DOCSLIB.ORG

Why Do Border Guards Shoot? an Explanation of Shoot to Kill Policies Which Target Illegal Border Crossers

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

WHY DO BORDER GUARDS SHOOT? AN EXPLANATION OF SHOOT TO KILL POLICIES WHICH TARGET ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSERS Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen vorgelegt von Laçin İdil ÖZTIĞ 2013 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to my mother, Süheyla Öztığ and to my cousin, Dr. Ömer Cenker Ilıcalı. They supported me and gave me strength during the long and difficult years in which I have been writing my dissertation. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Thomas Diez whose ideas, comments and constructive criticisms enabled me to look at my study from a much broader perspective. He taught me how to question my own ideas and strengthen my arguments. I am grateful to my co-supervisor, Prof. Dr. Andreas Hasenclever. I have benefited from his insightful comments and criticisms during Ph.D. Colloquiums. I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ayse Nuhoğlu for her comments about the legal dimension of shoot to kill policies. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Gülay Kıroğlu, Associate Prof. Dr. Gülhayat Gölbaşı and Lukas Kasten for their help in statistics. I finally would like to thank my dear friend, Dr. Lale Bükçüoğlu for supporting me when I lived in Germany. 2 ABSTRACT When states are interested in excluding illegal border crossers, they have a considerable number of strategies at their disposal. States can exclude illegal border crossers by building fences, militarizing their borders, adopting a push-back policy at their maritime borders, through cross-border cooperation with their neighboring states and adopting a shoot to kill policy. The objective of this study is to answer why some states choose shoot to kill policies and other states refrain from shoot to kill policies when they are interested in excluding illegal border crossers. The majority of arguments derived from the current literature fall short of explaining this research query. The findings of this study reveal that as the level of democracy decreases, states become more inclined to adopt shoot to kill policies at their borders. In a nutshell, it is argued that the norm of non-violent conflict regulation which is intrinsic to democracies induces policymakers to rule out a shoot to kill policy. In democracies the rule of law prevents abusive and arbitrary actions of governments. In other words, through independent legal institutions policymakers are held accountable for their actions. Most importantly, when domestic political conflicts emerge, the rule of law ensures that they are regulated non-violently. In and through non- violent practices in light of domestic political conflicts, policymakers develop an understanding that non-violence is part of their identity. When states decide to reinforce their borders, policymakers think that as a non-violent state, they should rule out a shoot to kill policy as an option. This study also shows that when states have engaged in violent conflicts with their neighbors, they become more likely to adopt shoot to kill policies at their borders. Interestingly, violent interstate conflicts override the norm of non-violent conflict regulation. Overall, the study concludes that democracies are more likely to refrain from shoot to kill policies compared to other states given that they have not engaged in violent conflicts with their neighbors. 3 TABLE OF CONTENT Acknowledgements Abstract Table of Content Tables, Figures Chapter One: Introduction 9-17 Chapter Two: A Theoretical Framework 2.1. Introduction 18 2.2. Academic Debates on Borders 20 2.3. Shoot to Kill Policies 25 2.4. Border Reinforcement Strategies 26 2.4.1. Ethical Considerations 29 2.5. A Review of the Current State of Art 31 2.5.1. The Dynamics of Illegal Border Crossers 31 2.5.2. The Dynamics of State Interference 35 2.6. Towards a Theoretical Framework of the Study 36 2.6.1. Introduction 36 2.6.2. Democracy 37 2.6.2.1. Electoral Competition 37 2.6.2.2. The Rule of Law 39 2.6.2.3. The Norm of Non-Violent Conflict Regulation 40 2.6.3. Undemocratic States 46 2.6.4. Why do Democracies Rule out a Shoot to Kill Policy? 52 2.6.4.1. Norms 52 4 2.6.4.2. The Norm of Non-Violence and a Shoot to Kill Policy 61 2.6.5. Counter Arguments 70 2.6.5.1. The Dynamics of Interstate Conflict 71 2.6.5.2. Criminal Law 74 2.6.5.3. The Integration with the Global Refugee Regime 75 2.6.5.4. Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State 76 2.6.5.5. State Fragmentation 78 2.6.5.6. State Capacity 79 2.6.6. Conclusion 81 Chapter Three: A Methodological Framework 3.1. Introduction 83 3.2. The Operationalization of Shoot to Kill Policy 84 3.2.1. Border Reinforcement Strategies not based on a Shoot to Kill Policy 88 3.2.2. Shoot to Kill Policies 98 3.2.3. Coding Scheme 105 3.3. The Operationalization of Democracy 105 3.3.1. Coding Scheme 107 3.4. The Operationalization of Interstate Conflict 108 3.4.1. Coding Scheme 108 3.5. The Operationalization of Criminal Law 109 3.5.1. Coding Scheme 109 3.6. The Operationalization of the Integration with Global Refugee Regime 109 3.6.1. Coding Scheme 109 3.7. The Operationalization of Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State 110 5 3.7.1. Coding Scheme 110 3.8. The Operationalization of State Fragmentation 110 3.8.1. Coding Scheme 110 3.9. The Operationalization of State Capacity 111 3.9.1. Coding Scheme 111 3.10. The Methodology of the Research 111 3.10.1. Statistical Analysis 111 3.10.2. Illustrative Case Study Narratives 113 3.10.2.1. Case Selection 113 3.10.2.2. Data Analysis 116 3.10.2.3. Data Collection 117 3.11. Conclusion 118 Chapter Four: A Statistical Analysis 4.1. Introduction 119 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 120 4.2.1. Democracy 120 4.2.2. Interstate Conflict 121 4.2.3. Death Penalty 122 4.2.4. Refugee Convention 123 4.2.5. Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State 124 4.2.6. State Fragmentation 125 4.2.7. Economic Capacity 125 4.2.8. The Evaluation of the Descriptive Statistics 126 6 4.3. Measurement 128 4.3.1. The Output of the Logistic Regression Analysis 130 4.3.2. Collinearity Test 132 4.3.3. The Full Impact of Democracy on a Shoot to Kill Policy 134 4.4. Conclusion 135 Chapter Five: Illustrative Case Study Narratives 5.1. Introduction 137 5.2. The U.S.-Mexico Border 141 5.3. The India-Bangladesh Border 154 5.4. The Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan Border 164 5.5. The Egypt-Israel Border 169 5.6. The Israel-Palestine Border 174 5.7. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Border 180 5.8. Conclusion 188 Chapter Six: Conclusion 192-201 Chapter Seven: Appendix 202-230 Bibliography 231-259 7 Figures 2.1. Border Control Strategies 27 2.2. Border Reinforcement Strategies 28 4.1: Democracy Strength and Shoot to Kill Policies 20 4.2: Interstate Conflict and Shoot to Kill Policies 121 4.3. Death Penalty and Shoot to Kill Policies 122 4.4. Refugee Convention and Shoot to Kill Policies 123 4.5. Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State and Shoot to Kill Policies 124 4.6. State Fragmentation and Shoot to Kill Policies 125 4.7. Economic Capacity and Shoot to Kill Policies 126 4.8. The Full Impact of Democracy on the Probability of Shoot to Kill Policy 135 Tables 4.1. Classification Table 130 4.2. Variables in the Equation 131 4.3. Correlation Matrix 133 4.4. Predicted Probability of Shoot to Kill Policy 134 Table 5.1. 152 Table 5.2. 162 Table 5.3. 168 Table 5.4 173 Table 5.5. 176 Table 5.6. 184 8 9 WHY DO BORDER GUARDS SHOOT? AN ANALYSIS OF SHOOT TO KILL POLICIES WHICH TARGET ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSERS CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION From the eyes of state authorities, borders symbolize security and control. Borders are seen as lines to be protected. At some borders state authority is visible with passport control points. At these borders identity documents are checked and visas are controlled. When illegal border crossers are detected, they are either detained or deported. Passport controls do control illegality of border crossings. However, this control is made by differentiating between people with proper documentation and illegal border crossers. However, most illegal border crossers eschew these control points and attempt to enter the territory of a state in which no official control takes place. Once states decide to reinforce their borders against illegal border crossers, they take extra measures between and/or beyond passport controls. Measures taken between passport controls include fencing, militarization, and at the extreme end of the spectrum, shoot to kill policies. Shoot to kill policies differ from other strategies on the grounds that they are based on the elimination of illegal border crossers. If illegal border crossers can be excluded at borders through a number of measures, why do shoot to kill policies become a suitable strategy for policymakers? Additionally, what motivates other states to refrain from shoot to kill policies? In a nutshell, this study asks why a shoot to kill policy becomes an option for states when they are interested in reinforcing their borders. From the eyes of illegal border crossers, borders represent hope. Human traffickers, smugglers and terrorists are only one side of the story. From the eyes of illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and border villagers, borders are steps towards a brighter future.
Recommended publications
  • The Police Academy of Montenegro

    The Police Academy of Montenegro

    PI VOCATIONAL SCHOOL POLICE ACADEMY The Police academy is located in Danilovgrad, Montenegro. It is the only Law Enforcement Educational institution in Montenegro. It was established by the Decision of the Montenegrin Government in March 2006 as a public institution with the status of legal entity. The Police academy was established as a result of the “Montenegrin Police Education Reform“project (2005) and was supported by: International Institutions and Associations; Competent Ministries; NGOs. The goal of Montenegrin Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies is to: Harmonize their activities with European standards; Increase the level of legality, accountability, professionalism and respect of human rights; Provide more efficient response to modern security challenges. The scope of work of the academy is: I - Education, training and professional development of the Police Directorate employees, implemented through: I/a – Basic Police Education; I/b – Supplementary courses for police officers; I/c – Professional and specialized training; I/d – Police management training; I/e – Foreign languages and computer science (ECDL standard). II - Education of the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration employees III - Education of the Customs employees IV - Education of the Penitentiary Institution employees V - Education, training and professional development of the employees dealing with persons and property protection staff – security services VI - Librarian, publishing and research related activities VII - International cooperation. The core task of the Police academy is Basic police education which enables students to gain: policing competences; the basic knowledge for professional and specialized development as well as professional career development. So far 256 cadets have completed Basic Police education. At this moment we are educating 22 cadets.
  • Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts, Components and Ammunition To, from and Across the European Union

    Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts, Components and Ammunition To, from and Across the European Union

    Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and across the European Union REGIONAL ANALYSIS REPORT 1 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and across the European Union UNITED NATIONS Vienna, 2020 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and across the European Union REGIONAL ANALYSIS REPORT UNITED NATIONS Vienna, 2020 © United Nations, 2020. All rights reserved, worldwide. This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the copy- right holder, provided acknowledgment of the source is made. UNODC would appreciate receiving a copy of any written output that uses this publication as a source at [email protected]. DISCLAIMERS This report was not formally edited. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNODC, nor do they imply any endorsement. Information on uniform resource locators and links to Internet sites contained in the present publication are provided for the convenience of the reader and are correct at the time of issuance. The United Nations takes no responsibility for the continued accuracy of that information or for the content of any external website. This document was produced with the financial support of the European Union. The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect
  • Manual on Border Controls Along the Danube and Its Navigable Tributaries

    Manual on Border Controls Along the Danube and Its Navigable Tributaries

    EU Strategy for the Danube Region Priority Area 1a – To improve mobility and multimodality: Inland waterways Practical manual on border controls along the Danube and its navigable tributaries Author(s): Milica Gvozdic (viadonau) Simon Hartl (viadonau) Katja Rosner (viadonau) Version (date): 31.08.2015 1 General information .................................................................................................................. 4 2 How to use this manual? .......................................................................................................... 5 3 Geographic scope .................................................................................................................... 5 4 Hungary ................................................................................................................................... 7 4.1 General information on border controls ................................................................................... 7 4.1.1 Control process ................................................................................................................... 8 4.1.2 Control forms ..................................................................................................................... 10 4.1.3 Additional information ....................................................................................................... 21 4.2 Information on specific border control points ......................................................................... 22 4.2.1 Mohács .............................................................................................................................
  • REFUGEECOSATT3.Pdf

    REFUGEECOSATT3.Pdf

    + + + Refugees and IDPs in South Asia Editor Dr. Nishchal N. Pandey + + Published by Consortium of South Asian Think Tanks (COSATT) www.cosatt.org Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) www.kas.de First Published, November 2016 All rights reserved Printed at: Modern Printing Press Kathmandu, Nepal. Tel: 4253195, 4246452 Email: [email protected] + + Preface Consortium of South Asian Think-tanks (COSATT) brings to you another publication on a critical theme of the contemporary world with special focus on South Asia. Both the issues of refugees and migration has hit the headlines the world-over this past year and it is likely that nation states in the foreseeable future will keep facing the impact of mass movement of people fleeing persecution or war across international borders. COSATT is a network of some of the prominent think-tanks of South Asia and each year we select topics that are of special significance for the countries of the region. In the previous years, we have delved in detail on themes such as terrorism, connectivity, deeper integration and the environment. In the year 2016, it was agreed by all COSATT member institutions that the issue of refugees and migration highlighting the interlinkages between individual and societal aspirations, reasons and background of the cause of migration and refugee generation and the role of state and non-state agencies involved would be studied and analyzed in depth. It hardly needs any elaboration that South Asia has been both the refugee generating and refugee hosting region for a long time. South Asian migrants have formed some of the most advanced and prosperous diasporas in the West.
  • Report to the Bulgarian Government on the Visit to Bulgaria Carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture

    Report to the Bulgarian Government on the Visit to Bulgaria Carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture

    CPT/Inf (2004) 21 Report to the Bulgarian Government on the visit to Bulgaria carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 17 to 26 April 2002 The Bulgarian Government has requested the publication of this report and of its response. The Government's response is set out in document CPT/Inf (2004) 22. Strasbourg, 24 June 2004 - 2 - CONTENTS Copy of the letter transmitting the CPT's report ............................................................................4 I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................5 A. Dates of the visit and composition of the delegation ..............................................................5 B. Establishments visited...............................................................................................................6 C. Consultations held by the delegation and co-operation encountered...................................7 D. Immediate observations under Article 8, paragraph 5, of the Convention .........................8 II. FACTS FOUND DURING THE VISIT AND ACTION PROPOSED ................................9 A. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs .............................9 1. Preliminary remarks ..........................................................................................................9 2. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment..........................................................................10
  • EMN Ad-Hoc Query on Intra-Schengen Border Monitoring

    EMN Ad-Hoc Query on Intra-Schengen Border Monitoring

    EMN Ad-Hoc Query on Intra-Schengen border monitoring and border control Requested by Dylano de Wilde on 4th June 2018 Border Responses from Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway (20 in total) Disclaimer: The following responses have been provided primarily for the purpose of information exchange among EMN NCPs in the framework of the EMN. The contributing EMN NCPs have provided, to the best of their knowledge, information that is up-to-date, objective and reliable. Note, however, that the information provided does not necessarily represent the official policy of an EMN NCPs' Member State. Background information: Over the past couple of years, the Schengen area has come to face several challenges. In particular in response to a range of terrorist attacks as well as the so-called European refugee “crisis”. Member states have used a variety of measures to enhance the monitoring of cross border mobility. These measures are not exclusively taken at the external border of the European Union, but also increasingly at the physical borders between two Schengen States. By, for instance, temporarily reintroducing border checks under Article 29 of the Schengen Border Code (SBC) or by using the possibility to carry out police or immigration checks in a region around the physical border under Article 23 SBC. In the light of one of the core principles of the European Union and the Schengen Agreement, the principle of free movement, the temporary introduction of border checks under article 29 SBC is to be seen as a last resort that can only be justified by exceptional circumstances.
  • India: Skilled Migration to Developed Countries, Labour Migration to the Gulf

    India: Skilled Migration to Developed Countries, Labour Migration to the Gulf

    India: Skilled Migration To Developed Countries, Labour Migration To The Gulf Binod Khadria Visiting Senior Research Fellow Asia Research Institute, and the Department of Economics National University of Singapore and Professor of Economics Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi E-mail: [email protected] Working paper. Not to be quoted or cited without permission. 1. INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL OVERVIEW ON INDIAN MIGRATION FIGURE 1 Percentage Distribution of NRIs and PIOs by Region Source: ICWA, Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 2001. Figure 1 presents the regional distribution of destinations where an approximate 20 million-strong stock of the Indian migrants (Non-resident Indian citizens – the NRIs, and the foreign Persons of Indian Origin – the PIOs, the two together referred to as the “Indian Diaspora” in official as well as general par- lance in India (since the Report of the High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora of 2001) were recorded at the close of the twentieth century.a This stock has been a function of the flows of migration of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers and their families from India as an important source-country of the South over time.b It is common knowledge that the early migrants who had formed the basis of this so-called Indian dias- pora formation mainly involved ‘cheap’ manual workers leaving India in large numbers to meet the enormous quantitative demand for indentured
  • Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development

    Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development

    HDRP_2009_47.pdf 1 31/08/2009 4:52:55 PM Human Development Research Paper 2009/47 Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran C M Y CM MY CY CMY K HDRP_2009_47.pdf 1 31/08/2009 4:54:22 PM United Nations Development Programme Human Development Reports Research Paper September 2009 C M Y CM MY CY CMY K Human Development Research Paper 2009/47 Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran United Nations Development Programme Human Development Reports Research Paper 2009/47 September 2009 Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran Jonathan Crush is Director of the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and Southern African Research Centre (Queen’s University) and is Honorary Professor, University of Cape Town. E-mail: [email protected]. Sujata Ramachandran is Research Associate at the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). Comments should be addressed by email to the author(s). Abstract In the continuing discussion on migration and development, the vulnerability of all migrant groups to exploitation and mistreatment in host countries has been highlighted along with an emphasis on protecting their rights. However, xenophobia has not yet received explicit attention although anti-migrant sentiments and practices are clearly on the rise even in receiving countries in developing regions. Despite gaps in existing empirical work, research and anecdotal evidence exposes pervasive forms of discrimination, hostility, and violence experienced by migrant communities, with the latter becoming easy scapegoats for various social problems in host countries. This study attempts to insert xenophobia in this debate on migration and development by examining the growth of this phenomenon in host countries in the South.
  • Transportation, Smuggling, and Organized Crime

    Transportation, Smuggling, and Organized Crime

    TRANSPORTATION, SMUGGLING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY CSD REPORTS: 1. Bulgaria’s Participation in EU Structural Funds, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-050-8 2. Social Policy Aspects of Bulgaria’s EU Accession, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-053-4 3. Preparing for EU Accession Negotiations, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-055-7 4. The Role of Political Parties in Accession to the EU, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-055-0 5. Bulgaria’s Capital Markets in the Context of EU Accession: A Status Report, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-059-3 6. Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Sofia, 2000. ISBN 954-477-078-X 7. Establishing Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: Bulgaria, Sofia, 2000. ISBN 954-477-084-4 9. Corruption and Illegal Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Second, revised and amended edition, Sofia, 2000. ISBN 954-477-087-9 10. Smuggling in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2002. ISBN 954-477-099-2 11. Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform, Sofia, 2002. ISBN 954-477-101-8 12. The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2003. ISBN 954-477-111-5 13. Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2004. ISBN 954-477-115-8 14. Weapons under Scrutiny: Implementing Arms Export Controls and Combating Small Arms Proliferation in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2004. ISBN 954-477-117-470 15. Transportation, Smuggling, and Organized Crime, Sofia, 2004. ISBN 954-477-119-0 Editorial Board: Ognian Shentov Boyko Todorov Alexander Stoyanov ISBN 954-477-119-0 ©2004 Center for the Study of Democracy All rights reserved.
  • Bulgaria 2020 Human Rights Report

    Bulgaria 2020 Human Rights Report

    BULGARIA 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Bulgaria is a constitutional republic governed by a freely elected unicameral National Assembly. A coalition government headed by a prime minister leads the country. National Assembly elections were held in 2017, and the Central Election Commission did not report any major election irregularities. International and local observers considered the National Assembly elections and the 2016 presidential election generally free and fair but noted some deficiencies. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for law enforcement, migration, and border control. The State Agency for National Security, which reports to the Prime Minister’s Office, is responsible for investigating corruption and organized crime, among other responsibilities. The army is responsible for external security but also can assist with border security. During the coronavirus-related state of emergency, the army had the authority to enforce COVID-19 measures and restrictions but did not exercise it. The National Protective Service is responsible for the security of dignitaries and answers to the president. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Members of the security forces committed some abuses. Significant human rights issues included: violent treatment by police; arbitrary arrests; serious problems with judicial independence; serious restrictions on free expression, including media censorship, violence and threats of violence against journalists, and corporate and political pressure on media; refoulement of refugees or asylum seekers; serious acts of corruption; crimes involving violence or threats of violence against Roma; violence against children; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons. Authorities took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed human rights abuses, but government actions were insufficient, and impunity was a problem.
  • Introduction Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin

    Introduction Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin

    Introduction Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin The chapters in this volume originated as papers delivered at the conference ‘Managing International and Inter-Agency Cooperation at the Border’, held in Geneva on 13-15 March 2003. The idea behind organising the conference, and its objective, was to conduct an assessment of recent developments in the governance of border security systems, both within the European region, and comparatively across other regions. Transnational movements of people, goods, and capital have become important security policy items on national and global agendas, and the control of such movements is focused largely on efforts at borders. The powers and reach of border control systems have been enhanced by changes in law, increased political attention, an influx of resources, the utilisation of technological detection and control devices and systems, and a security discourse which stresses border management as crucial element in ensuring the stability of states and the well-being of citizens. In short, as border guards and other state authorities have been given more authority and as their capacity to coercively control people has been magnified, the perennial question of how to control and hold accountable agencies and agents who exercise that power, often within wide margins of discretion, has risen to greater salience. At the same time, the means and mechanisms of accountability must respond to the realities of evolving forms of border management if they are to be effective and legitimate. There are widely acknowledged reasons why borders and the accountability of evolving border control systems now matter. In an era of globally structured change and the increasing interconnections of international and local affairs, advancing integration of even remote societies into a global system of commerce, migration and production is apparent, supported by technologies of communication and transportation far more efficient and more difficult to know about and control than traditional means.
  • Afghanistan's Police

    Afghanistan's Police

    UNITeD StateS INSTITUTe of Peace www.usip.org SPeCIAL RePoRT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPO R T Robert M. Perito The Afghanistan National Police is Afghanistan’s front line of defense against insurgency and organized crime. Yet despite nearly $10 billion in international police assistance, the Afghan police are riddled with corruption and incompetence and are far from the professional law enforcement organization needed Afghanistan’s Police to ensure stability and development. This report details the past failures and current challenges facing the international police assistance program in Afghanistan. It draws conclusions about the prospects for current programs and offers The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform recommendations for corrective action. The report urges that the international community’s approach to police assistance expand to embrace a comprehensive program for security Summary sector reform and the rule of law. • In seven years, the Afghan National Police forces have grown to 68,000 personnel, with The report is based on a conference titled “Policing a target end strength of 86,000. The ANP includes the uniformed police force, which is Afghanistan,” which was hosted by the United States Institute responsible for general police duties, and specialized police forces, which deal with public of Peace’s Security Sector Reform Working Group on May 27, order, counternarcotics, terrorism, and border control. 2009. It draws on the author’s participation in numerous Afghanistan-related conferences, interviews, workshops, and • Despite the impressive growth in numbers, the expenditure of $10 billion in international study groups; on his two visits to the country; and on an police assistance, and the involvement of the United States, the European Union, and extensive review of the literature on the Afghanistan police multiple donors, the ANP is riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan development program.