The Evolution of Infantry Brigade Command in the British Army on the Western Front, 1916-1918 Roger Wood MA A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Wolverhampton for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy October 2020 This work or any part thereof has not previously been presented in any form to the University or to any other body whether for the purposes of assessment, publication or for any purpose (unless otherwise indicated). Save for any express acknowledgements, references and /or bibliographies cited in the work, I confirm that the intellectual content of this work is the result of my own efforts and of no other person. The right of Roger Wood to be identified as author of this work is asserted in accordance with ss.77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. At this date copyright is owned by the author. Roger Wood……………………. Signature 20 October 2020………………. Date 1 Abstract This thesis challenges the orthodox view that the role of the infantry brigade command of the British Army during the First World War was unduly narrow. Instead, it is argued that the response of the brigadiers and their staff to the challenges of the Western Front secured their role as agents of organisational and tactical change. A series of case studies over the period 1916-1918 serve to demonstrate the significant contribution of brigade staff to the Army’s learning process. Much like that of the wider BEF however, this process was complex and uneven. As a consequence, the development and battlefield performance of the brigades varied in accordance with factors of an external and internal nature: of these, the influence of the corps or division under which a brigade served was fundamental. 2 Contents Page Acknowledgements 8 Abbreviations 9 Introduction and Literature Review 11 Chapter 1 - Brigade Command: Identity, Structure and Function: Brigade Operations 1915 1:1 Introduction 34 1:2 Brigade Social Status 35 1:3 Royal Military College 37 1:4 Staff College 39 1:5 Regimental origin 40 1:6 Pre-war colonial experience 43 1:7 Military ethos 45 1:8 Brigade staff roles 47 1:9 Renewal of command staff 57 3 1:10 Brigade Operations 1915 71 1:11 Conclusion 82 Chapter 2 - Fourth Army: Brigade Operations on the Somme,1916 2:1 Introduction 84 2:2 XIII Corps – Brigade Operations, 1 July 1916 85 2:3 XIII Corps – Brigade Operations July-August 1916 93 2:4 Attack of 9 Brigade (3rd Division), 23 July 1916 94 2:5 Attack of 30th Division at Guillemont, 30 July 1916 96 2:6 XIV Corps - Brigade Operations at Flers-Morval, September 1916 106 2:7 Guards Division - Brigade Operations: Preparations 108 2:8 Attack of 1 and 2(Guards) Brigades and 6th Division 115 2:9 Conclusion 123 Chapter 3 - Fifth Army: Brigade Operations on the Ancre,1916-1917 3:1 Introduction 127 3:2 II Corps – Brigade Operations 129 4 3:3 V Corps – Brigade Operations 142 3:4 Brigade Minor Actions, 1917 152 3:5 Action at Puiseaux Trench 153 3:6 Action at Irles 157 3:7 Action at Bucquoy 162 3:8 Conclusion 165 Chapter 4 - Second Army: Brigade Operations at Messines and Third Ypres,1917 4:1 Introduction 167 4:2 X and IX Corps’ - Brigade Operations at Messines, June 1917 167 4:3 Brigade training and preparation 170 4:4 Third Ypres - context 181 4:5 X Corps - Brigade Operations on 20 September: Preparations 182 4:6 IX Corps - Brigade Operations on 20 September: Preparations 186 4:7 The attack of 23rd Division, 20 September 1917 191 4:8 The attack of 118 Brigade (39th Division), 25 September 1917 195 5 4:9 Brigade tactical analysis 197 4:10 Conclusion 199 Chapter 5 - Fifth Army: Brigade Operations at Third Ypres,1917 5:1 Introduction 202 5:2 Fifth Army: Brigade Training 203 5:3 XIV Corps - Brigade Operations, 31 July 1917 208 5:4 XVIII Corps - Brigade Operations, 31 July 1917 212 5:5 II Corps - Brigade Operations, 16 August 1917 217 5:6 XIV Corps - Brigade Operations, 16 August 231 5:7 Conclusion 236 Chapter 6 - Fourth and Second Armies: Brigade Operations,1918 6:1 Introduction 239 6:2 The Battle of Amiens: 8-12 August 1918 – context 243 6:3 Fourth Army: III Corps - Brigade Operations, Amiens, 245 8 August 1918 6:4 III Corps - Brigade Operations, Albert, 20-26 August 1918 251 6 6:5 IX Corps - Brigade Operations, Ephey, the St. Quentin Canal and the Beaurevoir Line, September-October 1918 257 6:6 Second Army: II, X and XIX Corps’ - Brigade Operations September-October 1918 265 6:7 Conclusion 283 Conclusion 286 Bibliography 290 Tables Table 1:1 Regimental origins 43 Table 1:2 Pre-war colonial experience of brigadiers serving on the Western Front, 1 January 1915 45 Table 1:3 Average days in post experienced by brigadiers serving in major Offensives, 1915-1917 61 Table 1:4 Average days in post experienced by brigadiers serving in major Offensives, 1915-1917 65 Maps 313-319 7 Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the support and guidance of various individuals. In particular, my supervisor Prof. Gary Sheffield has provided unstinting and boundless guidance throughout the past seven years. I would like to extend my gratitude also to Prof. Stephen Badsey and Prof. Peter Simkins. My thanks go also to Dr. Peter Hodgkinson and Dr. Trevor Harvey for their provision of primary material and to Barbara Taylor for producing the maps. A debt of thanks is owed to Dr. Phylomena Badsey and the WFA for their financial contribution. For their assistance over the course of my research, my thanks are extended to the respective staff of the TNA, LHCMA and the Imperial War Museum, London. Away from academia, thanks are due to Mr. Angus Maitland Pelham-Burn and Kit and Caroline Cator for allowing me access to private papers in their possession. Finally, without the unwavering support, encouragement and patience of my wife Sue, this work would not have been accomplished. Dedication The thesis is dedicated to my maternal grandfather Private G.C. Creasey, 10/Lincolnshire (1885-1979) and his brother Private E. Creasey,1/4 Lincolnshire (1899-1916). 8 Abbreviations ABHQ Advanced Brigade Headquarters ABFS Advanced Brigade Forward Station ABRC Advanced Brigade Reporting Centre BEF British Expeditionary Force BHQ Brigade Headquarters BGGS Brigadier-General General Staff BGRA Brigadier-General Royal Artillery BIO Brigade Intelligence Officer BM Brigade Major BMRA Brigade Major Royal Artillery BSO Brigade Signals Officer CCC Churchill College Cambridge CO Commanding Officer CRA Commander Royal Artillery DAHQ Divisional Artillery Headquarters DSO Distinguished Service Order FOO Forward Observation Officers FSR Field Service Regulations GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding GSO1 General Staff Officer (1st Grade) GSO2 General Staff Officer (2nd Grade) GSO3 General Staff Officer (3rd Grade) HA Heavy Artillery HQ Headquarters IWM Imperial War Museum KOSB King’s Own Scottish Borderers KRRC King’s Royal Rifle Corps 9 LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives LO Liaison Officer MG Machine Gun MGC Machine Gun Corps MGGS Major-General General Staff MGRA Major General Royal Artillery NAM National Army Museum NCO Non-Commissioned Officer OC Officer Commanding OTC Officer Training Corps OR Other Ranks psc passed staff college RAHQ Royal Artillery Headquarters RE Royal Engineers RFA Royal Field Artillery RFC Royal Flying Corps RHA Royal Heavy Artillery RMC Royal Military College RND Royal Naval Division RUSI Royal United Services Institute SC Staff Captain TF Territorial Force TMB Trench Mortar Battery TNA The National Archives VC Victoria Cross WD War Diary WFA Western Front Association 10 Introduction and Literature Review The infantry brigade of the British Army comprised a key component in the chain of command on the Western Front during the First World War. This role was subject to a progressive, but irregular, transformation as the Army responded to the difficulties imposed by trench warfare. This thesis explores the evolution of the brigade as an effective battlefield formation and the influence exercised by the brigade staff in their multi-functional role. The introduction addresses five points: what the thesis sets out to demonstrate, how command and control is treated in the relevant literature, what factors defined the parameters in which brigade command operated, how the British Army’s capacity for learning has been evaluated and the justification for the selected case studies. Two primary research questions were posed. First, to what degree was brigade command’s response to static warfare and the transition to mobile operations a reflection of the British army’s flexible approach to learning and innovation? It will be argued that the contribution by brigade staff to this process has been underestimated by historians. Second, to what extent was the organisational and tactical development of brigade command shaped by the corps and division under which it served? It will be demonstrated that a brigade’s battlefield performance was significantly influenced by this factor. Both questions were designed to challenge the orthodox interpretation of the brigadier’s role as unduly narrow, a view expressed by Major-General Sir John Gellibrand in that ‘the brigadier had little scope other beyond oiling the works and using 11 his eyes’.1 Instead, it will be argued that the role of the brigadier was far broader and constituted a catalyst for organisational and tactical change. Two avenues of research were adopted to reflect the many interrelated physical dimensions and conceptual planes upon which the conflict was fought. The first, at a macro level, included the geographical, economic and technological factors that shaped operations, those that continually evolved in ‘new and often unexpected directions under the influence of the others’.2 These broad factors comprised the parameters in which brigade operated.