnmos National Laboratory LCF Latent cancer fatality LLNL I.awrence I .ivermore National Laboratory LLW Low-Level Waste m2 square meters ni3 cubic meters ERPG Emergency response planning guidelines in meter mi mile Yd yard NAFR Complex Nellis Air Force Range
Volume 1, Appendix I I"
~ ~_____ ACRONYMS (continued) nCi llanocurie NTS Nevada Test Site PSC Public Service Commission ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory PEIS Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement PORTS Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant RFETS Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site SLAC Stanford Linear Accelerator Spaghetti Bowl US. 15/95 Interchange in Las Vegas SRS Savannah River Site RADTRAN A computer code combining user-determined meteorological, demographic, transportation, packaging, and material factors with health physics data to calculate the expected radiological consequences and accident risk of transporting radioactive materials voc Volatile Organic Compound
Y Volume I, Appendix I
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Volume I. Appcndix I \I
~~ This report has been prepared to address local people who reside along three of the primary transportation issues concerning current and routes previously evaluated for risk in the NTS potential operations at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), EIS. The DOE is committed to having the study to document the results of the NTS transportation reflect the full range of American Indian options. risk analysis, and to provide information and supporting documentation for the Environmental As part of its mission related to Defense Program, Impact Statement (EIS) for the NTS and Off-Site the DOE maintains and operates a special fleet of Locations in the State ofNevada. Four alternatives trucks and trailers used to transport Category I1 or are evaluated in the NTS EIS: Alternative I, higher nuclear material between Department of Continue Current Operations, (No Action); Defense (DoD) and DOE sites in a safe and secure Alternative 2, Discontinue Operations; Alternative manner. The DOEiAlbuquerque Operations 3, Expanded Use; and Alternative 4, Alternate Use Office, Transportation Safeguards Division is of Withdrawn Lands. The transportation risk responsible for the operation and maintenance of analysis estimated the health risk from highway these safe-secure trailers and support vehicles. transportation of DOE-generated low-level waste, Since the establishment of this program in 1974, mixed waste, and defense-related nuclear materials the DOEiTransportation Safeguards Division has for each of the four alternatives. accumulated more than 120 million kilometers (kin) (75 million miles) of over-the-road Stakeholders have identified transportation, health, experience transporting DOE-owned nuclear and safety issues as their paramount concern. In materials without an accident that resulted in a response to these concerns, the U.S. Department of release of radioactive material. Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOENV) solicited and received input from the public Another significant program managed by the DOE through public meetings and in meetings with that includes transportation activities is the federal, state, and local organizations; and Environmental RestorationiWaste Management commissioned a transportation study. The Program. Two low-level waste management sites stakeholders and U. S. Department of Energy for the DOE complex are presently located at the (DOE) established the Transportation Protocol NTS. Two additional missions which would Working Group and Big Group to further discuss expand operations at the NTS are under issues associated with NTS transportation consideration: the addition of the disposal of low- activities. The Transportation Protocol Working level mixed waste from off-site generators, and the Group submitted over 20 recommendations to the expansion of current disposal facilities to receive DOE concerning the transportation of low-level significantly more waste. Expansion of these waste to the NTS. These recommendations programs would result in an increased need for covered areas such as information gathering and support services in the areas of shipping, handling, dissemination; emergency response and disposal of hazardous materials. Interstate communications, equipment, and training; transportation of low-level waste is also an integral operating procedures; and route selection. The part of these expanded missions. recommendations of the Transportation Protocol Working Group are discussed in Chapter 2. This study used two diffcrent models to calculate risk: (I) potential risk associated with Defense The DOEiNV has also begun a comprehensive Programs Transportation Activities (ADROIT), study to assess the potential social and cultural and (2) a computer code combining user- effects on American Indian people from the determined meteorological, demographic, transportation of low-level waste and mixed waste. transportation, packaging, and material factors The study will focus on the American Indian with health physics data. This second model
s-1 Volume 1. Appendix I
~___~ ~ ,NEVADA TLST SITE I;I,NAL EN VIRO)V.ME.VTALIMPAL'T STATEjUENT
(RADTRAN-like) was used to calculate the injuries, and illness and even those numbers are expected radiolagical consequences and accident low. Radiation-induced fatalities and illnesses risk of transporting radioactive material for waste result predominantly from incident-free exposures; management activities. Because of national however, the expected number of latent cancer security concerns associated with special nuclear fatalities is extremely small in either case. material, the DOE developed ADROIT to define the potential risk associated with Defense Program Of particular interest locally were the in-state risks transportation activities. A RADTRAN-like model of low-level and mixed waste transportation. As was used to calculate the risk associated with the far as in-state routes are concerned, vehicle-related Waste Management and Environmental fatalities and injuries dominate the risk, followed Restoration Program. This model was used based by incident-free radiation-induced fatalities. The on the stakeholder request to see each step in the risks along all in-state routes are very low, and, are process. This model is comprised of a combination within the uncertainty bands of the analysis. These of spreadsheet, and a computer programming risks are so similar, that it is not meaningful to language for problems that can be addressed in rank routes solely on the basis of risk. The results algebraic terms (FORTRAN) numbers. A detailed indicate that routing decisions need not rely solely discussion of the model is contained in the on the health risks as they are all similar, and all Summary of the Transportation Risk Assessment are low; however, certain routes do exhibit small Results,for the Environmental Impact Statement for risk reductions over others and could be used as a the Nevada Test Site und Off-Site Locations in the risk management tool. Reduction of total risk can State ofNevuda (DOEINV, 1996). be achieved inainly by selecting the route from a given generator site with the lowest vehicle-related The results of the transportation risk analysis show risks. that the human health risks from transportation operations are low under any alternative, and are Risk is not the only concern in the transportation of not significant contributors to the total risk from all radioactive and hazardous waste to the NTS. operations under these alternatives. The expected Consequently, the DOE will continue to interact number of occurrences of cargo-related health with the stakeholders to ensure that local concerns effects were calculated for both incident-free and are brought to the attention of carriers selecting accident scenarios for radioactive and hazardous routes; will ensure that full government-to- cargo. Vehicle-related health effects of traffic government consultation with American Indian fatalities and injuries were also calculated. The tribal governments occurs; and will continue to maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents for conduct all operations, including shipping, in a safe low-level waste and mixed waste transportation manner. were assessed. There are no maximum reasonably foreseeable Defense Program accidents that would result in a radioactive release. The total human health risk is dominated by vehicle-related deaths, 1.1 Purpose and Scope Under Alternative 3, use of the NTS and its resources would be expanded to support national The NTS is a multiple-facility site that supports a programs of both a defense and nondefense nature. diverse range of DOE mission objectives. This would mean a significant increase in Although the principal mission of the NTS has opportunities for use of the NTS and its been to conduct nuclear tests, and more recently, capabilities and resources in support of ongoing to maintain a readiness to conduct nuclear tests, the and new Defense, Nondefense Research and NTS has also supported other DOE activities in the Development and Work for Others Programs waste management, environmental restoration, activities. The increase in activities would result in non-defense research and development, and work increased highway transport of hazardous materials for others program. This report was written to and waste to and from the NTS. address the local issues concerning these and potential future operations and to provide Alternative 4 places new environmental and information and supporting documentation to the economic-based activities at the NTS. Under this NTS EIS, particularly by summarizing the alternative, potential new programs and activities transportation risk analysis. would depend on future mission requirements, land-use designations, and withdrawal status at the Four alternatives have been identified for NTS. One key feature of this alternative, as evaluation in the NTS EIS: defined in the NTS EIS, is that the DOE would stop all defense-related activities, including most - Alternative 1, Continue Current Operations of those under the Work for Others Program. (No Action) Waste management operations would continue in support of ongoing DOEiNV operations and Alternative 2, Discontinue Operations activities.
Alternative 3, Expanded Use The current mission of the NTS is to maintain readiness to test nuclear weapons. Under Alternative 4, Alternate Use of Withdrawn Alternative 3, Expanded Use, the mission of the Lands. NTS would increase to include many stockpile stewardship responsibilities, such as weapons Alternative 1 is defined as the continuation of assembly and disassembly, and storage of ongoing DOE and interagency programs, activities, plutonium pits and other highly enriched nuclear and operations at NTS. It also includes the material. This mission requires the transport of provision for continuing past operations such as; special nuclear inaterial to the NTS. maintaining and conducting nuclear weapons tests, Transportation scenarios have been developed for and disposal of waste generated from some outside these activities and inodelcd to define the risk sources. associated with the transportation of special nilclear material. The type of weapons, specified Alternative 2 represents one end of the spectrum of routes, and other associated information is options considered in the EIS. This alternative classified for rcasons of national security. would result in site closure, with the exception of required activities in support of site security and As part of its Defense Program mission, the DOE environmental monitoring. All current programs, maintains and operates a special fleet of trucks and including waste receipt and disposal activities, trailers used to transport Category 11 or higher would be discontinued. nuclear material hetween DoD and DOE sites in a safe and secure manner. The DOE Albuquerque
1-1 Volume I. Appendix I Operations Office, Transportation Safeguards potential risks to human health associated with Division is responsible for the operation and transporting radioactive waste and nuclear maintenance of these safe-secure trailers and materials. Stakeholders were particularly supporting vehicles. Since the establishment of interested in local transportation issues, such as the this program in 1974, the DOE Transportation routing of radioactive shipments in and around Safeguards Division has accumulated more than southern Nevada metropolitan areas, and the 120 million km (75 million miles) ofover-the-road potential for using rail systems as an option to experience in transporting DOE-owned nuclear highway transport. A map depicting the NTS, materials without any accident that resulted in a nearby states, and the regional highway system is release of radioactive material. given in Figure 1-2.
The DOI is responsible for managing and The transportation risk analysis in this study operating complex-wide radioactive Waste estimated the health risk in terms of both vchicle- Managcmeirt and Iinvironmental Restoration related death and iiijuries and cargo-related deaths Program activities. Tlicse programs provide for and illness such as; latent cancer fatalities from the coniprehcnsivc manngement of all DOE- highway transportation of DOE-generated Iow- generated radioactive waste, as well as some non- level waste, mixed waste, defense-related nuclear DOE defense-related wastes. As part of these materials, and hulk shipments of hazardous programs, two low-level management sitcs are cliemicals for each of tlie four alternatives. The located at the NTS. In accordance with the study also assesses the nonradiological risk provisions established in the Atomic Energy Act of (vehicle emissions) of Iiealtli effects associated 1954, the NTS has received radioactive waste for with all DOE transportation activities. Rail and disposal from the DOE and the DoD generators intermodal transportation options were not since 1976. evaluated in the risk analysis, but have been included in Attachment E. The environmental This current mission of managing DOE and DoD coilsequences of highway transportation and on- low-level waste is under consideration for site operations are discussed in Chapter 5 of the expansion within the DOE complex. Two potential Final NTS EIS. expansions of thc DOE/NV mission are; the addition of the disposal of low-level mixed waste ‘The remainder of this chapter provides background from off-site generators on the NTS, and expansion information, and a summary of the results, and of the current disposal facilities to receive conclusions of the transportation risk analysis. significantly more low-level waste. Generator sites Chapter 2 contains a discussion of stakeholders are sliown on thc map of the United States in concerns and recommendations issues. Chapter 3 Figure 1-1. Future defense mission activities at the summarizes the transportation risk analysis for N.fScould also include storage and/or production Defense, Waste Management, and Environmental or special nuclear materials. Expansion of these Restoration Program. References are provided in programs would rcsult in an increased need for Chapter 4. Six attachments provide additional support services in tlie areas of shipping, details and supporting information for this study. management, and disposal of hazardous material. Several changes have occurred between During the scoping period for the NTS EIS and in publication of the Transportation Study in the NIS subsequent meetings with the DOE, some members Draft EIS and publication in the Final ELS. The of the public, elected officials, and private issue Transportation Protocol Working Group’s advocacy groups expressed concern about the recommendations have been added to Chapter 2. DOE’S ongoing and expanding radioactive waste .This chapter has also been revised to remove any and nuclear materials management activities at implication that full government-to-government NTS. These stakeholders asked the DOE to consultation with American Indian tribes has provide them with more information about thc occurred. A discussion of past and planned NEVADA TEST SITE FIN4 L EN'c'IROh'MENTAl. MPACT ,STATE.WENT
Figure 1-1. NTS EIS Transportation Study Waste Generator Locations
1-3 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMEKT
Figure 1-2. NTS Map
Volume I, Appendlx 1 1-4
~ NEVADA TEST SITE FIXAL ENVIROIVME~VIALI.WP.4CT STATEMENT
American Indian involvement in low-level waste Through the Record of Decision, the DOE will transportation issues has been added. make important decisions regarding the mission of the NTS. In response to concerns that the transportation risk code, RADTRAN, was not used in this analysis to Stakeholders identified transportation, health, and calculate the transportation risk, a study (IT safety issues as a paramount concern during the Corp, 1995a) was conducted to compare the results NTS EIS scoping process. The DOE conducts generated by RADTRAN to those generated by the transportation operations in accordance with the model used in this analysis. The results of that requirements of the U.S. Department of comparison are summarized in Section 3.3.1 of Transportation and applicable U.S. Nuclear this study. Regulatory Commission regulations (Attachment A), in accordance with their own orders, and it Chapter 3 includes sites specific Defense Program holds an excellent transportation record, DOE, analyses, hazardous material and waste (1993a). Under Alternatives 1 and 3, the Defense (radioactive low-level, mixed and hazardous) Program activities continue interstate analysis, and maximum foreseeable accidents. An transportation of special nuclear materials to the NTS-specific analysis of the risk of the NTS. Much of the waste identified in Chapter 4 of transportation of defense-related nuclear materials tlie NTS Final EIS is generated by DOE and DoD has been conducted and the results of that analysis facilities outside the State of Nevada. Therefore, have been added in Section 3.2. Several waste interstate transportation of low-level radioactive management transportation activity scenarios have waste is an integral part of the Waste Management also been added (Section 3.3): incident-free Program, and those associated activities have the nonradiological health effects, incident-free potential to increase under Alternative 3. maximum individual doses, the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident, and the risk from In response to similar concerns throughout the transportation of low-level waste (contaminated DOE complex, the DOE is funding several studies soil) from the ‘ronopah Test Range to the NTS for designed to provide additional information on disposal. A hazardous chemicals shipment transportation risks and alternative modes of transportation risk analysis has also been added. transporting various types of waste. The DOE’s Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is In addition, a number of minor mathematical errors evaluating the costs and risks associated with have been corrected. These corrections do not alternative modes of spent nuclear fuel significantly increase the risk results, or do they transportation, including intermodal and rail affect any of the conclusions. options.
1.2 Background Information The proposed action of formulating and implementing an integrated Waste Management A sitewide EIS is required by the DOE’s Program is evaluated in the Drafi Wasfe implementing regulations for the National Mwqemenffrogrummatic EIS (DOE, J995c) that Environmental Policy Act, to evaluate the would include consolidating existing waste environmental impact associated with DOE management operations, and establishing a waste activities and programs, including current proposed transportation network. This Programmatic EIS activities. The NTS EIS provides a means to contains a transportation risk assessment which evaluate the potential effects of changes in identifies human health effects in terms of the operations and changes in the site’s missions, as expected number of fatalities and injuries. well as an opportunity to consider the total effects However, it would not be appropriate to coniparc of reasonably foreseeable activities. An EIS is also these results to the NTS transportation risk results required for any redera1 actions that have the because different assumptions were used. For potential for significant environmental impact. example, the Waste Management EIS assesses effects over 20 years, and the NTS study assesses and injuries were also calculated. Results of the effects For only 10 years. Furthermore, the transportation risk analysis are discussed in assumptions used to develop the alternatives in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.4. cach EIS are differcnt, including assumptions about volumes of waste, and different models were 1.3.1 Defense Program used to calculate the risk. However, the results of both studies indicate that transportation risks are The DOE has evaluated and reported the risks very low. (consequences and probabilities) associated with transporting Defense Program nuclear material in The DOENV has also solicited and received input the Defense Programs Transportation Risk from the public through public meetings and Assessment: Prohabiliiie.y und Consequences of meetings with federal, state, local governments, Accidentul Disposal of Rridioaciive Muterial and other organizations. The transportation risk Arising from Of-Site lransportuiion of Dejense analysis draft outline and preliminary draft input Prograni Material, (SNLiNM, 1994). The annual were provided to participants of the general risk for shipping various cargos was evaluated transportation meetings. Comments were received based on many factors including, but not limited during these meetings and incorporated, as to; the transportation mode, how often and how far appropriate. From this, a group of concerned each cargo must be shipped, the specific route, and stakeholders, called the "Big Group", was the population density along specific routes. identified to meet on a regular basis to focus on general transportation issues. Additionally, a Under Alternative I the risk of a single latent Transportation Protocol Working Group was cancer fatality (LCF) due to incidcnt-free created to focus on technical issues. transportation of Defense Program nuclear materials has been calculated as 4 x and the The DOE met with the Consolidated Group of nonradiological risk due to vehicle emissions is Tribes and Organizations (CGTO), and gave a 1.85 x lo-'. The expected number of traffic brief presentation on transportation issues. The fatalities is 6 x The risk of a single accident- DOEiNV officials later visited three tribal initiated LCF is 8 x IO-". governments and gave presentations on transportation issues that could affect tribal lands Defense Program activities described in or interests. No further studies or any Alternative 3 could include certain stockpile consultations were conducted. A comprehensive stewardship responsibilities (storage of plutonium study has been initiated to assess the potential pits and assembly and disassembly of components social and cultural effects on American Indian and weapons) and management of Defense people from thc transportation of low-level and Program surplus materials. This is in addition to mixed waste. the activities described in Alternative I. The risk ofa single LCF due to incident-free transportation 1.3 Summary of Results is 2.14 x lo-', and the risk of nonradiological health effects from vehicle emissions is 4.01 x 10". The DOE has over four decades of experience in The expected number of traffic fatalities is the safe transportation of hazardous materials and 1.06 x 10.'. The risk of a single accident- waste. Although accidents involving vehicles initiated LCF is 1 x The transportation risks containing radioactive material have occurred, 110 for these additional actibities are also being significant releases, exposures, or radiation evaluated in programmatic environmental impact fatalities have ever occurred. Thc expected number statements being prepared by the DOE. of occurrences of cargo-related health effects were calculatcd for both incident-free and accident 1.3.2 Waste Management Program scenarios Tor radioactive and hazardous cargo. Vehicle-related health effects of traffic fatalities The total human health risk associated with
Vulumz I. Appendix I 1-6 NEVADA TEST SllF FIIWL ENVIROAMENTAL IMPACT STA7K.WE.VT
hazardous materials and waste transportation for The maximum reasonably foreseeable low-level the waste management activities is dominated by waste and mixed waste transportation accidents vehicle-related deaths and injuries, and even those have a probability of occurrence of 8.08 x 10” (for numbers are low: 2 fatalities and 27 injuries in low-level waste) and 3.23 x 10.’ (for mixed waste) 10 years (0.2 fatalities and 2.7 injuries per year), under Alterative 3 for the most severe and a 0.003 risk of nonradiological health effects consequences of latent cancer-fatality and due to incident-free transportation under detriment. There are no maximum reasonably Alternative I; and 8 fatalities and 103 injuries in foreseeable Defense Program accidents which 10 ycars (0.7 fatalities and 10.3 injuries per year): would cause a release of radioactive material. and an 0.012 risk of nonradiological health effects due to incident-free transportation under 1.4 Conclusions Alternative 3. Typically, 50,000 traffic fatalities occur each year. It is evident that the 0.2 or 0.7 The results of this transportation risk analysis show fatalities due to transportation operations under that the human health risks from transportation Alternatives 1 and 3 represent minimal increases in operations are low under any alternative, and are the national number of traffic statistics. not significant contributors to the total risk from all operations under these alternatives. Along the Radiation-induced fatalities and illnesses result in-state routes, vehicle-related fatalities and predominantly from incident-free exposures; injuries dominate the risk because they are however, the expected number of latent cancer similarly followed by incident-free radiation- fatalities is extremely small in any case. For induced fatalities. The risks along all in-state instance, under Alternative 1, the total number of routes are low, and within the uncertainty bands of expected LCF is 2.5 x 10.’ in 10 years, which the analysis; therefore, it is not meaningful to rank would be 2.5 x annually (2.5 x I0”equals routes solely 011 the basis of risk. 0.0025, or about two and one-half fatalities every 1,000 years). Of the total LCFs, 0.0025 are Risk of course, is not the only issue of concern in attributable to incident-free transportation, and the transportation of radioactive and hazardous only 1.1 x 10~6to accident scenarios. waste to the NTS. The DOE will continue its Approximately 2,500 people die of cancer policy of interacting with the stakeholders, each year in Nevada, and transportation of ensuring that local concerns are brought to the radioactive waste to the NTS under attention of carriers selecting routes, and Alternative I adds 0.00025 to that total. The conducting all operations, including shipping, in a results for Alternative 3 are slightly higher than safe manner. The DOE will also begin full those for Alternative 1, although they are government-to-government consultation with the still low: 0.077 (7.7 x 10.’) LCFs in 10 years, affected American Indian tribes. This is primarily because of the greater quantities of waste being shipped to the NTS under the Expanded Use Alternative. NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT
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Volume I, Appendix I
~ ~ 2.1 Public Involvement this meeting was not wll-received by other local communities, and received an unfavorable report Public involvement bas played a significant role in in the media. Following this. the DOEiNV again the development of this study. During the NTS sought to better identify and address the wide EIS public scoping meetings, transportation was range of local concerns. identified as a major concern ranking second behind issues associated with the alternatives. At During the formal NTS EIS scoping period the same time, local communities expressed (August 10, 1994, through November 10, 1994), it concern over the routes used to ship low-level became clear that transportation was an issue that waste, as well as the route selection process. They required attention. Therefore, a separate also made it clear that they felt the DOE could do transportation meeting “Rig Group” was held on a better job of communicating with local November 15, 1994, as a follow-up to an August governments on transportation issues. meeting, to elicit further local government comments on specific issues and concerns to be The DOE solicited and received comments from included in this Transpc~rtationStudy. An advance the public during a series of transportation notice of the meeting was announced in the press meetings held with federal agencies, state, and so interested citizens could also attend. The local government organizations. Specific meeting was attended primarily by represcntatives concerns expressed included: of the state, surrounding counties, and cities located near the N’TS. A draft outline for the study Health and safety issues was provided to participants at the meeting. and On- and off-site transportation risks time was provided at the end of the meeting for Railroad options public comment. Local highway segments Carrier and route selection During the November niceting, several “one-oil- Applicable laws and regulations me” mectings with the DOE/NV transportation Emergency response and procedures team were requested by local representatives. Identification and analysis of alternative These meetings (Table 2- I) offered an opportunity routes, monitoring shipments, packaging, for the specific concerns to he heard, as well as for and handling requirements. DOEMV technical experts to answer questions in an informal setting. It was suggested during the These issues were repeatedly identified at various first of these meetings, and supported during transportation meetings during the scoping period, others, that working groups be established to focus and in comments provided on the Draft on the technical details ofthe risk asscssrnent and Implementation Plan for the NTS EIS. To the transportation protocol. Comments and responses extent possible, the DOE intends to address these from the “Big Group” meeting held April 20. 1995, concerns in this report. are provided in i\ttnchnient C, Public Participation In .The Transportation study^ The DOEiNV has accepted responsibility for improving communications with state and local At the April 20, 1995 mceting. in addition to governments, as well as the public. In providing a transportation study status update, a response to issues raised by city officials from session without DOE representatives was held and North Las Vegas, Nevada, concerning low-level stakeholders identified the positives and negatives waste shipments along Craig Road, the DOE/NV associated with the development and contcnt of met with North Las Vegas representatives in July DOWNV‘s Draft ‘[ransportation Study. W lien the 1994 to discuss their concerns. The news about DOE participants were invited to rejoin the Table 2-1. Transportation meetings held on the NTS EIS Transportation Study (Page I of 5)
EIS Transportation Study Meetings
Host Organization Date Location
I.ocal Rr count)' Governnrent August 22, 1994 X"V Auditorium 1753 S. Highland .a?. Vceas. Nevada 89 109
~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ I~Jnivcrsityof Nevada. 1.as Vcgas Nmernber 15, 1994 Jnivrrsity of Nevada, I.BS Vcgas Ilarry Krid Center larry Keid Center .as Vcgas. Nevada 8Y I54
Clarh ('ounty Ilecember 6. 1994 i01 I. Clark Avrnuc ;uitc 5'70 Vcgas.Nevada89101
City alllcndcrsiin December 7, 1994 123 I.end Strcct Icnderson. Nevada 8YO15
Dccembcr 12. 1994 '785 E.Sahara Avenue iuite 440 ,as Vcgas, Nevada 89103
CiO ofNorth l.as Vegas Deccmher 13, 1994 1200 Civic Center Driic AS Vegas. Nevada XY~O
January 5, 1995 005 Arilond Street 3oulder City, Nevada 89005
January 18. 1995 Howard Hughes Collcgc of Eiiginccririg llnivcrsity ofNevada, Las Vrgns Las Vegas. Nevada 89154
January 26, 1995 Nuclear Ilrpositor). Ofiicr Pahrurnp, Nerada89041
White I'iiic County February 10, 1995 Ely, Nevada 89101
Comlnunity Advisory Board li~the NT March I, 1995 Holiday Inn CroNnc Plxa i'rqgms Las Vegas, Nevada 891 09
Esmurald;i County March 13, 1995 Esrneralda Count). Courthouse (ioldfield. Nevada 89013
March 14, 1995 Rilbraq Industries 3650 Southpoint Citclc Laughlin. Ncvada XY02Y
March 22. 1995 Southern Paiute Field Station St. Cicorge, Utah 84770
April 20, 1995 University ofNevada. laVcgas Harry Rcid Center Las Vegas, Nevada X9151
Volume 1. Appendix I 2-2 Table 2-1. Transportation meetings held on the NTS EIS Transportation Study ( Pa&?- 2 015)
Big Group Working Meetings
Host Organization Date Location
I)OE/NV July 1994 L!. S. Ikpartmcnt aS Inerg) Ncvada Opcriltions Ol'licc 2765 S. I liehland- Drive t Las Vrgas, Nevada 89109 November 1994 University of "levad;i. I.as Vegas I Ilarn Rcid Centcr Las Vcgas. Ncvadn XY 1% I
I)Or'mv April 1995 University ol.Ncvada, 1.as Vegni Harry Rcid Centcr Las Vera. Ncuoda 89 I54 Table 2-1. Transportation meetings held on the NTS EIS Transportation Study (Page 3 of 5)
Host Organization Date Location
DOENV May 16, 1995 U.S. Department ofEnergy Nevada Operations Oftice 2765 S. Highland Las Vegas. Nevada 89 I09
DOEI"V June 15, 1995 IT Corporation 4330 S. Valley View, %I14 Las Vegas. Nevada 89103
Community Advisory Board for the NTS February I, 1995 Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza Programs Las Veeas. Nevada 89109
~~ DOE/NV February 7, 1995 University ofNevada, I.as Vegas Las Vegas Campus Clas,room Building Complex Las Veeas. Nevada 89154
DOE$'NV February 9, 1995 University of Nevada Reno Campus Classroom Student Union Building Reno, Nevada 89557
DOE/NV March 7. 1995 DOEINV Auditorium 2753 S. Highland LasVegas, Nevada 89109
DOE/NV March 9, I995 Reno Sparks Convention Visitors Center 4590 S. Virginia Street Reno, Nevada 8950 I
Date of Meeting Location
September 7, 1994 Fallon Convention Center 100 Campus Wa) Fallon. Nevada 89046
Septcrrihcr 8. 1994 Carscin City Vornmunity Ccntcr 851 E. Williams Strcet Carson City. Nrwda 89701
Scptenibsr 13. 1994 Ihic Center convention Facilities I 425 South 700 tast St. George. Utah 84770
September 15, 199.1 'Tnnopah Convention Center 301 Uroucher
Volume I. Appcndix I 2-4
~ Table 2-1. Transportation meetings held on the NTS EIS Transportation Study (Page 4 of5)
Sconine Period Meetings
1 Date of Meeting I Location I September 20, I994 Cashman Field Convention Center 850 Las Vega Boulevard, North Las Vcgas, Nevada 89101
Scptetnber21, 1994 Hob Kuud Community Center I lighway 93 Calicnte, Nevada 89008
October 4, 1994 Iknderson Convention Cciltcr 200 S. Water Strcct I-lendersiin. Nevada 89015
Sponsor Date Location SLiitc ut"cvada Clmiinghousc 1 August 30, 1994 State Clearinyhousc II Capitol Complex Carson City, Ncvada 89710
Environmental Management October 5, 1994 Ilolida) Inn Crowne Ylau Community Advisoty 13oard 4225 I'arailisc lliiad Las Vrzas, Nevada 89101 I Affkctcd Units of Government Octohcr 2 I, 1994 I Center 1 150 6th Strrrt I Ely. Nevada 80301 I
South-Ccntral Nevada Federal Complex Octohcr 28, 1994 Tonopah Con\cntiun Center Advisoty hard 301 Hrougher 'I'onopah. Nevada 89049
Air & Waste Managcmsnt Association December 14, 1494 I'alncc Station Hotel & Casino 241 I Wzst Sahara Las Vcgas, Ncbada XY102
State of Nevada Clraringhousc Dzcernhcr 19, 1994 Nevada State Lihrary Capitol Complex Carson Cil?. Nevada 8Y710
Svatc. I.ocal, Trihal, Govcmmcnt Fchrunry 24. 1995 .Tunopah. Ncvada 89049
Southcrn Nevada tcdcral Facility Community Fchruary 28, 19% 'l'rmopiih, Neiada X901') Advisur) Ooanl
2-5 Volume I, Appendix I
__~ Table 2-1. Transportation meetings held on the NTS EIS Transportation Study (Page 5 of 5) Other Information Meetings 1 Sponsor I Date Consolidated Group of Tribal and March I7 - 19. 1995 Organizations
I'aiutc 'Iribc olSiiuthem Utah September 9, 1995 600Xonh I60 i:ast Cedar City, litah X1720
Modpa Band of Paiutes Seplcmbcr 14. 1995 Tribal Ilcadquartcrs KO. Ihx 340 Moapa, Nevada 80025 La5 Vcgis I'aiute Tribe I September 19, 1995 Tribal I leadquarters 11 I Paiutc Uiivc I.as Vcgiis. Nerad;~XY 109
lx)lmV March 6, 1996 Community Advisory hsid Ilurango lligh School I.as Vegas. Nevada X9 I09
DOI'INV March 13, 1996 Air and Waste Managerncnt Luncheon Palace State Station llotrl I.as Vsgas, Nevada 89 I0 I
Public Hearings
DOE!NV March 5. 1996 Dixie Centcr Convrnlim I'acilities 425 South 700 Cast St. George. Utah 84770
DO K,W V March 13, 1996 Nuclear Kcprisitory Ofiice Pahrump. Ncvada X9041
DOI'INV March 19. I996 Univcrsity of Nevada I Reno Campus Classroom Sludent Union Building
I)Ok/VV March 26, 1996 Cashnian Field Con\cntion Ccntcr 850 1.u Vegas Boulciard. Nonh
I llhl V iOllT April X, 1996 City Hall Rouldcr Cit). Nciada XY005 UN1.V (:01<1: I April 16, 1996
I 1NI.V conk: April 23. I996 C'iimmissioncr's C'humhcr Cuurlhuusc Tonopah. Nciiida 8904')
IINI.\' <:oIlli April 25. 1996
Volume I, Appcndl.; I 2-6
- ~ stakeholders, the facilitator reported the results Risk Analysis will be the focus of this study. The of the session. It was at this meeting that the proposed study provides an opportunity for a full stakeholders requested that a risk working group government-to-government relationship between be formally established to review the risk potentially involved tribes and the DOE,iNV, and assessment. The DOE/NV then fomializcd the outlines DOE’S ongoing commitment to make Transportation Risk Working Group. This group every effort to have this study reflect the full range is comprised of representatives from state and local of the American Indian perspective. governments and from the Community Advisory Board who expressed an interest in reviewing and 2.2 Stakeholder Issues understanding the technical details of transportatioti risk analysis. The DOENV worked with state and local governments through the Transportation Protocol The stakeholder Transportation Protocol Working Working Group to identify local issues. Five Group met to identify, prioritize, and understand issues were identified by the group as major local issues and concerns associated with the concerns: transportation of low-level waste to the NTS, resulting in the ‘I‘ransportation Protocol Working Transportation management operations Group’s recommendations. The working group (applicable laws, regulations, packaging, will continue to meet with DOE at a minimum of and handling requirements, and emergency three times a year to discuss issues. This preparedness) associated with hazardous “teaming” approach has been well-accepted by materials and waste community members, and has already resulted in the acquisition of more current demographic data. - Local route segments of concern, primarily Suggestions have also been offered regarding how Craig Road, Hoover Dam, and Interstate 15LJ.S. Highway 95 Interchange to present the information to the public in a more straight-forward and understandable manner. - Routing of hazardous materials and waste In March 1995, the DOE met with the CGTO at Rail options for the NTS the NTS to discuss tribal involvement in the NTS EIS. At that time a brief presentation of - Health risk associated with transportation transportation issues was presented and it was apparent that these issues were vely important to An inclusive list of the issues identified and ranked the CGTO representatives. In June, a letter was by the Transportation Protocol Working Group is sent to the tribes and organizations of the CGTO shown in Table 2-2. The Transportation Protocol formally announcing the intention to begin Working Group continued to meet and submitted consultation to address specific transportation over 20 recommendations as comments on the concerns of tribal governments. Following this, NTS Draft EIS (Subsection 2.2.6). DOENV officials visited three tribal governments and gave a brief presentation of transportation 2.2.1 Transportation Management Operations issues that could affect tribal lands or interests. All DOE activities are governed by DOE orders, These actions do not constitute full government-to- which for transportation operations, adopt the government consultation. Consequently, the standards of Department of Transportation DOENV will begin a comprehensive study to regulations in Title 49 of rhe (’ode of Federal assess the potential social and cultural impacts to Regulations. Compliance with these regulations American Indian people that could occur from the protects workers. the public, and the environment transportation of low-level radioactive waste, The from exposure to radioactive or hazardous American Indian people who currently reside near materials. Cargo-related incident-free risks along the routes identified in the NTS EIS Transportation the Hoover Dam route are higher than those for the
2-7 Volnmr 1 Appendix I
~ ~~ -~ alternate routes because of the low speed and Because of the nature of this training, the basic higher population density. Cargo-related accident courses have been presented at other locations in risks along the Hoover Dam route are similar to both southern (Las Vegas and Henderson) and those of the alternate routes because of relatively northern (Reno-Sparks and Elko) Nevada. The sniall differences in distances, and large Emergency Medical Personnel Radiological uncertainties associated with accident risks. Seminar has been given in both Tonopah and Ely. The DOE is working with rural response forces to One scenario of concern is the likelihood of a schedule training that volunteers can attend in their vehicle accident over Hoover Dam, and the local areas. possibility of a release of radioactive or hazardous material into the Colorado River, contaminating 2.2.2 Local Segments of Concern the water. The consequences of such an accident arc minor. Radioactive or hazardous material Several route segments in and arouud the NTS present in these shipments is not present in present concerns regarding accident rates and the concentrations high enough to contaminate the consequences of a release: Craig Road, Hoover food chain or affect the ecosystem. Of the material Dam, and the Interstate 15/U.S. Highway 95 spilled, some could be suspended in the water and interchange (referred to locally by the name, the carried downstream, but the material would be "Spaghetti Bowl"). The segments were included in highly diluted. The remainder would likely settle the in-state routes in the transportation risk to the bottom quickly. In addition, the likelihood analysis. of a release actually reaching the river is also very low. Since the likelihood of an accident is very Craig Road low aud related consequences are extremely minimal, the associated risk is very low. Craig Road was suggested as a possible alternate route to avoid the Interstate 15/U.S. Highway 95 The DOE also complies with applicable state and interchange. North Las Vegas provided an updated local regulations. Stakeholders have expressed population density of 0.00045 persons per square concern about their knowledge and under standing meter for this segment of the route. However, to of applicable laws and regulations, the division of be conservative in calculating the cargo-related responsibility, how radioactive and hazardous risks along this route, a value of 0.00082 persons materials are packaged and shipped, and per square meter was used. Risks due to vehicle- emergency preparedness. related traffic injuries and fatalities are slightly higher for Craig Road than for the routes which The laws and regulations which apply to DOE include the Interstate I5IU.S. Highway 95 transportation operations to, from, and on the NTS interchange, primarily because of the higher are listed in Attachment A. Packaging accident rate for Craig Road. However, the cargo- requirements, carrier selection criteria, driver related risk due to incident-free transportation training, liability, and on-site waste acceptance and along Craig Road is slightly lower. tracking procedures are described in Attachment B. Hoover Dam The stakeholders also identified concerns about local rural emergency preparedness. Emergency A study was commissioned by the US. response training and procedures are described Department of the Interior (CH2M Hill, 1993) to further in Attachment D. First responder training predict truck accident rates and hazardous is available to all jurisdictions within Nevada and materials shipment accident rates for different road has been taught in several Nevada counties. First- segments leading to, over, and from Hoover Dam. on-scene training has been made available by the The key findings of this study indicate that while DOE to fire, law enforcement, and emergency approximately 50 truck overturns are expected medical responders in Nevada siiice 1983.
Volume I, Appendix I 2-8
- Table 2-2. Results of Transportation Protocol Working Group Issue Ranking
(Page I Of 2)
Votes to rar ISSUeE (1 = hiehest iority) II I I ~ Issue 1234s
X I.ines and mechanisms of communication between thc DOE, Transportation Protocol Working Group, state and local gavcmments 9 Entire regulatory structure within state, local, federal, and tribal governmcnts, and how thcy interact 10 Risk analysis methodology - communication -public perception of risk I1 Cost bcnelit analysis between rail and truck for low-level waste for tvtal systems life cycle, based on what comes out ofthe EM Programmatic EIS
2-9 \‘olnrne I Appendrx i Table 2-2. Kesults of Transportation Protocol Working Group Issue Ranking (Page 2 Of?)
during the 10-year time frame of the NTS EIS, Hoover Dam. Class 7 (radioactive substances) only 5 of those are expected to be hazardous shipments over the Hoover Dam represent only a materials shipmcnts. Of hose five hazardous small fraction of the total hazardous materials materials shipments, less than one is expected to shipments. The volume of hazardous material result in a spill. shipped under Alternative 3 represents less than 3 percent of the total hazardous material shipped Currently, approximately 825 hazardous materials across Hoover Dam; therefore, using CII2M Hill shipnieiits cross the Hoover Dam per week. predictions, no spills involving radioactive The study (C112M Hill, 1993) indicates that two inaterials are expected during the next 20 years. spills are estimated to occur over the next 20 years on the basis of historical accident rates at the The study also indicated that only a small fraction same regulations apply whether the carrier is a of the total accidents are severe enough to cause common carrier, contract carrier, or if tlie shipper injury or death because of the exceedingly low operates its own transport vehicle. No individual, speed around and over the I-loover Dam. Vehicle- entity, organization, or jurisdiction may select or related injury and fatality risks along the Hoover require routing that is not in compliance with these I>am route are comparatively lower than the regulations. When evaluating routing options and alternate routes to the Hoover Dam because ofthe the radiological risk of transport, the carrier must lower speeds along the dam route. Cargo-related consider: incident-free risks along the Hoover Dam route are higher than those for the alternate routes because 1. Known accident rates along potential routes ofthe low speed and higher population density. 2. Transit time Cargo-related accident risks along the Hoover Dam 3. Population density and activities route are similar to those of the alternate routes 4. Time of day and day ofthe week that because of relatively small differences in distances, transport will occur and large uncertainties associated with accident risks. Two contracting mechanisms exist for shipping: contract carriers, who carry under a special Another conccrn raised about this route involves contract; and common carriers, who carry under a trucks stopping in or near Boulder City. The bill of lading. Because of dcregulation, industry proximity of Boulder City to the NTS is such that and government preference is to use common a lengthy stop would occur infrequently. carriers unless specific, tangible benefits can be realized by using contract carriers. A more Interstate 15111,s. Hieliwav 95 lntercllanee detailed discussion of these cmtracting mechanisms is provided in Attachment B. The Interstate 1 S/U.S. Highway 95 interchange is a primary route that would avoid Craig Road. 2.2.4 Rail Option Risks due to vehicle-related traffic injuries and fatalities arc slightly lower for the interchange than Although no generators currently ship. or plan to for the alternate routes primarily became of lower ship, material to NTS by rail, a rail access study accident rates due to lower speed. Cargo-related (Attachment E) that discusses the option of using risks due to incident-free transportation are slightly rail to transport radioactive and hazardous higher than those of tlie alternate routes, because materials to the NTS is included for information. the interchange has a higher population density This NTS Rail Access Study was prepared to than the alternate routes, and because of the low provide existing data to stakeholders interested in rates of speed assumed for urban travel through the the NTS Transportation Study. This attachment interchange. Cargo-related accident risk along the was prepared without involving American India11 interchange route is similar to that of alternate people, and can not be considered complete until routes and is subject to large uncertainties. American Indian assessments are performed and incorporated into the text of this attachment. 2.2.3 Routing The primary benefit of developing the capability to Routing has been identified as a is a major concern transport waste to the NTS by rail or by using of the stakeholders. Routes are selected in truckhail intermodal systems is to reduce the accordance with the 1J.S. Department of number of legal-weight truck shipments of Transportation regulations. The shipper selects the material, particularly radioactive material. The carrier, and it is the carrier's responsibility to select radiological and nonradiological risk to the public a route between the shipper's location and the and the environment during transport of the destination that is in compliance with all applicable materials is roughly proportional to the number of Department of Transportation regulations. The shipments. The only alternative for which rail
2-1 1 Volome I. Appcndn I
____- transport would be viahlc to tiic NTS is one in induced release. A transportation risk analysis was uhich tlie N'I'S ~ouldbe tlic sole disposal site for conducted to estimate the human health risks from low-level waste for the entire I)OE complex transporting low-level waste, mixed waste, nuclear (Alternativc 3 1. Llnder this alternative, the NTS material. and bulk shipments of hazardous would receive a projccted onc million cubic meters inaterials to the NTS. Risks were calculated over (~1')of low-level waste over the next I0 years. the entire generator-to-NTS route, for in-state routes, and for on-site transportation of the low- 'I'lie study siiiiiin~iri~espast rail access studies, and level waste. The national routes chosen for identilied potential rail routes using the tliree major evaluation are described in Attachment F. The railruad lines tliat pass tlirough Nevada: the Union consequences evaluated were vehicle-related Pacific (C'alientc to Statcline) line, the Southern fatalities, injuries, and illness; and cargo-related p,'icilic :- (0g:deii to I ("'I 1'ic~ite. ~ Czirliii. .ican. aid V:dIey klodifictl . They are considcred rensonalilc liascd 011 iiiiiiintii~iiland Results and conclusions arc summarized in Section use conflicts. iiiaxiiiiii~tt us of ravorable I .3 of this report, and described in more detail in topography and fedcral land. avoidance of land Chapter 3.0. The results sho\v that the greatest risk federally withdrawn from public use. dircct access under any alternative is that of traffic-related to a iiiqior regional carrier, md conditions allowing injuries (estimated to bc about 100 injuries in design in iiccordance with accepted rail I0 years), followed by vehiclc-related fatalities engiitceriitg practices. (2 and 8 in 10 years for Alternatives 1 and 3, respectively). Along the routes inside Nevada, iii additiun to the four potential I-ail routes, t\vo these risks fall to less than 5 in.juries and less than cuncepts were discusscd iii the N'IS rail access I fatality in 10 years. One liuman health risk of study, me in wliicli N.IS would be supported by concern is radiation-induced death and injury. To ti-id (ir rail/truck interinodal shiptncnts, and the put this risk in perspective, consider that while the other in which a rail spur to N'TS would be expected number of latent cancer fatalities in the constructed and used to supplement truck State of Nevada due to low-level waste transportation. The effects of these alternatives on transportation under Alternative 1 is 7.5 x in the environment and area reso~irceswere then 1 year, an annual average of close to 2,500 cancer discussed. The costs of shipping hy truck, rail, and deaths from all causes occurred in Nevada between intermodal inodes were also compared. No 1982 and 1990 (National Cancer Institute, 1990). rec~tiit~i~iidatioitsor decisions were made in the In other words, an individual in the State of report; rather the comparison is presented to Nevada is more than 30 million times more likely stimulate discussion oftlic issue. (2,50017.5 x to die of cancer from any cause than to die of radiation-induced cancer from 2.2.5 Health Risks transportation of radioactive waste. Closely related to routing is the concern about the 2.2.6 Transportation Protocol Working Group iiutnaii liealtli risk from exposure to ionizing Recommendations radiation as a result of tlic transportation of hazardous materials and wastc. Exposure to The Transportation Protocol Working Group has radiation occurs during incident-free ofticially submitted, as comments on the NTS transpoi-tation, and ns :i i-csult of ti vehicle accident- Draft EIS, recommendations that the DOE should take to respond to local concerns. The text of their planned or to-he-developed, mitigation submittal follows: measure. These recommendations are the result of For the reader's convenicnce, the following a series of discussions (by telephone, recommended action items are grouped into three conference, and in person) among major areas that include: (I) institutional members of the Protocol Working interactioniconimunication, (2) mitigation, and (3) Group, a subcommittee of the NTS route selection and selection of parking areas. The Advisory Group (aka., the Big Group). mitigation group is further subdivided into sub Representatives of the DOEiNevada areas ofcommunication, equipment, planning and Operations Office were present all such training, and procedures and operations. No discussions and are cognizant of the consensus was reached regarding route selection, proposed action items presented in this with some persons opting for the specification of document. certain routes, others calling for development of a route-selection methodology, others calling for the These recommendations do not reflect development ofa route-selection methodology, and the official positions of any local still others suggesting compromise measures. government. participating group, or individual. They are being put forth to: Therefore, the section on routing and parking area (I) help the participants see the areas of selection contains a brief summary of the most concern to Protocol Working discussions rather than specific recommendations. Group members, and (2) assist staff of governmental and private agencies Institutional InteractinniCommunication preparing comments on the Draft EIS for the Nevada Test and Off-Site Locations 1. The DOE must specify shipment in the State of Nevada. With this notification procedures, including: (I) information, reviewers may incorporate state, tribal and local jurisdiction, (2) specific recommendations into their own estimates of materials and volumes to be comments, or indicate where they shipped, and (3) designations of points of disagree. This will assist the DOEiNV in contact far corridor jurisdictions. understanding the importance of each recommendation to each individual 2. There should be regular meetings among commentor. In addition, we feel that representatives of the DOE, corridor DOES perception of the importance of jurisdictions, and other stakeholders and any recoinmendation will be enhanced interested entities. 'These meetings by repetition of that recommendation in should be used to: individual comment submissions. It is important to note that these a. Provide updates regarding ongoing and recommendations may become part of planned shipment campaigns, and the official record of the EIS only when reports and evaluations on past they are submitted as comments. shipments (based on DOE monitoring program); Protocol Working Group members expect the DOE/NV to evaluate each of b. Address issues that may arise whcn these recommendations explicitly in the significant changes have occurred or are EIS. Further, we would like any planned for the transportation system, recommendation that is accepted by the and in materials and/or volumes being DOEiNV to be addressed in the Record shipped; of Decision as a specific, rather than a 2-13 Volumc I, Appendix I c. Identify and mitigate additional impacts radio repeater, binoculars, cellular or concerns of local communities should telephones, and other equipment to transportation problems occur. corridor jurisdictions. 3. Interim information can be made c. The DOE should provide preference available through postings to an internet to local public safety and emergency home page, or through other electronic, response agencies for the free hard copy, or oral communication. distribution of federal surplus emergency response equipment. In addition, the DOE should also provide: 3 Planning and Training a. A mechanism for receiving and addressing concerns that may arise a. DOENV should work with corridor between meetings; and, communities to make training opportunities as effective as b. Annual reports to include, at the possible. Consideration should he minimum; identification of carriers, given to direct funding of training sources and destinations of each programs to the corridor shipment, the number and volume of communities, providing training shipments of each substance, opportunities on weekends to highway and rail evaluations of each accommodate volunteer responders, shipment campaign. and providing stipends to participants (See, Item 1 under Mitigations Equipment). 1. Communications b. The DOE should provide financial and technical assistance as necessary The DOE must ensure that local to ensure that corridor communities emergency response agencies are able to have up-to-date emergency identify low-level waste shipments and management and evacuation plans in provide immediate notification to federal place. and state agencies responsible for responding to or supporting the handling 4 Procedures and Operations of accidents. a. Transported loads should be covered 2. Equipment or contained to prevent possible aerosol disbursement. a. The DOEmV should provide responding jurisdictionsiagencies b. All shipments of low-level waste with at least two new detection arriving at the NTS during off-hours instruments per jurisdiction, and should he directed to temporarily ongoing calibration services in park their loads in a secure area conjunction with local training in inside the NTS gates. corridor communities in emergency response for incidents involving c. Each truck transporting Class 7 radioactive materials. materials should have two drivers present at all times. b. The DOE/" should provide or facilitate the provision of in-vehicle Vulurne I, Appendix I 2-14 ~ -__ ~__~ NEVADA TZST SITE FlXAL EKVIRON~MENTALIMPACT Y~ATLMEIVT d. Carriers should respond to all driver routes, route segments, or shipping advisories and notifications of delays at certain times. and make appropriate adjustments to primary routes. c. The DOE and stakeholders should agree on a methodology for route e. All vehicles should he required to selection. Under this option the undergo quarterly CVSA inspections DOE must commit in the Record of (based on enhanced Northern Decision to a clearly articulated American standard), and should process for routing LLW shipments, display appropriate safety inspection and to a mechanism that hinds the stickers. shipper to adhering to the identified routing alternative. Two inemhers Route Selection and Selection of Parking Areas suggested specific language for a recommendation on route selection 1. Members of the group were unable to methodology and direction to reach consensus on recommended action carriers. terms regarding transportation. However, there were a number of This suggested language and other discussions that brought out three discussion brought out the point that definite positions. These were: the DOE and stakeholders should enter into a process to establish a. The DOE should select specific methodologies for selecting the primary routes, usually interstates, safest and most acccptable routes. US. and state highways, and direct Some working group inemhers carriers to use these routes through recommended that the U.S. contracts or other means. Any Department of' Transportation exception to their use would occur guidelines for routing of hazardous when drivers may make adjustments and radioactive materials he used to to routes based upon official provide direction in this effort. advisories and notifications of delays Within this context, it was also (see Group 11, Mitigation; Item 4 suggested that the DOE should Procedures and Operations). provide state and local jurisdictions with copies of the route and risk h. The DOE should avoid the use of analyses for each carrier transporting certain routes, segments of routes, Class 7 materials, as defined in and shipping at specific times. In Radioaclive Material 49 CFR this case, the DOENV and affected 172.403. parties would agree on routes and segments of routes that cannot he d. As a compromise between Options h used for Low-Level Waste (LLW) and c above, some working group shipments. It was also suggested representatives thought that option h that the DOE institute policies to might he put into effect and used avoid transporting materials during until a methodology is agreed upon. holidays, peak tourist travel periods, or during special events. Examples 2. Parking Areas of areas to avoid are Hoover Dam and the Spaghetti Bowl. Carriers The DOENV should work with the state would be prohibited by contract or and corridorjurisdictionsto develop criteria other means from using certain for selection of safe parking areas to he 2-15 Volume I, Appendix 1 ~~ ___ NEI’ADA TEST SITE FIIVAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE.MENT used by carrier vehicles. This is related to In response, the DOE has begun a comprehensive the recommendation in Group 11, study of the potential social and cultural effects of Mitigation, Procedures and Operations low-level waste transportation on affected item b, that all shipments of low-level American Indian tribes. waste arriving at NTS during off-hours be required to temporarily park loads in a 2.4 Conclusions secure area inside the NTS gates. During public meetings with the DOE, the Detailed responses to specific recommendations stakeholders established transportation working can be found in Volume 3 of the NTS final EIS. groups to consider issues and review DOE transportation activities. Many of these issues first 2.3 American Indian Issues appeared in the transportation study of the Draft EIS. After working for several months, the The study will focus on the American Indian Transportation Protocol Working Group people who reside along three of the primary developed a set of recommendations. These routes previously evaluated for risk in this EIS. recommendations have been reviewed by DOEN management, and as a result, the DOE has Several comments were also received from begun to make decisions about what mitigating Sovereign Nations. Responses to those specific actions are required, and what actions can be taken comments can be found in Volume 3 of the final as part of normal program activity. The DOE/NV EIS. will continue to meet with the Transportation protocol Working Group, the “Big Group,” and American Indian tribes are concerned that the state and local government representatives on a promised full government-to-government regular basis to address their concerns. consultation has not taken place, and that their concerns have not been recognized. American The DOELVV is also beginning full government- Indian people, especially elders, express a fear of to-government consultation on transportation radiation as an “angry rock” which can affect issues with the affected American Indian tribes. people as it travels, even when safely packaged. The DOE is committed to having this study reflect American lndian people also express the concern the full range of American Indian options. that places of spiritual power are being, and could be further harmed by the transportation of radioactive and hazardous waste. Volume I, Appendix I 2-16 ~~ NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRON,MEh'TAL IWACT STATEMENT 3.0 Transportation Risk 3.1 General Information then its dispersion predicted. From the exposure caused by a release, a dose is calculated, and that One of the primary concerns of the public dose is related to a health effects. This commonly regarding the transportation of radioactive material used definition of risk (the product of probability is the human health risk associated with exposure and consequence) allows the risk for a given to ionizing radiation. To respond to these accident scenario, i.e., to be expressed in general concerns, the health risks of transporting low-level terms (Equation 3.1) as defined in Rhyne (1988). waste, low-level mixed waste, nuclear material and bulk shipments of hazardous materials to and on Risk is expressed numerically as a combination of the NTS were calculated for a transportation risk the likelihood and the consequences of the analysis. scenario. It may be in the form of the percentage probability of a given consequence (e.g., 0.02 To evaluate risk, three components must be percent), or the expected number of failures (which defined. The first component is the scenario. can be a whole number). Scenarios are made up of either one basic failure event or an initial failure event followed by Results of a risk analysis can be used to make subsequent failures that lead to some undesirable decisions concerning the best ways to manage the outcome. The second component is likelihood. risk. To reduce risk, either the scenario frequency Likelihood describes bow often the scenario is must be reduced by preventive measures or the expected to occur. Likelihood may be expressed as consequences must be controlled by mitigating a probability, which is a subjective expression of features. In transportation risk analysis, the release the belief that something will, or will not, occur. frequency is reduced by using safer roads with (For example, there is a 70 percent chance of lower accident rates; taking shorter routes, which showers tomorrow.) Probability is a unit-less reduces the opportunity for an accident; and using number and is always between zero and one. strict packaging criteria and strict operating Likelihood may also be expressed as a frequency, procedures, to reduce the probability of a release. such as a rate, e.g., 5 x 10.' accidents per mile (mi). Consequences, particularly radiological doses, are The third component of risk is consequence, the mitigated by using more robust packaging, undesired results of the scenario. To evaluate reducing the exposed population, and by consequences, the source term (what is released, emergency response. how much, what form it takes) must be defined and Ri = P,, x M, x P>w x Pajm x Pgn x AJxt x XI, x NJm wherc: R, = Risk for a given accident scenario. P,, = Accident frequency, in accidents per mile on transport link j hased on highway type and conditions, vehicle typc, and traftic conditions. M, = Number of miles in link j. P,, = Probability that the accident in link j results in accident forces of type k,e.,g., mechanical forces or thermal forces are generated. IJ4,m = Probability that release class 1 occurs, based on the accident force type, force magnitudqand the package capability. I'5in = Probability that meteorological class n occurs on link j. A,,P = Release amount for release class Q. X,. = Health effect on the hazardous material for meteorological class n. - N,, = Number of persons in population class m. 3-1 Volume I, Appendix I ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3.2 Defense Programs Transportation observable health effect, and are below regulatory Risk Analysis concern, there is a small probability that an exposed individual may develop a latent cancer This section describes the risk assessment of which may be fatal. The risk associated with transporting Defense Program nuclear material intrinsic radiation is referred to as ‘incident-free (test devices, nuclear explosives, and pits) to the risk’. NTS. The consequences of interest are incident- free radiation-induced cancer, traffic fatality and In a severe transportation accident, ‘blunt trauma, accident-initiated radiation-induced cancer and burns, or both’ may result in fatalities to vehicle detriment in US. DUE, Transportation Risk occupants, pedestrians, and bystanders. This Assessment From Sandia Naiional Laboraiories to consequence is independent of the cargo carried in D. Howard, US. DOE, Nevada Test Site EIS, the trailer. The risk associated with fatalities and (Clauss 1996). Incident-free non-radiological risk injuries caused by blunt trauma and/or burns is was also calculated for Defense Programs (SAIC, referred to as the ‘vehicle-related risk’. 1996a). The consequences of terrorist attacks are not specifically analyzed, but the radiological Given a very severe transportation accident, consequences are not believed to be greater than radioactive materials could be dispersed into the the maximum release scenario presented. atmosphere, which could subsequently expose members of the public in the vicinity of the 3.2.1 Defense Programs Transportation Risk accident to ionizing radiation. Although the Methodology and Data exposure levels can be higher than those associated with intrinsic radiation (due to direct contact by The DOE maintains and operates a special fleet of inhalation), the levels are still below those that trucks and trailers used to transport Category I1 or result in an immediate or observable health effect. higher nuclear material between DoD sites and Just as for intrinsic radiation, the primary health DOE production sites, laboratories, and test sites effect is a possible increase in latent cancer in a safe and secure manner. Because the DOE fatalities in the exposed population. The risk exclusively operates and maintains the safe-secure associated with dispersal is referred to as ‘cargo- trailer network, the DOE is responsible for related risk’. evaluating and approving the use of this network. One method of evaluation is to perform a 1. Incident-Free Risk transportation risk assessment; the model used for safe-secure trailer activities is ADROIT. This code a. Transportation of radioactive materials was developed and is operated by Sandia National will result in some radiological dose to Laboratories. the general public along the route even under normal conditions. The incident- Three different consequences are considered in the free risk calculation in the ADROIT risk evaluation: intrinsic radiation; blunt trauma, code is patterned after the one used as a burns, or both associated with transportation basis for the RADTRAN computer code accidents; and dispersal of radioactive material RADTRAN 4 Volume II: Technical associated with extremely severe transportation Manual, (Neuhauser and Kanipe, 1993) accidents. with modifications to specialize it for safe-secure trailer shipments. A simple ‘Intrinsic radiation’ exposes members of the public radiation transport model is used to along the roadway, on the roadway, and at rest calculate the radiation flux intensity as a stops to extremely low levels of ionizing radiation function of distance from the source. during routine travel. Although the levels are well The people absorbing the dose are below those at which there is any immediate or divided into three groups: people Volume I, Appendix I 3-2 - hrEVADA TEST SITE FI)VAL E,VVIROXMEA’I’AL 1.WPACTSTATEME~VT adjacent to the roadway on which the calculated in ADROIT based on a simple shipment is traveling, people traveling event tree. on the roadway in other vehicles, and people exposed during rest stops. The b. The annual probability of tow-aways is total dose to the public is the sum of the based on the distribution for the doses for each of these three groups. Armored TractoriSafe-Secure Trailer (ATlSST) overall tow-away rate per b. For calculational purposes, each trailer is mile, the influence factors for different modeled as a point radiation source operating environments, and the annual located at the geometric center of the mileage in each operating environment; trailer. The source strength of the which is determined from the shipment radiation is usually given in terms of the prqjections, and the route segmentation Transportation Index (TI), which is a data files. The probability of a fatal measure of the source strength one meter accident given a tow-away accident is from the “package” surface. Both sampled from a binomial distribution gamma rays and neutrons contribute to based on Determination of Influence the TI, hut for weapons shipments the Factors and Accident Rates for the gamma component is usually dominant. Armored TractoriSafe-Secure Trailer While the mechanisms that govern the (Phillips et al., 1994). Given a fatal transport of neutrons in air are quite accident the number of fatalities is different from those that govern gamma sampled from the multinomial rays, the rate of absorption in air for both distribution based on the 1980 to 1988 types of radiation is similar. For this trucks involved in fatal accidents data reason, as well as to simplify the (Variable 45) for tractor semitrailer calculations, the source is modeled as accidents, (Blower, 1991; Sullivan and 100 percent gamma radiation. This Massie, 1993). approximation leads to a conservative (overestimate) result for radiation dose There are three basic elements of the (Neuhauser and Kanipe, 1993). A large accidental dispersal risk assessment. fraction of the people exposed to the Probabilities of release by tlic three radiation will be protected by some mechanisms that can produce respirable- environmental shielding such as sized aerosols and specific consequence automobile bodies, building walls, and scenarios were developed based on an shrubbery. However, the effect of this event tree analysis. Consequences are shielding is ignored in the calculations, evaluated for each end event in the tree which is also conservative. through an assessment which integrates dispersal calculations, route c. Incident-free nonradiological risk was characterization, population data, and also calculated in SAlC (1996a), and dose-health effects models to provide an nonradiological health effects are those estimate of excess LCFs and associated with vehicle exhaust contaminated area. Uncertainties are emissions. evaluated by incorporating Latin hybercube sampling into the caluclations 2. Vehicle-Related Risk for probabilities and consequences. a. The probability of fatalities due to direct 3. Cargo-Related Risk effects of the accident environment (i.e., blunt trauma, bums, or both to vehicle a. Radioactive materials transported to occupants, pedestrians and bystanders) is support Defense Program include, but 3-3 Vnlume I. Appzndix I are not limited to, isotopes of plutonium, rates in different operating environments, and the uranium, thorium, and hydrogen. Other types and severities of accidents. than relatively low levels of intrinsic radiation (which are considered in the Human health effects are estimated in the incident-free risk calculation), plutonium consequence assessment. Health consequences are and uranium isotopes do not pose a expressed in terms of the expected number of significant health hazard in the form in excess LCF produced in the exposed population. which they are transported; they must The exposed population is defined as those first he converted to an aerosol with members of the public subject a maximum respirable-size particles. Three individual risk of contracting an excess latent mechanisms by which aerosol may be cancer resulting in fatality (given a dispersal) generated and released are considered in greater than 1 in 10 thousand. ADROIT: violent reaction of high explosive, oxidation in a fire, and 3.2.2 Defense Programs Transportation Risk spalling and break-up of the surface System Description oxide layer by mechanical forces. Under Alternative 1, nuclear test devices would he b. There are three basic elements of the transported to the NTS Nuclear test devices, high accidental dispersal risk assessment. explosives, and pits would be transported to NTS Probabilities of release by the three under Alternative 3. mechanisms that can produce respirahle- sized aerosols, and specific consequence The only Defense Program shipments to and from scenarios are developed based on an the NTS under Alternative 1 are 10 per year from event tree analysis. Consequences are Pantex; two per year from Los Alamos National evaluated for each end event in the tree Laboratory (LANL); and two per year from through an assessment which integrates Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory dispersal calculations, route (LLNL), for a total of 140 shipments over the 10 characterization, population data, and year period in question. The radiological hazard dose-health effects models to provide an from these shipments is bounded by assuming not estimate of excess latent cancer fatalities more than 10 kg of weapons grade plutonium per and contaminated area. Uncertainties container, and only one container for each ATiSST are evaluated by incorporating Latin trip. hybercube sampling into the calculations for probabilities and consequences. Under Alternative 3, the NT’S would receive not only the test device shipments (as in Alternative I), For this analysis, ADROIT was used to calculate hut also nuclear explosives. The projected number the probability of each accident scenario leading to of shipments of nuclear explosives over the 10 year a release. The operating history with the ATiSST period is 1,587. is sufficient to define an overall tow-away accident rate. The mean estimate for the rate oftow-away Under this Alternative, the NTS would be the sole accidents involving an ATEST is 0.066 per million location for interim storage of pits as well as being miles. However, the number of accidents used for assemblyidisasseinbly operations. Under experienced with the ATiSST is not sufficient to this scenario. pits already stored at the Pantex Plant quantify the accident rate in the operating would he transported from Pantex to the NTS. In environments of intercst, or the types and severities addition, pits would he transported between the of accidents. Thus, general commerce data for NTS and LANL for the purpose of quality heavy truck transportation is used as a surrogate assurance and testing. The projected number of for ATISST data to quantify the relative accident shipments over the next 10 years under this scenario is 366. Volume 1. Appendix I 3-4 ~ Details concerning routes are classified. describes the risk analysis of the transportation of low-level waste and mixed waste to the NTS. 3.2.3 Defense Program Transportation Risk The analysis calculated both incident-free and Results accident-initiated risks of radiation-induced cancer and detriment; and chemical-induced cancer and Health effects for the transportation of Defense noticancer health effects, as well as the expected Program nuclear materials to the NTS were number of traffic fatalities and injuries. Risks calculated for incident-free radiological effects were calculated for the entire national route from and nonradiological effects, vehicle-related traffic each generator, and for 10 representative in-state fatalities and accident-initiated radiological effects routes. All results represent the risk for the entire (LCF). The risks were calculated for the 10 year campaign. The maximum reasonably transportation of test devices, nuclear explosives, foreseeable accident was also assessed. and pits. The results of this analysis for Alternative 1 are shown in Table 3-1, in Table 3-2 3.3.1 Methodology for Alternative 3, and are compared in Table 3-3. The risk assessment approach includes system 3.2.4 Defense Program Transportation Risk definition, accident scenario description, frequency Conclusions analysis, consequence analysis, risk evaluation, and documentation. tollowing this approach, the For all scenarios, between 60 and 65 percent of first step in the transportation risk analysis for the the collective exposure (and health risk) is received Waste Management Program was to identify the by people on theroadway. Between 30 and current and potential types of waste that would be 35 percent is received by members of the public at transported to the NTS under each alternative. rest stops. The balance of the collective exposure Representative national routes from each generator is received by people offthe roadway. By contrast, to the NTS as well as in-state routes, were selected the maximum individual dose (and risk) is received for evaluation. The in-state routes were chosen to by an individual off the roadway. This is because reflect local concerns regarding route segments. an individual living near the roadway in Las Vegas The routes chosen are not necessarily the exact or another town common to all the routes is routes that will be chosen by actual carriers, but assumed to be exposed to the intrinsic radiation represent the most likely routes on the basis of from all the shipments, whereas the people sharing distance, accessibility, and economics. On-site the roadway or at rest stops are not likely to transportation risk was also calculated. The include the same individuals for all (or even most) maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was shipments. assessed, as were maximum individual doses. No reasonably foreseeable (release probability In this transportation risk analysis, the scenarios greater than 10.' per year) consequence (greater are either incident-free transportation, which has than I) scenarios that would result in a release exist the consequence of exposure to ionizing radiation in the transportation of Defense Program nuclear from the contents or exposure to vehicle-exhaust materials to the NTS. Therefore, there are no emissions, or accident-initiated releases. In maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents. accident-initiated releases, a vehicle accident is the initiating event and must be followed by failure of 3.3 Waste Management Activities the packaging in order to rcsult in an actual release Transportation Risk of the radioactive or hazardous contents. A complete list of the NTS transportation risk Waste management transportation is the risk analysis accident scenarios can be found in associated with transportation of waste generated DOEmV (1996). by environmental restoration and waste management programs at the NTS. This section 3-5 Volume 1, Appendix I .~ - ~MEL'ADATEST SITE I%VAL &VI'lROL:MLVIiL MAC7STATE.IfE.I;T Table 3-1. Defense Programs Transportation Risk for Alternative 1 Conseauences && Incident-Srec radiological effects 4 x 10~' Incidcnt-free rronradiological effects I.X5 x 10" 'Trnfiic Satalitics 6 h 10-a Accident-initialed radiological effects 8 h lo-" Maximum exposed individual 7 x 10P Table 3-2. Defense Programs Transportation Risk for Alternative 3 Nuclear Conseauences Test Devices Exnlosives -Pits Total Incident-free radiological effects 4 x 10~' 2 x 10~' I 10-4 2.14 x 10~' Incident-free nonradiological effmts a il a ?.Ill x 10~' Traffic fatalitics 6 x 10.' 8 x 10" 2 Y 10~' 10.6 x 10.' Accident-initiatcd radiological effects 8 x 10~" Y 10~7 I in.' I x 104 Maximum exposed individual 7 x 10~~ 3 x 10" 2 x IO~' 3.3 x 106 il. Not calcuhtcd individually Table 3-3. Comparison of Defense Programds Transportation Risks Between Alternative 1 and Alternative 3 Conseauences Alternative 1 Alternative 3 Incidcnt-free radiological effccts 4 Y 11)~' 2.14~IU~' Incident-free nonradiological eikcts 1.85 x 104 4.01 x 10~' 'Traffic Sitalilias 6 x 10.' 1.06x Ill" Accident-initiated radirilogical effects 8 x 10" I x 10" Maximum cxposed individual 7 x 10~8 3.3 x inh The consequences of interest in this study are (chronic) after exposure, resulting in a vehicle-related and cargo-related. Vehicle-related fatality. consequences include traffic fatalities, traffic injuries, and incident-free nonradiological 2. Radiation-induced detriment, i.e., other consequences. Cargo-related consequences are chronic health effects including non-fatal divided into four types: cancer occurring after 20 years or so, such as genetic damage or birth defect. 1. Radiation-induced latent cancer fatality, i.e., a cancer occurring 20 or so years 3. Cancer incidence 20 years or more in the future (chronic) resulting from exposure Volume 1, Appendix I 3-6 N5VADA TEST SITE FINAL E,.YVIRONMEXTAL IMPACT STATE.WEh 7' to hazardous volatile organic compounds International Commission on Radiation Protection due to accident conditions. (ICRP 1991). [n cases where the individual dose is more than 20 rem and the dose rate is greater than 4. Noncancer health effects (chronic) due 10 rem in a 1-hour period, prompt effects, in to exposures to hazardous volatile addition to latent effects, may be of concern. None organic compounds due to accident of the exposures resulting from the transportation conditions (i.e., nausea, genetic effects, of low-level waste and mixed waste to the NTS and central nervous system damage). would exceed this level. For example, the dose-to- risk conversion factor for workers is 0.0004 LCF Although accident-initiated exposure levels may be per person-rem. If a population of 100 workers higher than those associated with incident-free received a collective dose of 30 person-rem, the transportation, the levels would still be below those estimated number of 1,CFs among all 100 workers that result in an immediate or observable health would be: effect; therefore, the risk of early (acute) fatality or illness is not reported. Radiological consequences (30 person - rem x 0.0004 LCFPerson - rem) = for the transportation of radioactive waste were 0.012LCF estimated for members of the public and transport crew under both normal operating conditions and This means that there would be about 1 chance in accident conditions. Members of the public are 83 (110.012) that a single LCF would occur among considered to be persons who are within 800 the 100 workers as a result of the radiation meters (m) (875 yards [yd]) of the transportation exposure. Latent cancer fatalities caused by corridor, persons sharing the transport corridor radiation exposure are cancers that take many years with the transport, and persons at rest stops. For to develop, and may not be the actual cause of the accident scenarios, the radiological doses were death. In addition to LCFs, other health effects, estimated for individuals located near the scene of including nonfatal cancer and genetic effects, could the accident and for the population within a 61 km occur. (SO-mi) radius of the accident. Risk associated with waste handling activities are discussed in The DOE guidance for preparing environmental detail in Appendix H, Human Health Risks and impact statements recommend using a Safety Impacts Study. transportation risk model which is a defensible estimation method, such as the most current Radiological consequences are expressed in terms version of RADTRAN. The stakeholders of person-rem (Roentgen equivalent man). The requested that a more open modeling process be collective dose to an exposed population is used, so they could actively review the calculated by summing individual doses in that assumptions, input data, and formulas. population. For example, if 100 people are exposed to 300 millirem per year (mrem/yr), the The model used to perform the NTS EIS collective dose would be: Transportation Study is a RADTRAN-like model that is more flexible and easier for the stakeholder (100 people x 0.3 rem) = 30 person-rem due to to review and use. The model is composed of a background radiation in a population of 100. combination of spreadsheets and FORTRAN number to assist in the evaluation of routes for the Assuming a linear dose-response relationship, a transportation of low-level waste. Being easier to population dose of 30 person-rem is equivalent to review, the analysis allows stakeholders to review 50 people receiving a dose of 600 mremiyr. input data and assumptions, and contributes to the acceptance of risk values. The most significant health effects due to radiation exposure are latent cancer fatalities (LCF) and Thc NTS transportation risk model was compared detriment (illness or injury), as defined by to KAD'IRAN 4 (IT Corp., 1995a). Three sites 1-7 \'olumc I. Appendix 1 - ~. within the DOE complex were chosen, and up to The results of a separate study calculating the risk four routes were modeled for each site. The routes from transporting low-level waste from Tonopah to used were identified as those most frequently the NTS, (IT Corp., 1995b) were incorporated into traveled. The sites used for this comparison are the results reported here. In addition, corrections Lawrence Livermorc National I~boratory,Pantex were made to some of the results from the Draft Plant, and Savannah River Site. Similar source Transportation Risk Assessment; the calculation of terms (based on shipment inventory) were used in new results is documented in Risk Assessment fur both models. the NTS EIS Alternalives I 82 3 and the TTR (SAIC, 1996d). The primary differences between the models are in the development of the external dose rate, and in 3.3.2 System Description assumptions concerning shielding of the low-level waste. If a radioisotope which was present at the The system being evaluated consists of shipments identified site was not present in the RADTRAN of radioactive and hazardous materials (including library, that radioisotope was eliminated from the wastes) to the NTS. The type and amount of waste radioactive source term in order to maintain varies under each alternative. Historically, the compatibility ofthe modcls. instead of the actual primary radioactive waste type accepted for external dose rate based on historical data from the disposal at the NTS has been low-level waste. DOE, the Transportation Index (TI) was used in Under Alternative I, Continue Current Operations RADTRAN 4 to calculate external exposure during (No Action), and Alternative 3, Expanded Use, the routine transportation. The TI is defined as the disposal sites at the NTS would continue to accept exposure rate at a distant of I meter from the low-level waste from both on-site and off-site container. generators. Mixed waste from on-site generators would also be managed under both alternatives. lhe other difference between the models is in the Definitions of other radioactive waste types are shielding factors used. No shielding was used in provided below for comparison and clarity. the RADTRAN calculation, resulting in a very conservative potential exposure rate. The NTS Waste Definitions model takes into account shielding, based on real time data that lias been obtained from DOE low- Hazardous Waste - Wastes that are level waste shipments. The assumptions associated designated as hazardous by the with the shielding result in NTS-model dose results Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or that are attenuated by a factor of 10.' to State of Nevada regulations. Hazardous relative to the corresponding RADTRAN 4 waste, defined under the Resource calculated doses. Conservation and Recovery Act, is waste from production or operation activities that This comparison indicates that the results are poses a potential hazard to human health or comparable given the standard assumptions. The the environment when improperly treated, radiation doses calculated by the two models are in stored, or disposed. Hazardous wastes that general agreement. This was expected, since the appear on special EPA lists possess at least equations used in tlie NTS model are based on one of the following characteristics: KADTRAN 4 equations. As indicated, the reason ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity. for the primary difference in the dose results is the assumptions associated with shielding in the NTS Mixed Waste - Waste containing both model. Another factor that may account for some radioactive and hazardous components, as of the differences in the results is the difference in defined by the Atomic Energy and the long-term treatment of dispersion of radioactive Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, material froin a container after an accident. respectively. Mixed waste intended for disposal must meet the Land Disposal Restrictions as listed in Land Disposal management activities are required in the Restriclions 40 CFR 268. Mixed waste is a handling of these materials. generic term for specific types of mixed waste such as low-level mixed waste, and Under Alternative I, the NTS would continue to transuranic mixed waste. accept waste from 15 off-site generators (currently approved) and from ongoing DOEINV Low-Level Mixed Waste - Low-level waste environmental restoration activities. Future waste that also includes hazardous components, as shipments would consist of both low-level waste identified in, Identification and Listing of and mixed waste. If Alternative 3 is selected, it is Hazardous Waste, 40 CFR 261, Subparts C anticipated that waste shipments to the NTS would and D. come from approximately 28 off-site waste generators (DOE, 199%). Future waste received Transuranic Waste - Radioactive waste at the NTS for disposal would generally consist of containing alpha-emitting radionuclides low-level waste and mixed waste, the type being having an atomic number greater than 92, dependent upon the specific waste-generator site. half-lives greater than 20 years, and in Alternative 2, would result in closure of the NTS; concentrations greater than 100 nanocuries therefore, no waste operations would occur. (nCi) per gram. Alternative 4, Alternate Use of Withdrawn Land, would allow for only NTS-generated waste to be Low-Level Waste - Radioactive waste not managed, and no off-site transport would occur. classified as high-level waste, transuranic Since Alternatives 2 and 4 would eliminate the waste, spent nuclear fuel, or the tailings or receipt and disposal of wastes generated outside wastes produced by the extraction or the NTS, they are not considered further in this concentration of uranium or thorium from any analysis. The waste generators, primary waste ore processed primarily for its source material types, and waste shipment information associated content. Test specimens of fissionable with alternatives I and 3 are shown in Tables 3-4, material irradiated for research and 3-5, and 3-6. development only, and not for the production of power or plutonium, may be classified as Another aspect of a transportation system is low-level waste, provided the concentration routing. Routes evaluated in the waste of transuranic elements is less than 100 nCi management analysis were selected using the per gram. routing program Highway 3.2-An Enhanced Highway Routing Model: Program Descrbtion. High-Level Waste -The highly radioactive iWethodoloa3 and Revised User Is Manual, waste material that results from the (Johnson et al., 1993). The routes evaluated may reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. including not be the actual routes used for transportation. liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing of and any solid waste derived from the The HIGHWAY 3.2 program is a flexible tool for liquid, that contains a combination of evaluating highway routes for transporting transuraiiic waste and fission products in hazardous materials in the United States. The concentrations requiring permanent isolation. HIGHWAY database contains a computerized road atlas that describes over 240,000 miles of - Classified Waste - Weapons components highways including complete description of the and assemblies designated by the U.S. entire interstate system and other highways except Government, pursuant to Executive Order, those that parallel a nearby interstate. Many state statute, or regulation, that require protection highways and a number of local and county against unauthorized information or material highways are also identified. The database also disclosure for reasons of national security. includes locations of nuclear facilities and major Additional security and safeguards airports. 3-9 Volumc I, Appendix I ~ A'EL'AD.4 TEST SITE FINAL LNUROIV.WENTAL MPACT STATE.W&VT Table 3-4. Low-Level Waste and Mixed Waste Volumes" and Shipments for Alternative 1 Volume Number Generator of Shipments 'd Abcrdeen Proving Ground 790 21 Energy Technology Engineering 614 16 Environmental Management Project 84,177 2,213 L.awrence Livermore National Laboratory 1,928 51 Inhalation Toxicology Rcsearch Institute 344 9 Mound 60,027 1,578 Nevada Tcst Site 150,500 11,615' Oak Ridge National Laboratory 26,607 699 Pantex Plant 769 20 RMI Extrusion Plant 5,528 146 Rocky Flats Environmental 'Technology Site 14,000 2,000 Sandia National Laboratories - California 219 6 Sandia National Laboratories - New Mexico 351 9 All vnluincs dcrivcd Crnm thc 1994 lntcgrated Data Base, the Baseline Environmental Management Repon (DOE, 1995a) and thc Draft Waste Managcmenl Programmatic EIS (DUE, 1995~) Cubic Mstcr 'Assume wntaincrs are 4' x 4 x 7' boxes dAssume 12 containers per shipment 'Bulk shipment: assume 13 in' per shipment Volume I Appcndn I 3-10 -~ - ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Table 3-5. Low-Level Waste Volumes"and Shipments for Alternative 1 10-year Volume Number Generator Site Proiection (db 21 4berdeen Proving Ground 790 32 4mes Laboratory 1,232 11,265 296 9rgonne National Laboratory - Ea 257 3ettis Atomic Power Laboratory 9,775 86 3rookhaven National Laboratory 3,264 3ergy Technology Engineering Center 614 16 57 Fermi Laboratory 2,165 2,213 Fernald Environmental Management Project 84,177 Llanford 170,891 4,492 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and 106,934 2,81 I Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory - Kesselring 15,554 409 I34 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 5,099 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 1,928 51 Los Alamos National Laboratory 41,773 1,098 Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute 344 9 Mound 60,027 1,578 1 1,600 Nevada Test Site 150,000 Oak Ridge National Laboratory 26,607 699 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 16,996 447 Pantex Plant 769 20 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 63,512 1,670 Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory 187 5 RMl Extrusion Plant 5,528 146 Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site 14,000 2,000 Sandia National LaboratoriesICA 219 6 Savannah River Site 243,90 1 6,411 West Valley Demonstration Project 67 2 Stanford Linear Accelerator 3,694 97 Sandia National LaboratoriesMM 351 9 a All volumes derived from the 1994 Integrated Data Base, the Baseline Environmental Management Report (DOE, 1995a) and the Drafl Waste Management Programmatic EIS (DOE. 1995~) Assumes containers are 4' x 4' x 7' Assumes 12 containers per shipment 3-1 I Volume I, Appendix I ~~ NEVADA TEST SliE FINAL ENVIRON,WENTAI. IMPACT STATEMENT Table 3-6. Mixed Waste Volume and Shipments for Alternative 3 Volume Number Generator of Shinments r,d Ames Laboratory 1 1 Argonne National Laboratory - East 6,700 181 Bettis Laboratory 40 1 Hanford 120,000 3,243 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 47,390 1,281 Knolls Laboratory 1 so 4 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 4,300 1 I6 Los Alamos National Laboratory 2,700 73 Nevada Test site (ER)” 500 IS Paducah Plant 600 16 Portsmouth Plant 33,754 912 RMI Extrusion Plant 2s I Rocky Flats 63,000 9,000 Savannah River 21,300 576 West Valley 40 1 Generatcd by the Environmental Restoration Program Cubic Meter ‘ Assume conlaincrs arc 4’ x 4’ x 7’ boxes d.4ssumc 12 containers pcr shipment Several different types of transport routes may be Program offers a selection between different routes calculated by the HIGHWAY Program, depending of nearly equal length. It also has the on a set of user- supplied constraints. HIGHWAY capability to report route-specific population calculates routes by minimizing the total distance density data. The population density distribution is and driving time along a particular highway calculated for each highway segment in the route segment. Several user-supplied routing constraints and is reported on a state-by-state basis. The can be imposed during the selection process. population data used by the program are based on Special features of the model UIGUWAY is the the 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census block group ability to calculate routes that maximize the use of data. A United States map showing the national the interstate highway system, and the ability to interstate system is given in Figure 3-1. Specific select routes that bypass a specific state, city, town, descriptions of the generator truck routes were or highway segment. taken from the HIGHWAY 3.2 routing code, and are described in detail in Attachment F. Thc UIGHWAY 3.2 Program has the capability to automatically identify alternative routes. Most Ten in-state routes within Nevada, generated by the routing models will produce only a single route, HIGHWAY 3.2 computer program, were identified although different routes between the generator for evaluation to allow more detailed analysis of site and the NTS often vary only slightly in the Nevada routes. This effort was crucial to distancc and estimated driving time. With the comparing geographic area5 of concern. The alternativc routing feature, the HIGHWAY selection of routes within Nevada had the same Volume I, Appendix I 3-12 -~ NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Figure 3-1. National Interstate System 3-13 Volume I, Appendix I ~~ ~~ parameters as the national routes, that is, interstate 573), west to Rancho Drive, north on U.S. and state highways were used instead of local roads Highway 95. The length of this route is 227 km wherever possible. However, rather than the most (14 I mi). Craig Road is another road segment of direct routes being selected, alternative routes were concern to local officials. The residential growth identitied specifically to avoid three geographical in the adjacent areas has created congestion as well areas ofconcern: Craig Road, the Interstate 1SIU.S. as concern for the effect of hazardous material Highway 95 interchange, and Hoover Dam transport to the residential population. (Boulder City). NV-3, Northern Route 5 (Figure 3-4). South on Within Nevada, the routes selected are based on U.S. Highway 93 (from Idaho) to Ely, south on the direction of approach to the NTS. Local U.S. Highway 6 to Tonopah, south on US. concerns focused their analysis on specific areas Highway 95. The length of this route is 846 km such as the lloover Dam; highway segments that (526 mi) the longest Nevada alternate route. It is had congested or scemingly higher accident the only Nevada route which goes through Ely and probabilities, (Interstate 1511J.S. Highway 95 Tonopah, as well as other areas with relatively low interchange), and segments with rapid growth, population densities. (Craig Road). In particular, one alternative route was proposed to avoid passage through Boulder NV-4, Eastern Route 9 (Figure 3-5). North on City and I Ioover Dam. Interstate 40 to Interstate I5 U.S. Highway 93 (from Arizona) via Hoover Dam, would allow sliipments to approach the NTS from to I.as Vegas, through the Interstate 15IU.S. the south ~itlioutpassing through Boulder City Highway 95 interchange, continuing north on U.S. and Hoover Dam. .This alternative would allow Highway 95. The length of this route is 161 km shipments to proceed to the NTS through Pahrump, (100 mi). Routing through the Hoover Nevada or on tlic US.Highway 95 through the DamIBoulder City area is also a local concern. Intcrstate l5IU.S. Iligliway 95 interchange. The Traffic in the area is congested by the slowdown of roules arc described in the following paragraphs. vehicles because of the curves and grade of the road as well as visitors entering and leaving the NV-1, Eastern Route 7 (Figure 3-2). (Note: parking areas for the Hoover Dam. "Eastern Route 7" identified that the route is approached from the east, and the number relates NV-5, Eastern Route 10 (Figure 3-6). North on to the specific unique designation the route was U.S. Highway 93 (from Arizona) via Hoover Dam, givcn carlier.) South on Interstate 15 (from to US.Highway 93iU.S. Highway 95, north to Arizona) to Las Vegas, through the Interstate State Route- 146, west to Interstate 15, and north to lS/U.S. IHighway 95 interchange, and north on State Route-I60 to U.S. Highway 95. The length IJ.S. Highway 95. The length ofthis route is 238 ofthisrouteis211 km(131 mi). (km) (148 miles [mi]). The interstate I5IU.S. Highway 95 interchange is referred to locally as NV-6, Southern Route 6 (Figure 3-7). North on the "Spaghetti Bowl". It is a location at which U.S. Highway 95 (from California) through the numerous merging vehiclcs routinely create Interstate I5IU.S. Highway 95 Interchange and, congestion, traffic delays. and accidents. None of north on U.S. Highway 95. The length of this route the Nevada route dcscriptions include a local road is 233 kin (145 mi). approximately 3.2 km (2 mi), that connects U.S. Higlway 95 to the NTS entrancc gate at Mercury. NV-7, Southern Route 8 (Figure 3-8). North on because it is coinnioii to all of Ihe Nevada route U.S. Highway 95 (from California) north on State alternatives; Iiowevcr. this local connector road Route-146, west to Interstate 15, to State Route was included in the risk analysis calculation. 160 to U.S. Highway 95. The length of this route is 283 km (I76 mi). NV-2, Eastern Route 8 (Figure 3-3). South on Interstatc 15 (from Arizona) to Craig Road (SR- 3-15 Volurnc I. Appendix I Figure- 3-3. NV-2, Eastern Route 8 Volume I. Appcndlv I 3-16 ;ure 3-4. NV-3, Northern Route 5 a Figure- 3-5. NV-4, Eastern Route 9 -ure 3-6. NV-5, Eastern Route 10 ,?JEVADA TEST SITE FI’VAL E.NVIRON.WE.VTAL IMPACT STATEjWEjVT Figure 3-7. NV-6, Southern Route 6 - ne I. Appcndn I 3-20 ~ ~~~ NV-8, Southern Route 1 (Figure 3-9). North on average dispersion, and another to represent a Interstate 15 (from California), to Las Vegas worst-case dispersion. through the Interstate 1SIU.S. Highway 95 Interchange, north on U.S. Highway 95. The Population dose estimates are based on the unit length of this route is 175 km (I 09 mi). risk factor approach. The unit risk factor proves an estimate of the dose to either crew members or NV-9, Southern Route 2 (Figure 3- 10). North on specified members ofthe public from transporting Interstate IS (from California), west on State a single shipment, on a single route, with a Road-I60 to [J.S. Highway 9s. lhe length of this specified population density. Unit risk factors, in route is 208 kin (129 mi). units of person-reni per kilometer, are multiplied by shipping distances in various population zones N\’-10, Southern Route 5 (Figure 3-1 I). North (as determined by the HIGHWAY 3.2 code) to on State Road-373 (from California), east on U.S. calculate the total population dose for one Highway 95. The length of this route is 74 km (46 shipment. mi). The population dose estimates are then converted 3.3.3 Data Values to excess latent cancer fatalities using the dose conversion factors of 5 x I 0-4(0.0005 ) excess fatal l‘lie types of data used, their sources, assumptions, cancers per person-reni for members of the public and related uncertainties for the waste management and 4 x I 0-4(0.0004) fatal cancers per person-rein activities evaluation are discussed below. Specific for the crew (ICRP, 1991). values ofall data are provided in DOE/” (1996). Low-level and mixed waste characterization data Radiation detriment the dose conversion factors are was derived from the DOE Integrated Data Base, I .6 x I 0.4 for the worker and 2.3 x 10.‘ for the the Draft Waste Management Prograniinatic EIS general public. The dose conversion factor for the (DOE, 1995~). and NTS waste management public is slightly higher because of the inclusion of estimates. Representative physical and more sensitive individuals (e.g., children). radiological characteristics were assumed for each waste type because detailed consideration of every The chemical-induced noncancer risk is reported as possible shipment would he impractical. Contact- a hazard index. The hazard index is the ratio handled low-level waste, mixed waste, and between daily intake of a noncarcinogenic toxic transurmic waste were each assigned a dose rate of chemical and acceptable reference level. If the 0.05 mreniilir at I in from the shipping container. hazard index is less than one, then no consequences would be expected. Accident scverity categories for radioactive waste transportation accidents are taken froin Final on Uncertainty is introduced with each step of the the 7rmi.sporlotion ojRadina~liveMaterial by Air analysis. Conservative assumptions and values and Other Modes, NUREG-01 70 (NRC, 1977). (those which lead to overestimating the risk) are Accident severity is assigned on the basis of used whenever assumptions are made. and when impact ftorce and the potential for fire. Each the data values are not well known. The most accident sevcrity category is assigned a probability uncertain parameter was the contents of each of occiirrcnce. Potential radioactive releases from shipment, e.g., the radiological characteristics, the transportation accidents %ere estimated using chemical characteristics, and tlie physical form. It release fractions (IT Corp., 1996) for each accident was conservatively assumed that the waste forms severity category. were resuspendable and combustible under accident conditions. The high end of allowable Radioactive material released to thc atmosphere is concentration values used for the chemicals were dispersed hy tlic wind. Two Pasquill stability takeii froin (DOE, 1995~). Other uncertainties catcgories bvere sclected; one to rcpresent the include the health cffect models used for ;ure 3-9. NV-8, Southern Route 1 NEVADA TESTSIE FINAL EKVIRO,VMENTAL IMPACT SJZTE,WE,VT Figure 3-10. NV-9, Southern Route 2 me 1, Appendix I 3-24 NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL E.VVIR0h'MENTAL IMPACT STA7E.LE1'T Figure 3-11. NV-10, Southern Route 5 3-25 Volume I, Appendix I chemicals, radionuclides, and dose assessment Maximum Exposed Individual Risk assumptions. The data required to apply the methodology are subject to sampling errors, The maximum individual dose and health effects variability, ineasurcment errors, and assumptions. risk were calculated for members of the public: a The cargo-related risks are low but they also have person caught in traffic, a resident living along the the largest uncertainties because the input high\vay, and a service station worker. These parameters for their calculations are the least results are reported for a singlc event in Maximurn known. The uncertainties for the higher vehicle- Indiridzrrrl Do.ses.fi,rIiicin'ent-Free Trcmsportation, related risks are the smallest, allowing (SAIC, 1996b). The maximum exposed individual differentiation for each route on the basis of was a person caught in traffic with an expected distance, which is subject only to a small dose of4.1 mrem/event. resulting in a risk of latent nieasuremeiit error. cancer fatality of 2 x (about I iii 500,000). 3.3.4 Waste Management Transportation Risk Incident-free tionradiolorrical risk Results and Conclusions Incident-frce nonradiological risks for .The following sections discuss iiational, in-state, transportation of lowlevel Lvaste and mixed waste and on-site risks from the transportation lowlevel were calculated in SAIC (1996a). These liealth and mixed waste to thc NIS. effects resulted from cxposure to vehicle exhaust em issioiis. National Routes Risk Under Alternative I, these incident-free The estimated number of vehicle fatalities along nonradiological risks are 3.02 x 10.' (about 1 in the national routes during the 10-year period 300), and they are I .20 Y I 0-2(about I in 75) under Alternative 3. for Alteriiativc I is 2, 27 vehicle injuries are estimated. The risk of a single radiation-induced Maximum reasonablv foreseeable accident canccr fatality in the general population is 0.0025 (about I in 400). 'I'he risks calculated for the other 'The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident is consequence types is significantly smaller than defined as the accident of highest consequences these. Results are shown in Table 3-7. with a probability of occurrence that is greater than or equal to I .0x I0~'peryear. These accidents for Along the national routes within Nevada, less than lowlevel and mixed waste transportation under one (0.02) vcliicle death is estimated, and only one Alternatives I and 3 were analyzed in an vehicle-related injury. The risk of a single asscsstnent ofNTS shipments (SAIC 1996~).The radiation-induced cancer fatality is 0.00075 about maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents were 1 in 1.300 (Table 3-X). evaluated for urban, suburban, and rural populations under both neutral and stable IJnder Alternative 3, the number of vehicle atmospheric conditions. The maximum fatalities is estitnatcd as eight. One hundred and consequences under Altcrnative 1 occur in an three vehicle-related iiijuries are cstimated to urban zone under stable atmospheric conditions; occur. The risk ofa single radiation-induced LCF they are radiation-induced fatal cancers is 0.077 (about I in 3). These results are shown in (2.25x105), and detriment (1.04 x 10~'). The Table 3-7. Within Nevada, only four vehiclc- highest aiiiiual maximum severity accident related injuries are expected, and less than one frequency was 2.25 s 10.' for travel through rural (0.08) fatality. Cargo-related fatalities are 0.016 population zones. (Tahle 3-8). Under Alternative 3, the most severe expected consequences from low-level waste transportation is also radiation-induced cancer (2.25 x 10"). The maximum severity accident frequency with these consequences is 8.08 x 10” for travel through rural NV-3, the longest route, lias thc highest risk population zones. The radiation-induced health (8.75 x lo-”). The difference between tlie highest effects consequences and probabilities for mixed risk and the lowest is exceedingly smali. waste transportation are the same as those for low- level waste transportation. The chemical-induced Chemical cancer deaths and hazards due to consequences are cancer (1.1 x 10.‘) and the accidents would be the result of acute exposure to chemical noncancer hazard index is 0.38. The members of the crew or the public during a release hazard index represents the ratios of the daily of volatile organic compounds when an accident exposure to a referenced acceptable limit; if the caused the breach of a container. These risks are ratio is less than one, no adverse effects would he dependent on distance and population density; expected. The maximum probability of an therefore, tlie risks for NV- I, NV-4, and NV-6 are accident with these consequences is 3.23 x lo-’, the greatest. The risks [or all remaining routes are also for travel through rural population zones. by risks due to incident-free transportation. Incident-free transportation risks arc conservative The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident was because the estimate of the population at risk is not analyzed for Alternative 2 and 4 due to no off- high, and because no credit is taken for the site transportation. shielding properties of surrounding btructures. Uncertainties were not calculated for these risks, as In-State Route Risk Results they are small compared to the off-sile risks, and no alternate routing is considered. The expected number of consequences per shipment along thc Nevada routes NV-I through Risks associated with the noiicarcinogcnic effect of NV-I0 are shown in Figures 3-12 through 3-19. volatile organic compounds are represented by a The largest number of vehicle fatalities 1.8 x 1 O~’,is hazard index. Ifthe hazard index is less than one; along NV-3 while NV-4 (Hoover Dam and approximately the same because of large through tlie Interstate I5LJ.S. Highway 95 uncertainties in the cal~ulation. Interchange) poses the lowest risk (around 1 x lox). The other routes have approximately the These results indicate that the greatest risk is from same traffic-related fatality rate (2 x 10.‘). vchicle-related injuries, followed by vehicle- related fatalities, and finally, incident-free These risk estimates have very low uncertainties radiation exposures (fatalities and injuries). associated with them. On-Site ‘Transoortalion Risk Results Vehicle-related injury estimates per shipment were the highest for NV-I, NV-2, NV-3, and NV-6 Detailed results of the on-site transportation risk (around 2 x 10~4).Injury rates (per shipment) for analysis are provided in I)OE/NV (1996). The on- all other routes were approximately the same site transportation risk analysis includes: NTS- (around 1 x 10~‘)with the exception of NV-I0 generated low-level waste from 17 points of origin which is low due to the short distance traveled. on the NTS to the disposal site. plus contaminated soil from environinental restoration activities at Risks due to incident-free shipment are the largest Tonopah. A summary of results is shown on Table for routes with the longest distance, highest 3-9. No on-site transportation is associated with population, and low rates of speed through urban Alternative 2. As with off-site transportation, the zones. Routes NV-I, NV-4. and NV-6 had the risks from traffic fatalities are the largest, followed highest risk (approximately 7.5 x lo-’); while all as it is for the national routes ill-statc routes, and other routes had lower, hut similar, risks (around oil-site transportation. no adversc effects are 1.25 I 0~’). expected. Radiation-induced cancer death estimates due to accidents are primarily sensitive to distance traveled and population density along the route. 3-27 Volume I. Appzndix I ~-~ h%VADA TESI'SITE I.7KAI. tVVIIKI.V.44ENTAL I.WPACT STATEME.VT Figure 3-12. Nevada In-State Traffic Fatality 'Risk ~ l.8X 10~: 1.6~10~' 1.4~10.' 4x10~8 .. . I-. - i 2 x 10-6 i .~I .. ., , ...... ! I ~ 0 I I I NV1 NV2 NV3 NV4 NV5 NV6 NV7 NVB NV9 NVlO Nevada Routes Figure 3-13. Nevada In-State Traffic Injury Risk 2.5 x 10. 2.0 x lo-' m -2 15x10' 2, 0 c , 3 3x 10x10~ 1 105 0 I Volume I, Appendix I 3-28 ~ ~~ NEVADA TEST SITL FINAL E,VVIRO~V,$!E!v'I.II. IMPACT STA 7734E;VT Figure 3-14. Nevada In-State Incident-Free Radiation-Induced Cancer Fatality Risk 7.5~10~' 10.' -= 6.25~ 2 2. 5x10~' Nevada Routes Figure 3-15. Nevada In-State Radiation-Induced Cancer Fatality Risk Due to Accidents I -z> zYZZ 5 222 5 Y 9 0 z z Nevada Routes 2 3-29 Volume I, Appendix I ~~~ Xt.'l';lDM I>:ST .Wf; FhVA L ~,~I'IRO,~'.~~~~~TAI.I.WPA('T STA TE.WE;VT Figure 3-16. Nevada In-State Incident-Free Radiation Induced Detriment Risk 4x10' 3.5 x 10~ 3 x 10~' 2.5~10' 2 x 10~' 1 5 x 10~' 1 107 5x 10~8 0 --,___i-i- -_--Ii_-b- NV1 NV2 NV3 NV4 NV5 NV6 NV7 NV8 NV9 NVlO Nevada Routes Figure 3-17. Nevada In-State Radiation-Induced Detriment Risk Due to Accidents 5x10' . 45x10'. 4x10' 35x10~' 3 x 10~' 2.5x10' zXi0' 15x111' 1 x 10~' 5x10~1 - 0 -.d- ..L__L__I. __ NVl NV2 NV3 NV4 NV5 NV6 NV7 NV8 NV9 NVlO , Nevada Routes ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ . Volume I,Appendix I 3-30 -~ 4x10" 4 3.5~10~l2. ~ NVI NV2 NV3 NV4 NV5 NV6 NV7 NV8 NV9 NV10 Nevada Routes 1- ~ ~ ~ Figure 3-19. Nevada In-State Chemical-Induced Noncancer Hazard Index 6x10." 5x10.'' 4x10~'' UI 1 L NVI NV2 NV3 NV4 NV5 NV6 NV7 NVB NV9 NVIO 3-31 Volume I, Appendix I NEI’ADA TEST SITE FINAL E~VVlllllONMENTALIMPACT STATE.ME,AY Table 3-7. Expected Number of Occurrences in 10 years (National Route) Risk Conseauence Alternative 1 Alternative 3 Vehicle-related fatalities 2 8 Vehicle-related injuries 21 I .3 Incident-free nonradiological health effects 3.02 x 10-1 I .20 x 10-2 Radiation-induced cancer fatalities 2.5 x 10-3 7.1 x 10-2 Radiation-induced detriment 1.4~10.’ 3.9 x 10-2 Chemical-induced cancer 9 x 10~6 7.5 x 10-5 Table 3-8. Expected number of Occurrences in 10 years (within Nevada) Risk Conseauence Alternative 1 Alternative 3 Vehicle-related fatalities 2.3 x 7 x 10~2 Vehicle-related injuries 1 4 Incident-free nonradiological health effects 7.84 x 10~4 1.61 x 10.’ Radiation-induced cancer fatalities (LCFs) 7.5 x 10~4 1.6~10~’ Radiation-induced detriment 3.54 x 10-4 1.9 x 10~’ Chemical-induced cancer 2.4 x lo4 9.8 x lo6 3.3.5 Waste Management Transportation Risk radiation cancer risks, NV-5 is preferable to NV-4; Con c Iu s i o n s however, it should be noted that these risks are highly uncertain, and the estimates are very The primary goal of the waste management conservative. To reduce the risk due to accidents analysis study was to estimate the health effects of involving hazardous materials, NV-5 the most the transportation of low-level and mixed waste desirable route because it is the shortest distance, along various routes from generators to the NTS. and has the lowest population density. However, The results indicate that routing decisions need not when selecting national routes, risks outside the rely solely upon the health risks, as they are all state would also have to be considered. similar, and all are low. However, certain routes do exhibit small risk reductions over others, and On-site transportation risks are common to all their use could be a risk management tool. alternatives that involve transportation, and do not Reduction of total risk can be achieved mainly by contribute significantly to the total risk of any selecting the route from a given generator site with alternative. the lowest traffic-related risks. 3.4 Hazardous Materials Shipments On the basis of the evaluation of in-state routes Transportation Risk alone, routes NV-4, or NV-5 would have the lowest number of traffic related injuries or NV- 10 A separate analysis w-as performed for this EIS to if entering from the wcst. To reduce incident-free assess impacts from transportation accidents Volume I, Appendix I 3-32 NEVADA TEST SITE FI.VAL EIVVIRO,VME.VTAL IMPACT STATEME,VT involving nonradioactive hazardous materials shipment is about 460 kilograms. Under SAIC (1996e). Hazardous chemicals are routinely Alternatives 1 and 4, it was assumed that annual shipped to the NTS from chemical manufacturers hazardous waste shipments would he similar to in various parts of the United States. In addition, recent experience, about 20 shipments per year. the NTS routinely ships hazardous wastes to off- The number of shipments is assumed to double to site hazardous waste treatment, storage, and 40 shipments per year under Alternative 3. disposal facilities. All shipments of hazardous Alternative 2 was assumed to have a single chemicals and hazardous waste are made by truck. shipment to remove any wastes stored in the Area 5 Hazardous Waste Storage Unit at the time that To assess human health risks from transportation the NTS program operations were discontinued. accidents involving hazardous chemicals, the shipment of chemicals in hulk quantities represents The postulated accident scenario is a truck accident the bounding case because of the large quantities leading to a breach of shipping containers (drums per shipment. A review of NTS hazardous or tank) and a release of hazardous materials to the material shipment records identified the top six environment. The spilled chemicals either chemicals that are routinely shipped to the NTS in evaporate (liquid spill) or are acrosolized by the bulk quantities. These chemicals were screened accident impact and wind (solid release). Accident for relative toxicity to humans based on the probabilities were calculated for urban, suburban, Reference Concentration assigned to each chemical and rural population zones based on: truck, by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. accident rates per highway kilomctcr, the (The reference concentration is the concentration conditional probability that an accident will result in air below which it is unlikely for sensitive in a release of hazardous material, the length populations to experience adverse health effects.) (kilometers) of the shipment route, and the number Of the six chemicals reviewed, ammonia was of shipments per year. found to have the highest relative toxicity. Approximately two shipments of ammonia per Airborne concentrations of released chemicals year are made from Las Vegas, NV to the NTS. were calculated using the EPI number code Each shipment contains about 1,000 pounds of computer program for both neutral and stable am tnon i a. atmospheric dispersion conditions. Consequences to people located downwind of the release are The bounding case for shipments of hazardous expressed in terms of Emergency Response waste was determined by review of NTS Planning Guidelines (ERPGs). ERPG values are hazardous waste shipment rccords. Each NTS estimates of airborne concentration thresholds hazardous waste stream was evaluated and ranked above which one can reasonably anticipate based on the following properties: potential for observing adverse effects based on an exposure accidental dispersion, quantity, chemical time of one hour. concentration, material form (liquid, gas, or solid), and the frequency of shipment. Based on this * ERPG-I: The maximum airborne screening methodology, Lab Pack waste was concentration below which it is believed that identified as the most important waste stream on nearly all individuals could be exposed for up the basis of types and quantities of hazardous to one hour without experiencing other than wastes. Lab Pack wastes consist of a wide mild transient adverse health effects, or assortment of individual chemicals which were perceiving a clearly defined objectionable subsequently screened for relative toxicity based odor. on their reference concentrations. The results of this screening process identified mercury, barium, - ERPG-2: The maximum airborne chromium, arsenic, and cadmium as the Lab Pack concentration below which it is believed that chemicals that present the greatest health risks to nearly all individuals could be cxposed humans. The average Lab Pack weight per for up to one hour without experiencing or 3-33 Volume I, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMEIYTAL IMPACT STATEMEh'T Table 3-9. On-site Transportation Risk for NTS-Generated Waste Cnnseauence Alternative 1 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 Traffic fatalities 0.1 1 0.11 0.11 Traffic injuries 1.1 1.1 1.1 Radiation-induced cancer fatalities I x 10~7 3 x 10~' 9 x lo-* Radiation-induced detriment I x 10~7 2 x 10-1 8 x 10~8 Chemical-inducedcancers NA' NA NA Not applicahlc developing irreversible or other serious chemicals in excess of EWG-3 concentrations, but health effects, or symptoms than could 1 to 6 people could be exposed to chemicals in impair their abilities to take protective excess of ERPG-2 concentrations. The probability action. of the accident in a suburban population zone increased to 7.6 x 10" per year; one person could - ERPG-3: The maximum airborne be exposed to chemicals in excess of ERPG-2 concentration below which it is believed concentrations, and 92 to 183 people could be that nearly all individuals could be exposed in excess of ERF'G-I concentrations. The exposed for up to one hour without accident probability increases to I .7 x 10" for rural experiencing or developing life- population zones where no people would be threatening health effects. exposed to ERPG-3 or ERPG-2 concentrations, but I to 2 people could be exposed to chemicals in For a severe transportation accident involving a excess of ERPG-1 concentrations. The tanker shipment of ammonia, the probability of the probabilities given for these accidents are based on accident occurring in an urban population zone is the estimated annual hazardous waste shipments estimated to be about 2.3 x lo-' per year and for Alternatives 1 and 4. For Alternative 3, the could result in 5 to 39 people being exposed to accident probabilities double, but he consequences ammonia in excess of ERPG-3 concentrations. remain the same. For Alternative 2, the accident The probability of the accident in a suburban probabilities are lower by a factor of 20. population zone increases to 1.4 x 104per year and 1 to 7 people could be exposed to ammonia in The consequences presented for hazardous material excess of ERPG-3 concentrations. The accident transportation accidents establish the upper bound probability increases to 4.3 x 10' for rural of reasonably foreseeable consequences. In other population zones where no people would be words, if the postulated accidents actually exposed to ERPG-3 concentrations, but 0 to 3 occurred, the consequences would be expected to people could be exposed to ammonia in excess of be less than those presented in this EIS. The ERPG- 1 concentrations. These probabilities and accident analyses performed for the EIS did not consequences are assumed to be the same for consider mitigative actions, such as individuals Alternatives I, 3, and 4. No bulk chemical taking cover, escaping to an area of lower or safe shipments are expected under Alternative 2. concentrations, or wearing protective equipment, which would lower the consequences of the For a severe transportation accident involving a postulated accidents. shipment of lab packed hazardous wastes, the probability of'the accident occurring in an urban population zone is estimated to be about 2.5 x 10.' per year. No people would be exposed to Volume I, Appendix I 3-34 ~- ~- NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL E!VII/RO.V,bltiVTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3.5 Summary The maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents associated with low-level w'astc and mixed waste A transportation risk analysis was performed in transportation were identified. response to stakeholder concerns about the alternatives in the NTS EIS. The transportation of The results of the transportation risk analyses for low-level waste, mixed waste, nuclear materials, Defense Program nuclear material and waste and hazardous chemicals was analyzed. Both management of low-level and mixed waste show vehicle-related and cargo-related consequences that the human health risks from transportation are were assessed for incident-free radiological and low under any alternative, and are not significant nonradiological health effects, vehicle fatalities contributors to the total risk from all operations and injuries, accident-initiated radiological under any alternative. Since transportation fatalities and detriment, and chemical-induced decisions do not need to be made on the basis of cancers. A hazard index was calculated as a risk (because all thc risks are low, and, are similar measure of the chemical-induced noncancer health within the uncertainty bounds), other factors can be effect. In addition, the maximum individual given greater consideration. exposure (dose and health risk) for low-level waste transportation was calculated. 3-35 Volume I, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume 1, Appendix I )Vb;_CXDATESTSIIE FI;VAL E.Vh;l;lRO.V,\iE,VTAL IMI’ACI’STA TE.$iE,VT 4.0 REFERENCES REGULATION. ORDER. LAW 10 CFR 71 Nuclear Regulatory Commissioii (NRC), Energy: Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988. 40 CFR 261, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “Protection of Environment: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste”, Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988. 40 CFR 268 1J.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “Protection of Environment: Land Di.yxi.sal Restrictions ”, Code of Federal Regulutions, Oftice of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. US. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988. 49 CFR 172.403 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Transportation: “Radioactive Material”, Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, US. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988. 49 CFR 397.101 U .S. Department of Transportation (DOT), “Federal Highway Adminisfration: Requirements for Motor Carriers and Drivers, ’’ Code of Federal Regulutions, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1995. GENERAL AAR, 1993 Associution of American Rai1roud.s (AAR), Competitive Policy Reporter, Volume IV, Number 8, 1995. Blower, 1991 Blower, D., Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents, Codebook 1980-88, By Power Unit Type, UhVRI-93-1, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, 1993. CH2M Hill, 1993 CH2M Hill, Ihzardous Material TruckSafety Study, US. Highway 93 at Hoover Dam, Final Report, CH2M Hill, Sacramento, CA 1993. Clauss, 1996 Clauss, D.B., Attachment to letter dated May 7, 1996, from D.B. Clauss to D. Howard, U.S DOE, Transportation Risk Assessment .for Sandia National Laboratories to D. Howard, US. DOE, Nevada Test Site EIS. DOE, 1992 Department of Energy, (DOE), Nevada Test Site Defense Waste Acceptance Criteria, Certification, and Transfer Requirements NVO-325. prepared by DOE/NV and Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc., Waste Management Department, 1992. 4-1 Volume 1, Appendix I ~ ~- DOE, 1993a Department of Energy (DOE), Trunsporting Radioactive Materials Q&A Answers to Your Que.stion.s, DOE/EM-0097, Washington, DC, 1993. DOE, 1993b Department of Energymevada Operations Office (DOE/") Hazardous Material On-Site Transportation Manual, Nevada Test Site. Rev 3, October 1994. DOE, 1998a Department of Energy (DOE), Estimrrting the Colcl Wur Mortgage: IYYS Baseline Environnientul Mmagement Report. DOEiEM-0232, Vols. I, II, and Executivc Summary, Office of Environmental Management, Washington, DC, 1995. DOE, 1995b Department of Energy (DOE), h'evada Potential Repository Preliminary Transportation Strategy Study I, 800000000-0 17 17-4600-0023 Rev. 0 I, April 1995. prepared by TRW, Environmental Safety Systems, Las Vegas, NV, 1995. DOE, 1995~ Department of Energy (DOE), Draft Wuste Munagmen/ Programmatic EIS for Munaging Treatment, Storuge and Disposal of Radioactive and Huzardous Waste, US Depurtment ofEnergy. Ofire of Environniental Management, 1995. DOENV, 1996 Department of Energy (DOE), Surnmurv <$the Trunsportation Risk Assessnrenl Results ,fir the Environmental Inipact Statenientfor the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site Locxtions in the State of Nevuda, DOE Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, 1996. ICRP, 1991 International Comtnission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiologicul Protection, Pergainon Press, Elmsford, New York, 1991 IT Corp, 1995a Attachment to letter dated November 27, 1995, from Tom Wilczek, IT Corp., to Mary Ellen Giampaoli, U.S. DOE, Benchmarking the Nevadu Test Site Environniental Inipuct Stutement Trunsportution Risk Asessment Model IT Corp, 1995b Attachment to letter dated December 1995, froin Tom Wilczek, IT Corporation, to Mary Ellen Giampaoli, U.S. DOE, Tonopah Soils Transportation Risk Study IT Corp, 1996 Attachment to letter dated May 9, 1996 from Tom Wilezek, IT Corporation, to Mary Ellen Giampaoli, US. DOE, NTS EIS Draft Transportation Risk Assessmen1 Johnson et al., 1993 Johnson, P.E., D.S. Joy, D.B. Clarke, and J.M. Jaeobi, Highway 3.2-An Enhanced Highway Routing Model: Program Description, Methodologv, and Revised User's Manuul, ORNLITM- 12 124, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, 'IN, I993 National Cancer Memorandum dated May 6, 1996, from Steve Adams, IT Corporation, to Institute. 1990 Denise Crenshaw-Smith, Science Applications International Corporation, Cancer Stutistics Volume I, Appendlx I 4-2 -~ Nauhauser and Neuhauser, K.S., and F.L. Kanipe, RADTRAN 4 Volume II: Kanipe, 1993 Technical Manual, Kanipe, SAND89-2370, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, 1993 NRC, 1911 US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material hy Air and Other Modes. NUREG- 01 70, Office of Standards Development, Washington, DC, 1977. Phillips et al., Phillips, J.S., D.B. Clauss, and D.F. Blower. Deternrinalion of Influence Factors 1994 and Accident Rutes,for lhe Armored Tructor/Saje-Secure Trailer, SAND93-0 I 1 I, Sandia National Laboratorics, Albuquerque, NM, 1994. Rhyne, W.R., Rhyne, W.R., Critical Issues in Performing Transportation Risk Studies, H&R Technical Associates, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, May 16, 1988. SAIC, 1996a Anderson, M., Incident-Free Non-Radiological Health 6;rfectsfor Transportation of Waste Management and Defense Program Shipments to NTS, Engineering Design File NTS-01, Rev. 1, Science Applications International Corporation, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 1996. SAIC, 1996b Maheras, S ., Muximum Individual DCJS~S,for Incident-Free Transportation, Engineering Design File NTS-02, Science Applications International Corporation, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 1996. SAIC, 1996c Pippen, H., Assessnient ufthe Ma.rimwn Reasonuhly Foreseeable Accidentjbr Shipment of Low-Level Waste andMixed Wmte tu NTS, Engineering Design File NTS-03, Rev. I, Science Applications International Corporation, 1996. SAIC, 1996d Morris, R., Risk Assessment,for the NTS EIS Alternatives I Rr 3 and the TTR, Engineering Design File NTS-04, Science Applications International Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 1996. SAIC, 1996c Wieiman, T.E. and M. Hall, Nevada Test Site Trrmsporfation of Hazarduu.~ Materials Accident ilnal.ysis, Engineering Design File NTS-05, Science Applications International Corporation, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 1996. SNLiNM, 1994 SN LINM, Defense ProKrunls Transportation Risk Assessment: Prohabilities and Consequences uf Accidental Disposal uf Radioactive Material Ariving porn Off-Site Transportation ofDejense Program Material, SAND93- I67 I, Albuquerque, NM, 1994. Sullivan and Sullivan, K.P., and D.L. Massie, Trucks Involved in Fritul Accidents, 1990 3 Massie, 1993 Facthook, IMTRI-93- I, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, 1993. 4-3 Volume I. Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FIXAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank NEVADA TESTSITE FIiVAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment A to Appendix I APPLICABLE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume I, Appendix I ~. NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment A. Applicable Federal, State, and Local Laws and Regulations All shipments of hazardous materials, including transportation of materials to and from the Nevada radioactive, whether from industry or government, Test Site (NTS). The NTS transportation activities must be packaged and transported according to must comply with federal, state, and local strict federal, state, and local regulations. environmental protection regulations, waste Handling, storage, and disposal of these wastes management regulations, occupational health and must also be performed in accordance with specific safety standards, and transportation regulations. regulations. These regulations are intended to protect the public, transportation and other In Tables A-I through A-6, regulatory citations and workers, and the environment from potential requirements, including the implementing exposure to hazardous materials or radiation. authority, are summarized. The summary column in each table lists a brief This appendix lists those federal, state, and description of the regulation's possible relation local laws and regulations, including U.S. to the NTS transportation activities. Thc tables Department of Energy (DOE) orders, that are organized by implementation authority. the DOE believes are applicable to the safe A-I Volume 1, Appendix I - ~~ ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT I Volume I, Appendix I A-2 ~ Table A-1. Applicable State and local laws and regulations. (Page 2 of2) Title Authoritv Citation Summary ~ ~ ~~ Nevada Hazardous State Uoard of Health, State Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. A Nevada hazardous materials statute establishes requirements for Materials Lans Dcpatimcnt of S$459.001 etsrq. hazardous and nuclcar materials waste management. transportation, Transportation, Department and emergency response. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety, Highway Patrol Division, State Environmental Commission. Department of Conservation and Natural Resources Westcm Interstate Nuclear Western Interstate Nuclear Na.. Rev. Stat. Ann. Nevada is a party to the Western Interstate Nuclear Compact which, in Comnact Board $$459.001 through relevant part, obligates party states to provide mutual aid in coping 459.005 with nuclear incidents. 'This may or may not extend to nuclear transportation incidents. ~ Hazardous Materials Board of Health Nev Admin. Code The Nevada Board of Health has promulgated radiation control Regulations (February @459.010 through regulations which concern hazardous materials licensing, 1992 edition) 459.950 transportation, and radiation protection. I ransportation of Fire Chief Ordinancc No. 960 Clark County. Nevada, has an ordinance regarding transportation of IHuardnus Materials hazardous materials. The ordindncc includes requirements for reporting, certification; fees. routing, and liability issucs a the) relate to the transportation of hazardous materials through Clark County. Nevdda rransportation of Department of Fire Services Ordinance No. 3 190 The City of Las Vegas, Nevada. has an ordinance that regulates thc -lazardous Materials tr,msportation of hazardous (including radioactivc) materials in the city. The nrdinance includes requirements for reporting, permitting, fees, routing, and liability issues as they relate to the transportation of hazardous materials through Las Vcgas, Nevada. rransportation of Fire Department Ordinancc No. 82 I The City ofNorth Las Vegas, Nevada, has an ordinance concerning lazardous klatrrials hazardous materials transportation by various modes in and through [he city. 'The ordinance includcs requirements for adoption of federal regulations, liability. notification, and reporting issues as the, relate to the transportation of hazardous materials through North Las Vegas, Neuada. Table A-2. Applicable US. Department of Transportation regulations Table A-3. Applicable Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations Title Authority Citation Summary Koiices. Instructions and Rcports LIS. huclear 10 CFR 19 Each licensee shall post Form NKC-3 "Noticc to Employers;" lhc regulations to Workers: Inspections Regulator) in 'Title 10 CFR 20. and the applicable operatine proccdurcs. Each norkcr Commission shall he advised annually oftheir exposure to radiation or radioactivc (NRC) material. Standards for I'rotection ;\gainst NRC 10 CFR 20 Estahlishes standards for protection against ionizing radiation resulting from Radiation activities conducted undcr licemils from the U.S. Nuclcnr Regulator) Commission. Prescribes rulrs governing the licensing of thr DOE tii receivc and posses radioactive material at a geologic repository Provides standards fbr near-surface land disposal olradioactise \baste. ~~ ~ Packaging and I'ranspoltation nf NRC 10 CFR 71 Providcs rrquirrinents for packaging. prcparatlun for shipment. illid Radioacrivc Material transportation of liccnscd material; and states proccdurcs and standards for US. Nuclear Regulatory Cammission approbal ofpachaging and shipping procedures for radinacti, 2 material. lee5 for l'iicilitics and imntcrials NKC 10 CFR 170 Scts out fcci chnrgcd for liccnsing scniccs rundcrcd b> thc U.S. Nuclear licznsrs adother ieg~liitol-! Rcgulator) Commisiiim xrbiccs undcr the .Atnlnic I N .c r, E c, i 3 3 7 --T in C .-a * m -a F L 4 aw su m .-U -a 9 7. 4 aJ 3 b Volume I, Appendix I 4-6 Table A-6. Applicable DOE requirements Title Authority Citation Summary National En\,ironmental u.s. DOE Order 491 lmpiements the Environment Safety, and Health Strategic Plan; and Policy Act Compliance Department (Draft) suhstantivel! revises DOE 544O.lE to incorporate provisions ofthe Secretaty of Program of Energy Energy's National Environmental Policy Act Policy of June 1994. It reflects the (DOE) sccrctary's chaise to control the cost and time for document preparation and review while maintaining quality, implements effective National Environmental Policy Act planning and teamv.ork, enhances public involvement, and strives for continuous imorovemenl of the National Environmental Policy Act ~rocess. Materials 'l'ransportation DOE DOE Order 460.2 Transportation management. and 'Traffic Management II General Environmental DOE DOE Order 5400.1 Establishes environmental protectiun program requirements, authorities, and Protection Program responsibilities Tor DOC operations to ensure compliance with applicable federal; state. and local environmental protection laws and regulations, executive orders. and internal DOE policies. Kddiation Protection of DOE DOE Ordrr 5400.5 Establishes standards and requirements for the operations of DoD and DOE the Public and the COntVdCtOlS \rilh respect to protection ofmembers of the public and the Environmcnt environment against undue risk from radiatiun. Radioactive Waste DOE DOE Order Contains packaging requirements for \,arious materials. Management 5820.2A I1 Safety Rcquiremrnts for DOE DOE Ordrr 460.1 Each package ojfcred for transport to a carrier must comply with this order, U.S. the Packaging and Department of Transponation regulations, and the applicable standards of Title Transportation of 10 CFR Part 71 Huardous Materials, Huardous Substances. and Hazardous Waste Radiological I1 ss1stance .' DOE DOE Order 5530.3 DOE to provide support and emergency response. Pnxram II ~ ~ Quality Assurance riob; DOE Order Establishes quality assurance requirements for the DOE. 5700.6C Nwada Test Site DOE VV-325 (Rev. I) Establishes procedures, requirements, and criteria for the safe transfer and DOE Approved Waste disposal of low-level and mixed waste, and storage of transuranic and Acceptance Critcria, transuranic mixed svaste at the NTS. Certification, and 'Transfer Reauiremenll NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMEXT Attachment B to Appendix I PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS Volume I, Appendix I I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume 1, Appcndix I ~ -~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment B. Procedures and Regulations Relating to Transportation of Hazardous Materials B.1 General Transportation Procedures low-level of radioactivity They are and Regulations shipped in "strong, tight" packages (49 CFR 173.421). Slightly contaminated B.1.1 Containerization, Packaging, and clothing, laboratory samples, and smoke Labeling Regulations detectors are examples of materials that may be shipped in strong, tight packages. The containerization and packaging of hazardous These packages are generally constructed materials must comply with detailed of cardboard, wood, or metal. The DOT U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the has proposed that strong, tight packages U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. be replaced by "industrial packaging," The form, quantity, and concentration of the which is a standard international package radioactive materials determine the type of for low-level radioactive materials. packaging used. All radioactive materials must be Industrial packaging conforms to packaged to ensure that the radiation level at the international design and construction package surface does not exceed the DOT requirements. This type of container will regulations 49 CFR 173. The requirements of retain and protect the contents during Title 49 CFR 173, Subpart 1, ensure that package normal transportation activities. handlers, transporters, and the public are advised of package contents; and do not receive dose rates in . Type A Packages. This type of container excess of recognized safe limits established by the is used for radioactive materials with US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. After higher specific activity levels radioactive materials are put in the proper (radioactivity) These packages must packaging, they are sealed, they are surveyed with demonstrate their ability to withstand a special instruments to ensure radiation is within series of tests without release of their regulatory limits, and checked for external contents. Test requirements are established contamination. The package is then marked and by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory labeled to provide information about its contents. Commission. Regulations require that the package protect its contents and maintain The radioactive waste type that would be shipped sufficient shielding under conditions to the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under Alternatives normally encountered during 1 and 3 would likely be low-level waste or mixed transportation. These packages are waste. The type of packaging for a great majority generally 55-gallon steel drums, steel of low-level and mixed waste will be industrial boxes, or specially designed shielded (strong, tight packages). However, to provide boxes. Typically, Type A packages are additional information and comparisons of the used to transport radiopharmaceuticals three basic types of packaging used to transport (radioactive materials for medical use) and radioactive wastes and/or materials, information on certain regulatory-qualified industrial all three basic types of packages are provided in products. the following paragraphs (49 CFR 173, Subpart 1). It should be noted that packaging regulations apply * Type B Packages. This type of container to both rail and truck transport. is used for radioactive matcrials that exceed the limits of Type A package Industrial Packages. This type of package is requirements must be shipped in Type B used for materials that present little hazard packages. Shippers use this type of package from radiation exposure, due to their to transport materials that would present a B-1 Volume I, Appendix 1 NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT radiation hazard to the public or the designated for waste with a radiation level greater environment if there was a major than 50 mremihr. (See Table B-I). Any waste release. For that reason, a Type B package containing a highway-route controlled package design must not only quantity of radioactive material must be labeled demonstrate its ability to withstand Radioactive Yellow-Ill. This requirement does not tests simulating normal shipping generally relate to low-level or mixed waste. Each conditions. but it must also withstand package requiring radioactive labels must have two credible accident conditions without labels, one affixed to opposite sides of the package. rclcasing its contents. Type B The package contents (name of radionuclides) and packages are used to transport the activity ofthe contents (e.g., Ci and microcurie materials with high levels of [pCi]) must be written on the radioactive label in radioactivity, such as spent fuel from the spaces provided. nuclear power plants. The size of Type B packages can range from small The shipment of certain types of radioactive containers to those weighing over I00 materials requires that the vehicle be clearly tons. marked with placards on all four sides. Most shipments received at the NTS have the The packaging of waste is completed by the Radioactive White- 1 placard. Materials that meet shipper. (In all cases, radioactive waste received at highway route-controlled parameters, such as the NTS under Altcrnativcs I and 3 would be from commercial radioactive spent nuclear fuel, require a DOE-approved waste generator.) The shipper a white square to be displayed behind each marks and labcls thc container. and ensures that radioactive placard. The correct use of markings, vehicle placarding is in place. The three types of labels, and placards is the responsibility of the waste packages are sliowii iii Figure B-I. shipper. Markings, labels, and placards identify the hazardous contents to emergency responders Federal rcgulations Hrirlionclive Moterial 49 CFR and guide them in the selection of appropriate 172 requires that shippers follow specific required safety procedures in the event of an accident. guidelines in marking and labeling all packages containing radioactive materials. At a minimum, Radioactive material shipments must be markings must provide the proper shipping name, accompanied by accurate shipping papers (49 identification number, tlie shipper's name and CFR 172.200). These papers contain detailed address. as well as other information. Labels must information on the materials being transported, and identify the contents and radioactivity level they reference the appropriate emergency response (indicated iii curies [Ci]). a tinit of measurement procedures to follow should the need arise. In that specifies tlie number of atoms undergoing addition, these documents include certification that radioactive decay per second), and provide a the materials are properly described, classified, hazard index to elistire proper handling. Shippers packaged, marked, and labeled and are in proper of radioactive materials use one of three different condition, according to Department of shipping labels in accordance with Title 49 CFR Transportation regulations. Drivers must keep Part 172.403 (c): Radioactive White I (lowest shipping papers in the vehicle and make them category), Yellow 11, or Yellow Ill (highest available at all times for inspection by responsible category. The appropriate labcl corresponds to the officials. type of matcrial shipped, and the measured radiation level or the package's contents. Radioactive White I is designated for materials with a package surface radiation level of less than 0.5 mremihr. Kadiation Yellow I1 is used for materials with a radiation level greater than 0.5 mremihr. But less than 50 mremihr. Yellow 111 is Volume I, Appendix I B-2 ~~~ ~~ ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMEIVT Figure B-1. Examples of container types Industrial Package Type A Package B-3 Volume 1, Appendix I ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Table R-1. Category of label to be applied to radioactive materials packages Radiation Level (RL) at Fissile Criteria Label Category" Transport Index (T.1.) Package Surface NA~ 10.5 mremihr (mrcmlhr) Fissile class 1 only. no White-I iissile class 11 or 111 'T.I. i 1.11 0.5 mrem/h '1.1. > 1.0 50 rnredhr B.1.2 DOE Procedure for the Selection of The DOE and its contractor transportation Carriers specialists visit carriers' corporate offices and maintenance facilities to determine whether they The DOE, through its Transportation Management are eligible to transport radioactive and hazardous Division at DOE Headquarters in Washington, DC, materials for the DOE. make every effort to ensure the quality of the carriers, drivers, and equipment used to transport The specialists review the following information DOE material. The DOE has a Motor Carrier on the carriers: Evaluation Program to assist DOE field offices and contractor transportation personnel in selecting Experience with hazardous and radioactive carriers to transport radioactive and hazardous cargo materials. Safety and regulatory compliance record Driver employment policies Carriers are also subject to Federal Highway Equipment maintenance programs and Administration inspections that provide procedures information on driver qualifications, maintenance, Emergency response capabilities and operating policies. The Department of Driver training program, including Transportation issues a safety fitness rating for the documentation carrier. DOE evaluates for its use only those - Financial stability and insurance records. carriers with a satisfactory rating from the Department of Transportation. The DOE scores each motor carrier on how well they comply with DOT standards, meet essential The DOT funds the Motor Carrier Safety DOT-prescribed requirements, and possess Assistance Program, which provides information desirable attributes. Any carrier not meeting DOT on accident statistics, roadside inspection results, standards is declared ineligible. Carriers are and compliance reviews at the carrier's principal typically re-evaluated on a scheduled basis related place of business. The DOE contractor's to their level of DOE activity. transportation specialists receive copies of this data, and use the information contained therein to Two contracting mechanisms exist for shipping select carriers for further consideration. materials: the special contract negotiated for individual shipments, or for a series of shipments; and the hill of lading which acts as the contract between carriers and shippers. Carriers performing Volume 1, Appendix I 9-4 - NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT under special contract are called contract carriers, responsibilities are inherent in the bill of lading while carriers performing under a bill of lading are and bind the common carrier without additional called common carriers. documentation.) Contractual timeframes and total tonnage to be moved are identified. The shipper The Act to Regulate Commerce was signed into must pay for the total identified tonnage even if the law on February 4, 1887, and created the Interstate tonnage is less than the contractual amount. Each Commerce Commission. Several additional acts shipment is treated individually and is paid for were passed during the first half of the twentieth through standard billing procedures. Payment is century that imposed restrictions on all modes of not made unless full service is rendered. The transportation. During this time, there was a major shipper has no control over who bids on the distinction between the two types of carriers, and contract, which could result in an award to an shippers with “specialized” commodities normally owner-operated carrier that uses owner-operator chose contract carriers rather than common carriers drivers and equipment. In this situation, little or no because there was greater regulation of the contract control can be exercised over the operators or the carrier. During the late 197Os, deregulation was equipment. started and, the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission has diminished Some common carriers do have authority to bid on significantly, in fact it may soon cease to exist. and operate as contract carriers, but there is no Much of what has become law has been tested in guarantee that a company in this status would be the courts and will be in the court system for years awarded the contract. Common carriers have to come, but it is clear that industry and control over their operators (employed by the government are moving away from regulation. company) and operate under established rules of Deregulation has made the choice between contract operation such as those governing dispatcher- and common carriers almost moot; however, operator interactions, global positioning systems shippers may elect to do comparison studies before on equipment, and maintenance support selecting a carrier. In selecting a carrier, the DOE agreements throughout the country. A generatorishipper gives careful consideration to comparison of carrier contractual issues is cost, performance history, and condition and provided in Table R-2. In summary, public availability of equipment. Inspections and perception (based on comments received) is that evaluations of the carrier, and the ability to work DOE will have more control over their shipments, closely with available carriers are also carefully that the shipment will somehow be safer, and the de I i berated. government will be able to make all routing decisions if a contract carrier is selected (see Table The following paragraphs and tables show some of B-3). This is not necessarily true. There are pros the differences between contract and common and cons to the type of carrier selected for any carriers. Primarily due to deregulation, industry given shipment or series of shipments. In order to and government preference is to use common make a decision that provides the best, safest carriers unless there are very specific, tangible transportation for any commodity, a variety of benefits to be gained by using contract carriers. subjects must be reviewed. All criteria such as type of shipment (truck load versus less than a Contract carriers are obligated to supply only what truck load); single shipment or on-going campaign; is negotiated and contained in the provisions of the single or multiple origins or destinations; specific specific contract. Additional needs identified by routing requirements; general cargo versus the shipper require further negotiation and incur hazardous materials; transit times, special additional cost. Delays are also a common result handling, equipment, and packaging; services of this process. The responsibilities of both the available in the geographic location of the shipper; carrier and the shipper must he carefully defined willingness of carriers to work closely with DOE and documented; for example, responsibility for transportation managers and their contractors; and damage, delay, and terms of custody. (These B-5 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONME.VTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Table B-2. Comparison of carrier contractual issues CARRIER TYPE PROS I CONS ~ ____ ~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~ 'ontract Carrier must comply with Tillr 49 CFR Shipper will incur cxtra costs if item(s) Federal Mntor Carricr Safety Rcgolatians not originally ncgolialrd are requested Carricr will provide dedicaled equipment Obligated to adhere tii cnntracl and drivers requiremcnts. prncurcmcnt rules and rcgulatinns in addition I:] transporta!ion rcgulaliilns Potcntiiil for contractur linancial inslsbilily Case lau is not hinding, onl) irhat is contained in the contract ii binding .:ominon Carrier must comply with 'Titlc 49 CFR Fcdcrlil Motor Carricr Safety Kc.dations Agree on mutes to he used under critiiin conditions I Shippcr pays for scrvices received. iiitli inn supulatinn to pay for more Normally have more and better equipment. which is morz readily available I Legally hound by case law Table B-3. Public perception of carrier issues CARRIER TYPE PROS CONS l'onti;ict DOt; in cnntrol olsliipmcnts DOC has ciintrnl ofroulrs used ('ontract carriers use best equipment. drivers. and communication devices nvailahlz Common DOC not in cntitrni oicnirisr <,perations No inersight nfcariicr's I sclcction rif rnutcs the effect of deregulation as discussed above will shipments in accordance with Federul Highwuy he examined before any decision to use common or Adrnini.s/rir/ion:Requirenfen/s b-or Moforor Corriers contract carriers is made. und Drivers Code of Federul Regrrlulions ( 4Y CFR Part 397.10I (a). I lowever, the DOE works closely B.1.3 Route Selection Process with carriers in this area. The carriers are required to ensure that the motor vehicle is operated on Carriers or private trucking companies are routes that minimize radiological risk. They must responsible for selecting routes for low-level waste consider available information on accident rates, Volume I, Appendix I 8-6 NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT transit time, population density and activities, and transport. Funding for this coverage comes from the time of day and day of week during which both private insurance and government indemnity. transport will occur. B.1.5 Driver Training and Education For shipments containing a highway route- controlled quantity of radioactive material, the Drivers of vehicles that transport hazardous carrier must adhere to the requirements in Title 49 materials (which includes radioactive materials) CFR Part 397.101(b) through (g)(3). These must first receive special training and certification shipments occur on state-designated routes, (49 in accordance with Department of Transportation CFR 397.103), or preferred routes, as defined in Regulations, which include the Federal Motor Title49CFR Part397,10I(b). Carrier Safety regulations (49 CFR 350-399). B.1.4 Liability Drivers must have in their immediate possession a document certifying that training has been Carriers of hazardous materials must carq liability completed, and a copy placed in their insurance to cover damages in case of an accident. qualification file (required by Driver Qudijica/ion The carrier retains liability for accidents in which Files 49 CFR 291.51) showing the following: it is at fault. The carrier is also responsible for the costs to clean up the site of an accident. The DOE The driver's name and operator's license is responsible, however, for legitimate health and number safety claims after an accident has occurred. - The dates that training was provided Decreased land values or loss of business are not - The name and address of the person DOE'S responsibility, because carriers are providing the training responsible for selecting routes of travel and must * That the driver has hecn trained in the carry insurance in accordance with Department of hazards and characteristics of highway Transportation requirements. route-controlled quantity of Class 7 (radioactive) materials The required amount of coverage for carriers of A statement by the person providing the radioactive materials varies according to the mode training that information on the certificate of transport (water, air, road, or rail). Minimum is accurate. coverage requirements are contained in ( 49 CFR Part 387). If damages caused by an accident Lastly, drivers must liave in their immediate exceed the liability coverage held by the carrier, possession the route plan required by Title 49 umbrella coverage is provided by the Price- CFR Part 391.57, and be operating the vehicle in Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act was added accordance with the plan. in 1957 as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to help establish financial protection Transportation of hazardous waste also requires the for persons injured and persons liable for those specialized training of drivers. Title 49 CFK injured by a nuclear incident or a precautionary Parts 172.700-172.704 discusses the importance evacuation. The Act provides coverage for public and responsibility for training and testing of liability arising from: (I) the slow release of employees who handle Iiazardous materials. As radioactive material, if the release resulted from an defined in Ilefinilions and Aggravations action that occurred during contract activity, even (49 CFR Part 171.8), this would be a person who is if the damage occurred after the termination of the employed by a hazardous materials employer, and contract; and (2) the release of the nuclear material who in the course of employment, directly component of mixed waste. The Act also covers affects hazardous materials transportation safety. damages resulting from terrorism, sabotage, and Hazardous materials employers must ensure that other illegal acts which might occur during every employee who handles hazardous materials is trained and tested in accordance with Title 49 8-7 Volume I, Appendix I __ ~. NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT CFR Parts 172.700-1 72.704 prior to performing training shall be received by the employee every 2 any function subject to Department of years. Transportation's hazardous materials regulations. The training may be provided by the employers or Records of current training for the preceding 2 other public or private sources and must include years must be created and maintained by the the following: employer for as long as the employee is employed, and for 90 days after that. The records must General Awareness Familiarization include the following information: Training - Employee's name Training designed to provide familiarity with Most recent training completion dates the requirements of the hazardous materials Description, copy, or location of the regulations in Title 49 CFR, and to enable the training materials employce to recognize and identify hazardous Name and address of the person providing materials consistent with the hazard the training, and communication standards of the hazardous Certification that the hazardous material materials regulations in Title 49 CFR. employee has been trained and tested. Function-Specific Training B.1.6 Inspection and Enforcement System Training concerning the requirements in 'Iitle State, tribal, and local law cnforcement personnel 49 CFR as they apply to the employee's may conduct vehicle inspections in terminals and specific job function. along road sides, and are responsible for enforcement of all applicable statc and local laws Safety Training and regulations. For all radioactive inaterial shipments, the Nevada Department of Human Training concerning emergency response, Resources, Health Division, is notified of the employee protection measures against work- shipment prior to its entering Nevada. State place hazards, and methods and procedures officials make all other notifications within for avoiding accidents.Training conducted by Nevada. In accordance with U.S. Nuclear employers must comply with hazard Regulatory Commission directives, the general communication programs required by the public is not specifically informed of a given Occupational Safety and Health shipment. Administration of the Department of Labor or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). B.I.6.1 NTS Procedures. The DOE is committed This training may be used to satisfy the to ensuring that waste accepted for disposal at the training requirements of the preceding NTS is properly characterized, certified, packaged, paragraph to avoid unnecessary duplication of and transported according to all safety, training, to the extent that such training environmental, and transportation requirements. addresses the requirements. Transportation on the NTS is accomplished in accordance with the Hazardous Material Onsite The training for hazardous materials employees Transportation Safety Manual, Nevada Test Site employed on or before July 2, 1993, shall be (DOE, 1994). The DOElNV requirements are completed by October I, 1993. Training for rcviscd as necessary to reflect any changes in hazardous materials employees employed after regulatory requirements. Waste that does not meet July 2, 1993, or who change hazardous materials these requirements is not accepted for disposal on job functions, shall be completed within 90 days the NTS. In order to help in implementing the after employment or job change. The required Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program, NTS Volume I, Appendix I B-8 ~ ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT personnel provide assistance through education and comprehensive reviews of programmatic and site visits for waste generators. waste-related documentation and performs a thorough Facility audit. Each site sending waste to At theNTS, DOENaccepts and disposes of low- the NTS will continue to be reevaluated on a level waste. The waste is from approved DOE and regularly scheduled basis. Although NV-325 DoD facilities across the United States. Approval provides waste acceptance criteria for four to ship waste to the NTS is granted only after the radioactive waste types, the NTS has only received waste generator certifies that all waste meets the low-level waste from off-site generators since DOE/NV's strict acceptance criteria. Personnel May, 1990. Criteria for the three wastc types not with expertise in waste management, quality currently being received at the NTS will remain in assurance, and applicable state and federal NV-325. This establishes a documented regiilations assure compliance with the program's acceptance program for such waste types if and/or inspection criteria. The requirements, terms, and when the NTS is capable of receiving these waste conditions for accepting waste for disposal are types. briefly described in the following section. The most accurate waste volume projections All waste streams are characterized according to available are based on 3-year forecasts that are strict waste acceptance criteria prior to their being provided to the NTS by the waste generators. approved for shipment to the NTS or other DOE Generators are required to submit 3-year forecasts sites. A computerized database for DOE waste every 6 months. Information froin the 3-year was established in 1987. This database includes forecasts is broken down by fiscal year quarters information regarding the generator, number of (fiscal years run froin October I through shipments, weight, volume, radionuclides, and September 30), and is provided to the Nevada their concentrations. At the disposal site, the Division of Environmental Protection on a location of each waste package in the disposal quarterly basis. facility is mapped according to a grid system. Typically, the 3-year forecasts include both DOE Order 5820.2A requires the disposal facility approved generators and those generators who are to develop and implement waste acceptance not approved, but are actively in the NV-325 criteria. The NTS specific program for waste approval process cycle. Generators who are not acceptance, at its radioactive waste disposal approved and not actively involved in the approval facilities, is accomplished by the rigorous approval process sometimes submit 3-year forecasts hut it is process detailed in the Nevada Te.sl Site Defense not a requirement. Wa.yle Acceptance Crileria, Certificulion, and Transjer Requirements (NV-325, Revision 1) There are strict requirements for waste acceptance (DOE, 1992). The NV-325 details the acceptance at the NTS. The acceptance process begins with an criteria that on- and off-site generators must meet application. Each site designated by the DOE to dispose or store radioactive waste at the NTS. Headquarters to ship low~-levelwaste to the NTS The NV-325 requirements specify criteria for must submit an application to the DOE/NV. acceptable waste content and form, Applications are reviewed to ensure that the waste characterization, packaging, labeling, certification, and the generator's waste management program are and transport. All waste must meet these strict fully described. Applications for low-level waste criteria to ensure that all safety. health, must also state that the waste does not contain any environmental, and transportation requirements are nonradioactive hazardous materials as defined by met. thc Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. These requirements include the identification, In order to evaluate the acceptability of the site's transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of overall waste certification program and each waste. individual waste stream, the DOEAT conducts B-9 Vnlume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL EIYVIRONMENTALIMPACTSTATEMENT Once the application review is completed and explosives. If necessary, the waste must be accepted, personnel from the DOENV travel to the stabilized so it does not give off hannful vapors, waste generator's facility to inspect all stages of gases, or liquids. The generator must waste production. l'his review is necessary to demonstrate that its personnel are qualified to ensure that the information in the generator's properly document and certify that these application is complete and accurate; methods of conditions are met. waste generation, characterization, handling, and shipping are evaluated and certified. Waste packaging must meet strength, size, and weight requirements. This is necessary After the inspection is complete, an audit report is to ensure that the integrity of all packages issued. If problems are identified, the generator is maintained after they are stacked in must complete corrective actions, and DOE landfills at the NTS waste management personnel must return to the site to verify that the site. In addition, marking and labeling problems have been corrected. When all each waste package must meet Department requirements are met, the manager ofthe DOEiNV of Transportation, federal, and pennits the generator to send waste to the NTS Tor environmental safety requirements. disposal. Sites that are approved to dispose of low- level waste are inspected periodically to assure that Radioactive cargo is the most closely inspected of all waste acceptance criteria continue to he met. all hazardous material shipments, and must be accompanied by shipping papers. These papers Each generator shipping waste to the NTS must contain accurate, detailed information on the designate a waste certification official who is materials being transported, and they reference the independent from budget concerns to schedule appropriate emergency response procedures to waste handing and shipping. The waste follow, should the need arise. In addition, these certification official is a key person responsiblc for documents include certification that the materials certifying that the waste shipped to the NTS meets are properly described, classified, packaged, DOE/NV requirements. In addition, the generator marked, labeled, and are in proper condition must have an independent quality assurance according to Department of Transportation organization that reviews all phases of the waste regulations. Drivers must keep shipping papers in management program, including inspections and the vehicle and make them available at all times waste certification. for inspection by responsible officials. To determine the ability of the generator to meet B.1.7 Monitoring and Tracking System waste acceptancc criteria, generator quality assurance personnel inspect the following key 'The waste disposal sites are presently open points, at a minimum, during the independent Monday through Thursday (during daylight hours examination: only). Waste shipments are scheduled so that they arrive in time to be off-loaded during business Empty shipping containers are inspected to hours. In the event that a nonclassified shipment assure that they are free from dents, rust, arrives and cannot be off-loaded during business corrosion, or other conditions that could hours, the driver reports to the Mercury guard gate compromise strength and integrity. to check in. The driver is directed to a secure staging area where the trailer may be detached - Waste is certified as meeting DOENV from the tractor. 'The trailer remains at the staging requirements. For cxample, low-level area until normal business hours when it is waste cannot contain nonradioactive reattached to the tractor and sent through the hazardous waste, free liquids, gas normal receiving process. There are established containers under pressure, disease-causing procedures regulating radioactive waste entering or infectious agents, corrosive rnatcrial, or the NTS waste disposal areas (Areas 3 and 5) (NV- Volume I, Appendix I R-10 ~_____ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT 325). The procedures for receiving hazardous is released from the waste management site. The materials (including radioactive materials) for truck is again inspected for radioactive other programs and activities on the site follow the contamination within the Mercury camp area and basic steps described in the following paragraphs: before exiting the Mercury gate. The driver returns ! to the receiving office to check out and return the A more detailed description of the NTS badge and dosimeter. The truck's departure is transportation requirements is available in noted on the tracking system. DOElNV Hazardous Material On-Site Transportation Manual, Nevada Test Site, the In Nevada, a monitoringitracking system based at DOE-356, Rev. 3, October 1994. the NTS is used. This tracking system, called the NTS Traffic System, is a database. Waste The load-bearing truck checks in at the receiving generator sites provide information on the office for the NTS at Mercury, Nevada, to present shipment location, volume, and time that the the shipping orders and manifest to the security shipment would be expected at the NTS. The officer. The trucks are monitored to make sure routing from the generator sites is known by the external radiation levels are below established agencies using the database. The information can limits before they are permitted on the NTS. Each be revised ifthe driver is delayed, for example, due truck trailer is also inspected to ensure the security to mechanical failure. County and local seal is intact. The attending officer reviews the governments may request access to this tracking shipping papers and contacts the disposal area to system. verify the truck's entry and load. Upon showing proper identification to the NTS security officer, B.2 Transportation of Defense Materials the driver is given a badge with a dosimeter (a device for measuring doses of radiation), which The DOE maintains and operates the must he worn while at the NTS. Information about Transportation Safeguards System. This system is the truck's forthcoming entrance, its contents, and comprised of a fleet of specialized equipment used its destination is entered into the on-site tracking to transport, in a safe and secure manner, Category system for hazardous materials. 11 or higher nuclear material between DoD and DOE production sites, laboratories, and test sites. The truck is then permitted to enter through the The materials transported support DOE and DoD Mercury gate and proceed to the disposal site. At activities for production, testing, surveillance, the waste site office, the shipping papers are again limited-life component replacements, and reviewed and verified. The shipment is monitored dismantlement and disposal of nuclear weapons. again for external radiation levels, and the security Materials are transported throughout the United seal is rechecked. The truck then enters a gate to States either by air or over-the-road operations. the disposal area, and the trailer is carefully opened For the purpose of this study, only over-the road (the seal removed) and monitored for radioactive operations are germane. contamination. Each package is inspected as it is unloaded to make sure that it is undamaged and The DOE, Albuquerque Operations Office, properly labeled. The packages are customarily Transportation Safeguards Division is responsible unloaded into the disposal pit by forklift or crane. for the operation and maintenance of the Later, the entire container is placed in a specific Transportation Safeguards System. In tenns of location within the disposal pit for permanent over-the-road operations, the specialized disposal and covering. When these materials are equipment includes a fleet of highly modified taken to specific locations on the NTS, the on-site highway tractors, safe-secure trailers, and support tracking system is again used to show the route escort vehicles. Since the DOE exclusively taken by vehicles carrying the hazardous materials operates and maintains the Transportation within the NTS. Finally, the empty trailer is Safeguards System, it is responsible for evaluating monitored for radioactive contamination before it B-11 Volume I, Appendix I ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT and approving these transportation operations radiological monitoring equipment, and other throughout the continental United States. equipment to enhance safety and security. The safe-secure trailer is a modified, standard The DOE operates the Transportation Safeguards closed van. The dry-freight-type semi-trailer System under full compliance with DOT includes necessary cargo tie-down equipment and requirements, except for regulations that would temperature monitoring, fire alarm, and access tend to conflict with security imperatives, the DOE denial systems. It is essentially a mobile vault that complies with, and often exceeds, the requirements is highly resistant to unauthorized entry and of the DOT regulations during over-the-road provides a high degree of cargo protection under operations, even though the DOE is exempted from accident conditions. The safe-secure trailers are compliance with US. Government Material pulled by an armored, penetration-resistant (49 CFR Part 173.7[b]). highway tractor. Many special features are also added to these tractors to make them safe for the Since its establishment in 1975, the Transportation drivers and passengers, Highway Transportation Safeguards Division has accumulated more than Technical analysis Report (Crowder et al, 1993). 120 million km (75 million mi) of over-the-road The safe-secure trailers are accompanied by experience in transporting DOE Defense Program- armed couriers in escort vehicles equipped owned cargo without any accidents that resulted in with communications and electronics systems, a release of radioactive material. NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT B.3 References REGULATION, ORDER. LAW 49 CFR 171-397 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Transportation,” Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, US. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1994. GENERAL Crowder et al., 1993 Crowder, G.W., B.D. Boughten, J.K. Deuel, and L.J. Branstetter, Highwcp Transportation Technical Analysis Report (CHITTAR), Draft SAND93-250 I, Secret National Security Information, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, 1993. DOE, 1992 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Nevada Operations Office, Nevada Test Site Defense Waste Acceptance Criteria, Certification, and Transfer Requirements, NV-325, Rev. 1, Las Vegas, NV, 1992. DOENV, 1994 DOE, Hazardous Material Onsite Transportation Safety Manual, Nevada Test Site, DOEMV 356, Rev. 3, 1994. B-13 Volume 1, Appendix I -- ~~____~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume 1, Appendix I ~ ~~ NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment C to Appendix I PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE TRANSPORTATION STUDY Volume 1, Appendix I l- NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume 1, Appendix I ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment C. Public Participation in the Transportation Study C.l Summary of Public Involvement affect local communities. The Risk Assessment Working Group was established to provide local The Transportation Study is one of the technical data and ad hoc studies to help ensure that the most reports being prepared in support of the Nevada current information available is used in the Test Site (NTS) Environmental Impact Statement Transportation Study. (EIS). It identifies and addresses the potential environmental impacts related to the transportation A second meeting with representatives of various of hazardous materials to and from the NTS under surrounding counties, cities, and other interested the alternatives being considered in the NTS EIS. organizations was held on April 20, 1995. During The following discussion generally describes the this meeting. preliminary results were issued public participation in the Transportation Study. through the Draft Preliminary Transportation Study. Information on concerns and issues raised Following the formal NTS EIS scoping period, a during the first meeting, during the one-on-ones, general transportation meeting was held in Las through the mail, and by telephone calls was Vegas on November 15, 1994. Those in provided at this meeting. In addition, comments attendance included representatives of surrounding on the preliminary results of the transportation counties and cities near the NTS. Presentations by impacts were discussed. the US. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOENV) representatives included a The meetings of the Protocol and Risk Assessment description of existing transportation conditions, Working Groups will continue on an as-needed DOE procedures, emergency response capabilities, basis. One-on-one meetings with the and the proposed draft outline of the representatives from American Indian tribes and Transportation Study. Comments, issues, and organizations will continue. A list of the scoping questions regarding transportation were raised by meetings, as of the fall of I995 is shown in Table those in attendance (Section C.2). In addition, one- c-I. on-one meetings between the DOENV transportation group and county and city officials C.2 General Responses to the April 20,1995, were requested. These one-on-one meetings, Transportation Meeting Comments which were held at each requested location (e.g., cities of North Las Vegas and Henderson), These responses were prepared following the were conducted to offer an opportunity for April 20, 1995, transportation meeting and sent to governmental and American Indian representatives everyone on the “Big Group” mailing list. to voice their concerns. Additionally, the DOENV Subsequent to this mailing, additional discussions transportation group was able to present and were held internally that altered the response to respond to requests for additional information comment number 2. A short discussion follows the on a timely basis. Two committees, the original response that provides DOEMV’s most Protocol Working Group and Risk Assessment current thinking. Working Group, were also established during the one-on-one meetings. General Response The Protocol and Risk Assessment Working The comments provided during the transportation Groups were formed to provide forums for closed session meeting on April 20, 1995, are communication on specific transportation valued for several reasons. The public comments concerns. The Protocol Working Group was demonstrate sincere interest in the study, provide established to discuss the protocol for handling indicate recognition that the DOE is taking the routing decisions that may have the potential to public’s concerns seriously. c-1 Volume 1, Appendix I ~~ ~ NEVADA TESTSITE E-INAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Table C-1. EIS Meetings as of October 13, 1995 (Pagc 1 of2) Location Date Scoping Meetings State of Nevada August 20, 1994 Fallon, Nevada September 7, 1994 Carson City, Ncvada September 8, 1994 St. George, Utah Septemher 13, 1994 Tonopah, Nevada September 15. 1995 Las Vcgas (Cashman Field), Nevada September 20, 1994 Pahrump, Nevada September 21, 1994 Caliente, Nevada September 22, 1994 Henderson, Nevada October 4, I994 State of Nevada Clearinghouse (Carson City), Nevada August 30, 1994 EM Community Advisory Board, Nevada October 5, 1994 Affected Units of Governments (White Pine County, state, tribal, local October 2 I, I994 governments) South-Central Nevada Federal Complex Advisory Board October 28, 1994 LocalVCounty Govcrnmenls (Las Vegas, Nevada) August 22.1994 I.ocal/County Governmenls (I larry Reid Center. Las Vcgas, Nevada) November 15, 1994 Local/County Governments (Ilarry Reid Center, Lar Vegas, Nevada) April 20, I995 Clark County, Las Vegas, Nevada December 6, 1994 City of Henderson, Nevada December 7, 1994 City of Las Vegas, Nevada December 12. 1994 City ofNorth Las Vegas, Nevada December 13, 1994 Boulder City, Nevada January 5, 1995 Lincoln County, Nevada January 18, 1995 Nye County, Ncvada January 16, 1995 Goldfield, Nevada March 13, 1995 Laughlin, Nevada March 14, 1995 NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Table C-1. EIS Meetings as of October 13, 1995 (Page 2 of2) ~ ~ American Indian March 22, 1995 Ely, Nevada February 10, 1995 EM Community Advisory Board March I, 1995 )I Implementation Plan Meetings I1 1) EM Community Advisory Board I February I, 1995 II 11 Las Vems, Nevada I February 7, I995 II ~ ~ Reno, Nevada February 9,1995 Las Vegas, Nevada March 7, 1995 Reno, Nevada March 9, I995 (1 Other Meetings It (1 Air & Waste Management I December 14, 1994 I( State, Tribal, Local Government Coordinating in Tonopah February 14. 1995 Southern Nevada Federal Facilities Community Advisory Board February 28, 1995 American Indian Consultation March 11-19, 1995 (1 State Clearinghouse Meeting - Carson City, Nevada I April 19, 1995 II 11 Paiute Tribe of Southern Utah I September 9, 1995 I1 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ Moapa Band of Paiutes September 14, 1995 Las Vegas Paiute Tribe, Nevada September 19, I995 Before providing item-by-item responses to 2. Not integrated yet with Yucca Mountain. comments, we note that the comments were provided in response to ongoing dialogue, as well Response: Although the DOE has stated that only as in the April 10, 1995, Preliminary Draft the Yucca Mountain site characterization activities Transportation Study. This draft was not complete, will be included in the NTS EIS, the DOE/NV staff it was a work-in-progress document. is currently working with their Yucca Mountain counterparts to determine an approach to effect Item by Item Response to Comments integration of transportation issues. This will be possible because Yucca Mountain is beginning I. No analysis of data, generators, preparation of their own EIS. lhe planned EIS for commodities, and radiation waste type. a potential repository at Yucca Mountain will evaluate the environmental impacts of Response: The analysis was not included in the construction, operation, and closure of a repository April 10, 1995, Preliminary Draft 'Transportation at Yucca Mountain. The Yucca Mountain EIS will Study because the model had not yet been run. consider the cumulative impact of transporting This information will bc included in the next draft. nuclear waste with the radioactive materialsiwaste shipments expected by the NTS. c-3 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Following the preparatioii of this response, a 6. Mistake on 1.2.2 (Preliminary meeting was held with representatives of Yucca Transportation Study): Conflict with Mountain Site Characterization Projects Office and National Environmental Policy Act Code a decision was made not to commit Yucca of Federal Regulurions, CostlBenefit Mountain to consider cumulative impacts Analysis 40 CFR 1502.23. associated with NTS waste shipments. The DOE will consider cumulative impacts; however, Yucca Response: It is our understanding that this Mountain may not be the organization that does comment refers to the fact that the National this work. Environmental Policy Act 40 CFR 1502.23 states that alternatives cannot be eliminated based solely 3. Heavy haul route refers to Craig Road and on cost. We recognize this constraint and are now tlie “Spaghetti Bowl.” contrary to previous including a description of both the northern and agreements. southern rail routes for comparison to highway routes. Please see Item 19 for further discussion of Response: As agreed in a meeting with North Las how rail routes will be addressed in the completed Vegas officials in July 1994, the DOENV is Transportation Study. committed to not using Craig Road for shipments of low-level waste. We are currently telling the 7. Sources of information are weak, carriers they are not to use the Craig Road route. inaccurate, and untimely. To the best of our knowledge, 110 agreement has been reached regarding the “Spaghetti Bowl”; Response: We are making every effort to ensure however, we are committed to exploring all accurate and timely information is used in the options for avoiding this interchange. study. One step toward this is our request to local, state, and tribal governments to provide their most As responsible decision makers, we want to make current demographic and traffic data for sure we have the data required to support our incorporating into the risk models. We will be decisions. Therefore, both Craig Road and the working with the Risk Assessment Working Group “Spaghetti Bowl” will he included in the study. to obtain the most current official data. Inclusion of a route in the study does not imply that route will be used. 8. Unfair in training, rural versus urban 4. Inadequate risk assessment factors Response: First responder training is available to all jurisdictions within the state ofNevada, and has Response: Risk assessment factors were not been given in several Nevada counties. identified in the Preliminary Draft Transportation Study, but will be part ofthe final document. In First-On-Scene Training lias been made available addition, a risk working group has been formed to by the DOE to fire, law enforcement, and address this issue in detail. emergency medical responders throughout Nevada since 1983 (at no cost other than travel to the 5. Page 1.3 (Preliminary Draft Transportation presentation site). Because of tlie nature of this Study): Today’s meeting is already training, the basic courses have been prcscnted at written. specialized training facilities at llie NTS. Refresher training sessions have been presented for Response: A place was set aside in the study for many people at locations in both soutliern (Las “today’s mccting.“ Since tlic inccting was set, we Vegas and I lenderson) and northern (Reno-Sparks felt it appropriate to include an up-to-date and Elko) Nevada. The Emergency Medical summary of public involve~nentactivities. The Personnel Radiological Seminar will he presented outcome of tlie April 20, 1995, meeting was not this August in both Tonopah and Ely. included, only its date and purpose. Understanding that the volunteer nature of the rural response force may make it difficult for them to Volume I, Appendix I c-4 NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT attend, the DOE will work with them to schedule Response: The April 10, 1995, version of the training. Preliminary Draft Transportation Study does not include impact analyses, because the model for the 9. Future and current choke points are risk assessment had not yet been completed. ignored “Spaghetti Bowl”. 13. Section 2.5.1 (Preliminary Draft Response: Analysis of choke points, such as Transportation Study): has no provision Hoover Dam and the “Spaghetti Bowl,” will be for funding personnel training in rural provided in the final study. This issue will also be counties. addressed by the Transportation Protocol Working Group. In addition, the “Spaghetti Bowl” is Response: First responder training is free to the scheduled for reconstruction over the next few counties. As stated in Item 8, the DOE will work years to alleviate congestion problems. with the counties and the Transportation Protocol Working Group to identify needs and develop a 10. Guiding assumptions for risk analyses strategy to meet those needs. were not presented. 14. What about compensation for rural Response: The assumptions had not yet been (county training) volunteers, i.e., lost incorporated into the study. They will be provided wages, vacation (time), and equipment? in the next version of the Transportation Study. These will also be discussed by the Risk Response: Please see Items 8 and 13 Assessment Working Group. In addition, the technical appendices addressing the risk analyses IS. Section 1.4 (Preliminary Draft will be available to interested parties in early June, Transportation Study): Please include your prior to release of the next version of the study. definition of high-activity low-level waste. 11. Rail spur implications for waste volume Response: The next version of the Transportation are not addressed. Study will include a definition of high-activity low-level waste, as well as other waste types. It is Response: Over the next several weeks, the important to remember that the definitions of high- DOE/NV must decide on what assumptions to level and low-level waste are rooted in the way the make regarding the volume of low-level waste was generated, rather than the level of radioactive waste to be transported to the NTS. radioactivity in the waste. Keeping that in mind, Once these assumptions are made, the DOENV the following definitions are presented: can complete its evaluations and draft report. High-level waste: Radioactive material which The scope of the rail evaluations includes a cost results from chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, and risk comparison of moving the same volume of contains fission products, traces of uranium and materials by both truck and rail. The potential plutonium, and other transuranic elements. competitive advantages to the NTS of having rail access, to support the development of new Low-level waste: Radioactive waste not classified missions, could lead to the movement of as high-level waste, transuranic waste, spent fuel, additional materials not considered in this or by-product material. In genera,l most low-level evaluation. For the development of major new waste has low specific activity. However, low- facilities, a separate impact assessment could be level waste can have high specific activity and still required. be considered low-level waste because it is not high-level waste, transuranic waste, or spent 12. No impact analysis nuclear fuel. c-5 Volume 1, Appendix I l- NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Transuranic waste: Waste material contaminated arena the DOE operates in with regards to with U-233 (and its daughter products), certain transportation, carrier selection, oversight of isotopes of plutonium, and nuclides with atomic carriers, and emergency management and training. numbers greater than 92 (uranium). It is produced As the study is finalized, our goal is to reflect local primarily from reprocessing spent fuel and from conditions, policy, and sentiment in the draft study the use of plutonium in the fabrication of nuclear report as long as they do not conflict with U.S. weapons. Department of Transportation laws and regulations. 16. Tribes should not have to go to the DOE; DOE should go to the tribes. 18. There is no discussion of liability (insurance). Response: For many years, the DOE has transported radioactive and non-radioactive Response: The information on liability had not materials and waste on state and federal highways been fully compiled; therefore, was not included in across American Indian lands. Although the DOE the April 10, 1995, version ofthe preliminary draft has complied with all national and state study. It will be provided in the completed draft transportation laws and regulations, we have not version of the Transportation Study. made a concentrated effort, to date. to coordinate our transportation needs with the various tribal Liability is the responsibility of the commercial governments. Now, recognizing and carrier. Most commercial carriers are insured by understanding our responsibility, we are working private insurance companies. Carriers are aware of to establish relationships and coordinating our liability and insurance requirements. The DOE transportation needs with tribal governments prior traffic managers inform their traffic officer that to shipping materials and waste. A letter was sent copies of carrier insurance coverage must be to each Tribal Council Chair inviting him or her to available prior to using a carrier. meet with the DOE on a government-to- government basis to discuss the topic of 19. Figure 1.1 (Preliminary Draft transportation. Transportation Rail Study) needed work, particularly to clarify “main” versus In addition, the DOE has had several meetings with “alternate.” American Indian representatives specifically to discuss the NTS EIS. To fully incorporate the Response: The April 10, 1995, preliminary study comments from the American Indian tribes, the identified two rail routes; the Modified Valley DOE has provided funding for a Resource route, and the Stateline route as feasible Document to be prepared by a team of American alternatives for rail access to the NTS. Since that Indian writers representing various local tribes. time, in response to comments received, we have This Resource Document is expected to reflect a decided that the final study will include unified position and/or comments on the NTS EIS. descriptions of the four routes as identified and This is an innovative outreach approach that is recommended for detailed evaluation in the Yucca consistent with the DOE’S resolve to incorporate Mountain document, “Nevada Potential Repository and encourage the full participation of the Preliminary Transportation Strategy Study 1 .” American Indian People. These routes will be discussed for comparison purposes only (with highway routing). No rail 17. The document does not consider reality of decision will be made as a result of this study or local conditions, policy, or sentiment. the NTS EIS. Response: The DOE has met one-on-one, and in The only scenario where rail access to the NTS larger groups, to gain a better understanding of might be required, because of the large volumes of local concerns. Tlic study was modified to address prqjected low-level waste, is where the NTS would and clarify questions raised about the regulatory be the sole low-level waste disposal site for the Volume I. Appendix I C-6 ~ ~~ ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT DOE complex. This is one of the alternatives Response: The final Transportation Study will included in the Draft Waste Management summarize comments and concerns raised by the Programmatic EIS and is included in Alternative 3 local jurisdictions. However, although all input of the NTS EIS. Although the NTS EIS and this will be considered, it is possible that not all will be transportation study are addressing this option, the adapted or used. In addition, many of the final decision will be made in association with the suggestions received during the one-on-one Draft Waste Management Programmatic EIS and meetings have been formulated into issues that will its transportation study. Therefore, detailed risk be further addressed by the Transportation Protocol analysis, as would be performed for decisional Working Group. (Also, see response to Item 17). purposes, will not be done for the NTS EIS. 24. Environmental risk is not considered under 20. Page 1.2.1 (Preliminary Draft scenarios. Transportation Rail Study): regarding the No-Build Alternative: trucks go through Response: The Transportation Study will include Las Vegas, contrary to promises made at possible human impacts associated with various one-on-one county meetings. scenarios corresponding to the four alternatives identified in the NTS EIS. As stated, Response: Please see Item 3 the Preliminary Draft Transportation Study was not completed and subsequently, the risk information 21. Clarify issues about responsibility, was not included in the April 10, 1995, version, accountability, liability. 25. No new alignment for heavy haul. Response: The April 10, 1995, draft report did not offer a clear discussion of responsibilities, Response: Please see Item 3 accountability, and liability. Our goal is to provide this discussion as it pertains to the DOE, carriers, 26. Heavy haul analysis and discussion is not and local jurisdictions in the completed draft study realistic. report. Response: Please see Item 3. 22. Other routes are omitted, e.g., Tonopah Test Range, Tonopah Test Site, Nellis Air 27. Legislation is in process to create Force Base. a rail spur - fait accompli - not a recommendation. Response: The Transportation Study focuses on activities at the NTS and Tonopah Test Range, as Response: Our goal is to include a short summary well as off-site locations within Nevada. While of the events associated with the legislation in the there are no waste disposal areas within the other completed draft study report. However, this DOE Nevada-operated sites, Environmental legislation affects Yucca Mountain, and not the Restoration Program Projects are expected at these NTS EIS. Proposed language, as introduced, sites under Alternatives I, 3, and 4 of the NTS EIS. would require a separate National Environmental Transportation of materials associated with these Policy Act process to evaluate the impacts of using activities will be along the same Nevada public this route for the movement of spent nuclear fuel highways as identified in the existing and or and high-level waste. The Modified Valley Route, potential highway routes. This point will be as well as other potential rail corridors, will be clarified in the Transportation Study. evaluated in the planned EIS for a Potential Repository at Yucca Mountain. Movement of 23. Previous statements and agreements are these materials is not part of the scope of the missing, time and time again. transportation study, or a mission under consideration in the four EIS alternatives. c-7 Volume 1, Appendix I , ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT 28. Page 1.2.2 (Preliminary Draft Response: Please see Item 3 Transportation Study): No presentation of northern routes and no reason. 3 1. No relationship between this study and the other 26 DOE EISs, especially the study of Response: Please see Item 19. transportation issues. 29. Page 2.1 .I (Preliminary Transportation Response: Consistent with Alternative 3 of the Rail Study): The authority to designate NTS EIS, the Transportation Study will address all routes, truck (economy) company, DOE, materials that are identified in the other DOE ElSs Nevada Department of Transportation. for possible shipment to the NTS. However, our study is focused primarily on intra-Nevada issues, Response: Low-level and mixed waste are not and therefore, is relying on the ElSs to provide the considered highway route controlled quantities; National Environmental Policy Act coverage for however, the following discussion is provided the activities they address. should there by some materials of this nature sent to the NTS. In addition, while the Preliminary Transportation Study does not address this issue explicitly, the Movement of highway route controlled quantities NTS EIS will contain a section entitled takes place on preferred highway routes identified “Cumulative Effects.” The Council on by individual states with the intent to minimize Environmental Quality (CEQ) defines Protection time in transit. Interstate highway routes and of Environment: Cumulative Impact 40 CFR Part alternatives designated by a state routing agency 1508.7 cumulative impact as “the impact on the are preferred routes. Because Nevada has no environment which results from the incremental designated routes, the preferred routes to the NTS impact of the action when added to other past, presently include Interstate 15 and U.S. present, and reasonable foreseeable future actions Highway 95. Nevada is considering the regardless of what agency (federal or non-federal) designation of alternative preferred routes. The or person undertakes such other actions. DOE would be obliged to use these routes for Cumulative impacts can result from individually highway route controlled quantities shipments. minor but collectively significant actions taking However, few projected shipments in this study place over a period of time.” Subsequently, the would contain highway route controlled quantities NTS EIS is the appropriate report to identify and of radioactive material. The Transportation Study, analyze impacts of other EISs regarding when completed, will provide the Nevada cumulative impacts. Department of Transportation information relating to all possible state-designated shipping routes. 32. It is not apparent that a review has been made of comprehensive laws and Subsection 2.2.3 presently provides information on regulations (local, state, tribal, special state routing agencies having the authority to districts, etc.). designate routes for highway route controlled quantities shipments. Carriers planning highway Response: It is our goal to provide available route controlled quantity shipments are information on various laws and regulations in the responsible for obtaining information about completed draft Transportation Study. existing state-designated routes. States report these routes to the DOE, as required. The 33. Rail 6ptions don’t consider inter-modal Department of ‘Transportation maintains this transfer. information in a database for carriers to access and use. Response: Please see ltcm 3. Intermodal transfers will be included in the completed draft 30. Trucks’ minimum requirements not stated. Transportation Study. Volume 1, Appendix I C-8 ~~ ~~~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 34. The DOE is abdicating routing authority to Comments and suggestions received during any of carriers. these activities will be considered and incorporated into the Transportation Study, as appropriate. In Response: The DOE does not have routing all cases, the DOE/NV will respond to the authority for any shipments. It strictly adheres to comments explaining how they were incorporated, Department of Transportation regulations for all or why they were not incorporated. hazardous materials (both radioactive and non- radioactive) shipments. However, the DOE will The Transportation Protocol Working Group, explore all avenues to ensure selected carriers of composed of representatives from city, county, hazardous matcrials adhere to all transportation tribal, state and federal governments, as well as direction. These avenues include alternate from the NTS Community Advisory Board, will contracting mechanisms, which would provide the develop recommendations on transportation issues, DOE with some control over route selection. which it will present to the “Big Group.’’ The goal is for participants in the “Big Group” to take these 35. Take each issue presented here and give recommendations back to their respective written comment and response to concerns organizations for review, and provide individual and rationale. official comments and recommendations to the DOE/T*IV. Response: The DOEMV will adopt this practice for the remainder of the Transportation Study. To maintain the dialogue established through these various venues, the Transportation Protocol 36. Be more clear of ongoing process and how Working Group will continue to meet after we will be meaningfully involved in it. completion of the Transportation Study. It is anticipated that the Transportation Risk Response: Since the summer of 1994, the Assessment Working Group will disband upon DOEMV has been involved in an ongoing dialogue completion of the Transportation Study, since their with state, tribal, and local governments in an work will be completed. effort to understand our stakeholders concerns and response to these concerns. We are using a multi- In addition, the DOE/NV is committed to tiered approach that offers several methods for establishing a working relationship with American participation in the Transportation Study: Indian councils to identify if and how the American Indians want to participate in this Traditional public participation process. associated with development and finalization of an EIS Furthermore, in those areas directly related to local concerns, we invite state, local, and tribal Periodic “Big Group” meetings governments, to provide explicit wording for with state, county, city, and tribal sections they are concerned about. This will assist leaders, as well as interested us in reflecting local conditions, policies, and members ofthe public sentiments accurately. One-on-one meetings with 37. Include a list or map that shows all interested communities generators. Transportation Protocol Working Response: This information will be providcd (as Group indicated above) in the completed Transportation Study. Transportation Risk Assessment Working Group. 38. Give all assumptions and data sources used for risk analysis. c-9 Volume I, Appendix I l- - __ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Response: This information will be provided (as 43. Include a broad discussion of the US. Air indicated above) in the completed Transportation Force Acts and D0EILT.S. Nuclear Study. Regulatory Commission implementation. 39. Discuss rail transportation from any Response: At this time, we do not believe that a direction, not just I-as Vegas and areas discussion of U.S. Air Force Acts and DOE/U.S. from the south. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission is relevant to the Transportation Study. Response: Please see Itcm 19. 44. Clarify parameters on route selection 40. Rail routes are not as available to generators as are road routes. Response: The principal objective of the Transportation Study is to determine the probable Response. Please see Item 19. impacts of the NTS EIS proposed alternatives on the existing and potential highway routes, and 41. It is unclear how to incorporate comments consider a rail spur alternative as appropriate. The that have been made before - no-show on "Big Group" may, on considering the results of the nontribal participation. probable impact analysis, decide to make recommendations for the DOEiNV to consider in Kesponse: Please see Item 16. the routes selected for transporting hazardous materials to the NTS EIS. Also, see Item 34. 42. Address alternate routes to Hoover Dam. Response: The completed Transportation Study will include risk analyses for alternate routes to Hoover Darn. Volume I, Appendix I c-10 NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT C.3 References REGULATION, ORDER, LAW 40 CFR 1502.23 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Code of Federal Regulations, Protection of Environnient: Cost-Benejft Analysis, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Kccords Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993. 40CFR 1508.7 EPA, ('ode of Federal Regulations, Protection of Environment: C'imzulative Inipuct, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993. c-11 Volume 1, Appendix I ~ ~ -~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume 1, Appendix I c-12 ~~ - NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment D to Appendix I EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES AND TRAINING Volume I, Appendix I -~ I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume I, Appendix I ~~ NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Attachment D. Emergency Response Procedures and Training Radioactive materials are among the many kinds of state, tribal, and non-DOE response team members. hazardous materials that emergency responders might have to deal with in a transportation D.l Federal Response accident. The more potentially harmful the levels of radioactive materials, the stricter the packaging, Federal agencies do not become involved in safeguards, and other requirements designed to responding to an emergency unless specifically prevent their release must be. Although rare, requested to do so by state, tribal, or local accidents involving radioactive materials do government officials (Figure D-I). However, if a happen, and an emergency preparedness system is federal agency's support is needed, it is available as in place to respond. described in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which outlines each agency's Ultimately, state, tribal, and local government responsibility. The DOE will provide support in officials in the region where an accident occurs accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 have the prime responsibility for initial emergency and DOE Order 5530.3, Radiological As.si.@ance response to any accident, including those involving Program. The DOE is the primary agency for radioactive materials. A highway patrol officer, or providing radiological monitoring and assessment fireman, is usually the first person on the scene. assistance. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The first responder will typically relay the The Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal information about the accident to a State Command Emergency Management Agency, and other Center that will contact the hazardous materials agencies also provide assistance as part of this response team, the carrier, and the U.S. plan. The DOE'S support ranges from giving Department of Energy (DOE). These first technical advice over the telephone, to sending responders also typically administer first aid, highly trained personnel and state-of-the-art isolate the area, extinguish fires, and identify the equipment to the accident site (on request by hazard by the cehicle placards and shipping papers. authorized state officials) to help identify and They may also contact CHEMTREC, a company minimize any radiological hazards, and perform that provides help on how to respond to hazardous radiological monitoring. material emergencies, if hazardous materials or mixed waste are involved. The first responder can Any state, tribal, local, or private sector refer to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOT) organization needing radiological assistance can Emergency Response Guidebook to determine call the nearest DOE Regional Coordinating immediate steps to be taken. Upon request, state Offices to obtain information, advice, or assistance and federal agencies will supply trained personnel through the Federal Radiological Monitoring and to conduct radiological tests at the site to determine Assessment Plan (Figure D-2). The DOE whether any radioactive material releases have maintains Regional Coordinating Offices in eight occurred. Most local and state governments have regions across the country. The Regional emergency response plans and training programs in Coordinating Offices receive calls for assistance place to prepare first responders for transportation 24-hours a day, and are prepared to send trained accidents involving radioactive materials. States personnel and equipment to an accident site. The also conduct radiological response training on DOE Regional Coordinator decides what action is behalf of the Federal Emergency Management needed based on the request. The DOE Regional Agency, which also supplies radiological Coordinating Office also ensures that appropriate monitoring instruments to the states. The Federal state or tribal personnel are contacted in order to Emergency Management Agency also provides the ensure appropriate involvement of them and their Radiological Emergency Response Training for the resources. If necessary, the coordinator sends a D-1 Volume I, Appendix I ~- NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Figure D-1. Typical notifications made following a radiological transportation emergency I I t'L Volume 1, Appendix I D-2 ~~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Figure D-2. U.S. Department of Energy regional coordinating offices D-3 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT federal team to the accident site to assist the This response network, along with other preventive authorities in charge. If personnel, equipment, or safety measures, such as package design and both are needed at the accident scene, the Regional testing, and adherence to stringent regulations, Coordinating Office coordinates the activation of support the continued safe shipping of DOE-owned a DOE Radiological Assistance Program Team. radioactive materials. The Radiological Assistance Program team’s capabilities include tield monitoring, spectrometry, D.2 Training Programs sampling, decontamination, dedicated response vehicles. mobile laboratories, generators, The DOE, other government agencies, and private communications equipment, and aerial surveys. industry all offer emergency response training for Personnel include health physicists, industrial personnel responding to accidents involving hygienists, and public information staff. Should hazardous and radioactive materials. The DOE the emergency require monitoring and assessment also provides training to state and local emergency resources exceeding those of the Radiological personnel that covers basic procedures for dealing Assistance Program team, a federal monitoring and with transportation accidents. The first-on-scene assessrncnt center will be established, where all training program has been made available by the federal agencies provide support. DOE, to fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical responders in Nevada since 1983 (at no After the immediate threat from the accident has cost other than travel expenses to the presentation passed, the lead federal radiological monitoring site). These courses are available to all and assessment role is transferred from the DOE to jurisdictions within the State of Nevada and have the Environmental Protection Agency. It is the been given in several Nevada counties. Emergency responsibility of the carrier to repackage and Medical Personnel Radiological seminars will be dispose ofany primary radioactive material spilled, presented in the near future in Tonopah and Ely, plus any contaminated material. Nevada. The DOE is committed to working with rural emergency and volunteer response forces to Although the DOE only ships about 11,000 make it easier to attend training by arranging radioactive material shipments per year (compared training schedules and locations that are easily to a national total of 2 million such shipments), the accessible. DOE actively ensures the safety of its shipments, including assisting state and local emergency The Transportation Emergency Preparedness responders, as requested, should an accident occur. Program establishes consistent response policies and procedures among the DOE’S various The DOE follows all DOT (49 CFR 170-178,383, programs. A controlled, coordinated emergency 387, and 390 through 399), Nuclear Regulatory preparedness program ensures a constant capability Commission; Energv: Packaging and to respond to accidents involving radioactive Trunsportuiion of Radioactive Malerial (10 CFR materials. The Transportation Emergency 71), and other regulations and operating procedures Preparedness Program also supports the to help ensure safe transport, and to assist Transportation Emergency Training for Response emergency response personnel. This compliance Assistance Program, which provides radiological includes proper packaging, marking and labeling response training for both DOE and civil the packages, providing the correct emergency responders. Civil-oriented Transportation response information on shipping papers, Emergency Training for Response Assistance placarding the vehicle, stowing and securing the Program training sessions include the Radiological packages, complying with driver training and Emergency Training for Local Responders course, routing requirements, and following vehicle safety intended primarily for local emergency personnel; requirements. Local, state, tribal, and federal and Radiological Emergency Operations, for state, emergency response systems are in place to tribal, and regional radiological response team respond in the event of a transportation accident. members. Radiological Emergency Operations is Volume I, Appendix I 0-4 ~ ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT a revision of the Radiological Emergency TRANSAX ‘90, the first such exercise, was a joint Response Operations course formerly taught by the effort between the DOE, state, and local agencies DOE. It is now more oriented toward response to in Colorado. transportation incidents involving radiological materials. Civil personnel, in limited numbers, TRANSAX ‘92, involved agencies of the state of have also attended the Rail Radiological Response Idaho, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, and local and Transportation Public Information courses, organizations for response and accident command. which are part of the Transportation Emergency Training for the Response Assistance program. TRANSAX ‘94, involved agencies of the states of Idaho and Oregon, local governments, and the The Transportation Emergency Training for Umatilla Tribe. Response Assistance Program is managed by DOEmV for the DOE Headquarters Offices of The TRANSAX exercises helped participants Environmental Management, Nonproliferation, and improve their emergency response planning and National Security. procedures. The series is ongoing and will involve other states, tribes, and local organizations in the The Transportation Emergency Preparedness future. Program initiatives focus on planning and training, exercises, and technical assistance to DOE The DOE-sponsored training programs are elements, as well as state, tribal, and local available to all local and state agencies that may governments. An important Transportation have the need to respond to emergency situations Emergency Preparedness Program initiative is a involving transportation of radioactive materials. series of training exercises known as TRANSAX which is emergency preparedness simulation. The DOE, in conjunction with states and tribes, conducts these training exercises to evaluate response systems and support services. D-5 Volume 1, Appendix I ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT D.3 References REGULATION, ORDER, LAW 10 CFR 71 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Energv: Packaging and Transportation ofRadioactive Material, Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988. 49 CFR 171-399 US. Department of Transportation (DOT), “Transportation,” Office of the Federal Register, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. DOE Order 5530.3 Department of Energy (DOE), Radiological Assistance Program, Washington, DC, 1992. Volume 1, Appendix I D-6 ~ ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment E to Appendix I NTS RAIL ACCESS STUDY Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume 1, Appendix I ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Attachment E. Nevada Test Site Rail Access Study Transportation of low-level waste to the Nevada near Stateline, Nevada. The second carrier is the Test Site NTS by truck could also be accomplished Southern Pacific Railroad that operates a route by developing rail access from one of the existing from Ogden, Utah, to Reno, Nevada. This line has mainline railroads or by intermodal transfer to a two branch lines, one running south from the legal weight truck. This section provides a vicinity of Cobre, Nevada, to Ely, Nevada, and the suinmary of considerations related to rail spur other running south from the vicinity of Hazen, development, use of tmckirail intermodal systems, Nevada, to Thorne, Nevada. Thc Union Pacific and comparisons to the continued use of truck operates a second northern route that runs from transportation systems. Salt Lake City, Utah, to Winnemucca, Nevada, and then west into California. The Southern Pacific This discussion serves as an introduction to line and the Union Pacific line run parallel between alternative radioactive material transportation Wells and Winnemucca, Nevada. All rail opportunities that could benefit both the shipments going west use the Southern Pacific line, community and the federal government. This and those going east use the IJnion Pacific line section does not support any specific decision in between those two points. this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), since rail transportation is not part of any specified E.l.l Site Rail Access History operating alternative. Rather, this section is a basis for starting a future discussion of this issue. Several studies have been done over the last several years to evaluate rail access options from The primary outcome of developing the capability an existing mainline railroad to the NTS. The of transporting low level waste to the NTS by rail following sections present a general description of or by usingtrucWrail intermodal systems, would be these studies. the reduction of the number of legal-weight truck shipments of material in particular, radioactive E.I.I.1 Feasibility Study for Trunspormion material. The radiological and nonradiological risk Facilifies to NTS. In March 1962, Holmes & to the public and the environment during transport Narver prepared a report for the Atomic Energy of these materials by truck is roughly proportional Commission entitled "Feasibility Study for to the number of shipments. According to the Transportation Facilities to the Nevada Test Site, Association of American Railroads, Competitive (AEC, 1962). The study was a preliminary Policy Reporter (AAR, 1993), rail transport is five determination of the technical and economic times safer than truck transport in terms of feasibility of constructing and operating a railroad accidents per ton-mi when carrying hazardous short-line from the vicinity of Las Vegas (Wann) materials. Railroads also ensure that shipments are to Mercury and then on to Jackass Flats in Area 25. better separated from other traffic and the public. The result ofthat study indicated that the short-line railroad concept was technically and economically feasible. The cost of the rail line was estimated to E.l Railroad Access be $12,323,000, and could be amortized in about 6% years. The end result of this activity was that Three major railroad lines pass through Nevada, the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) supported which could be used as a starting point in Clark County in upgrading U.S. Highway 95 into developing a rail spur to the NTS. One of these a four-lane highway from Las Vegas to the routes is the Union Pacific line that runs from Salt entrance to Mercury to provide a safer highway for Lake City, Utah south into Nevada at Caliente, the NTS workers. then south through Las Vegas and into California E-1 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT E.I.I.2 Lincoln County Study. In 1989, ETS cost estimates were about $171 million. Pacific prepared a report for the City of Calieiite Subsequent to the study that developed the route evaluating three alternative rail corridor routes from Elgin to US. Highway 95, ETS Pacific issued through Lincoln County, Nevada to Yucca a study (ETS Pacific, 1989b) that added a rail Mountain, Nevada. These routes could also alignment from the location at the end of the service the NTS. previous alignment at U.S. Highway 95 that went north along U.S. Highway 95 to the vicinity of The first route started in Caliente and then went Yucca Mountain. The additional rail alignment of north to Pioche on the abandoned Union Pacific 121 km (75 mi) in length would have added about railroad right-of-way. The alignment continued up $86 million to the total cost of building the rail line Lake Valley to Bristol Wells and then westerly from Elgin to Yucca Mountain. down through Dry Lake Valley, south of Burnt Peak, to cross State Route 3 18. The line continued Based on the data developed in the study, ETS to Timber Gap, into Garden Valley, and then into Pacific ranked the three routes from most desirable Sand Spring Valley. The line then ran southwest to to least desirable in the order of the second route, Chalk Mountain, crossing State Route 375, and the first route, and the third route. ETS Pacific then into the Nellis Air Force Range Complex determined the third route is the least desirable (NAFR). The line continued down Emigrant because it passes through the Desert National Valley around Rhyolite Hills to Groom Pass. From Wildlife Range and does not end up at Yucca Groom Pass, the line descended to Yucca Flat onto Mountain. This report did not consider going the NTS and then to Yucca Mountain. As reported through the NAFR Complex and the NTS in the in the study; Evaluate Alternative Rail Corridor area of the underground nuclear testing to be Roures through Lincoln County (ETS Pacific. problematic. 1989a), This alignment was 331 km (206 mi) long, and was estimated to cost $215 million to E.1.1.3 Preliminary RailAccess Study. In 1990, construct. the DOE issued a Preliminary Rail Access Study (DOE, 1990) that identified 10 rail options (Figure The second route was essentially the same, except E-1) from the currently existing mainline railroads that it started at Crestline (about 32 kin [20 mi] in Nevada to Yucca Mountain. Lincoln County northeast of Caliente on the Union Pacific and Caliente identified three additional alignments mainline), went to Sheep Springs Draw, then that were addressed in the study. Each of the descended just east of Panaca Hills, and connected options was reviewed to identify land-use to the first route just north of Condor Canyon. As compatibility issues. They were categorized as reported in the study, this alignment was 327 km either having existing conflicts that are not likely (203 mi) long, and in 1988 ETS Pacific estimated to change prior to DOE needing access, potential its cost would have been about $210 million. conflicts, or no identified conflicts. Of the 13 alignments (including 3 from the Liiicoln County The third route started south of Caliente in Elgin, study), the Caliente and Jean alignments were Nevada, followed Kane Springs Valley to US. found to have no significant land-use conflicts, and Highway 93, then went parallel to U.S. the Carlin alignment was judged to have the least Highway 93 north to Lower Pahranagat Lake. The potential for serious conflicts of all the routes line then went southwest into the Desert National connecting to the Southern Pacific line, based on a Wildlife Range passing Desert Lake, into Clark detailed review of current ownership patterns and County, and ended near U.S. Highway 95. This development criteria. route would require an intermodal transfer station along U.S. Highway 95 to transfer the waste from The three routes identified with the least land-use railcar to truck for the remaining 161 km (1 00 mi) conflicts were recommended for further of the route. As reported in the study, this engineering evaluation with the objective of not alignment was 187 km (116 mi) long, and 1988 excluding access to any of the three regional rail Volume 1, Appendix 1 E-2 NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Figure E-1 U.S. Department of Energy identified railroad options and Nevada state rail network, 1989 E-3 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FIVAL ENVIROffMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT carriers. The remaining 10 alignments were Mountain were developed, which constituted an recommended for continued monitoring, should envelope of possible routes between Caliente and any of the identified land access conflicts be Yucca Mountain. Approximately 11,675 km removed. As identified in the rail access study, the (7,256 mi) of rail alignment were included in the final routes selected for consideration as potential dctail study. rail access alignments to the Yucca Mountain site will be identified and discussed as part of the Information was developed on engineering factors Yucca Mountain Project EIS scoping process. including distance, grade rise and fall, the amount of cut and fill required, curvature, drainage, and A maJor result of this study is a table of the lengths rail operations. Alignment maps on a horizontal of each aligiiment and the costs, both capital and scale of 2.54 cm equals 152 m (1 in equals 500 ft), operating, and maintenance costs. Line lengths and a vertical scale of 2.54 cm equals 15.2 m (I in and costs ranged from a low of 159 km (99 mi), equals 50 ft), were developed for the alignment $142 million (1988 dollars) capital cost, and studied. A hydrology study was conducted to $740,000 aiiiiual operations and maintenance costs cvaluate worst case runoff flows for a 100-year for the Valley option; to a maximum of 721 kin flood condition. Environmental constraints were (448 mi), $735 million capital cost, and $3.3 evaluated to complement the engineering tradeoffs million aniiiial operalions and maintenance costs in route locations, to ensure that the base route and for the longest of the Caliente alignments. The options did not traverse environmentally sensitive capital costs included the cost of $500,000 per mile areas. In addition, archaeological studies were for track work, $500,000 per mile for grading, conducted to assure that the potential route and fencing, and establishing right of way access. In options did not traverse restricted, historical, mountainous terrain, an additional $I million to archaeological, or cultural sites. $1.2 million per mile was allotted for increased grading and drainagc. The operating cost Five potential operational options were evaluated calculations estimated a cost of $16.70 per 1,000 in this study. These included DOE owned, DOE gross ton miles. The maintenance costs were operated; DOE owned, short line operated; DOE estimated to be from $5,140 per track mile owned, contractor operated: DOE owned, Class 1 equivalent to an additional operating cost of $50.1 5 railroad operated; and privately owned, privately per 1,000 gross ton miles. This estimate was based operated. Finally, engineering, construction, and on a projected tonnage of 102,000 gross tons per operating costs were developed for each of the year. operational options. E.1.1.4 Caliente Route Conceptual Design. In The results of the rail study indicate there is a June 1992, the final Caliente Route report was potential feasible rail route, with several options, issued YUCCCIMount& Rai1Acces.i Sludy: Caliente from the existing Union Pacific railroad in the Route Design Report (DOE, 1992). That followed Caliente area to the potential repository site at a year after the draft report was issued for external Yucca Mountain. Conceptual plan and profile review in June 1991. The scope of the study was evaluations indicate that this route can be to develop the conceptual design, provide constructed within the limitations of present railroad engineering practices and normal preliminary environmental analysis, and prepare a operating standards. The base cost of doing the cost estimate for the Caliente alignment. This detail design and constructing the railroad was study included an cnvironmental screening to aid $108 million in 1990 dollars. in route establishment. The conceptual design also included the design oran access highway from E.1.1.5 High Speed Surface Transportation U.S. Highway 95, in Amargosa Valley, to the between Las Vegas and the NTS. In April 1994, potential site at Yucca Mountain, about 26 km Raytheon Services Nevada issued a draft report (16 mi) away. Two possible routes from the High Speed Surface Transportation between Las vicinity of Caliente to the potential site at Yucca Vegas and the Nevada Test Site (RSN, 1994). That report explored the rationale for a potential Volume 1, Appendix I E-4 ~~ ~~~~ ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT high-speed rail corridor between Las Vegas and the conditions that caused these route to be placed in NTS to accommodate increased workers for new this category will be monitored. Routes in this programs at the NTS in the 21st Century. The category, shown in Figure E-I, are Mina. Cherry study looked at a personnel carrier from the Creek, and Dike. vicinity of US. Highway 95 and Ann Road, in northwest Las Vegas, to Mercury and Control E.l.Z.6.3 Eliminated from Further Point 6 in the NTS, with another branch line to Study-These rail routes failed to meet one or Yucca Mountain. The line was not connected to more of the evaluation critcria listed in the any existing railroad line. It would include 185 km recoinmended status category, and the study has (1 I5 mi) of mainline track plus sidings and passing determined that the unfavorable conditions turn-outs. There would be two train sets, each eliminate any potential for the route to be consisting of one engine and six passenger cars, successfully developed. The routes are to be with four terminals on the line. The total cost of maintained at the present level of development by constructing the rail line and the associated the Yucca Mountain Project and will be presented equipment was $964 million. No follow-up to this in the National Environmental Policy Act scoping study has been initiated. process, with the route alternatives assigned to the other two status categories. E.I.I.6 Yucca Mountain System Study. The Nevada Potential Repository Preliminary During the National Environmental Policy Act Transportation Strategy. Study I (DOE, 1995) scoping process, these rail routes will be discussed reevaluated 13 previously identified rail routes and briefly to identify the reasons for their elimination. advanced a new route called the Valley Modified Routes in this category (Section E.1.1.2 and Route. This route was added as the result of recent Figure E-I) are Lincoln County A, B, & C, discussions with U.S. Bureau of Land Management Crucero, Ludlow, Valley, and Arden. Las Vegas District personnel regarding the status of two potential Wilderness Areas. The routes The rail routes recommended for detailed were categorized as follows: evaluation by Study 1 were comparatively evaluated against the Preliminary Rail Access E.1.1.6.1 Recommended for Detailed Study (DOE, 1990) selection criteria. The selected Evaluation-These rail routes were deemed the routes were also evaluated using the following most reasonable route alternatives based on the preliminary criteria developed by the Study I team conclusions of the (DOE, 1990) (see Section E.1.1.3) and Study I. They were considered Ease of construction reasonable, based on minimal land-use conflicts, - Initial cost maximal use of favorable topography and federal * Safety land, avoidance of land federally withdrawn from - Flexibility for personnel and freight public use, direct access to a major regional carrier, Operating and maintenance costs and conditions allowing design in accordance with - Safeguards and security accepted rail engineering practices. Routes in this Public perception. category are Caliente, Carlin, Jean (see Figure E-l), and Valley Modified (see Figure E-2). E.1.2 Description of Alternatives E.1.1.6.2 Eliminated from Defailed Evaluation Two options were considered in this study: (I) a Monitor-These rail routes failed to meet one or no-build alternative in which the NTS would more of the evaluation criteria listed in the continue to be supported by truck or railitruck previous paragraph. They were considered intermodal shipments; and (2) construction and technically feasible, but known or potential land operation of a rail spur to the NTS as a supplement use conflicts, indirect access to a major regional to truck transportation. carrier, or conflict with land federally withdrawn from public use, significantly reduced the potential for these routes to be successfully developed. The routes are to be maintained by the Yucca Mountain Project at the present level of development, and the E-5 Volume I, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Figure E-2. Modified Valley Route Profile i Legend w Volume 1, Appendix I E-6 NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT E.I.2. I No-Build Alfernative. Under the no- of the range and then northwest again between the build alternative, a rail spur would not he Southern Paiute Indian Reservation and the Desert constructed and the existing rail and highway National Wildlife Range. The route would network would remain the same. Normal highway continue northwest between US. Highway 95 and improvements planned by Clark County, the State the NAFR land, then pass in the vicinity of the ofNevada, and improvements made to the railroad Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field. Past the by the Union Pacific Railroad would continue. Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, the route would he This would mean that radioactive waste shipments between the highway and the mountain range, would continue to he brought in by truck or using entering the NTS between the main gate at railitruck intermodal systems. Any waste brought Mercury and the airplane landing strip. in by rail, destined for the NTS, would have to he transported from the rail line to the NTS by truck. The advantage of the Valley Modified route is that Issues associated with truck-only shipments are it is the shortest of all the alignments that have described in the other attachments. been evaluated in previous reports, and does not pass through any rugged terrain. Figure E-3 shows E.1.22 Rail Alignmenfs. Four routes were an approximate route profile. selected for evaluation in this study based on the need to compare truck and rail systems. Shorter, The major obstacle to this alignment is that it less expensive routes were developed to identify passes through Wilderness Study Areas. However, potential environmental impacts. Longer routes the U.S. Bureau of Land Management has were included for completeness. The routes recommended the removal of these Wilderness considered in this report do not include all feasible Study Area classifications, Final Environmental routes, but do address stakeholder concerns about Impact Statement, Preliminaty Wilderness the continued shipment of waste through the Las Recommendations (D01, 1990). If legislation Vegas Valley. If the DOE decides to propose removes the Wilderness Study Area designation, construction of a spur, this proposal would he this entire alignment would be on federal lands subjected to a separate National Environmental managed by the US. Bureau of Land Management Policy Act action. Exclusion of routes from the and on land withdrawn for the U.S. Air Force at detailed study in this report, likewise, does not Indian Springs. If right-of-way access across the terminate the government's potential interest in Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Base is not available, other alternatives as part of future actions. it is possible to cross U.S. Highway 95 prior to reaching Indian Springs, going south of the Routes originating in,northern Nevada, identified community of Indian Springs, and then crossing in previous DOE studies, were not given detailed US. Highway 95 again into the NTS. This consideration in this report because they offered no alignment would be longer, two grade separations advantages to improve transportation to the NTS would he required, and there is rougher terrain to compared to the two routes selected and would go through, which would make this option more require more resources to build and operate. costly. The additional cost for the grade Routes across the NAFR were also reviewed and separations and land excavation is estimated to he not considered in the report. These routes offered $25 million. An alternative alignment for this route no advantages to improve transportation to the would be to originate near Dike Siding northeast of NTS compared to the routes selected, and could Valley siding. This alignment would cross the significantly impact the mission of that facility. Sheep Mountain Bombing Range hut would allow the route to pass to the north of areas under E.I.2.2. I ValIey Modifud Route-The route consideration for residential development as part of being proposed is a combination of the Valley the City of North Las Vegas. route and the Dike Siding route identified in (DOE, 1990) (Figure E-2) and the repository system study E. 1.2.2.2 Sfaleline Route-A separate alternative (DOE, 1995). This route leaves the Union Pacific route would originate from the Union Pacific mainline north of the Valley Siding, northwest mainline near Stateline, Nevada (Figure E-4). adjacent to the NAFR Complex land to near the This route is similar to the Jean route identified in southern boundary of the Desert National Wildlife the DOE Preliminary Rail Access Study and is Range. It would continue west along the boundary designated as the Modified Jean Route in Study 1. E-7 Volume 1, Appendix I Rail Route Slope Analysis Modified Valley - NTS Route 34001 30003200t ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... I I 0 100 150 200 250 300 350 Distance (Feet) (Thousands) NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT The route would cross Interstate 15 through a E.1.2.3 Truck Haul Routes. This section grade separation, proceed along the south end of introduces truck routes evaluated for use in the Spring Mountains, and cross the border into possible truckhail intermodal shipments to the California and into the Mesquite Valley area. The NTS. Truck transport of legal weight (less than route would proceed north along the Spring 36,240 kg [80,000 Ib]), overweight (36,240 kg Mountains into Nevada east of the Sandy Valley greater than [80,000 Ih]), and heavy loads (greater area, avoiding private lands. The alignment would than 58,437 kg [129,000 Ib]) in Nevada over then cross State Route 160 through a grade existing U.S. and state highways and secondary separation, and skirt the communlty of Pahrump roads is feasible, and can be performed without and the Ash Meadows Wildlife Refuge. The route restriction for legal weight shipments or within the would then cross U.S. Highway 95 via a grade existing permit system for overweight and separation between State Route 160 and State overlength loads with a number of state Route 373, and proceed along US. Highway 95, restrictions. passing through Area 25 past Little Skull Mountain toward Mercury to the desired areas in the NTS. The State of Nevada’s permit system for overweight and overlength truck transport allows The advantage of this route over any of the other loads in excess of 58,437 kg (129,000 Ib). options is that it is shorter than any other route However, the transport of loads of this type on a except the route that leaves Jean and remains in regular basis would need to be evaluated with state Nevada. The advantage of this route is that it permitting agencies. In addition to obtaining a crosses the Spring Mountains at an elevation of state permit, the state permitting agency also must nearly 304 m (1,000 ft) lower than any of the approve the route. The annual cost for the state routes from Jean that remain in Nevada. Although overweight and overlength permit is $120 per ton the route is about 24 km (15 mi) longer, lower in excess of 36,240 kg (S0,OOO Ib) for each construction costs are expected to more than offset transport vehicle. An added annual cost of $1,000 the cost for the increased distance. A route profile is required for a hazardous materials permit for is shown in Figure E-5. carriers with 6 to 25 vehicles. Prior to transporting loads from an existing mainline railroad in Nevada The disadvantage of this route is that it crosses the to the NTS, an intermodal transfer facility adjacent California Desert Conservation Area. The U.S. to an existing railroad will have to he Bureau of Land Management can only grant a developed. right-of-way through these lands if there is no other feasible route. Shipments would also use the For an infrequent transfer, portable cranes could Santa Fe Railroad through Barstow, California, if he used at an existing rail siding to make that shipments through Las Vegas are to be minimized. transfer. If there were frequent transfers, a permanent facility might need to he developed. E.Z.2.2.3 Calienfe-This route is described in Trucks would be required to meet the state Section E.l.l and shown in Figure E-l of this requirements for maximum axle loads (9,060 kg report. It is included here for completeness hut [20,000 Ib] for a single axle, 15,402 kg [34,000 Ih] was not developed in detail in the remainder of this for atandem axle, and 21,744 kg [48,000 Ib] for a report. tridem axle) and minimum axle spacing. E.1.2.2.4 Carlin-This route is described in Study Road grade should be limited to a maximum of 4 1, referenced in Section E., and is shown in Figure to 5 percent. Grades of 6 to 7 percent could be E-I. This route would depart from the Union negotiated, hut would require either additional PacificiSouthern Pacific paired track near Carlin, tractors or larger tractors. This is very important Nevada. The route parallels Nevada Highway 278 for overweight and heavy haul trucks. Either and then passes south through either the Monitor or asphalt or concrete road surfaces are acceptable. Smokey Valley along the west side of the NTS Unpaved roads are not recommended; however, if entering the site near Amargosa Valley. This route properly constructed, they could be used. Unpaved is included here for completeness but is not roads and some secondary roads require time-of- developed in detail. year restrictions as roads thawing in the spring tend to he quite soft and rutted. E-9 Volume I, Appendix I ~~ ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Figure E-4. Stateline alternative rail alignment r Legend Volume 1, Appendix 1 E-I0 ~ ~- ~~ Rail Route Slope Analysis Stateline - NTS Route I I I I I I 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Distance (Feet) mousandsl NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT E.1.2.3.1 ApedVulIey Truck Haul Route-This needed to support the design, administration, and truck route would start a1 one of the sidings contract management. between Apex and Valley on the Union Pacific mainline. The route would use existing highways The major material cost drivers for construction either across Craig Road or to the intersection of include: (I) earthwork and rock excavation, Interstate 15 and U.S. Highway 95. The route (2) ballast and sub-ballast processing and transport, would then take U.S. Highway 95 north to Mercury (3) track and ties, (4) grade separations, and and into the NTS. (5) drainage structures. The advantage of this route is that it uses multiple The cost for the Modified Valley route is estimated lane divided highways without significant local to be $320 million for the approximately 161-kin road access, with the exception of Craig Road, if (100-mi) spur. The cost for the Stateline that road is used. The major disadvantage of this alternative is estimated to be $400 million for the route is that it has to pass through Las Vegas and, approximately 201-km (125-mi) spur. These in particular, through the high-traffic intersection estimates are based on the cost estimate from the at Interstate 15 and IJ.S. Highway 95. Caliente conceptual design report (DOE, I992), considering thc difference in distances. These E.I.2.3.2 Arden Truck Houl Route-'"he Arden estimates include the design costs, all construction truck route would originate at the Union Pacific costs, and a 35 perccnt contingency factor on siding in Arden, just south of Las Vcgas and near construction. State Route 160. This route would take Route 160 through Pahrump to U.S. Highway 95 and then E.2.2 Intermodal TrucWRail Construction south on U.S. Highway 95 to Mercury. The Costs advantage to this route is that it does not go through the populated sections of Las Vegas. The If intermodal systcms are uscd, there would be a disadvantage ofthis route is that it goes through construction cost of developing and operating an the populated and business sections of Pahrump. intermodal transfer station. It is estimated that the State Route 160 is also not a desirable heavy haul design and construction of a covered transfer highway, according to the Nevada Department of station with a sufficient overhead crane would cost Transportation about $2.5 million. There would also be the operational cost of the intermodal transfer station, E.1.2.3.3 Other Truck Haul Routesather which would depend on the frequency of its use. alternatives to the movement of trucks through Ix Vegas would result in an extremcly long route, E.2.3 A Comparison of Truck, Rail, and going through other communities or both. An Intermodal Shipping Costs example would be to make the intermodal transfer in the vicinity of Caliente, using US. Highway 93 Estimated shipping cosls for radioactive waste to State Route 375, thcn using State Route 375 to shipments by rail and by intermodal truckhail 1J.S. Highway 6, then to U.S. Highway 95 in modes were developed using a combination of the 'fonopah, and finally U.S. Highway 95 south to truck costs, and a verbal rail transportation cost Mercury. This would be a distance of about 579 estimate obtained from the Union Pacific km (360 mi), passing through the communities of Transportation Company. The costs developed for Tonopah, Goldfield, and Beatty. Use of California trucks were based on twelve 1 .2 x I .2 x 2.1 m State Route 127 to State Route 373 and then to (4 x 4 x 7 ft) waste boxes on a trailer. The cost per Mercury via U.S. Highway 95 is an example of a mile based on the trip length. The rail cost longer route originating south of Las Vegas. developed in this appendix is based 011 a single railcar carrying two cargo containers, each holding E.2 Cost Analysis nine 1.2 x 1.2 x 2.1 in (4 x 4 x 7 ft) waste boxes. The Union Pacific cstimated costs are based on the E.2.1 Rail Construction Costs movement of a railcar with 2 cargo containers having 18 waste boxes from Chicago to Las Vegas Cost drivers in the development of rail access and returning the hvo empty cargo containers. No include the design activity and the survey work adjustment was made in the cost per rail car mile Volume 1, Appendix I E-I2 ~- ~~ - NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL EjVVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT for multiple railcars per train or for increased trip $307 per box for the distant sites and about $139 lengths. Additional cost savings may be possible per box for the closer sites. if these parameters are included. Based on the "No Action Alternative Volumes," Estimates were made for representative shipments shipments from the distant sites (FEMP, Mound, to the NTS from sites in two general areas. Costs ORNL, and RMI), a total of about $14.6 million for intermodal shipments are not significantly could be saved using intermodal truckhail different between shipping by rail using the Union transportation, and about $20.7 million would be Pacific to Clive, Utah, and then by truck to the saved if the NrS rail spur is constructed. Savings NTS; shipping by rail using the Union Pacific to of about $2.5 million could be realized on North Las Vegas and then by truck to the NTS; or shipments from tlic closer sites using intermodal shipping by rail using the Santa Fe Railroad transportation. Additional savings of $5.4 million Company to Barstow, California by rail and then could be made if shipments could go all the way by by truck to NTS. On the basis of distance from a rail. Total savings could be $17.1 million for site to the NTS, Argonne National Laboratory-East intermodal shipments, and $26.1 million for an (ANL-E), Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory NTS rail spur. (BAPL), Fernald (FEMP), Mound, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Portstnouth Gaseous Based on the Expanded Use Alternative Volumes Diffusion Plant (PORTS), the RMI Extrusion from the distant sites, a total of about $43.3 million Plant, and the Savannah River Site (SRS) are could be saved for intermodal trucldrail nearly the same 3,339 * 362 km (2,075 * 225 transportation, and a savings of $61.3 million, mi); and so the radioactive waste transportation using a rail spur to the NTS. From the closer sites, costs from each site to the NTS would be about the an additional savings of $12.2 niillion could be same. The Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory realized using intermodal transportation or $26 (KAPL) is somewhat farther 4,183 kin (2,600 mi) million for an NTS rail spur. Potential savings and the cost would be somewhat higher. Also, total $55.5 million for intermodal transportation Lawrence Livermore National Laboratoly (LLNL), and $87.3 million for an NTS rail spur in this Rocky Flats (RFETS), Hanford, Los Alamos alternative. National Laboratory (LANL), the Stanford Linear Accelerator (SLAC), and the Idaho National One caution with regard to these cost estimates is Engineering Laboratory (INEL) are about the same that they are based on a truck load of only 12 boxes distance from the NTS (I ,5 I2 i 257 km [940 -+ and an intermodal truck load of 9 boxes. This 160 mi]), and so the cost of shipping the waste means that to meet the maximum legal-weight from those sites to the NTS would be about the truck requirement of 36,240 kg (80,000 Ib) same. maximuin, the boxes had to average less than 2,039 kg (4,500 Ib). In recent discussions with FEMP The resulting cost estimate for an intermodal transportation personnel, future boxes of waste truckhi1 shipment from any of the distant sites to from FEMP for NTS would contain contaminated the NTS is about $416 per box, whereas a truck equipment weighing between 2,265 kg (5,000 Ib) shipment from the originator site to the NTS is and 2,718 kg (6,000 Ib) per box, and there wouldbe about $678 per box. The cost estimate for an boxes of transite (concrete) weighing 3,624 kg intermodal truckirail shipmcnt from one of the (8,000 Ib) to 4,077 kg (9,000 Ib) per box. closer sites to the NTS is ahout $247 per box, Therefore, future truck shipments from FEMP to whereas a truck shipment all the way is about $342 the NTS may not contain the 12 boxes without per box. The main reason for the smaller exceeding the maximum gross vehicle weight of difference is that the truck rate for short hauls R0.000 Ib. ?'his means that some future shipments (approximately 161 kni [I00 mi]) is more than from FEMP would cost the same per shipment but twice the rate for truck shipments of more than would have fewer boxcs per truckload, thereby 1,126 km (700 mi), so the effect of the short increasing the cost per box. Kail shipments having (approximately 161 km [ 100 mi]) intermodal truck higher weight limits would not he subject to this shipment is more pronounced. As a comparison, reduction in efficiency. if a rail spur were constructed to the N.i"S, thc shipping cost is estimated to be about E-13 \'olurne I, Appendix I ~ ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT In conclusion, there is an opportunity for NTS site by truck. In addition, if a rail spur is significant cost savings in transporting low-level constructed out to the NTS, substantial additional waste using intermodal railitruck shipments versus savings could he realized that could partially offset shipping all the way from the originator site to the the capital costs of this alternative. Volume I, Appendix I E-14 - NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT E.5 References REGULATION, ORDER, LAW 43 CFR 2300 U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Public Lands: Land Withdrawals 4.34-General, Code of Federal Regulations. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, US. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993. 43 CFR 2800 U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Public Lands: Land Withdrawals, Rights-of- Way 4.34- Generul, Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, US.Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993. GENERAL AAR, 1993 AAR (Association of American Railroads), Competitive Policy Reporter, Volume IV, Number 8, 1993. AEC.1962 AEC (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office), Feasibility Study for Transporration Facilities to Nevada Test Site. Holmes & Narver, Inc., On-Continent Test Division, Las Vegas, NV. 1962. DOE, 1990 DOE, (U.S. Department of Energy), Preliminary Rail Access Study. DOE/YMP-89- 16, Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project Office, Las Vegas, NV, 1990. DOE, 1992 DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), Yucca Mountain Rail Access Study: Caliente Route Conceptual Design Report, Science Applications International Corp., Las Vegas, NV, 1992. DOE, 1995 DOE, Nevada Potential Repository Preliniinary Transportation Strategy Stu&l, B00000000-0 1717-4600-00023 Rev. 01, TRW Environmental Safety Systems, Las Vegas, NV, 1995. DOI, 1990 DO1 (U.S. Department of the Interior), Final Environmental Impact Statement, Preliminary Wilderness Recommendation.s, US. Bureau of Land Management, Las Vegas, NV, 1990. ETS Pacific, ETS Pacific, Evaluate Alternative Ruil Corridor Routes through Lincoln CounQ, 1989a NV, to Yucca Mountain, NV, August 1989. ETS Pacific, Rail Route C Extension vs. lntermodal Facility at Yucca Mountain, December 1989 1989b RSN, 1994 Raytheon Services Nevada, High Speed Surface Transportation Belween Las Vegas and the Nevada Test Site. Draft, Las Vegas, NV, 1994. DOT, 1917 U.S. Department of 'Transportation, Final Stundards, Clavsrficalion, rind Designation of Lines uf Class I Railrouds in /he UnitedStates. Washington, DC. 1977 E-15 Volume I, Appendix I ~~ - NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT This Page Intentionally Left Blank Volume 1, Appendix I - ~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Attachment F to Appendix I GENERATOR ROUTES Volume 1. Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT west 266 mi to Buffalo, New York. Interstate 90 is Generator: Los Alamos National Laboratory then traveled for 9 mi south to Lackawanna, New (LANL-l), Los Alamos, New Mexico York. At Lackawanna, Interstate 90 is continued 66 mi along the coast of Lake Erie southwest to The primary transportation route from the Los Ripley, New York. At Ripley, Interstate 90 is Alamos National Laboratory to the Nevada border again continued 106 mi to Willoughby Hills, Ohio. consists of traveling local roads to State Route 4 in At Willoughby Hills, Interstate 271 is driven 14 mi Bandelier, New Mexico. At Bandelier, to Bedford, Ohio. At Bedford, Interstate 480 is State Route 4 is driven I mi to State Route 502. driven west through Cleveland 30 mi to North State Route 502 is then traveled for 12 mi to Ridgeville, Ohio. Interstate 80 is acquired in North Pojoaque, New Mexico, where U.S. Ridgeville and is traveled 8 mi to Elyria, Ohio. At Highway 285184 is traveled 18 mi south into Santa Elyria, Interstate 80 combines with Interstate 90. Fe, New Mexico, to U.S. Highway 4. U.S. Interstate 801lntcrstate 90 is then taken 281 mi to Highway 4 is driven 2 mi south to Interstate 25, Portage, Indiana, where Interstate 80 branches off which is then driven 56 mi south to Albuquerque, from Interstate 90. At Portage, Interstate 80 is New Mexico. At Albuquerque, Interstate 40 is taken for approximately I mi to Lake Station, driven 468 mi to Kingman, Arizona. At Kingman, Indiana, at which point Interstate 80 combines with US. Highway 93 is traveled 72 mi northwest to the Interstate 94. Interstate 80194 is then traveled 19 Nevada border. This route would likely continue mi to Lansing, Illinois, where Interstate 94 on NV-4 or NV-5. branches off and Interstate 80 combines with Interstate 294. Interstate 801294 is driven west for Generator: Los Alamos National Laboratory 5 mi to Homewood, Illinois. At Homewood, (LANL-2), Los Alamos, New Mexico Interstate 80 branches off and is taken 146 mi to Green Rock, Illinois. At Green Rock, Interstate 74 One alternate transportation route from the Los is then traveled west for 9 mi to Quad City Airport, Alamos National Laboratory to the Nevada border Moline, Illinois, where Interstate 280 is driven 18 consists of traveling local roads to State Route 4 in mi around the southwest perimeter of Rock Island, Bandelier, New Mexico. At Bandelier, State Illinois, and Davenport, Illinois, until Interstate 80 Route 4 is driven 1 mi to State Route 502. State is once again interccptcd. At this point, Route 502 is then traveled for 12 mi to Pojoaque, Interstate 80 is driven west 153 mi into Des New Mexico, where U.S. Highway 285184 can be Moines, Iowa. At Des Moines, Interstate 80 acquired. U.S. Highway 285184 is then traveled combines with Interstate 35 and is taken 14 mi 18 mi south into Santa Fe, New Mexico, where until Interstate 80 splits off from Interstate 80135. U.S. Highway 84 is driven 2 mi south to Interstate 80 is driven 96 mi from Des Moines to Interstate 25. Interstate 25 is then taken 56 mi Minden, Iowa. At Minden, Interstate 680 is driven south to Albuquerque, New Mexico. At 16 mi to Loveland, Iowa, where Interstate 680 Albuquerque, Interstate 40 is driven 549 mi across combines with Interstate 29. At Loveland, Arizona to Needles, California. At Needles, U.S. Interstate 680129 is traveled for 10 mi to Crescent, Highway 95 can be accessed and driven north for Iowa. At Crescent, Interstate 680 branches off 23 mi to the Nevada border. This route would from Interstate 29 and is traveled west 17 mi into likely continue on NV-6 or NV-7. Omaha, Nebraska. At Omaha, Interstate 80 is acquired and driven 343 mi to Big Springs, Generator: Los Alamos National Laboratory Nebraska. At Big Springs, Interstate 76 is traveled (LANL-3), Los Alamos, New Mexico west 186 mi to Arvada, Colorado. At Arvada, Interstate 70 is then taken southwest 502 mi to One alternate transportation route from the Los Cove Fort, Utah. At Cove Fort, Interstate 15 is Alamos National Laboratory to the Nevada border driven 16 I mi through northwest Arizona and to consists of traveling local roads to State Route 4 in the Nevada border. This route would likely Bandelier, New Mexico. At Bandelier, State continue on NV-I or NV-2. Route 4 is driven 1 mi to State Route 502. State F-7 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL lMPACT STATEMENT Route 502 is then traveled for 12 mi to Pojoaque, Interstate 980 is driven 2 mi to Oakland, New Mexico, where US. Highway 285/84 is California, to Interstate 880. Interstate 880 is then traveled I8 mi south into Santa Fe, New Mexico. driven 1 1 mi southeast to San Leandro, California. US. Highway 84 is driven 2 mi south to At San Leandro, Interstate 238 is traveled for 2 mi Interstate 25. Interstate 25 is then taken 56 mi to Castro Valley, California, where Interstate 580 south to Albuquerque, New Mexico. At is found. Interstate 580 is then taken 47 mi to Albuquerque, Interstate 40 is driven 681 mi across Vernalis, California. At Vernalis, Interstate 5 is Arizona to Barstow, California. At Barstow, driven 291 mi south to San Fernando, California, Interstate I5 can be accessed and driven north for where Interstate 210 can he acquired. Interstate 112 mi to the Nevada border. This route would 210 is taken 48 mi east to Pomona, California to likely continue on NV-8 or NV-9. the Interstate 10. Interstate 10 is then traveled 17 mi to Ontario, California, where Interstate 15 can Generator: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory then be driven 137 mi northeast to Baker, (LBL-l), Berkeley, California California. At Baker, State Route 127 can be taken 56 mi to Shoshone, California, where State The primary transportation route from the Route 127 combines with State Route 373. State Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory to the Nevada Route 1271373 is driven 34 mi north to the Nevada border consists of traveling 3 mi on local roads to border. This route would likely continue on NV- Berkeley, California. At Berkeley, 10. Interstate 580180 is traveled 2 mi to Oakland, California where Interstate 580 splits off by itself. Generator: Lawrence Livermore National Interstate 580 is then driven 1 mi south to Laboratory (LLNL-l), Livermore, California Interstate 980 in Piedmont, California. Interstate 980 is driven 2 mi to Oakland, The primary transportation route from the California, to Interstate 880. Interstate 880 is then Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to the driven 11 mi southeast to San Leandro, California. Nevada border consists of traveling approximately At San Leandro, Interstate 238 is traveled for 2 mi 3 mi on local roads to Altamont, California. At to Castro Valley, California, where Interstate 580 Altamont, Interstate 580 is accessed and driven is found. Interstate 580 is then taken 47 mi to south 24 mi to Vernalis, California, to Interstate 5. Vernalis, California. At Vernalis, Interstate 5 is Interstate 5 is then traveled south 291 mi to San driven 291 mi south to San Fernando, California, Fernando, California, to Interstate 2 10. where Interstate 210 is then driven 48 mi to Interstate 210 is then taken 48 mi east to Pomona, Interstate 10 in Pomona, California. Interstate LO California. At Pomona, Interstate 10 is driven 17 is traveled 17 mi to Ontario, California, where mi east to Ontario, California, to Interstate 15. Interstate 15 is accessed and driven 186 mi Interstate 15 is then traveled 186 mi northeast from northeast to the Nevada border. This route would Ontario to the Nevada border. This route would likely continue on NV-8 or NV-9. likely continue on NV-8 or NV-9. Generator: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Generator: Lawrence Livermore National (LBL-2), Berkeley, California Laboratory (LLNL-2), Livermore, California One alternate transportation route from the One alternate transportation route from the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory to the Nevada Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to the border consists of traveling 3 mi on local roads to Nevada border consists of traveling approximately Berkeley, California. At Berkeley, 3 mi on local roads to Altamont, California. At Interstate 580/80 is traveled 2 mi to Oakland, Altamont, Interstate 580 is accessed and driven California, where Interstate 580 splits off. south 24 mi to Vernalis, California, to Interstate 5. lntcrstate 580 is then driven I mi south to Interstate 5 is then traveled south 291 mi to San Interstate 980 in Piedmont, California. Fernando, California, to Interstate 210. Volume I. Appendix I F-8 NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Interstate 210 is then taken 48 mi east to Pomona, Generator: Oak Ridge Reservation (ORISE-l), California. At Pomona, Interstate 10 is driven 17 Oak Ridge, Tennessee mi east to Ontario, California, to Interstate 15. Interstate 15 is then taken 137 mi northeast to The primary transportation route from the Oak Baker, California. At Baker, State Route 127 is Ridge Reservation to the Nevada border consists of driven north for 56 mi to Shoshone, California. At traveling from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 7 mi on Shoshone, State Route 127 combines with State State Route 62 to Solway, Tennessee. At Solway, Route 373 and is traveled 34 mi north to the State Route 162 is traveled 6 mi east Nevada border. This route would likely continue to Knoxville, Tennessee. At Knoxville, on NV- 10. Interstate 40175 is accessed and driven 10 mi west to Farragut, Tennessee, where Interstate 40 splits Generator: Mound Plant (Mound-1), off from Interstate 75. Interstate 40 is then Miamisburg, Ohio traveled 156 mi west to Nashville, Tennessee. At Nashville, Interstate 24 is taken south for 1 mi to The primary transportation route from the Mound Interstate 440 where it is driven west 7 mi to Facility to the Nevada border consists of traveling Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is then driven from 1 mi on local roads to Miamisburg, Ohio, to State Nashville west for another 215 mi to West Route 725. State Route 275 is then traveled for 3 Memphis, Tennessee. At West Memphis, mi through Miamisburg, to Interstate 75. Interstate 40 combines with Interstate 55 for 3 mi Interstate 75 is then accessed and driven 18 mi when Interstate 40 once again splits off. through Dayton, Ohio, to Vandalia, Ohio. At Interstate 40 is then taken west for 443 mi through Vandalia, Interstate 70 is driven west 101 mi to Arkansas and into Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At Indianapolis, Indiana. At Indianapolis, Oklahoma City, Interstate 240 is driven for 17 mi Interstate 465 is taken past Interstate 74 for about west around Oklahoma City to Interstate 44. 20 mi until it intersects with Interstate 70. Interstate 44 is then traveled north for 5 mi to Interstate 70 is then traveled west 131 mi into Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is again accessed and Teutopolis, Illinois. At Teutopolis, Interstate 70 traveled west 1,004 mi through the Texas becomes Interstate 57 and is driven approximately Panhandle, through New Mexico, and into 6 mi to Interstate 70, located in Effingham, Illinois. Kingman, Arizona. At Kingman, U.S. Highway 93 Interstate 70 is then traveled 77 mi west into can then be taken northwest 72 mi to the Nevada Edwardsville, Illinois. At Edwardsville, border. This route would likely continue on NV-4 Interstate 270 is traveled 30 mi into St. Louis, orNV-5. Missouri. At St. Louis, Interstate 70 is again taken west 224 mi to Kansas City, Missouri. At Kansas Generator: Oak Ridge Reservation (ORISE-2), City, Missouri, Interstate 435 is driven 3 1 mi west Oak Ridge, Tennessee into Kansas City, Kansas. At Kansas City, Kansas, Interstate 70 is taken approximately 4 mi west to One alternate transportation route from the Oak Bonner Springs, Kansas. At Bonner Springs, Ridge Reservation to the Nevada border consists of Interstate 70 is continued 42 mi west to Topeka, traveling from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 7 mi on Kansas. At this point, Interstate 470 is traveled for State Route 62 to Solway, Tennessee. At Solway, 12 mi around the Topeka city limits until State Route 162 is traveled 6 mi east to Knoxville, Interstate 470 intersects with Interstate 70. Tennessee.At Knoxville, Interstate 40/75 is Interstate 70 is then driven for 1,037 mi west accessed and driven 10 mi west to Farragut, through Colorado and into Cove Fort, Utah. At Tennessee, where Interstate 40 splits off from Cove Fort, Interstate 15 is driven southwest 161 mi Interstate 75. Interstate 40 is then traveled 156 mi through northwest Arizona and to the Nevada west to Nashville, Tennessee. At Nashville, border. This route would likely continue on NV-I Interstate 24 is taken south for 1 mi to or NV-2. Interstate 440 where it is driven west 7 mi to Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is then driven from F-9 Volume 1, Appendix I NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Nashville west for another 215 mi to West Generator: Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Memphis, Tennessee. At West Memphis, (PGDP-l), Paducah, Kentucky Interstate 40 combines with Interstate 55 for 3 mi when Interstate 40 once again splits off. The primary transportation route from the Paducah Interstate 40 is then traveled west for 443 mi Gaseous Diffusion Plant to the Nevada border through Arkansas and into Oklahoma City, consists of traveling 3 mi on local roads to Kevil, Oklahoma. At Oklahoma City, Interstate 240 is Kentucky. At Kevil, US. Highway 60 is traveled obtained and driven for 17 mi west around east 8 mi to Paducah, Kentucky. At Paducah, Oklahoma City to Interstate 44. Interstate 44 is lnterstate 24 is driven 44 mi north to Pulleys Mill, then traveled north for 5 mi to Interstate 40. Illinois, where Interstate 57 can be found. Interstate 40 is again accessed and traveled west Interstate 57 is then traveled for 48 mi north to 1,085 mi through the Texas Panhandle, Mt. Vernon, Illinois, at which point Interstate 57 New, Mexico, Arizona, and into Needles, and Interstate 64 combine. Interstate 57/64 are California. At Needles, U.S. Highway 95 can then driven 5 mi north to Mt. Vernon where be taken north 72 mi to the Nevada border. This Interstate 64 branches off from Interstate 57. route would likely continue on NV-6 or NV-7. Interstate 64 is then driven 67 mi west to Washington Park, Illinois. Interstate 255 is Generator: Oak Ridge Reservation (ORISE3), obtained in Washington Park and is driven 1 1 mi to Oak Ridge, Tennessee Edwardsville, Illinois. At Edwardsville, Interstate 270 is taken 22 mi west to St. Louis, One alternate transportation route from the Oak Missouri. At St. Louis, Interstate 70 is taken west Ridge Reservation to the Nevada border consists of 224 mi to Kansas City, Missouri. At Kansas City, traveling from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 7 mi on Missouri, Interstate 435 is driven 3 1 mi west into State Route 62 to Solway, Tennessee. At Solway, Kansas City, Kansas. At Kansas City, Kansas, State Route 162 is traveled 6 mi east to Knoxville, Interstate 70 is taken approximately 46 mi west to Tennessee. At Knoxville, Interstate 40175 is Topeka, Kansas. At this point, Interstate 470 is accessed and driven I0 mi west to Farragut, traveled for 12 mi around the Topeka city limits Tennessec, where Interstate 40 splits off from until Interstate 470 intersects with Interstate 70. Interstate 75. Interstate 40 is then traveled 156 mi Interstate 70 is then driven for 1,037 mi west west to Nashville, Tennessee. At Nashville, through Colorado and into Cove Fort, Utah. At Interstatc 24 is taken south for I mi to Cove Fort, Interstate I5 is driven southwest 16 1 mi Interstate 440 where it is driven west 7 mi to through northwest Arizona and to the Nevada Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is then driven from border. This route would likely continue on NV-I Nashville west for another 215 mi to West or NV-2. Memphis, Tennessee. At West Memphis, Interstate 40 combines with Interstate 55 for 3 mi Generator: Pantex Plant (Pantex-1), Amarillo, when Interstate 40 once again splits off. Texas Interstatc 40 is then traveled west for 443 mi through Arkansas and into Oklahoma City, The primary transportation route from the Pantex Oklahorna. At Oklahoma City, Interstate 240 is Plant to the Nevada border consists of traveling driven for 17 mi west around Oklahoma City to south 4 mi on FR-683 to Pantex, Texas. At Pantex, Interstate 44. Interstate 44 is then traveled north U.S. Highway 60 is then taken west 7 mi to for 5 mi to Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is again Amarillo, Texas. At Amarillo, LR-335 is driven acquircd and traveled west 1,217 mi through the west 22 mi around Amarillo to Interstate 40. Texas Panhandle, New Mexico, Arizona, and into Interstate 40 is then driven 745 mi west through Barstow, California. At Barstow, lnterstatc 15 is New Mexico to Kingman, Arizona. At Kingman, taken north 112 mi to the Nevada border. This U.S. Highway 93 is driven northwest 72 mi to the route would likely continue on NV-8 or NV-9. Nevada border. This route would likely continue on NV-4 or NV-5. NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Generator: Pantex Plant (Pantex-2), Amarillo, traveled west 13 1 mi into Teutopolis, Illinois. At Texas Teutopolis, Interstate 70 becomes Interstate 57 and is driven approximately 6 mi to Interstate 70, One alternate transportation route from the Pantex located in Effingham, Illinois. Interstate 70 is then Plant to the Nevada border consists of traveling traveled 77 mi west into Edwardsville, Illinois. At south 4 mi on FR-683 to Pantex, Texas. At Pantex, Edwardsville, Interstate 270 is traveled 30 mi into U.S. Highway 60 is then taken west 7 mi to St. Louis, Missouri. At St. Louis, Interstate 70 is Amarillo, Texas. At Amarillo, LR-335 is driven taken west 224 mi to Kansas City, Missouri. At west 22 mi around Amarillo to Interstate 40. Kansas City, Missouri, Interstate 435 is driven 3 I Interstate 40 is then picked up in Amarillo and mi west into Kansas City, Kansas. At Kansas City, driven 826 mi west through New Mexico and Kansas, Interstate 70 is taken approximately 46 mi Arizona to Needles, California. At Needles, U.S. west to Topeka, Kansas. Interstate 470 is traveled Highway 95 is driven north 23 mi to the Nevada for 12 mi around the Topeka city limits. At this border. This route would likely continue on NV-6 point, Interstate 470 intersects with Interstate 70 or NV-7. and is driven for 1,037 mi west through Colorado and into Cove Fort, Utah. At Cove Fort, Generator: Pantex Plant (Pantex-3), Amarillo, Interstate I5 is driven southwest 161 mi through Texas northwest Arizona and to the Nevada border. This route would likely continue on NV-I or NV-2. One alternate transportation route from the Pantex Plant to the Nevada border consists of traveling Generator: Princeton Plasma Physics south 4 mi on FR-683 to Pantex, Texas. At Pantex, Laboratory (PPPL-1), Princeton, New Jersey U.S. Highway 60 is then taken west 7 mi to Amarillo, Texas. At Amarillo, LR-335 is driven The primary transportation route from the west 22 mi around Amarillo to Interstate 40. Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory to the Interstate 40 is then taken from Amarillo and Nevada border consists of traveling from the driven 958 mi west through New Mexico and Princeton Laboratory on US. Highway 1 for 7 mi Arizona to Barstow, California. At Barstow, to Bakersville, New Jersey. At Bakersville, Interstate I5 is driven north 1 12 mi to the Nevada Interstate 295 is traveled 9 mi to White Horse, border. This route would likely continue on NV-8 New Jersey. At White Horse, Interstate 195 is or NV-9. driven 1 mi to Bordentown, New Jersey. At Bordentown, US. Highway 206 is taken south for Generator: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion 2 mi to the point U.S. Highway 130 and U.S. Plant (PORTS-l), Portsmouth, Ohio Highway 206 come together. U.S. Highway 1301 US. Highway 206 is then traveled 1 mi through The primary transportation route from the Bordentown to where U.S. Highway 206 splits off Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant to the Nevada from U.S. Highway 130. US. Highway 206 is then border consists of traveling 25 mi north on US. taken 1 mi to Mansfield Square, New Jersey. At Highway 23 to Chillicothe, Ohio. At Chillicothe, Mansfield Square, U.S. Highway 206 is driven 2 US. Highway 23 and U.S. Highway 35 combine, mi to Hedding, New Jersey, where Interstate 276 and U.S. Highway 23135 is driven 2 mi until U.S. can be found. Interstate 276 is then driven 4 mi to Highway 23 splits off. U.S. Highway 23 is then Florence, New Jersey at the New Jersey- taken 37 mi north to Shadeville, Ohio. At Pennsylvania border, and on for 3 mi west to Bristol, Pennsylvania. At Bristol, Interstate 276 is Shadeville, Interstate 270 is traveled 11 mi to then driven for 31 mi to Valley Forge, Columbus, Ohio. At Columbus, Interstate 70 is Pennsylvania, where Interstate 276 turns into then taken west for 160 mi to Indianapolis, Interstate 76. Interstate 76 is then traveled 166 mi Indiana. At Indianapolis, Interstate 465 is driven to Breezewood, Pennsylvania. At Breezewood, south around Indianapolis for about 20 mi until it Interstate 70 and Interstate 76 combine, and intersects with Interstate 70. Interstate 70 is then Interstate 70176 is traveled 87 mi to New Stanton, F-11 Volume I, Appendix 1 ~ ~~ NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Pennsylvania. At New Stanton. Interstate 70 splits At Pasadena, Interstate 210 is driven 23 mi to from Interstate 76 and is driven for 38 mi to Pomona, California, to Interstate 10. Interstate 10 Laboratory, Pennsylvania. At Laboratory, is then traveled 17 mi east into Ontario, California. Interstate 70 and Interstate 79 combine and the At Ontario, Interstate 15 is taken 186 mi northeast road is traveled for 5 mi into Washington, to the Nevada border. This route would likely Pennsylvania. At Washington, Interstate 70 splits continue on NV-8 or NV-9. off from Interstate 79 and is taken west 27 mi to Interstate 470 in Wheeling, West Virginia. Generator: Rocketdyne Division (RD-Z), Interstate 470 is then traveled to the south of Canoga Park, California (also identified as Wheeling for 11 mi. Interstate 70 is once again Energy Technology Engineering Center) picked up in St. Clairsville, Ohio. Interstate 70 is then taken from St. Clairsville to Columbus, Ohio, One alternate transportation route from the which is 111 mi away. At the city limits of Rocketdyne Division to the Nevada border consists Columbus, Interstate 270 is taken north 21 mi until of traveling north 3 mi on State Route 27 to it intersects with Interstate 70. Interstate 70 is then Woodland Hills, California. At Woodland Hills, taken west 160 mi to Indianapolis, Indiana. At U.S. Highway 101 is taken 13 mi east to North Indianapolis, Interstate 465 is driven south for Hollywood, California. At North Hollywood, State about 19 mi until it intersects with Interstate 70. Route 134 is driven 13 mi to Pasadena, California, Interstate 70 is then taken west 131 mi into at which point Interstate 210 is driven 23 mi to Teutopolis, Illinois. At Teutopolis, Interstate 70 Pomona, California, to Interstate 10. Interstate 10 becomes Interstate 57 and is driven approximately is then traveled 17 mi east into Ontario, California. 6 mi to Interstate 70, located in Effingham, Illinois. At Ontario, Interstate I5 is driven northeast 137 mi Interstate 70 is then traveled 77 mi west into to Baker, California. At Baker, State Route 127 is Edwardsville, Illinois. At Edwardsville, taken north 56 mi to Shoshone. State Interstate 270 is obtained and traveled 30 mi into Route 1271373 is then traveled 34 mi north to the St. Louis, Missouri. At St. Louis, Interstate 70 is Nevada border. This route would likely continue taken west 224 mi to Kansas City, Missouri. At on NV-10. Kansas City, Missouri, Interstate 435 is driven 3 1 mi west into Kansas City, Kansas. At Kansas City, Generator: Rocky Flats Plant (RFP-l), Golden, Kansas, Interstate 70 is taken approximately 46 mi Colorado west to Topeka, Kansas. Interstate 470 is taken for 12 mi around the Topeka city limits. At this point, The primary transportation route from the Rocky Interstate 470 intersects with Interstate 70 and Flats Plant to the Nevada border consists of Interstate 70 is driven for 1,037 mi west through traveling 2 mi on local roads to Rocky Flats. At Colorado and into Cove Fort, Utah. At Cove Fort, Rocky Flats, State Route 93 is traveled 3 mi to Interstate 15 is driven southwest 161 mi through Marshall, Colorado. At Marshall, State Route 128 northwest Arizona and to the Nevada border. This is then traveled 8 mi to Broomfield, Colorado. At route would likely continue on NV- 1 or NV-2. Broomfield, U.S. Highway 36 is driven 9 mi to Thornton, Colorado. Interstate 25 is then traveled Generator: Rocketdyne Division (RD-l), 1 mi to Interstate 76 in Commerce City. Canoga Park, California (also identified as Interstate 76 is taken 5 mi through Denver, Energy Technology Engineering Center) Colorado, to Interstate 70. Interstate 70 is then traveled 502 mi to Cove Fort, Utah. At Cove Fort, The primary transportation route from the Interstate 15 is then taken 161 mi across northwest Rocketdyne Division to the Nevada border consists Arizona and to the Nevada border. This route of traveling north 3 mi on State Route 27 to would likely continue on NV-I or NV-2. Woodland Hills, California. At Woodland Hills, U.S. Highway 101 is driven 13 mi east to North Hollywood, California. At North Hollywood, State Route 134 is driven 13 mi to Pasadena, California. Volume 1, Appendix 1 F-12 NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Generator: Reactive Metals, Inc., (RMI-l), Nevada border. This route would likely continue Ashtabula, Ohio on NV-I or NV-2. The primary transportation route from the Reactive Generator: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Metals, Inc., to the Nevada border consists of (SLAC-l), Palo Alto, California traveling 3 mi on State Route 11 to Ashtabula, Ohio. In Ashtabula, Interstate 90 is traveled The primary transportation route from the Stanford southwest 42 mi to Willoughby Hills, Ohio. At Linear Accelerator Center to the Nevada border Willoughby, Interstate 271 is driven 14 mi to consists oftraveling on Interstate 280 for 22 mi to Bedford, Ohio, At Bedford, Interstate 271 and San Jose, California. At San Jose, lnterstate 680 is Interstate 480 combine and are driven 4 mi south to taken north to Dublin, California. At Dublin, Northfield, Ohio. At Northfield, Interstate 271 Interstate 580 is driven east 37 mi to Vernalis, splits off from Interstate 480 and is traveled 21 mi California, to Interstate 5. Interstate 5 is then to Weymouth, Ohio. At Weymouth, Interstate 71 traveled south 291 mi to San Fernando, California, is driven 12 mi north to Strongsville, Ohio. to Interstate 210. Interstate 210 is then taken 48 mi Interstate 80 is then driven west for 17 mi to east to Pomona, California. At Pomona, Elyria, Ohio. At Elyria, Interstate 80 combines Interstate 10 is driven 17 mi east to Ontario, with Interstate 90 and Interstate 80190 is traveled California, to Interstate 15. Interstate 15 is then 281 mi to Portage, Indiana, where Interstate 80 traveled 186 mi northeast from Ontario to the branches off from Interstate 90. At Pottage, Nevada border. This route would likely continue Interstate 80 is taken for approximately I mi to on NV-8 or NV-9. Lake Station, Indiana, at which point Interstate 80 combines with Interstate 94. Interstate 80194 is Generator: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center then traveled 19 mi to Lansing, Illinois, where (SLAC-2), Palo Alto, California Interstate 94 branches off and Interstate 80 combines with Interstate 294. Interstate 80/294 is One alternate transportation route from the driven west for 5 mi to Homewood, Illinois. At Stanford Linear Accelerator Center to the Nevada Homewood, lnterstate 80 branches off and is taken border consists of travcling on Interstate 280 for 22 146 mi to Green Rock, Illinois. At Green Rock, mi to San Jose, California. At San Jose, Interstate 74 is then traveled west for 9 mi to Quad Interstate 680 is taken north to Dublin, California. City Airport, Moline, Illinois, and Interstate 280. At Dublin, Interstate 580 is drivcn east 37 mi to Interstate 280 is driven 18 mi around the southwest Vernalis, California. Interstate 5 is then traveled perimeter of Rock Island, Illinois, and Davenport, south 291 mi to San Fernando, California. Illinois. At this point, Interstate 80 is driven west Interstate 2 10 is then taken 48 mi east to Pomona, 153 mi into Des Moines, Iowa. At Des Moines, California. At Pomona, Interstate 10 is driven 17 Interstate 80 combines with Interstate 35 and is mi east to Ontario, California, to Interstate 15. taken 14 mi until Interstate 80 splits off from Interstate 15 is then taken 137 mi northeast to Interstate 80/35. lnterstate 80 is taken 96 mi from Baker, California. At Baker, State Route 127 is Des Moines to Minden, Iowa. At Minden, driven north for 56 mi to Shoshone, California. At Interstate 680 is driven 16 mi to Loveland, Iowa, Shoshone, State Koute 127 combines with State where Interstate 680 combines with Interstate 29. Route 373 and is traveled 34 mi north to the At Loveland, Interstate 680/29 is traveled for 10 mi Nevada border. This route would likely continue to Crescent, Iowa. At Crescent, Interstate 680 on NV-10. branches off from Interstate 29 and Interstate 680 is traveled west 17 mi into Omaha, Nebraska. At Generator: Sandia National Laboratories Omaha, Interstate 80 is driven 343 mi to Big (SNLA-l), Albuquerque, New Mexico Springs, Nebraska. At Big Springs, Interstate 76 is traveled west 186 mi to Arvada, Colorado. At The primary transportation route from Sandia Arvada, Interstate 70 is then taken southwest 502 National Laboratories, Albuquerque to the Nevada mi to Cove Fort, Utah. At Cove Fort, Interstate 15 border consists of travcling 3 mi on local roads to is driven 161 mi through northwest Arizona to the Albuquerque, New Mexico. At Albuquerque, F-13 Volume I, Appendix I NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Interstate 40 is taken west for 474 mi to Kingman, National Laboratories, Livermore, to the Nevada Arizona. At Kingman, U.S. Highway 93 is taken border consists of traveling 2 mi on local roads to north for 72 mi to the Nevada border. This route Livermore Valley, California. At would likely continue on NV-4 or NV-5. Livermore Valley, Interstate 580 is driven 25 mi to Vernalis, California. Interstate 5 is then traveled Generator: Sandia National Laboratories south 291 mi to San Fernando, California. (SNLA-2), Albuquerque, New Mexico Interstate 210 is then taken 48 mi east to Pornona, California. At Pomona, Interstate 10 is driven 17 One alternate transportation route from Sandia mi east to Ontario, California, to Interstate 15. National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to the Nevada Interstate 15 is then taken 137 mi northeast to border consists of traveling 3 mi on local roads to Baker, California. At Baker, State Route 127 is Albuquerque, New Mexico. At Albuquerque, driven north for 56 mi to Shoshone, California. At lnterstatc 40 is traveled west 555 mi to Needles, Shoshone, State Route 127 combines with State California. At Needles, U.S. Highway 95 is taken Route 373 and is traveled 34 mi north to the north for 23 mi to the Nevada border. This route Nevada border. This route would likely continue would likely continue on NV-6 or NV-7. onNV-10. Generator: Sandia National Laboratories Generator: Savannah River Site (SRS-l), (SNLA-3), Albuquerque, New Mexico Aiken, South Carolina One alternate transportation route from Sandia The primary transportation route from the National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to the Nevada Savannah River Site to the Nevada border consists border consists of traveling 3 mi on local roads to of traveling 4 mi on local roads to New Ellenton, Albuquerque, New Mexico where Interstate 40 is South Carolina. At New Ellenton, State Route 19 accessed and traveled west 687 mi to Barstow, is then taken 12 mi north to Aiken, South Carolina. California. At Barstow, Interstate I5 is taken north At Aiken, State Route 19 is driven 6 mi north to for 112 mi up to the Nevada border. This route Interstate 20. Interstate 20 is traveled west 155 mi would likely continue on NV-8 or NV-9. to Atlanta, Georgia. At Atlanta, Interstate 285 is traveled 26 mi around the southern part of Atlanta Generator: Sandia National Laboratories, to Interstate 75. Interstate 75 is then traveled 93 Livermore (SNLL-I), Livermore, California mi northwest to East Ridge, Tennessee. At East Ridge, Interstate 24 is taken 133 mi northwest to The primary transportation route from Sandia Nashville, Tennessee. At Nashville, Interstate 24 National Laboratories, Livermore to the Nevada is taken south for I mi to Interstate 440 where it is border consists of traveling 2 mi on local roads to driven west 7 mi to Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is Livemore Valley, California. At then driven from Nashville west for 658 mi into Livermore Valley, lnterstate 580 is driven 25 mi to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At Oklahoma City, Vernalis, California. Interstate 5 is then traveled lnterstate 240 is taken for 17 mi west around south 291 mi to San Fernando, California. Oklahoma City to Interstate 44. Interstate 44 is Interstate 210 is then taken 48 mi east to Pomona, then traveled north for 5 mi to Interstate 40. California. At Pomona, Interstate 10 is driven 17 Interstate 40 is traveled west 1,004 mi through the mi east to Ontario, California, to Interstate 15. Texas Panhandle, through New Mexico, and into Interstate I5 is then traveled I86 mi northeast from Kingman, Arizona. At Kingman, US. Highway 93 Ontario to the Nevada border. This route would is taken northwest 72 mi to the Nevada border. likely continue on NV-8 or NV-9. This route would likely continue on NV-4 or NV-5. Generator: Sandid National Laboratories, Generator: Savannah River Site (SRS-Z), Livermore (SNLL-Z), Livermore, California Aiken, South Carolina One alternate transportation route from Sandia One alternate transportation route from the Volume 1, Appendix I F-14 ~~ - NEVADA TESTSITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Savannah River Site to the Nevada border consists Mexico, and Arizona into Barstow, California. At of traveling 4 mi on local roads to New Ellenton, Barstow, Interstate 15 can then be taken north I 12 South Carolina. At New Ellenton, State Route 19 mi up to the Nevada border. This route would is then taken 12 mi north to Aiken, South Carolina. likely continue on NV-8 or NV-9. At Aiken, State Route 19 is driven 6 mi north to Interstate 20. Interstate 20 is traveled west 155 mi Generator: West Valley Demonstration Project to Atlanta, Georgia. At Atlanta, Interstate 285 is (WVDP-l), West Valley, New York travelcd 26 mi around the southern part of Atlanta to Interstate 75. Interstate 75 is then traveled 93 The primary transportation route from the West mi northwest to East Ridge, Tennessee. At East Valley Demonstration Project to the Nevada border Ridge, Interstate 24 is taken 133 mi northwest to consists oftraveling 2 mi on CR-85 to Springville, Nashville, Tennessee. At Nashville, Interstate 24 New York. At Springville, U.S. Highway 219 is is taken south for 1 mi to Interstate 440 is then traveled north I7 mi to North Boston, New York, driven west 7 mi to Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is to State Route 391. State Route 39 I is driven 4 mi taken from Nashville west for 658 mi into to Hamburg, New York. At Hamburg, State Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At Oklahoma City, Route 75 is driven 2 mi to Intcrstate YO. Interstate 240 is driven for 17 mi west around Interstate 90 is taken 165 mi to Willoughhy Hills, Oklahoma City to Interstate 44. Interstate 44 is Ohio. At Willougliby Hills, Interstate 271 is then traveled north for 5 mi to Interstate 40. driven 14 mi to Bedford, Ohio. At Bedford, Interstate 40 is traveled west 1,085 mi through the Interstate 271 and Interstate 480 combine and is Texas Panhandle, New Mexico, and Arizona into driven 4 mi south to Northfield, Ohio. At Needles, California. At Needles, U.S. Highway 95 Northfield, Interstate 271 splits off from can then be taken north 23 mi to the Nevada Interstate 480 and is traveled 21 mi to Weymouth, border. This route would likely continue on NV-6 Ohio. At Weymouth, Interstate 71 is driven 12 mi or NV-7. north to Strongsville, Ohio. Interstate 80 is then driven west for 17 mi to Elyria, Ohio. At Elyria, Generator: Savannah River Site (SRS-3), Interstate 80 combines with Interstate 90 and Aiken, South Carolina Interstate 80190 is traveled 281 mi to Portage, Indiana, where Interstate 80 branches off from One alternate transportation route from the Interstate 90. At Portage, Interstate 80 is taken for Savannah River Site to the Nevada border consists approximately I mi to Lake Station, Indiana, at of traveling 3 mi on local roads to Jackson, South which point Interstate 80 combines with Carolina. At Jackson, State Route 125 is then Interstate 94. Interstate 80iInterstate 94 is then taken 10 mi north to Beech Island, South Carolina. traveled 19 mi to Lansing, Illinois, where At Beech Island, State Route 28 is driven 11 mi Interstate 94 branches off and Interstate 80 north to Interstate 20. Interstate 20 is traveled west combines with Interstate 294. Interstate 801294 is 135 mi to Atlanta, Georgia. At Atlanta, driven west for 8 mi to Homewood, Illinois. At Interstate 285 is traveled 26 mi around the southern Homewood, Interstate 80 branches off and is taken part of Atlanta to Interstate 75. Interstate 75 is 146 mi to Green Rock, Illinois. At Green Rock, then traveled 93 mi northwest to East Ridge, Interstate 74 is then traveled west for 9.0 mi to Tennessee. At East Ridge, Interstate 24 is taken Quad City Airport, Moline, Illinois. lnterstatc 280 133 mi northwest to Nashville, Tennessee. At is driven 18 mi around the southwest perimeter of Nashville, Interstate 24 is taken south for 1 mi to Rock Island, Illinois and Davenport, Illinois. At Interstate 440 where it is driven west 7 mi to this point, Interstate 80 is driven west I83 mi into Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is then driven from Des Moines, Iowa. At Des Moines, Interstate 80 Nashville west for 658 mi into Oklahoma City, combines with Interstate 35 and is taken 14 mi Oklahoma. At Oklahoma City, Interstate 240 is until Interstate 80 splits off from Interstate 80135. driven for 17 mi west around Oklahoma City to Interstate 80 is driven 96 mi from Des Moines to Interstate 44. Interstate 44 is then traveled north Minden, Iowa. At Minden, Interstate 680 is driven for 5 mi to Interstate 40. Interstate 40 is taken west 160 mi to Loveland, Iowa, where Interstate 680 1,217 mi through the Texas Panhandle, New combines with Interstate 29. At Ixweland, F-15 Volume 1, Appendix I -~ ~ NEVADA TEST SITE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSTATEMENT Interstate 680129 is traveled for 10 mi to west 186 mi to Arvada, Colorado. At Arvada, Crescent, Iowa. At Crescent, Interstate 680 Interstate 70 is then taken southwest 502 mi to branches off from Interstate 29 and is traveled Cove Fort, Utah. At Cove Fort, Interstate 15 is west 17 mi into Omaha, Nebraska. At Omaha, driven 161 mi through northwest Arizona and to Interstate 80 is driven 343 mi to Big Springs, the Nevada border. This route would likely Nebraska. At Big Springs, Interstate 76 is traveled continue on NV-I or NV-2. Volume 1, Appendix I F-16 *U.S. U)VERM(ENl PRINTIHG OFFICL:1996-785-718