Spartan Responses to Defeat: from a Mythical Hysiae to a Very Real Sellasia

CHAPTER 7 Spartan Responses to Defeat: From a Mythical Hysiae to a Very Real Sellasia Matthew Trundle Defeat defined and molded Spartan history and identity. Ancient writers created a mythology around the refusal of Spartan hoplites to surrender. In turn and over time the Spartans mythologized their own relationship to defeat. Recent work on Sparta has sought to reassess aspects of Spartan history and society calling for reconsideration of the stereotypical nature of the way the Spartan state and its ideology have often been presented and viewed.1 This chapter, therefore, reexamines the stereotypical image of Spartan hoplites. It attempts to understand Sparta’s evolving relationship with defeat and the origins and influence of an ideology often associated with Thermopylae. The argument that follows suggests that Sparta’s reaction to defeat in the sixth and early-fifth centuries BCE initially made Sparta stronger and defined its place as the most powerful state in the Peloponnese and in Greece. Thermopylae crystallized the hoplite ideal of standing firm to die in the face of overwhelming odds. Thanks primarily to Thermopylae and its legacy, Sparta was glorified in defeat and in turn glorified it. Sparta’s hoplite ideology promul- gated in the Thermopylae story created a stereotype for future Spartans that led to more catastrophic defeats in the fourth and third centuries BCE than might otherwise have been. The irony is that Leonidas and the three hundred Spartiatae had almost certainly intended to escape from the pass, but became trapped and were killed by the oncoming Persians. Spartan propaganda sup- ported by non-Spartan traditions, for example historians like Herodotus, created for the Spartans an image of what it meant to be a Spartan. The supposed act of hoplite sacrifice at Thermopylae became paradigmatic of the Spartan mentalité. By the fourth century, this ideology of fighting to the death what- ever the odds had infiltrated Spartan thinking to the point where retreat or surrender ceased to be an option for Spartans on the battlefield. In short, as 1 Thus on the date and nature of the establishment of the Spartan system, see Kennell (1995) and Hodkinson (1997) 83–102 and (1999); on peacemaking and diplomacy, see Tritle (2007) 172–90; on violence in Sparta, see Hornblower (2000) 57–82; on state terror and secret organi- zations like the krypteia, see Millender (2016) 117–50 and Trundle (2016) 60–76. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��8 | doi ��.��63/9789004355774_008 Spartan Responses To Defeat 145 Spartan power waned after the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) so Spartans increasingly found themselves tied to a mythic tradition of victory or death. The defeats at Leuctra (371), Mantinea (362), Megalopolis (331), and Sellasia (222) became increasingly devastating as Spartans embraced the myth created for them by the stories of their past, refused to retreat and so suffered increasingly terrible losses on the battlefield.2 Sparta and Defeat in the Archaic Age The earliest Spartan military engagement of which we hear is the Battle of Hysiae (c. 669), at which the Argives are said to have defeated the Spartans. Our source for this battle, Pausanias (2.24.7), wrote in the second century CE, some eight centuries later. The absence of corroboration from earlier Greek historians like Herodotus and Thucydides throws up real doubts about the battle’s historicity; it is almost certainly a Spartan (or perhaps an Argive) myth.3 Pausanias states simply that the common graves of the Argives and the Spartans who fell at the battle lie at the site. In the absence of further de- tails, historians have associated all manner of events from early Greek history with Hysiae, some more plausibly than others. Thus, the legendary Pheidon of Argos who features as a key figure in early Argive history must have led the Argive army;4 this supposed victory at Hysiae would therefore have enabled him to dominate the Peloponnese and to reform the Olympic Games (Strabo 8.3.33 = Ephorus fr. 115, Hdt. 6.127, Paus. 6.22.2). Some historians have also con- cluded that the defeat at Hysiae explained seventh-century reforms to the Spartan constitution.5 It could perhaps explain the cause of the great seventh- century Messenian revolt, as well. Wade-Gery argued that Hysiae lay behind the origins of the festival called the Gymnopaedia, though evidence for this is typically scant.6 Nothing explicitly connects the one with the other, though another legendary battle, Thyreae, certainly had connections with the festival (for example, see Plut. Ages. 29, Xen. Hell. 8.4.16): the leaders of the chorus wore a Thyreatic Crown. In the absence of concrete evidence, Hysiae remains enigmatic and its historicity presents serious problems. If a major battle did occur and resulted 2 All dates are BCE, and all translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. 3 Kelly (1970) 31–42. 4 For a recent thorough introduction to the evidence for Pheidon, see Hall (2006). 5 Forrest (1968) 58. 6 Wade-Gery (1949) 79–81..

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