WHY DO BORDER GUARDS SHOOT? AN EXPLANATION OF SHOOT TO KILL POLICIES WHICH TARGET ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSERS Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen vorgelegt von Laçin İdil ÖZTIĞ 2013 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to my mother, Süheyla Öztığ and to my cousin, Dr. Ömer Cenker Ilıcalı. They supported me and gave me strength during the long and difficult years in which I have been writing my dissertation. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Thomas Diez whose ideas, comments and constructive criticisms enabled me to look at my study from a much broader perspective. He taught me how to question my own ideas and strengthen my arguments. I am grateful to my co-supervisor, Prof. Dr. Andreas Hasenclever. I have benefited from his insightful comments and criticisms during Ph.D. Colloquiums. I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ayse Nuhoğlu for her comments about the legal dimension of shoot to kill policies. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Gülay Kıroğlu, Associate Prof. Dr. Gülhayat Gölbaşı and Lukas Kasten for their help in statistics. I finally would like to thank my dear friend, Dr. Lale Bükçüoğlu for supporting me when I lived in Germany. 2 ABSTRACT When states are interested in excluding illegal border crossers, they have a considerable number of strategies at their disposal. States can exclude illegal border crossers by building fences, militarizing their borders, adopting a push-back policy at their maritime borders, through cross-border cooperation with their neighboring states and adopting a shoot to kill policy. The objective of this study is to answer why some states choose shoot to kill policies and other states refrain from shoot to kill policies when they are interested in excluding illegal border crossers. The majority of arguments derived from the current literature fall short of explaining this research query. The findings of this study reveal that as the level of democracy decreases, states become more inclined to adopt shoot to kill policies at their borders. In a nutshell, it is argued that the norm of non-violent conflict regulation which is intrinsic to democracies induces policymakers to rule out a shoot to kill policy. In democracies the rule of law prevents abusive and arbitrary actions of governments. In other words, through independent legal institutions policymakers are held accountable for their actions. Most importantly, when domestic political conflicts emerge, the rule of law ensures that they are regulated non-violently. In and through non- violent practices in light of domestic political conflicts, policymakers develop an understanding that non-violence is part of their identity. When states decide to reinforce their borders, policymakers think that as a non-violent state, they should rule out a shoot to kill policy as an option. This study also shows that when states have engaged in violent conflicts with their neighbors, they become more likely to adopt shoot to kill policies at their borders. Interestingly, violent interstate conflicts override the norm of non-violent conflict regulation. Overall, the study concludes that democracies are more likely to refrain from shoot to kill policies compared to other states given that they have not engaged in violent conflicts with their neighbors. 3 TABLE OF CONTENT Acknowledgements Abstract Table of Content Tables, Figures Chapter One: Introduction 9-17 Chapter Two: A Theoretical Framework 2.1. Introduction 18 2.2. Academic Debates on Borders 20 2.3. Shoot to Kill Policies 25 2.4. Border Reinforcement Strategies 26 2.4.1. Ethical Considerations 29 2.5. A Review of the Current State of Art 31 2.5.1. The Dynamics of Illegal Border Crossers 31 2.5.2. The Dynamics of State Interference 35 2.6. Towards a Theoretical Framework of the Study 36 2.6.1. Introduction 36 2.6.2. Democracy 37 2.6.2.1. Electoral Competition 37 2.6.2.2. The Rule of Law 39 2.6.2.3. The Norm of Non-Violent Conflict Regulation 40 2.6.3. Undemocratic States 46 2.6.4. Why do Democracies Rule out a Shoot to Kill Policy? 52 2.6.4.1. Norms 52 4 2.6.4.2. The Norm of Non-Violence and a Shoot to Kill Policy 61 2.6.5. Counter Arguments 70 2.6.5.1. The Dynamics of Interstate Conflict 71 2.6.5.2. Criminal Law 74 2.6.5.3. The Integration with the Global Refugee Regime 75 2.6.5.4. Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State 76 2.6.5.5. State Fragmentation 78 2.6.5.6. State Capacity 79 2.6.6. Conclusion 81 Chapter Three: A Methodological Framework 3.1. Introduction 83 3.2. The Operationalization of Shoot to Kill Policy 84 3.2.1. Border Reinforcement Strategies not based on a Shoot to Kill Policy 88 3.2.2. Shoot to Kill Policies 98 3.2.3. Coding Scheme 105 3.3. The Operationalization of Democracy 105 3.3.1. Coding Scheme 107 3.4. The Operationalization of Interstate Conflict 108 3.4.1. Coding Scheme 108 3.5. The Operationalization of Criminal Law 109 3.5.1. Coding Scheme 109 3.6. The Operationalization of the Integration with Global Refugee Regime 109 3.6.1. Coding Scheme 109 3.7. The Operationalization of Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State 110 5 3.7.1. Coding Scheme 110 3.8. The Operationalization of State Fragmentation 110 3.8.1. Coding Scheme 110 3.9. The Operationalization of State Capacity 111 3.9.1. Coding Scheme 111 3.10. The Methodology of the Research 111 3.10.1. Statistical Analysis 111 3.10.2. Illustrative Case Study Narratives 113 3.10.2.1. Case Selection 113 3.10.2.2. Data Analysis 116 3.10.2.3. Data Collection 117 3.11. Conclusion 118 Chapter Four: A Statistical Analysis 4.1. Introduction 119 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 120 4.2.1. Democracy 120 4.2.2. Interstate Conflict 121 4.2.3. Death Penalty 122 4.2.4. Refugee Convention 123 4.2.5. Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State 124 4.2.6. State Fragmentation 125 4.2.7. Economic Capacity 125 4.2.8. The Evaluation of the Descriptive Statistics 126 6 4.3. Measurement 128 4.3.1. The Output of the Logistic Regression Analysis 130 4.3.2. Collinearity Test 132 4.3.3. The Full Impact of Democracy on a Shoot to Kill Policy 134 4.4. Conclusion 135 Chapter Five: Illustrative Case Study Narratives 5.1. Introduction 137 5.2. The U.S.-Mexico Border 141 5.3. The India-Bangladesh Border 154 5.4. The Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan Border 164 5.5. The Egypt-Israel Border 169 5.6. The Israel-Palestine Border 174 5.7. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Border 180 5.8. Conclusion 188 Chapter Six: Conclusion 192-201 Chapter Seven: Appendix 202-230 Bibliography 231-259 7 Figures 2.1. Border Control Strategies 27 2.2. Border Reinforcement Strategies 28 4.1: Democracy Strength and Shoot to Kill Policies 20 4.2: Interstate Conflict and Shoot to Kill Policies 121 4.3. Death Penalty and Shoot to Kill Policies 122 4.4. Refugee Convention and Shoot to Kill Policies 123 4.5. Intra-state Conflict in the Neighboring State and Shoot to Kill Policies 124 4.6. State Fragmentation and Shoot to Kill Policies 125 4.7. Economic Capacity and Shoot to Kill Policies 126 4.8. The Full Impact of Democracy on the Probability of Shoot to Kill Policy 135 Tables 4.1. Classification Table 130 4.2. Variables in the Equation 131 4.3. Correlation Matrix 133 4.4. Predicted Probability of Shoot to Kill Policy 134 Table 5.1. 152 Table 5.2. 162 Table 5.3. 168 Table 5.4 173 Table 5.5. 176 Table 5.6. 184 8 9 WHY DO BORDER GUARDS SHOOT? AN ANALYSIS OF SHOOT TO KILL POLICIES WHICH TARGET ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSERS CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION From the eyes of state authorities, borders symbolize security and control. Borders are seen as lines to be protected. At some borders state authority is visible with passport control points. At these borders identity documents are checked and visas are controlled. When illegal border crossers are detected, they are either detained or deported. Passport controls do control illegality of border crossings. However, this control is made by differentiating between people with proper documentation and illegal border crossers. However, most illegal border crossers eschew these control points and attempt to enter the territory of a state in which no official control takes place. Once states decide to reinforce their borders against illegal border crossers, they take extra measures between and/or beyond passport controls. Measures taken between passport controls include fencing, militarization, and at the extreme end of the spectrum, shoot to kill policies. Shoot to kill policies differ from other strategies on the grounds that they are based on the elimination of illegal border crossers. If illegal border crossers can be excluded at borders through a number of measures, why do shoot to kill policies become a suitable strategy for policymakers? Additionally, what motivates other states to refrain from shoot to kill policies? In a nutshell, this study asks why a shoot to kill policy becomes an option for states when they are interested in reinforcing their borders. From the eyes of illegal border crossers, borders represent hope. Human traffickers, smugglers and terrorists are only one side of the story. From the eyes of illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and border villagers, borders are steps towards a brighter future.