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The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey Ömer Taşpinar US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES NUMBER 50 March 8, 2011 The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey Ömer Taşpinar While the growing importance of religion in However, Turkey is too complex to fit into this Turkey should not be dismissed, a more facile paradigm. It defies sweeping nuanced debate on Turkish foreign policy generalizations about Islamization. This paper is should take into consideration three different an attempt to capture the multifaceted nature visions of Turkey’s place in the international of Turkish foreign policy by analyzing the three order: (1) Neo-Ottomanism, (2) Kemalism and strategic visions mentioned above. 1 (3) Turkish Gaullism. The common denominator of these strategic visions is that they transcend 1. Neo-Ottomanism the erroneous narrative prevalent in Western media that focuses on the dichotomy between Since the AKP came to power in late 2002, its Turkey’s Islamic and secular, pro-West factions. foreign policy has been based on what Prime Many Western policymakers, analysts and Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s top foreign scholars equate the notion of a Turkish policy advisor and now foreign minister, Ahmet divergence from the West—or the fear of Davutoglu, calls “strategic depth.” Davutoglu’s "losing Turkey"—with the idea of an Islamic main argument is that Turkey is a great power revival. This is an understandable fallacy. After that has neglected its historic ties and all, Turkey's population is almost fully Muslim diplomatic, economic and political and a political party with Islamic roots has won relationships with its neighboring regions consecutive electoral victories. Moreover, this is (Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and exactly how some members of the Turkish Eurasia), dating back to the Ottoman era. It secular establishment—the military, the should be noted that this “neo-Ottoman” vision Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the is not an imperialist agenda. It is also very upper echelons of the judiciary—describe the different from policies advocated by current policies of the Justice and Necmettin Erbakan, the Islamist leader of the Development Party (AKP). now defunct Welfare Party. While Erbakan sought to create an Islamic alliance with Ömer Taşpinar is a Nonresident Senior Muslim countries like Libya, Iran, Malaysia, and Fellow with the Center on the United Indonesia as an explicit alternative to alliance States and Europe at Brookings. His work focuses on Turkey, the European This paper builds upon sections that were previously Union, Muslims in Europe, political published in Insight Turkey, Today’s Zaman, and by Islam, the Middle East and Kurdish The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. nationalism. US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 1 with the West, AKP leaders want to reach out opens the door for a less “ethnic” and more to non-Western regions to complement their multicultural conceptualization of Turkish ties to the West—not to replace them. “citizenship.” As a result, neo-Ottomanism is tolerant of Kurdish cultural rights and expression The AKP’s neo-Ottoman vision builds on the of Kurdish national identity, as long as loyalty to approach of former President Turgut Özal. the Republic of Turkey is not put into question. Shortly after the Cold War came to an end, Faced with demands for Kurdish cultural and Özal helped Turkey rediscover its imperial political rights, the neo-Ottoman mindset opts legacy and his Motherland Party tried to for accommodation in the framework of establish a new consensus at home between multiculturalism and Muslim identity. Unlike the multiple identities of Turkey (western, hardline Kemalism which insists on assimilating Muslim, secular, Kurdish and Turkish). Neo- the Kurds, neo-Ottomanism allows Islam to play Ottomanism reminds Turks that they once had a greater role in terms of building a sense of a great multinational empire that ruled the shared identity. Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and parts of Central Europe. Such emphasis on the The second characteristic of neo-Ottomanism Ottoman legacy is not part of a plan to is a sense of grandeur and self-confidence in Islamize Turkey and its foreign policy. Rather, it foreign policy. Neo-Ottomanism sees Turkey as is an attempt to balance and broaden the a regional superpower. Its strategic vision and geostrategic horizons of a country, which in the culture reflects the geographic reach of the past has been obsessed with following an Ottoman and Byzantine Empires. According to exclusively Western trajectory. this neo-Ottoman vision Turkey is a pivotal state which should play a very active diplomatic, Three factors help define the neo-Ottoman political, and economic role in a wide region of tendencies of the AKP. The first is the willingness which it is the “center.” Such grand ambitions, to come to terms with Turkey’s Ottoman in turn, require a nation-state at peace with its heritage at home and abroad. Neo- multiple identities, including its Muslim and Ottomanism does not seek to re-create the multinational past. The third aspect of neo- Ottoman Empire with territorial ambitions in the Ottomanism is its goal of embracing the West Middle East and beyond. Similarly, it does not as much as the Islamic world. Like the imperial seek to institute an Islamic legal system in city of Istanbul, which straddles Europe and modern Turkey. Instead, it favors a more Asia, neo-Ottomanism is Janus-faced. In that moderate version of secularism at home and a sense, the fact that the Ottoman Empire was more activist policy in foreign affairs, part of Europe matters a great deal to AKP’s particularly in terms of a willingness to mediate neo-Ottoman vision. conflicts. In this neo-Ottoman paradigm, Ankara exerts more “soft power” (i.e. political, This is partly why, despite its Islamic roots, the economic, diplomatic and cultural influence) AKP has worked much harder than previous in former Ottoman territories and in other Turkish governments to improve Ankara’s regions where Turkey has strategic interests. This chances of EU membership. Such efforts were broad vision for Turkish foreign policy requires eventually rewarded with the opening of an embrace of Ottoman multicultural legacy. accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union in 2005. Not surprisingly, the In practical terms neo-Ottomanism amounts to AKP’s ability to embrace the West and the a change of “mindset”, and has serious European Union has not impressed the implications for policy making. For instance, Kemalists, who are now suspicious of Westerners because neo-Ottomanism is at peace with the and see them as naïve and supportive toward multinational legacy of Ottoman Empire, it the AKP’s brand of “moderate Islam.” US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES 2 2. Kemalism rights agenda vis-à-vis the Kurdish problem. With the additional complication of an Islamist There are clear differences between Kemalism pro-EU agenda, its willingness to see Turkey and neo-Ottomanism in the three main aspects move closer to the EU was further tempered. In of strategic culture discussed above. Where that sense, the arrival of AKP to power proved neo-Ottomanism favors an ambitious regional to be the end of the love affair between policy in the Middle East and beyond, Kemalism and Europe. The fact that the Bush Kemalism opts for modesty and caution. Where administration praised the AKP as a model for the first favors multiculturalism and a more the Islamic world and spoke of Turkey as a moderate version of secularism, the latter “moderately Islamic” country exacerbated the prefers rigid measures against Islamic influence Kemalist frustration with the West. Under such and Kurdish ethnic identity. Where neo- circumstances Kemalism came to be Ottomanism is trying hard to pursue EU associated with an anti-Western stance, membership and to have relatively good sometime referred to as the neo-nationalist relations with Washington, Kemalism is alternative. Today, hard-liners within Turkey’s increasingly resentful of the EU and the United Kemalist establishment believe the United States. States and Europe have eroded Turkey’s secular identity by promoting “moderate Islam” Under President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and by helping AKP’s consolidation and Kemalism was primarily about an independent monopolization of power. and nationalist foreign policy. During the Cold War it came to represent an exclusively pro- In the event of a military or judicial coup Western approach, sometimes at the expense against the AKP, hardliners within the secular- of Turkey’s relations with the Islamic and Arab nationalist establishment might well break with world. Today, ironically, many Kemalists, who the West and seek closer ties with authoritarian were once Western oriented, have turned states like Russia, China, Syria, Iran, Azerbaijan against the West. Since the arrival of the AKP to and the Central Asian Republics. This so-called power, Turkey's domestic and foreign policy “Eurasian” alternative, sometimes openly dynamics have turned upside down. In its first supported by retired generals, would also three years in power, the AKP passed more pro- enable Ankara to take action against Kurds EU legal reforms than most of the previous without worrying about the reaction from the secularist governments. This formerly Islamist liberal West. In that sense a Kemalist foreign party became the strongest advocate of policy would prioritize full sovereignty and Turkey's EU membership in order to enhance independence against the West. political liberties and human rights at home. Yet, the Kemalist opposition remained very skeptical. What had caused this sudden 3. Turkish Gaullism change of heart among former Islamists? Was their pro-EU stance tactical? They came to the Turkish Gaullism combines many elements that conclusion that the AKP was engaged in are common to the two versions presented taqiyya, “dissimulation of real intentions.” above. Despite the important differences According to this logic, the Islamists were between Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism pushing for EU reforms in order to weaken the described above, they both share a strong role of the Turkish military, the main bulwark sense of patriotism and attachment to the against political Islam.
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