How Does Terrorism End?
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How does Terrorism End? A case study analysis of the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Master thesis Thijmen Robert Hamer s1610481 Crisis and Security Management Leiden University June 2016 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank my supervisor, Alastair Reed, for his good advice and continued support. 3 ABSTRACT This Master thesis describes the case of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and its struggle for independence. The conflict between the MILF and the government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) that stretched from ca 1980 to 2014 was used to answer the question “How does terrorism end through a political process?” This case was first placed into a historical context. Then, different lenses (State, group and context) were applied to the case that was divided into four distinctive phases. This relied on four important theoretical concepts derived from literature. These are: greed and grievance, spoiler roles, negotiation strategies and protracted social conflict. This led to the following main findings: The main reason why the MILF could continue the Moro struggle after the MNLF had agreed to peace, was the continuance of the Moro grievances. An acknowledgment by the government that the MILF was here to stay, opened up the possibility of negotiations. Militarization and internationalization of the conflict was detrimental to any peace, and served as a clear spoiler. Separating the radical terrorist elements from the more moderate rebels and international oversight was crucial for creating conditions for substantive and serious negotiations. Small steps in the negotiation process work better than comprehensive deals. A convergence or inclusive strategy works better than a divisive and exclusive strategy. A clear projection of the benefits of peace should be in place. A stalemate which was not satisfactory for both parties but which they believed could only be changed by politics. International involvement in the diplomatic process to create trust and mutual understanding between the parties. 4 Table of Contents ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ 4 List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 7 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 10 1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 10 1.2. General outline of this thesis ................................................................................................ 11 1.3. Literature review ................................................................................................................... 11 1.3.1. Terrorism, a complex area of study ..................................................................................... 12 1.3.2. Observations from quantitative research ........................................................................... 14 1.3.3. Asymmetrical conflicts: causes and dynamics .................................................................... 17 1.3.4. Ending conflict non-violently ............................................................................................... 23 1.3.4.4 Using negotiations for other ends than peace .................................................................. 30 1.4. Research Design ......................................................................................................................... 31 1.4.1. Main theoretical considerations and strategies relevant to this case. ............................... 31 1.4.2. Framework of analysis ......................................................................................................... 31 1.4.3 Method ................................................................................................................................. 32 1.4.4. Case selection ...................................................................................................................... 34 CHAPTER 2. THE CASE OF THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT .................................................... 35 2.1. Historical background of the Moro-Philippine conflict. ............................................................. 35 2.1.1. Islamic and Christian colonization of the Philippines .......................................................... 35 2.1.2. American colonization: sowing the seeds for conflict ......................................................... 37 2.1.3. World War II, a period of reconciliation and Philippine independency .............................. 40 2.1.4. Filipino rule: from an uneasy peace to overt conflict, 1946-1996 ...................................... 40 2.2. Starting negotiations and Estrada’s all-out war ......................................................................... 47 2.2.1. Timeline of events ............................................................................................................... 47 2.2.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 49 2.2.3. State..................................................................................................................................... 51 2.2.4. Group ................................................................................................................................... 54 2.2.5. Main observations ............................................................................................................... 57 2.3. Arroyo and the global war on terror (2001-2005) ..................................................................... 59 2.3.1. Timeline of events ............................................................................................................... 59 2.3.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 62 2.3.3. State..................................................................................................................................... 67 2.3.4. Group ................................................................................................................................... 71 5 2.3.5. Main observations ............................................................................................................... 73 2.4. Negotiations center around the topic of ancestral domain (2005-2010) .................................. 75 2.4.1. Timeline of events ............................................................................................................... 75 2.4.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 79 2.4.3. State..................................................................................................................................... 83 2.4.4. Group ................................................................................................................................... 90 2.4.5. Main observations ............................................................................................................... 92 2.5. New energy and building trust under Benigno Aquino (2010-2014) ......................................... 94 2.5.1. Timeline of events ............................................................................................................... 94 2.5.2. Context ................................................................................................................................ 96 2.5.3. State................................................................................................................................... 101 2.5.4. Group ................................................................................................................................. 104 2.5.5. Main observations ............................................................................................................. 106 CHAPTER 3. UNDERSTANDING THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE MILF-PHILIPPINE PEACE PROCESS ............................................................................................................................................................. 108 3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 108 3.2. Different lens perspectives ....................................................................................................... 108 3.3. Within-case comparison ........................................................................................................... 109 3.4 Connections to theory ............................................................................................................... 111 3.4.1. Greed and Grievance theory ............................................................................................. 111 3.4.2. Spoilers .............................................................................................................................. 114 3.4.3. Negotiation strategies and tactics ..................................................................................... 116 3.4.4. Protracted