US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES NUMBER 50 March 8, 2011

The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey Ömer Taşpinar

While the growing importance of religion in However, Turkey is too complex to fit into this Turkey should not be dismissed, a more facile paradigm. It defies sweeping nuanced debate on Turkish foreign policy generalizations about Islamization. This paper is should take into consideration three different an attempt to capture the multifaceted nature visions of Turkey’s place in the international of Turkish foreign policy by analyzing the three order: (1) Neo-Ottomanism, (2) Kemalism and strategic visions mentioned above. 1 (3) Turkish Gaullism. The common denominator of these strategic visions is that they transcend 1. Neo-Ottomanism the erroneous narrative prevalent in Western media that focuses on the dichotomy between Since the AKP came to power in late 2002, its Turkey’s Islamic and secular, pro-West factions. foreign policy has been based on what Prime Many Western policymakers, analysts and Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s top foreign scholars equate the notion of a Turkish policy advisor and now foreign minister, Ahmet divergence from the West—or the fear of Davutoglu, calls “strategic depth.” Davutoglu’s "losing Turkey"—with the idea of an Islamic main argument is that Turkey is a great power revival. This is an understandable fallacy. After that has neglected its historic ties and all, Turkey's population is almost fully Muslim diplomatic, economic and political and a political party with Islamic roots has won relationships with its neighboring regions consecutive electoral victories. Moreover, this is (Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and exactly how some members of the Turkish Eurasia), dating back to the Ottoman era. It secular establishment—the military, the should be noted that this “neo-Ottoman” vision Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the is not an imperialist agenda. It is also very upper echelons of the judiciary—describe the different from policies advocated by current policies of the Justice and Necmettin Erbakan, the Islamist leader of the Development Party (AKP). now defunct Welfare Party. While Erbakan sought to create an Islamic alliance with Ömer Taşpinar is a Nonresident Senior Muslim countries like Libya, Iran, Malaysia, and Fellow with the Center on the United Indonesia as an explicit alternative to alliance States and Europe at Brookings. His work focuses on Turkey, the European This paper builds upon sections that were previously Union, Muslims in Europe, political published in Insight Turkey, Today’s Zaman, and by Islam, the Middle East and Kurdish The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. nationalism.

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with the West, AKP leaders want to reach out opens the door for a less “ethnic” and more to non-Western regions to complement their multicultural conceptualization of Turkish ties to the West—not to replace them. “citizenship.” As a result, neo-Ottomanism is tolerant of Kurdish cultural rights and expression The AKP’s neo-Ottoman vision builds on the of Kurdish national identity, as long as loyalty to approach of former President Turgut Özal. the Republic of Turkey is not put into question. Shortly after the Cold War came to an end, Faced with demands for Kurdish cultural and Özal helped Turkey rediscover its imperial political rights, the neo-Ottoman mindset opts legacy and his Motherland Party tried to for accommodation in the framework of establish a new consensus at home between multiculturalism and Muslim identity. Unlike the multiple identities of Turkey (western, hardline Kemalism which insists on assimilating Muslim, secular, Kurdish and Turkish). Neo- the Kurds, neo-Ottomanism allows Islam to play Ottomanism reminds Turks that they once had a greater role in terms of building a sense of a great multinational empire that ruled the shared identity. Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and parts of Central Europe. Such emphasis on the The second characteristic of neo-Ottomanism Ottoman legacy is not part of a plan to is a sense of grandeur and self-confidence in Islamize Turkey and its foreign policy. Rather, it foreign policy. Neo-Ottomanism sees Turkey as is an attempt to balance and broaden the a regional superpower. Its strategic vision and geostrategic horizons of a country, which in the culture reflects the geographic reach of the past has been obsessed with following an Ottoman and Byzantine Empires. According to exclusively Western trajectory. this neo-Ottoman vision Turkey is a pivotal state which should play a very active diplomatic, Three factors help define the neo-Ottoman political, and economic role in a wide region of tendencies of the AKP. The first is the willingness which it is the “center.” Such grand ambitions, to come to terms with Turkey’s Ottoman in turn, require a nation-state at peace with its heritage at home and abroad. Neo- multiple identities, including its Muslim and Ottomanism does not seek to re-create the multinational past. The third aspect of neo- Ottoman Empire with territorial ambitions in the Ottomanism is its goal of embracing the West Middle East and beyond. Similarly, it does not as much as the Islamic world. Like the imperial seek to institute an Islamic legal system in city of Istanbul, which straddles Europe and modern Turkey. Instead, it favors a more Asia, neo-Ottomanism is Janus-faced. In that moderate version of secularism at home and a sense, the fact that the Ottoman Empire was more activist policy in foreign affairs, part of Europe matters a great deal to AKP’s particularly in terms of a willingness to mediate neo-Ottoman vision. conflicts. In this neo-Ottoman paradigm, Ankara exerts more “soft power” (i.e. political, This is partly why, despite its Islamic roots, the economic, diplomatic and cultural influence) AKP has worked much harder than previous in former Ottoman territories and in other Turkish governments to improve Ankara’s regions where Turkey has strategic interests. This chances of EU membership. Such efforts were broad vision for Turkish foreign policy requires eventually rewarded with the opening of an embrace of Ottoman multicultural legacy. accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union in 2005. Not surprisingly, the In practical terms neo-Ottomanism amounts to AKP’s ability to embrace the West and the a change of “mindset”, and has serious European Union has not impressed the implications for policy making. For instance, Kemalists, who are now suspicious of Westerners because neo-Ottomanism is at peace with the and see them as naïve and supportive toward multinational legacy of Ottoman Empire, it the AKP’s brand of “moderate Islam.”

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2. Kemalism rights agenda vis-à-vis the Kurdish problem. With the additional complication of an Islamist There are clear differences between Kemalism pro-EU agenda, its willingness to see Turkey and neo-Ottomanism in the three main aspects move closer to the EU was further tempered. In of strategic culture discussed above. Where that sense, the arrival of AKP to power proved neo-Ottomanism favors an ambitious regional to be the end of the love affair between policy in the Middle East and beyond, Kemalism and Europe. The fact that the Bush Kemalism opts for modesty and caution. Where administration praised the AKP as a model for the first favors multiculturalism and a more the Islamic world and spoke of Turkey as a moderate version of secularism, the latter “moderately Islamic” country exacerbated the prefers rigid measures against Islamic influence Kemalist frustration with the West. Under such and Kurdish ethnic identity. Where neo- circumstances Kemalism came to be Ottomanism is trying hard to pursue EU associated with an anti-Western stance, membership and to have relatively good sometime referred to as the neo-nationalist relations with Washington, Kemalism is alternative. Today, hard-liners within Turkey’s increasingly resentful of the EU and the United Kemalist establishment believe the United States. States and Europe have eroded Turkey’s secular identity by promoting “moderate Islam” Under President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and by helping AKP’s consolidation and Kemalism was primarily about an independent monopolization of power. and nationalist foreign policy. During the Cold War it came to represent an exclusively pro- In the event of a military or judicial coup Western approach, sometimes at the expense against the AKP, hardliners within the secular- of Turkey’s relations with the Islamic and Arab nationalist establishment might well break with world. Today, ironically, many Kemalists, who the West and seek closer ties with authoritarian were once Western oriented, have turned states like Russia, China, Syria, Iran, Azerbaijan against the West. Since the arrival of the AKP to and the Central Asian Republics. This so-called power, Turkey's domestic and foreign policy “Eurasian” alternative, sometimes openly dynamics have turned upside down. In its first supported by retired generals, would also three years in power, the AKP passed more pro- enable Ankara to take action against Kurds EU legal reforms than most of the previous without worrying about the reaction from the secularist governments. This formerly Islamist liberal West. In that sense a Kemalist foreign party became the strongest advocate of policy would prioritize full sovereignty and Turkey's EU membership in order to enhance independence against the West. political liberties and human rights at home. Yet, the Kemalist opposition remained very skeptical. What had caused this sudden 3. Turkish Gaullism change of heart among former Islamists? Was their pro-EU stance tactical? They came to the Turkish Gaullism combines many elements that conclusion that the AKP was engaged in are common to the two versions presented taqiyya, “dissimulation of real intentions.” above. Despite the important differences According to this logic, the Islamists were between Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism pushing for EU reforms in order to weaken the described above, they both share a strong role of the Turkish military, the main bulwark sense of patriotism and attachment to the against political Islam. Turkish nation-state. Neo-Ottomanism represents a more pragmatic and liberal The Turkish military already had serious mindset than Kemalism, but it has successfully concerns about the EU’s human and minority internalized the Kemalist paradigm of Turkish

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nationalism. The concept of the nation-state and self-confident Turkey that transcends the and the achievements of the modern Turkish over-emphasized Islamic-secular divide. After republic are not put into question or rejected all, both the Turkish military’s Kemalism and the by neo-Ottomans. At the end of the day, both AK Party’s neo-Ottomanism - the ideal of neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism share a state- regional influence – share a similar vision of centric view of the world and Turkish national Turkish independence and nationalism. interests. In that sense, both Kemalism and neo- Ottomanism share Turkish nationalism as a To understand Turkish Gaullism one needs to common denominator. In fact, seen from the look at Turkey’s impressive economic prism of rising Turkish self-confidence and performance. Today’s Turkey offers a nationalism, one can even argue that there is a considerably different picture than Turkey in certain convergence between neo- the 1990s. During the “lost decade” of the Ottomanism and Kemalism that is increasingly 1990s, the Turkish economy was plagued by present in this third vision of Turkish foreign policy. recessions, an average inflation rate of 70 percent, structural budget deficits, chronic If current Turkish trends continue, Washington financial crisis and constant political instability. might witness the emergence in Turkey of not In addition to such dismal economic necessarily an Islamist foreign policy but a performance, the war in the country’s much more nationalist, independent, self- southeast against the Kurdish separatist group confident and defiant strategic orientation - in (PKK) caused 30,000 deaths during that short, a Turkish variant of “Gaullism.” Turkish decade alone. Gaullism is primarily about rising Turkish self- confidence and independence vis-à-vis the Turkey managed to surprise most analysts with West. A Gaullist Turkey may in the long run its remarkable economic recovery and political decide to no longer pursue an elusive EU stability in the last 10 years. Shortly after the lost membership. It may even question its military decade culminated with the worse financial alliance with the United States. Burdened by a crisis in Turkish history in early 2001, Turkey sense that it never gets the respect it deserves, began structural economic reforms and Turkey may increasingly act on its own in cleaned up its financial and banking system search of full independence and sovereignty, under the stewardship of Finance Minister strategic leverage and, most importantly, Kemal Dervis. Economic and political reforms “Turkish glory and grandeur.” continued after the moderately Islamic Justice and Development (AKP) came to power in As France did under Charles de Gaulle in the 2002. In the last 8 years, the Turkish economy 1960s, Turkey may opt for its own force de managed to grow by an average of 6.5 frappe - a nuclear deterrent - and its own percent. Turkey is now the sixteenth largest realpolitik with countries such as China, India economy in the world, and in the last decade, and Russia. Similarly, it could even contemplate Turkish per capita income has more than leaving the military structure of NATO, while doubled from $4,245 to $8,711.1 maintaining its political membership in the organization. Contemporary analyses of Turkey Such economic performance, coupled with in American circles constantly refer to the political stability, fuels an unprecedented sense tension between “secularism” and “Islam” or of self-confidence and pride in Turkey. The AKP, “eastern” versus “western” proclivities. Such under the charismatic and mercurial leadership focus often comes at the expense of the most of Prime Minister Erdogan personifies this sense powerful force driving Turkish foreign policy: of Turkish “hubris.” One should not forget that nationalism and self-interest. One should not underestimate the emergence of nationalist 1 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010

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Turkey’s newfound sense of confidence and geopolitical alternatives and complacently grandeur is taking place in a context where reassure themselves that it did not. But today’s most Turks feel they are not getting the Turkey is a much more self-confident and “respect” they deserve from the West, independent country and Turkey feel they no particularly from Europe and the United States. longer have only a “Western” option. The rise of New obstacles to EU accession, perceived Turkish Gaullism or neo-Ottomanism needs not injustice in Cyprus, growing global recognition come fully at the expense of Turkey’s strong of the “Armenian genocide” and Western relations with the West. But if the strategic sympathy for Kurdish national aspirations are all relationship between Ankara and Washington major factors forcing Turks to question the continues to erode and prospects for joining value of their long-standing pro-Western the EU continue to recede, Turkey will certainly geostrategic commitments. Looking beyond have an additional incentive to look at the secular versus Islamist divide in Turkish strategic opportunities in relations with Russia, politics, one would find that both the Kemalist India, China and, of course, the Middle East and neo-Ottoman camps have come to and Africa. The stakes are high for Washington. embrace the same narrative of nationalist Home to more than 75 million Muslims, Turkey is frustration vis-à-vis Europe and America. the most advanced democracy in the Islamic world. It has borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, After 2004, when the Greek Cypriots joined the Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. EU and acquired veto power against Turkey’s EU It is the corridor through which the vast energy accession, the AKP grew increasingly disillusioned reserves of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia with the EU process. As a result of this dynamic, pass to the West—the only alternative being the neo-Ottoman camp joined the Kemalists and Iran. A stable, Western-oriented, liberal Turkey jumped on the bandwagon of nationalist on a clear path toward the EU would serve as frustration with the West. The irony is that such a growing market for Western goods, a frustration with the West is in great part fueled by contributor to the labor force Europe greatly self-confidence and national pride. Turkey’s needs, and a democratic example for the recent problems with Israel and the United States Arab world. A resentful, unstable and also led to a convergence in the Kemalist and authoritarian Turkey, on the other hand, would neo-Ottoman camp further reinforcing the be the opposite of all this. Gaullist dynamics in Turkish foreign policy.

ABOUT CUSE: While Turkey feels it is not getting enough respect in the West, recent historic The Center on the United States and Europe developments in the Arab world—where (CUSE) fosters high-level U.S.-European dialogue ossified regimes are finally overthrown by on the changes in Europe and the global democratic revolutions—reinforce Turkey’s political challenges that affect transatlantic relations. The relevance and sense of importance. The Center offers independent research and potential for a more democratic Tunisia and recommendations for U.S. and European officials Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to and policymakers, and it convenes seminars and emulate a “Turkish model” are factors that fuel public forums on policy-relevant issues. Turkey’s Gaullist sense of sense of national pride and grandeur. The Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe Conclusion 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 In the past, Americans and Europeans would often ask whether Turkey had any realistic www.brookings.edu/cuse

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