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8603029

Linn, Brian McAllister

THE WAR IN LUZON: U.S. ARMY REGIONAL COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1900-1902

The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1985

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Copyright 198-5 by Linn, Brian McAllister All Rights Reserved

THE WAR IN LUZON: U.S. ARMY REGIONAL COUNTER INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1900-1902

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By Brian McAllister Linn, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University 1985

Dissertation Commitee: Approved By

Allan R. Millett

Austin Kerr Adviser Duane Tananbaum Department of History Copyright by Brian McAllister Linn 1985 To My Wife and Companion,

Dinny K. Linn

11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Allan R. Millett for suggesting research in the Philippines and for his constant support during my graduate school career. I would like to thank Dr. Kenneth J. Andrien and Dr. Williamson Murray for their suggestions and patience. Thanks go to Dr. Jack Balcer for extending the History Department's library resources to me. Thanks are due to Dr. Glenn A. May for his comments and Dr. Duane Tananbaum for his proof-reading. 1 would also like to express my deepest appreciation to the U.S. Army Center of Military History and to Dr. David Trask and It. Col. Robert K. Griffith for allowing me the financial and moral support to complete research in Washington. Thanks are also due to Dr. Richard Sommers and the staff at the U.S. Army Military History Institute. During my research in Washington 1 contracted a great debt to Mr. Jean Klieger and Mrs. Anne Jay. My parents. James and Kathleen Linn, provided the necessary loan to buy a Macintosh. I would also like to thank my colleagues at The Ohio State Universtiy, particularly Richard Hall, Ray Stokes, Mark Pari Ho, Doug Bisson, George Sinks, Tom Dickie, Richard Muller, Chris Gable, Charlie O'Connell, and Roger Nimps for all the help they have given. I would finally like to express my appreciation my in-laws, Robert and Shirley Kamins and my son, Adam, for their support and help.

Ill VITA

September 14, 1953 ...... Born - Honolulu, Hawaii

1978 ...... B.A. University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii

1979-1981 ...... Graduate Research Associate, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1981 ...... M.A, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1981-1984 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1985 ...... U.S. Army Center of Military History Dissertation Year Fellow, Washington, D.C.

IV PUBLICATIONS

"Pacification in Northwestern Luzon: An American Regiment in the Phiiippine-American War, 1899-1901 ' PILIPINAS 2 (December 19o2):i 4-25.

"Pretty Scaly Times: The Ohio National Guard and the Strike of 1877" Ohio History 94 (Summer-Autumn 1985), pp. 35- 42.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Military History

Dr. Allan R. Millett (American)

Dr. Williamson Murray (European)

Minor Fields: Spanish Colonial History

Dr. Kenneth J. Andrien

Japanese His.tary

Dr. James R. Bartholomew TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... in VITA...... iv LIST OF MAPS...... vii LIST OF CHARTS...... viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... ix INTRODUCTION...... 1 CHAPTER Page I. The Philippine War ...... 21 II. The First District, DNL...... 65 III. The Fourth District, DNL...... 139 IV. The Third District, DSL...... 182 V. The Second District, DSL ...... 243 VI. Conclusion ...... 352 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 364

VI LIST OF MAPS

MAPS PAGE

1. The Philippines ...... 22

2. First District, DNL...... 66

3. Fourth District, DNL...... 140

4. Third District, DSL...... 183

5. Second District, DSL ...... 244

Vll LIST OF CHARTS

CHARTS PAGE

1. First District, DNL:....Engagements, 1900-1 ...... 92

2. First District, DNL: U.S. Casualties, 1900-1 ...... 97

3. Fourth District, DNL: Engagements, 1900-1 ...... 152

4. Fourth District, DNL: U.S. Causualties, 1900-1 ...... 154

5. Third District, DSL: Engagements, 1900-1 ...... 210

6. Third District, DSL: U.S. Causalties, 1900-1 ...... 212

7. Second District, DSL: Engagements, 1900 ...... 273

8. Second District, DSL: U.S. Casualties, 1900 ...... 274

9. Second District, DSL: Engagements, 1901-2 ...... 298

10. Second District, DSL: U.S. Casualties, 1901-2 ...... 302

Vlll LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION NAME

ID ...... First District

2D ...... Second District 3D ...... Third District 4D ...... Fourth District 8th A C...... Eighth Army Corps Adj ...... Adjutant Afckl...... Army and Navy Journal C.G...... Commanding General C O...... Commanding Officer C. S...... Chief of Staff DivPhil...... Division of the Philippines DM I ...... Division of Military Information DNL...... Department of Northern Luzon D. P...... Department of the Pacific

DSL...... Department of Southern Luzon

H q ...... Headquarters

G O...... General Orders

LS...... Letters Sent

IX LR...... Letters Received

OMG...... Off Ice of the Mi 11 tary Governor

OMI ...... Office of Military Intelligence

PIR 5D...... Philippine Insurgent Records. Selected Documents

P.L...... Présidente Local

5-D ...... Sub-District

SMG...... Secretary to the Military Governor INTRODUCTION

The guerrilla war between 1900 and 1902 that followed the American occupation of the Philippines provided a strong challenge for U.S. Army pacification methods. On the principal island of Luzon, the Army defeated the Philippine Republic's conventional armies in 1899 and occupied the island in the first months of 1900. With their conventional military forces scattered, the Filipino nationalists continued their resistance to American occupation through guerrilla warfare. This guerrilla war varied consider­ ably from area to area in its military strength, popular support, and opera­ tional goals. The Filipino guerrillas, called fnsurrectos by the soldiers, were usually regional forces and relied on their ability to blend in with the rural populace. The burden of defeating these local guerrillas fell on Army district and provincial commanders who were isolated from central control by terrain and poor communications. With no clear understanding of either the dynamics of Philippine guerrilla warfare or Filipino society, these officers were often confused and frustrated by both the fnsurrectos and the local population. They were also hampered by uncertain and ambiguous policies emanating from Army headquarters in Manila. Most officers, how­ ever, quickly adjusted to this confusing situation and developed pragmatic counterinsurgency policies to deal with the guerrillas in their particular

1 areas. By adapting their pacification methods and techniques to the specific conditions they encountered in their respective regions, American officers were able to overcome an essentially local resistance. The result was that U.S. counter insurgency in the Philippine War became a series of small regional pacification campaigns rather than a comprehensive and archipelago-wide campaign. By mid-1901, the success of these regional pacification operations allowed the Army to structure a pacification campaign which subdued the most insurrectionary provinces within a year. The Philippine War of 1899-1902 remains one of the most contro­ versial wars ever fought by the United States Army. Yet despite a vast and often vituperative literature, very little has been vi^ritten on the military history of the war during its guerrilla phase of 1900-1902. Instead, writers have devoted most of their efforts to analyzing the Army's allegedly atrocious conduct, exploring the anti-war movement in the United States, or debating the morality of the U.S. occupation of the Philippines. An overview of the historiography of the Philippine War must therefore start with gen­ eral interpretations of the war itself and then turn to the specific studies of the guerrilla war period. The American occupation of the Philippines was justified by a number of scholars who can be grouped under the general heading of the impe­ rialists. The imperialists include James A. LeRoy, Daniel P. Barrows, Dean C. Worcester, and Charles B. Elliott. For the most part these men had occupied high positions in the early American colonial government and based their views both on personal experience and contemporary government records such as the War Department reports. These authors asserted that the Filipinos were neither a united people nor capable of self-government, and that sentiment for Filipino independence was restricted to a corrupt and bombasitic elite drawn from the Tagalog provinces. To the imperialists, the guerrilla war was maintained by a combination of terrorism, tribal loyalty, and Filipino blindness to the benevolence of American rule. When the Filipinos did recognize the good intentions of the United States, they joined with the Americans against the insurrecto minority and forced the guerrillas to surrender.i In direct constast to the imperialist view is the interpretation offered by the anti-imperialist historians. Articulated first by Moorefield Storey and Marcial Lichauco, the anti-imperialist view has been further expanded by Leon Wolff and Stuart C. Miller. Basicaly the anti-imperialists argue that the Filipino people were united in their desire for independence and that the national government formed by Emilio Aguinaldo reflected these popular aspirations. According to the anti-imperialists, the Filipino nationalists' adaptation of guerrilla tactics demonstrated both their patriotism and their ability to mobilize popular support. As the U.S. Army grew frustrated with this popular people's war, it turned to repressive and cruel measures to crush Filipino resistance. Eventually, the Army's adoption of widespread torture and population reconcentration broke Filipino resis­ tance and led to the decision by nationalist leaders to accept colonial gov­ ernment. While the anti-imperialist view is the most popularly accepted view of the Philippine War, and the one taught in the majority of university- level American history texts, it has serious weaknesses. At the present time no anti-imperialist historian has consulted the essential Army or Filipino primary sources. Instead, they have based most of their conclusions on contemporary anti-imperialist newspapers and on a few selected atrocity trials. The result has been scholarship which, while entertaining reading, is filled with factual errors and interpretive flaws.2 Within the field of Philippine history, attention has focused less on the conduct of the war than on the roles of various interest groups and their interaction with the American authorities. Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Renato Constantino argue that the guerrilla war represented an internal class war in which the Filipino educated elite, or iUustrados, collaborated with the Americans, while the common people, or taos, supported the "revolution." Neither Agoncillo nor Constantino has presented documentary evidence to support his conclusions.^ Their interpretation has been challenged by Jane S. Ragsdale, who used primary sources in the Philippine Insurgent Records (PIR) to demonstrate that the the Filipino elite was torn between resis­ tance and accommodation.'^ Renal do C. Ileto has recently revised the Agoncillo-Constantino thesis and asserts that the Filipino populace sought to find a new utopia after independence. By using extensive literary criti­ cism of the popular native payson poems, Ileto believes it is possible to determine the revolutionary sentiments of the Filipino "masses.'^ Milagros C. Guerrero, utilizing the PIR and U.S. Army material as sources, asserts that the inability of Aguinaldo's nationalist government to harness the revolutionary potential of the masses prevented effective resistance to American colonial rule. Guerrero argues that Filipino politicians used their official positioi'.s to confirm their own social and economic power and ignored much needed social reforms. In doing so, the nationalists destroyed their initial popular support and fragmented Filipino resistance.^ Taking a different approach, John N. Schumacher argues that the Filipino clergy were a key element in mobilizing revolutionary support among the populace. Schumacher utilized church records. Army sources, and the PIR to demonstrate both the guerrillas' reliance on the clergy and the Army's attempts to break these ties.^ A significant break with the PhiHppinista fascination with social class structures and influences has been provided by Glenn A. May. Drawing comparisons with the Vietnam War, May argues that a key factor in the defeat of the Filipino guerrillas was the world balance of power in 1900. May criticizes the Filipino nationalist leaders and argues that the Fi lipino armed forces received only lukewarm support from the masses. May is one of the foremost scholars of the Filipino resistance in southwestern Luzon, and his work is excellent on the Filipino aspects of the guerrilla war. His work is weakened, however, by his failure to examine the Army's pacifica­ tion programs or counter insurgency policies with the same attention he devotes to the Filipinos side. Moreover, while he makes some telling criticisms of other studies, he does not provide a reinterpretation of the Philippine War.® These broad interpretations have been challenged by Philippine his­ torians who have studied the effects of the war in individual provinces on the island of Luzon. The regional historians have relied on a variety of source material, especially local and provincial records, personal papers, the PIR, U.S. Army records, and personal interviews. John A. Larkin, who studied the war in the central Luzon province of Pampanga, concluded that. “the Pampangans willingly collaborated with the government that promised them the most peace and order."^ Glenn A. May's own study of the guerrilla war in Batangas province determined that resistance was conditioned by unique local factors. In Batangas, a combination of Tagalog unity, good leadership, and elite participation contributed to a prolonged guerrilla war. 10 Norman Owen's analysis of the war in Albay province indicates that the area was not viewed as crucial by either the American high command or the local guerrilla leadership. While popular resistance was initially fierce, it was worn down by American military superiority, social reforms, insur­ gent weakness, and war weariness. Owen maintains that Albayano accom­ modation to American authority was achieved by "progressive shifts from resistance to collaboration "11 The historiographical impact of these regional historians is substantial, for, as John Schumacher has pointed out, they have shown conclusively that "the Revolution had different causes, different effects, and a different character in different regions of the

Philippines, thus undercutting monolithic generalizations."!2 On the American side some of the earliest military analyses of the Filipino guerrilla war were provided by the military commanders who served in the Philippines. To Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis, the guerrillas were little more than roving bands of /adronss, or outlaws, encouraged by a small group of revolutionaries. Otis believed that when the Filipinos saw the benevolence of American intentions they would join with the Army and these bands would soon be hunted down. 13 Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, who commanded in the final phase of the war, believed that the key problem was separating the population from the guerrillas. He discounted guerrilla popular support and believed that most Filipinos wished for peace. At the same time, he argued that "the well disposed are completely terrorized and dare not aid the troops with information, nor can they resist contributions of supplies when demanded." The most complex interpretation of the guerrilla war was developed by Maj. Gen. Arthur Mac Arthur, who commanded all Army forces in the Philippines during the height of the guerrilla war. MacArthur believed that following the defeat of their conventional forces in 1899 the Filipino revolutionary leadership had decided to continue their resistance through guerrilla warfare. In addition to forming guerrilla bands, the fnsurrectos had organized shadow governments which paralleled the native municipal governments established by the Army. While ostensibly serving the Ameri­ cans, the towns were in fact "secure places of refuge" where the guerrillas could be sheltered and supplied. MacArthur believed that the Philippine system "depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population," a factor he attributed to terrorism and "ethnological homoge­ neity." The Americans finally prevailed against this warfare because Mac­ Arthur turned U.S. counter insurgency efforts against the towns and enforced those laws of war which dealt with aiding the enemy and terrorism.*5 The views of these U.S. Army commanders reflect the situation in the Philippines at the time they commanded. Otis, who left before the magni­ tude of the guerrilla war was apparent, dismissed it as post-war disorder. MacArthur viewed it as a popular people's war and credited his policies with ultimately defeating it. Chaffee believed that the war was almost over and required only rigorous campaigns in the last recalcitrant provinces. While 8

MacArthur's interpretation provides an attractive and logicial model of Filipino guerrilla warfare, there are indications he based most of it on a report of conditions in Union province. It is not an accurate model of condi­ tions throughout the Philippines. Moreover, all three generals were writing to justify their administrations; hence their reports must be treated with some caution. Within the field of American military history, the first study of the Philippine War was written by John R. M. Taylor. As an Army intelligence officer charged with collecting and translating captured guerrilla docu­ ments, Taylor was in an excellent position to analyze the Filipino guerrilla war. His work is invaluable as a source on guerrilla policy, tactics, and methods while his compilation of key documents provides access to vital primary sources. Unfortunately, Taylor's work is often biased against the Filipinos and was suppressed by the Taft administration as too controver­ sial for publication. Moreover, Taylor was not a trained historian and his interpretation is weakened by his contradictory explanations and his failure to examine the U.S. Army's role in the provinces. Until comparatively recently, Taylor was virtually the only writer who had studied the military aspects of the guerrilla war. One exception was William T. Sexton, another Army officer, who was primarily concerned with the American conventional operations in 1898 and 1899.1? it was not until the United States was engaged in another guerrilla war in Southeast Asia that interest in the Philippine War resurfaced. John M. Gates provided the major military historical re interprétât ion on Army pacification. Utlizing the extensive military correspondence in the Adjutant General's records (Record Group 94) as well as the PIR, Gates traced the outlines of American military policy in the Philippines. In a reasoned attack on the anti-imperialist position, Gates argued that the .Army combined progressive reforms and a benevolent policy with effective military measures to structure a uniform counterinsurgency program that was both practical and humane. 18 Gates' pioneering work has been criticized by several subsequent scholars. Virginia Mulrooney has questioned both the sincerity and the effectiveness of Army social reforms, while Stuart C. Miller has unfairly dismissed Gates' work as a "whitewash. "19 Glenn May has pointed out that Gates overlooks the "underside " of the war in his treatment of the Batangas campaign, and May believes that benevolence played a minor role in Army pacification.20 Gates also overemphased the non-military aspects of paci­ fication and did not study Army combat operations in the provinces. The cataloguing of key U.S. Army operational records was not complete at the time he was engaged in research. As a result, Gates was forced to rely primarily on sources that reflected the views and policies of the Army high command in Manila. He was unable to find comparable documentation on whether these policies were implemented by the officers actively engaged in fighting the guerrillas. Gates" work is thus reliable on what Army headquarters established as pacification policies, but it does not study Army pacification in the field. This examination of the historiography of the guerrilla war indicates that there is an essential aspect of the Philippine War missing in most of the major historical interpretations. A key factor is that anti-imperialist, 10 imperialist, Philippine, and military historians have all sought monolithic interpretations for what regional historians have demonstrated was a local guerrilla war. They have all accepted the conclusion of John Taylor that "it is not possible, nor would it be worthwhile, to attempt to describe the course of guerrilla warfare in every province of the archipelago. What took place in one was much like what took place in another.“2i Despite evidence that American forces faced a variety of regional antagonists rather than a united enemy, no scholar has yet drawn the obvious conclusion that the U.S. Army may have adapted its counter insurgency policies and operations to the conditions existing in each separate region. This dissertation is an attempt to bridge this current historiogra­ phical gap by examining the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency campaigns in four districts on the island of Luzon between 1900 and 1902. These districts are:

1. First District, Department of Northern Luzon. This comprises the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Bontoc, I locos Norte, llocos Sur, and Union.

2. Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon. This com­ prises the provinces of Nueva Ecija and Principe. 3. Third District, Department of Southern Luzon. This comprises the provinces of Albay, Ambos Camarines, and Sorsogan.

4. Second District, Department of Southern Luzon. This com­ prises the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas.

These military districts, created by the Army between early 1900 and late 1901, were the highest Army organizational level at which both regional differences and operational similarities are discernable. It was at the 11 district headquarters that intelligence was gathered, expeditions coordi­ nated, and pacification policies developed. Examining the Army's pacifica­ tion of the Philippines at the district level offers an opportunity to test the views of imperialist, anti-imperialist, Philippine, and military historians. It may serve to explain the reasons behind the U.S. Army's early successes in some provinces and the long wars that occurred in other areas. It provides an ideal ground for examining U.S. troop conduct, Filipino guerrilla warfare, and Army tactics and doctrine in the field. Finally, it gives the researcher a chance to examine how U.S. Army counter insurgency policies from Manila were adapted or altered to fit local circumstances. The four districts chosen were selected primarily on historical, ethnological, and geographical criteria. Historically they include some of the more controversial areas of the war such as Batangas, Tayabas, and northwestern Luzon. They also include some of the more famous, or infa­ mous, personalities, such as Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, and Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles. The selection also takes into account some provinces that were pacified as early as 1900 and others than were not pacified until 1902. They include one district where the population is primarily Tagalog, one district where it is Bicol, and one where the populace is llocano, as well as a district where no one ethnic group dominated. Finally, these districts are all relatively isolated from each other and so may be studied as distinct entitites. In analyzing the Army's counter insurgency in these four districts I will concentrate on both military and non-military aspects of pacification. I will look first at the origins of the Philippine War and its early 12 conventional operations. I will also examine the basic outlines of American military policy in the Philippines and the origins of Filipino guerrilla resis­ tance. I will then turn to the war in the individual districts One of the first tasks will be to establish the leadership, strength, policies, and tac­ tics of the guerrilla opposition. I will also study initial U.S. Army perceptions of the war in each district and the ecrly attempts to implement counter insurgency policies. I will concentrate especially on the estab­ lishment of civil government, native police forces, native scouts and auxiliaries, and local intelligence networks. In addition, I will study U.S. Army military operations and their effect on the Filipino guerrillas and populace. In each district I will examine whether U.S. Army counterinsur­ gency policy changed or altered to counter the local guerrilla warfare. The most important source of material for my dissertation are the Records of the U.S. Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942 (Record Group 395) at the National Archives in Washington. This record group contains reports on nearly all aspects of the Army's activities in the Philippines. These range from the activities of small garrisons to divi­ sional headquarters and cover such topics as operations, intelligence, civil government, native scouts, and social reform activities. While Philippine historians such as Guerrero, May, and Shumacher have used some of this material, military historians have yet to study it. Unfortunately, there are substantial gaps in Record Group 395. Per­ haps most serious is the loss of most of the records from the Division of the Philippines during World War II. As a result, there is only fragmentary documentation on the formation of Army policies and decision making at the 13 divisional or departmental level. This in turn means that it is impossible to know exactly what material was available to Otis, MacArthur, and Chaffee or to the departmental commanders such as Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, Maj. Gen. John C. Bates, and Maj. Gen. James F. Wade. The annual reports of these offices, which appear in the annual War Department reports, and the collec­ ted correspondence give only fragmentary information.22 In addition to Record Group 395, the other primary sources I used were the Records of the Adjutant General's Office (Record Group 94) and the Philippine Insurgent Records. Record Group 94 provided the correspondence (series 117) and regimental histories (series 187) of the U.S. Volunteer Infantry regiments. It. also contains the individual records of specific officers, investigations into alleged atrocities, and an invaluable inquiry on the guerrilla war in southwestern Luzon. The PIR are primarily captured fnsurrecto documents. They are disorganized and often unintelligible, but they do provide an invaluable source of information about the guerrillas' leadership, policies, and organization. Besides these three sources I also examined the Records of U.S. Army Mobile Units, 1821 -1942 (Record Group 391), the Records of the Office of the Inspector General (Record Group 159), the Records of the Judge Advocate General (Record Group 153), and the Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (Record Group 350). I also consul­ ted numerous veterans' personal papers at the Library of Congress, the United States Army Military History Institute, and state and university archives. These diaries, letters, and questionnaires provide information on both the reaction of U.S. soldiers to local guerrilla warfare and the develop­ ment of pacification policies adapted to local conditions. 14

In an attempt to show the chronological progression of the regional war I have charted both the number of engagements and U.S. casualties in each district. I have charted only those incidents in which Army forces were in active combat with the guerrillas and not those incidents in which the Army destroyed property or rounded up suspects without resistance. This data provides a useful illustration of actual level of fighting in an area. V/hile these charts present an overview of the ebb and flow of the guerrilla war, they should be used with some caution. Most of the statis­ tical material was obtained from the district and departmental reports which were sent to the War Department and published in the annual reports. This represents only a partial and rather inaccurate chronological listing of all the engagements, casualties, and captures of the U.S. Army in the Philip­ pines. Many of these reports fail to specify the place, province, unit, or day in which the engagement occurred. Some districts suffered from such poor communications that operation reports were almost a year late. In other districts the Army forces commonly went in pursuit of guerrillas outside of their provincial or district boundaries and cooperated with other U.S. Army commands. In order to avoid duplication or omission, I have compared these statistics both to other War Department statistics and to regimental reports wherever possible. Within these limitations, I believe that the engagement charts provide a clear indication of the regional nature of the Philippine War. Throughout this dissertation I have made decisions on titles and names which require some explanation. The title Philippine War refers to the period between 4 February 1899 and 4 July 1902 when active military hostilities existed between the U.S. Army and Filipino nationalist guerrillas. The title Philippine War has been chosen because more accepted titles such as the Philippine Insurrection, Philippine-American War, and Filipino- American War are unsatisfactory. The Philippine Insurrection suggests an rebellion against a constituted authority when in fact the war broke out before the United States exercised sovereignty in the Philippines. The Philippine-American War and Filipino-American War suggest a war between two duly constituted governments or two peoples, neither of which is applicable. In an effort to avoid confusion I have retained the spelling of Filipino personal and place names used by the Army in their reports. This has probably led to some inaccuracies in spelling—in 1902 one exasperated officer complained that ninety percent of all Filipino names on Army reports were misspelled or incorrect.24 However, it seems less confusing than editing Army reports to conform to modern usage. I have also used the con­ temporary Army terms fnsurrecto and “insurgent" as synonymous with Filipino nationalist guerrillas. These terms should not be seen as an attempt to denigrate the guerrillas. This dissertation offers a substantial revision of the previous interpretations of the Philippine War. It argues that Filipino resistance to American occupation was primarily localized, disunited, and varied greatly from region to region. In some areas the insurrectos had great popular support and succeeded in waging a prolonged war, but in other areas the guerrillas were neither popular nor effective. Faced with a resistance that was primarily regionalized. Army officers in the field developed their own counter insurgency policies to deal with the specific circumstances in their 16 areas. U.S. Army pacification throughout the Philippine War was thus char­ acterized by flexibility and innovation and not by a rigidly structured pacification policy. By allowing officers in different regions to adapt to the conditions they found, the Army was able to defeat a localized guerrilla war. NOTES

’ Daniel P. Barrows, History of the Philippines (New York: World Book Co., 1926); James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, 2 vol. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914); Dean C. Worcester, The Philip­ pines Past and Present (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930); W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1928); Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merril Co., 1917).

2 Moorefild Storey and Marcial Lichauco, The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1926); Stuart C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philip­ pines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); David H. Bain, Sitting in Darkness: Americans in the Philippines (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1984); Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday and Co., 1961). For an indication of how the anti-imperialist view has been accepted by university level American history textbooks see Keith 1. Palakoff, Norman Rosenberg, Giania Bolton, Ronald Story, Jordan Schwarz, Generations of Americans: A History of the United States, part 2 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. SOI; Stephan Thernstrom, A History of the American People vol. 2: Since 1865 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), p. 505; Richard N. Current and Gerald J. Goodwin, A History of the United States Since 1865 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 591; Mary Beth Norton, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas 6. Patterson. William Tuttle, Jr., A People and a Nation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982), p. 627; Winthrop D. Jordan, Leon F. Litwack, Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, Daniel Aaron, The United States, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), pp. 539-42.

17 18

3 Teodoro Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses (Quezon City, P.I.: Univer­ sity of the Philippines Press, 1956); Teodoro Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City, P.I.: University of the Philippines Press, 1960); Renato Constantino, A History of the Philippines (New York: Monthly Press, 1975); Connsorcia L. Donovan, "The Philippine Revolution: A ‘Decolonized’ Version" (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont University, 1976).

4 Jane 5. Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1974). See also David J. Steinberg, "An Ambiguous Legacy: Years of War in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs 45 ( 1972): 167-79; Michael H. Hunt, "Resistance and Collaboration in the Amerian Empire, 1898-1903: An Overview, Pacific Historical Review 48 (November 1979):467-71.

5 Renaldo C. Ileto, Payson and Revolution: Popular Movements In the Philippines. 1840-1900 (Quezon City, P.I.: Ateneo de Manila Univer­ sity Press, 1979). For criticisms of lleto’s approach, see Milagros C. Guerrero, "Understanding Philippine Revolutionary Mentality," Philippine Studies 29(1981 ):240-56; John N. Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," Philippine Studies 30 ( 1982):445-92. For a different perspective on Filipino popular revolts see David R. Sturtevant, Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976).

6 Milagros C. Guerrero, "Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898-1902" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1977).

7 John Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement, 1850-1903 (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1981).

8 Glenn A. May, "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902," Pacific Historical Review 52 (November 1983):353-77.

9 John A. Larkin, The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 127. 19

10 Glenn A. May, "Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas, 1399- 1902," Pacific Historical Review 48 (November 1979):531 -556.

11 Norman Owen, "Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903, Pacific Historical Review 48 (November 1979):557-89, quotation from p. 557.

12 Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives," p. 445.

13 "Report of Major-General E. 5. Otis, U.S. Army, Commanding the Divisiion of the Philippines and Military Governor of the Philippine Islands" M l 1900 1:4:560-1 [hereafter cited as "Otis 1900"].

14 “Annual Report of Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U.S. Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines, and Military Governor of the Philippine Islands," M l 1901 1:7:7-12 [hereafter cited as "Chaffee 1901"]; "Report of Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U.S. Army, Commanding the Division of the Philippines, M l 1902 1:8:186-206 [hereafter cited as "Chaffee 1902"]. The quotation is from "Chaffee 1901," M l 1901 1:7:8.

15 "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U.S.V., Commanding Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands," M l 1900 1:5:59-72 [hereafter cited as "MacArthur 1900"]; "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U.S.V., Commanding Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands," M l 1901 1:4:88-114 [hereafter cited as "MacArthur 1901 "]. The quotations are from "MacArthur 1900," M l 1900 1:5:61.

16 John R. M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction (Washington: 1906) [hereafter cited as Taylor, History!. For comments on Taylor's work, see John T. Farrell, "An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R. M. Taylor and the Philippine Insurgent Records," The Catholic Historical Review 39 (January 1954):385-407; John M. Gates, ed., "James M. LeRoy's Critique of John R. M. Taylor's The Philippine insurrection Against the United States (n.p., n.d.).

17 William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1939). 20

> 8 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973); John M. Gates, "The Pacification of the Philippines, 1898-1902," Ib& American Military and the Far East, Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980):79-9I.

19 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p. 277; Virginia Mulrooney, "No Victor, No Vanquished: United States Military Government in the Philippine Islands, 1898-1901" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of California at Los Angeles, 1975).

20 Glenn A. May, "Private Presher and Sergeant Vergara: The Underside of the Philippine-American War," Peter Stanley, ed.. Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 56; May, "Philippine- American War," pp. 360-1.

21 Taylor, HistflEy, p. 27H5

22 U.S. Army, Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain and Conditions Growing out of the Same including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition. B.e.tween .the Adjutant .G.eneral..of t he Army.and Milita ry Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands from April 15, 1898 to July 50, 1902, 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902) [hereafter referred to as CWSl.

23 Maj. Gen. George W. Davis to All Station Commanders, 11 January 1902, RG 395, series 3287, Calamba, Lag., Letters Received, 1901-6 [here­ after cited as 395/3287], RG 395, Records of U.S. Army Overseas Operations and Comands, 1898-1942, National Archives, Washington, D.C. CHAPTER ONE;

THE PHILIPPINE WAR

In the early hours of May 1,1898, within a few days of the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Admiral George Dewey pounded the obsoles­ cent Spanish fleet into submission at Manila Bay. Dewey's triumph touched off a wave of national rejoicing in the United States among a population which would have been hard pressed to locate the Philippines on a map. While wags would later suggest that it would have been better had Dewey simply sailed way, the admiral immediately began to consider how best toexploit his victory. The Battle of Manila Bay had made the United States supreme in the archipelago’s waters, but a Spanish army prevented Dewey from taking immediate possession of the islands. Certain that the capital city of Manila could be easily taken, Dewey asked for a small U.S. Army expeditionary force to occupy the city. The admiral's request was favorably received in Washington, where Dewey's victory was a welcome respite from the scandals attending preparations for the Cuban campaign. U.S. Army and state volunteer units were suddenly ordered to concentrate at San Francisco for overseas service. The seeds of the U.S. Army's half-century involve­ ment in the Philippines were planted inadvertantly as the government

21 22

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0 C» £ L £ B e S S £ 23 rushed to take advantage of the opportun'Ly offered By Dewey s victory. The 1898 Army expedition to the Philippines established a precedent for later confusion over Army policy and goals in the Philippine War. The expedition's commander, Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, was assigned 20,000 troops on May 12 but not told if it was McKinley's "desire to subdue all of the Spanish territory in the islands, or merely to seize and hold the capital. Merritt's superior, Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, believed that the purpose of the expedition was only to occupy the harbor and city of Manila. Although President William McKinley's early intentions towards the Philippines are uncertain it is probable that he saw them as a bargaining counter to force peace with Spain on the issue of Cuba. A U.S. Army expedi­ tion to Manila offered a military opportunity to strike at the Spanish in the Pacific with relative impunity.2 Despite his own uncertainty on the retention of the Philippines, McKinley's May 19 instructions to Merritt established a basis for American governorship of the islands. McKinley defined the purpose of Merritt's force as "to give order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States." The Filipinos were be made aware that the Americans came to protect them and the American occupation was to "be as free from severity as possible." Yet at the same time, the Army's military powers were "absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants." The expedition's commander had a right to levy taxation, seize private property necessary for military purposes, and control the ports. Moreover, the ordinary law of the land was to be administered only by those who recognized the authority of the United 24

States. If McKinley did not intend to extend American control over the Philippines at that time, his orders certainly provided the U.S. Army with the basis for a colonial government.^ The archipelago that the Americans were about to occupy consisted of some 3,000 islands with a total area of 115,026 square miles and a popu­ lation of seven million people. The largest and most important island was Luzon, some 530 miles long and with an area of 40,420 square miles, over half the population, and the location of the capital city of Manila. Luzon was divided by geography into several virtually separate regions with unique terrain, economies, and societies. The terrain ranged from jagged mountains to flooded rice paddies and from impenetrable abaca groves to impassable swamps. Within the island were five major linguistic groups including the Tagalogs, who provided the majority of the Philippine revolu­ tionary leadership against both the Spanish and Americans. The population itself ranged from headhunting Igorrotes to urbane Manileros, but it was primarily composed of poor agricultural workers. The climate was tropical, with a monsoon season that extended in most of the island from June to September. Tropical diseases, especially malaria, dengue fever, and dysentery were common, especially in the rainy months. As subsequent westernized armies have discovered, Luzon's terrain and climate made it almost as much an adversary as any human enemy.'^ The Philippines had been a Spanish colony since 1572, but for many centuries the attention of the Spanish administration was turned more towards oceanic trade than the internal development of the colony. As John L. Phelan has noted, the Hispanicization of the Philippines was a long and 25 incomplete process in which there was a great deal of Filipinization of Spanish government and culture. In the provinces outside of Manila the Spanish ruled through the local elite, who were confirmed in their power in return for their subordination to Spanish authority. This elite, often refer­ red to as the principalià, or principal citizens, filled the lower political offices and served as intermediaries between the far-away government in Manila and the local populace. In addition to the principaliâ, the Spanish relied on the Spanish friars, who were given large tracts of land to support their missionary efforts in the Philippines. In the late eighteenth century the development of an export economy placed the interests of Filipino land­ owners in increasing conflict with the friars and the Spanish government. In the mid-nineteenth century a Filipino reform movement emerged determined to secure a more equitable arrangement of both political and economic power. Educated Filipinos exposed to European liberal and nation­ alist ideas ( ii/ustrados) sought limited reforms within the context of the Spanish imperial system. Broadly speaking, they wanted to curb the power of the religious orders, open up official positions to qualified Filipinos, exclude the Chinese, and be granted the political authority their education entitled them to. These men were supported by provincial landowners who wished to consolidate their political and economic power in the countryside without outside interference. The elitist background of the ii/ustrados made them unwilling to advocate radical social or economic reforms and they had support among conservative Filipinos. The Spanish government responded to this mild reform movement with enough brutality to give it martyrs but not enough to crush it.5 26

In the last decade of the century the focus of resistance shifted to the more popular-based "Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country," or Katipunan society. Founded by Andres Bonifacio, the exact nature, ideology, and composition of this society are still the subject of a lively scholarly debate. Combining Christian ideals with secret society rituals, Bonifacio's Katipunan sought independence from Spain and sanctioned armed rebellion. While the society grew rapidly in the Tagalog region near Manila it is probable that different Katfpunans shared only the most basic common ideology. Certainly it possessed neither the cellular organization, the rigid discipline, nor the coherent program that have dis­ tinguished more recent revolutionary parties.^ In August 1896 the Katipunan was compromised when the society's plans were betrayed to government authorities. With the Spanish searching for him, Bonifacio fled Manila, and on August 22 he issued the "Grito de Balintawak," which marked the official beginning of the revolt against Spain. While there were sympathetic or KatipunartvQ\z\.^(\ outbreaks in the Tagalog regions, resistance to the Spanish was disorganized and frag­ mented. Many Filipinos outside the Tagalog region opposed the independence movement and supported the Spanish. Spanish and native volunteers were brought in to fight against the Katipunerosov hunt down suspected rebels in their own provinces. By April the Katipunan forces were driven out of Cavite and into the mountains of Bulacar. province. Under the strain of these defeats, Bonifacio's leadership in the Katipunan was challenged by Emilio Aguinaldo, a twenty-seven year old Tagalog from Kawit, Cavite. Aguinaldo had joined the Katipunan in 1895 and 27 had used his position as a civic official to recruit and organize a substantial Katipunan group in Cavite. Aguinaldo's success in the field led him to assume the title of general within a week after the revolt had started. Commanding a powerful Caviteano faction, Aguinaldo soon wielded as much influence as Bonifacio. Bonifacio's own weakness as a military commander and the split between Cavite and Manila factions led to his being deposed as Katipunan leader by Aguinaldo's faction. When the furious Bonifacio refused to accept this demotion he was arrested, given a summary trial, and shot. While Bonifacio's execution left Aguinaldo free to take control of the Filipino independence movement, it created a bitter legacy among Filipinos who wished Bonifacio's social reforms implemented.? In the mountains of Bulacan, Aguinaldo organized a revolutionary government with himself as president and continued a sporadic guerrilla war. By the fall of 1897 the Spanish had isolated Aguinaldo's forces around Biac na bato but were facing increasing insurgency in other provinces. Unwilling to launch an expensive and bloody campaign against Aguinaldo, the Spanish tried to co-opt the Revolution by buying off the revolutionaries. After extended negotiations the Pact of Biac na bato was concluded in December 1897. Aguinaldo and some of his followers left for Hong Kong with $400,000 and the alleged verbal promise by the Spanish to pay an indemnity to injured Filipinos and institute reforms.^ Aguinaldo's departure did not end Filipino resistance to the Spanish and he became a symbol for Filipino nationalist aspirations. Throughout Luzon there were new outbreaks that were often only slightly related to the original Katipunan revolt. Some were provoked by sectional disputes. 28

others by the brutal and lawless behavior of reactionary volunteers, and others were the work of small bands of nationalists. The American victory at Manila Bay and Spanish attempts to enlist Filipinos against the United States sparked more provincial turmoil. Suspicious of their native troops, and with much of their manpower bottled up in Manila, the Spanish garrisons offered little resistance to the native insurrectos. By the end of 1898 military power in the provinces was in the hands of regional Filipino forces, most of whom recognized Aguinaldo's authority in principle, if not in prac­ tice. The return of the exiled rebel on May 12 gave these regional revolts a national leadership. Declaring himself dictator, Aguinaldo gathered an army in front of Manila and declared the independence of the Philippines on June 12.9 From the beginning, relations between American military leaders and the Philippine insurrectos were strained. Because McKinley had not declared what American intentions were towards the Philippines, American commanders lacked a clear idea of what policy to pursue towards the Fili­ pinos. The insurrectos were also uncertain of how to treat the American invaders. With the Spanish still controlling Manila they did not wish to antagonize a potentially valuable ally in the United States. At the same time, they had no wish to trade one master for another. In such a situation, misunderstandings were bound to arise. Emilio Aguinaldo would later claim that some Americans had promised him the independence of the Philippines as the reward for his cooperation. Although there is no documentary evidence to support Aguinaldo's contentions, they were widely believed and contributed to much distrust between Americans and Filipinos. 10 29

The siege of Manila became two separate campaigns with both Americans and insurrectos conducting their own operations while osten­ sibly cooperating. The Republican Army, described by Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Anderson as a "bush-whacking force of brave and adventurous men, but of very loose organization, " was unable to capture the city by itself.The Americans, while able to attack the city, could not capture the city without the insurrectos joining the assault. The Spanish commander solved the dilemma by agreeing to surrender to the Americans if they kept the Filipino revolutionaries out. After brief battle, Manila was occupied by the United States on August 13. The Army then moved quickly to deny Aguinaldo s forces access to the town. While they waited for the final diplomatic deposition of the archipelago, the Army set to work reforming Manila"s municipal government.'2 The American occupation of Manila soured the already poor relations between Aguinaldo s revolutionaries and the Army. The Filipinos were understandably outraged that the Americans refused to let them occupy their capital city. Aguinaldo s hold on his army, never strong, was compro­ mised by the apparent American betrayal. Some of the Filipino commanders urged immediate war. The inflammatory situation was exacerbated by the poor diplomacy of the American commander, Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis. Otis had little respect for the insurrecto forces and was overly influenced in his view of the situation by wealthy Filipinos hostile to any change in the social order. While he was instructed to avoid any armed struggle with the revolutionary forces, Otis made little attempt to conciliate the revolutionaries or to soothe their feelings. 30

Yet even had the Army been served by an excellent diplomat, It is doubtful that an armed struggle could have been avoided. By the time of Manila's occupation, McKinley was convinced that the Filipinos were incapa­ ble of self government and that the United States had a moral obligation to provide order to the archipelago. He thus insisted that Spain cede the Phil­ ippines to the United States as part of the Treaty of Paris. The president's decision to annex the Philippines and his December 21, 1898, policy of "benevolent assimilation" made it clear that the United States intended to occupy the Philippines and establish a colonial government. 13 There was no middle ground between McKinley's policy and the insurrecto demand for independence. By the time actual hostilities broke out on February 4, 1899, both sides were preparing for a military resolution of the issue. In the operations following the outbreak of hostilities the U.S. Army quickly established its military superiority over the Filipino nationalist forces. American forces pushed out of Manila and inflicted terrible casual­ ties on the ill-trained Republican Army. This military superiority was to continue throughout the Philippine War. The U.S. Army's marksmanship, tactical ability, and mobility were never successfully countered by the poorly armed and undisciplined Filipinos. As a result, when the Americans could close with the insurrectos, the Filipinos were forced to fall back, scatter, and regroup, or take prohibitive casualties. The Republican Army's entrenchments were "beautifully made and wretchedly defended," and the Americans soon found that flanking attacks could rout the Filipinos. These tactical successes, however, did not lead to the defeat of the Republican forces. The Americans lacked the manpower to occupy the areas they 31 coriquered and when they withdrew the Filipinos would reoccupy their entrenchments, necessitating another attack. As a result, the early

American operations did little but clear the areas around Manila.is The U.S. Army that won these initial victories in the Philippines was a makeshift organization hastily thrown together for the expedition to Manila. Numbering about 30,000, it was predominantly composed of state volunteers whose military obligations ended with the end of the Spanish- American War. The state volunteers were retained in the Philippines until the fall of 1899 while a new force was quickly raised in the United States. Under the provisions of the Army Bill of 2 March 1899 the regular establish­ ment of the United States Army was placed at 65,000 men. This brought the infantry and cavalry regiments in the regular U.S. Army establishment to their full war time strength. In addition, a special force of 35,000 U.S. Volunteers was raised for service in the Philippines. These volunteer units were a temporary force and were only authorized until July 1, 1901. Despite later anti-imperialist claims, the U.S. Army that served in the Philippines between 1900 and 1902 was one of the finest ever raised by the United States. The regular Army was a commanded by experienced professional officers and including many veterans of the Cuban, Puerto Rican, or earlier Philippine campaigns. The U.S. Volunteers, twenty-five infantry and one cavalry regiment, began recruiting in July 1899 and by November several were in combat in the Philippines. These regiments were led by regular and state volunteer officers who had distinguished them­ selves in the Spanish-American War. Many of the enlisted men also had prior service. In both regulars and volunteers the examination standards 32 were extremely rigorous and the training thorough. The men arrived in the archipelago in the fall of 1900 well versed in the skirmishing tactics and marksmanship necessary to fight a guerrilla w a r . 16 The Philippine Republic was unable to establish a government or an army strong enough to counter the U.S. Army. The Americans captured the capital city of Malolos in the spring of 1899 and subsequent governments were under the constant threat of attack. Factional politics also weakened the government at the center, while provincial powers weakened it at the extremities. Conservative Filipinos feared the political and social turmoil unleashed by the Revolution, while religious and ethnic groups found their corporate rights violated by the new government. Composed of Filipinos from the elite social classes, the Republic avoided any meaningful social or economic reform and confirmed many oppressive practices. The Republican Army was also factionalized and its generals undisciplined and insubor­ dinate. Aguinaldo's private bodyguard assassinated his leading general, Antonio Luna, while his soldiers often preyed upon defenseless civilians. As a result, the insurrectos never developed a strong mass base and faced the Americans internally divided and with a disobedient and disorganized army. 17 The arrival of the new regular and volunteer units in the fall of 1900 allowed Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis to plan operations that would not only defeat the revolutionary forces but allow the Army to occupy territory. Otis planned to finish the Philippine War quickly through two major offen­ sives in Luzon and amphibious operations in southeastern Luzon and the islands to the south. By sweeping up central Luzon, the Army would capture 33 the Republican leadership and scatter its army. After defeating any remaining forces in the Tagalog provinces south of Manila, the rest of the Philippines would be occupied immediately. Otis assumed that with the Republic's conventional military forces defeated, the majority of Filipinos would welcome the Americans as deliverers from Tagalog despotism. The U.S. Army could then garrison the archipelago with little resistance and institute the beginnings of colonial government and benevolent assimilation. In November 1899, the Americans went on the offensive in a three­ pronged drive directed at the Filipino forces in the north. While Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur pinned down the Filipinos on the central Luzon plain, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton swept to the right and occupied the mountain passes, preventing any insurgent retreat to the east. The Filipinos fell back to the north, only to have their retreat cut off by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton's amphi­ bious landing at Lingayen Gulf. Caught between the converging American forces, with their lines of retreat blocked, the Republican Army broke up. The insurrectos lost much of their supplies and correspondence and some of the most prominent Filipino leaders were killed, captured, or surrendered. Aguinaldo himself narrowly escaped the pursuing Americans, losing his family, treasury, bodyguard, and much of his staff in the retreat. By December 1900 the U.S. Army, exhausted and disorganized from its headlong pursuit, occupied most of the populated areas north of Manila. 18 With northern Luzon conquered, Otis turned to the south. In January 1900 expeditions under Wheaton and Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan marched into the Tagalog provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. After some early engagements, the revolutionary forces disappeared and Army units 34 occupied the Tagalog provinces with little further resistance.19 shortly after, an amphibious force under Brig. Gen. William Kobbé landed in Albay and Sorsogan provinces on the southeastern coast of Luzon. The Amricans faced stiff initial opposition, but once the landings were secured the insurrectos retreated into the mountains with much of the population.20 The final step in Otis' Luzon campaign was taken in February, when another amphibious force under Brig. Gen. James M. Bell landed in the neighboring Camarines provinces and occupied the area around Nueva Caceras.2i The destruction of the Philippine organized forces removed visible resistance to American occupation and left the cause of Filipino indepen­ dence apparently defeated. Yet the war had actually entered a new and far more frustrating phase. On November 13, 1899, as the Northern Expedition swept aside the Philippine government, Aguinaldo decided to abandon conventional tactics and turn to guerrilla warfare. Dividing Luzon up into three politico-military commands, he kept northern Luzon open for himself and placed Maj. Gen. Mariano Trias and Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia over southern and central Luzon respectively. In these three new zones flying columns and guerrilla bands would continue the war for Philippine indepen­ dence. Aguinaldo may have envisioned retaining personal control over guerrilla strategy and operations but his own flight from the Americans prevented this. Isolated in northeastern Luzon, the president ceased to be a major factor in the direction of the Philippine War. The guerrilla war was fought by regional chiefs and provincial commanders and "Aguinaldo's orders were not obeyed by his subordinates unless they considered it expedient to do so'22 35

The new guerrilla strategy was to protract the war until either the U.S. Army broke down from disease and exhaustion or the .American public demanded a withdrawal. Instructions by guerrilla commanders to their units emphasized the use of small forces which could strike and then dis­ perse, regrouping later at some prearranged rendezvous. Guerrillas were to fight only when they had overwhelming superiority and to rely on skir­ mishes, raids, and ambushes.23 The insurgents sought political as well as military gains. By prolonging the war, they sought to cause a Democratic victory in the 1900 American presidential elections.24 The Filipinos had always relied on irregular units working in conjuntion with their army; now they made these irregular units the basis of their military forces. In some areas Filipino conventional forces simply put on civilian clothing and began to ambush convoys and stragglers. In other areas there was no activity for months while the Republican soldiers disbanded and returned home to reorganize. In some areas there was an attempt to establish a new Katipunan and to use it as the basis of a revolutionary organization. By April 1900 Army garrisons in nearly all areas of the archipelago faced this newly reorganized guerrilla resistance.25 Luzon's guerrilla organization, while subject to many regional varia­ tions, combined regular military forces with a civil-military infrastructure based on villages and towns. The island was divided into geographical districts and then sub-divided into provincial and zone commands. While Tagalogs dominated the upper commands, the combat units were usually raised locally and led by officers drawn from the regional elites. As local landowners or politicians, these men could draw on both traditional patron- 36 client bonds and economic power to organize guerrilla bands among the populace. Within their local areas, the guerrilla leaders were virtually autonomous and self-sufficient. While they could, and often did, cooperate for specific operations, for the most part they operated independently. The guerrilla military forces in most areas were usually divided into regulars, or full-time guerrillas, and militia. The regulars operated within a zone, usually in one or two small fifty-man bands, and often had their base camps in mountain retreats, or cuartels. It was their job to cut telegraph lines, ambush Army convoys, and attack towns that had accepted American civil government. The militia operated as occassional guerrillas and other­ wise continued their normal civilian pursuits in their native towns. They grew food for the regulars, provided information, and manned the numerous outposts which informed the regulars of any Army maneuvers. While poorly armed and disciplined, the militia had more than enough strength to inti­ midate their fellow villagers into paying taxes and keeping silent. The distinction between the two forces was at best a hazy one. Neither wore uniforms and both often lived in the same villages, posing as harmless pea­ sants and "amigos." There was a great deal of merging back and forth. Militia in an area in which the U.S. Army was inactive could become full­ time guerrillas. In the face of Army pressure guerrilla regulars might abandon operations for months and resume their civilian occupations, only reassembling when Army operations ceased. The guerrilla military movement was supported by a far larger civilian organization or infrastructure which paid taxes, hid weapons, and provided food. The regular forces were supplied by civil-military officers 37 who collected taxes and supervised the supplying of the cuartels through a number of village appointees. The collectors often operated as political agents by insuring that village leaders conformed to guerrilla policies, arranging the election of suitable candidates, and supervising the operations of the militia. A committed town government would establish its own militia, send information of American troop movements, hide dispersed guerrillas, and use the administrative machinery to collect insurrecto taxes. The result was a layered guerrilla organization in which regulars, collectors, militia, and town governements all operated together and mutually supported each other.26 As Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur noted, the success of the Philippine guerrilla movement rested primarily on the ability of the Filipino irregular forces to control the native population. Much of the guerrilla strength came from their social and class ties with the traditional Filipino regional authorities. Few peasants and tenants were able to resist the appeals of their landowning patrons. The guerrillas also used propaganda, secret societies, religious beliefs, and appeals to the poor to win over the popu­ lation. In many cases the guerrillas simply adapted earlier Spanish propa­ ganda and claimed the Americans wished to impose Protestantism or make the Filipinos slaves. The insurgents stressed the appeal of kalayaan, or independence, often picturing it in traditional religious folk terms. The Katipunan, while ineffective as a supply organization, provided a secret society which appealed to some Filipinos. Guerrillas stole or constructed religious images which were used to show the Filipino peasants that divine blessing attended their cause. Late in the war there were even appeals to 38 the taos to join the Revolution and assurances that they would benefit in the new society created after independence.^? For the most part, however, the insurrectos were more inclined to rely on the bolo knife than the pen. William H. Taft was only slightly exag­ gerating when he asserted that the guerrilla campaign could not have exis­ ted without the use of terrorism. "Agitational terrorism," to use Thomas P. Thornton's term, was used to keep an otherwise apathetic population in a state of anxiety, advertise the movement, and eliminate any opposing forces. While the American records of atrocities may owe something to Army efforts to discredit the guerrillas, captured guerrilla correspondence is full of orders to execute suspected spies or collaborators and destroy their property. Terror too often became a localized violencia with rural Filipinos being mutilated, burned, tortured, or buried alive in a self-perpet­ uating cycle of atrocity. The American forces might garrison the towns, but, as Felipe Calderon pointed out, "the insurgents, being absolute masters of the fields, impose their will absolutely and despotically."28 Throughout the Philippines, the guerrillas were decentralized and drew their strength from local and regional guerrilla organizations. Even the most powerful guerrilla leaders such as Juan Cailles, Miguel Malvar, or Vicente Lukban were essentially regional warlords whose power seldom extended past the boundaries of their provinces. This decentralization was both the guerrillas'strength and their weakness. Local insurrecto commanders had a shrewd grasp of the realities of warfare in their own areas and could adapt tactics and policies best suited to their regions. They knew the local population and its leadership and could draw on both 39 intimidation and prewar social connections for supplies, recruits, and information. Virtually autonomous, the guerrillas could sustain war indefinetly regardless of events in other provinces while any American victory was "only local and had little effect upon general conditions."29 Yet while regional autonomy allowed the guerrillas to sustain the war, it also hindered them. The revolutionaries were seldom able to combine for a sustained offensive throughout the island, allowing the U.S. Army to shift troops from theater to theater to meet specific emergencies. Within the guerrilla forces local rivalries often surfaced, and there was a great deal of insubordination, factionalism, and disorganization. Finally, when Americans were able to construct succcessful local pacification strategies the guerrillas could not shift into new areas to resume the war.30 To combat this guerrilla warfare the Army had to develop counter in­ surgency policies and methods while respecting McKinley's insistence that:

It should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and admiration or the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.31 Army pacification at the highest levels was governed by the principles ennunciated by McKinley. From their headquarters in Manila, sucessive commanders of the Division of the Philippines were often reminded that the U.S. Army had not only a military, but a civilizing mission. The Army was to prepare the Philippines for colonial government and do so in such a way that the Filipinos would be docile, obedient, and grateful subjects. The American 40 emphasis on such non-military pacification policies as civil government, education, and municipal police reflects the Army's role as pathfinder for American colonial government. At the same time, this emphasis on win­ ning over the hearts and minds of the Filipinos brought the Army directly into conflict with the insurrectos insistence that the populace support the guerrillas. The Philippine War, in many respects, was a war over who would establish a sufficient base among the population to overcome the enemy. The early success of Philippine guerrillas in establishing control over the population was greatly aided by the persistent refusal of the U.S. Army high command to recognize their existance. Otis, the Army's commander until mid-1900, never acknowledged that the guerrilla war was a major problem. To Otis, the destruction of the insurgent regular forces meant "war in its proper meaning had ceased to exist."32 otis believed that the rural violence which remained after the American victories resulted from remnants of the Tagalog military forces and ladrones He insisted that once the majority of Filipinos could live in peace they would see the benefits of American colonial government and join with the U.S. Army against the bandit-guerrillas. To achieve this, Otis stationed American garrisons in as many towns in the archipelago as possible. To demonstrate the civil character of Army occupation, he broke up the old tactical military commands and instituted a geographical district organization on April 7, 1900. Luzon was divided into the Departments of Northern and Southern Luzon and these were further sub-divided into district and provincial commands. By mid-1900, when he requested leave from service in the 41

Philippines, Otis believed that his policy was already working and that the situation was "eminently satisfactory/'^^ In following McKinley's instructions for benevolent assimilation, Otis sought to establish a basis for American and Filipino cooperation in the institution of local government. Under the provisions of General Orders No. 43 and General Orders No. 40, Army officers constructed municipal govern­ ments in Luzon's towns. These municipal governments consisted of a local présidente, or mayor, a town council, and a police force. Army garrisons also instituted sanitary reforms, cleared roads, and encouraged the develop­ ment of local schools. The American garrisons contributed to the financial health of many municipalities by purchasing much of their forage, labor, transportation, and housing from local s o u rc e s .3 4 Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who succeeded Otis in May, was less sanguine about the level of pacification in the Philippines. Unlike Otis, MacArthur recognized the existence of the guerrilla war in the Philippines, and he believed that the majority of Filipinos supported the insurrectos, not the United States. MacArthur was also aware that Otis' strategy had left American forces in Luzon overextended and incapable of offensive action. Moreover, he was dubious about the utility of civil governments. He believed that they would be "useful agencies in the work of pacification," but also knew that the insurrectos had organized many of them and that the American-appointed officials actually served the guerrillas.^S Initially, MacArthur appeared to be continuing Otis' policies of bene­ volence and conciliation and ignoring the seriousness of the guerrilla war. Convinced that many guerrillas leaders would surrender if given the 42

opportunity, MacArthur declared a ninety-day amnesty on June 21. All guerrillas who surrendered within that period might take the Oath of Allegiance to the United States and be returned home immediately. MacArthur claimed that this was to give all prominent insurrectos a chance to surrender, but he was also aware that the summer rainy season would effectively hinder Army operations from June until late August. Whatever the motivations, the amnesty was not a success. Only 5,022 Filipinos surrendered, and many of these were people who were already prisoners of war or lived in areas without a strong guerrilla resistance. MacArthur concluded that the upcoming U.S. presidential election explained the "meager result," and recommended that any further development of U.S. counter insurgency policy await the election.36 MacArthur's wavering policy towards the establishment of armed native police forces is indicative of his tentative behavior during much of 1900. Municipal police forces were authorized as part of the Army muni­ cipal governments under G.0.40 and G.O. 43. Their mission was both to protect local governments and help American troops hunt the ladrones that Otis viewed as the major threat to order in the Philippines. Organized by individual garrison commanders and présidentes, and paid by the towns, the new police usually lacked adequate pay, discipline, and armament. Many Americans, both military and civilian, urged that the police be reorganized, armed, and incorporated within the Army's pacification campaign. While MacArthur verbally supported the principle of an armed and organized native police, he had grave doubts about the wisdom of entrusting Filipinos with firearms. He dealt with this dilemma by officially supporting 43 a strong local police but doing very little to aid them in practice. On June 18 he issued General Orders No. 87, \which stated that the Army encouraged native self-protection, authorized the arming of local police, and urged the formation of a mounted provincial constabulary. However, MacArthur gave no indication of how this constabulary was to be organized, officered, or equipped, nor did he clarify its status regarding the municipal police. Thus, some officers believed they should arm their garrison police while others began developing a totally independent para-military scout force. In the midst of the confusion engendered by his orders, MacArthur struck at effective local police forces by ordering the return of all captured weapons to Manila. The result was that in 1900 municipal police, except in areas where local Army commanders supported them, were of little use to

American pacification e ff o r t s .2 7 In the absence of direction from Manila, Army officers in the field took the initiative in structuring counterinsurgency programs to deal with conditions in their areas. The dispersal of the Army under Otis and his insistence on placing small garrisons throughout the entire archipelago gave many officers over a year of service in one area. Field and company officers suddenly found themselves the civil-military rulers of entire pro­ vinces or commanding large contingents of native troops. Stationed in the same towns or districts for extended periods they soon developed pragmatic policies designed to deal with specific local problems. As they imple­ mented their ideas, many reported their successes to their superiors and in turn influenced policies at the next highest level. Local Army commanders were often able to pacifiy a municipality or even a province with their own 44 counterinsurgency campaigns. In Union province, for example, the guerrilla war was effectively ended by June 1900, while in many areas of eastern Luzon the guerrillas had been driven to the mountains and ceased to be a threat by the fall. Officers were able to clear their garrison towns, then the adjoining barrios, and gradually to establish large pacified zones. Throughout the Philippines junior officers learned the intricacies of their area's guerrilla war and developed methods of dealing with the local insurrectos and their supporters. Army pacification and counterinsurgency methods in the field developed in different directions from that encouraged by directives from Manila. For the most part, officers in 1900 were discouraged by the high commands' inability to structure clear pacification policies, its emphasis on non-military pacification, and what they viewed as excessively lenient treatment of guerrillas and their supporters. While many officers were in sympathy with the social reform aspects of Otis' strategy, they recognized that the military problem had to be settled before any civil government could be established. They were aware that local municipal governments, either from patriotism or intimidation, aided and supplied the insurrectos, and that many of the villagers were guerrilla soldiers. The guerrillas' ability to control the countryside and intimidate the population made "civil government... more or less a farce.'^Q Until the United States could protect friendly Filipinos and punish hostile ones, the guerrillas would continue to draw supplies, recruits, and shelter from the populace and the war would continue. 45

In the fall of 1900 many of the guerrilla organizations attempted to launch a coordinated offensive against the U.S. forces and influence the American presidential elections. Aguinaldo ordered attacks to be made from 15 to 23 September, and in some areas, such as northwestern Luzon, the insurrectos were able to pressure isolated American garrisons. On the whole, however, the offensive was a failure. Many provincial guerrilla units either never learned of the offensive or ignored orders to attack. The insurgents' tactical shortcomings in conventional warfare were exposed and the success of local pacification campaigns allowed U.S. troops to be shifted from areas that were relatively pacified to troubled areas. The offensive might have also had a substantial psychological cost as well. McKinley's victory made an insurrecto victory appear almost impossible and helped convince many Filipinos that peace was preferable to continued warfare. The arrival of fresh U.S. forces and Army offensive operations weakened the already damaged guerrilla resolve.39 In the wake of the guerrilla fall offensive, MacArthur developed paci­ fication policies that could work in harmony with the counterinsurgency activities and methods developed in the field. The election of McKinley insured that there would be no early American military withdrawal from the archipelago. At the same time the the guerrillas' military efforts made the seriousness of the opposition clear to MacArthur's superiors, leading them press for a speedy conclusion. To the Army's Adjutant, General Henry C. Corbin, "the successes of the Filipinos have conclusively shown that the time has arrived when more aggressive operations would be in order Secretary of War Elihu Root announced that the time had come for the Army 46 to utilize the "methods which have proved succesful in our Indian campaigns in the West."41 These men spoke for both the Army high command and the U.S. government when they demanded that severe measures be instituted in the Philippines. Encouraged by this support from above, MacArthur issued a proclamation on December 20 instituting a more rigorous policy throughout the Philippines. He declared the Philippines under martial law and warned that guerrillas who violated the provisions of these laws would be held accountable for their actions. MacArthur borrowed appropriate passages from the U.S. Army's code of warfare, General Orders No. 100, to detail the guerrillas' specific violations of the laws of war. In particular, the Army would no longer tolerate the "amigos," who shifted from civilian to military status and refused to wear uniforms. Hereafter, these part-time guerrillas would be punished for their violations of the laws of war. Persons who lived in occupied towns and accepted American protection but continued to fight the Americans were now classified as "war rebels, or war traitors" and could be punished. MacArthur also singled out the secret comittees who lived in American-occupied towns and collected taxes for the guerrillas. The proclamation warned Filipinos that the Army's previous failure to enforce these provisions would now be rectified; the Army would no longer tolerate guerrilla terrorism.42 MacArthur believed that his proclamation marked the beginnings of:

an entirely new campaign... based upon the central idea of detaching the towns from the immediate support of the guerrillas in the field, and thus also precluding the indirect support which arose from indiscriminate acceptance by the towns of the insurrection in all its devious ramifications.'^^ 47

Most historians have accepted MacArthur's view of the importance of his proclamation and John M. Gates believes that the December 20 proclamation "contained the guidelines for the policy that the Americans would follow throughout 1901 ."44 a closer examination of the document, however, does not really support this contention. MacArthur himself claimed that the document's main purpose was to educate Filipinos on their violations of the laws of war and warn them of punishment. MacArthur's educating instinct did not extend to the Army, however. While he declared martial law, he provided little guidance for how he wanted to enforce it. Moreover, many of his ideas had already been adopted earlier. His suggestion that known guerrillas and suspects be deported to Manila had been operational since September 22. Those parts of G.O. 100 which applied to guerrilla war had been formally issued and enforced throughout much of northern Luzon six

months before MacArthur's o rd e rs .4 5 it would be far more accurate to state that MacArthur's proclamation provided official sanction for some of the more stringent policies either advocated or already applied in the field. More importantly, it stated conclusively that the Army was facing a guerrilla war and was willing to pursue a vigorous military policy to win it. After almost a year of the Army high command denying the problem existed and apparently oblivious to the nature of the war, this was of crucial psy­ chological importance to Army officers in the field At the same time he was preparing to issue his proclamation, MacArthur was also developing concrete counterinsurgency policies that could be applied throughout the Philippines. Recalcitrant Filipino leaders who continued to work for Philippine independence were deported to Guam. 48

The Army helped the Federal Party, a Filipino political party that favored American rule, and allowed its members to travel freely in occupied terri­ tory. Composed of leading Hfustrados, ex-guerrilla leaders, and wealthy conservatives, the FederaJistas negotiated with guerrilla leaders, organi­ zed civil governments, and urged the population to aid the Army. In addition, the Army made serious efforts to identify and compromise known guerrillas. Captured guerrillas who wished to take the Oath of Allegiance and be paroled now had to show their commitment to the United States by giving information, surrendering weapons, or acting against their former comrades. In March, Army post commanders were ordered to keep file cards on ex­ guerrillas, suspected insurrectos, and influential Filipinos in their locales, which could be used to locate suspects and "amigos."^? MacArthur's shift in policy coincided with an increase in U.S. Army manpower to 70,000, "stronger than it will ever be again" and now ready for "decisive results.'"^® Many of these soldiers were veterans who had served in the same area for almost a year and were well acquainted with the local geography and population. Moreover, for the first time American military operations were clearly directed against guerrilla bands throughout the Philippines and not at the establishment of civil government. The Army also built on the local successes achieved in 1900. In northwestern Luzon, for example, troops could leave certain provinces virtually ungarrisoned while they operated in adjacent ones. In central Luzon and the Bicol area native forces either garrisoned the towns or accompanied U.S. forces into the mountains against the guerrillas. 49

In 1901 the American military placed continuous pressure on the insurrectos on military, social, and economic fronts. The Army's military operations utilized a combination of proven local methods with MacArthur's Philippine-wide policies. While members of the Manila-based Federal Party sought to negotiate the surrender of insurrecto leaders, locally raised native volunteers hunted the guerrillas in the field. Insurgent commanders had their property confiscated and their relatives harassed, a major blow at the socioe-conomic elites furnishing the guerrilla leadership. Units from several provinces or districts combined to block off mountain passes and prevent the guerrillas from escaping over the border. Military commissions tried and occasionally executed captured guerillas for violations of the laws of war. Army provost courts, operating in areas where martial law was declared, were given a free hand to try and punish suspects without exces­ sive reliance on evidence. The provost courts were used to strike at the guerrillas' infrastructure by trying Filipinos who paid insurgent taxes, sup­ plied the guerrillas, or served in the Katipunan. The Army also sanctioned crop destruction and the reconcentration of certain villages to cut the guerrillas off from their supplies and shelter. Throughout the year the guerrillas faced constant pressure from many sources and on many levels. The Army also wisely combined stringent measures with acts of benevolence. While the Army reconcentrated the populations of insurgent towns and destroyed crops in some areas, friendly townspeople in other areas were allowed to harvest the crops of known insurrectos. The muni­ cipal police, newly established Native Scouts, and constabulary enlisted many Filipinos. These organizations gave Filipinos an economic stake in 50

American government and often tied entire villages to the American side. The arrest and deportation or imprisonment of many of the princingiià struck at their social and economic power and made both the deportees and their supporters realize the consequences of continued warfare. Faced with the loss of their local power and prestige and aware that the guerrillas were losing, many principaliâ swung their influence to the American side. Prominent former guerrilla leaders such as Juan Cailles, Juan Villamor, and Mariano Trias secured positions in the American civil government, exercising the power that they had sought as revolutionaries. The rapid institution of civil government in the spring of 1901, often within a month after a province had been declared pacified, made it clear that Filipinos would have some measure of local independence under American colonial government. Throughout 1901 the U.S. Army successfully utilized both the carrot of benevolence and the stick of militry operations to pacify the archipelago. The results of this new Army offensive were apparent almost imme­ diately. Army military operations yielded far more captured arms while suffering fewer casualties. The capture of Emilio Aguinaldo in March 1901 removed a symbolic figurehead, while Aguinaldo's proclamation acknowled­ ging American sovereignty legitimized the surrender of other guerrilla coomanders. By July, such prominent guerrilla chiefs as Juan Cailles, Manuel Tinio, Juan and Bias Villamor, Mariano Trias, Urbano Lacuna, José Alejandrino, and Vito Bellarmino had all surrendered with their arms and men. Guerrilla resistance was confined to the Tagalog provinces of Laguna,

Tayabas, and Batangas and the tumultuous island of Samar.49 51

In an effort to insure a smooth transition from military to civilian government, MacArthur was replaced by Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chafee on July 4 1901 at the same time that William H. Taft was appointed civil governor. This division of authority placed civil government in those areas that had been pacified while continuing military government in the few areas where the guerrillas still maintained a strong resistance. The new comander was given Instructions by the Secretary of War to withdraw the Army from these powers over to the new civilian authorities. Chaffee, a veteran cavalryman with extensive service in the Indian Wars, had commanded the United States forces in the China Relief Expedition. During his first months in office, Chaffee concentrated primarily on administrative changes. As part of the Army disentanglement from civil government, he wanted to concentrate the scattered company garrisons into military camps and turn Army attention back to training, drill, and administration. In an effort to replace civil- military organizations with purely military ones he broke up the old geographical departments and districts and instituted two divisions and seven "Separate Brigades" in October.50 The massacre of Company C, 9th U.S. Infantry at the town of Balan- giga, Samar, on September 28, 1901 abruptly shifted Chaffee's attention back to the subjugation of Filipino resistance. He utilized the newly formed 6th and 3rd Separate Brigades to crush resistance on Samar and in southern Luzon, but in a manner that invited criticism from anti-imperial­ ists. Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith, the commander of the 6th Separate Brigade, ordered one of his officers to turn Samar into a "howling wilderness" and to shoot any males over ten. Brig. Gen. James F. Bell, commanding thd 3rd 52

Separate Brigade in Batangas, Tayabas, and Laguna provinces reconcentrated most of the populace into protected zones. In both campaigns there was great destruction of property and the civilian population suffered from the loss of crops and animals. Anti-imperialists seized upon Smith's orders and Bell's adoption of reconcentration to renew their accusations of U.S. Army atrocities and misconduct. Smith would eventually be court-martialed and retired from the Army for his orders to kill and burn. Several other offi­ cers were also court-martialed and given light sentences. If the campaigns were severe, they were also effective and resulted in the surrender of the last insurrecto leaders by June 1902. A month later. President Theodore Roosevelt officially thanked the U.S. Army for the "successful conclusion" of its military services in the Philippines.®! These concluding campaigns of the war indicate that after three years of fighting the Army was still relying far more on regional warfare than a carefully structured archipelago-wide pacification policy. Chaffee impli­ citly recognized the Army's familiarity with regional warfare. He did not seek to impose a uniform pacification policy, but rather gave both comman­ ders almost complete independence to deal with the conditions in their areas. Bell and Smith designed counterinsurgency measures based on their perceptions of the regional guerrilla resistance. The last campaigns are thus indicative of both the regional nature of the Philippine War and the Army's ability to adapt its counter insurgency methods to the numerous different guerrilla wars it encountered in the Philippines. NOTES

1 Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt to William McKinley, 15 May 1898, £W2 2:646.

2 Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles to Secretary of War, 18 May 1898, CWS 2:648- 9. For McKinley's decision to retain the Philippines see H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His American (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 368; Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKin­ ley (New York.: Harper Bros., 1959), pp. 209-12, 323-8, 345-7, 361-3; Ernest L. May, inoerial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 243-62; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion. 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 361-2,408-17. For examples of the reports that McKinley was receiving on the situation in the Philippines see Oscar F. Williams to Tomas W. Cridler, letters of 22 February, 19 March, 27 March 1898, ÇWS 2:650-2. For the background on the political decision to Invade the Philippines see Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army In the Snanlsh-Amerlcan War (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1971), pp. 119-21; David F. Trask, The War With Soain in 1893 (New York.: Macmillan and Co., 1983), pp. 369- 90, 404, 439-41, 470; Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-Amerlcan War. 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill, N.C.; University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 3-10.

3 William McKinley to Secretary of War, 19 May 1898, CWS 2:676-8.

4 U.S. Special Mission on Investigation to the Philippine Islands. Report of the U.S. Special Mission on lnvestigation_to_the PhlliPDlneislands to the Secretary of War (Washington: G.P.O., 1921), pp. 5-6; Frederick L. Wernstedt and J. E. Spencer, The Philippine Island World, A Physical,

53 54

Cultural, and Regional Geography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 311 -3.

5 John L. Phelan, The Hispanicization of the Philippines (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Nicholas Cushner, Spain in the Philippines from Conquest to Revolution (Quezon City, P.I.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1975); Nicholas Cushner, Landed Estates in the Colonial Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1976); David J. Steinberg, The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 27, 34-40; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule. 1901- 1913 (N.P.: Shoe String Press, 1968), pp. 6-14; Dennis M. Roth, Ih£ Friar Estates of the Philippines (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1977); Cesar Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City, P.I.: University of Manila Press, 1973); LeRoy, Americans 1:6-82: Rizalino Cades, "The Social and Economic Background of Philippine Nationalism, 1830-1892" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Hawaii- Manoa, 1974).; John A. Larkin, "Philippine History Reconsidered: A Socioeconomic Perspective," American Historical Review 87 (June 1982):613-24; John A. Larkin, ed.. Perspectives of Philippine Histor­ iography: A Symposium (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1979); Edgar Wickburg, The Chinese in Philippine Life. 1850- 1900 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Gregorio F. Zaide, The Philippine Revolution (Manila: Modern Book Co., 1968); Melanio S. Figuracion, "The Background and Development of Philippine Nationalism" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pittsburgh, 1958); Cesar A. Majul, Mabini and the Philippine Revolution (Quezon City, P L: University of the Philippines Press, 1960) pp. 62-70; Cesar A. Majul, "Social Back­ ground of Revolution." Asian Studies 9 (April 1971 ): 1 -24; Maximo M. Kalaw, The Development of Philippine Politics (1872-1920) (Manila: Oriental Commercial Co., 1927), pp. 1-68; Schumacher. Revolutionarv Clergy, pp. 1-47. For studies of socioeconomic development in regions of the Philippines, see John A. Larkin, The Pampannans: Soledad M. Bor- romeo, "El Cadiz Filipino: Colonial Cavite, 1571-1896" (Ph.D. disserta­ tion, University of California at Berkeley, 1973); Normen G. Owen, "Kab- ikolan in the Nineteenth Century: Socioecomomir Change in the Provin­ cial Philippines" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1977); Bruce R. Cruikshank, "A History of Samar Island, the Philippines, 1768- 1898" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975). 55

6 Agoncillo. Revolt of the Masses: lleto. Payson. dp. 93-139: Kalaw, Development, pp. 68-93; Majul. Mabini. do. 119-25; Lymon W. V. Kennon, "The Katipunan of the Philippines," North American Review. 173 (1900:208-20; Guerrero, "Philippine Revolutionary Mentality," pp. 240-56; Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives," pp. 447-454; Taylor, History. 27-34, 80-100 FZ, 1 -8 LY; LeRoy, Americans 1.82-90,100- 1 ; 119-20; James A. LeRoy to Capt. John R. M. Taylor, 16 May 1904, Philippine Insurgent Records, Select Document 1306.1, Microcopy No. 254, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as PIR SD].

7 Zaide. Philippine Revolution, pp. 141-52; Emilio Aguinaldo and Vicente A. Pacis, A Second Look at America (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), pp. 18-28; Bain. Sitting In Darkness, dd. 154-73; Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," pp. 127-31 ; Welch, Response to Imperialism. pp. 11-12.

8 Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 153-66; Aguinaldo and Pacis, Second Look, pp. 27-8; Schumacher, Revolutionarv Clerov. pp. 48-64; 1 leto, Payson. pp. 130-9, 155-95: LeRoy. Americans 1:79-138: Taylor. Historv. pp. 27-40 FZ, 11-79 LY; Steinberg, Philippines, pp. 41-3.

9 "Untitled," Taylor, Historv. Exhibit 66, p. 68 LY and Ferdinand Macabu- los, "Statement," 10 July 1898, j^d, Exhibit 130, pp. 50-1 MG; Trask, War With Spain, pp. 398-410; Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," pp. 28-54. For the war in individual regions, see Elias M. Atraviado. The Philippine Revolution in the Bicol Region, vol. 1: From August 1896 to Januarv 1899. trans. by Juan T. Atraviado (Manila: Encal Press, 1953); Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 557-61; May, "Filipino Resistance," pp. 593-6; Peter Schreurs, "Surigao, From General Aguinaldo to General Bates, 1898-1900," Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 11(1983):57- 68; Donald Chaput, "Leyte Leadership in the Revolution: The Moxica- Lucban Issue," Levte-Samar Studies 9 (1975):3-5.

10 For Aguinaldo’s version see Bain, Sitting in Darkness, pp. 173-7; Agui­ naldo and Pacis, Second Look, pp. 29-66; Emilio Aguinaldo, "Untitled," Tavlor. Historv. Exhibit 2, pp. 2-8 MG; Emilio Aguinaldo “To all civilized nations and especially to the Great North American Republic," ibid. Exhibit 71. pp. 71-3 LY; Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 173-4, 215-8. For a scholarly view of the controversy see Cosmas, Army for 56

Empire, pp. 190-2; Welch. Response to Imperialism, pp. 13-4; Trask, War With Spain, pp. 398-402.

11 Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Anderson to AG, U.S. Army, 14 July 1898, CWS 2:779-80.

12 Trask. War with Spain, pp. 411 -22; Gates, Schoolbooks. pp, 17-22,32- 4; Taylor, History, pp. 34-40 AJ; Cosmas, Army for Empire, pp. 236-42

13 William McKinley to Maj. Gen. El well S. Otis and Admiral George Dewey, 8 January 1899, CWS 2:858-9.

14 Stuart C. Miller argues that Aguinaldo wanted peace and that Otis almost single-handedly provoked the war, see Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp. 58-66. There is, however, ample documentary evidence that the revolutionaries were making plans for an attack on the Americans. See for example, "Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of the Sandahatan of Manila," 9 January 1899, Frederick Funston Papers, Folder P-1. Kansas Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas; Taylor, Historv. pp. 95-9 MG, 8-10 KU. For more objective views, see Grania Bolton, "Military Diplomacy and National Liberation: Insurgent-American Relations After the Fall of Manila," Military Affairs 36:3 (October 1972):99-105; Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," pp. 70-84; Welch, Response to Imperialism, pp. 15-23. For the account of Otis, see "Statement of General El well S. Otis," U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Philippines, Affairs in the Philippines. Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate, S. Doc. No. 331,57th Cong., 1 st sess., 1902, pp. 729-848 [hereafter cited as Senate, Affairsl: "Report of Major-General E.S. Otis, U.S.V., Commanding Department of the Pacific, Covering Correspondence with Insurgent Leaders." WD 1899 1:4:334-54; "Report Of Major-General Otis from September 2, 1898 (including documents not published in the report of Major-General Merritt), to February 4, 1899 (the date of breaking out of the insurrection)," M) 1899 1:4:355-528.

15 Quote "wretchedly defended" from, "Sand-30" [pseud.], "Trench, Parapet, or the Open, " Journal of the Military Service Institute 30:118 (July 1902):480: Sexton. Soldiers in the Sun, dd. 103-61; WD 1900 1:8:18- 19; ANJ 37 (7 April and 2 June 1900): Gates. Schoolbooks. o. 102; 57

Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees, " pp. 212-18. For the Filipino militia see PIR 5D 996.

16 ^ 1900 1:2:63,169; ANJ 36 (4 March 1899); Henry C. Corbin, "Autobio­ graphy," Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as HCCP].

17 Antonio Marbini to Ambrosio Moxica, 26 April 1899, PIR SD 1021.2; Agoncillo. Malolos: May. “Phippine-American War," pp. 365-6; lleto, Payson. pp. 141-54; Guerrero, "Luzon At War," pp. 39-217, Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," pp. 85-127; Majul, Mabini. pp. 166-435; Kalaw, Development, pp. 94-163; Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 244- 87; LeRoy, Americans. 2:280-353; Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy. pp. 65-123: Taylor. History. 46-9 AJ; Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 92-8. For U.S. Army operations, see Taylor, Historv. pp. 74-95 AJ. For views of the Filipino Army and its internal divisions, Marcelino A. Fornado, Jr., Introduction to An Acceptable Holocaust bv Teodoro Kalaw (Manila: National Historical Commission, 1974), pp. iv-vi; José Alejandrino, The Price of Freedom (Manila: M. Colcol and Co., 1949); Willis B. Wilcox Through Luzon on Highways and Byways (Philidelphia: Franklin Book Co., 1901), p. 194. For a different view of the effectiveness of the Filipino army, see Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 277-81.

18 "Otis 1900," WD 1:4:199-347; "Report of an Expedition to the Provinces North of Manila, P.I., during the Months of September, October, Novem­ ber, and December, 1899, Maj. Gen. Henry T. Lawton, Commanding," WD 1900 1:6:6-417, includes "Report of an Expedition into the Northern Provinces of Luzon, October 11, 1899, to January 5, 1900, by Brig. Gen. S. B. M. Young, U.S.V, Commanding," [hereafter cited as "Young Report"] WD 1:6:262-94; "Report of Operations of Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, From May 31, 1899, to April 6,1900, by Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, Ü.5.V., Commanding," WD 1900 1:8:14-526.

19 "Otis 1900," WD 1900 1:4:366-7, 369-95; "Report of an Expedition into the Province of Cavite, January 4 to 31, 1900, by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U.S.V., Commanding," WD 1900 1:6:625-639; "Report of Oper­ ations of Schwan's Expeditionary Brigade in the Provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, January 4 to February 8, 1900, by Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan, U.5.V., Commanding," [hereafter cited as "Schwan Report"] WD 1900 1:5:387-564; "Report of Operations in the Provinces 58

of Cavite, Morong, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, January 4 to February 8, 1900, by Maj. Gen, J. C. Bates, U.S.V., Commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps," M i 1900 1:6:640-659.

20 "Otis 1900," M i 1900 1:4:395-6; "Report of an Expedition to Occupy and Open Hemp Ports in the Philippine Island, January 18 to April 8,1900, by Brig. Gen. w. A. Kobbé, U.5.V.," [hereafter cited as "Kobbé Report"] M i 1900 1:7:7-41.

21 "Report of an Expedition to the Provinces of North and South Camarines, February 12 to March 1, 1900, by Maj. Gen. J. C. Bates, U.S.V.," M i 1900 1:6: 660-5.

22 Taylor, Historv. pp. 47 HS. See also pp. 29-32 HS, 48-9 HS, 51 HS.; Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 128; M i 1900 1:5:59-60. Aguinaldo's own role Influence over the guerrilla war is the subject of some debate. John R. M. Taylor, who made the most extensive study of Aguinaldo's correspon­ dence and captured insurgent documents concluded that Aguinaldo's influence was minimal. Most of the primary source material supports this, see for example, the "Diary of Simeon A. Villa," a translation of which can be found in Senate, Affairs, pp. 1986-2060. For a different view see Welch, Reosonse to Imperialism, p. 32; Bain, Sitting in Darkness, p. 13.

23 "MacArthur 1900, " WD 1900 1:5:59-65, 72-6; "Orders for a Guerrilla Column commanded by Major Villamor," 1900, PIR SD 51.7; Taylor, Historv. pp. 46 HS; Ambrosio Flores, "Instructions for the Organization of a Corps of Guerrilla Militia," 5 January 1900, PIR 1198.10; "Plan of Combat," n.d.. Exhibit 1030, Taylor, Historv. pp. 41 GV; Pantaleon Garcia, "Instructions for Guerrillas and Flying Columns," n.d., Exhibit 1020, jb ii pp. 37 GV; Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Majors and Captains Commanding Companies of 1st and 2nd Battalions, 7 December 1900, PIR SD 658.4; Maj. Tomas Tagunton to Captains Commanding Guerrilla Batttalions, 29 November 1900, PIR SD 658.3.

24 For the importance attached to the U.S. presidential elections and the adaption of operations designed to influence it, see Taylor, Historv. pp. 31 HS; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Col. Pablo Asti I la, 6 August 1900, Exhibit 1084, iMd, pp. 57GV; Emilio Aguinaldo to Calixto Villacorta, 27 June 1900, Exhibit 997, M i PP- 27 GV; Col. Teodoro Sandico to Lt. Col. 59

Casmiro Tinio, 23 July 1900, Exhibit 1080. ibid. dp. 56 GV; Emilio Aguinaldo to Brig. Gen. Isidro Torres, 8 July 1900, PIR SD 527.8; Emilio Aguinaldo to Brig. Gen. Francisco Macubulos, 27 June 1900, PIR SD 527.2; Emilio Aguinaldo, "To the Filipino Generals, Field and Line Officers, and Soldiers." 29 October 1900, PIR SD 1037.2; Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," pp. 304-9.

25 Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 97-6,156-7. For the organization of the "new" Katipunan see Taylor, History, pp. 33 MS; "To the Katipunan," Emilio Aguinaldo, 15 July 1898, Exhibit 60, Taylor, History, pp. 37-8 MG; San Miguel to Acting Military Chief, 6 December 1899, Exhibit 1022, Taylor, History, on. 37 GV: Flores, "Instructions," 5 January 1900, PIR SD 1198.10; "Reglamento del Katipunan de los Hijos del Pueblo," 28 September 1900, PIR SD 673.1 ; Juan Villamor, Inedlta Cronica de la Guerra Americano-FlliDino en el Norte de Luzon. 1899-1901 (Manila: Juan Fajardo, 1924), pp. 69-72; Perfecto Clemente to Monico Andres, 28 September 1900, PIR SD 673.1

26 Major Edgar Z. Steeyer to C.O. Vigan, 20 July 1900, RG 395, series 5583, Vigan, Luzon, Letters Receiyed Feb 1900 to Dec. 1902, LR 1286. [here­ after cited as 395/5583]; Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 156-66; May, "Phil- ippine-American War," pp. 361,365-71; May, "Filipino Resistance" pp. 536-48; M i 38 (20 October 1900).

27 "MacArthur 1900," W 1:5:61-2; lleto, Payson. pp. 197-209; "llocanos Proclamation," Isobel Abaya, n.d., 1900, PIR SD 521.1; "Proclamation of Lt. Col. Emilio Zurbano, Military Governor of Tayabas, to his Fellow Citizens," 23 March 1901, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1154, p. 81 GV; Gates. Schoolbooks. dp. 161-2. For an example of insurrecto propa­ ganda directed at American troops see Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans and the White Man's Burden (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press. 1975), p. 287; Lt. Col. Emilio Zurbano, "To the Worthy North American Citizens in these Islands," 25 September 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1097, pp. 61-2 GV.

28 Felipe Calderon to the United States Philippine Commission, 25 November 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Special Correspondence, 1900- 1902, U.S. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as ERP). For Filipino terrorism and U.S. reaction, see Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 164-9; "Taft Statement," Senate, Affairs, pp. 69-70; Simeon Villa 60

to Chiefs of Guerrillas, 15 November 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1115, pp. 68 GV; U.S. Senate, Report of the Taft Philippine Commission. S. Doc. 112, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1901, pp. 17-8; Worcester, Philip­ pines Past and Present, pp. 226-47; ANJ 38 (8 September 1900); LeRoy, Americans. 2:228-46. For a discussion on "agitational terrorism" see Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, ed. bv Harrv Eckstein (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 71-99.

29 Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (London: Constable and Co., 1912), p. 386.

30 May, "Filipino Resistance," pp. 548-51 ; Schreurs, "Surigao," pp. 67-8; Chaput, "Leyte Leadership," pp. 6-9. For examples of factionalism among the guerrillas see Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Lt. Col. Vicente Salazar, 22 April 1901, PIR SD 909.8; Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Adj., Btln. Lorenzo Tomayo, 19 May 1900, PIR SD 345.3.

31 William McKinley to Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, 21 December 1898. CWS 2:859.

32 "Otis 1900," WD 1900 1.4:448.

33 AbU 37 (9 June 1900); Maj. Gen. Elwell 5. Otis to AG, Washington, 15 February 1900, £WS 2:1144; Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis to Secretary of War, iO April 1900, CWS 2:1159. For the division of Luzon see Hq, DivPhil, G.O. No. 1,7 May 1900, in "Otis 1900," m 1900 1:4:442-4; ANJ 37 (7 May 1900 and 9 June 1900). For Otis' continued belief in the pacification of the Philippines after 1899, see "Statement of General Elwell S. Otis," Senate, Affairs, pp. 732-3. For similar optimistic statements, see Lt. Col. Edwin Haye's comments in ANJ 37 (28 April 1900); Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan's comments in ANJ 37 (26 May 1900); "A Year's Work in Luzon" ANJ 37 (9 June 1900).

34 "Otis 1900," WD 1900 1:4:448-561 ; Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 128-149; Owen, "War in Albay" pp. 579-85. For text of G.O. 40 and G.O. 43 see Senate, Affairs, pp. 111-28; Lt. William R. Smedberg, to Capt. William A. Burnside, 7 January 1900, RG 395, series 2148, ID, DNL, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Dec. 1899 to Apr. 1900, LS 27, [hereafter cited as 395/2148]. For a critical overview of American military civil govern­ ment, see Mulrooney, "No Victor, No Vanquished." 61

35 "MacArthur 1900," W 1900 1:4:61 ; quote "useful agencies" from Lt. Col. Enoch Crowder to C.G., DSL, 5 February 1901, RG 395, series 2330, DSL, General Correspondence, Apr. 1900 to Nov. 1901, Box 18, CA 225 [hereafter cited as 395/2330]; Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 194-5. For MacArthur's criticism of Otis' scattering strategy, see William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 14 July 1900 and 18 August 1900, William H. Taft Papers, Series 21, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as WHTPj.

36 Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 31 August 1900, CWS 2:1203-41; "MacArthur 1900," WD 1900 1:5:65-6; ANJ 38 (29 December 1900); Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," pp. 298-304. In the Department of Northern Luzon, for example, of the 1,241 surrenders over half came from the pacified Second District while the troublesome First District had only 78, see Hq, DNL to SMG, 17 September 1900, RG 395, series 2130, Hq, DNL, Letters Sent, Apr. to Dec. 1900, LS 674 [hereafter cited as 395/2130].

37 Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 193-9; Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, U.S. Army, 21 October 1900, Correspondence of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, series 386152, "Copies of Correspondence and Reports of Organization of Native Police or Constabulary in the Philippines," National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as 94/386152]; General Orders No. 87, 18 June 1900, Office of the Military Governor, RG 395, series 2070, Hq, DivPhil, Special and General Orders and Circulars, 1900-1917, 1919-1920, [hereafter cited as 395/2070] a copy of this appears in "MacArthur 1900, " WD 1900 1:5:64-5; Maj. Gen Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 28 May 1900, CWS 2:1172-3. For an idea on the confusion over native police policy, see the correspondence in RG 395, series 2412, 2D, DSL, Correspon­ dence and Reports Relating to the District, Oct. 1900 to Apr. 1901, "Native Police" packet, [hereafter cited as 395/2412]. For one particular example of MacArthur's policy of stripping local police of their weapons see Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 28 June 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1, Laoag, IN, Letters and Telegrams Sent Jan. 1900 to Dec. 1902, [hereafter cited as 395/4043]. For Taft's complaints over MacArthur's procrastination, see William H. Taft to Elihu Root, letters of 13 September, 8 November, 30 November, 1900, WHTP, series 21. 62

For a conflicting view of MacArthur’s role in the organization of police, see Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 213-4

38 Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to Maj. John 6. Ballance, 2 August 1900, RG 395, series 3061, Bangued, Abra, Letters Sent Relating to Civil Affairs, Jan. 1900 to Aug. 1901, CS 18 [hereafter cited as 395/3061]. For similar sentiments see. Col. William P. Duvall to Maj. John G. Ballance, 4 June 1900, RG 395, series 5617, San Fernando, Un., Letters Sent, Jan. 1900 to Sept. 1906, vol. 1 [hereafter cited as 395/5617]; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 5 May 1900,395/2330, LR 333. For progressive attitudes among American officers see Gates, Schoolbooks. p. 64-70.

39 "Taft Statement," Senate, Affairs pp. 135-40; Senate, Philippine Com­ mission. p. 17; Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees," pp. 304-9; Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 161-3.

40 ANJ 38(10 November 1900).

41 Elihu Root to Secretary of State, 2 November 1900, 94/349329.

42 For a copy of the proclamation see 1901 1:4:91-2. For a copy of G.O. No. 100, see Senate. Affairs, dp. 971-82. For MacArthur’s intention to issue it see Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 25 December 1900, CWS 2:1137-8. For an analysis of G.O. 100 see Richard S. Hart.igan, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War (Chicago: Precedent Press, 1983).

43 "MacArthur 1901," 1901 1:4:90 Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Barry to C.G., DNL, 395/2133, Box 18, LR 20693.

44 Gates, Schoolbooks. p. 206. See also Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 251; Taylor, Historv. pp. 19-20 HS.

45 Brig. Gen. Merritt Barber to C.G., DNL, 22 September 1900, RG 395/ 2130, LS 702; Col. Edward B. Williston, Provost Marshal to C.G., DNL, 20 June 1900, RG 395, series 2269, 4D, DNL, Letters and Telegrams Received Apr. 1900 to Oct. 1901, [hereafter cited as 395/2269]. For the lack of a previous American policy on prisoners see LeRoy, Americans. 2:256. For the issuance of G.O. 100 in other areas before 63

MacArthur’s proclamation, see G.O. No. 24, Hq, DSL, 5 June 1900, in Senate, Affairs, pg. 40; "Proclamation," Office of Chief Assistant, ID, DNL, 15 June 1900, RG 395, series 5583, Vigan, I locos Sur, Letters Received Feb. 1900 to Dec. 1902, Box 1 [hereafter cited as 395/5583]. For Funston’s summary execu'^ion of the guerrillas under the provisions of G.O. 100 in an area where they had not been issued, see Funston, Memories, pp. 331 -5; ANJ 37 (14 April 1900). Indicative of the Army’s confusion over the actual meaning of the provisions of G.O. 100 is the case of a lieutenant in an area where G.O. 100 had been issued being almost court martialed for shooting a spy, see "Proceedings of a Board of Officers Convened Purusant to a Telegram from Hdqrs. 1st Dist., Dept. Northern Luzon, dated Vigan, P.I., Nov. 24, 1900, ” 21 December 1900, RG 395, series 4047, Laoag, llocos Norte, Letters and Telegrams Received, 1900-1902, LR 4496.

46 For examples of offices urging the implementation of 6.0.100, see Lt. Col. James H. Parker to Theodore Roosevelt, 18 November 1900, series 1, reel 7, Theodore Rooosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as TRP]. For examples of the general upsurge in morale after the issuing of MacArthur’s proclamation, see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL. 17 January 1901, RG 395, series 2150, ID, DNL, Letters and Telegrams Sent Apr. 1900 to Nov. 1901, vol. 4, LS 83 [hereafter cited as 395/2150]; Sherwood Coleman to Theodore Roosevelt, 10 January 1901, TRP, series 1, reel 8.

47 "MacArthur 1901,”# 1901 1:4:94-6, 114-25; Hq. DivPhil toC.G., DNL, 11 March 1901, 395/2269, Box 2. For deportation see William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 18 September 1900, WHTP, series 21; Maj. Gen. Henry Corbin to Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, 26 December 1900, TRP, series 1, reel 8. For new surrender policy, see Provost Marshal General [2D, DSL] to C O., 2 January 1901, RG 395, series 2408, Hq, DSL, Letters Received, Nov. 1899 to Apr. 1901, Box 3, LR 8. For the Federal Party, see "Plat­ form of the Federal Party December 21 1900,” Senate, Affairs, pp. 310- 19;. Taylor, History, p. 46 HS; Steinberg, Philippines, pp. 45-8; Ragsdale, "Coping With the Yankees." pp. 316-9; PIR SD 899.

48 Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 4 January 1901, CWS 2:1241-2. Troop strength figures from RG 153, series 12184, Records of the Judge Advocate General, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 54

49 "MacArthur 1901,"# 1901 1:4:92-106; "Chaffee 1901,"# 1901 1:7:8-11; Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 225-43

50 Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 238-9; Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin to Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, 16 March 1901, CWS 2:1259; Maj. Thomas Ward to Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chafee, 21 June 1901. CWS 2:1285. For the organi­ zation of Separate Brigades see "Chaffee 1902," # 1902 1:9:187-8.

51 6.0. No. 66, 4 July 1902, CWS 2:1352-3. For the campaign In Samar see Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 249-256; Joseph L. Schott, The Ordeal of Samar (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrll Co., 1964); David L. Fritz, "Before the Howling Wilderness;' The Military Career of Jacob Hurd Smith, 1862- 1902," Military Affairs 43 (December 1979): 178-85. An extremely inaccuarate view of the campaign Is given In Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp. 219-35. For the popular response to these campaigns see Welch, Response to imperialism , pp. 138-41. CHAPTER TWO: THE FIRST DISTRICT, DNL

A review of the telegraphic dispatches which we have presented shows the difficulties experienced by General Young's troops increased greatly after they entered these northwestern provinces, because of the efforts of the Tagalo chiefs to incite the inhabitants to active hostility by every possible artifice, appealing to their creed, superstitions and race prejudices, and by ruthlessly enforcing the demands which they made upon them through robbery and murder. The dispatches show that our men were gladly received by the mass of the people upon entering the provinces, that later, a portion of the people under insurgent impressment contributed in men and money to drive the Americans out, and finally that the great majority, gaining confidence, united with our troops to destroy the Tagalos and the robber bands which they directed.'

Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis spoke for many U.S. Army officers when he insisted the Philippine War was a Tagalog rebellion in which other Filipinos had no interest. He spoke for a much smaller group when he insisted that the war was to all intents and purposes over in May 1900. As one of the first non-Tagalog areas occupied by the Army, the First District was seen as something of a showcase for Army benevolence. It was the site of one of the earliest and most intensive Army efforts at establishing civil govern­ ment. Within a few months this non-military pacification policy was

65 66

MAP 2

A 6 t,c < y

“^Wa-Ce^rJ •

FIRST DISTRICT D.N.L. 67 shaken by the discovery of insurrecto among the new governments and a religiously inspired revolt. By 1901, Otis' successor, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, would regard the district as "for many months the worst in

Luzon."2 The pacification of the First District demonstrates both the limi­ tations of early Army pacification policy and the quickness and adaptability of field officers in the provinces. The First District, Department of Northern Luzon, comprised the four "llocano" provinces of llocos Norte, llocos Sur, Union, and Abra and the "Mountain" provinces of Benguet, Lepanto, and Bontoc. The district had a total area of some 8,000 square miles and a population estimated at 531,000. The majority of the population was llocano, with some Tagalog and Chinese minorités, and heavily concentrated on the eastern China Sea coast and the Abra River valley. In the Mountain provinces were aboriginal tribesmen known collectively as Igorrotes. About 80% of the district was mountainous and communications were restricted to the Camino Real up the coast, some internal trails, and the Abra River. During the summer monsoon season the few roads became muddy footpaths or were completely washed out. With the exception of a small garrison in Benguet, the American forces were stationed in the four llocano provinces' and left the sparsely populated and rugged Mountain provinces alone.3 The Philippine Revolution in the llocano provinces was slow in developing and there is little indication of any disturbances during the Revolt of 1896. After the Pact of Biac na Bato there was an attempt by some friars and Spanish officials to stamp out any traces of nationalism. On March 24, 1898 Isobel Abaya staged an abortive nationalist uprising at 68

Candon, llocos Sur. He attacked the local constabulary quarters and murdered a Spanish friar. When this revolt collapsed, Abaya took to the mountains and recruited a band of Igorrotes in Bontoc, which he later placed under Aguinaldo. The region was conquered for the Philippine Republic in August 1898 by twenty-two year old Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio who brought a small force up from Nueva Ecija. After taking San Fernando de Union, Tinio was joined by much of the populace and Spanish resistance collapsed.4 The Filipino forces in northwestern Luzon had originally intended to fight a conventional campaign against an expected American amphibious landing on the llocano coast. William B. Wilcox, a U.S. Navy paymaster who visited the area shortly before the outbreak of hostilities estimated there were 3,500 Filipino troops in the region. Perhaps more significantly, he found that not only every town but nearly every barrio had a small garrison of about twelve men. While Wilcox was critical of the lack of training in the Republican Army, he was impressed with its popular support, number of weapons, and large militia. Felipe Buencamino, who inspected the llocos region in the spring of 1899 as a special investigator for the Philippine Republic, noted the strong entrenchments being constructed along the coast and the benefits of the mountainous terrain. He also was impressed with the sharp appearence of the Filipino soldiers and the popular enthusiasm for the Filipino cause.5 Tinio's regular forces in northwestern Luzon were divided into a four battalion "Tinio Brigade," with each of the llocano provinces furnishing a battalion. At least some of these battalions were commanded by officers drawn from the provincial elite. Originally intended primarily as a 69 defensive force, the Tinio Brigade was sent into Pangasinan province in November 1899 to hold Aguinaldo's line of retreat open. Most of the Brigade was destroyed either at the battle of San Jacinto on November 11 or in the following campaign in northwestern Luzon.^ American troops arrived in northwestern Luzon less as forces prepa­ red to begin an organized occupation than as scattered units in confused pursuit of Emilio Aguinaldo and the revolutionary army. In November 1899, Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton landed near San Fabian, Pangasinan, in an attempt to cut off the retreating Filipino forces. After a sharp battle with Tinio's forces at San Jacinto, Wheaton sent Maj. Peyton C. March and a battalion of the 33rd infantry, U.S.V., after Aguinaldo and Tinio's retreating forces. After destroying Aguinaldo's bodyguard at Tila Pass on December 2, this battalion chased the Filipino president up to the Bontoc border, capturing much of his staff but unable to overtake Aguinaldo. Other Army units fol­ lowed, fighting scattered battles with Tinio's retreating forces. On Decem­ ber 9, after a three hour running battle at Dingras, llocos Norte, American forces captured most of Tinio's ammunition and routed his retreating army. With the organized Filipino forces destroyed, detachments of the 33rd and 34th under Col. Luther R. Hare made an epic march across the Cordillera Norte and rescued several American prisoners of war.7 While the destruction of the organized Philippine conventional forces removed visible opposition to Army occupation, the Americans quickly found they had new problems with which to contend. The speed of the American advance had made chaos of regimental and divisional organiza­ tions. The troops were exhausted and many were footsore or sick; one 400- 70 man battalion had been reduced to 87 men fit for duty m two weeks of campaigning. Detatchments had been dropped off to garrison towns along the route and officers had been attached and detached with little attempt to preserve command or staff lines. In Union province the Army was plagued with what were initially perceived as "Tagalos" and ladrones [bandits] who cut telegraph wires, sniped, and robbed with impunity. As Otis noted, the necessity of creating some form of civil-military organization for the Filipinos, if not the occupying forces themselves, was "urgent.''^ Because Otis believed that the Philippine War was essentially due to disgruntled Tagalogs, he had great expectations for civil government in non- Tagalog areas such as northern Luzon. Otis saw pacification as entailing the restoration of order through the garrisoning of towns, protecting the populace, and creation of a working civil government. He did not believe that Aguinaldo's partisans would continue armed resistance against these new civil governments. Indeed, he never really acknowledged the existence of a guerrilla war. Secure in his assumption that the majority of the Filipino population was friendly, he believed that all that was needed was honest government and Army protection.^ On December 20, 1899, Otis placed Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young in charge of the newly created District of North-Western Luzon and gave him a mandate to create civil government in his district. Young in turn further sub-divided the district into provincial commands with a military governor in command of each province and the troops in it. This basic organization was maintained when the District of North-Western Luzon was renamed the First District, Department of Northern Luzon, in the reorganization of 7 71

April 1900. Young was instructed to organize towns along the lines of G.0.43 and assigned the 33rd U.S.V. infantry, 3rd U.S. Cavalry, and a battalion each of the 34th and 29th U.S.V. Infantry as a constabulary force. In March 1900 the 48th U.S.V. Infantry replaced the battalion of the 29th. 10 The new district commander, Samuel B. M. Young, was a sixty year old veteran of the Civil War, several Indian campaigns, and the Cuban expedition. Although he had proven himself an able and aggressive field commander. Young was unable to master the complexities of Philippine guerrilla war. Having decided, upon entering northwestern Luzon, that resistance came from Tagalogs and bandits, he persisted in that misperception throughout most of his tenure. Easily frustrated. Young showed a penchant for advoca­ ting extreme solutions on paper, including a controversial suggestion that the Americans adopt the methods of "European nations" in dealing with the guerrilla war. These he defined as summary executions, concentration, and complete military rule. His confused and often contradictory reports led his superiors to view him as an alarmist. 11 Despite his own personal limitations. Young was not a failure as district commander. He was fortunate enough to be assigned capable subor­ dinates, but Young should be given full credit for encouraging them and weeding out incompetents. While he lacked the ability to create policies (beyond extreme or impractical ones) he supported the efforts of those officers who could. It is no accident that some of the most creative coun­ terinsurgency policies were developed under Young's tenure. There is no evidence he attempted to implement the extreme measures he advocated in his letters or that he tolerated misconduct in his theater. Although he 72 disliked many Filipino characteristics, he urged that loyal Filipinos be armed, and he was a strong advocate of total state support for education. He seems to have enjoyed good relations with the provincial elite and clerics. Critics who point to his extreme statements in the fall of 1900 overlook that much of his concern was for those Filipinos who had endan­ gered themselves by their support of American government.’2 Civil administration in northwestern Luzon was coordinated at the district level by Captain [later Major] John Green Ballance. Ballance had served with Young in the Northern Expedition and had impressed Young as one of the finest officers in the Army. Personally chosen by Young, Ballance was appointed Civil Governor, Chief Assistant and Advisor to the Military Governor in February. This in effect set up two channels of communication, with officers required to report on civil affairs to Ballance and on military affairs to their military superior. In practice, however, these lines of authority were often confused, and to all intents and purposes, Ballance functioned as a Chief of Staff to Young. He also supervised much of the district intelligence and the enforcement of district general orders. As a confidant and occasional emissary for Young, Ballance probably played a vital role in the determination and implementation of policy. 13 In keeping with Otis' emphasis on civil government, northwestern Luzon was the site of a major effort at municipal government. On the same day the district was created, officers were ordered to establish civil governments under G.O. 43. The practical emphasis of Army civil govern­ ment can be seen in the instructions issued to organizing officers. They were ordered to devote at least one day to the formation of each municipal 73 government and to impress upon the population the necessity of a well organized police to hunt down Jadrones. Officers were also enjoined to remind the populace that while the U.S. Army forces were available for assistance, the main burden of self-protection lay upon the individual towns. The speed with which these civic governments were created was impressive; in three months 63 pueblos were organized, each with a présidente, town council, and police fo r c e . 14 Despite the haste with which they were established, most officers believed that the municipal governments would work. The civil reports of early 1900 stress the satisfaction of the population with American authority, the implementation of sanitation measures, and the creation of local police forces. In keeping with previous policy, the Army assumed that civil government rested in part on the consent and participation of the governed. From the very first, Filipinos and Army officers cooperated in the creation of civil government in a variety of ways and to a variety of degrees. One proponent of a sort of "Filipinization" was Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze, the military governor of llocos Norte. Howze appointed a local politician, Aguedo Abayani, as Civil Adjutant and had the local municipal governments in the province work through him.15 Along with an attempt to establish municipal governments went a vigorous attempt to reform district education. Officers were ordered to establish schools in their towns and monthly reports on teachers, salaries, and attendance were expected from each post commanders as part of their civil report. In April, Young requested authority to hire soldiers to teach in local schools and to pay them an extra stipend. In June, he reported that 74 there were 203 schools in his district with 10,714 students attending out of a total school age population of 44,716. He also outlined an ambitious program to establish two schools in each of the district's 75 pueblos and requested English teachers, building materials, and school supplies, all of which "should be maintained by the Government." Young's subordinates echoed his interest in education with various degrees of enthusiasm. In llocos Norte, Howze urged the building of new schools and development of a Spanish-English-11ocano primer. In Vintar, Capt. Frank L. French helped organize a local board of education and assisted them in building new desks, painting the school, and cleaning up the grounds. In Laoag, school attendance a climbed from 253 students in May to 625 in October, with teaching being done in Spanish and English. Col. William P. Duvall, the commander in Union province, was less enthusiastic, believing that military considerations were more important that civil reform. He worked hard at education, however, and by February 1901 over half the registered pupils in the First District came from Union province. The initial optimism which characterized civil government soon faded before a host of unforeseen problems. 6.0. 43, while it provided a basis for organizing municipalities, had serious weaknesses when put into practical application. Although it designated certain industries and trades as liable for taxation, most of these categories had little utility in the agricultural pueblos of the district. Ballance's efforts to civilize the natives by prohibi­ ting cockfighting destroyed a major source of municipal income. Unable to raise their own revenue, some municipalities were dependent on the fines from the garrrison's provost court. Other towns simply did not pay their 75 employees. At first both Ballance and Young attempted to follow the dictates of the G.O. 43 by insisting that municipalities provide for the salaries of their officials, teachers, and police. By June, however. Young was protesting vehemently that the area was "taxed to death" and reporting that until finances were straightened out there was little hope of any functioning civil government in the district.'8 in addition to the weaknesses of G.O. 43, there were numerous other problems with military civil government. There was simply not enough officers to fill both military and civil requirements. The slowness of the Army bureaucracy in Manila in confirming local appointments or authorizing essential payments caused further delays. The Army ran into problems with entrenched local customs and interests. Young cynically remarked that in most civic elections the populace voted for whoever they believed could plunder them least. Ballance castigated the municipal council of Vigan for appropriating nearly all the town’s revenues for their own salaries. One présidente was found to be selling illegal identification passes to his gullible townsmen. In their efforts to establish civil order and support their civic officials some garrison officers were drawn into local rivalries or factional struggles. A final problem was maintaining order among the mountain tribes, or Igorrotes, who occasionally raided the lowland town on head-hunting expeditions.'^ The main problem facing civil government, however, was the active resistance of a guerrilla organization that placed conflicting demands upon the loyalty of the native population. Like the Americans, the Filipino revolutionaries sought to establish a form of government which would give 76 them control over the civilian population. Through their influence over the présidentes, the guerrillas could draw supplies, feed their men, and if necessary disperse their forces and take refuge in the nearest barrio. As Tinio's forces broke up in late 1899, his officers issued orders to local présidentes forbidding collaboration with the Americans, ordering sup­ plies, and instructing locals to furnish information on U.S. movements. Civic officials who aided the Americans were kidnapped and executed. The guerrillas also mobilized the militia in many towns and the townspeople joined with the insurrectos in attacks on U.S. Army garrisons at Namac- pacan and Vigan. In the face of this increasingly organized resistance. Army officers abandoned their belief that the enemy was "small bands of thieves and robbers," and began calling for more attention to the military aspects of pacification.20 The early guerrilla organization in northwestern Luzon remained in some f lu>. due to Aguinaldo's desire to retain northern Luzon under his own control. The president's precipitate retreat left the insurgent forces in the hands of Tinio. A young Tagalog from Nueva Ecija, Tinio had fought in the Revolution of 1896 and gone into exile with Aguinaldo, returning in 1898 to lead the Filipino forces that drove the Spanish out of the llocos provinces. As an outsider, Tinio's authority was tentative. While some Army officers believed he was responsible for guerrilla operations throughout the district others believed he was dependent on his provincial commanders. His captured correspondence indicates Tinio did issue orders coordinating the activities of provincial operations, appointing commanders, and maintaining guerrilla bands. He also wrote proclamations for the general public and 77 warned "back-sliding" individuals. His actual control over events in his districts was not firm and he was often out of touch with his subordinates.

Some leaders, such as Gregorio Aglipay, never recognized his authority.2i On the provincial level, insurrecto authority was maintained by Lt. Col. Juan Villamor, Col. Bias Villamor, Maj. Juan Quitterez, Maj. Vincente Salazar, Lt. Col. Joaquin Alejandrino, Father Gregorio Aglipay, and several other lesser guerrilla leaders. Lt. Col. Juan Villamor was the most able of these provincial commanders. A former officer in the Spanish Army, he had been an early proponent of guerrilla warfare, an editor for a revolutionary paper, and a delegate to the Malolos Congress. He had strong connections with the provincial elites in Abra and the llocos, giving him access to sup­ plies and information. A competent and efficient guerrilla leader, he was highly respected by the Army officers who faced him. Aglipay, an excom­ municated llocano priest, had been an influential figure in Aguinaldo's government. He played a key role in the llocos Norte revolt of April 1900, but his relations with Tinio were so hostile that Tinio ordered his a r r e s t.2 2 The insurrecto military forces in northwestern Luzon were divided into full time, or regular, guerrillas and a part-time militia, often referred to as the Sandahatan, or bolo-men. The regulars were the military elite of the revolutionary forces and were responsible for such combat operations as ambushing U.S. detachments or attacking towns. According to their instruc ■ tions, they operated in small bands of 30 to 50 men, with some 200 to a province dispersed into three or four provincial zones. Ideally, these bands v/ere supposed to consolidate a few times a month for a major operation. In practice, the regulars seem to have operated in even smaller groups of 78 five to ten men whose membership and organization changed constantly. When attacked by Army patrols, guerrillas would flee for the nearest barrio, hide their weapons, and become “amigos."23 The militia, or Sandahatan, were a military forces which acted as the intelligence and supply arms of the guerrilla infrastructure. While the regulars were supposed to deal with the U.S. Army, the militia spied on Army movements and insured that supplies were gathered, taxes paid, and villagers remained loyal. The militia were further divided into a small semi-regular force and a number of volunteers who could be called upon for tax collecting, wire cutting, or intimidating collaborators. In the First District the militia rarely joined with the regulars, though in the fall of 1900 it is clear that the insurrecto forces were made up of both regulars and part-time militia.24 Of equal importance with the military arm was the Insurrecto civil and administrative network or infrastructure. The regular forces were supplied and paid by contributions levied on each native and collected by tax collectors backed up by the milita. Many of these supplies were taken to cuarteJs, or depots, allowing the regulars to spend weeks in a particular area. The civil administrator, or jefe principal, was also responsible for enforcing the insurrecto proscriptions on collaboration, establishing outposts to spy on American forces, and disseminating guerrilla o rd e rs .2 5 In its ideal state, regulars, militia, and jefes all worked together in the manner described by one officer:

The Insurrectos have a regularly organized government thoughout these districts, with a Jefe principal and assistants for each peublo and corresponding officials for each "centre," 79

which comprises from three to eight or ten adjoining barrios. In each "centro" is an irregular force, usually a platoon of guerrillas, who keep their arms hidden but ready to turn out at a moment's notice, either to join the regular troops of the Insurgents or to attack small bodies of Americans whenever a favorable opportunity exists. In addition there are hundreds of men—so called “hermanos" (brothers), armed with fighting (not working) bolos. Besides these irregulars, who ordinarily remain at or near their homes, there were...not less than from four hundred to five hundred riflemen under the orders of Generals Tinio, Aglipay, Alejandrino, Natividad, Colonels Salazar, Bias Villamor, Comandante Celedeno and others.26

A key factor in maintaining this system was the maintenance of guerrilla influence over local municipal governments. By controlling the local political structure, the revolutionary leadership could insure that their regular troops would be fed and protected and that their jefes could operate with impunity. If a town's leaders were hostile to the guerrillas, they could inform the American garrison of where the cuarteJs were kept, who was in the militia, and what guerrilla bands were in the area. The guerrillas recognized the threat posed by the Army civil governments and singled out for punishment those présidentes who failed to cooperate with the guerrillas. According to First District statistics, civic officials were the targets for one quarter of all the recorded insurrecto assassin­ ations of pro-American natives. In the face of this intimidation, many civic officials gave a nominal loyalty to the guerrillas or actively assisted th e m .2 7

While it enjoyed the support of most officers and was thoroughly instituted, the Army attempt to pacify northwestern Luzon through civil government weas not a success. The speed with which the municipal 80 governments were established, the problems inherent in their organizational structure, and the smallness of the American occupying forces caused substantial problems. When this was combined with the growing Filipino resistance, the entire policy was undermined. While some officers were able to establish working governments in areas free of guerrilla influence, others found themselves increasingly cut off from popular support. The events in Union and llocos Sur in March and April 1900 demonstrated the extent of guerrilla resistance and forced district officers to re-examine their pacification policies and methods. The fragility of Army pacification was thoroughly demonstrated in Union province in the spring of 1900. Approximately 53 miles long and between 6 to 24 miles wide. Union Province is a narrow corridor running along the China Sea up into llocos Sur province with a population in 1902 of 136,000.28 The initial American forces in Union were detachments dropped off by Young's forces during their pursuit of Aguinaldo and Tinio. Small in numbers and often composed of sick or fatigued men, they were too weak to protect the Army wagons going up the coast road to supply Young's forces from attack by guerrillas. The Army forces were further weakened when a detachment of Macabebe auxiliaries were withdrawn for disciplinary reasons. While Young and Otis were concerned about the rural violence and the small Army forces, Lt. Col. Henry W. Wessels, the first American commander of the province, believed there were only "a few small bands of thieves as there are in every c o u n tr y . "29 Over the next month, Wessels alternated between excessive optimism and alarmism. In February he complained that friendly Filipinos were being murdered, yet in March he 81 told two officers he could ride from one end of the province to the other without an escort.^o Neither Wessels' subordinates nor his superiors shared his confidence. Young commented that some areas of Union were "very bad" and full of guerrillas who were "amigos in the daytime." Privately, Young believed that Wessels physical infirmities, including being almost completely deaf, and his "incompetence" made him unfit to govern.31 One officer in the province, Capt. Franklin 0. Johnson, reported that there were at least five insurrecto organizations within ten miles of the town of Namacpacan alone. Johnson claimed that the guerrillas had a "well organized system of espionage," which reported Army movements while his own spies made him distrust the recently elected municipal officers. He pointed out that in five weeks of activity in Union the Army had lost six dead, six wounded, and two missing as well as fourteen rifles.32 The province's reputation as a guerrilla stronghold extended beyond the officers who served there. Shortly before he left Manila, Col. William P. Duvall was shown a map of the province by General Otis and told, "This, to-day[sic], is the worst part of the Philippine lslands."33 In early March a leader of the Guardia de Honor religious sect, Crispulo Patajo, was turned over the the American authorities by the présidente of Bauang as a suspected outlaw. Originally a religious cofraternity, the Guardia had been a source of trouble in the provinces to the south of Union because of their anti-Spanish activities, agrarian radicalism, and millenarian beliefs. Patajo, however, was an intelligent, pragmatic, and capable leader of Union's Guardias and apparently devoid of 82 the fanaticism attributed to the sect. Interviewed by Lt. William T. Johnston, he denounced Bauang"s présidente as an insurrecto agent and offered to expose the entire guerrilla military and administrative network in the area. Johnston, who was soon to demonstrate a remarkable flair for counter insurgency intelligence, gave Patajo his freedom and armed him. In the next weeks, Patajo identified guerrillas living in Army-occupied towns, showed Johnston the location of insurrecto supply depots, and even fought on the American side in several skirmishes. More importantly, he explained to Johnston the connection between the guerrilla bands in the field and the towns which supplied and sheltered them. In mid-March, Wessels was replaced by Col. William P. Duvall, who assigned Johnston the task of investigating the connection between the Army-organized municipal governments and the guerrilla bands. Johnston and Patajo examined nine pueblos in Union province, several of which were garrisoned by American forces. His conclusions showed the depth of insurrecto influence in Union. While the towns varied in their degree of support to the guerrillas, all of them contributed money and supplies and all did so with the support of their municipal governments. In the weeks following the Army's municipal organization, the newly appointed town officals had met with guerrilla leaders and clandestinely begun to organize their own guerrilla bands. Over the governments organized under G.O. 43, the guerrillas had superimposed their own organization of regulars, militia, and jefe principals. Funds were raised by a taxes and by doctoring the municipal books. Regular guerrilla forces were raised and quartered in the barrios or in camps just outside the towns. Revolutionary leaders, including 83

Tinio, actually lived near or in Union’s towns and met frequently with the American-appointed civic officials. The impact of Johnston’s findings was substantial. His report demonstrated that the Philippine War was not over and that the Army’s municipal governments by themselves could not guarantee pacification. It was "the first news that the insurrectos were actively at work organizing and the first indication that the American authorities had that the native officials of the towns and others were playing a double role."34 Johnston’s model became the accepted view of insurgency held by the Army command. MacArthur believed it was "altogether the best description which has reached these headquarters of the insurgent method of organizing and maintaining a guerrilla force." He incorporated many of Johnston’s findings into his own report of guerrilla war and into his later policies, which were implemented throughout the archipelago. Indeed, MacArthur’s model of the towns as centers of the guerrilla resistance owes most of its inspiration directly to Johnston’s report on Union’s municipalities.35 Within Union, the investigations of Johnston and Patajo had an immediate effect on Army counter insurgency policy. Under Duvall, American counterinsurgency efforts were now directed at destroying not only the guerrilla bands^ but the infrastructure in the towns wnich supported them as well. Duvall appointed Patajo as a chief of detectives and authorized him to recruit his Guardia de Honor followers as an American militia. They were allowed to turn in any rifle they obtained for the $30 reward authorized by Otis. In the next few weeks, Patajo raised between 400 to 500 volunteers who ranged throughout Union and Benguet, often with 84

American forces for support, and hunted down guerrilla units. At the same time, American forces with loyal native guides were able to inflict substantial casualties on the regular guerrilla bands. So successful were these operations that the insurrecto organization in Union and Benguet was all but destroyed by the end of May.36 Duvall also established a provincial intelligence system that made use of both the Guardia de Honor and former insurrectos. In early April he captured the rosters of two of the regular guerrilla companies stationed in Union, allowing his subordinates to "pick up insurrectos like chickens off a roost." Captured guerrillas were given their freedom if they agreed to accompany U.S. forces and identify their former comrades. Having comprom­ ised themselves by collaboration and knowing that they risked guerrilla retaliation, they "seemed most anxious to ferret out all insurrectos in this vicinity."37 The Filipino guerrilla leadership recognized the danger posed by the Guardia de Honor adherence to the Americans. In late March, Col. Bias Vi 11 amor wrote that the Guardi as were supporting the Americans more and more and the southern area of the province was becoming disillusioned with the revolutionary cause. The provincial insurrecto leadership threatened to burn any towns who tolerated the presence of Guardia supporters. In addition to threats, the guerrillas attempted to organize an dr\\.\-Guardia campaign using the regulars of Maj. Angeles band to attack the Guardia militia throughout the province. When these measures failed, Tinio reversed previous policy and instructed his subordinate to conciliate the Guardias if at all possible. Patajo was not included in this amnesty, and the 85 guerrillas offered a reward of $150 [Mex.] for the head of that "traidor y terrible Americanista llamado Cripulo P a ta jo .“ 38 The insurgents found it almost impossible to regain their hold on Union because of the establishment of a Guardia de Honor infrastructure in towns to replace that of the insurrectos. Patajo’s reccomendations for municipal officers were used by Ballance and Duvall to replace disloyal officials with americanistas. Many of these were Guardia partisans and some were Patajo’s relatives. The presence of loyal officials actively committed to the American cause gave the Army forces in Union a chance to conduct more active opartions. Leaving the protection of the towns to volunteers and local police forces, the Army and Guardia volunteers undertook long sweeps into the mountains. As Patajo's men moved through Union and Benguet on patrols, they held rallies in which villagers denounced insurrecto agents, confessed previous misdeeds, embraced the American flag, bought Guardia rosaries, and Joir.sd the sect. If necessary, Patajo would establish a new government and threaten the native elites who had supported the guerrillas. According to one critic they forced influential Filipinos to "come down from the fence" by "bringing to light all acts of disloyalty on their parts."39 In their support of Patajo’s volunteers, officers in Union often had to go against the official Army policy against the Guardia de Honor. Otis viewed them as "religious fanatics" and probably forbade Army officers to utilize their services. Army officers, with Young’s complicity, atttempted to muddy their own connection with the Guardias while pointing out the hatred which the insurrectos bore the sectarians. Johnston set the tone 8 6 by writing of Patajo; "as to whether he is a guardia d’honor I do not know or c a re ."4 0 in addition to problems from Manila, officers in Union were casti­ gated by Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith, commanding in neighboring Pangasinan province. Smith complained to his superiors of both the utilization of the Guardia in Union and the character of Crispulo Patajo. Duvall and Young also evaded or ignored several inquiries from Manila on the subject of their new recruits. The success of Patajo and his followers, both in Union and elsewhere, mitigated against their dismissal. Later, when Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, who had been involved in dx\i\- Guardia activities in Pangasinan, look command of the First District, he continued to utilize Patajo and his followers.^i The alliance between Union's Army officers and the Guardia de Honor was also threatend when civil government was instituted in the Mountain province of Benguet. Phelps Whitemarsh, the new governor of Ben­ guet, launched an attack on both Guardia and Patajo in an official letter to MacArthur. Whitemarsh also complained to the head of the Philippine Commission, Willaim H. Taft, and Taft in turn complained to Secretary of War Elihu Root. Taft argued that while Duvall was a good soldier, he was a bad administrator and had "produced a system of terrorism by using a secret society opposed to the insurrection and permitting its members to guide him in prosecutions that can do no good, but on the contrary, do a great deal of h a rm ."4 2 in spite of repeated protests. Army officers in Union continued to utilize the Guardia as a local militia and even expanded its operations outside the province. 87

The Army's use of Crispulo Patajo and the Guardia de Honor in Union offers a clear example of the individualized pacification programs developed by the Army in the Philippines. In Union the presence of a large number of Filipinos who were potentially hostile to the revolutionaries provided a basis for a popular militia. The Army officers stationed in the province realized the opportunities open to them because of the Guardia- guerrilla feud and encouraged it. The provincial commander, Duvall, was intelligent enough to encourage Johnston’s investigations and to act on them. Believing from the beginning that Filipinos were best suited to fight other Filipinos, Duvall steadily pursued his policy in the face of opposition from both the Army and the Philippine Commission. By adapting the official policy of civil government to the realities of the situation in Union, the Army was able to pacify the province in five months. The war in llocos Norte in April 1900 demonstrates a different aspect of the guerrila war, a popular uprising against the Army that was based on religious fears. The attackers were less partisans of independence than simple villagers who believed that their religion was being threatened. In common with the war in Union province, fifty miles to the south, the war in llocos Norte was essentially a provincial war. The key factors which inspi­ red the revolt were internal and confined within the provincial boundaries. The American pacification campaign was also confined to within the pro­ vince and reflected the response of local officers to the guerrilla war in their immediate area. 8 8

The first American forces to arrive in llocos Norte were U.S. Marines who landed at Laoag to guard supplies for Young's forces. Shortly after, new troops arrived in the province on the coastal road on the heels of Tinio's retreating forces. At Dingras, Howze's battalion of the 34th inflicted the final defeat on the Tinio Brigade and broke it up into scattered groups. In December, civil government was established in Bangui and Laoag and other towns were organized in January and February. Howze, who had distin­ guished himself in the campaign, was appointed the military g o v e r n o r . "^3 Unlike Union, there was almost no sign of insurrecto activity in the llocos Norte for three months after the Army occupation. In part this was due to the weakness of the American forces. There were only five comp­ anies of U.S. troops in llocos Norte and they were broken up into company garrisons and stationed in five towns. As a result, Howze's troops could not patrol the province to seek out guerrillas or gather information on their location. Officers were dependent on information from the newly appointed présidentes, who claimed there were no guerrillas near their towns. Howze believed, however, that "there is a strong undercurrent of bad spirit and preparations for a revolt."44 Throughout March, garrison commanders picked up growing indications that conditions were degenerating. Insurgent activity increased and tele­ graph lines were cut, convoys attacked, and loyal Filipinos threatened. Howze found "juntas" of insurgents being organized in the towns and natives being tatooed or branded with the triangle of the Katipunan society. There was disturbing evidence that the municipal governments were disloyal or under constant intimidation. The presidents of Pasuquin and two 89 suspected Army spies were murdered by the guerrillas. A skirmish on March 4 yielded a proclamation from Tinio calling for a general uprising. The \i\ZQ-présidente of Paoay was arrested for branding 42 men and the vice- presfdente of Vintar was found to be serving as a messenger for Tinio. Father Gregorio Agiipay, a native of llocos Norte, was reported to be organ­ izing the province's inhabitants through the native clergy. Aglipay was reported to have a large force in the Badoc-Batac area, and Howze reported

that, "everybody in that locality [were] insurrectos.""*^ The presence of Aglipay gave a religious aspect to insurrecto activities in llocos Norte that is absent in other districts of Luzon. John Schumacher believes that beyond Aglipay's own leadership there is little evidence of clerical support for the guerrillas. He credits this to Aglipay's excommunication and the anti-clerical policies of the Malolos government. Schumacher's conclusions were not shared by officers serving in llocos Norte, who credited Aglipay with formidable powers in organizing popular support and believed that the clergy actively supported him. Army officers believed that Aglipay used provincial priests to desseminate propaganda, recruit men, and gather supplies. Howze claimed that "all padres in this province are actively supporting the Insurrection" and believed the situation serious enough to warrant a complete purge of the native clergy."*^ On April 11 the Americans captured plans for a poposed uprising later in the month. These plans outlined a provincial revolt and ordered the inhabitants of towns and their surrounding barrios, many of whom had recently been branded and enrolled as Katipunan by Aglipay's agents, to attack their Army garrisons. Although short of men, Howze sent out patrols 90 to disrupt the guerrillas' mobilization and prevent unified action. On April 15 and 16, Army patrols located guerrilla concentrations in the Batac-Badoc area and inflicted substantial losses upon them. On April 16 the thirty-man garrison at Batac was attacked by an estimated 800 insurrectos. The Fil­ ipinos set fire to the town and made several charges using women as human shields. The small Army contingent stood its enemies off from its quarters and the church, where about 1,500 townspeople had sought refuge. Accor­ ding to one account the Aglipay's followers resembled "Mahdi fanatics," while another claimed that they were all drunk. Certainly their attacks against the well armed soldiers were almost suicidal. The Americans later counted 180 dead and captured 135 prisoners.^? A similar attack was made on Laoag the next evening with equal disregard for American firepower and almost equal casualties. Howze wrote to his commanding officer, "they were regular dervish charges. Slaughter terrible." He estimated that over 300 Filipinos had been killed in the two days wheras the Americans had only lost three killed and three w o u n d e d .4 9 Howze responded to the llocos Norte revolt with a combination of magnanimity and firmness. He realized that many of the attackers were not active insurrectos but simple villagers whipped into a religious frenzy. He wished to detach the populace from the guerrillas and then crush the regular bands. Howze ordered the présidentes of Batac and Badoc to send out word to "hombres forced to fight and who do not wish to follow the Insurrectos to come in at once and they will be pardoned '"*9 After a four day grace period in which several hundred Filipinos surrendered, Howze launched an aggressive campaign. U.S. patrols pursued guerrilla bands and 91 ravaged the district around Batac, sending women and children into the town. In one engagement on April 24, the Americans surrounded a guerrilla band and killed 125 insurrectos with "great slaughter." The guerrillas were soon reported to be without food, suffering from disease, and so demoralized that Tinio had to come llocos Norte to attempt to rally them.50 The results of the llocos Norte revolt are difficult to determine. The Americans counted 520 dead and believed they had inflicted substantially more casualties. They had not, as in Union, destroyed the entire guerrilla infrastructure and guerrillas continued to be a problem in the south of the province along the llocos Sur and Abra borders. But even if the failure of the revolt did not lead to the complete pacification of the province, it marked a turning point in the provincial war. The fighting brought most of the guerrillas' infrastructure into the open and the Army was able to purge several municipal governments and replace disloyal officials. The revolt had also incensed the populace in those towns which had been attacked. In Laoag, insurrecto prisoners were whipped and mistreated by the inhabi­ tants, "because their town, which they seem to care very much for, was attacked and threatened with destruction by the bad men of the neighboring towns."5l Similar hostility to the guerrillas may have occurred in other towns as well and prevented them from re-establishing their clandestine organizations. By June, Howze, who had previously been pessimistic about native police, believed they were loyal and should be allowed to keep their weapons. While the Batac-Badoc-Paoay area and the Dingras Valley were recognized insurgent strongholds, they were the exception to the general tranquility of the rest of the province. The April llocos Norte revolt 92

CHART 1

Eng.

Ja Fe Mr Ap My Jn Jl Au Sp Oc No Do da Fe Mr Ap My Month

First District, DNL Engagements, 1900-152 destroyed much of the guerrillas' popular support, shattered their infra­ structure, and left them weakened and on the defensive. The llocos Norte and Union provincial wars made it clear that paci­ fication measures based totally on civil government were not enough to tranquilize the 1st District. In both llocos Norte and Union many municipal governments were shown to be heavily influenced, if not controlled, by the insurrectos. Yet if civil government as the only policy was discredited, officers both at headquarters and in the field were far more aware of the nature of the enemy they faced. The previous misperception that Tagalogs and bandits were the sole problem was slowly replaced with a new view of a united and popular guerrilla resistance. In the late spring, there was increased centralization as new 1st District policies sought to break up the 93

insurrecto infrastructure and give a uniform direction to counterinsur­ gency within the district. The first district-wide policies to be implemented were travel restrictions and the declaration of martial law. On May 22, 1900, 1st District Headquarters issued Circular Letter No. I, requiring all males in the llocos and Union to have a registration certificate. The letter also established restrictions on travel. No male inhabitant over eighteen was allowed outside the jurisdiction of his pueblo without a pass from his présidante. Persons arriving or departing from a barrio had to report to the barrio head, or cabeza within twenty-four hours, and he in turn had to report to the présidante. The présidantes were obliged to keep a regis­ ter of their pueblos' inhabitants and made responsible for arresting all people without p a s s e s .5 3 on June 15, those sections of G.O. 100 concerning the treatment and classification of spies, war rebels, war traitors, and pri­ soners of war were published as a proclamation to the inhabitants. The same proclamation also contained specific prohibitions against inhabitants of occupied territory supplying the enemy with food, shelter, and informa­ tion. Ten days later, 1st District headquarters issued additional prohibi­ tions on the possession or hiding of firearm s.54 These new orders attempted to establish a new basis for both muni­ cipal government and individual responsibility and to define to both soldiers and inhabitants what constituted enemy action. They allowed commanding officers to punish not just the guerrillas in the field but the présidantes who tolerated them and the population who supported them as well. Reali­ zing that civil government was not enough. Young and Ballance began to 94 develop a more comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine. Central to this \was the shift in emphasis in civil government. No longer viewed simply as means of preparing the way for colonial rule, the municipal governments were now perceived as agencies of the new pacification policies. By forcing the municipal officials to be agents of Army policy, they were placed in direct opposition to the insurrectos. Circular Letter No. 1 established a basis for social control over the populace and forced civic governments to aid U.S. counterinsurgency. The publication of the laws of war outlined sanctions that were potentially as harsh as those employed by the guer­ rillas. Civil government was now being utilized as a means of coercion and less as a means of benevolent assimilation. While these laws were enforced sporadically, they did allow officers more opportunities for selective enforcement.55 Another aspect of the new centralized policies in the First District was the organization and arming of native auxiliaries. The Army had entered northwestern Luzon with Castner's Lowe Scouts, a mixed company of American soldiers and Tagalog scouts. This unit was reformed in January 1900 with llocano recruits, and by August it had been built up to 250 men. These scouts were used primarily for patrolling and intelligence work and established a good reputation. Officers who served with them were enthu­ siastic about their ability, while other officers recognized that their use was a necessity in the manpower-poor 1st District, in addition to the officially enlisted U.S. Army Native Scouts, many informal auxiliaries, such as Patajo’s forces, were often raised for specific campaigns.56 95

1st District offices were far less enthusiastic about the establish­ ment of a provincial police force. Under the provisions of G.O. No. 87, MacArthur urged commanders to make suggestions for the raising of provin­ cial constabulary. Young, however, believed that the police were "mere creatures of the présidentes and the people in power. 'S? He proposed a para­ military force modeled on Mexico's Guardia Rural, armed only with antiquated weapons, and under state supervision. In September, Divisional Heaquarters, perhaps in some exasperation at Young's delays, declared that it was "desired that this whole matter of placing arms in the hands of the natives in your district be subject entirely to your orders and control."58 Young used this blanket authorization to table any organization of a provin­ cial police. As late as February 1901 district reports blamed disturbed conditions for the lack of progress in the arming or organization of the native police.59 In addition to Young's tangible obstruction, efforts to organize a dis­ trict police were hindered by the lack of consensus on organization, the slowness of the Army in supplying firearms, and confusion over who would control the police. MacArthur's call for a provincial constabulary seemed to go against the earlier policy to establish municipal police. Most officers shared Young's perplexity over whether native police were to be municipal guards or part of a para-military district constabulary. As a result, sugges­ tions for the organization of native police ranged from battalion-sized units to small squads in each town. Because a coherent policy towards native police was never developed for the entire district, the police were used by individual commanders as an extension of local or provincial pacification.^^ 96

1st District headquarters had better success in its efforts to estab­ lish a central intelligence system. Native spies had been employed from the earliest days of American occupation and Young himself had his own private informers. In the early days of the guerrilla war there was little atttempt to exchange information within the district and Duvall complained that high ranking Filipino officers were allowed to escape because soldiers were not informed of their identités. A centralized district intelligence system was developed when Ballance added the task of collecting and disseminating district intelligence to his duties in May. As district intelligence officer, Ballance passed on information on suspected guerrillas, urged or ordered the arrest of known collectors, and analyzed captured documents.^i The new laws and restrictions, increased emphasis on native auxi­ liaries, and creation of a district intelligence service represent an attempt to establish clear pacification policies throughout the district. They indicate a great deal of innovation and adaptability at district headquarters. Aimed at specific problems common throughout the district, the new policies demonstrated a far more sophisticated view of the situation in the 1 st District. While the travel restrictions struck at insurgent bands and their suppliers, the laws of war educated the population as to the penalties that might be enforced for aiding the enemy. The use of native scouts gave the Army auxiliaries who knew the terrain and local dialects. The early establishment of a district intelligence service recognized the vital need for reliable information and allowed district headquarters to coordinate operations against guerrilla bands. 97

CHART 2

Cas. 10

4 — w I" Ja Fe M Ap M Jn Jy Au Sp Oc No Da Ja Fe M Ap M Months

First District, DNL U.S. Army Casualties, 1900-01^2

With the end of the rainy season in early September the insurgents began a major offensive in the First District. While other areas of the Philippines experienced an upsurge in combat, in no other area did the revo­ lutionary forces so openly challenge American occupation. From September to November the guerrillas inflicted almost 50% more casualties on the American forces than during the rest of the district's pacification. Yet if the offensive had tactical victories, it proved to be a strategic disaster. Instead of maintaining their forces and dragging out the war, the guerrillas gambled on a large offensive to either drive the occupation forces out or influence the presidential elections in the United States. The guerrilla bands achieved some success on the battlefield, but provoked a massive response from the Army. Reinforcements were rushed to threatened areas. 98 strict counterinsurgency policies implemented, and in the towns and provinces officers utilized the experience of a year of guerrilla warfare to implement new and effective pacification measures. The most active area during the guerrilla offensive was Abra, an isolated and mountanous province whose only access was the Abra River. For much of the early war Abra had been one of the quietest areas and it had been exempted from district travel restrictions. The only Army forces in Abra comprised only a weak battalion of the 33rd Infantry, U.S.V., stationed at the capital city of Bangued. initially one of the finest Army units in the Philippines, by August they had failed prey to malaria, fatigue, and tropical ulcers. In some companies barely half the men were fit for duty and the post surgeon demanded their immediate transfer.^3 The guerrilla organization in Abra was headed by Lt. Col. Juan Vi 11a- mor, the best provincial guerrilla leader in the 1st District. Throughout 1900 Villamor had conserved his forces, concentrating primarily on control­ ling the towns and villages outside of Bangued. Villamor's men rarely chal­ lenged the Army forces, contenting themsleves with sniping at rafts going down the river or sending a few volleys into Bangued. As a member of the provincial elite, Villamor had close connections with many of the most influential people in the province. In addition, he was quick to establish contact with municipal leaders and used a mixture of exhortation and intimidation to insure that they cooperated. His guerrilla forces were composed of two fifty-man regular companies and a local militia with perhaps 150 r if le s . 6 4 99

The first indication of insurgent power in Abra came in late July when Bangued's civil government was reorganized and new elections were held. Out of a population of some 13,000, only twenty-one votes were cast, confirming the provincial commander's belief that "civil government thoughout this Province is more or less a fa r c e . '^s on August 28 a company of Native Scouts was ambushed near Pilar, the American officer killed, and the Scouts routed. In a burst of apparent panic Young wrote his superiors demanding more troops and claiming that "the insurrection has assumed such proportions in Abra that I do not consider it advisable to send out a detachment with less that one hundred r ifle s ." 6 6 Conditions in Abra grew steadily worse through September and October. Army patrols and guerrilla bands clashed in several sharp engage­ ments. The crucial supply rafts operating along the Abra River, the only entrance to Bangued, were attacked and companies attempting to clear the river banks ran into large concentrations of insurgents. The guerrillas fired into Bangued constantly from the surrounding hills. In early October, a report on the province claimed that Bangued was "at its worst" with the police having deserted, much of the town destroyed, telegraph lines cut, and the population terrified. To add insult to injury, the town band deserted to the guerrillas.^Y

While Abra was the center of insurrecto action, the guerrillas were also active in other areas. In the Batac-Badoc area the insurgents virtually destroyed Army communications in September, cutting telegraph wires and poles faster than they could be replaced. In the same month there were also disturbances in the Dingras Valley area and reports of large guerrilla 100 concentrations operating on the border. The greatest disaster for the Americans, however occurred in relatively peaceful llocos Sur on October 25. At Cusucus, an Army expedition was trapped in a narrow canyon and had to fight its way back to Narvacan. Lt. Charles Febiger and four other sol­ diers were killed and fourteen Americans were wounded, the worst losses inflicted on the Army during the entire pacification of the 1st District.68 The person who was most affected by the guerrilla offensive was General Young. The initial August outbreak in Abra surprised the First District commander, causing him to send a panicky letter to his superiors which hinted at an Army defeat in the province. Frustrated by a war he did not understand and which showed no signs of ending, he began to advocate a harsh and repressive policy. On December 11 he openly criticized Army policy in the Philippines, claiming it was based on a false assumption of Filipino character, and urged the adoption of the "effective" methods used by the "Spanish and other European nations." Young believed it essential to "inspire rebellious Asiatics, individually and collectively, with a greater fear of the reigning government than they had of the rebels." Among the "European" methods he believed would achieve this were giving military commanders supreme authority to make or change the laws, retaliation in kind, summary executions, deportations, concentration, devastation, and utilizing soldiers to fill positions in civil government.89 In spite of Young's vocal advocacy of a repressive policy, there is no evidence that he attempted to implement harsher measures in the First District. The Army response to the insurgent attacks continued the previous trend of allowing provincial and local commanders to implement their own 101 pacification measures. These local measures were influenced by the re- election of McKinley, Young's operational orders, and the more stringent policy ordered MacArthur in the fall of 1900. However, the pacification of the 1st District was essentially the result of a variety of pacification techniques, policies, and innovations which were developed and executed by district officers in the winter and spring of 1900-1901. The eventual pacification of the 1st District continued the earlier pattern of regional and local war with little direction from Manila. This improvisization occurred at all levels of Army command in the 1 st District. In some cases a policy that had been successful in one area was utilized in other provinces. The use of certain officers to investigate guerrilla towns, so successful in Union, was expanded to the llocos provinces. In other cases, however, the very opposite was true. While Bell was encouraging reconcentration of the population in llocos Sur the commander in llocos Norte was protesting against its implementation. The key to successful pacification was less the declaration of policy and its rigid enforcement as it was the willingness of Army commanders to encourage and sanction flexibility."70 In response to both the guerrilla offensive and Young's requests there was a dramatic increase in American troop strength during the late fall and early winter. In August, when the guerrilla offensive started, the 1 st Dis­ trict had only 3,985 officers and men, of whom 10% were sick. Moreover, many of the men carried as "effectives" were capable of only light duties and could not be used for patrols or expeditions. In October troop strength had increased to 4,897 and in late November to 5,866. With nearly a 50% 102

Increase in manpower in two months, the Army was was able to garrison previously neglected areas and launch sustained offensive operations."^i Army manpower was further increased by the use of native Filipino auxiliaries. In the fall of 1900 there was a steady recruitment of both officially enlisted Filipino forces and informal auxiliaries. The Native Scouts grew from 4 officers and 245 men in September 1900 to 11 officers and 568 men in March 1901. Much of this was due to the January authori­ zation by the Division of the Philippines Headquarters allowing district commanders to employ as many Native Scouts as necessary to replace the departing U.S. Volunteer regiments. The Native Scouts proved effective in early 1901, destroying guerrilla supplies and on one occasion holding off an estimated 500 men under Tinio.^Z Besides the Native Scouts, First District Headquarters encouraged less formal groups of Filipino auxiliaries. The ardor of these Filipino volunteers was bolstered by the guerrilla terrorism which in some areas was little more than violence directed against pre-war enemies and fac­ tions. In llocos Sur and Abra, Crispulo Patajo was utilized to recruit and lead bands of volunteers. These people were not paid wages, but received $30 tor every rifle they turned in and a bounty for captured revolutionary officers. Patajo had such success that by April the new district commander. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, was urging all provincial commanders to emulate this and recuit their own native volunteers. Patajo was also used to clear up the barrios near Vigan and hunt down a gang which had randomly hacked more than thirty people to death and buried them on an isolated beach."^3 103

Another case of the American use of Filipinos can be seen in the activities of the newly formed Federal Party in early 1901. 1st District Headquarters issued passes for Federal Party representatives and autho­ rized them to hold meetings in the llocano provinces. Federalistas also corresponded with insurrecto leaders and went into the mountains to induce surrenders. While the Federal Party was viewed as a major factor by the Philippine Commission and MacArthur, it was simply one of many tools used by 1 st District officers. Bell wrote that a major benefit of aiding the Federal Party would be to convince intelligent Filipinos that it was the insurrectos who were to blame for continuing the war. in Union, the Federal Party was not utlized and officers were, "instructed to have nothing whatever to do with this organ nor any other that is merely political."74 in contrast, Ballance believed Federal Party representatives had played an important role in negortiations with Tinio and Aglipay. In llocos Norte, Col. William S. McCaskey believed that to the Federal Party "more that any other influence is due the complete pacification of this province."75 As with most pacification policies in northwestern Luzon, provincial commanders determined the actual implementation. The Army also sought to destroy the connections between towns and guerrillas. The special talents of officers who had distinguished themselves in the earlier provincial wars were utilized. Capt. Daniel H. Boughton, a veteran of Duvall's staff, was sent to the guerrilla stronghold of Badoc to make a complete census of the town. Johnston was given a warrant to investigate the towns in llocos Sur, "with a view to breaking up the secret support which had been rendered by these towns to the insurgents."76 104

Special attention was paid to the présidentes and cabezas who failed to report insurrecto activity or supplied the guerrillas. This was in keeping with MacArthur's decree, but it was also a continuation the same policies that had been utilized in the district since April. Provincial officers were given the authority to dissmiss any municipal officers whom they suspected of contact with the guerrillas and, if their suspicions were strong enough, to deport them to Manila.^? One unique pacification technique developed by General Young was to utilize both the native clergy and an American chaplain for mass meetings to take the Oath of Allegiance to the United States. In December, Young held meetings with the llocano clergy and was present at a ceremony involving some 2,190 Katipunan who took the oath and listened to "much earnest exhortation by the padres "78 Throughout the winter, ceremonies involving as few as 687 and as many as 2,200 natives took place in llocos Sur. These oath-taking ceremonies gave a religious element to allegiance to the United States and added a great deal of pomp and ceremony. While 1st District directives insisted that the local priest was there only to assist the mili­ tary authorities, the Oath of Allegiance was taken on a Bible and accompan­ ied by the kissing of a crucifix and a speech by the padre. The padres urged their parishoners to abandon the guerrillas, turn in their weapons, and "earnestly described the advantages of peace and emphasized the solemity and binding character of the obligation they were about to take."7Q Through Young's cultivation of the local priests, the Army was able to tie one of the most influential groups in the region to Army pacification. 105

District pacification also meant that soldiers were allowed to take far more stringent measures against hostile areas and individuals. Men and women who had relatives prominent in the guerrillas forces were liable for deportation. The U.S. Army Provost Courts, which had previously been lenient, became much harsher. In Candon there were as many cases tried in January and February 1901 as had been tried in all of 1900. Moreover, the penalties increased from $25 fines to one or two years at hard la b o r.8 0 in November, District Headquarters began confiscating and destroying rice and foodstuffs on property owned by guerrillas. Juan Villamor, for example, had an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 tons of rice seized. In early 1901, the populations of some isolated mountain towns were reconcentrated and all who remained were treated as insurrectos and their houses burned.^l First District offensive operations were characterized by sweeps through border areas or perceived guerrilla strongholds which often lasted for over a week. Columns of about fifty men from surrounding garrisons and special mobile forces would converge on insurrecto strongholds and then begin to cover the area thoroughly, with soldiers slowly sweeping a selected territory and establishing outposts at night. Small detachments guarded roads and trails while other groups moved into barrios at night and searched them, rounding up all suspects. The fatigue that had previously crippled these expeditions was avoided by having the men cover only small areas and carry only their weapons—supplies were carried by Filipinos drafted from local villages. Operations were coordinated with other provincial commands, preventing guerrillas from moving across the borders. The increase in manpower also allowed individual garrisons to provide more 106 patrols in the immediate vicinity. These patrols were aided by new restrictions which forbade civilians from travelling on the roads at night. The result was that from October 1900 to May 1901, 1st District soldiers were kept constantly in the field. One veteran, recalling the campaign in Abra summed it up as, "From Vigan to Bucay, Banguet, Tyaune, Pedagan [sic],

Santa Rosa On the move until they surrendered and it wasn't all fu n ."8 2 While U.S. commanders sought insurrecto bands to bring them to battle, the guerrillas seldom stood to fight, preferring to fire a few rounds and flee. Army expeditions often had to be satisfied with destroying food and supplies, cuartels, lookouts, and suspected guerrilla quarters. Some officers were discouraged by the lack of combat, complaining, "it is as easy to hunt quail with an old fashioned horse pistol and without a dog, as it is to encounter the enemy under circumstances favorable to our success."83 Yet as the constant operations went on, officers were more aware that the guerrillas were steadily losing ground. The steady captures of a few rifles, the killing or capturing of a few guerrillas, the destruction of food supplies, all led to steady attrition in the guerrilla ranks. Continued over a period of months, it ground the guerrillas down and made them sick, hungry, and fatigued. Broken into small groups and kept constantly moving, the insurgents were no longer able to control the villages or the population.84 The simple scattering of the guerrilla bands did not ensure pacifi­ cation any more than it had in early 1900. The guerrillas could have simply hidden their weapons and become amigos, waiting for a suitable time to resume their resistance. In the 1st District, however, pacification was designed not only to break the guerrillas up but to deny them shelter in the 107 towns and barrios. In conjunction with the large operations, this town pacification meant that once the guerrillas scattered, they found themselves hunted down by garrison forces, native police, and even local volunteers. In most cases, town pacification was the responsiblility of individual officers who adapted and developed counterinsurgency techniques based on their knowledge of local conditions. The notorious town of Badoc, llocos Norte, was cleared up in a pacification campaign that lasted almost a year. After two Army investi­ gations produced a census and maps of the district, the post commander instituted a thorough purge of the area's municipal governments. By February 1901, most of the officials had been dismissed or arrested and the guerrilla infrastructure broken up. Captured guerrillas were sent into the area to identify their former comrades who were secretly living in the town. The most effective measure, however, was the decision by Badoc’s commander to name a former insurrecto tax collector as the new presidents. Taking advantage of the emnity between Tinio and Aglipay, he appointed a known partisan of Tinio, Juan Rubio, to purge a town dominated by Aglipay's supporters. Rubio was given power to have a private Jail, imprison or release prisoners, and a number of other "highly irregular practices."85 The town of Bucay, Abra, had been a known insurrecto center with many of the principalia having family members serving with the guerillas. When the town was garrisoned in November 1900 the new commander, Lt. Ezekial Williams, found it deserted and was told that the people were off cultivating. The Army's active operations in Abra soon drove the population 108 back into the town while forcing the guerrillas to levy more contributions to replace those destroyed by the Army. Caught between the Army and the insurrectos, the town soon swung to the Army. In December, a delegation presented themselves and stated they had made a compact to aid the Army against the guerrillas and wished to take the Oath of Allegiance. They voluntarily placed sentinals in the barrios, promised to provide guides and spies, and urged that the population in the outlying barrios be concentrated and their crops brought in. Over the next weeks the population of Bucay became involved in a virtual war with the guerrillas. Barrio chiefs and inhabitants were kidnapped, a former guerrilla murdered, houses burned, and the whole town threatened with "sangre y muerte," by the local guerrilla band under Lt. Francisco Bendito. This terrorism, however, turned the town solidly against the guerrillas. Patrols from the garrison were accompanied by armed villagers. In April, Bendito's hiding place was discovered by one of these combined patrols and his band wiped out.86 Although other towns did not have as dramatic a pacification as Badoc or Bucay, these examples are indicative of a general shift in Filipino loyalty from the insurgents to the Army. As the tempo of Army field operations increased, garrison commanders in several towns received citizens dele­ gations who disclosed the location of guerrilla bands or named the local jefe and collectors. By March, one provincial commander believed that the population was thoroughly sick of the war and wanted p e a c e .8 7 A major beneficiary of the Army success in the winter of 1901 was Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, who was appointed to command the I st District on February 28. Bell, probably the finest Army commander in the Philippine 109

War, was a 45 year old Medal of Honor winner who had already played an instrumental role in the engagements around Manila and central Luzon. Like Young, he was a good judge of talent, and he utilized Crispulo Patajo, William T. Johnston, and other First District veterans. He was willing to sanction strong measures, but when the enemy surrendered he proved a com­ passionate victor; one civilian commented on "his vigorous enthusiasm for education as well as whatever might be for the general welfare of the peo- ple."88 Unlike Young, he did not openly urge the implementation of the most drastic measures. At the same time, his ruthlessness should not be under­ estimated. While Young advocated harsh measures such as concentration and devastation on paper, Bell was far more willing to put them into practice. Bell's contribution to the course of pacification in the 1st District is difficult to ascertain. His own report suggests that he inherited a critical situatioi? in l^lc Fcui uary and lui ntd it aroûiiu in twc^monthc, but this4c an . exaggeration, in terms of their ability to inflict damage on the Army the guerrillas had ceased to be a factor by the end of February, and most of the basic tactical methods had already been implemented in the provinces. Bell also implied that he brought with him a complete counterinsurgency policy and successfully implemented it in northwestern Luzon, but there is no evidence to support this claim either. The bulk of the documentation suggests Bell adopted the personnel and policies he found existent in the First District and changed virtually nothing. He was the recipient of the gains of the American counteroffensive and of new forces. He could use small garrisons in regions cleared by earlier sweeps while concentrating his forces on areas that were still recalcitrant. His major contribution was 110 that he was willing and able to escalate the war to a level that the insurrecto leaders found intolerable and that once they surrendered, he was able to conciliate them to American rule. He was thus a key figure in the pacification of the First District, but he was not a crucial figure.89 Under Bell, operations were begun in southern llocos Sur and Abra against the last areas where the guerrillas still operated. Many of the personnel and policies that had worked in Union were implemented in llocos Sur. Duvall was placed in overall command while a new sub-district was created under another veteran of the Union pacification, Maj. Sedgwick Rice. Lt. William T. Johnston, who had been operating in the area since January, investigated the towns and managed to secure the names of the guerrillas supplier 3 and members of the Katipunan. Crispulo Patajo brought 50 of his Guardia de Honor followers in and soon recruited another 150 men. Local officers took advantage of the historic emnity between Igorrotes and insurrectos. Igorrote villagers were promised protection and their vil­ lages were given Army garrisons. Soon the Igorrotes were actively hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains. The guerrilla commander in llocos Sur, Lt. Col. Juan M. Guttierez, was captured on April 15 by one of these Igorrote units. Quitterez agreed to collaborate, turning over the names of his suppliers, accompanying Johnston on his investigations, and writing to the Villamors urging their surrender. The whole operation took some five weeks, and illustrates the high level of pacification expertise achieved by

First District officers.90 11

While llocos Sur was being cleared, Bell himself was active in Abra. Abra had been placed under Col. Richard Comba in November, 1900, and he had been ordered to prosecute the war with "the utmost rigor" and to "use the most severe measures known to the laws of war."9i Comba quickly succeeded in scattering the guerrilla bands but could not destroy capture the leaders or their guns. In mid-March, 1901, Comba was replaced by Maj. William C. H. Bowen who attempted to negotiate with the Villamor's thorugh both members of the Villamor family and local présidentes. When these negotiations failed, the Army adapted both a stronger policy in Abra and a harsher view of the Villamors. Orders were given to round up all amigos after an engagement and rigorously question them. On April 9, all persons were prohibited from entering or leaving the province and all trade was cut off. The populations of two of the most troublesome towns. Pilar and Villavieja, were concentrated and much of the province devastated. In the f words of the Bowen; During the insurrection the province suffered severely, every man was either an active insurrector or a sympathizer, the consequence being that property had been destroyed right and left; whole villages had been burned, storehouses and crops had been destroyed, and the entire province was as devoid pf food products as was the valley the the Shenandoah after Sheridan's raid during the civil war. The jurisdictions or comprehensions of Pilar and Villavija had been depopulated and this portion of the province had been absolutely destroyed,.. ..9% These measures proved to be the final straw; on April 21 Juan Villamor requested terms and was brought into Bangued the following day. On April 29 he surrendered 137 rifles and his guerrillas and the militia took the Oath of Allegiance. 112

Villamor's surrender was indicative of the collapse of guerrilla resistance during in March and April. The guerrilla regulars were virtually powerless to resist American forces while Army control of the towns prevented them from breaking up and taking shelter. The number of engagements increased, but U.S. combat casualties were virtually nonexis­ tent; according to War Department statistics one U.S. soldier was wounded in the last two months of campaigning. The guerrillas lacked the means to defend themselves; Villamor's band had only eight cartridges for each Mauser and sixteen for each Remington, and many of these were homemade. The guerrillas were also hampered by internal dissension; relations between Tinio and Agiipay were so bad that Tinio outlawed the priest and ordered his arrest 93 Following Villamor's capitulation there was a rush by the few remaining guerrilla leaders to surrender. According to John 6. Ballance, the guerrillas surrendered separately and not as part of a general plan. Tinio sent in an officer to ask for terms on April 27 and surrendered on April 30. Gregorio Agiipay also surrendered on April 27. For over a month he had negotiated with Federal Party members but had steadfastly refused to commit himself. Eventually the exasperated llocos Norte commander sent him a note that "there would be no more talk, it was surrender or fight from then on." The priest surrendered two days later. A general district-wide cessation of hostilities was ordered on May I in order to allow guerrilla units to come in unmolested, and there was no further fighting.94 113

The pacification of the First District was one the most complete in the Philippines. There were no reported engagements with last-ditcn guer­ rilla bands after May 1. The reports of the provincial governors stressed the peaceful conditions and the inhabitants' appreciation of Army reforms in transportation and education. Furthermore, all the major guerrilla leaders surrendered and some, such as Juan Villamor, immediately accepted positions with the U.S. government. Other ex-guerrillas aided the Army in hunting down fadrones who might have continued to disrupt the peace. The decision not to look into the war-time activities of most insurrectos also helpeo the American cause. Although there was a feeling within the First District that Tinio and Agi ipay had been guilty of atrocities. Bell urged that they not be prosecuted.95 The pacification of the First District presented the U.S. Army with one of its first experiences in Philippine counterinsurgency. Initially the Army believed the inhabitants favored American occupation and were hostile to the Tagalogs who composed the revolutionary leadership. As a result, the initial efforts of the Army went into civil government while military needs were neglected. The outbreak of rebellion in llocos Norte and the discovery of the guerrilla infrastructure in Union in the spring of 1900 changed that perception. The provincial commanders of these areas realized they faced a strong and organized resistance and undertook pacification policies designed to deal with their region's insurgency. Pacification in the First District for most of the Philippine War was far less centralized than it was regionalized. It was, in many respects, fought province by province as each commander altered and created his own counterinsurgency methods. Much of this is due to the District's comman­ der, Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, who left most of the actual conduct of operations to his provincial commanders. While policies were adapted at the District level, they were often altered by provincial and post commanders. This gave First District counter insurgency a flexibility and adaptability that was ultimately effective. Policies and personnel could be shifted into new areas and utilized in conjunction with already existing methods. The guerrilla offensive in the Fall of 1900 briefly panicked the District commander but it proved only a temporary success for the guerrillas. The guerrillas' very success prompted a large buildup in Army strength and gave impetus to a variety of military polices designed to crush the insurgents. Under the leadership of Young's successor these essentially localized policies broke Filipino resistance and provided a long lasting peace. NOTES

1 "Otis 1900," M l 1900 1:4:334-5. James R. M. Taylor quoted this passage and asserted: "this is what took place everywhere else in the archipelago except the extreme south," Taylor, History, p. 11 MS; Anon., "District of North Western Luzon, P.I.," AKJ 37(14 April 1900); LeRoy, Americans. 2:204-5.

Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 30 April 1901. CWS 2:1274. "Otis 1900," WD 1900,1:4:448-9; 560-1. For Otis'View of the death of Philippine resistance after 1900 see, Senate, Affairs, pp. 733- 4; Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis to Secretary of War, 10 April 1900, CWS 2:1159.

Figures on population are taken from Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 September 1900, Samuel B. M. Young Papers, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa., Box 6 [hereafter referred to as SBMYP); Maj. John G. Ballance estimated the populations by province as: Abra-36,523; llocos Norte-140,443; llocos Sur-151,400; Union-103,297, a total of 431,662 inhabitants of whom 113,700 were males eighteen and over. Maj. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 28 February 1901, 395/2167, vol. 3 L5 326. The later reports of civilian governors are reasonably close to these figures. See "Report of the Provincial Governor of Abra," 16 December 1901, Record Group 350, series 3599, "Abra" File, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, National archives, Washington D.C., [hereafter cited as 350/series number]; "Report of Aguedo Agbayani, Governor of the Province of llocos Norte, Luzon," 1 November 1902, 350/3601, "llocos Norte" File; "Report of Julio Agcaoli, April 2, 1903, giving for the year 1903 the General Conditions, etc., in the Province of llocos Norte," 2 April 1903, 350/3601, "llocos Norte" File. For the geography of the llocos regions see Wernstedt and Spencer, Philippine

15 Island World, pp. 328-61. For a good account of climatic and geogra­ phical obstacles, see Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Chief Engineer of the Division, 9 July 1900, 395/4043, LSBkl.

"Memorial on Behalf of Isabel Abaya," 23 January 1899, PIR 50 682.2; Mariano Llanera to Emilio Aguinaldo, 7 August 1898, Taylor, History. Exhibit 88, p. 43 MG; Exhibit 65, pp. 65 LY, "S. 5. Saturnus" File, PIR 50 1148.4; PIR 50 1024; Zalde, Philippine Revolution, p. 222.

Felipe Buencamino, "Notes of a trip of inspection," [Eng. trans.] 3 April 1899, PIR SO 742.2; "Memoria de la defensas de Ambos llocos," 17 March 1899, PIR SO 687.1; "Memoria de la defensas llocanos-Union," n.d., PIR 50 687.3; Felipe Buencamino to Emilio Aguinaldo, 17 April 1899, PIR 50 679.12; Wilcox, Through Luzon, pp. 193-99. James LeRoy's criticism of Wilcox as an observer should be noted, see LeRoy, Americans. 1:334-5.

Villamor, Cronica. pp. 9-11; Maj. James Parker to Maj. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, 11 July 1902, SBMYP, Box 3, "Official Correspondence" File; Col, William S. McCaskey to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, n.d. 1901, 395/4043, L5 Bk 5, LS 1792.

"Report of an Expedition to San Fabian, San Jacinto, and Vicinity, November 5 to November 30, 1899, by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U.S.V., Commanding," M 1900 1:6:528-560. Maj. Peyton C. March to AG, Cav­ alry Brigade, 1st Div., 8th A.C., 8 December 1899, W 1900 1:6:330-4; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Cavalry Brigade, 1st Div. and 8th A.C.. 5 January 1900, 395/4043 LS Bk 1; "Young Report." WO 1900 1:6:277-88; WD 1900 1:4:313; "Report on the Defense of Vigan, Luzon, P.I., Decem­ ber 4, 1899, by Lieut. Col. James Parker, Forty-Fifth U.S. Volunteer Infantry," ^ 1900 1:7:138-51; Oliver Tafton MS, Oliver Tafton File, 33rd Infantry, U.S.V. Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa. [hereafter cited as Taf­ ton MS.]; Letter of 27 December 1899, Milton Nixon File, 33rd Infantry, U.S.V. Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa., John T. McCutcheon, Drawn From Memory (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merril Co., 1950) pp. 161-5; Teodoro M. Kalaw, An Acceptable Holocaust, pp. 49-55.

"Otis 1900," W 1900 1:4:321-9, quote from pg. 449; "Young Report," W 1900 1:6:285. For indications of the exhaustion and scattering of American forces see ^ 1900 1:6:330-3; Jawbone (February 1938), 117

USAMHI; U.S. National Archives, Returns From Regular Armv Cavalry Regiments. 1833-1916. National Archives Microfilm Publication M 744, Roll 35, 3rd U.S. Cavalry Regiment, January 1900. [Hereafter cited as M744/3rdCav.].

9 For Otis' views of the importance of civil government and garrisoning as 3 means of pacification, see "Otis 1900," w 1900 1:4:448-9,560-1; AM 37(16 June 1900).

'0 Hq, DivPhil, GO. No. 1, M 1900 1:4:442-44. I was unable to find an original of OMG, G.O. No. 70, 20 December 1899. A copy appears in 37 (2 February 1900). For the organization of the District of North- Western Luzon see G.O. No. 3, OMG of North-Western Luzon, 9 January 1900, RG 395, series 2172, ID, DNL, General and Special Orders, Jan. to Apr. 1900 [hereafter cited as 395/2172], Under this organization Col. Luther R. Hare, 33rd Inf., was responsible for llocos Sur and Abra prov­ inces; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze, 34th Inf., for llocos Norte; Maj. Peyton C. March, 33 Inf. for Bontoc and Lepanto; and Lt. Col. Henry M. Wessells, 3rd Cav., for Union and Benguet. Each of these commanders was also assinged troops for garrisoning his assinged area. As a result, regi­ mental organization became tied up with provincial organization, causing great confusion in record keeping procedures.

’ 1 Quote "European nations" from Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 28 December 1900, RG 395, series 2150, ID, DNL, Letters and Tele­ grams Sent, Apr. 1900 to Nov. 1901, vol. 3, LS 3421 [hereafter cited as 395/2150). Carefully selected portions of this letter can be found in "Report of Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, Commanding First District, Department of Northern Luzon," WD 1901 1:5:30-6. [hereafter cited as "Bell Report"). John Gates believes that Young's proposals were the "most radical suggestions made by any officer...", Gates, Schoolbooks p. 189. For Young's comments on his "irritable" disposition see Young to Marjorie and Elizabeth [daughters), 18 December 1899, SBMYP, "Uncata­ loged Material." For a sample of Young's habit of pouring his frustra­ tions out on paper and his penchant for extreme statements see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 September 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Personal File," LS 167; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 4 February 1901, 395/2167, vol. 3, LS 223; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 4 July 1900, SBMYP, Box 3, "Official Correspon­ dence" File; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Dean C. Worcester, 16 18

December 1900, LS 191; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Senator T. H. Carter, 1 May 1900, LS 126; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Theodore Roosevelt, 1 April 1900, LS 119 all in SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File." For Otis' comments on Young's alarmism see Maj. Gen. Elwell 5. Otis to Secretary of War, 10 April 1900, CWS 2:1159

12 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, O.P. and 8th A C., March 1900, 395/2157; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Military Secretary [herefter cited as MilSec], 28 June 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File," LS 143.; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 24 November 1900, RG 395, series 2133, DNL, General Correspondence, "A" Series, Apr. 1900 to Nov. 1901, Box 16, LR 19208 [hereafter cited as 395/2133]; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 4 February 1901, RG 395, series 2167, LS 223, ID, DNL, Letters Relating to Civil Affairs, Jan. 1900 to Sept. 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2167].

13 Capt. John G. Ballance to C.O., Laoag, 7 February 1900, 395/2167, LS 16; Capt. John G. Ballance to AG, U.S. Army, 28 February 1900, 395/ 2157, LS 48; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to C.S., 21 December 1899, W 1900 1:4:323. f^or Ballance's role as Young's emissary see Capt. John G. Ballance to Samuel B. M. Young, 17 April 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File," LR 258. Ballance was appointed Chief of Staff in December 1900 and in May 1901 was placed in command of the First District, see, Hq, 1D, DNL, G.O., No. 21 17 December 1900 and G.O., No. 11, 25 May 1901, both in RG 395, series 2173, General Orders, Special Orders, and Circulars, Apr. 1900 to Nov. 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2173]. i"i Capt. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 13 September 1900, 395/2167, vol. 2, LS 576; M i 37 (2 February 1900); Lt. William Smedberg to Maj. Samuel M. Swigert, 20 December 1899, RG 395/2148; Lt. William Smedberg to Capt. George F. Hunter, 30 December 1899, 395/2148; John C. Brown, Diary of a Soldier in the Philippines. (Portland, Maine: n.p., 1901), pp. 147-8; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 4 July 1900, SBMYP, "Private File" LS 152.

’3 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Capt. John G. Ballance, 20 May 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to MilSec, 11 January 1900, 395/2167, LS 3; Maj. Thomas Q. Ashburn to AG, Vigan, 9 January 1900, 395/3061; Lt. William Coffey to Adj., 1st Btln, 33rd Inf., 7 April 1900, 395/ 2157, LR 1269; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Civil Governor, 119

19 February 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, March 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1. For Young's reports on civil government see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 3 March 1900, SBMYP, Box 3, "Official Correspondence" File; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 5 May 1900,395/2150, LS 166; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to MilSec, 28 June 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File," LS 143; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 4 July 1900, SBMYP, Box 3, "Official Correspondence" File.

’6 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to MilSec, 28 June 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File," LS 143; Capt. John G. Ballance to C.O., Laoag, 7 February 1900,395/2167, LS 16. For samples of officers' reports on education see 395/2184; Capt. John G. Ballance to SMG, 16 April 1900, 395/2167, LS 120. For other examples of Young's interest in education see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 4 July 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File" LS 152; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 24 November 1900, 395/2233, Box 16, LR 19208; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 4 February 1901, 395/2167, vol. 3, LS 223.

Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Chief Assistant [hereafter cited as ChAst], ID, DNL, 1 June 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; Capt. Frank L. French to Post Adj., Laoag, 30 November 1900, 395/4037, Box 1, LR 447; "Province of llocos Norte-Laoag," RG 395, series 2180, Extracts of Monthly Reports Received from Inspecting Officers [hereafter cited as 395/2180]; Col, Lymon W. V. Kennon to ChAst, ID, DNL, 10 February 1901, RG 395, series 2158, ID, DNL, Letters Received Apr. 1900 to Oct. 1901, Box 24, LR 2763 [hereafter cited as 395/2158]; ANJ 38 (25 May 1901); Col. William P. Duvall to ChAst, DNWL, 28 May 1900, 395/5617, vol. 1,LS 669; Col. William P. Duvall to Capt. John G. Ballance, 4 June 1900, 395/5617, vol. 1, LS 719; Maj. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 28 February 1901,395/2167, VOl 3, LS 326.

18 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to MilSec, 28 June 1900, 395/2167, LS 259; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 4 July 1900, SBMYP, Box 5, "Private File," LS 152; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 8 December 1900, 395/2167; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to ChAst, 1 June 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; Capt. John G. Ballance to C.O., Bangued, 21 December 1900; 395/2167 LS 1008; Capt. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 3 August 1900, 395/2167, LS 413. Much of the correspon­ dence in the first three volumes of 395/2167, "Letters Sent Relating to 120

Civil Affairs, 1st District, DNL," is devoted to the district's financial problems.

19 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze, 13 March 1900, 395/2173; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, D.P., 13 May 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1 ; Capt. George E. Dodd to Adj., Vigan, 27 June 1900, RG 395, series 5582, Vigan, 15, Registers of Letters and Telegrams Received, Feb. 1900 to Jan. 1903, LR 234 [herafter cited as 395/5582; Capt. John G. Ballance to Jose Rivero, 25 July 1900, 395/2167, LS 361; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 3 March 1900, SBMYP, Box 3, "Official Correspondence" File; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to William McKinley, 4 July 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File," LS 152; "Report of Lt. John W. Ward," encl. in Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Civil S-D, Vigan, 14 December 1900, RG 395, series 5589, Vigan, IS, Letters Received Relating to the Civil Government, Mar. 1900 to Oct. 1901, Box 1, LR 994 [hereafter cited as 395/5589]; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Civil Sub- District, Vigan, llocos Sur, 9 February 1901, 395/5589, Box 2, LR 206; Lt. John A. Roff to C.O., Badoc, 7 February 1901, 395/4043, LS Bk 3, LS 388; Lt. Francisco Bendito to Jefe Americano del Destacamento de Bucay, 15 February 1901, RG 395, series 3064, Bangued, Abra, Letters Received 1900-1901 [hereafter cited as 396/3064]. For officers detached from companies see 94/M744/3C. For U.S. expeditions against the Igorrotes seeW 1900 1:6:730-3; Tafton MS.

20 Col. Luther R. Hare to AG, DNWL, 15 February 1900, RG 395, series 5578, Vigan, IS, Letters and Endorsements Sent, Feb. 1900 to Dec. 1902 vol. 1 [herafter cited as 395/2178]. Hare, in fact, continued to perceive the guerrillas as the "ladrone contingent" until he left the 1st District, see Col. Luther R. Hare to AG, ID, DNL, 3 June 1900, 395/5578 vol. 1, LS 651. For reports on early guerrilla activities see Maj. Thomas Ashburne to Adj., 33rd Inf., 22 February 1900, 395/2157, L5 629; Capt. Julio Tinio to P.L.'s of Taguidin, Sevilla, Santa Cruz, etc., 21 March 1900, PIR 5D 598.1.

21 For information on Manuel Tinio see PIR SD 353, "Manuel Tinio, Briga­ dier General" File, PIR SD 576, "Manuel Tinio" File, and PIR SD 1024, "Tinio, M." File; "Proclamation Published in San Fernando de Union of Aug. 2, 1898," PIR SD 1024; Taylor, Historv. Exhibit 65, pp. 65 LY, "Notes on the History of a Glorious Epogée of the Independence of the Philippines," Exhibit 70, p. 70 LY.; Capt. George A. Dodd to [AG, ID, 121

DNL], SBMYP, Box 5, LR Bk I, LR 574; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to AG, DNL, 28 March 1901, 395/2150, LS Bk 4, LS 540; LeRoy, Americans 2:205-5.

22 For information on Juan Villamor see Villamor. Cronica: PIR SD 522. "Juan Villamor" File and PIR SD 528, "Abra" File. For indications of his connections with the elite, see LeRov. Americans 2:206: Ewing E. Booth. My Observations and Experiences in the_United States Army (n.p.: 1944), pp. 58-9. For information on Agi ipay see PIR 909, esp. Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Lt. Col. Vicente Salazar, 22 April 1901, PIR SD 909.8; Capt. George A. Dodd to [AG,ID, DNL], 14May 1900, SBMYP, Box 5, LR Bk 1, LR 574. For a highly critical view of Aglipay's role as a revolu­ tionary leader, see Schumacher, Revolutionarv Clery. pp. 87-123.

23 Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 31 July 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; Villa­ mor, Cronica: Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Lt. Col. Joaquin Alejandrino, 8 September 1900, PIR SD 576.1; "Diary supposed to be written by Lt. Col. Vicente Salazar," PIR SD 367.9; Maj. Peyton C. March to Col. Luther R, Hare, 5 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 394; Francisco Caledonia to Comman­ ders of Flying Columns, 12 March 1900, PIR SD 353.11 ; "Orders for a Guerrilla Column Commanded by Major Villamor," 1900, PIR SD 51.7; "Report of Asst. Surgeon Theodore Bath," 24 October 1900, 395/2133, Box 17, LR 20047; "Official Memorandum: Antonio Singson," Lt. William R. Smedburg to CO., Vigan, 12 December 1900, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 49; "Declaracion del Capitan de Sandihatan, Victoriano Avilia," "Declaracion del soldado Pablo Arce," "Declaracion del soldado Batolomé Aspa," taken by Crispulo Patjo, enclosures in Maj. John G. Ballance to CO., Vigan, 15 February 1901, RG 395/5583, Box 3, LR 1125.

2^ "Revolutionary Military Code," captured by Maj. Edgar Z. Steever, 5 July 1900, 395/2133, LS 14873; Col. William P. Duvall to AG, Vigan, 1 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 235; Capt. William Graves to Adj., Vigan, 27 March 1901, 395/2133, LR 8814.

25 Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to P.L Piddig, 17 May 1900, PIR SD 353.10; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Lt. Bonifacio Fernadez, 2 March 1901, Exhibit "E" in Maj. John G. Ballance to CO., Vigan, 13 April 1900, 395/5583, Box 3, LR 2075; "Receipts for rice, supplies," PIR SD 745.2; "Papers Captured at Collago, Abra," 8 December 1900, 395/2133, LR 1097; Col. Wirt Davis to Maj. John G. Ballance, 27 December 1900, 395/5578, vol. 5; Capt. 122

Earl C. Carnahan to Adj., Bangued, 13 April 1901, RG 395 series 3059, Bangued Abra, Letters Sent, July 1900 to Jan. 1902, Box 1, LR 244 [hereafter cited as 395/3059].

26 Maj. Edgar Z. Steever to C O. Vigan, 20 July 1900, 395/5583, Box 1, LR 1285.

27 Senate. Affairs, p. 1001. The importance the guerri 1 las attached to control over municipal government can be seen in the number of letters that Tinio devoted to local présidentes. See Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio, "Proclamation," 20 March 1900, PIR SD 353.6; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Pantaleon Gonzales, 15 June 1900, PIR SD 353.4; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Saturnio Singson, 15 June 1900, PIR SD 353.5; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Pedro Legaspi, P.L., 3 October 1900, PIR SD 353.7; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to P.L, Santa Cruz, September 1900, PIR SD 575.9; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to P.L., Candon, September 1900, PIR SD 575.9.

28 "Annual Report of the Governor of La Union," Senate, Affairs pp. 929-43.

29 Lt. Col Henry J. Wessels to AG, 31 January 1900, 395/2157, Box 1, LR 257; "Otis," M 1900 1:4:324-5. For the Macabebe misbehavior, see James R. Woolard, "The Philippine Scouts: The Development of Ameri­ ca's Colonial Army," (Ph.D. dissertation. The Ohio State University, 1975), pp. 39-42.

39 Lt. Col Henry J. Wessels to AG, Military District, DNWL, 10 February 1900, 395/5517, vol. 1, LS 27; Lt. William T. Johnston, "To Whom It May Concern," 13 June 1901, 94/ACP 417595, Crispulo Patajo File; Capt. William T. Johnston, "A Brief Record of Services Since 1898," 94/ACP 4525, William T. Johnston File.

31 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, 8th AC., 25 January 1900, 395/2148, LS 119; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, Washington, 3 July 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File," LS 150.

32 Capt. Franklin 0. Johnson to AG, Vigan, 6 March 1900, 395/2157, LR 684; January-April 1900, 94/M7444/3C. 123

33 "History of the 48th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers," Col. William P. Duvall to AG, U.S. Army, 24 June 1901, RG 94, series 187 [Hereafter cited as 94/187, 48th Inf. History].

34 Johnston,"To Whom," 94/ACP 4176956; "Investigation into the Methods Adopted by the Insurgents for Organizing and Maintaining a Guerrilla Force by First Lt. W. T. Johnston, Third U.S. Cavalry," WD 1900 1:7:257- 264; Capt. Philip H. Stern to Adj, San Fernando, 16 March 1900,385/ 2156, LR 19; Capt. Philip H. Stern to AG, Military Governor, DNWL, 18 March 1900, 395/2157, LR 996. For background on the Guardia de Honor see, Milagros Guerrero, "Luzon at War," pp. 185-212; Sturte- vant. Peasant Uprisings, pp. 96-114; Katherine Mayo, The Isles of Fear: The Truth About the Philippines (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1924), pp. 181-4; LeRoy, Americans. 1:346-7, 2:208-9. For a discus­ sion on the conflict between peasant expectations and the elite see Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives." Philippine Studies pp. 467-8; Guerrero, "Philippine Revolutionary Mentality," pp. 240-4; Glen A. May, "Philippine-American War," pp. 366-7 For sources on the relations between the Guardia de Honor and the Republican Government see PIRSD 94.1; PIR SD 168; PIR SD 1006; PIR SD 2015.

35 Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, endorsement on Johnston, "Investigation, " WD 1:7:264-5. For indications of Johnston's influence on MacArthur’s views and policies, see "MacArthur 1900," WD 1900 1:7:61-2; Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Barry to C.G., DSL, 19 December 1900, 1901 1:4:93; Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 25 December 1900, TRP, Series 1, Reel 8. John Gates believes that Johnston's report only confirmed MacArthur's own conclusions on the nature of the guerrilla war, see Gates, Schoolbooks. pp. 194-5.

36 Col. William P. Duvall to AG, 16 April 1900, 395/2157, LS 1423; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, Bautista, 2 May 1900, 395/2150, vol. 1, LS 133; Capt. William A. Hankins to Adj., 2nd Btln., 48 Inf., 2 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 682; Capt. Alexander V. Richardson to Adj., 48th Inf., 8 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 678; Lt. Lewis Smith to CO., Co. "I," 48th Inf., 9 May 1900,395/2133, LR 6413; "Report of Engagement near Vagal in, Provine of Union, Luzon. P.L, May 27, 1900, by Lieut. W. T. Johnston, Third U.S. Cavalry, Commanding Troop M," W 1:7:270; 94/M744/3rd Cavalry, April and May, 1900; "Diary of Events, May 6, 1900 to June 14, 124

1900" in 94/228225. Statistics on rifles captured from 94/187, 48th Inf.History, p. II.

37 Lt. Edwin M. Suplee to Adj., San Fernando, 21 April 1900, 395/2158 LR 86; quote "chickens" from Col. William P. Duvall to AG, DNWL, 4 April 1900,395/2157; Juan Baltazar to Col. William P. Duvall, 5 April 1900, 395/2157, LR 1338; Leon Jacunda to "The General," 2 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 457.

38 Lt. Col. Juan Guitterez to Capt. Ignacio Peralta, Taylor Historv. Exhibit 1109, pp. 66 GV; Natalio Valencia "Proclamation," 13 November 1900, PIR SD 564.4; Col. William P. Duvall to AG, ID, DNL, 28 December 1900, 395/5617, vol. 3, LS 2037; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 25 December 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 3303; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Lt. Col. Joaquin Alejandrino, 8 September 1900, PIR SD 576.9; Bias Villamor to Capt. Anacleto Mendoza, encl. in Col. William P. Duvall to AG,ID, DNL. 6 June 1900, 395/2133, LR 6014; Bias Villamor to Maj. Pablo Bustamente, 30 March 1900, encl. in Capt. William Hankins to Adj, 2nd Btln., 48th Inf., 14 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 682; "Coboar," PIR SD 1006.6; Unsigned "Proclamation," 18 April 1900, PIR 1055; Col. William P. Duvall to Hq, ID, DNL, 15 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 679; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, Dept, of the Pacific, 29 March 1900, in WD 1900 1:4:332; Lt. William T. Johnston to Adj., San Fernando, 5 April 1900, 395/2157, LR 1231; Col. William P. Duval 1 to AG, Vigan, 11 July 1900, 395/2158; Lt. Hugh Thomason to Adj., San Fernando, 15 May 1900, 395/2158, LR 550; Col. William P. Duvall to AA6, DNWL, 20 March 1900, 395/2157, LS 996; Col. William P. Duvall to Adj., Vigan, 3 April 1900, 395/2157, LR 1103; 94/7444/3C "March-July 1900" entries; Capt. A. D. Beight to Sr. Bartolomé Vaguer, vice-presidente of San Juan, 3 April 1900, 395/5617, vol 1, LS 185.

39 Phelps Whitemarsh to Arthur MacArthur, 9 September 1900, 350/2368.5, "Correspondence on Civil-Military Relations in Benguet." Mulrooney, "No Victory, No Vanquished," pp. 213-22. For Guardia operations see Col. William P. Duvall to ChAst, 18 October 1900, 395/5167, vol. 3; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., San Fernando, 6 December 1900, 395/2167, LS Bk 2, LS 895; Francisco Veracruz to Civil Governor [Sp.], 10 December 1900, 395/5589, Box 1, LR 410; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Civil S-D, Vigan, 11 December 1900, 395/5589, LR 400; Brig. Gen. Benjamin A. Alvord to HQ, ID, DNL, 6 November 1900, 125

395/2158, LS 819; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, U.S. Army, 23 January 1902, 94/ACP 417696.

^ Johnston, "Investigation," WD 19001:7:263. For Otis' comments see "Otis 1900," WD 1900 1:4:338-9. I have been unable to locate corres­ pondence from Otis forbidding the recruitment of Guardias de Honor. However, Duvall mentions Otis' hostility to the sect in Col. William P. Duvall to Maj. John G. Ballance, 24 January 1901, 395/2133, Box 20, LR 675. See also Duvall's comment that both he and officers in Union have not recruited Guardia de Honor though some men belong to it, his policy has been to ignore "secret societies" in "our native helpers," Col. William P. Duvall to AG, 12 April 1900, 395/2157, LR 1321.

For the often bitter correspondence over the retention of Patajo's men, see "Correspondence,"350/2638.5; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O., San Fernando, 5 April 1901,395/2488, LR 38; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell AG, DNL, 25 April 1901, 395/2133, Box 32, LR 9233. Characteristi­ cally, Bell neither mentioned that the "volunteers" recruited by Patajo he was using were Guardia de Honor nor that his predecessor was the first to use these auxiliaries.

'^2 William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 10 October 1900, WHIP, "Special Corres­ pondence," Series 21. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to AG, DNL, 25 April 1901, 395/2133, Box 32, LR 9233; 94/117/48, esp. pg. 2; "Brief Record," 94/ACP 4625.

43 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Civil Governor, Vigan, 395/4043, LS Bk 1 ; Lt. William Smedberg to Capt. George K. Hunter, 30 December 1899, 395/2148, LS 2; Col. William S. McCaskey to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 395/4043, vol. 4, LR 1762.

44 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 7 March 190, 395/4043, LS Bk 1 ; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Civil Governor, Vigan, 19 February 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1.

45 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Lt. Grayson Heidt, 16 March 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1. For further correspondence see Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Lt. Cleavland C. Lansing, 16 March 1900; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 30 March 1900; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 12 April 1900; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 26 February 1900; Lt. Col. 126

Robert L. Howze to Maj. Edgar Z. Steever, 26 February 1900 all in 395/4043, LS Bk 1 ; “Report of Operations in the Province of I locos Norte, Luzon, P.L, April 16 to April 28, 1900," 1900 1:7:237-9.

46 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 15 March 1900,395/4043 LS Bk 1; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 22 March 1900,395/4043, LS Bk 1 ; Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 114-15; "Otis 1900," W. 1900 1:4:313-6; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Maj. Gen. Arthur Mac­ Arthur, 19 April 1900, 395/2150, vol. 1, LS 12. James LeRoy suggested that the revolt in April was the responsibility of Agi ipay and that the regular guerrillas did not take part, see LeRoy, Americans. 2:205. For the confused relations over Aglipay's authority see Col. William S. McCaskey to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 3 May 1901, 395/4043, LS Bk. 4, LS 1456; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, 12 October 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 321; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Lt. Col. Vicente Salazar, 2 April 1901, PIR SD 909.8; Santiago Espiritu to Lt. Rosendo Valido, 24 April 1901, PIR SD 909.8.

47 Quote "Mahdi fanatics" from ANJ 37 (21 July 1900). "Report of an Engagement at Batac, Province of llocos Norte, P.L, April 16, 1900, by Capt. C. J. Rollis. Thirty-Fourth U.S.V. Infantry," WD 1900 1:7:225-8; "Report of Engagement at Batac, Province of llocos Norte, Luzon, P.L, April 16 and 7, 1900, by Lieut. Grayson Heidt, Third U.S. Cavalry," WQ 1900 1:7:229-30; MJ 37 (23 June 1900).

48 Lt. Co). Robert L. Howze to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, 18 April 1900, 395/ 4043, LS Bk 1; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 18 April 1900, 395/ 2157, LR 1469. Howze also believed that "many of them were drunk and all were fanatically crazy," W 1900 1:7:238.

49 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Maj. Julius A. Penn, 20 April 1900, 395/4043, LSBk 1. 127

50 Quote "great slaughter" from Capt. George A. Dodd to Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, 395/2158, Box 1, LR 5; 94/187/3C, April 1900; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, 25 April 1900, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 64. The Americans were incensed that three native scouts had been captured, tortured, and beheaded. For Tinio’s arrival in llocos Norte see Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to ChAst, ID, DNL, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; M 1:7:239; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, 26 April 1900, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 64.

51 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AAG, 1D, DNL, 21 May 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1 ; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 5 Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to ChAst, 1 June 1900; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 11 June 1900; Howze to AG, 28 June 1900; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AAG, 1D, DNL, 30 June 1900, all in 395/4043, LS Bk 1. See also the civil reports on police improvement in 395/2180.

52 Statistics for engagements taken from W 1900 1:5:5-43, 1901 1 ;5:7- 29; 94/187, 48th Infantry History; Col. Marcus Cronin to AG, U.S. Army, 15 April 1901, RG 94, series 187, "History of the 33rd Infantry, U.S. Volunteers," [hereafter cited as 94/187, 33rd Inf. History]; M744/3rd Cav.

55 Hq, 1D, DNL, Circular Letter No. 1, 22 May 1900, RG 395, series 2174, ID, DNL, General Orders, Special Orders, and Circulars, 1900-1901, Box 1 [hereafter cited as 395/2174]. This was modified on June 7 to restrict travel only to males 18 to 60, Circular Letter No. 3, 7 June 1900 395/2173. Circular 1 was not issued in Abra until November, see Post Hq, Bangued to ChAst, 8 Novber 1900, 395/3059, LS 411 ; Circular Letter No. 11, Office of ChAst, 11 July 1900, 395/2174.

54 Office of ChAst, "Proclamation," 15 June 1900, 395/5583, Box 1, Office of ChAst, Circular Letter 7, 25 June 1900, 395/2174.

55 For examples and criticism of the lax enforcement of these orders see Lt. Frederick E. Coe, Provost Marshall to Adj., Vigan, 31 August 1900, 395/ 5583, Box 1; Maj. John Howard to Adj, San Fernando, 5 November 1900, RG 395, series 2884, Aringay, Union, Letters Received [hereafter cited as 395/2884], LR 455; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Civil S-D, Vigan, 15 February 1901, RG 395/5589, LR 221; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Vigan, 16 Februry 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 277. In Cabugao there were a total of two cases in 1900 to 1901, and these were 28

suspects found on a sweep of a guerrilla stronghold, RG 395, series 3268, Cabugao, llocos Sur, Charges and Specifications for Cases Tried by the Provost Court, 1900-1901 [hereafter cited as 395/3268]. For Provost Court reports on enforcement, RG 395, series 2986, Badoc, IN, Record of Charges and Specifications for Cases Tried in the Provost court, Nov. 1900 to June 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2986]. For selective enforcement see RG 395, series 5644, San Fernando, Un., Register of Charges and Specifications for Cases Tried in the Provost Court, Mar. 1900 to Apr. 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/5644], entries for May and November, 1900.

56 The term "native scouts" caused some confusion as the companies organized by the Army were referred to as "Scouts," usually preceded by the commanding officer's name, as in Batson's Macabebe Scouts. There were also detachments of white troops who were referred to as "Scouts." Thus the 1st District Scouts were Tagalogs and llocanos with a few white officers and NCO's while the 4th District "Headquarters Scouts" were Americans with a few native guides. Moreover, the Guardia de Honor volunteers in Union were referred to as "native scouts," as were guides and even police when they operated outside their residences. For the purposes of simplicity I will refer to the officially organized U.S. Army forces as "Scouts" and other native auxiliaries as "volunteers" or "auxiliaries. For information on 1st District scouts see "Woolard, "Philippine Scounts," pp. 17-8, 42-3; Col. Wirt Davis to Maj. John G. Ballance, 27 December 1900, SBMYP, Box 4, LR 2882. For correspondence on the raising of Native Scouts in late winter see. Brig. Gen. Thomas Barry to C.G., DNL, 19 January 1901, 395/2133, Box 21, LR 1091; "Correspondence Relating to the Organization of Native Scouts and Police," 94/369141; OMG, G.O. No. 17, 14 April 1900, 395/2172; Capt. John F Green to Anon. [AG, ID, DNL], 20 April 1900, SBMYP, Box 5, Bk 1, LR 35; Capt. John F. Green to AG, 30 April 1900, 395/2158, LR 229; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 395/2157, LR 1201; Col William Duvall to AG, 5 April 1900, 395/2157, LR 1150. For Castner's Scouts see Lt. Joseph Castner to Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, 2 April 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private File" LR 249; # 1900 1:4:327, 332; Lt. Joseph C. Castner to Maj. Edgar Z. Steever, 23 January 1900, 395/2157, Box 1 ; Lt. Joseph C. Castner to Adj., Vigan, 15 March 1900, 395/5582; Capt. John F. Green to AG, Vigan, 5 October 1900, 395/2158, LR 4006; Lt. John A. Ward, "The Use of Native Troops in Our Newest Possessions," Journal of the Militarv Service Institution of the United 129

States 31 (November 1902):793-805; Capt. John F. Green to AG, Vigan, 25 October 1900, 395/2158, LR 4806; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 3 December 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 2921; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 10 December 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 3042; Col. Wirt Davis to C.5., Hq, ID, DNL, 3 April 1901, 395/5578, vol. 7, LS 1120; Lt. John A. Ward to Adj., Santa Maria, 19 April 1901, 395/2133, Box 33, LR 9645. For volunteer units see Hq, DNL, G.O. No. 22, 29 December 1900, 395/2173.

57 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL 31 January 1901, 395/2167, vol. 3, LS 203; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 30 July 1900, 395/2133, LR 10899. For Young's comments on the dangers of arming Filipinos, see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 February 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS210.

58 Brig. Gen. Benjamin A. Alvord to C.G., 1D, DNL, 23 September 1900, 395/2130, LS 703.

59 For the correspondence on native police, see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 30 July 1900, 395/2133, LR 10899; Hq., DNL to C.G., ID, DNL, 15 August 1900, 395/2130, LS 603; Hq., ID, DNL to AG, DNL, 13 September 1900, 395/2133, LR 1468; Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton to AG, DivPhil, 30 September 1900, 395/2130, LS 724; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 13 October 1900, 395/2167, vol. 2, LS 680; Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton to SMG, 30 November 1900, 395/2130, LS 884; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to SMG, 10 January 1901, 395/2133, Box 20, LR 361 ; Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton to AG, DivPhil, 27 January 1901, 395/2130, LS 941; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 31 January 1901, 395/ 2167, vol. 3, LS 203; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 February 1901, 395/2133, LR 3837; Maj. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 28 February 1901, 395/2167, vol. 3, LS 326.

50 Lt. Col. Enoch H Crowder to C.G., ID, DNL, 20 June 1900, 395/2130, LS 437; Col. William P. Duvall to AG, ID, DNL, 9 July 1900, 395/2158, LR 2125; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze, to AG, Vigan, 19 July 1900, 395/2158 LR 2102; Maj Edgar Z Steever to CO, Vigan, 20 July 1900 395/5583, Box 1, LR 1286; Col. Wirt Davis to AG, ID, DNL, 22 July 1900, 395/2158, LR 2143; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL. 30 July 1900, 395/ 2167, vol. 1, LS 392; Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 28 May 1900. CWS 2:1172-3. 130

61 Maj. John G. Ballance to CO., San Fernando, 15 May 1900, 395/2157, LS 137; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Bangued, 11 December 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 2552; Maj. John G. Ballance to CO., Vigan, 14 September 1900, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 71; Maj. John G. Ballance to CO., South I locos, 29 February 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 321 ; Maj. John G. Ballance to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 4 April 1901, 395/2150, vol 5, LS 582; Col. William P. Duvall to [AG], 16 April 1900, 395/2157, LR 1922. For Young's private sources see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Marjorie [Mrs. John H. Gibbons], 21 March 1900, SBMYP, "Uncatalogued Material." One clear case of native spies being used in the llocos Norte revolt. For this provincial intelligence service, see Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Maj. Edgar Z. Steever, 23 February 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; Lt. Col Robert l. Howze to Lt. Harold P. Howard, March 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; 94/M744/3rd Cav.

62 Statistics for U.S. casualties taken from WD 1900 1:5:5-43, 1901 1:5:7- 29; 94/187, 48th Infantry History; 94/187, 33rd Inf. History; M744/3rd Cav.

63 Capt. Frederick Hadra, Ast. Surgeon to Post Adj, Bangued, n.d., enclos, in Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to Post Adj., Vigan, 17 August 1900, 395/2158, LR 3188. See also, Capt. Lindsey Rucker to Post Adj, Bangued; Lt. Entienne Bujac to Post Adjutant, Bangued; Lt. William L. Lowe to Post Adjutant, Bangued; Capt. Charles Van Way to Post Adjutant, Bangued all in 395/2158 This entire correspondence over the condition of the men at Bangued shows the unreliability of Army troop strength statistics. While much of the garrison at Bangued was listed as "effective" only about 30 to 50 men in each company were able to engage in marches or active duty. See also, Col. Marcus Cronin to AG, ID, DNL, 10 November 1900, 395/2158, LR 5280; Carl Musgrove, "Brief History of the 33rd U5VI," Texas State Archives, Austin Texas; Jawbone (February 1936), USAMHI.

64 "Orders for a Guerri la Column Commanded by Major Villamor, n.d. 1900, PIR SD 51.7; Juan Villamor to Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio, 25 May 1900, PIR SD 522.2; "Projecto de un Codigo desehales de dia y noche para las guer­ rillas de Abra, n.d., PIR SD 628.1; "Unsigned" [Maj. William C. H. Bowen] to AG, ID, DNL, 2 May 1901,395/3059, LSBk 1, LS 92; Villamor's Cronica gives virtually no information about the guerrilla war in Abra. For examples of guerrilla warnings see Lt. Col. Juan Villamor, "Procla­ mation," 14 February 1900, enclosed in Maj. Thomas Ashburn to Adj., 33rd Inf., 22 February 1900, 395/2157; Lt. Col. Juan Vi liait lur, "To the Suffering Inhabitants of Abra" and Julio Borbon, "To the Public of Ban­ gued," captured 10 October 1900, 395/2133, LR 17487; Bias Villamor, "Inhabitants of Abra," 10 January 1901, 395/3054, Box 1.

Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to Maj. John 6. Ballance, 2 August 1900, RG 395, series 2151, ID, DNL, Copies of Telegrams (Ciphers) Sent, Dec. 1900 to Mar. 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2161], LS 18; Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to Maj. John G. Ballance, 31 August 1900, 395/2151, LS 21; Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to ChAst, 6 September 1900, 395/3061, LS 23.

66 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 September 1900, SBMYP, Box 5, "Personal" File, LS 167; Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to Post Adj., Vigan. 5 September 1900, 395/3059, LS 171; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Mr. V. G. Way, 2 November 1900, SBMYP, Box 5, "Personal" File; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, endorsement on LR 4107,5 November 1900, vol. 3, LS 2424. Juan Villamor behaved very chivalrously in this fight, burying the American commander, Lt. Henry N. Way, and sending his class ring to the Americans. He also released the eight Native Scouts he captured. See J. V. [Lt. Col. Juan Villamor] to Lt. Col. Peyton C. March, n.d., SBMYP, Box 5, "Private" File.

67 "Province of Abra," entry for October 1900, 10 October 1900, 395/2180. According to captured documents, Villamor ordered the présidente of Bangued to evacuate all non-combatants from the town, see Julio Bor­ bon, "To the Public of Bangued," (captured 10 October 1900), 395/2133, LR 17487. For reports on engagements and conditions in Abra, see Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to Capt. William R. Smedberg, 5 September 1900, 395/2158, LR 2151; Capt. Charles W. Van Way to Post Adj., Bangued, 6 September 1900, WD 1901 1:5:45-7, Capt. William R. Smedberg to Lt. John W. Ward, 19 September 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 1505; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 24 September 1900, 395/2150, vol 3, LS 1550; "Report of Capt. Frederick Hadra, Ast. Surgeon, 33rd U.5.V.I.," 25 October 1900, 395/2133, LR 20045; CO., Vigan to [AG, ID, DNL], 8 October 1900, SBMYP, Box 5, LR Bk 4, LR 4108; Capt. Eilliam R. Smedberg to Lt. Howard, 3 December 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 29223; Lt. Col. Willaim L. Luhn to Adj., Province of Abra, 5 December 1900, 395/3054; 94/187, 33rd Inf. History. In November attacks on the Abra 132

River were so serious that U.S. forces were stationed along it every time rafts were sent, see, William Lowe to Capt. William F. Martin, 10 November 1900, RG 395, series 3059, Bangued, Abra, Letters Sent, July 1900 to Jan. 1902 [hereafter cited as 395/3059], LS 4102; Lt. Col. Peyton C. March to Lt. Howard C. Price, 13 November 1900, 395/3059; Lt. Stephen n. Hackney to Capt. William P. Martin, 16 November 1900, 395/3059, LS 424.

68 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 25 October 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 2206; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 2219; Lt. Grayson V. Heidt to AG, DNL, 26 October 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 2220; "Report of Ast. Surgeon Thomas Bath," 7 November 1900, 395/2133, LR 20047; ANJ 38 (30 March 1901); Bath, who was captured by the guerrillas was very well treated by them. He claimed that Tinio had about 1,000 guerrillas at Cusucus. For conditions in llocos Norte see Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 2 Septembr 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 197; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 8 September 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 154; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Lt. Harold B. Howard, 23 September 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, TS 1639; Lt. Col. Robert L, Howze to Lt. Harold B. Howard, 25 September 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, TS 1661; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to C.O. Batac, 27 September 1900, 395/4043, Ls Bk 2, TS 207; "Province of llocos Norte- -Dingras," September, 1900, 395/2180; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG Vigan, 10 October 1900,395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 313.

69 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 17 January 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 83; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Theodore Roosevelt, 28 November 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, LS "Personal" File, LS 190; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Henry C. Corbin, 28 November 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, LS 189. For Young's initial letter see Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 September 1900, SBMYP, Box 6, LS "Personal" File, LS 167.

70 While MacArthur's proclamation may have served to notify officers that their own individual ideas were approved, it was not the key factor in the actual conduct of pacification operations. Indeed, some policies suggested by MacArthur had been implemented months before the December 20 Proclamation. The Laws of War, particulary those dealing with war traitors and rebels, were published in the First District in June and in October DNL Headquarters ordered all captured guerrilla officers to be tried in accordance with G.O. 100. MacArthur's single 133

specific reccomendation for field officers, to deport to Manila all suspects believed to be supplying the guerrillas, was in operation in the 1st District in early September. See, Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Vigan, 395/2150, LS Bk 4, LS 71; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Maj. Henry P. Kingsbury, 2 November 1900, 395/4043. LS Bk 2, TS 439; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Capt. William H. C. Brown, 2 November 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 440; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vigan, 3 November 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 456.

71 Troop strength figures in the First District are incomplete. These figures are taken from 395/2181.

72 Col. Wirt Davis to Chief of Staff, 7 March 1901, 395/5578, vol. 6, LR 804; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to C.S, 9 February 1901, 395/4043, vol. 3, LS 405. For authorization of Native Scouts, see Brig. Gen. Thomas Barry to C.G., DNL, 19 January 1901, 395/2133.

73 Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O. Aringay, 5 April 1901, 395/2488, LR 38; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to Col. Wirt Davis, 24 April 1901, 395/2150, vol. 5, LS 704; 94/187, 48th Inf. History; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Vigan, 16 February 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 277. For the Vigan murder ring see, "Bell Report" WD 1901 1:5:35;, ANJ 38 (6 April 1901); Hq, DivPhil, G.O. No. 83, 27 April 1901, RG 395/2070, this order is reprinted in Senate, Affairs, dp. 1155-60.

74 Capt. A. D. Beight, Adj., 48th Inf. to C.O., Aringay, 3 February 1901, 395/2884, LR 49. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to AG, DNL, 28 March 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 540; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O. Vigan, 15 March 1901, 395/5589, Box 2, LR 388-397

75 Col. William 5. McCaskey to AG, ID, DNL, 29 May 1901, 395/4043, LS Bk 4, LR 1766; Brig. Gen. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 8 June 1901, 395/2150, vol. 5, LS 903.

75 Capt. Henry L. Ripley, Adj. to C.O., Santa Maria, 17 April 1901, 395/5578, vol. 7, LS 1259; Capt. Dennis E. Nolan to CO., llocos Sur, 395/2150, 395/2150, vol. 5. LS 668; 94/187, 48th Inf. History, p. 2; Capt. Daniel H. Boughton to Adj., 1 December 1900, 395/4047, Box 1, LR 5390. 134

77 Maj. John G. Ballance to CO., Civil Sub-District, Bangued, 13 January 1901, 395/3064, Box 1; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Civil Sub-District, Vigan, 15 February 1901, 395/5589, LR 221.

78 Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, 2 December 1900, 395/2180, vol. 3, IS 2894; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, 17 January 1901, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private" File, LS 201.

79 Col. Wirt Davis to Chief of Staff, 1D, DNL, 11 March 1901,395/5578, vol. 6, LS 830; Col. Wirt Davis to AG, ID, DNL, 28 January 1901, 395/5578, vol. 6, LS 275; Col. Wirt Davis to Maj. John G. Ballance, 22 February 1901, 395/5578, vol. 6, LS 654; ANJ 38 (2 March 1901). For official guidelines on the role of the local priest, see Maj. John G. Ballance to CO., South I locos, 25 February 1901, 395/3150, vol. 4, LS 333; Capt. Henry L. Ripley to CO., Candon, 25 February 1901, 395/2278, voi 6, LS 693; Capt. Henry L. Ripley to C.O., Cabuagao, 11 March 1900, 395/5578, vol. 6, LS 845. The guerrillas may have been reacting to these ceremonies when they kidnapped Padre Ambrocio Miria in Candon, see Capt. James 5. Butler to Lt. Frank D. Tompkins, 24 January 1901, RG 395, series 3402, Candon, llocos Sur, Letters Sent, Feb. 1900 to Jan. 1902 [hereafter cited as 395/3402], vol. 2, LS 155.

80 RG 395, series 3410, Candon, llocos Sur, Record of Charges and Specifications for Cases Tried by the Provost Court, Feb. 1900 to July 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/ 3410]; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Vigan, 19 January 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 92; Capt. Henry L. Ripley to Mrs. Elenteria Florentina, 18 February 1901, 395/5578, vol. 6, LS 622. For the connections between the Florentine family and the guerrillas, see RG 395, series 5594, Vigan, llocos Sur, Lists of Natives Connected with the Insurgent Government, 1900 [hereafter cited as 395/5594].

81 Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Bangued, 2 November 1900, 395/2150, vol 3 LS 2562; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Bangued, 12 November 1900, 395/ 5583, Box 2, LR 3640; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Vigan, 17 November 1900, 395/2150, vol. 3, LS 26365; Capt. Henry L. Ripley to CO., Santa Maria, 1 April 1901, 395/5578, vol. 7, LS 1236; Capt. Henry 135

L Ripley to C.O.’s Sinait, Cabugao, Santo Domingo, Lapo, 21 April 1901, 395/5578, vol. 7, LS 2379.

82 George 0. Burweli Questionnaire, 5th U.S. Infantry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.. For restrictions see Col. Wirt Davis to AG, ID, DNL, 1 October 1900, 395/5578, vol. 3, LS 1942.

83 "Report of Major Edgar Z. Steever," 30 December 1900,395/2233, Box 25, LR 3837; "Bell Report," M 1901 1:5:75; Col. Wirt Davis to Maj. John 6. Ballance, 31 January 1901, 395/5578, vol. 6, LS 369.

84 This overview of Army operations is taken from "Bell Report," WD 1901 1:5:30-100; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 395/2150, vol 3, LS 3216; Capt. Henry L. Ripley to Maj. Edgar Z. Steever, 1 October 1900, 395/5578, vol. 3, LS 1932; "Report of Capt. E. Carnahan," 10 December 1900, 395/2233, Box 25, LR 3837; Capt. Henry L. Ripley to C.O. [Cabugao, Lapo, Salmonique, Sinait], 11 November 1900, 395/5578, vol. 5, LS 2605; Col. Richard Comba to Maj. Johh 3. Ballahce, 21 Decem­ ber 1900, SBMYP, Box 5, LR Bk 4, LR 6719; Lt, Col. Robert L. Howze to C.O., "K" Co., 34th Inf., 4 October 1900, 395/2158, LR 4719; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, 1 October 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 249; Lt. Harold P. Howard to Maj. Edgar Z. Steever, 1 October 1900, 395/2150, LS 1771; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, Vagan, 15 October 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 329; Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to AG, ID, DNL, 17 October 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, LS 6; Capt. Harry W. Newton to C.O., Badoc, 30 November 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 593; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, Vigan, 29 November 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 591; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, ID, DNL, 5 December 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 2, TS 650; Capt. R. T. Ellis to C.O. Vigan, 7 December 1900, 395/2158, LR 6263; Capt. Henry L. Ripley to C.O. [Cabugao, Lapo, Narvacan, Candon], 24 December 1900, 395/5578, vol. 5, LS 2851,2852, 2855,2858; Col Richard Comba to C.5., ID. DNL 5 January 1901 395/3059, LS 4; Col. Wirt Davis to Maj. John G. Ballance, 26 February 1901, 395/5578, vol. 6, LR 900.

85 Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O., Badoc, 1 June 1901, 395/2150, vol. 5, LS 877; Hq, Civil Sub-District, llocos Norte to ChAst, ID, DNL, 10 February 1901, Lymon W. V. Kennon Papers, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina [hereafter cited as LWVKP]; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to C.O. Batac, 395/4043, LS Bk 3, LS 495; Col. William S. McCaskey to CS, 136

1 D, DNL, 21 February 1901, 395/4043, LS Bk 3, LS 583. For investi­ gations see Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze to A6, Vigan 13 August 1900, 395/4043, LS Bk 1; Capt. Daniel H. Boughton to Adj., 1 December 1900, 395/4047, Box 1,LR 539

06 Bell Report," ^1901 1:5:39; Lt. Ezekial J. Williams to Adj, Bangued, 20 April 1901, 395/3064; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Bangued, 12 November 1900, 395/3064, Box 1, LR 263. For Bedito's proclamations, see Lt. Francisco Bendito to Habitants of Bucay [Sp.], n.d., 1901, 395/3064, Box 1; Lt. Francisco Bendito to Jefe Americano del Destac- amento de Bucay, 15 February 1901,395/3064. Bendito also told the Americans he would boil them in oil or tie them to anthills, see Peter Konrad Questionnaire, 5th U.S. Infantry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa. The entire ccrresnondence on Bucay's pacification is in 395/3064.

87 Col. Richard Comba to CS, ID, DNL 1 March 1901 395/3059 VI LS 26; Capt. Earl C. Carnahan to Adj., Bangued, 13 April 1901, 395/3059, Box 1, LR 344; Capt. Earl C Carnahan to Adj., Bangued, 21 April 1901, 395/3059, Box 1.

88 w. E. Chapman, "Report of the Schools in the Province of Abra, 16 De­ cember 1901, 350/3599, "Abra" File also reprinted in Senate, Affairs pp. 432. There is at present no scholarly biography of J. Franklin Bell. I am very grateful to Edgar F. Raines for his comments on Bell in the Philippines. For Bell's later life, see Edgar F. Raines, "Major General J. Franklin Bell and Military Reform: The Chief of Staff Years, 1906- 1910" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977).

89 "Bell Report" WD 1901 1:5:37. In this report Bell quoted Young's correspondence to indicate the seriousness of the situation but left out the sections in which Young explained that the situation was much better. Compare Bell's citations of Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young's 28 1900 December letter in "Bell Report" pp. 33-4, with the actual letter. Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 28 December 1900, 395/2150, vol 3, LS 2421. Young, for example, states the situation is "much improved" and that the guerrillas have broken into small bands and their leaders are hiding. See also Young's more optimistic appraisal of the district in Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 February 1901, 395/2150. vol. 4. L3 210. 137

90 “Bell Report." WD 1901 1:5:37-41, 95-100; Col. William P. Duvall to Capt. Richardson, 7 January 1901, 395/2884, LR 13; Lt. Dennis E. Nolan, Adj. to CO., llocos Sur, 17 April 1901, 395/2150, LS 668; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Vigan, 395/5583, Box 3, LR 2124; "Brief Record," 94/ACP 4625; 94/ACP 417696; 94/187, 48th Inf. History, pp. 1-2.

91 Col. Richard Comba to Maj. John G. Ballance, 24 December 1900, SBMYP, Box 3, vol. 4, LR 6808; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, 17 January 1901, SBMYP, Box 6, "Private" File, LS 201; "Report of Col. Richard Comba," enclos, in Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young to AG, DNL, 7 February 1901, 395/2233, Box 25, LR 3837; Col. Richard Comba to C.S., ID, DNL, 1 March 1901, 395/3059, vol. 1, LS 26.

92 "Report of the Provincial Governor of Abra," 16 December 1901, 350/3599, "Abra File." For final operations in Abra, see Maj. William C. H. Bowen to CS, ID, DNL, 395/3059, vol. 1, LS 45; Capt. Stephen M. Hackney, Adj., 5th Inf. to All C.O.'s, Abra, 31 March 1901, 395/3059, vol. I, LS 41 ; Hq, 1D, DNL, G.O. No. 6, 9 April 1901, 395/2173; Capt. Earl C. Carnahan to Adj., Bangued 13 April 1901, 395/3064; Capt. Earl C. Carnahan to Adj., Bangued, 21 April 1901, 395/3064; Maj. William C. H. Bowen to Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 22 May 1901, 395/2133, Box 35, LS 11549; Aüj 39 (7 September 1901); Peter Konrad Question­ naire; Maj. John G. Ballance to C.O., Province of Abra, 8 March 1900, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 414; Col. Bias Villamor to Col. Richard Comba, 17 March 1900, 395/3064; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to AG, DNL, 28 March 1901, 395/2150, vol. 4, LS 540; "Bell Report," M 1901 1:5: 37-8; Maj. William C. H. Bowen to C.S., ID, DNL, 1 April 1901, 395/3059, vol. 1, LS 45; Villamor, Cronica. pp. 30-133. The surrender ceremonies are described in “Major" [Maj. William C, H. Bowen] to AG, ID, DNL, 9 May 1901, 395/3059, vol. 1,LS 80.

93 Brig. Gen Manuel Tinio to Lt. Col. Vicente Salazar, 2 April 1901, PIR SD 909.8; Brig. Gen. Manuel Tinio to Lt. Dionisio Reyes, 25 February 1901, enclos, in Maj. John G. Ballance to C O., Vigan, 3 April 1901, 395/5583, Box 3, LR 2105; "Major" [Maj. William C. M. Bowen] to AG, ID, DNL, n.d., 395/3059, LS Bkl, LS 92; Villamor. Cronica p. 10-11.

95 Col. William S. McCaskey to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 25 April 1901, 395/4043, vol. 4, LS 1315. For negotiations and surrender ceremonies Col. William S. McCaskey to CS, 27 April 1901, 395/4043, LS 1335; Col. 138

Wirt Davis to Maj. John G. Ballance 23 March 1901, 395/5578, vol. 7, LS 996; Capt. Lewis M. Lewis, Adj., 20th Inf. to C.O.'s, Dingras, Banna, and Salsona, 24 April 1901, 395/4043, LS Bk 4, LS 1292; Col. William S. McCaskey to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 28 April 1901, 395/4043, LS Bk 4, LS 1368.; Brig. Gen. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 8 June 1901, 395/2150, vol. 5, LS 903; Brig. Gen. William 5. McCaskey to Capt. John R. M. Taylor, 14 August 1904, PIR SD 1306.10. For the amnesty see Brig. Gen. John G. Ballance to AG, DNL, 8 June 1901, 395/2150, vol. 5, LS 903; Lt. Frrank A. Wilcox to C.O.'s Union, Abra, llocos Norte, llocos Sur, 1 May 1901, 395/5583, Box 4, LR 2529.

96 Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O., 3rd Cav., 13 May 1901, 395/2150, vol 5, LS 778; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O., South llocos, 26 May 1900, 395/2150, vol. 5, LS 853; Capt. Henry L. Ripley, Adj. to C.O. Cabugao, 27 May 1901, 395/5578, vol. 7, LS 1597. For ex-guerrlllas helping the Army see Col. William S. McCaskey to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 1 May 1901, 395/4043, LS Bk 4, LS 1400. For provincial reports, see Senate, Affairs pp. 192-4, 212, 350-1; 429-33, 461-70, 498-500. Col. William P. Duvall made a survey of all the guerrilla leaders who served in Union and llocos Sur, most of them were killed or captured. Almost none remained out after May 1, see 94/187, 48th Inf. History, pp. 16-18. CHAPTER THREE:

THE FOURTH DISTRICT, DNL

The condition of the country seemed perfectly normal, the towns being full of people and the usual work going on in the fields. There was not a sign of the war to be seen. .. . If anyone imagines that this was a desolated country, with the inhabitants fleeing to the woods and mountains for shelter, he is entitled to imagine again. The tendacy of the people was to flock to the garrisoned towns for shelter from their own ruthless countrymen, having not the slightest fear of the troops. I have no doubt that in the year 1900 Nueva Ecija raised as much rice as it ever did; at least all suitablie land was in culivation. And yet there was a nasty litte war going on all the time. It certainly was an odd state of affairs. 1 As Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston noted, the war in the Fourth District marks one of the most unique regional pacification campaigns in the Philip­ pine War. The U.S. Army faced a weak indigenous resistance movement which was only saved by outside intervention. The local guerrillas were unable to establish shadow governments or challenge American control of the towns and had to rely on terrorism to intimidate the population. Under Funston, the Americans developed regional pacification policies which stressed rapid response to guerrilla operations and the utilization of key elements of society against the insurrectos.

139 MO

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/ Pt.nalf'aAÂx îMen o (

FOURTH DISTRICT D.N.L. 14)

The guerrilla war in the Fourth District was a two-phase affair. In the first phase the guerrillas, under Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia, Col. Pablo Padilla, and Lt. Col. Casimirio Tinio, attempted to establish an politico- military organization in the towns which would supply and shelter guerrilla bands operating in the mountains. Whether through personal failings or American tactical skill, the revolutionaries were unsuccessful in both these undertakings. The Americans won over much of the llocano population and deprived the insurrectos of a popular base. American military forces also drove the guerrillas from the mountains and scattered them into small bands. In May 1900 nearly the entire guerrilla provincial command was captured, and the demoralized guerrillas hid their weapons and returned to the villages. To some Americans it appeared as if the guerrilla war was almost over. The second phase of the war witnessed the arrival of Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna from neighboring Bulacan province. Lacuna made a belated attempt to establish an insurgent politico-military organization of regulars, militia, collectors, and shadow governments. While Lacuna was surprisingly successful at this, he could not reverse popular disenchantment with the revolutionary cause nor the active collaboration of key elements of society with the Americans. Guerrilla morale was poor, and Lacuna's commanders always ran the risk that when their forces scattered to avoid pursuit many insurrectos would remain in the towns and barrios. The weakness of local civil guerrilla organizations meant these men could not be compelled to rejoin their units until the guerrillas moved back into the area. Throughout most of the second phase of the guerrilla war the 142 insurgents were on the defensive and their military activities consisted of little more than terrorism. The Fourth District comprised the adjacent provinces of Nueva Ecija and Principe. Nueva Ecija was by far the more important province. With a population in excess of 130,000, and an area of some 2,040 square miles, it was one of the most important rice producing areas in the archipelago. The province was situated on the northeastern side of the Central Luzon plain and watered by the Rio Grande de Pampanga and its tributaries. Most of the land had been cleared and was devoted to rice paddies, but in the mountains to the west and north ana in the area around Mount Arayat at the southeast­ ern tip the terrain was rough and contained mountains and swamps. Along the rivers the towns of San Isidro, Cabanatuan, Aliaga, and Tayug served as commercial centers for the surrounding rice country. The province of Principe was an isolated, mountainous province with a population of only 5,200. To all intents and purposes, the war in the Fourth District was the war in Nueva Eci ja.2 As a province with a large Tagalog population and a number of iHustrados and wealthy Filipinos, Nueva Ecija was drawn into the anti- Spanish turmoil of the late nineteenth century. Such prominent revolution­ aries as Manuel Tinio, Pantaleon Garcia, and Mariano Llanera were provincial landowners. During the Revolt of 1896 the Katipuneros, under Llanera attacked the provincial capital of San Isidro and the Spanish placed the entire province under martial law. While there was a temporary lull after the truce at Biac na bate, conditions in the region remained unsettled and there was continued resistance to Spanish authority. Brig. Gen. Ferdinand 143

Macabulos, refusing to recognize the Biac na bato settlement, waged a desultory war against the Spanish and claimed to exert control over 98 towns in central Luzon. With the arrival of the Americans and the return of Emilio Aguinaldo, Filipino nationalists once more began concerted attacks on the Spanish. The brothers Casmirio and Manuel Tinio captured the capital city of San Isidro and Nueva Ecija's independence was declared on July 3,1896. The province was under the Philippine Republic for almost a year, and San Isidro and Cabanatuan served as the temporary capitals of the governement after Malolos was captured by the Americans. Despite Nueva Ecija’s active and early role in the Philippine Revol­ ution, the Philippine Republic did not establish a strong administration in the province. This may be due to the fact that powerful local leaders sought rewards with the government at the expense of provincial organ­ ization and soldiers were withdrawn for the battles around Manila. Nueva’s Ecija's military preparations were minimal and a U.S. Navy observer estimated that in late 1898 there were only 300 Republican troops in the entire province. Moreover, these soldiers behaved so badly that they caused one town to riot and take away their guns. A U.S. Army expedition in the summer of 1899 brushed them aside with disenheartening ease and may have further diminished military support for the Republic.^ In addition to these factors the Philippine cause in Nueva Ecija was weakened by internal divisions unique to the province. For much of the Spanish era Nueva Ecija had been an unpopulated frontier. In the nineteenth century the province was settled by Tagalogs and Pampangans from the south and llocanos from the north. The distrust between these three groups 144 led to ethnic tensions which the Americans were later to exploit. Unlike the llocanos in the 1st District, Nueva Ecija's llocanos were hostile to the Philippine Revolution. The killing of the Republic's leading general, the llocano Antonio Luna, by Aguinaldo's Tagalog bodyguard at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, probably exacerbated this tension. The Pampangans apparently followed the example of the people in their native province and remained nuetral. Because of these ethnic divisions the north of the province had little guerrilla activity while in the Tagalog south there were elements of the society that were apathetic.^ Nueva Ecija was also showing signs of the socio-economic stress which would plague it in the twentieth century. Absentee landownership and tenancy were common, while traditional patron-client relations were weakening. The Revolutionary period saw a great deal of peasant unrest throughout central Luzon as peasants sought to achieve an egalitarian and less exploitive society. The Philippine Republic's elitist economic policies and its failure to institute economic or social reforms alienated peasants who turned to more messianic anti-Republican movements sucri as the Guardia de Honor. Nueva Ecija's provincial elite, on the other hand, may have found the restoration of order provided by the Americans essential for them to continue their local political control. These class divisions, when combined with the province's ethnic divisions, contributed greatly to the weakness of the native guerrilla resistance.^ The Americans invaded Nueva Ecija in May 1899 as part of their early campaigns against the main Republican army under Emilio Aguinaldo. While the American forces under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton occupied the Republic's 145 temporary capital of San Isidro on May 17, they did not capture the Repub­ lican government, which retreated up the river to Cabanatuan. The weakness of the U.S. Army, which was undermanned and near collapse from overwork and disease, prevented any sustained occupation. Lawton's forces withdrew and the province reverted to Republican control. Perhaps the main result of this expedition was to Increase the tension between Aguinaldo and his leading general, Antonio Luna, culminating In Luna's murder a month later and a corresponding loss of Internal discipline In the Republican army.6 American forces returned to Neuva Ecija In the fall of 1900 as part of the Northern Expedition. Once again commanded by Lawton, U.S. troops blocked the mountain passes In the east and north of the province and pre­ vented Aguinaldo's army from retreating Into northern Luzon. Col. Pablo Padilla's weak defense allowed Lawton's vanguard to occupy San Isidro on October 19. Plagued by alternating low and high water and unseasonable rains, the American advance bogged down shortly afterwards. In a daring gamble, Lawton cut Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young's cavalry free of the supply train and sent them north to head off Aguinaldo's retreat. Young’s forces swept over Nueva Ecija's demoralized insurrectos and scattered them while Lawton's forces followed behind occupying the towns. In their sweep through Nueva Ecija, Lawton's forces encountered little organized resistance and were somewhat surprised at the friendliness of the population. In December 1900, the new district commander rode through the province with a one man escort and commented that the area was so peaceful that he could not tell there was a war going on. The lack of insurrecto activity allowed the Army to reorganize its chaotic admlnis- 146 tration and supply system. Young's headlong dash and Lawton's aggressive operations had left them "fearfully strung out" along the two main trans­ portation routes, the San Isidro-Aliaga-San Juan de Guimba-Cuyapo-Rosales road and the San isidro-Cabanatuan-Bongabong route which followed the Pampanga River Army companies and detachments had been dropped off haphazardly to guard the mountain passes, patrol the area, and transport supplies for the forces operating in northern Luzon. The result was that when the Fourth District was organized, its' 2,400 man occupation force consisted of detachments from six different U.S. Army regiments and some Macabebe Native Scouts, reorganized as the Philippine Cavalry in May.7 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, who took command of the U.S. forces in Nueva Ecija, was already one of the most famous figures of the Philippine War. Although not yet thirty five, and with no formal military training, "Fighting Fred" Funston's exploits in the Cuban Insurrection and Philippine War had won him both international fame and a brigadier generalship in the U.S. Volunteers. Funston had fought both as a guerrilla in Cuba and against guerrillas in the Philippines. Despite his experience, or perhaps because of it, Funston was guided far more by practicality than any self-developed theories of counterinsurgency. He was willing to use whatever means necessary to accomplish a task, and if his solutions were often theatrical, they were also effective. Funston’s counterinsurgency policies demonstrate his pragmatic grasp of the realities of guerrilla war in his district. Although a vocal advocate of repression, his actual conduct towards the guerrillas was characterized by lenient surrender terms, rewards for collaboration, and personal friend­ 147

ship. His considerable political skills more than compensated for his limi­ tations as an administrator. While he remained convinced that the Filipinos were semi-civilized and unfit for self-government, he enjoyed excellent social relations with the people he governed and was able to mobilize considerable native support against the insurrectos. Moreover, he posses­ sed a shrewd idea of what was essential for counterinsurgency operations. His intelligence service was excellent and his use of highly mobile elite troops allowed him to quickly launch operations for "exterminating the Goo

G o o s."8 Under the three zone guerrilla organization established by Emilio Aguinaldo at Bayambang on November 13,1899, Nueva Ecija fell into the area termed "Center of Luzon" and was placed under the politico-military command of Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia. The Center of Luzon included Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Zambales, and Pangasinan provinces, and as a result it overlapped several Army military districts. Garcia appointed provincial and zone commanders himself, making Padilla the politico- military chief of Nueva Ecija and Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio a zone commander. Although Garcia, Padilla, and Tinio were captured in the spring, this structure remained the basis of insurrecto organization until the area was pacified in 1901. Generals Tomas Mascardo and José Alejandrino asumed control of Center of Luzon and Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna took charge of Nueva Ecija.9 One of the key determinants of the nature of guerrilla warfare in Nueva Ecija was the poor leadership provided by the insurrectos in the first months of the war. Garcia was an iilustrado who had been one of the 148 original Republican commanders in 1896, signing the pact of Biac na bato and going into exile with Aguinaldo in Hong Kong. He commanded an army brigade at the siege of Manila and served as the president's chief of staff in 1899. Garcia appears to have been a good theorist and issued detailed instructions on guerrilla warfare. He urged that the Filipinos avoid conven­ tional combat and suggested they capture weapons and wear out their American opponents rather than seek military victory. He recognized that American civil government would be used to justify foreign occupation and ordered all Filipinos who held political office under the Americans to give them up or be punished as traitors. Garcia also understood that popular support was absolutely essential for the guerrillas and insisted that the insurrectos do nothing to lose the friendship of the populace. Despite his intellectual abilities, Garcia was a poor combat commander who seems to have been both physically weakened and demoralized by Filipino defeats. He spent much of his time in hiding, exerting little control over his subordi­ nates. His capture on May 6,1900, at Jaen, Nueva Ecija was not a "death­ blow to the insurgent class" but rather an opportunity for more aggressive leadership to emerge. 10

Garcia's weak leadership at the top was compounded by poor guerrilla leadership within Nueva Ecija. Col. Pablo Padilla, "a cruel and cowardly scoundral," was unable or unwilling to control the misbehavior of his forces. Although a prominant figure in the provincial war against the Spanish, he was constantly outmaneuvered by the Americans. Padilla failed to take advantage of the disorganization of the American forces during the winter and instead suspended hostilities until February. In the north of Nueva 149

Ecija the bombastic Col. Teodoro Sandico, another veteran of the 1896 Revolt, was perhaps the most ineffective commander in the insurgent ranks. Described by Funston as a military nonentity, Sandico appears to have devoted his time to organizing a "Republican Guard" out of non-existent troops and contemplating which conditions would allow him to surrender with honor. Not surprisingly, he was soon writing letters to Aguinaldo complaining that other guerrillas paid no attention to him.* 1 From its inception, the guerrilla movement in the 4th District was hampered by the failure of it leaders to establish a civil organization in the towns and barrios that could support military operations. The causes of this failure are not clear and may be due to a combination of the speed of the Army advance in the fall of 1899, the lack of political and administra­ tive skills among provincial guerrilla chiefs, and the internal divisions within Nueva Ecijan society. Garcia and Padilla issued proclamations forbidding Filipinos from accepting civil office under the Americans, but they did not or could not enforce these decrees. Captured correspondence indicates that unlike guerrilla chiefs in other areas, the insurrecto commanders in Nueva Ecija did not devote themselves to creating the network of loyal militias, shadow governments, cuarteis, Katipunans, and village supply organizations which made up the usual Philippine guerrilla infrastructure. While some guerrilla chiefs did establish ties with local principaiia or insured collaboration through intimidation, this effort was not carried on in a systematic way throughout the province. As a result, guerrilla resistance in Nueva Ecija consisted primarily of the regular guerrilla bands operating without an organized support system.>2 150

The insurrecto failure to establish a civil support organization was compounded by their decision to attack isolated Army garrisons. Despite his own instructions to avoid large battles, Garcia sanctioned an attack on Penaranda which involved much of the insurrecto regular forces. On March 18,1900, Garcia and Padilla's forces, an estimated 400 to 700 guerrillas, were located at Maui lui lui near Penaranda. With a company of infantry and fifty Macabebes, the Americans scattered the guerrillas and inflicted substantial casualties on them. Funston also established a camp in a reputed guerrilla stronghold in the northeast highlands and found that large insurgent concentrations did not exist. Convinced that the engage­ ment at Maui lui lui had dispersed the insurgent forces and that guerrilla strength had been exaggerated, he wrote, "we shall soon drive all of the small bands out of the mountains of the province." ’3 The American success in March demoralized the Nueva Ecija guerril­ las. Insurrecto bands broke up as the men hid their guns in mountain caves and fled to the towns. Other bands refused to fight and were held together only by threats of punishment. Padilla later admitted to executing several of his own men. In the midst of this general collapse, nearly the entire Nueva Ecija guerrilla leadership was captured. Funston's intelligence service located Garcia on May 6 and Pablo Padilla and Casimirio Tinio were arrested ten days later. The demoralization of the Nueva Ecija provincial leadership can be seen by the active assistance these men gave the Amer­ icans against their former comrades. The arrival of Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna in April prevented the disinte­ gration of the insurgent cause in Nueva Ecija. A native of Bulacan province 151 and a veteran of the 1896 fighting, Lacuna had remained In the Philippines after Biac na bato. In 1898 he served under the notorious Plo del Pilar and probably gained a good education In terrorism from this old ladrone. Despite this apprenticeship Lacuna remained a humane and chivalrous commander who won the respect the Army offices who faced him. Arriving with a force of some 200 Bulacano guerrillas. Lacuna quickly set to work gathering the scattered Nueva Ecija forces, locating arms, and asserting his authority over the remaining provincial guerrilla chiefs. 15 Lacuna realized that the attempts by Garcia and Padilla to concent­ rate their forces for attacks on American towns had been disastrous. He rejected this strategy of confrontation for one that would Increase guerrilla morale and demonstrate to the populace that the insurrectos still control­ led the countryside. In May 1900, Lacuna's guerrillas began to fire Into Army-occupied towns at night, thus making maximum use of the guerrillas’ poor marksmanship and faulty ammunition. In a slightly more spectacular attempt to Impress the population, Maj. Tomas Tagunton attacked San Isidro on May 12, killing several civilians In the fighting. Unlike Garcia, Lacuna kept his forces dispersed and the Americans were unable to locate the perpetrators of "this deviltry." 15 Lacuna was greatly aided during his reorganization of the Nueva Ecija guerrilla forces by events In the neighboring Fifth District. On May 29 Capt. Charles D. Roberts was captured at Santa Lucia, Bulacan, by an insurrecto band. Shortly afterwards, an Army patrol was badly punished by a guerrilla force under the Tecson brothers. Funston was ordered to strip his garrisons 152

CHARTS

Eng. 6

Ja FeMrApMyJnJyAuSpOcNoDe JaFeMrAp Month

Fourth District, DNL Engagements, 1900-01 and cooperate with Brig. Gen. Frederick D. Grant to hunt down the guerrillas responsible. These operations lasted much of June and required the ser­ vices of up to a quarter of the 4th District's troops. During the same month Funston sent an expedition into the mountains near Bongabong which des­ troyed an insurrecto salt works. The result was that in June there were very few Army forces in Nueva Ecija available to maintain pressure on the guerrillas. 18 Lacuna attempted to take advantage of the lack of Army manpower and the summer rainy season by concentrating his forces and attacking isolated American garrisons. This proved to be a mistake. On June 14 an American patrol located Lacuna's force as it was assembling near Penaranda and administered a severe defeat, killing 22 and capturing 16 rifles. On July 4 the insurrectos attacked Manicling, which had just been garrisoned by a 153 small detachment and lacked any defenses. To prevent U.S. reinforcements, the guerrillas also attacked Gapan and Penaranda. While there was some hard fighting at Manicling, these attacks were beaten off with large guer­ rilla losses. The July 4th engagements cost the guerrillas heavily in men and ammunition and eroded insurrecto confidence. ^ 9 This guerrilla activity prompted a quick American counteroffensive which aimed at driving the guerillas into the mountains and then conducting operations against them there. On July 22 a provisional force of Philippine Cavalry and U.S. Army infantry destroyed Lacuna’s largest permanent camp. In late August U.S. Army forces cooperated in a giant sweep of the Pampan- ga-Bulacan-Nueva Ecija border area, desroying insurgent cuartelszvA scattering guerrilla bands. In the north, the surrender of Lt. Col. Roberto Grassa virtually removed all insurrecto forces on the Pangasinan border. The guerrillas also suffered a major loss when Lt. Col. Isidro Carmona, Lacuna's chief collector, was captured at Gapan with much of Lacuna’s administrative correspondence. Carmona’s capture led to the arrest of the entire Gapan infrastructure and the discovery of much of Nueva Ecija’s guerrilla supply organization. By August much of Lacuna’s success in building up an organization capable of sustained guerrilla war had been reversed. Army intelligence reported increased insurrecto desertions and over a hundred rifles captured or surrendered. Forced into the border regions. Lacuna was soon asking Lt. Col Alipio Tecson for more rifles while Col. Pablo Tecson complained that the American operations had left his guerrillas without ammunition and food.20 154

CHART4

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0 J FMAMJJASONDJ F M A M Month

Fourth District, DNL: US Casualties, 1900-01

The failure of his summer attacks and the success of the American counteroffensive forced Lacuna to fall back on the tactics he had developed in May. The insurrectos resumed firing into U.S.-occupied towns and Lacuna added instructions that the houses oiamericanistas should be burned. By November this strategy had been extended to include people who did not pay their taxes or actively aid the insurgents. Lacuna ordered the town of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, burnt to ashes because the people were alleged to be spies for the Americans. On January 2,1901, Tagunton's guerri 1 las burnt 200 houses in San Isidro because the population refused to contribute food or money. The American garrisons suffered negligible casualties during these attacks but "the situation of the people who had taken refuge in the garrisoned towns was in many ways pitiable."22 155

Most of the evidence shows that the strategy of guerrilla terrorism in the 4th District proved counterproductive. The Americans did not halt their military operations in the mountains to protect the towns but rather increased them. Throughout the winter and early spring the Americans inflicted substantial casualties on the insurgents while losing only three wounded More importantly, the principaiia decided that the guerrillas posed a major threat to their safety and openly allied with the Americans. By January Funston reported that the "better class" of Filipinos were in favor of the Americans and hostile to the gerrillas and that "there is a very decided tendency to actively aid us."23 in February the "principal men" of ten pueblos wrote Lacuna stating that the population was sick of war; they threatened to turn their people into anti-guerrilla "voluntaries" if he did not surrender. In one town guerrillas who attempted to get food were killed and their rifles turned over to the Americans.24 In the winter of 1900-1901, most of the prominent insurrectos in the 4th District either surrendered or were hunted down and killed. Engage­ ments yielded few Americans casualties but increasing numbers of captured or surrendered guerrillas. In January alone the Americans counted 135 rifles captured and 24 surrendered, more than the total obtained in the four previous months. Increasingly, guerrilla bands were forced into the border areas in the southeast where they were harried by Army expeditions from several districts. Prominant guerrila leaders such as Joaquin Nativldad and Antonio Mendoza surrendered while others, such as the notorious Tomas Tagunton, were killed. Those guerrillas that remained "devoted all their energies to keeping away from the troops" and virtually no engagements 156 between January 28 and May 19. Lacuna found It necessary to threaten insurrecto commanders with punishment for allowing Army forces to travel through their areas without molestation. By April Lacuna's own officers were deserting him while In the neighboring provinces insurrecto leaders such as José Alejandrino, the Tecson brothers, and Isidro Torres surrendered. Despite the hopelessness of his cause. Lacuna held out until May 19, when, after prolonged negotiations, he finally capltulated.25 The most famous military operation In the pacification of the 4th District actually did not occur in the district at all. Acting upon captured correspondence received from the Isolated command at Principe, Funston organized and led an expedition which captured Emilio Aguinaldo on March 23 at Palanan, Isabella. The exact effect of Aguinaldo's capture on the Immediate pacification of the Fourth District Is difficult to determine. Funston believed that Lacuna began surrender negotiations after he received a personal letter from Funston In mId-Aprll with Aguinaldo's peace proc­ lamation attached. Of far more Importance, however, may have been the destruction of Lacuna's headquarters on March 18, the surrenders of Alejan­ drino, Torres, and Sandico in April, and pressure from the Nueva Ecija Federal Party.26 During the pacification of the 4th District U.S. Army officers were able to develop and Implement counterinsurgency methods and policies which took advantage of the guerrilla weaknesses. Because the guerrillas never established a strong Infrastructure, the Army was not forced to spend much of Its time rooting out Jefe principals and shadow governments In the occupied towns. Army officers were free to concentrate on the military 157 aspects of pacification in their locales, which consisted primarily of pro­ tecting the towns and hunting down the permanent insurgent bands. Unlike officers in other areas, Funston virtually ignored the implementation of civil government until the military situation had all but been resolved. This lack of interest in civil control could have left the Americans isolated from the population, but Funston's own personal political skills compen­ sated for his lack of administrative interest. The insurrecto failure to establish strong local organizations and their later terrorism allowed the Army to mobilize much of the populace against the guerrillas. The American pacification campaign in the 4th District was thus characterized by an ability to exploit insurrecto failures and a pragmatic emphasis on dealing with the guerrilla regulars who constituted the primary barrier to peace. The major American pacification methods developed in the district were a well organized intelligence service, rapid response to insurgent military offensives, and the inclusion of key elements of the population in their own defense. Funston himself never articulated these policies and it is quite probable that he never consciously developed them into a coherent pacification strategy. He was primarily an operational leader who conduc­ ted much of the district's pacification from horseback. His personal charis­ ma allowed him to form close contacts with the local elite, former guer­ rillas, and the llocanos, which he exploited whenever practicable. Against a deeply-rooted popular guerrilla movement he may well have proven an abysmal failure, but against the particular provincial resistance he faced, Funston was a resounding success. Pragmatic and flexible, he could quickly exploit the opportunities the guerrillas gave him. 158

Funston’s Intelligence system was, by his own words, "hard to beat," and it gave him valuable information on insurgent plans and concentrations. He established social contacts with former or captured insurrecto leaders in order to gain information on guerrilla organization. Quite early in his tenure he created a native secret service whose efficiency he promoted by making very large payments for vital information. The Filipinos who located Pantaleon Garcia, for example, were paid $200 for their help, and the Filipino guide who led Funston to the hidden papers of the Philippine Repub­ lic received $150. In January 1901 Funston required $2,000 for secret service work such as the capture of Mariano Llanera.27 This district intelligence service was supported by fine field intelligence from garrison commanders. Capt. Frank A. Sullivan kept a file of suspected insurrecto soldiers at Aliaga and was able to identify amigos found on patrols.28 The effectiveness of Fourth District intelligence is best illustrated in the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo. From the discovery of Aguinaldo's correspon­ dence by a garrison commander in Principe to the forging of letters from Lacuna, and the actual expedition itself, the entire operation shows a smoothly functioning and capable intelligence sei'vice at work. The success of U.S. Army intelligence in the Fourth District owed a great deal to the insurrectos' own carelessness. In June 1900, Lt. Frank A Jernigan's llocano Scouts located Casmirio Tinio's correspondence for the two years in which he had headed the insurgent organization in Nueva Ecija. According to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, this gave the names and organizations of the entire civil-military organization as well as "a very complete idea of the existing military conditions in this province."29 The capture of Lt. Col. 159

Carmona, delegated to establish a supply system, compromised much of the guerrilla civil organization. In October the Americans captured much of Lacuna's administrative papers, "implicating natives in San Isidro and here iJaenl as well as revealing a well organized spy system.'^o The failure of the insurgents to protect the identities of their supporters contributed greatly to their inability to form an effective infrastructure. Funston also was able to utilize his intelligence to organize and conduct fast, hard-hitting military operations against the guerrillas. In early 1900 he organized a twenty-five man unit called the "Headquarters Scouts" which served as a personal escort on expeditions and as a scouting and quick strike force. By fall 1900 the Americans were able to confine the guerrillas to the mountains and rapidly cut off any guerrilla attempts to break out into the lowlands.3i Funston also made good use of the Philippine Cavalry (Macabebes) and llocano Scouts assigned to the district. The Macabebes and llocanos were used during the rainy season and in the swamps and mountains which hindered American forces. They could also perform operations which Ajnericans could not. On one occasion they broke up a group of insurgents attempting to levy tolls on the Cabiao road by dis­ guising themselves as carometa drivers and ambushing the collectors.32 In contrast to the insurgents growing terrorism, Funston made increasing efforts to insure that his military operations fell only on the guerrillas and their supporters. Funston moved from advocating harsh and rather indiscriminate repression to being a relatively benevolent com­ mander. Funston's treatment of wire cutting in his district offers a good example of this. In January 1900, Funston's policy was to confine the 160 village headmen and bum down the houses immediately around the cut, with the provision that if the problem continued the entire village would be burned. There are hints that even more drastic measure were occasionally

"discretely adm inistered.'^: By January of 1901, however, Funston wrote, “ I cannot see the expediency of burning the barrios in the vicinity of where a wire has been cut as the damage is almost invariably done by people from elsewhere. I think the unarmed and defenseless people in the barrios could not prevent wire cutting if they were so disposed.":^ Funston also protested when soldiers from other districts mistreated people in the 4th District. In his attempts to stop this, however, he was hampered by Wheaton's belief that officers who reported misconduct were somehow soft on the guerrillas. Funston came to believe, however, that effective military operations could go hand in hand with conciliating the population and made increasing efforts to insure this.:: The third aspect of American pacifiction efforts in the 4th District was the integration of important segments of Nueva Ecijan society into counterinsurgency activities. Despite his lack of interest in the more benevolent aspects of American occupation, Funston was able to draw on considerable Filipino support throughout his tenure. He had excellent rela­ tions with Nueva Ecija's social elite and was often invited to bafles and fiestas. Funston in turn overlooked the principaJias' contributions to the insurgents. This elite americanfsta feeling increased through the war, prompting one insurrecto chief to comment that since both llocanos and Tagalogs "of importance" were so hostile to the guerrillas "it will be neces­ sary that four or five lives be taken in each town.":: 161

Perhaps because of his ties with the local gentry and town elders, Funston was able to utilize the services of the many former insurrecto chiefs who wished to resume their place among the provincial elite. The original Nueva Ecija guerrilla command had not been distinguished by a strong comittment to Filipino independence and after their capture many ex- insurrectos collaborated against Lacuna. Lacuna's terrorism streng­ thened this tie between ex-guerrilla leaders and the Americans. Casmirio Tinio, for example, received several notes and even a visit from Sandico, who threatened to kill Tinio and destroy his town of Licab. Tinio, probably against his own instincts, was forced to become an American informer and give Funston information on the strength and composition of the insurgent bands in his area.37 other former insurrectos such as Padilla and Lt. Col. Joaquin Natividad helped organize the Federal Party in Nueva Ecija and warned Lacuna that they would aid the Americans against him. Lacuna expressed great interest in the Federal Party program and direct negotiations by its members may have been the deciding factor in his eventual surrender.38 Funston encouraged the support of ex- insurrectos by giving lenient surrender terms to former guerrillas. Initially Funston opposed negotia­ tions with insurrectos, but with his customary adaptability he quickly became a master of using his former adversaries to aid district pacifica­ tion. Guerrilla leaders who surrendered were expected to bring in their men and arms when they came or risk being sent back to round them up. Natividad and Maj. Antonio Mendoza, for example, spent several days persua­ ding their fellow guerrillas to come in with their rifles. Once he had 162 surrendered a guerrilla leader soon found he had given up very little. Tinio was maintained as a principalia in Licab despite U.S. suspicions that he was still collaborating with the guerrillas. Padilla's numerous crimes against Filipinos were overlooked and he was allowed to go free. Lt. Col. Roberto Grasso, who was believed to have killed many Filipinos, was also given a virtual amnesty in the hope that it would encourage other Filipinos to surrender. Teodoro Sandico was released immediately after his surrender and allowed to go to Manila. The benevolence of this approach contrasted with the guerrilla attempts to intimidate ex- insurrectos and explains why many former guerrillas collaborated with Funston.39 Lacuna was perhaps the greatest beneficiary of Funston's lenient policy. He and his officers were promised complete amnesty, allowed to keep their side arms, and given immediate liberty and freedom to travel. After Lacuna's surren­ der, Funston "spent many hours in pleasant remiscence" with his former adversaries.'^^ One of the most successful instances of Americans utilizing Filipinos against the insurrectos was the Fourth District llocano Scouts. While the originial impetus for these units came from from Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, Funston was quick to support them. Raised primarily in the northern part of Nueva Ecija, these units performed exceptionally well. Funston claimed in December 1900, while asking for reinforcements, that they had never lost a man or gun in over a year and had captured more weapons than any other unit in the district. They took part in many of the Army's expeditions and operations and served as translators, escorts, and outposts as well as protecting the llocano community from insurrecto retaliation. They also 163 tied much of the llocano comunity to the American cause with the result that the guerrillas could not establish a strong organization in the north of Nueva Ecija^l

The American-llocano alliance began in late 1899 during the U.S. offensive when Kennon was forced to use insurrecto prisoners of war to transport supplies. Kennon's use of llocanos for transportation and construction work brought him into a close working relationship with the influential Francisco Madrid. Madrid was soon recruiting llocanos from Nueva Viscaya province to work for the Americans, an activity which led to his assassination early in 1900. Kennon realized that the insurrectos had made a serious blunder and alienated the entire llocano community. He arranged for Francisco's son Bruno to return home with an American pass to bury his father, believing that "with proper management and through him or his companions the llocanos may be made assured friends of the United States.“42

Both Kennon and Funston soon became convinced that the llocanos could be trusted as armed auxiliaries, and on January 15,1900, Funston proposed that 100 llocanos be raised as native scouts. Kennon, however, quickly moved beyond this modest proposal and began to press actively for large llocano forces. In March he claimed that the district's American soldiers were insufficient for a protracted guerrilla war and that native forces were necessary to support them. Kennon pointed to the historic hatred between Tagalogs and llocanos as well as the recent murder of Madrid to explain why the llocanos would be loyal. To Kennon's disgust, Otis brushed off his suggestions, stating bluntly that native troops were not 164 expedient at the time and authorizing only a few guides. Undaunted, Kennon immediately set to work and by June had recruited a company of 50 llocanos armed with Springfield rifles under Lt. Jernigan.43 In addition to the llocano Scouts, the Americans relied on the llocano populace as guides, construction workers, and bearers. On September 1, 1900, a group of llocano boatmen and four llocano Scouts successfully held off nearly 100 insurrectos at Villacorta after their American escort had fled. The Americans for their part actively encouraged the llocanos. Kennon favored llocanos in appointments to municipal offices and instructed his officers to do the same. When Americans operated near llocano towns they were instructed not to molest "peaceful citizens" because "it is desired to win and retain the friendship of every 11ocano."44 Kennon also formed llocano volunteers into a para-military force to serve with the American garrisons. The insurrectos attempted to stop llocano support for the Army by murdering key leaders and llocanos suspected of working for the Americans, in one instance decapitating an old woman and burying two others alive. This terrorism seems only to have tied the llocanos closer to the Americans.45

The American use of llocanos also illustrates the conflicts between local officers and their superiors over pacification policies. Kennon became a vocal advocate of using native forces against the insurrectos constantly urged the recruitment of more llocano Scouts. He saw in the llocano Scouts a force which would compensate for the undermanned Army units in Nueva Ecija. Kennon even tried to go over Funston's head and enlist the aid of Taft and Wheaton when he felt Funston was blockinq the 165 recruitment of more llocanos. Funston, who knew that there were insuffi­ cient American officers to command even the existing Army companies, eventually had to call attention to Kennon's lapses in military decorum. Kennon also became involved in a dispute with MacArthur over payment of the $30 rewards to some llocanos who had led U.S. forces to over 100 insurrecto rifles. MacArthur inexplicably refused to pay the reward money despite Kennon's argument that the key factor in pacification was obtaining guerri I la rifles.46 A final, and less pleasant aspect of the use of llocanos was the relatively free hand that both they and the Philippine Cavalry were given against possible guerrillas. Funston made it clear that he would tolerate no insurrecto misconduct against his native auxiliaries and summarily executed two Filipino officers who were caught murdering native scouts. He was less prompt in punishing the misbehavior of his own forces, however, llocano "voluntarios" were accused of being secret members of the Guardia de Honor and of shooting and torturing suspects.^? The Macabebes of the Philippine Cavalry also had a vicious reputation. On one occasion they took over the town of San Francisco, Nueva Ecija, and "committed numerous and atrocious outrages during the 24 hours they were garrisoned there."^ Wheaton was furious at the abuses of the Macabebes in central Luzon and ordered Funston to "enforce discipline on these savages at all hasards [sic]." Funston reprimanded the officer responsible, pointing out that such conduct negated the otherwise good record of his men.49 Unlike General Young's 1st District, Funston's 4th District was not viewed as a showcase for American colonial government and he was not 166 subjected to the same pressures as Young to establish municipal govern­ ment. Either through his own preferences or through the disorganization that he initially faced, Funston delayed the implementation of military civil government for most of 1900. In July, he announced that sixteen towns were ready for organization under G O. 40, but by October only ten of these had held elections. Moreover, Funston noted that in many of these towns the elections were so poorly attended that in one town only fourteen people cast votes. In other towns the elections were postponed due to bad weather or invalidated by the election of unqualified officials. Nevertheless, by December Funston reported all town governments operational and "as far as reported the system appears to be working fairly well."50 The Fourth District’s commander was also indifferent to the possible uses of Filipino native police as an aid to American pacification. In July 1900, his chief administrator, Capt. Erneste V. Smith, reported that nothing had been done to organize or arm the district's native police. Under some pressure, Funston armed the police force of Penaranda in October as a test case for the rest of the district. It was disarmed in December after two pistols were lost and Funston argued that the "unsettled state of affairs" mitigated against arming any native police.®* The success of Army military operations and the recovery of the two pistols caused Funston to reverse himself in January. Thereafter he advocated arming the police and in March he claimed that they had materially aided the Army forces. Other officers noted that présidentes used the police as servants and that the police's low wages and bad armament led to very inefficient law enforcement. The civil governor who replaced Funston reported that in January 1902 only ten 167 of the province's twenty-three towns had an armed police force and that the situation needed an urgent remedy.52 In addition to his lack of interest in civil government, Funston did not exert himself in the realm of social reform. Fourth District Headquarters made great efforts to Insure that roads were built, but beyond this there was little centralized direction in the more benevolent aspects of pacifi­ cation. Some local commanders were far more enthusiastic, believing “the schoolhouse, together with just and enlightened treatment must be relied on to regenerate these people and lead them in true paths of civilization.“53 Chiefly at the initiative of such post commanders, schools were established at Cabanatuan, San Isidro, San José, and other towns in the district. Funston's success in the Fourth District despite his lack of interest in civil government suggests that personal contacts with influential native groups may have had more effect on regional pacification than a smoothly functioning military administration. For the most part Funston, his officers, and even his soldiers enjoyed excellent relations with the natives.54 Funston's close relations with principal ia and ex- insurrectos and Kennon's friendship with the llocanos are two prominent examples of this. Guerrilla terrorism, in contrast, fell on the very people Funston conciliated. The traditional principalis political control of the towns was not threatened by Funston but it was threatened by insurrecto sniping and burning. Similarly, ex- insurrectos found their ability to return to peacetime power threatened by their former companions. If the basis of civil government was to prepare the way for a civil government and allow 168

U.S. occupation, then Funston's lack of interest in civil government accom­ plished these ends. Funston's military and civil methods were well suited to the regional guerrilla war he encountered in the 4th District. The provincial guerrilla resistance was badly led and lacked popular support and their defeat in the spring of 1900 further weakened them. Lacuna's terrorist tactics, while probably the best he could do, further alienated the population. Vet military history is replete with commanders who took an advantageous situation and turned it into disaster. Funston should be credited with the intelligence to exploit this situation and to develop policies that were effective in his region. By conciliating anti-guerrilla social groups, using native auxil­ iaries, and conducting military operations which struck the insurrectos but left the populace relatively untouched, he contributed greatly to his district's pacification. NOTES

1 Funston, Memories, pp. 314-5.

2 Capt. Augustus C. Macomb to AG, DNP, 16 March 1902, RG 395, series 2635, Hq, DNP, General Correspondence Nov. 1901 to Oct. 1902, Box 6, LR 7454 [hereafter cited as 395/2635]; Wernstedt and Spencer, Philippine Island World, p. 371-3, 631; Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt In the Philippines (Berkeley. Ca.: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 1-25; Larkin,"Philipplne History Reconsidered," p. 614. Principe Province has since been incorporated into Quezon (Tayabas) Province.

3 Ferdinand Macabulos, "Statement," 10 July 1898, Exhibit 130, Taylor, History. 50-1 MG; "Acta de la proclamation de la independencia de la provincia Nueva Ecija," 3 July 1898, PIR SO 345.1; Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 116-117,126; Guerrero, Luzon at War, pp. 203; Taylor, History, p. 22 AJ; L. M. Lacundola to Emilio Aguinaldo, 18 April 1899, PIR SO 192.3; Wilcox, Through Luzon, p. 197.

^ Funston, Memories, p. 319; Larkin, Pamoanqans. p. 126; William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 13 September 1900, WHTP, Series 21; Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr.. Nueva Eci ja in American Times: Homesteaders. Hacendros. and Politicos (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1981), pp. 6-7. In 1960 out of Nueva Ecija's total population of 608,300 some 386,700 were Tagalog speaking, 205,000 llocano, and 10,400 Pangansinan or Pampango. It is quite possible that proportion of Tagalog-speaking people has increased substantially from the 1900 level, see Wernstedt and Spencer, Philippine Island World, pp. 622-3.

5 May. "Philippine-American War." pp. 365-7. For the antipathy of peasants towards the Revolutionary regime in Central Luzon, see

169 170

Guerrero. Luzon at War, dp. 144-9, 164-204. For the conditions of the peasantry In Nueva Ecija and later revolts see lleto, Payson. pp. 259- 313; Sturtevant. Peasant Uprisings, dp. 70-2. 131-8, 175-92; Kerkvliet, Huk Rebellion, esp. pp. 1 -25. John A. Larkin argues that the Pampangans, when faced with a similar situation, opted for the secutity of American rule, see Larkin, Pamoangans. pp. 119-126. For the collaboration of the elite with the Americans, see Funston, Memories, pp. 355-6; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 2 January 1901, RG 395, series 2263,40, DNL, Telegrams Sent, Jan. 1900 to Aug. 1901, Box 4 [hereafter cited as 395/2263].

“Otis Report 1899," ^ 1:4:119-21. Although there is no documentary evidence to support a definitive conclusion most historians believe Aguinaldo is implicated in Luna's killing, see May, “Philippine American War." pp. 362-3; PIR 50 861, esp. Lt. C. N. Murphy, “The Death of Antonio Luna," PIR SO 861.3; “El Commercio," 23 July 1903, PIR SO 1021,6; Kalaw, Philippine Politics, pp. 205-16; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 166; Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 315-7; Taylor, History, p. 43 AJ. Aguinaldo’s partisans believe he was innocent, see Bain, Sitting in Darkness, pp. 189-90.

7 Quote “fearfully strung out," from Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton to CS, 17 November 1899, "Otis 1900," W. 1:4:263. For U.S. operations in Nueva Ecija see. “Otis 1900," W 1:4:217-38,262-88; Lawton's posthumous report, which also included the reports of his subordinate commanders, is in "Report of an Expedition to the Provinces North of Manila, P.l. During the Months of September, October, November, and December, 1899, Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U.S.V., Commanding," WD 1:900 1:6:6-404 including “ Young Report," pp. 262-83; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Lt. Col. Clarence R. Edwards, 8 December 1899, RG 94, series 117,34th Infantry, U.S. Volunteers Letters Sent Book 1, L5 154 [hereafter cited as 94/117,34th Inf. LS Bk]; Emilio Aguinaldo to Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio, 18 October 1899, PIR SD 1198.1; Woolard, “Philippine Scouts," pp. 24-41. For evidence of Republican demoralization see the captured correspondence in PIR SD 299.1; Alejandrino, Price of Freedom, p. 191. Funston, Memories, p. 313; “MacArthur 1900," WQ 1:5:46. For an idea of Army confusion see Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, 8, 9, and 10 December 1900, 94/117, 34th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 172, 174, 182, 183; Funston, Memories, p. 313. For the organization of the Philippine Cavalry see Woolard, "Philippine Scouts," pp. 56,77-88. 171

® Entry of 14 August 1900, William C. Brown Diary [hereafter cited as WCBD], William C. Brown Papers, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa. [hereafter cited as WCBP]. For biographical material on Funston see Funston, Memories; Thomas W. Crouch, "The Making of a Soldier; The Career of Frederick Funston" (Ph D. Dtss. University of Texas at Austin, 1969); Thomas W. Crouch. A Yankee Guerrillero: Frederick Funston and the Cuban insurrection, i 896-1897 (Memphis, Tenn.: Memphis State University Press, 1975); Bain Sitting in Darkness. For Funston's popularity with his soldiers see Jack Ganzhorn, I've Killed Men (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1940) pp. 147-208; Elston Mitchell Questionnaire, 5th U.S. Inf. Box, USAMHI; William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 14 July 1900, WHTP, Series 21.

9 “Decree Appointing Pantaleon Garcia to the Supreme Command in Central Luzon," 2 November 1899, PIR SD 243.2; Taylor, History, p. 49 HS; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia to Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio, 3 January 1900, PIR SD 243.3; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia, "Appointments," 9 January 1900, Taylor. History. Exhibit 1037, p. 44 GV. Garcia’s appointment from Emilio Aguinaldo is in PIR SD 243.2. For José Alejandrino's assumption of authority. Brig. Gen. José Alejandrino to Isidro Torres, 1 July 1900, PIR SD 323.11; Brig. Gen. Tomas Mascardo to Brig. Gen. José Alejandrino, 1 November 1900, PIR SD 625.1.

10 m i 37 (25 June 1900); Hq, 34th Inf. to C.O., "K" Co., 34th Inf., 13 April 1900, RG 395, series 2790, Allaga, NE, Letters Received Apr. to Aug. 1900, LR 35 [hereafter cited as 395/27901; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia to Brig. Gen. Isidro Torres, 2 February 1900, PIR SD 243.11; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia to Brig. Gen. Isidro Torres, 10 February 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1044, pp. 45-6 GV; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia, “Decree," 15 April 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1054, p. 48 GV; “MacArthur 1900, " ^ 1:4:59-60,62; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia, "Instructions for Guerrillas and Flying Columns," 25 November 1900, PIR SD 243.6; Capt. Erneste V. Smith to AG, 4D, 7 May 1900, 395/2133, LR 5166; M i 37(12 May and 25 June 1900). For background of Garcia, see Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 294-5. For a critical assessment of his abilities as a leader see Gleeck, Nueva Ecija. p. 6; Funston, Memories, p. 318.

11 Quote "cruel and cowardly" from Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG DNL, 17 May 1900,395/2263, Box 1. Funston, Memories, pp. 319,357; 172

"Diary of Events, May 6 to June 14,1900," 94/228335; Col. Pablo Padilla to Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio, 21 January 1900, PIR SD 51.8.; Col. Teodoro Sandico to Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio, 20 July 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1079, p. 56 GV; Unsigned [Col. Teodoro Sandico] to Emilio Aguinaldo, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1075, p. 54 GV; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL. 25 May 1901, RG 395, series 2262, Hq, 4D, Copies of Letters Sent, Apr. 1900 to Oct. 1901, LS 2759 [hereafter cited as 395/2262]; "Otis 1900," # 1900 1:4:360-1. Padilla admit­ ted to executing several of his own men, see Brig. Gen. Frederick Fun­ ston to AG, DNL, 20 May 1900,395/2263, Box !. For Padilla's interference in local affairs see Lt. Col. Pablo Padilla to Marcelino Garcia, 13 January 1900, PIR SD 498.1. For complaints on the behavior of Padilla's men, see Ferdinand Madrid to Col. Pablo Padilla, 17 February 1900. PIR SD 345.4.

12 For examples of guerrilla proclamations see Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia to Brig. Gen. Isidro Torres, 2 February 1900, PIR SD 243.11; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia to Brig. Gen. Isidro Torres, 10 February 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1044, pp. 45-6 GV; Maj. Gen. Pantaleon Garcia, "Decree," 15 April 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1054, p. 48 GV; Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio to Captain of Detachment at Margan, 26 March 1900, PIR SD 480.12; "MacArthur 1900," M i 1900 1:5:62; Capt. Willard D. Newblll to AG, San Isidro 7 February 1900 94/117,34th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 214; Lt. Col. Casmiro Tinio to Jefe Local of Toro and Santa Rita, 17 March 1900, PIR SD51.9.

13 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, 2nd Div., 21 March and 28 March 1900,395/2262; "Reports of Operations of the Thirty-fourth Infantry, U.S.V. in the Provinces of Nueva Ecija and Bulacan, Luzon, P.I., March 16 to August 30,1900, by Maj. Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Thirth-fourth Infantry, U.S.V.," WD 1900 1:7:365-7 [hereafter cited as "Wheeler Report"]; Maj. Joseph E. Wheeler, "Report of Expedition and Engagement, March 18 1900," 7 April 1900, 395/2133, Box 3, LR 4516; Capt. Emeste V. Smith to AG, DNL, 21 March 1900 395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 25 May 1901. 395/2262, LS 2759.

14 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, 2nd. Div., 6 April 1900,395/2263; Maj. John A. Baldwin to AG, 3rd Brig., 2nd Div., 27 February 1900, RG 391, series 1728, Records of U.S. Army Mobile Unites, 1821-1942, National Archives, Washington. D C., 22nd U.S. Infantry LS Bk [hereafter 173

cited as 391/1728]; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 20 May 1900 395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 25 May 1901, 295/2262, LS 2759; Funston, Memories, p. 347-8; HQ, 34 Inf. to C O., Co. “K," 34th Inf., Aliaga, 13 April 1900,395/2262; Capt. Emeste V. 5mith,to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 6 May 1900,395/2262; M l 37 12 May 1900; M i 37 (25 June 1900); "Diary of Events 5/6/00 to 6/14/00," 94/338335; Capt. Erneste V. Smith to Capt. Robert W. Dowdey 10 March 1901,395/ 2263; Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 26 September 1900, PIR SD 480.9.

^5 "Settlement of a Check for $200,000 pesos," Taylor, History. Exhibit 78, p. 77 LY; Emilio Aguinaldo to Col. uTbano Lacuna,, 29 October 1899, PIR Roll 3, AGO 3317; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 28 May 1900,395/ 2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 28 June 1900,395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 25 May 1901 395/2262, LS 2759, LeRoy, Americans. 2:213; "Brl. Gen. Urbano Lacuna" File. PIR SD 658.

16 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 14 June 1900, 395/2263; Capt. Emeste V. Smith to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 12 May 1900 395/2263. One of the most interesting examples of Lacuna’s reorgan­ ization effort is his letter to a Tayabas unit ordering them to disregard the insurgent Southem Luzon command and come north. It sheds inter­ esting light on the factional and sectional rivalries among insurrecto leaders, see Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Adj., Btln. Lorenzo Tugcay T amayo, 19 May 1900, WD 1900 1:7:120.

17 Statistics for engagement figures from WD 1900 1:5:5-43; WD 1901 1:5:7-28; RG 94, series 187,34th Inf., U.S.V. History.

18 "Report of Engagment on Mount Balubad, Province of Bulacan, P.I., June 11, 1900, by Brig. Gen. F. D. Grant, U.S.V.," WD 1900 1:7:115-120; Funston, Memories, pp. 348-54, 357-9; Ganzhom, I’ve Killed Men, pp. 176-82; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 4D, DNL ,14 June 1900, RG 395, series 3248, Cabanatuan, NE, Letters Sent, Mar. 1900 to Dec. 1901, LS 117 [hereafter cited as 395/3248].

19 "Wheeler Report," WD 1900 1:7:370-1 ; HO, 4D, DNL to AG, DNL, 14 June 1900, Folder P-3, Funston Papers; Lt. Harry W. Newton to Capt. Wiliam 174

D. Newbill, 19 June 1900, 395/2269, LR 673; Funston, Memories^ pp. 359-65; Ganzhorn, I've Killed Men, pp. 182-4; M l 37 (25 June 1900).

20 Col. Pablo Tecson to Brig. Gen. Isidro Torres, 23 August 1900, PIR SD 545.3; Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Lt. Col. Alipio Tecson, 1 August 1900, PIR 50 591.2; Maj. Joseph E. Wheeler to AG, 40, ONL, August 26 1900,395/2269; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 24 June 1900, 395/2633; Capt. Emeste V. Smith to AG, ONL, 27 July 1900, 395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 25 May 1901, 395/2262, LS 2759; "Wheeler Report," m 1900 1:7:372-76.

21 Statistics for casualty figures from Ml 1900 1:5:5-43; WO 1901 1:5:7- 28; 94/187,34th Inf. History; "Chronological list of actions with losses in the Philippine Islands. Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon. Oct. 1st 1900 to May 5th 1901," attached to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 25 May 1901,395/2262, LS 2759. The high casualties in March 1901 were all in the Philippine Cavalry.

22 Funston, Memories, p. 373; Maj. William C. Brown to Helen. 26 January 1901, WCPB, Box 2; Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Capts. Severo and Oioniso de los Santos, 12 August 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1085, p. 58 GV; Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Lt. Col. Joaquin Natividad, 22 November 1900,395/2133, Box 23, LR 2147; Entry of 2 January 1901, WCBO.

23 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 2 January 1901,395/2263. For U.S. operations see “Chronological list" in Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 25 May 1901, 395/2262, LS 2759.

24 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG. ONL, 8 Feburary 1900,395/2263.

25 Quote “devoted all their energies" and statistics on engagements from Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 25 May 1901,395/2262, LS 2759. For reports on operations see “Wheeler Report," WO 1900 1:7:365-76; “Reports of Operations in Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon," WO 1901 1:5:130-4 [hereafter cited as “Fourth District 1901"]; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 25 January 1901, 395/2263; Capt. John J. Crittenden, 16 February 1901,395/2133, LR 3787; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 10 March 1901, 395/2133, Box 32, LR 803; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 10 175

May 1901,395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 25 May 1901,395/2262, LS 2759; Funston, Memories, pp. 381-3. For evidence of Lacuna's having to threaten his subordinates see Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Capts. Severo and Dioniso de los Santos, 12 August 1900, Exhibit 1085, Taylor, History, p. 58 GV; Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna to Majors and Captains Commanding Companies of the 1st and 2nd Btlns., 7 December 1900, PIR SD 658.4.

26 I was unable to locate evidence of negotiations between Funston and Lacuna. For information on the surrender of key insurrecto leaders, see Capt. Erneste V. Smith to Capt. Robert W. Dowdey 10 March 1901, 395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 10 April 1901,25 April 1901,29 April 1901,9May 1901, all in 395/2263; Alejandrino, Price of Freedom, pp. 172-4. For accounts of Aguinaldo’s capture see "Fourth District 1901," M l 1901 1:5:122-30; Funston, Memories, pp. 384-426; Lt. James D. Taylor to AG, 4D, DNL 10 February 1901, 395/ 2269; Lt. James D. Taylor to Adj., 24th Inf., 8 April 1901,395/2133, Box 34, LR 10677; PIR SD 697; Entries 10-12 February 1901, WCBD; Bain, Sitting .in Darkness.

27 Quote "hard to beat" from Funston, Memories, p. 373. Brig. Gen. Fred­ erick Funston to Col. Charles Keller, 20 April 1900 395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 8 May 1900,395/2262; Boxl, LS 218; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 19 May 1900,395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Provost Marshal General, 13 December 1900,395/2262; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 10 January 1901, 395/2263; Funston, Memories, pp. 344-6.

28 Capt. Frank A. Sullivan to Adj., 34th Inf., 20 May 1900,395/4047, LR 141. For a later district-wide campaign to spread photographs of prominant insurrectos see Capt. Emeste V. Smith to C.O. San Isidro, etc., 18 April 1901, RG 395, series 2261, Hq, 4D, DNL, Letters and Endorsements Sents, Apr. 1900 to Oct. 1901, LS 1306 [hereafter cited as 395/2261].

29 Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DNL, 5 June ! 900,395/3248, LS 79.

30 Lt. David Wheeler to Adj., 22nd Inf., 3 October 1900, 395/2269. 176

31 Funston, Memories, pp. 315-6; Ganzhorn, I've Killed Men, pp. 147-9; For U.S. operations see "Chronological list" in Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 25 May 1901,395/2262, LS 2759; Lt. Col. Charles Keller to AG, 40,8 October 1900, 395/2269; Adj. to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, 10 October 1900,395/3248; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 40,17 October 1900,395/3248, LS 476; Lt. David P. Wheeler to Adj. 22nd Inf., 22 October 1900 395/2269, LR 1674; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 40, ONL, 31 October 1900,395/3248, LS 532.

32 Entry of 31 October 1900, WCBO.

33 Capt. Erneste V. Smith to C.O., San Jose, 7 January 1900,395/2263. For official policy see Capt. Emeste V. Smith to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, 31 January 1900,395/2263; Capt. Emeste V. Smith to C O., Cabiao, 5 February 1900,395/2263.

34 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 3 January 1901. Funston was under considerable pressure to retaliate for wire cutting, see Maj. Benjamin Alvord to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 3 January 1901, RG 395, series 2270, Hq, 40, ONL, Telegrams Received, Jan. 1900 to Oct. 1901, [hereafter referred to as 395/2270).

35 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 29 October 1900,395/2263; Maj. Thomas Baldwin to AG, 40, DNL, 4 June 1900, 395/2133, LR 6474.

35 C. Gonzales to Teodoro Sandico, 3 August 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibt 1083, p. 57 GV; Funston, Memories, pp. 355-6,373.

37 Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 29 July 1900, PIR SO 480.8; Lt. Col. Casmirio Tinio to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 26 September 1900, PIR SO 480.9; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL, 2 January 1901,395/2262. For the good relations between Tinio and Funston see Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 25 July 1900,395/2263.

38 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, ONL. 8 February 1901,395/2263; Capt. Emeste V. Smith to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 15 March 1901, 395/2263. 177

39 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 28 June 1900,395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Maj. Joseph Wheeler, 9 July 1900 395/2263; Capt. Erneste V. Smith to C.O.'s Gapan and Penaranda, 10 July 1900,395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Lt. Col. Wilbur E. Wilder, 12 July 1900,395/2263; William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 14 July 1900, WHTP, Series 21. For relations with Tinio see Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, 27 October 1900, 395/2263. For Sandico surrender see Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 10 March 1901 395/2133, Box 32, LR 603; Lt. Burton J. Mitchel, ADC to AG, DNL, 7 April 19001,395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG DNL 10 April 1901, 395/2263. For Roberto Grasso see Col. Henry B. Freeman to AG, DNL, 8 October 1900,395/2129, LS 670; Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton to Col. Henry B. Freeman, 8 October 1900, 395/2129, LS 670. For Antonio Mendoza see Capt. Frank A Sullivan to AAG, 4D, DNL, 30 December 1900,395/2788, LS 55. For Natividad see Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 5 January 1901,3 95/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 6 January 1901,395/2263; Maj. Benjamin Alvord, AAG, DNL to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 7 January 1900, 395/2270, Box 5.

40 Funston, Memories, 433; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 9 May 1901,395/2263; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL. 19 MAy 1901, 395/2263; "Translation of Surrender Terms for Urbano Lacuna, “ 18 May 1901, PIR SD 658.6

41 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 30 December 1900 395/226; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DNL, 7 June 1900, LS 83; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DNL, 8 June 1900, LS 94; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze, 13 June 1900, LS 114; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 4D, DNL, 30 June 1900, LS 142, all in 395/3248; Maj. Edwin B. Bolton to AG, 4D, 16 December 1900,395/2269. For American's serving with the llocano Scouts, see Capt. Erneste V. Smith to C.O.'s, Co's A and B, llocano Scouts, 16 January 1901, 395/2262. For operations against insurrectos intimidating the llocano comunity, see Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DNL, 7 June 1900,395/3248, LS 83; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DNL, 8 June 1900, 395/3248, LS 94.

42 Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AAG, San Isidro, 29 March 1900, 94/117, 34th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 427. For correspondence on the use of llocanos see Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to CS, 10 December 1899, LS 187; Col. 178

Lymon W. V. Kennon to Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton 12 December 1899, LS 197; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Maj. Benjamin Alvord, AG, 28 December 1899, LS 255 all in 94/117, 34th Inf. LS Bk 1. See also Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, 2nd. Div., 15 January 1900,395/2263; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Capt. William Dame 13 January 1900, LS 97; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to C.O. Bayombong, March 8 1900, LS 328; Lt. Col. Charles Keller to AG, 3rd Brig., 27 March 1900, all in 395/2270.

Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 3rd Brig., 2nd Div., 8th AC., 8 March 1900 94/117,34th Inf., LS Bk 2, LS 443. For recruitment of llocano Scouts see Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 40, DNL, 29 May 1900, 395/3248, TS 50; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to CO., San Jose, 5 June 1900,395/3248, LS 76; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Chief Ordinance Officer, DivPhil, 29 May 1900, 94/117,34th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 560; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Lt. Col. Robert L. Howze, 13 June 1900, 395/3248, LS 114. For Otis' comment see Maj. Gen. Ewell S. Otis to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, April 241900,94/117,34th Inf, LS Bk 2, LS 443.

44 Adj., 34th Inf. to Capt. Frank A Sullivan, 14 April 1900,395/2070. For llocano operations see "Miller" to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, 2 September 1900, 395/3248, LS 340; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DivPhil, 8 October 1900 395/2133; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 25 May 1901,395/2262, LS 2759; Funston, Memories, pp. 344-6; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Col. Charles Keller, 20 April 1900,395/2263; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Capt. Frank A. Sullivan, 12 June 1900, 395/3248, LS 110; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Military Governor, San Isidro, 7 November 1900 395/3248, LS 566; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Military Governor, 9 November 1900,395/3248, LS 572.

45 Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DNL, 7 June 1900, 395/3248, LS 83; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, DNL, 8 June 1900, 395/3248, LS 94.

45 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Maj. Benjamin Alvord, 26 August 1900, 395/2263; Capt. Erneste V. Smith to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, 8 Sep­ tember 1900,395/2263; William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 13 September 1900, WHTP, Series 21. For Kennon's version see "The General Situa­ tion, in Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Secretary Proctor, 17 January 1902, LWVKP. For the episode of the payment of the llocano rifles see Capt. Charles A Green to AG, 13 June 1900,395/2133, LR 8933, Kennon's comments are on the 7th endorsement. Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, 12 179

September 1900; Lt. Col. Samuel D. Sturgis to C.G., DNL, 6 October 1900, 395/2130, LS 757; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to C.O., Aliaga, 31 October 1900,395/3248, LS 521. This entire episode is extremely revealing for the light it sheds on MacArthur's own fussiness and inflexibility on the matter of arming Filipinos.

^7 Lt. Col. John H. Markley to AG, 40,22 January 1901 395/2270, Box 5; Pantaleon Aliciano y Dias to U.S. Colonel, Cabanatuan, 16 July 1900, 395/4047, LR 371 ; Adj. 34th Inf. to Capt. Frank A, Sullivan, 17 August 1900,395/2270, LR 105; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Capt. Frank A. Sullivan, 17 August 1900,395/3248, LS 320; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Capt. Frank A. Sullivan, 19 August 1900, 395/3248, LS 321; Col. Teodoro Sandico to Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, 20 November 1900, PIR SD 567.4; Col. Teodoro Sandico to Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon, n.d., 395/2269, LR 630. For the Incident regarding the summary execution of the guerrillas see Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, 2nd Div., 27 March 1900,395/2263; Funston, Memories, pp. 331-5; Ganzhorn, lye Killed Hen, pp. 166-9; M l 37 (14 April 1900).

48 Maj William C. Brown to Grace [sister], 16 December 1900, WCBP, Box 1 ; Maj. William C. Brown to AG, 4D, DNL, 24 December 1900 395/2269 Box 2. See also the complaint of Col. Teodoro Sandico to Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, 20 November 1900, PIR SD 567.4.

49 Maj. Benjamin Alvord. AG, DNL to Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, 2 January 1901,395/2270. For Funston's comments see Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to Lt. Henry A Ripley, 31 December 1900,395/2261, LS Bk 4. LS 2924.

50 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL 10 December 1900,395/2262. For correspondence on civil government see Maj. James A. Baldwin to Military Governor, 17 May 1900,395/2133 LR 4022; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Judge Advocate, Manila, 19 March 1900,94/117,34th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 381; Col. Henry B. Freeman to AG, 2nd Div., 11 April 1900 395/2269; Lt. Col. A. L. Markley to AG, 4D, DNL, 22 January 1901, 395/2233, Box 25, LR 3622. For Funston's attempt to organize civil government in July, see Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 9 May 1900 395/2262, LS 224; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, G.O. No. 1.28 July 1900, RG 395, series 3198, Bongabong, NE, Miscellaneous Letters, Telegrams, Orders, and Reports 1900-1903, [hereafter cited as 180

395/3198]; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL 20 September 1900, 395/2262, LS 1692; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 14 October 1900,395/2261, LS Bk 3 LS 1930. For the results in local areas, see the following entries in 395/3248: Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to C.O., Aliaga, August 9 1900,, LS 280; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to C.O., Bongabong, 9 August 9,, LS 295; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 4D, DNL, 19 September 1900, LS 379; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to C.O., Santa Rosa, 19 September 1900, LS 378; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 4D, DNL, 19 September 1900; "Number of Qualified Electors-Bongabon- Sept. 20 1900," 395/3198.

51 Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 12 December 1900, 395/2262; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 4D, 30 September 1900,395/3248, LS 1929; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 4 October 1900, 395/2261, Bk 3; Capt. Erneste V. Smith to AG. DNL, 31 July 1900, 395/2262, LS 1085; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 13 April 1901,395/2262, LS 1290.

52 "Report of the Governor of Nueva Ecija," 15 January 1902, Senate, Affairs, p. 502. For Funston's optimistic reports see. Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 13 January 1901,395/2262, Box 1 ; Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston to AG, DNL, 4 March 1901, 395/2261, LS Bk 4, LS 799. For more pessimistic, and probably more accurate reports, see Capt. Emeste V. Smith to C.O.'s, 11 March 1901,395/2262; Capt. M. Black to AG, 40,30 June 1901,395/3248; Lt. Col. Alfred C. Markley, “Report for the Month of May 1901 on Native Police in 24th U.S. Infantry Territory," 395/2269.

53 Quote from Maj. James A. Baldwin to Military Governor, 17 April 1900 395/2133, LR4022. For other information and views on education see Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to AG, 4D, DNL, 13 May 1900 395/3248; Capt. Jacob F. Kreps to Adj. 22nd Inf. 11 May 1900,395/4965; Lt. Col. A. L. Markly to AG, 4D, DNL. 22 January 1901, 395/2233, Box 25, LR 3622; Lt. Stanley Howland to Adj. 24th Inf., 1 June 1901, RG 395, series 5045, San José, NE, Letters Sent. Mar. 1900 to May 1902 [hereafter cited as 395/5045]; Capt. Erneste V. Smith to AG, DivPhil, 7 October 1901, 395/2262.

54 For a good view of relations between soldiers and natives see James Miller Questionnaire, 34th Infantry, U.S.V. Box, USAMHI; Peder Pederson 181

Questionnaire, 34th Infantry, U.S.V. Box, USAMHI; Capt. James A. Moss "Journal," Funston Papers, Folder P-2. District officers made a strong effort to prevent troop misconduct, see Funston, Memories, pp. 368-9; Col. Lymon W. V. Kennon to Capt. Morgan, 5 June 1900 395/3248, LS 78. CHAPTER FOUR; THE THIRD DISTRICT, DSL

The garrisons were In all cases so small that no man could be spared to hold the interior towns as they were captured, and the inevitable result followed. Towns captured on one day were of necessity evacuated on the next; and any native who gave information or in any way showed friendship for the Americans was killed by the insurgents, who immediately returned and reoccupied the towns, and a district which could have been kept in comparative peace if more troops had been furnished, was repeatedly fought over, repeatedly captured, and as often given up for want of sufficient force to hold it. As a matter of fact the regiment held the ground upon which any part of it happened to stand, but no more.* This summation of the Army's pacification of the Third District, DSL illustrates the frustration felt by officers serving in southeastern Luzon. The war in the Bicol region was a unique regional war which had few simi­ larities with other areas. Unlike their compatriots in other areas of Luzon, the district's guerrillas did not challenge the Army's occupation of the towns but withdrew with the native population into the hills. Insufficient Army forces, formidable terrain, and the guerrillas' defensive strategy prevented a quick military solution and caused the pacification campaign to become a virtual stalemate. Unable to defeat the enemy In the field, officers In southeastern Luzon turned to enticing the population back through enlightened civil government, social reforms, and the conciliation of local elites. These benevolent policies were coupled with military 182 183

MAP A

THIRD DISTRICT D.S.L.

CAMflRiNES MORTE

5A*I HiSuct, 6Ay CAMAR in ES S y R S 4 2 3 » t ChThViOPtti

&JXo

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H A ^SA TE 184 counterinsurgency policies designed to cut off the guerrillas and their supporters from food and supplies. In the isolated garrisons of southeastern Luzon, the formation and implementation of pacification methods fell upon garrison and provincial officers. These men adopted pragmatic measures designed both to conciliate the populace and isolate the guerrillas. Despite being undermanned and poorly supported, the Army was able both to defeat the insurgents and win over the population to American government. The 3rd District, Department of Southern Luzon, encompassed the three provinces of Ambos Camarines, Albay, and Sorsogan, an area of some 5,400 square miles. Situated on a narrow peninsula and barely joined to the rest of Luzon, southeastern Luzon is a distinct cultural subregion known as "Bicolandia." The Bicol region is geographically broken up into several semi- autonomous regions by large bays and volcanic mountains. This isolation is further compounded by the area's dense vegetation and low hills, which present an almost impenetrable barrier to overland travel. The result is many areas of Bicolandia are joined to the rest of Luzon only through water­ borne communications. Despite these geographic barriers, the shared Bicol language and traditions have worked to create a distinct and unifying Bicol culture.2 Southeastern Luzon assumed world importance in the mid-nineteenth century with the commercial cultivation of abaca (Manila hemp) for an international cordage market. The hemp trade initiated great economic growth as merchants and traders, many of them Chinese, established close ties with international markets. The harbors of Legaspi, Sorsogan, Bulan, and Tobaco became key ports for the hemp trade while interior towns such 185 as Iriga, Ligao, Oas, became prosperous trading centers. The commercial cultivation of abaca also increased the prosperity of the lowland rice- growing areas which became responsible for feeding the population working in the abaca fields and ports. By 1900 Albay and Sorsogan had become the centers of abaca production, while Ambos Camarines exported rice to the other two provinces.^ The Philippine Revolution in Bicolandia, with the exception of the Camarines, is noteworthy chiefly for its lack of bloodshed and bitterness. In addition to the economic benefits of the abaca and food trade, many of the religious abuses that prompted rebellion in other areas of the Philippines were absent in Bicolandia. The diocese of Nueva Caceras was unique in having native Filipino priests occupying half the parishes, while the Fran­ ciscan order neither owned large estates nor served as agents of the Spanish government. In 1896 Albay sent volunteers, money, and supplies to fight against the Katipuneros under the belief that they represented a Tagalog plot to dominate Luzon. Spanish voluntarios managed to dispel much of this good feeling by brutally suppressing a Tagalog outbreak near Daet, Camarines Norte, in November 1897. With the collapse of Spanish authority in the rest of the archipelago, the provincial elite in Albay took power in September, allowing the Spanish governor to depart freely. In Sorsogan there was a similarly peaceful political transfer as the Spanish governor handed over his authority to Father Jorge Bari in. In Ambos Cama­ rines, perhaps as a result of the Spanish atrocities the year earlier, politi­ cal change was more violent and marked by the murder of over a hundred Spanish prisoners of war. Having freed themselves from the Spanish, the 186

local principalia established provincial governments and regional militia and pledged their loyalty to the new Philipine Republic.^ In September 1898, Emilio Aguinaldo appointed Maj. Gen. Vito Belar- mino to overall command of the Bicol region. Belarmino had been one of the most prominent Tagalog revolutionaries in 1896 and had fought in Cavite before going into exile with Aguinaldo. On his return he had commanded a division in the battles outside Manila, !n the Camarines provinces the capable Brig. Gen. Vicente Lucban established a local defense force before being sent to the Visayans. Brig. Gen. Jose Ignacio Paua, a native Chinese who had distinguished himself both as an armorer and a fighter arrived to insure that the profits from the hemp trade flowed to the new government. Paua quickly made important social connections in Albay and married into the powerful Imperial family in the fall. Through the efforts of Paua and the continued export of abaca, the region was able to send considerable sums of money to the Philippine Republic.^ While the Bicol area was under revolutionary rule until February 1900, the Republicans were hampered by a variety of factors in their attempt to establish a strong defense for the expected American invasion. The Philippine Republic contributed to the defense of Bicolandia by sending some 180 Amberg rifles, but this barely armed two companies. Despite Belarmino's efforts, the lack of rifles and ammunition was serious; in all of Albay province it was estimated that there were no more than 250 rifles. Lacking adequate armament, Belarmino had to be content with fortifying the major ports and attempting to form an army out of bolomen, archers, and spearmen. Equally serious, the U.S. blockade of the hemp ports in August 187

1899 cut Into the region's prosperity, causing hardship for the poor and demoralizing some of the more prosperous inhabitants. There were other indication of internal stress; Paua complained to Aguinaldo that the revolu­ tionaries were abusing the Chinese with robberies and enforced taxation. Thus despite more than a year of unhampered rule, the Philippine forces were militarily ill-prepared for the American expedition that arrived in January 1900.6 The objective of the American invasion of the Bicol region was, in the words of its commander, “to render a sufficient quantity of hemp available for the American market as soon as possible."? Otis' blockade of the archi­ pelago's ports had caused immediate repercussions within the U.S. cordage industry and caused the War Department to cable its "urgent inquiries and anxiety here about hemp."® Accordingly, on January 15, Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbé was assigned to occupy the hemp ports of Tobaco, Legaspi, Donsol, and Bulan in Albay and Sorsogan and establish civil government and customs services. The choice of Kobbé, one of the primary proponents of benevolent pacification policies, indicates both the importance with which Otis viewed the re-establishment of the hemp trade and his belief that pacification in southeastern Luzon would consist primarily of establishing effective civil gcvernment.9 On January 20 Kobbé's expeditionary force, comprising the 43rd and 47th U.S.V. Infantry, and Battery 6,3rd Artillery, occupied the port of Sorsogan without resistance. According to later reports the insurgent high command ordered the town burned, but the local commanders refused and withdrew with most of the townspeople. The following day Bulan and 188

Donsol were occupied by Maj. Hugh D. Wise's battalion of the 47th, giving the Army effective control of Sorsogan province's key hemp ports. While most of the organized Sorsogan forces retreated into Albay, irregulars continued to hover around the towns and harass American patrols. Army efforts to convince the inhabitants to move back into the towns met with little success, and Donsol was repeatedly attacked by small groups of men who atempted to burn the town. Despite the easy landing, the occupation of the Sorsogan ports indicated that pacification in southeastern Luzon would be a difficult and lengthy undertaking. The January 23 amphibious assault on the port of Legaspi, Albay, gave further indications of the strength of the local resistance. Under Belarmino and Paua, the Albayanos had constructed an elaborate system of trenches and bolstered them with captured Spanish cannon. Fortunately for the U.S. soldiers involved, Paua failed to devote sufficient attention to his flank defenses and a small American force landing to the north soon was able to turn the insurgent rear. The Bicols fought with reckless disregard for cas­ ualties, and it was only after vicious hand-to-hand fighting that they were driven out of Legaspi and the neighboring towns of Albay and Daraga. In the following days the Americans garrisoned other strategic lowland towns, meeting some resistance from fnsurrecto ambushes. Having seized the major hemp ports in Albay and Sorsogan provinces, Kobbé quickly set to work re-establishing the hemp trade. On January 27 he declared the ports of Sorsogan, Donsol, and Virac on neighboring Catuduanes Island open and three days he later opened Bulan, Albay, and Legaspi for trade. To encourage business he established liberal laws on the 189 transportation of hemp and agricultural products. Kobbé also made sincere attempts to win over the population. He forbade American trooops to enter native houses, ordered captured bolomen turned loose, and stressed "the importance of conciliating the inhabitants of your neighborhood in encoura­ ging them to pursue their usual avocations"*2 His subordinates complied with this, and Wise assured Kobbé that at Donsol "there has been no looting, no destruction nor no molestation of the property of absent natives." 13 While Kobbé's emphasis on trade and benevolence was commendable, it was highly unrealistic in light of the Army's precarious position. Kobbé's expeditionary force consisted only of two regiments, and he took the 43rd with him to occupy Leyte and Samar on January 25. The 47th was broken up and assigned to garrison seven large towns in Albay and Sorsogan with slightly more than a thousand soldiers. Belarmino's forces moved back into the barrios to threaten the isolated Americans and harass them with sniping and incendiaries. The 47th's garrisons lacked sufficient forces to create an effective buffer zone, one officer noting "I can chase the Insurgents for miles in any direction, but must afterwards come back and they follow ' l l Legaspi, Donsol, Albay, and Daraga were subject to serious attacks and sll four towns were fired by the insurrectos. Donsol and Albay were burned, while at Daraga the small Army garrison was almost overwhelmed by fnsurrecto attackers. Kobbé remarked that native resistance had "exceeded in stubborness and aggressiveness any fighting since the outbreak in February 1899. They are skillfully led, have had no experience in fighting Americans, and have been idle a year under frequent reports of insurgent victories in the north." 15 190

The first two weeks of Army occupation in Albay and Sorsogan estab­ lished a pattern that was to continue for much of the area's pacification. Belarmino’s forces could not drive or burn the Americans out of the towns nor could they face the better armed soldiers in combat without taking pro­ hibitive casualties. However, the insurgents could keep the population in the hills and prevent the Americans from re-establishing the hemp trade. The Army, for its part, could not achieve a decisive military victory over the guerrillas. Although the U.S. forces had killed over 200 insurrectos in less than ten days of fighting, it could not disperse the guerrilla forces who perched just outside their lines and continued to plague them. Patrols that ventured out of the towns soon learned that the hemp fields and hills provided excellent cover for snipers. Kobbé had taken the 47th's transport with him and the troops were forced to carry all their supplies themselves, effectively prohibiting sustained operations. Since neither side could effectively defeat the other, a military stalemate soon developed. While the occupation of Albay and Sorsogan provinces was beginning to bog down, a new Army expeditionary force was dispatched to Camarines Sur. On January 20 the 40th and 45th U.S.V. Infantry landed in San Miguel Bay and occupied the provincial capital of Nueva Caceres two days later. The Americans suspected that Belarmino's forces were dependent on food stored at Nueva Caceres and they quickly cut fnsurrecto supply lines to Albay. With the exception of an engagement at Libmanan, the insurgents gave little resistance. However, as the expeditionary forces moved into the populous valleys the inhabitants heeded fnsurrecto warnings and fled to the mountains. Almost immediately the stalemate that had emerged in 191

Albay repeated itself. With one or two exceptions the guerrillas avoided contact and contented themselves with sniping at the American forces from the hills or attempting to burn the towns they garrisoned. The rapid with­ drawal of the 40th left the 45th as undermanned as the 47th and unable to do more than garrison the towns they had captured, i? In early February Belarmino decided that the insurrectos would pursue a Fabian strategy, withdrawing to the mountains and avoiding combat except in extremely favorable circumstances. In part this strategy reflec­ ted Belarmino's belief that the war would be won either in central Luzon or in the United States with the election of William Jennings Bryan in 1900. Moreover, in the early stages of the war he was demoralized by the Army's victories and considered surrendering to the Americans. In his mid-fifties and suffering from a disease that would leave him almost blind, Belarmino was physically incapable of an active military role and he delegated nearly all decisions to subordinates. Norman Owen has argued that "Belarmino's restraint may have played a critical role" in explaining the relative lack of atrocities in the 3rd District, but there is insufficient evidence to credit Belarmino with such a humanitarian policy.'® His captured correspondence is unique for its lack of policy decisions or tactical advice, and beyond a warning against serving on American civil governments, he appears to have been more worried about the moral dangers of gambling than the physical dangers of American troops. Despite his limitations as a commander, his decision to adapt a Fabian strategy was an excellent one and contributed greatly to the sustained resistance in the 3rd District.'9 192

Under Belarmino's flexible management were a number of zone and provincial chiefs who seem to have been disproportionately Tagalog principalia . This regional guerrilla leadership was fragmented and there were several quasi-independent commanders who claimed to represent the Philippine Republic. In the Camarines, for example, General Jose Guevarra [or Gibarra], General [Augustin?] Pena, Lt. Col. Ranaisco Roldan, Lt. Col. Ludovicio Arejola, and Maj. Elias Angeles all operated as virtually indepen­ dent leaders. A study of thirty-one leaders in this area revealed that twenty-two were Tagalog or came from Tagalog regions, while only five were Bicols. The only non-Tagalog was to achieve high rank was Arejola in Camarines Sur, who deposed the Tagalog Pena in May. While Americans undoubtedly placed too much emphasis on the role of the Tagalogs, there was some truth to Lt. Col. James Parker's assertion that the "insurrection here is kept alive by about 200 Tagals, whom the mass of the inhabitants fear and hate."20

Under these insurgent commanders were guerrilla forces composed of a few bands of regulars and a much larger force of militia, or Sandahatan . The regulars lived in the mountains in bands of between ten and 100 men, about one-third of them supplied with rifles. During active U.S. operations the regulars would disperse and go home or break up into small groups which moved constantly. The Sandahatan "were engaged in cultivating the soil for the subsistence of the riflemen and themselves, posing as our friends, but acting as spies, and only assembling at stated times, or when specifi­ cally called upon for a kidnaping or marauding expedition.“2i The Sandahatan also served as outposts, or cordons, for the guerrilla camps. 193 using carabao horns and "bamboo tomtoms" to warn the guerrillas of the soldiers’ approach. The cordons frustrated Army officers and made them feel they were living in a fishbowl. Col. Walter Howe bitterly commented; "I cannot send out 10 men in the middle of the night without it being known before they have gone a mile."22 in addition, the militia dug mantraps, trenches, and served in their villages as the enforcement arm of the insurgents.23

Insurrecto tactics included a variety of methods designed to inflict casualties on American troops while avoiding guerrilla losses in either men or firearms. The guerrillas utilized the region's dense vegetation, low hills, and few roads to set up ambushes and snipe at Army patrols. One Army escort on the Legaspi-Ligao road reported they were fired on from all the "usual places on the road and in fact we had to fight our way through... every column that goes through the hills loses men."24 This had the advantage of forcing the Americans to deploy and on rare occasions actually inflicted casualties. For the most part, however, the limited number of rifles, poor marksmanship, and "tin-can ammunition," used by the insurrectos made this sniping chiefly a means of harassment.25 Belarmino also ordered his troops to attack the U.S. garrison towns while the soldiers were on patrol and there were several attempts to bum down towns occupied by the Army.26 Army patrols found that many trails hid artfully designed mantraps and pits. On one patrol from Libamanan soldiers found 40 spring-traps designed to drive a hidden spear through the unwary victim's chest. Within the towns soldiers were threatened by individual assailants. One sentry was decapitated by an apparently harmless "hombre" 194 who had concealed a long knife in a basket. Belarmino's chief of staff. Col. Ramon Santos, even proposed poisoning U.S. garrisons with a solution made out of a native fruit, but his fellow commanders refused to sanction this. Ail in all, American troops could agree with Brig. Gen. James M. Bell that "this is indeed a strange sort of warfare.'^? The most unique aspect of the guerrilla warfare in the 3rd District was not the insurrecto tactics nor their choice of weapons but their decision to encourage the entire population to move to the mountains. As Army forces moved through the Bicol region they found the towns depopu­ lated and for weeks the troops had the task of garrisoning deserted towns. The guerrillas attempted to keep the populace in the mountains with a mix­ ture of patriotism, propaganda, and intimidation. One captured proclamation urged Filipinos in Sorsogan to withdraw to the mountains where "the Amer­ icans cannot reach us and we can have our own government. ' Citizens were urged to avoid all contact with the Americans and only go into occupied towns to purchase essential supplies. They were told that the Americans murdered and plundered indiscriminately and would interfere with local religious beliefs. Those Filipinos who returned had their property destroyed or were threatened with horrible reprisals.28 Insurrecto resistance was maintained by a system of taxes and voluntary" contributions, chiefly on hemp and agricultural products, which allowed the guerrillas to purchase rice and supplies. The insurrecto high command recognized the importance of the abaca trade, and on April 19 Belarmino's headquarters declared that all merchants trading in abaca were required to purchase a license from the insurgents. Col. William Howe 195 estimated that the insurgents collected a peso a bale from the 500 bales that daily came into Legaspi, though he took some comfort from the fact that most of this was lost through corruption. The guerrillas also harvested hemp from the fields of suspected americanistas and sold It to middle­ men in the hemp ports. The result was that a steady stream of contraband hemp flowed out, either from small ports which lacked U.S. garrisons or under the suspicious supervision of U.S. Army customs officers. Guerrilla taxation on the hemp trade continued throughout the war, and some Army officers, probably unfairly, believed that the guerrilla leadership "only keep up the insurrection on account of the money they are making from a tax they place on all hemp brought in."29 Americans serving in southeastern Luzon were frustrated by the illicit hemp trade and fumed at their superiors' failure to support vigorous measures. The most obvious solution to cutting insurrecto supplies, the closing of all hemp ports and a blockade on trade, was repeatedly denied by Manila and Washington. The region's commander. Brig. Gen. James M. Bell, urged the closing of the hemp ports because "the greater portion of the hemp shipped from these ports is actually owned by the insurgents or their sym­ pathizers and... is sold in Manila for the benefit of the insurgents."30 After his own investigation in the fall of 1900, MacArthur also urged closing the ports on the grounds that "if hemp could not get out or rice in, two powerful interests would operate for tranquilization."3i Secretary of War Elihu Root, with his eyes fixed steadfastly on the importance of binding twine for American farmers, resolutely prohibited any interference in the 195 hemp trade. The insurgents continued to benefit from the contraband trade throughout the war. Within the Bicol region the insurrectos failed to develop a strong infrastructure or local support system in the American held towns. The guerrilla strategy of separating the native populace from the Army meant that no underground resistance remained in the Army-occupied towns. Those présidantes, priests, or other local authorities who supported the insurgents remained with the guerrilla forces and did not return to lead underground cells. The abandonment of towns left them without the shadow governments, clandestine Katipunans, and barrio militias that enforced insurgent authortity in most American-occupied towns in the Philippines. Those Filipinos who refused to flee or returned to their towns in the face of guerrilla threats had clearly decided that accomodation with American authority was possible and that Army garrisons could protect them. The result was that while the towns often had only a fraction of their orginal inhabitants, those who chose to live in the town were americanistas. 32 While the insurrectos defensive strategy and their organization allowed them to prolong the war in the Bicol region, it had weaknesses which the Army could exploit. By leaving the hemp ports to the Americans the insurrectos effectively cut off much of the population from its source of income and food. The depopulation campaign, the withdrawal of guerrilla forces to the mountains, and the failure to establish support systems in the towns all contributed to weaken the insurrectos . The guerrillas might occupy the highlands with relative impunity, but nearly all the food produ­ cing areas were in the lowlands under Army occupation. As a result, the 197 guerrillas were soon spending an inordinate amount of time simply avoiding starvation. The mission of the U.S. forces in the 3rd District was the clearest of any regional pacification force; to open the hemp ports, establish civil government, and insure that an adequate suply of hemp reached the U.S. market. Despite the clarity of objectives, the Army in the 3rd District was initially far too weak and poorly supplied to fulfill its mission. While the Americans had accomplished the first step of restoring the hemp trade "it became evident that possession of the ports was not possession of the interior, nor did it insure peace in the garrisoned places themselves."33 in many towns the population remained in the mountains while the only people benefitting from the hemp trade were the insurgents The guerrillas' insis­ tence on assuming a defensive posture combined with the existing problems of manpower, terrain, and logistics to effect a military stalemate in the southeastern Luzon. The 3rd District was commanded by Brig. Gen. James M. Bell, who had been in operational command of the Camarines invasion. Bell had a strong interest in the more benevolent aspects of pacification but was prevented from directing a coordinated pacifiction campaign by a number of factors. In his sixties. Bell was physically "breaking up" and forced to take a leave of absence from June to September. Eventually his physical problems would lead to his preplacement on February 28, 1901. Bell also suffered form a lack of support in Manila and from the Department of Southern Luzon's commander, Maj. Gen. John Bates. Both MacArthur and Bates failed to provide Bell with essential supplies and men and disregarded many of his 198 suggestions. Moreover, communications within the 3rd District were so primitive that many towns within the same province were linked only via Manila. As a result, Bell was forced to act more as a director of operations than a battlefied leader. He decided upon many of the key pacification policies but left their implementation to officers serving in the field. Fortunately for Bell, he was gifted with a number of very capable subor­ dinates who were able to construct effective regional pacification methods and develop their own policies during his absence.34 The initial operations that followed the occupation of the ports soon established American-held islands around the towns and left the country­ side under the control of the insurrectos. In March an Army expedition destroyed Belarmino's fortified camp at Malabog, Albay. That same month Paua, whose relations with Belarmino had deteriorated since the U.S. invasion, surrendered with several members of the influential Imperial family who had been prom inant guerrilla officers.35 These successes were small compensation for the continuing inability of the Americans to close with and decisively defeat the insurrectos . In April Bell toured the 3rd District and concluded that the guerrillas "infest the whole country, terror­ izing the people and driving them from their homes. Many cases are reported of the murders of natives and Chinamen who have shown friendship for the Americans. "36 Most officers in the area shared their commander's pessimism and believed that "we are governing just the spots we sit in "37 A chief cause of this military stalemate was the critical manpower shortage in the 3rd District. This itself was the outgrowth of Otis" insis­ tence on occupying the entire archipelago immediately after Aguinaldo's 199 defeat. Perhaps convinced that the Bicols would welcome the Americans, Army headquarters starved the 3rd District for troops until the fall. By mid-May the American forces In the 3rd District consisted of the 47th and 45th Infantry, a company of the 37th U.S.V. Infantry, a squadron of the 11th U.S.V. Cavalry, and a detachment of artillery: a total of 2,600 troops to pacify a native population of 500,000. Soldiers serving In the 3rd District were unanimous In demanding more troops and believed It Impossible to pacify the area with such limited troop strength.38 The terrain and climate of the Bicol region proved to be almost as much of an adversary as the Insurgents and greatly encouraged the early stalemate. There was no overland route between the provinces and within the provinces communications were so poor that Col. Howe complained he was out of touch with most of his 47th Infantry for most of his tour of duty. Tropical vegetation, abaca groves, hills, bays, and rivers created a terrain so rough that an insurrecto sniper could be ten feet away and virtually Invisible from the Army patrols that pursued him. Cavalry was useless and on patrols the flanking parties could not move through the brush fast enough to keep up with the main force. In the Inland valleys, the summer heat caused men to collapse and entire garrisons were reported too exhausted for operations. To further complicate matters, the fall monsoon season was accompanied by typhoons which restricted seaborne operations and washed out most of the roads. Conditions during this season were so bad that divisional headquarters advised a suspension of operat1ons.39 Another factor hampering the pacification of 3rd District was the Inadequacy of Army loglsltlcal support. The difficulties of sending supplies 200 by water from Manila to southeastern Luzon were never overcome by the Army’s commlsary department. The results appeared in critical shortages which left troops in some areas without adequate food for months. Rations arrived in the 3rd District so rotten they had to be immediately condemned; in one memorable (but not atypical) incident, soldiers at Nueva Caceres were able to salvage ten crates of potatoes out of the 195 that had been shipped. Within the 3rd District the supply system was equally bad. What little food that did arrive often could not be distributed. The expeditionary forces were not provided with supply wagons and the region-wide rinder­ pest epidemic delivered the double curse of killing almost all the domestic draft animals and denying the troops fresh meat. The supply services were forced to use numerous small supply trains, tying up many troops in escort duty and giving the insurgents ample opportunities for ambushes and sniping. In some areas, such as the Iriga district, the garrisons were depen­ dent upon native boatmen who were often robbed by the insurgents. The Army's failure to pay most garrisons for over six months meant that the men could not buy food themselves. Medical supply services during the first half year of occupation was as bad as food supply services. Kobbé appro­ priated nearly all the 47th Infantry’s medical supplies for his expeditionary force and replacements did not arrive till fall. In several cases officers bought essential medicine for their men out of their own funds, but often there were no supplies to buy.40 The problems of terrain, weather, transport, and supply had an insidious effect upon Army pacification efforts and tended to aid the 201 guerrillas in their defensive strategy. The shortage of manpower, supplies, and transport rendered any attempt at a build up for sustained operations impossible. On those rare occasions when the troops were able to maintain contact with the insurrectos , they ran out of supplies in a few days and these efforts had “slight tanglible result.“4i in addition to crippling military operations, the poor food and rough conditions took a considerable toll on the men. In some garrisons, such as Donsol, as many as half the men were unfit for active duty. Bad food, inadequate rest, non-exisistent medical supplies, and the strain of guerrilla warfare produced a general break down in the 47th Infantry;

This condition Is not altogether due to the climate, but Is largely due to the intense strain they have been under, which has acted in two ways: some have been rendered nervous and unfitted by it, others seem to have grown callous and indif­ ferent, willing at any time to take undue risks, but it has, generally speaking, affected the health of the regiment as a whole.42

Until these manpower, supply, and communications difficulties could be overcome the Army could not launch a sustained effort to challenge guer­ rilla control of the hills. With its military options circumscribed, officers turned their attention to pacification policies which would not require large expenditures of men or supplies. A key factor determining Army counterinsurgency policy in the 3rd District was the belief that the Bicol population did not really support the insurrectos and could be won over to American rule with humane treat­ ment. Norman Owen has stated that “at times American officers were convinced that the entire native element was against them," and there were 202 some officers who believed th1s/*3 However, Lt. Col James Parker spoke for a far greater number of officers when he declared, “It Is my earnest belief that once convinced of the beneficent motives of the United States all resistance by the mass of the people will cease.'"^"^ Most Army officers In the Bicol region attributed the Insurrection to the Tagalogs and believed the Bicol population was either pro-American or terrorized by the Insurgents. This division of the populace Into either malevolent or misguided insurrectos and potentially friendly natives helped channel much of the Army's pacification policies Into gaining the support of the population. The Army's civil pacification efforts In the 3rd District were among Its most successful In the Philippines In conciliating the populace to Amer­ ican rule. The Importance of establishing civil government had been stated In the Initial orders of Kobbé's expeditionary force and civil governments were organized In the occupied towns of Albay and Sorsogan Immediately. Post officers soon found, however, that the depopulation of the towns and insurrecto attacks made organization under the Army's standard model, G.O. 43, almost Impossible. Bell wisely decided that "unsettled conditions" precluded organization under either G.O. 43 or G.O. 40 and substituted his own governmental model, G.O. 7, on April 27. G.O. 7 required the post commander to do no more that appoint a présidente and organize a municipal police force. It did not require any other municipal offices, though they could be added If the situation warranted It. In Its simplicity and flexibility, G.O. 7 proved well suited to the rapid creation of working civil governments. It could be quickly Implemented even In towns where only a fraction of the populace was living. It did not require the post 203 commanders to deal with taxation, municipal ordinances, or town boundaries, but only with establishing order. Most importantly, it centered all authority in the post commander and the presidents and required them to work with each other.45 As a result of G.O. 7, présidentes became the middlemen between the Army and the populace. Throughout the district post commanders and présidentes established symbiotic relations which, while they varied from town to town, shared a mutual dependency. Présidentes quickly leaned that cooperation with the local commander could yield substantial personal benefits. Some of these were manifested in increased prestige: a visit from Bell or a public ceremony in which they were awarded a baton of office. There were also far more tangible benefits. In Iriga the presidents was authorized to select all the municipal officers, given permission to have gambling at the town fiesta, and resolutely backed in a conflict with the local padre. U.S. commanders lent troops to deal with town trouble­ makers or insured that a presidente's property in other garrison towns was respected. When the Army adopted strict controls over rice and hemp trading, the local présidentes were in an ideal position to make huge profits through licenses and fines.45 Garrison commanders utilized the local influence of the présidentes to further the military pacification in their areas. The most important contribution of the présidentes was their ability to convince much of the population to move back into towns. Throughout early spring and summer the villages steadily filled up and there was a resumption of pre-war activities. In addition to this key role, individual présidentes in the 3rd 204

District cooperated to a much greater extent than elsewhere in Luzon. They supplied spies and guides and kept a close watch on their own townsmen to prevent them from smuggling food or information to the insurgents. Présidentes Juan de los Herras of Magarao and Batolomé Roas of Oas for­ med voiuntario units and sent them into the hills, forcing the people still hiding to come in and burning guerrilla food caches. Eugenio Ocampo of Nabua provided vital information and advice to 3rd District Headquarters. Esteban Delgado, presidents of Ligao, wrote often to the guerrillas in the hills: first to offer to negotiate their surrenders and later to threaten them with destruction from his voluntaries. In countless other ways individual présidentes contributed to Army pacification of southeastern Luzon. It was fitting that when Bell stepped down as commander his final address praised the présidentes of the 3rd District for their great support.^? In addition to the présidentes , the 3rd District officers made an effort to conciliate and win over the native clergy. With the présidentes, the clergy played a vital part in convincing the populace to return to the towns. It became a recognized maxim among garison commanders that “if the Priest can be made come back to his house and live the natives will fol­ low and remain quiet.“48 Despite John Schumacher’s assertion that “no­ where else was there such widespread and effective support of the Filipino clergy for the Revolution“ the available evidence suggests only four members of the Bicol clergy can be definitely classified as insurrectos .^9 The bulk of Army source material indicates that as a group the clergy wil­ lingly collaborated with the Americans. Bell's offical policy was to avoid interference in church matters, but his subordinate officers were more 205

Willing to enlist clerical aid. Many local commanders made great efforts to secure priests for their local churches, realizing that "a thoroughly good man would be of very material assistance to us in the pacification of the district. 'SO Capt. Arlington U. Betts even considered kidnapping a priest for his town, but after some negotiations he was able to settle on a less drama­ tic solution. Once priests were established they proved very effective in calming the populace, urging support for American policies, recommending reliable people, and establishing good relations between soldiers and civilians. For their part, officers supported the clergy with medicines, passes, and concessions to their parishoners. Cooperation between officers and priests was the rule, not the exception, and at least one insurrecto fumed at the support given the Americans by the "Machiavellian" priests.5i Officers were less successful in their attempts to organize and arm the local police forces provided for in G.0.7, but this was hardly due to their lack of effort. Shortly after he took command Bell armed the police of four towns in Camarines Sur and required them to cooperate with U.S. patrols on operations outside their towns. This experiment proved a great success, the police from Magarao found several caches of insurgent supplies while the police at Mil oar fought off a guerrilla attempt to disrupt the 4th of July fiesta. Encouraged by this, in May 1900, Bell requested 200 rifles for the native police and began to plan a district constabulary. Despite MacArthur's announced policy of organizing an armed native police. Bell’s request was turned down by the general. An inadequate supply of 200 shot-guns arrived in November. The failure of Bell's superiors to support his policies made it impossible to establish a district-wide policy on the native police. As a 206 result, throughout 1900 it was left up to individual officers to organize and arm municipal police and utilize them according to the local situation.52 To make-up for the lack of native police, officers turned to using auxiliaries recruited from the population of the garrison towns. Proposals to develop a more formal native military organization of Bicol Scouts were ignored by MacArthur, and it was not until March 1901, that Native Scout units were established. Col. Joseph Dorst summed up some of the frustrat­ ion felt by district officers when he argued that “ an organization of armed natives is essential to help us" and urged it be organized at once:

There are plenty of men who have compromised themselves for us repeatedly and of whose loyalty there can be no reasonable doubt, and at the same time they have shown they are brave. They are acquainted with the people of the community and know amigos from rebels, and also know a stranger when they see him. They cannot be induced, however, to get far away from the immediate presence of troops because they have no guns.... They may not do much fighting but as spies and guides that would be most valuable In getting reliable information for troops and make the country insecure for rebels.53 In the absence of official support, local commanders often gave weapons to présidentes or armed their guides while they were on patrols. They also made use of ex- insurrectos and spies to obtain information and formed voiuntario units in their garrison towns. Although there were no officially recognized Native Scout units, there were many Filipinos who served with the U.S. forces as irregulars. Much of the cooperation between présidentes , priests, and Army officers in the 3rd District was due to the benevolence and humanity with which American soldiers conducted themselves. Both Kobbé and Bell were convinced of the importance of conciliating the inhabitants and underscored 207 the need for good conduct. During the fighting that accompanied the occupa­ tion, many officers tried to avoid inflicting unnecessary casualties, sending interpreters or prisoners to the guerrillas to persuade them to depart. With the advent of civil government this emphasis on benevolence became even greater. Army officers placed in command of provinces or towns took their responsibilities seriously and tried their best to look after their people. Col. Joseph Dorst put this into its strongest form when he declared "every­ thing that concerns the welfare of the people is [of] as much interest to me as matters affecting the welfare of a company are to its captain."54 Coupled with this social responsibility was the belief that the population was friendly and if properly treated would support American rule. This human­ itarian attitude was apparent among the majority of American enlisted men as well. To an unusual degree in a guerrilla war, the U.S. Volunteers in southeastern Luzon remembered that "the enemy was the insurrecto with gun or bolo—not the simple people caught between the lines."55 Faced with the problem of convincing the population to return from the mountains, officers sought to show the benefits of American rule through the establishment of schools, markets, and civic projects. Many officers found that "the school proved the key" and educational reform became a major element of district pacification.56 Under Bell the schools "received early and constant attention" and the general personally directed the publication of a Bicol-English grammar book. Due to the 3rd District's poor supply system, officers were often short of the books and monies available to other areas, but they showed quite commendable ingenuity in circumventing these problems. Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr used captured 208 insurrecto taxes to pay for a new schoolhouse, while Maj. William C. Forbush took over a guerrilla leader's vacated house for a schoolroom.^? Army doctors who treated Filipinos and dispensed scarce medicines also demonstrated American benevolence and helped win over the population. As Capt. Augustus Hart boasted "our attempts to give them medical assistance have been most gratefully accepted and have created good feelings among them."58 In addition Army officers built roads and bridges, established newspapers, and supervised the distribution of food when starvation threatened some districts.59 By the fall of 1900 American policies had caused much of the Bicol population to return to the towns. At Donsol, the population fled in February with the arrival of the Army and the 100 families who returned were supported largely through the efforts of Maj. Hugh D. Wise. Lacking any funds of his own and with his men unpaid since their arrival. Wise put the inhabitants to work rebuilding burned-out houses and paying them in cap­ tured rice. It was not until August 21 that a few native hemp boats tenta­ tively arrived and were allowed to sell their goods and given rice to take back to the interior. This broke the dam and within a few days the town was once again filled and a heavy trade in hemp was going on. DonsoTs officers skillfully exploited the situation, treating the hemp sellers well and send­ ing medicine to those in the mountains, for they realized such benevolence would "shake the confidence of the masses in the men who are the cause of the present suffering.”80 The population of Nabua, Camarines Sur, returned after an Army campaign had destroyed most of the food in the countryside and the présidante had threatened to go after them with his own forces. 209

In sharp contrast, the population In the Lagonoy area returned almost immediately after the Army occupation and within a month présidentes had been elected, police forces and schools established, and the priest was conducting religious services.^' The Army's emphasis on benevolence proved to be a successful pacifi­ cation policy and provided a rationale for Filipino accomodation to the American regime. Members of the Federal Party cited the Ameri good behavior when they negotiated insurrecto surrenders. The princfpaiia , who provided much of the support for the Republic, realized their social and economic interests could be served under American rule and "played an important role in the acquiesence of Albay to American colonialism. '^Z The good conduct of the Army showed the error of insurrecto reports of American atrocities and helped convince many Bicols to return to the towns. When coupled with the Army’s work on civil government it provided a basis for cooperation between Filipinos and Americans and increasing Filipino aid to American counterinsurgency activities. As Col. James Lockett pointed out;

The pompous bearing and vain boasting of the insurrecto, when feeling secure, and his aptitude for strategic moves to sylvan retreats on the approach of danger, has not been entirely lost on the observant but dazzled native, who has also had many opportunities for contrasting the humane treatement extended by the Americans with what he receives from his patriotic fellow countrymen.63

In the 3rd District the Army emphasis on pacification through civil government and benevolence was combined with increasing pressure on those Filipinos who chose to remain in the mountains. Because of the 210

CHARTS

Eng

J FMAMJJASONDJ FMAMdJASON Month

Third District, DSL Engagements 1900-1 ^4

insufficient forces, poor communications, and inadequate logisitics, the district officers were forced to fight a war of attrition, attempting to demoralize the insurrecto regulars and force the population back into the towns. Commanders seldom had the men or supplies to garrison important towns or cordon off a known insurrecto area and sweep it. Since they could not rely on purely military means, they had to approach the problem on a broad basis, at^’acking not only the guerrilla bands but the support system which maintained them. The key regional Army pacification polices devel­ oped in the 3rd District were new tactics, cutting off the insurrecto food supply and stopping the contraband hemp trade. By mid-1900, Army officers had combat procedures that were proving effective in the forests, hills, and rivers of southeastern Luzon. The 211 guerrillas' extensive use of outposts and their refusal to fight mitigated against large operations. Instead, garrisons relied on small patrols which could move at night and off the trail to surround and search the isolated barrios where the guerrillas lived. Increasingly these patrols used native guides, often the clients or servants of présidentes or principalia . In Albay "Wray's Scouts," a composite force of twenty men under the leader­ ship of Lt. George M. Wray, "struck fast, hard, often, near and far, and were a menace to every guerrilla band within marching distance." As American soldiers were rotated out, Wray replaced them with Filipino guides or former guerrillas until the unit was fully integrated. Naval gunboats and steam launches allowed the Army to conduct operations on the extensive waterways and coasts of the 3rd District. Patrols would land near a suspected insurrecto village and surround it, taking prisoners and destroying guerrilla supplies.65 These new tactics were complimented by a campaign which sought to cut the insurrectos off from the food-producing areas controlled by the Army. The insurrectos attempted to balance this with a tax on hemp products and smuggling. While Belarmino's defensive strategy allowed him to prolong the war in the Bicol region, it had a key weakness which the Army could exploit. The depopulation campaign and the withdrawal to the mount­ ains, coupled with the Army's success in organizing civil governments, denied the insurrectos the village infrastructure which supported them in much of Luzon. Army officers were quick to realize that "the food problem troubles the insurrectos more than any other."66 212

CHART 6

Cas

JFMAMJJASONOJFMAM Month

Third District, DSL: U.S. Casualties, i 900- i ^8

Bell's enforced absence from June to October left a vaccum of leader­ ship at the very time when many regional officers were developing their own policies to curb the hemp and rice trade. With Bell gone, district head­ quarters contented itself with the distribution of an Army decree allowing the destruction or confiscation of all insurrecto storehouses. With the return of Bell in the fall and the arrival of reinforcements and more patrol vessels, district headquarters implemented policies designed to cut sup­ plies and applied them throughout southeastern Luzon. In key towns officers présidentes issued orders to prevent food from leaving the towns. Food traders were required to be people of known loyalty, to obtain passes, and to have their products weighed both on departure and arrival. In February Bell implemented further food restictions, arguing that "this may 213 cause suffering in insurgent territory but it is necessary to adopt stringent measures in order to deprive the insurgents of the sinews of war/^7 While 3rd District headquarters slowly moved towards a district- wide campaign, local officers were far quicker to adopt measures to break the rice and hemp trade in their areas. In April, 1900, Maj. Hugh D. Wise on his own initiative prohibited a steamer with a cargo of rice from landing at the unoccupied town of Pilar. In the same month a company of the 45th raided a clandestine insurgent market established on Lake Bato and drove the insurrectos back across the lake. At Legaspi and Tabaco, ordinances passed in April forbade oil, cigarettes, and rice from leaving the towns. In retaliation, the guerrillas cut off all hemp shipments, but by May they were forced to withdraw Into the interior for lack of food.69 In the Iriga valley of Camarines Sur, a major rice-producing area, présidantes and Army officers collaborated on developing food restriction policies for the region. Présidantes issued orders fixing food prices, prohibiting the sale of rice and salt to anyone outside the town, and closing down all the stores outside the town limits. While the Army garrison provided support, most of the restrictions were enforced by the présidentes and native police. In Guinobatan and other Albay towns post commanders established convoys to escort people to market and prevent the insurrectos from levying taxes. These successes encouraged other officers to develop their own regional food restriction policies and encouraged cooperation among officers in different areas.^o American officers combined this new emphasis on stopping the flow of rice from their towns by placing as much emphasis on destroying supplies 214 as on inflicting casualties. U.S. patrols, often with native help, searched for hidden fields and storehouses, sometimes finding entire valleys devoted to cultivation. When U.S. forces could concentrate enough manpower, expedi­ tions were sent into known insurrecto areas to destroy crops. While some commanders tried to brina confiscated insurrecto rice back for the poor, most food could not be transported and was destroyed where it was found."'1 Few of these operations turned up major insurrecto caches, but they did inflict a steady drain on the guerrillas and forced them to devote much of their energy to searching for food. Sandahatan units were disbanded and ordered to plant crops, doing no military service beyond weekly guard duty. Operations were circumscribed by the unsteadiness of their food supply, which forced them to leave americanista towns alone and move constantly to new areas.72 The increasing guerilla demands on the populace for food alienated popular support and convinced many people to return to the garrisoned towns. One high-ranking guerrilla officer capured in December asserted his rations consisted of two pints of rice a day, and he commented that the Americans fed their prisoners better than the guerrillas fed their troops.73 The regional food restriction campaigns were greatly aided by rinder­ pest epidemic among the local livestock which struck in mid-1900. The disease not only killed off the scanty fresh meat supply for soldiers and natives, it prevented plowing during the summer planting season. Moreover, the stricken animals tended to die in rivers and streams, polluting the water supply. In Camarines Sur, upon which the entire Bicol region depended for grain. Bell estimated that only 10 per cent of the normal rice crop was 215

planted in 1900. At Iriga it was believed that ninety per cent of the cattle died in the summer and at San Jose de Laganoy, Capt. Peter Murray wrote in July, "cattle are dying all over the country and it looks as if we will have not only insurgents to contend with but famine and pestilence in addition."?^ Both insurrectos and Americans were concerned about the effects of this. Be 1 armino issued a proclamation forbidding any killing of animals except to feed insurrecto troops. The American garrrison officers, with somewhat more concern for the inhabitants, made arrangements for importing rice from merchant companies. The Army sent a total of 10,000 piculs of rice,

some 1,300,000 pounds, to the Laganoy district alone.^S In the fall of 1900, reinforcements allowed the Army to undertake larger operations which utilized the pacification methods developed earlier. In November an Army expedition took the insurrecto headquarters of Jovellar, Albay. While the expedition encountered few guerrillas it destroyed many of the insurrecto food supplies and scattered them so badly that Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr boasted "there are not more than 100 insurrectos left in this Province and the fight has been whipped out of them."76 The Americans also launched a major effort in Sorsogan province,

where small patrols were landed by steam launches at insurgent towns on the water while other troops swept the mountains. For the most part these patrols inflicted few casualties, and received none themselves, but they destroyed insurrecto food caches and crops and operated in areas pre­ viously left to the insurrectos . Occasionally they had major successes. One such small operation virtually cleared the adjacent island of Cataduanes of guerrilla resistance when it surrounded the town of Baras and captured 216 eleven rifles and twenty-seven prisoners, including Rogue Bustos, the insurrecto governor. In February detachments from Sorsogan transported on the U.S.S. Don Juan de Austria launched an amphibious raid on the insurrecto island of Burias and arrested the entire guerrilla supply organization.?? Similar operations in Camarines Sur destroyed Arejola’s headquarters and most of his food supplies. The insurrectos were "constantly chased and harassed" and many complained that they could sleep no more than one night in any place because of the pressure from Army patrols.?® The Americans were aided in these operations by the contacts they had established among the population during the period of military stale­ mate. Esteban Delgado, presidents of Ligao, published a proclamation which warned those people still in the hills that if they did not return within eight days the Americans would burn all their houses and shoot them like animals. The result, according to a guerrilla leader, was that many people fled to the towns.?9 Bartolomé Roa, presidents of Oas, issued a similar proclamation and with a troop of sixty armed voluntaries burned guerrilla crops.®® Priests also played an important role. In Bulan, Sorsogan, Father Casiano Vera urged his parishoners to assist the Americans. The next day a Federal Party chapter was formed and many people signed the Oath of Allegiance.®! in oas the town priest held a mass which both presidents Bartolomé Roa and the U.S. officers attended and urged the populace to work for peace. The parish priest of Minalabag played a key role in the negotiations between American officers and Arejola.®2 In some towns post commanders armed loyal policemen and used them to hunt down 217 guerrillas in the barrios. One such force killed the notorious Maj. Sixto Calleja and scattered his band. Other forces of Filipino irregulars accom­ panied Army forces on expeditions and did excellent work.83 The campaign in Sorsogan province is a good example of the Army's ability to combine both military operations, benevolence, and cooperation from influential Filipinos to achieve a successful regional pacification. In the winter of 1900-1901, the Army launched extensive military operations which broke up insurrecto sanctuaries in the hills and raided the small ports which furnished them with food. The forces of the military chief of Sorsogan, Lt. Col. Emetirio Funes, had been reduced to slightly more than 100 men, twenty three rifles, and 673 cartridges. In late January 1901, the priest of Bulan urged his parishoners to aid the Americans, and shortly afterwards a delegation of the Federal Party began to deliver speeches urging a stop to the fighting. These spe ihes were well received in Irocin, a town near Funes' hideout, and contact with the insurrectos was estab­ lished. Promised a complete pardon and given full military honors by the Army commander, Funes marched his troops in on February 21 and within a few days was out in the field "actively engaged in the work of pacifi­ cation "84 Officers in Sorsogan then turned their attention to Maj. Esteban Pul ay, Funes' chief subordinate, who was given the incentive of a one week armistice and the release of 55 prisoners when he concluded terms. Pul ay surrendered at Gubat on March 2 with 49 officers and 240 men, but only two rifles, and was given a huge fiesta. Through a clever combination of military force and Filipino support the Army had virtually ended provincial resistance in Sorsogan by mid-March, According to Howe, the "most cordial 218

relations" existed between former insurgents and the Army officers and the insurgents declared they were tired of fighting t: d determined not to have any more trouble.®5 Other Army campaigns pursuing similar policies yielded similar successful results. In Camarines Sur, Arejola was pressured by expeditions around Mt. isarog and in the north of the province that penetrated areas where he had previosly been secure and destroying his food supply. Although his forces numbered some 800 men, he had only 43 rifles and had little re­ course but to flee the American patrols. After establishing contact through the aid of a parish priest, Lt. George Curry and Lt. George Van Horn Mosely met with Arejola and persuaded him to surrender on March 23. The insurrecto leader cooperated in securing the surrender of most of the other guerrilla units in the Camarines.86 The final operations against Belarmino were characterized by unusual harshness on the part of the Army. This may have been due both to the presence of regulars Army troops who had replaced the volunteers of the 45th and 47th Infantry and to general exasperation with Belarmino’s refusal to surrender. Constantly harassed by Army forces in Albay, Bellarmino's forces crossed into Sorsogan and lauched an abortive attack on the small garrison of Donsol in May 25. This attack was beaten off with no American casualties and the ensuing operations demonstrated not only the Army’s ability to retaliate but also the insurrectos inablity to protect the popu­ lation. In the three weeks following the attack the Americans destroyed nineteen towns, 800 outposts and cuarteis, and large quantities of rice and hemp. They killed 150 guerrillas, captured 100, and had 900 more 219 surrender.87 while U.S. forces were operating in Sorsogan, others moved on Belarmino's last refuges in the Jovellar area of Albay. Belarmino's forces, some 300 riflemen, but with almost no ammunition, were isolated in south­ ern Albay and pursued by U.S. troops and native scouts. With his forces collapsing and many surrendering to the Americans on their own volition, Belarmino finally called a halt to the fighting and surrendered on July 4.88 Belarmino's surrender did not end all guerrilla resistance in south­ eastern Luzon. For the rest of 1901 the Army was engaged in mopping up operations. In Camarines Norte Maj. Lorenzo W. Cooke and a battalion of the 26th Infantry conducted operations against three recalcitrant insurrecto officers which were not completed until the fall. In Camarines Sur a cam­ paign against Maj. Elias Angeles, who had disregarded Arejola's instructions to surrender, also lasted until September. In this expedition the Army was assisted by the présidante of Magarao, who volunteered fifty municipal police to hunt down the insurrectos . No sooner were these last insurrecto campaigns over than Army units were sent into Sorsogan to deal with a messianic anting-anting outbreak. The leader of this, a former insurrecto named Caloche, had broken his parole and convinced his followers that through talismans, or anting-anting, they were invulner­ able to American bullets. For the next two years self-proclaimed revolu­ tionary and religious leaders maintained a sputtering guerrilla warfare which was only suppressed by the Philippine Constabulary in 1903. These movements, lacking any legitimate tie with either the Philippine Republic or the resistance under Malvar, may be better labelled agrarian unrest than part of the Philippine War. They were reflections of the turmoil and 220 displacement within Philippine rural society of three years of constant warfare.^9

The pacification campaign waged by the U.S. Army in the 3rd District was an impressive mixture of flexibility, benevolence, and pragmatic counter insurgency methods. Denied adequate manpower or resources and faced with an opponent who avoided a military decision, district officers could have conceded a stalemate to the insurrectos and attempted to simply occupy the hemp ports until reinforcements arrived, instead, they turned to non-military pacification methods and were able to develop a strong base of popular cooperation. By implementing flexible but effective civil governments, cultivating présidantes and priests, establishing social reforms, and emphasizing good conduct, the Army was able to demon­ strate to the Bicols that American rule "was tolerable and even potentially beneficient."90 As a result, many influential Filipinos abandoned the insurrectos and cooperated with the Americans. Coupled with these humanitarian pacification policies were new tactics and counterinsurgency polices designed to deprive the insurrectos of food and supplies. The tactics developed in southeastern Luzon stressed the use of small patrols which moved through the barrios and kept the insurrectos constantly on the move. Army officers increasingly turned to crop destruction to starve the guerrillas out of the mountains. The Army thus was able to demonstrate the benefits of American rule while at the same time holding out the threat of punishment for people who did not accept colonial authority. 221

The pacification of southeastern Luzon is an excellent instance of Army regional counter insurgency in the Philippine war. The Army officers and troops who served there had to overcome formidable obstacles, many of them placed there by their superiors in Manila. They had to deal with the frustration of facing an enemy who refused to stand and fight. The climate, terrain, and suplly difficulties all contributed to sapping the effectiveness of the soldiers and diminishing the already small forces. Despite this, offices in the 3rd District were able to establish pacificed enclaves, win over much of the populace, and weaken the insurrectos substantially. The Americans also won the peace as well as the war. Relations between soldiers and Filipinos were characterized by friendliness and humanitar- ianism. The pacification of the Bicol region offers a exemplary chapter in the annals of counter insurgency in the Philippine War. NOTES

Col. Walter Howe, "Historical Sketch of the 47th Infantry, U.5.V.," RG 94, series 187, [hereafter cited as 94/187,47th Inf. History].

Wernstedt and Spencer, Philippine Island World, pp. 605-6,631 -2; Zolio Galang, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Philippines, vol. 16, History (Manila; Exequiel Floro, 1957) pp. 119-20, 162-70.

Norman Owen, "Kabikolan in the Nineteenth Century;" Edwin Williams, "The Hemp Industry of the Philippines," Harpers Weekly 44 ( I Septem­ ber 1900).

Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 558-91; Atraviado, Revolution in the Bicol Region vol. I; Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, pp. 62-4, 155-60; Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 224-5; LeRoy, Americans 1:338-9.

Atraviado, Philippine Revolution, esp. pp. 164-7. For background on Belarmino see "Glorious Epopee " Taylor, History. Exhibit 70, p. 70 LY; Ibid, Exhibit 76, p. 79 LY; Vito Belarmino Files, PIR SD 341, 747, and 1070. For information of Paua see E. Arsenio Manuel, Dictionary of Philippine Biography 2 vols. (Quezon City, P.I.: Filipiana Productions, 1970) 2:297-9; Taylor, History p. 43 AJ; "Ignacio Paua File," PIR SD 355. For correspondence on taxation and hemp trade see Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Emilio Aguinaldo. 28 May 1899, PIR 50 1014.2, 769, 770, 2010.1.

For an organizational breakdown of the Republican forces in Albay see Elias Atraviado, Lurcha y Libertad (Conmonitario de la Revolucion Filipino en las Tierras Albayanas, vol. 2, De febrero de 1899 a abri I de 1900 (Manila: Commonwealth Press, 1941), pp. 31 -8, Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 560-1; "Presidencia Local de Sagnay," 10 February 1899, PIR SD 1150.2; Estanislas Legaspi to "Ilustre General," [Belarmino?], 8 May 1899, PIR SD 257.8; "Ligeros Apuntes sobre las

222 223

Provincias del Sur de Luzon," U.S. Navy ZE File, "Philippine Islands," Operational Archives, U.S. Navy Historical Center, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as "Legeros Apuntes"]; Brig. Gen. Ignacio Paua to Emilio Aguinaldo, 10 November 1898, PIR SD 355.10.

7 "Kobbé Report," M i 1900 1:7:15.

8 Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin to Maj. Gen. Elwell 5. Otis, 9 January 1900, CW2 2:1130. For Otis' reply see, Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis to AG, Washington, 10 January 1900, CWS 2:1131. For a discussion of the 'hemp panic' see Owen, "War in Albay, " pp. 575-8.

9 For Kobbé's work in civil government see Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 88- 9; William A. Kobbé Papers, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.

’0 "Kobbé Report," Mi 1900 1:7:19-28; Atraviado, Lurcha, pp. 43-50; 94/187, 47th Inf. History; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47th Inf., 23 January 1900, RG 395, series 3568, Donsol, Sor., Letters Sent, Dec. 1899 to Mar. 1902, LS 19 [hereafter cited as 395/3568]; Maj. Hugh D. Wise, "Information on Philippine Islands Questionnaire-Donsol," n.d. RG 395, series 2421, Hq, 3D, DSL, Letters Relating to Civil Affairs, 1900-1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2421]; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 28 February 1900, PIR SD 1070.2.

Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbé to AG, D.P., 24 January 1900, RG 385, series 893, D P. and 8th AC., Provisional Brigade [hereafter cited as P.B.], Letters, Telegrams, Reports, and Memoranda Sent, Jan. to Apr. 1900, No. 6 [hereafter cited as 395/893]; Brig. Gen. William a . Kobbé to SMG, 14 March 1900, 395/893, No. 42; "Kobbé Report, " M l 1900 1:7:10-1; Atraviado, Lurcha, pp. 51 -70; 94/187.47th Inf. History; Clarence Linninger, The Best War at the Time. (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1964 ). pp. 122-7.

'2 Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbé to CO., Donsol, 22 January 1900, 395/893, LS 3. For Kobbé's rules on trade see G O. 15, OMG, 27 January 1900, RG 395, series 2420, DSL, 3D, Letters Received, Jan. 1900 to Nov. 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2420]; GO. 22, 10 February 1900, 395/2420; "Kobbé Report" WD 1900 1:7:18-9. 224

Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 23 January 1900, 395/3668, LS 19. A copy of this appears in "Kobbé Report," W. 1900 1:7:19-20.

Maj. James A. Shipton to Col. Walter Howe, 29 January 1900, RG 395, series 5371, Tobaco, Alb., Letters Sent, Oct. 1899 to Apr. 1900, LS 8 [hereafter cited as 395/5371]; Atraviado, Lurcha. 2:71-9.

15 Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbé to SMG, 14 March 1900,395/893. For accounts of the battles see Atraviado, Lurcha. 2:80-9; "Kobbé Report" m 1900 1:7:32-4; 94/107,47th Inf. History; Col. Walter Howe to AG, P.B., 8th A.C., 2 February 1900, RG 94, series 117, 47th Infantry, U.S. V., Letters Sent Books, LS Bk 1, LS 354 [hereafter cited as 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk]; Col. Walter Howto AG, P.B., 11 February 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 377.

15 94/187, 47th Inf. History; Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbé to SMG, 14 March 1900, 395/893, No. 4; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, D.P., 10 February 1900, 94/117, 47th LS Bk 1, LS 364; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, P.B., 16 February 1900, 94/117, 47th LS Bk 1 LS 378; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, P.B., 94/117, 47 LS Bk 1, LS 413; Atraviado, Lurcha, 2:89-91. Indicative of either insurrecto optimism or propaganda is Bellarmino's claim that the Americans had lost over 150 killed while the Filipinos had lost only ten men, Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 28 February 1900, PIR SD 1070.2.

17 Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, US Army, 3 June 1901, "Historical Sketch of the 45th Infantry, U.S. V.," RG 94, series 187 [hereafter cited as 94/187, 45th Inf. History]; "Otis 1900," WQ 1900 1:4:400-3; WQ 1900 1:6:660-5; Col. Edward A. Godwin to AAAG, 25 February 1900 RG 395, series 2427, DSL, 3D, Reports of Military Operations, 1900-1901 [[hereafter cited as 395/2427]; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 24 February 1900, 395/2427; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1st Div., 8th A.C., 1 March 1900, RG 395, series 2418, DSL, 3D, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Feb. 1900 to Oct. 1901, [hereafter cited as 395/2418] ; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, Bell's Expeditionary Brigade [hereafter cited as BEB], 1 March 1900, RG 395, series 2420, DSL, 3D, Letters Received, Jan. 190 to Nov. 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2420]; Maj. Michael M. McNamee to AG, BEB, 6 March 1900 395/2420; Lt. Samuel P. Lyon to Mary P. Lyon, 3 March 1900, Samuel P. Lyons Papers. USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa. [hereafter cited as SPLP]. For U.S. 225

efforts to avoid unnecessary casualties see James Parker, The Old Army: Memories, 1872-1918 (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Co., 1924) pp. 310-12; Capt. Tom Rogers to Adj., BEB, 24 February 1900 395/2420. Belarmino was very worred about his rice supplies and accurately predicted that the Army might land in the Camarines, see Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 28 February 1900, PIRSD 1070.2.

Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 575. Owen appears to place undue emphasis for his belief in Belarmino's good conduct on a statement by Linnin- ger. Best War at the Time, p. 155. He overlooks Linninger's belief that the civilized warfare was due primarily to American good conduct, see Ibid,pp. 215-6,235-6. An examination of the veterans papers in the USAMHI indicates that most believed the insurrectos treated any Americans who fell into their hands quite barbarlcally, see Charles F. Anderson, George R. Clements, and Jesse A. Jackson Questionnaires, 45th Infantry, U.5.V. Box, Richard Mason and Sgt. Lewis A. Wheeler Questionnaires, 47th Infantry Box, Edward Johnson Questionnaire, 11th Cavalry, U.S.V. Box, all at USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.. For Belarmino's early pessimism and surrender attempt see 94/187, 47th Inf. History; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 28 February 1900, PIR SD 1070.2.

’5 Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, "Proclamation" 30 April 1900, Taylor, History, Exhibit 1053, p. 46 GV; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Anon., 7 November 1900, M L Exhibit 1112, pp. 67 GV; Maj. Gen. Vito Belar­ mino to Sr. Patricio Alcala, 13 October 1900, PIR SD 341.9; Atravi­ ado, liiccba, pp. 222-7; Owen, "War in Albay, " p. 567.

20 Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, D.P., 18 May 1900, 395/4577, LS 43; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, BEB, 28 February 1900, 395/2427, Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Capt. Peter Murray, AAG, BEB, 7 March 1900, RG 94, series 117, 45th U.S.V. Infantry Letters Sent Books, LS Bk 2, LS 227 [here­ after cited as 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk]; 94/187, 45th Inf. History; "Relacion de Jefes Officials que no se han presentado" n.d., PIR SDl 180.3; "Statement of Daniel Imperial, Col.," PIR SD 2011.2; Owen, "Kabikolan" p. 365; Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 565-8. For information on Lt. Col. Ludovicio Arejola see 94/187, 45th Inf. History; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL, 31 July 1900 395/2418; Maj. Dennis M. Nolan to AG, 3D, DSL, 21 September 1900, RG 395, series 4577, Nueva Caceres, 226

es, Letters Sent Api. 1900 to Aug. 1902, LS Bk 1, LS 135 [hereafter cited as 395/4577]; Maj. William H. Johnson to AG, 3D, DSL, 26 December 1900, TRP, Reel 8; Claude E. Harris Questionnaire, 11th Cavalry Box, USAMHI.

94/187,45th Inf. History; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1 st Div., 8th A.C., 11 April 1900, 395/2418.

22 Col. Walter Howe to AG, Independent Brig., 1 st Div., 8 A.C.. 15 April 1900, 47th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 539; quote "bamboo tomtoms" from Capt. C. P. Lee to Adj., 45th Inf., 18 April 1900, 395/2428; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL, 31 July 1900, 395/2418, Bk 2; Maj. William C. Forbush to AAG, 3D, DSL, 21 October 1900, RG 395, series 3835, Guinobatan, Alb, Letters Sent, Oct. 1900 to Mar. 1902, LS 1 [hereafter cited as 395/3835]; Lt. S. Adams to Adj., Legaspi, 14 January 1901, RG 395, series 4082, Ligao, Alb., Letters and Telegrams Sent, Sept. 1899 to Jan. 1902, LS 87 [hereafter cited as 395/4082].

23 Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47th Inf., 14 February 1900 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 26; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, "Proclamation,” 3 April 1900, PIR SD 1198.3; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, DSL, 4 September 1900, RG 395, series 4830, Regan Barracks [Legaspi], Alb., Letters Sent, July 1900 to Aug. 1906, LS Bk 1, LS 56 [hereafter cited as 495/4830]; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47th Inf., 1 October 1900, 395/ 3668, LS Bk 1, LS 205; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Patricio Alcala, 15 October 1900, PIR SD 341.9; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Col. Ramon Santos 15 March 1901. Taylor. History, Exhibit 1149, p. 79 GV.

24 Maj. Hugh J. Sime to AG, 3D, DSL, 12 May 1900, 395/2420, LR 7; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 28 April 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 595; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, 3D, DSL, 19 June 1900 , 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 749; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47thj Inf., 16 June 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1. LS 112.

25 Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 21 June 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 755. For information of guerrilla weapons, see 94/187, 47th Inf. History; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, 17 September 1900 295/4830, LS Bkl, LS 76; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 27 April 1900 and 1 st end.. Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 19 May 1900, 395/2330, Boxi, LR 522; Lt. Lanning Parsons to C.O. Camalig, 227

19 November 1900, M i 1901 1:5:363.; Atraviado, Lurcha, pp. 165-6. For insurgent emphasis on the importance of arms, see Col. Jose Natera to Anon., 17 June 1900, Taylor, History, Exhibit 1068, pp. 51- 2 GV. For veterans’ disparaging views on insurrecto marksmanship and weapons see Charles F. Anderson, George R. Clements, Frank Schallert, Purl A. Mulkey, Jesse A. Jackson; Richard Mason; Sgt. Lewis A. Wheeler; Edward Johnson Questionnaires.

26 Col. Orense to Col. Jose Natera, 26 May 1900, PIR SD 1198.5. Norman Owen has stated that the principaiia who led the guerrilla forces were unwilling to sanction destructive tactics, see Owen, "War in Albay," p. 567. There is, however, ample evidence of the guerrillas attempting to burn towns, see 94/187,47th Inf. History; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1st Div., 8th A.C., 1 March 1900 395/2418; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, BED, 1 March 1900,395/2420; Lt. Jens E. Stedge to Adj., 47th Inf., 29 March 1900,395/2420, LR 2 and endorsement by Col. Walter Howe, 1 April 1900; "Report of Opera­ tions for the Garrison of Gubat, Sorsogan Province, P.l. for the Month of August, 1900," RG 395, series 3808, Gubat, Sor., Monthly Report of Garrison Operations, 1900-1901, [hereafter cited as 395/3808]. For reports on property damage and other Insurrecto intimidation see Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, 17 September 1900, 395/4830, LS Bk 1, LS 76; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, BEB, 28 February 1900, RG 395, series 2427, DSL, 3D, Extracts of Orders and Circulars Relating to the Organizing of Bell's Expeditionary Brigade, [hereafter cited as 395/2427]; "Report of a Trip to Irocin," Capt. Charles Monroe, 12 March 1900,395/2420; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, 3D, DSL, 20 April 1901, 94/117, 47th Inf., LS Bk 3, LS 300; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 28 April 1900, 94/117 Inf., 47th, LS Bk 3, LS 595.

27 Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 7 May 1900, 395/2418; Col. Ramon Santos to Maj. Eleuteria Reveta, 14 October 1900, Taylor, History, Exhibit 1104, pp. 63-4 GV; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, BEB, 9 April 1900, RG 395, series 4577, Nueva Caceres, CS, Letters Sent Apr. 1900 to Aug. 1902, vol. 1, LS 5 [hereafter cited as 395/4577]. According to the 94/187, 47th Inf. History only one soldier in that regiment was injured by an insurrecto mantrap. 228

28 Quote "our own government" from Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 5 May 1900, WQ 1901 1:5:340-2. For reprisals see "El Montero" to Lt. Col. Raymond Sanz, n.d., 1900, PIR SD 2007.1. For reports on anti- American propaganda see Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1st. Div., 8th AC., 3 March 1900, 395/2418; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1st Div., 8th A.C., 22 March 1900; Capt. Tom Rogers to Adj., BEB, 24 February 1900, 395/2420; Capt. Leslie McGinn to Maj. McNamee, 7 March 1900 395/2420. For the depopulation of towns see, Atraviado, Lurcha, 2:103-7; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, P.B., 8 A C., 1 February 1900,395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 23; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, D.P., 12 February 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bkl, LS 373 ; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 14 February 1900,395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 26; Anon., 21 June 1900,395/4082, LS 4 ; Capt. John W Gulick to AG, 3D, DSL, 23 February 1901, RG 395, series 3801, Gubat, Sor., Letters Sent, Nov. 1900 to May 1902, L5 68 [hereafter cited as 398/3801]; "Circular 21," Col. Ramon Santos to Military Central and Zone Commanders of the National Militia, Ligao, 24 August 1900, Taylor, History, Exhibit 1085, p. 58 GV; Col. Ramon Santos to Esteban Nieves, 6 November 1900, M i, Exhibit 1111, p. 66 GV; Col. Ramon Santos to Exequiel Quinto, 10 December 1900, M l, Exhibit 1135, p. 74 GV. Owen fails to note that this depopulation was part of the guerrilla strategy, suggesting that the Albayanos chose to go into the hills voluntarily with no incentive from the revolutionary leaders, see Owen, "War in Albay," p. 562-4.

29 Lt. Col. Charles 6. Starr to AG, DSL, 4 September 1900 395/4830, LS Bk 1, LS 56; Col. Walter Howe to AG, Indpt. Brig., 1st Div., 8th A.C., 15 April 1900, 94/117,47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 539; Col. Ramon Santos, “Letter," 19 April 1900, PIRSD 2006.1; Col. Ramon Santos to Luis Romano, 27 September 1900, Taylor, History, Exhibit 1099 p. 62 GV; Col. Ramon Santos to Torino Poblete, 12 December 1900, ibid. Exhibit 1132, pp. 73-4 GV; Col. Ramon Santos, "Circular," 7 January 1901, M3, Exhibit 1141, p. 76 GV; Capt. J. T. Nance to C.O., Sorsogan, 30 June 1901, 395/2442, LS 22.

30 Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 15 November 1900,395/2420.

31 Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 9 January 1901, CWS, 2:1244. See also correspondence M l, 2:1241 -2, 1249-52; Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 577-8. For evidence of ties between Manila firms 229

and the guerrillas see Capt. Ralph Van Deman to AG, DSL, 19 October 1901, 395/2424; Capt. Raph Van Deman,”Appendix K," 5 December 1901, RG 395, series 2635, DNP, General Correspondence, Nov. 1901 to Oct. 1902, Box 1, LR 256 [hereafter cited as 395/2635]. For reports on insurrecto smuggling see Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, P.B., 8th A.C., 5 April 1900,395/2420, LS 4; Maj. William C. Forbush to Adj., S-D Albay, 31 January 1901, 395/3835, LS 72; Maj. William C. Forbush to AAG, DSL, 19 March 1901, 395/3835, LS 90; Maj. Lorenzo W. Cooke to C.O., Daet, 24 June 1901, 395/2420.

32 Atraviado, Lurcha, 2; 107. For présidantes and priests serving with the guerrillas, see Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, Nueva Caceres [here­ after cited as NC], 14 May 1900,94/117, 45th LS Bk 2, LS 562; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC 28 May 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 641 ; Maj. Hugh J Sime to AAAG, 3D, DSL, 16 June 1900, 395/2428; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 23 January 1900,395/3668, LS 19; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, DSL, 28 April 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 68; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Vicario de Sorsogan [Sp.] 7 May 1900, 395/3668, LS 74; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 1 July 1900 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 129; Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, pp. 160-72.

33 LeRoy. Americans, 2:171.

34 Quote breaking up' from Lt. Samuel P. Lyon to Mary P. Lyon, I June 1900, SPLP. For administration see, G.O. No. I, OMG, DSL, 28 March 1900, 395/2424; Hq, DSL, G.O. No. 1,1 April 1900 395/2424, Hq, 3D, DSL G.O. 1, 1 May 1900,395/2424; ANJ 37 (5 May 1900). For Bell's retirement see M i 1901 1:7:416.

35 94/187, 47th Inf. History; 94/187, 45th Inf. History; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, P.B., 2 March 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 1, Is 413; Col. Walter Howe to AG, P.B., 17 March 1900, 94/117 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 447; Arlington Betts, "The Memoirs of Arlington Betts," in Arlington Betts, Elmer Madsen, Victor Buencamino, Recollections of the Amer­ ican Regime, (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1973), pp. 22- 3. For Paua's surrender see Atraviado, Lurcha. pp. 190-8; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AG, Albay and Guinobatan, 27 March 1900,94/117, 47th LS Bk 2, LS 467; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1 st Div., 8th A.C., 1 April 1900, 395/2418; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 1st Div., 8th 230

A.C, 1 April 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 495; AÈU 37 ( 14 April 1900).

36 Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1 st Div., 8th AC., 11 April 1900, 395/2418.

37 Lt. Samuel P. Lyon to Mary P. Lyon, 12 April 1900, SPLP; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, D.P., 12 February 1900,94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk I, LS 373; Col. Walter Howe to AG, Indpt. Brig., 1st Div., 8th AC, 6 April 1900, 395/2420, LR 6.

38 Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1 st Div., 8th AC, 26 March 1900, 395/2418 LS Bk 1 ; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1 st Div., 8AC, 1 April 1900 395/2418, LS Bk 1; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 19 May 1900, 395/2330, Boxl, LR 522; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 27 May 1900, 395/2418; 94/187, 47th Inf. History. Otis believed Bell's reports on the desperate lack of men were "rather pessimistic." Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis to Secretary of War, 10 April 1900, c m 2:1159; Root to OtIs, 9 April 1900, CWS 2:1158. For Kobbé's report see Brig. Gen. William Kobbé to AG, D.P. and 8th AC, 28 March 1900, 395/893, LS 54.

39 Hq, DSL to C.G., 3D, DSL, 1 September 1900, RG 395, series 4077, Libmanan, CS, Miscellaneous Letters, Orders, and Reports Received, 1900-1902, [hereafter cited as 395/4077); George A. McCarter to Theodore Roosevelt, 24 November 1900, TRP, Reel 7; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, 3D, DSL, 29 May 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 675; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to Col. Walter Howe, 18 June 1900, 395/4082, LS 3; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL 31 July 1900, 395/2418, LS Bk 2.

^ 94/187, 45th Inf. History; 94/187, 47th Inf. History; Col. Walter Howe to AG, DSL, 27 April 1900, 94/117, 47th LS Bk 2, LS 582; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Lt. Col. James Parker, 27 July 1900, RG 395, series 5035, San Jose de Laganoy, CS, Letters and Telegrams Received, 1900 to 1901 [hereafter cited as 395/5035); Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, DSL, 23 August 1900, RG 395, series 5032, San Jose de Lagonoy, CS, Letters and Telegrams Sent, June 1900 to Mar. 1902, LS Bk 1, LS 56 [hereafter cited as 395/5032); Capt. Arlington U. Betts to AG, DSL, 24 October 1900, 395/5371 ); Gen. James M. Bell to Anon., 4 January 231

1901,395/2418, LS Bk 3, LS 1544; Maj. Samuel E. Armstrong, “Special Report of the Sanitary Condition and Medical Equipment of the Post of Nueva Caceres," 3 October 1900, 395/2330, Box 16, C235; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 21 October 1900, RG 395, series 3929, Iriga, CS, Letters Sent, July 1900 to Mar. 1902, LS Bk 1, LS 740 [here­ after cited as 395/3929]; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Lt. McCormick, 10 Sepember 1900,395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 434. For inta-departmental transport problems see 94/187,45th Inf. History; 94/187,47th Inf. History; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Capt. Peter Murray 15 May 1900, 395/2420; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL, 31 July 1900, 395/2418; Capt. F. N. Simpson, QM to AG, 3D, DSL, 24 July 1900, 395/2330, Box 6, Ml374; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL, 1 September 1900 395/2418. ',5 578. For an ingenious solution to the problem proposed by lack of pay see Betts, "Memoirs," pp. 35-6. For the accounts of veterans, most of whom dwelt with great detail on the horrors of food and medical supplies, see George R. Clements, Frank Schallert, Purl A. Mulkey; Sgt. Lewis A. Wheeler; Richard Mason Questionnaires.

Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, DSL, 12 December 1900, 395/2330, Box 4, C3099.

">2 94/187,47th Inf. History; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47th, 16 June 1900,395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 112; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, 3D, DSL, 29 May 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 675; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Chief Surgeon, DSL, 30 September 1900 94/117,45th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 1470.

43 Owen, "War in Albay," p. 566. For similar sentiments see Capt. Charles Young to DMI, November 1901, RG 395, series 5379, Tabaco, Alb., Micellaneous Letters, Telegrams, Orders, Circulars, and Reports Received, 1900-1902 [hereafter cited as 395/5379]. The source of Owen's quotation, Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr, believed that resistance came from twenty per-cent of the population who terrorized the majority, see Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, 17 September 1900, 395/4830, LS Bk 1,LS 76.

44 Quote from Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, DivPhil, July 3 1901, 395/3929, LS Bk 3, LS 518; Col. James Lockett to Capt. Peter Murray. 8 November 1900, 395/2420. For the official policy see Brig. Gen. William Kobbé to C.O. Donsol, 22 January 1900, 395/893, LS 3; Brig. 232

Gen. James M. Bell to all C.O.'s [3D], 28 June 1900,395/2418. For the belief that Tagalogs were responsible for most insurrecto activity, see Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, BEB, 28 February 1900, 395/2427; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Capt. Peter Murray, AAG, BEB, 7 March 1900,94/117,45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 227; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG. D.P., 18 May 1900, 395/4577 LS 43; Maj. William C. Forbush to AAG, 3D, DSL, 30 November 1900, M2 1901, 1:5:369-71. For examples of the belief that the insurrectos won support only by intimidation or ignorance see Lt. Samuel P. Lyon to Mary P. Lyon, 17 March 1900, SPLP; Lt. Col. James Parker to AG, 3D, DSL, 30 June 1900,395/5032, LS Bk 1, LS 6; M i 38 (1 September 1900); Maj, William H. Johnson to AG, 3D, DSL, 25 December 1900, TRP, series 1, Reel 8; Capt. S. E. Smiley to Brig. Gen. James M. Bell, 17 April 1900, 395/2420; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47th Inf., 12 February 1900, 395/2668, LS Bk 1, LS 57; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, P.B., 8th A.C., 14 February 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 26.

45 G.O. 7,27 April 1900,395/5379; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Maj. Edwin I. Cole, 13 May 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 543; Maj. James A. Shipton to AG, Exped. Brig., 1st Div., 8th A C., 1 June 1900,395/5371 LS 53 ; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 21 September 1900,395/3929, Bk 1, LS 514. For earlier attempts at government see 6.0.3, Brig. Gen. James M. Bell, 2 April 1900,395/2441 ; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 25 April 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 380; Sgt. Lewis A. Whee­ ler to Editor, indiana Progress, 17 April 1900, Sgt. Lewis A. Wheeler File, 45th Infantry, U.S.V. Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa..

45 Capt. B. Patrick, Adj. to Maj. Theodore K. Birkhaeuser, 2 and 15 March 1900,94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2; Juan de los Herras to Sr. Preboste, 13 March 1900, PIR SD 2007.3; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to Capt. Peter Murray, 1 June 1900, 395/2420; Maximo Noble to Col. Joseph H. Dorst, 16 June 1900, 395/2420; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, N.C., 4 July 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 1064; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 10 July 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 798; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 22 July 1900, RG 395/3929, LS Bk I, LS 87; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 19 September 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 481; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 1 July 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 129; Maj. Frank Taylor to Adj., S-D Albay, 2 May 1901, RG 395, series 5376, Tabaco, Alb., Letters and Telegrams Received, 1900-1902, [hereafter cited as 395/5376]; Lt. C. E. Stodter to 233

Governor of Albay, 2 November 1901,395/4082, LS 178; Parker, Old Army, p. 352.

47 Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to SMG, 4 March 1901, 395/2440, LS 55; Capt. B. Patrick to Maj. Theodore K. Birkhaeuser, 2 March 1900; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, BEB, 15 March 1900, LS 232; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC. 5 May 1900, L5 465, all in 94/117. 45th Inf. LS Bk 2; Capt. Edwin Cole to AG, 3D, DSL, 24 May 1900, 395/ 2420; Col. Joseph H, Dorst to AG, 3D. DSL, 28 June 1900,94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 982; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 16 July 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 31; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47th Inf., 1 July 1900, WD 1901 1:5:346-8; Esteban Delgado to Col. Ramon Santos, 4 and 28 July 1900, PIR SD 1014.3; Eusebio San Jose to Cmdte. Gregorio Mascate, 19 December 1900, PIR SD 1198.8; E. Villareal to Col. Ramon Santos, 13 February 1901, PIRSD 1014.7; Capt. John W. Gulick toHIpolltoFreola, 9 March 1901,395/3801, LS 87; Antonio Guerrera to Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, 15 March 1901. Taylor. History. Exhibit 1149, p. 80 6V.

48 Lt. E. J. Balsh to AG, BEB, 3 March 1900, 395/2420. For the good treatment accorded native clergymen who returned to towns see Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 10 July 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 798; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 3D DSL, 11 July 1900, 395/5032, LSBk l,LS21.

49 Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 174, for a full discussion see pp. 157-75. For the four priests serving with the//756r/’(?r/i?s’ see ibid, pp. 164-72; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 23 January 1900 395/3668, LSBk 1, LS 19; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, P.B., 8th A.C., 1 February 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 33; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, DSL, 28 April 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk I, LS 68; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Vicario de Sorsogan, 7 May 1900, 395/3668, LS 74; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 1 July 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 129; Lt. Brice P. Disque to C O., Bulan, 6 October 1900, M i 1901 1:5:358-9; Col. Ramon Santos to Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, 14 November 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1113, p. 67 GV; "Guerrilla Warfare." 27 October 1900, PIR 1014.8; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG. 3D, DSL, n.d., 395/4082, LS 4. Some officers also felt that local clergymen were aiding the insurgents see Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 22 July 1900, 395/3929, LS Bkl, LS 87; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, DSL, 16 234

January 1901, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 53 and 54; Lt. Col. William Quinton to AG, NC, 17 April 1901, 395/3929, LS Bk 3, LS 795.

50 Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Vicario de Sorsogan, 7 May 1900,395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 74; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAG, BEB, 2 March 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 232; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, n.d. 395/4082, LS 4; Lt. Albert O'Dell to Lt. Col. James Parker, 16 July 1900,395/5040. For Bell'S policies see Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to SMG, 26 December 1900, 395/2440, LS 9.

51 Antonio Guevara to Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, 15 March 1901, PIR SD 1014.9. Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 30 April 1900 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 414; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 21 May 1900, 94/117,47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 654; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 6 June 1900,94/117,45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 736; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 3D, DSL, 6 July 1900, 395/5032, LS Bk 1, LS 14; Capt. George W. Wlnterburne to AG, 3D, DSL, 9 July 1900,395/2420; Col. Walter Howe to AAG, 3D. DSL, 24 July 1900, 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 853; Father Mauricio Baraneda to C O. Donsol, 11 November 1900, 395/3671; LR 180; Father Mauricio Barraneda to C O., Donsol, 24 January 1901, 395/3671, LR 258; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Father Mauricio Barraneda, 24 January 1901 395/3669, LS Bk 2, LS 30; Capt. Charles C. McLain to Adj., 47th Inf., 4 February 1901, WD 1901 1:5:421-2; Parker, Old Army, p. 328; Betts, "Memoirs", pp. 15-18.

52 Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 27 May 1900,395/2418; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL, 31 July 1900, 395/2418; "Requisition for Ordinance Stores for 3rd District, DSL," 27 May 1900,395/2420; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL 31 July 1900, 395/2418; Col. Thomas MacGregor to AG, DSL, 12 October 1900 and 2nd endorsement, Lt. N. B., Chief Ordinance Officer to AG, DSL, 31 October 1900, 395/2330, Box 2, LRB2344. Vor présidentes demands for armed police see Capt. Edwin Cole to AG, 3D, DSL, 24 May 1900, 395/2420; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 16 July 1900, 355/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 31.

53 Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 3 August 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 195; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, DivPhil, 18 May 1900, 395/4577, LS Bk 1. LS 43; "Avislo," 10 June 1900, PIR SD 1068.4; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Maj. Keller Anderson, 24 July 1900, 395/3669, LS Bk 1, LS 148; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 3D, DSL, 31 July 1900, 395/5032, 235

LS Bk 1, LS 35; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 3D, DSL, 22 January 1901, 395/2418; Lt. William S. Chamberlain to AG, S-D, Camarines Norte [hereafter cited as CN], 20 July 1900, RG 395, series 4673, Pasacale, CN. Letters Sent, July 1901, LS 30 [hereafter cited as 395/4673]; Charles F. Anderson and 5gt. Lewis A. Wheeler Question­ naires.

54 Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, 3D, DSL, n.d., 1900, 395/3929, LS 687. For Army efforts to hold down casualties in the occupation see Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 23 January 1900, 395/3668, LS 19; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj., 47th Inf., 12 February 1900,395/2668, LS Bk 1, LS 57; Capt. Tom Rogers to Adj, BEB, 24 February 1900, 395/2420, Box 1, LR 1; Parker, Old Army, pp. 310-11.

55 Linninger, Best War At the Time, p. 236. For a rare favorable view of Army conduct from a Philippine historian see, Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 574-5,578. James Parker credited the U.S. Volunteers who served in the 3rd District with far better relations with the Filipinos than the regulars who followed them, see Parker, Old Army, p. 315. For social relations between officers and Filipinos, see Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, 28 April 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 406; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 4 July 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 1064. For generally favorable views of the Bicol populace among officers and enlisted men see 94/187,45th Inf. History; Lt. V/illlam McKinley to SMG, 26 January 1901,395/2420; William L. Bliss to Aunt, 30 April 1900, Harry L. Bliss File, 45th Infantry Box, andCharles E. Brossman Questionnaire, 47th Infantry, Ü.S.V. Box, USAMHI, Carlisle. Pa.; Purl A. Mulkey, Charles F. Anderson, George R. Clements, Claude Harris, Richard Mason Questionnaires.

56 Betts, "Memoirs," pp. 18-21.

57 Quote "earnest and prompt" from Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to SMG, 4 March 1901,395/2440, LS 55. Bell also proposed a land tax on the principaJia which would be used for education, see Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AG, DSL, 3 July 1900, 395/2418. For the work of officer's in garrison towns, see Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, 8 October 1900, 395/4830, LS 114; Maj. William C. Forbush to CO., Legaspi, 23 December 1900, 395/3835, LS 49; Maj. William C. Forbush to C O., Legaspi 1 January 1901, 395/3835, LS 14; Capt. Edwin T. Cole 236

to AG, 3D, DSL, 24 May 1900, 395/2420; Lt. Col. James Parker to Officer In Charge of Public Instruction, 17 August 1900,395/5032, LS Bk 1, LS 49; Col. Thomas MacGregor to AG, DSL, 31 October 1900, 395/2418, LS Bk 3, LS 1162; Capt. Walter L. Findley to AG, 3D, DSL, 9 February 1901,395/4072, LS 31 and 32; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to General Superintendent of Education, 16 November 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 269; Lt. Col. William Quinton to AG, 17 April 1901, 395/3929, LS Bk 3, LS 795; Maj. James A. Shipton to SMG, 22 February 1901, 395/5032, LS Bk 1, LS 29; Maj. James A. Shipton to SMG, 14 April 1901, 395/5032, LS Bk 1, LS 114; Betts, “Memoirs," pp. 38-41; Parker, Old Army p. 351.

58 Capt. Augustus C. Hart to Adj. 47th Inf., 1 September 1900,395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 179. Ramon Gonzalez, Vicar General to Lt. Col. James Lockett, 18 September 1900,395/2420; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Father Mauricio Barrameda, 11 November 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 267; Col. Edward Moale to AG, 3D, DSL, 24 February 1901, 395/4830, LS Bk 1, LS 120; Actg. Surgeon Edwin P. Hayward to Adj., 1 March 1901, 395/5376, LR 288; Parker, Old Army, p. 335. It should be noted, however, that this was unique to the 3rd District and that attempts to obtain extra medicines to treat Filipinos were denied by Manila, see Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to Capt. Chas Wilcox, Ast. Surg., 17 January 1901, 395/2418, LS 1683; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, 3D, DSL, n.d., 395/3929, LS 687.

59 Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, 28 April 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 406; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 14 September 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 457; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, NC, 19 March 1901, 395/3929, LS Bk 3, LS 595; Lt. Col. William Quinton to AG, NC, 4 May 1901, 395/3929, LS Bk 3, LS 886 and 7; Special Orders, 25 June 1901, 395/2420; Capt. H. H. McMaster to AG, S-D CN, Daet, 24 July 1901, 395/2420; Parker, Old Army, pp. 357-8; George W. Prioleau to Editor, Colored American, 13 July 1901, cited in Gatewood, Smoked Yankees, pp. 301-3.

80 Capt. Augustus C. Hart to Adj. 47th Inf., 1 September 1900, M i 1901 1:5:352-3. For the entire correspondence see M i 1901 1:5:346-54.

8' Col. Joseph H Dorst to AG, NC, 1 September 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 384; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 4 September 1900, 395/3929, 237

LS Bk 1, LS 408; G.O. No. 2, by Order of Lt. Col. James Parker, 3 July 1900, 395/2420; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 3D, DSL, 6 July 1900, LS 14; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 3D, DSL, 11 July 1900, LS 211; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 3D, DSL, 29 July 1900, LS 32, all In 395/5032, LS 5k 1 ; Lt. Albert 0 Dell to Lt. Col. James Parker, 4 August 1900, 395/5040.

62 Owen, "War In Albay," p. 566,564-8,574; “Descriptive Card of Inhab- itants-Anacleto Solano," "Decriptlve Card of Inhabltants-Domingo Sampson," "Descriptive Card of Inhabitants-Macario Sampson," 18 March 1902, RG 395, series 3399, Camalig, Alb., Letters and Reports Received by the Intelligence Officer, Nov. 1901 to Mar. 1902 [here­ after cited as 395/3399]; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Maj. Keller Anderson, 24 July 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 148; M i 1900 1:6:666,669,674- 6; 'El Montero’ to Lt. Col. Raymond Sanz, 1900, PIR5D 2007.1. For good relations between the princlpalia and Army personnel, see Betts, "Memoirs," p. 20; Linninger, Best War At the Time, p. 233; Parker, Old Army, pp. 331 -3,339; Samuel P. Lyon to Mary P. Lyon, 27 February and 6 July 1900, SPLP; Lt. Col. James Parker to AAG, 3D, DSL, 11 July 1900, 395/5032, LS Bk 1, LS 21.

63 Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL, 31 July 1900, 395/2418.

64 Statistics on engagements taken from M l 1900 1:5:5-43, M l 1901 1:4:5-72; M l 1902 1:9:136-78; 94/117, 45th Inf. History; 94/117, 47th Inf. History.

65 Quote "struck fast" from Linninger, Best War at the Time, p. 189; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, 12 October 1900, 395/4830, LS 123; Lt. George M. Wray, "Record of Troop D, 11th Cavalry, U.S.V. for the month of May 1900," RG 395, series 4085, Libmanan, Alb., Letters Received 1900, LR 37 [hereafter cited as 395/4085] ; Maj. Hugh T. Sime to Hq., 2nd Sqd., 11th Cav., 24 May 1900, 395/4085, LS 710; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to Col. Walter Howe, 18 June 1900, RG 395, series 4082, Libmanan. Alb., Letters and Telegrams Sent, Sept. 1899 to Jan. 1902, LS 3 [hereafter cited as 395/40821; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, DSL, 4 September 1900, 395/4830, LS Bk 1, LS 56; Lt. George M. Wray to AG, DSL, 1 October 1900, 395/2033, Box 2, A916. Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, 1st Div, 8th AC., 5 March 1900, 395/2418; Col. Walter Howe to AG, Indpt. Brig., 20 March 1900, 238

94/117. 47th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 549; Col. James Lockett to AG, DSL, 1 September 1900, 395/2418, LS 578; Col. Thomas MacGregor to AG, DSL, 50 October 1900, 395/2418, LS Bk 3, LS 1157; Capt. John G. Livingson to Adj., 47th Inf., 14 January 1901, 395/2420.

66 Maj. William C. Forbush to AAG, 3D, DSL, 30 November 1900, 395/3835, Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AAAG, BEB, 15 March 1900, 94/117 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 232.

67 Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 3 February 1901, 395/2418, LS Bk 3, LS 1957. For 3rd District policy on rice restrictions see Hq, DSL to C.G., 3D, NC, 25 July 1900 395/2402; AG, 30, DSL, to CO., Legaspi, 10 August 1900 395/4833; Hq, 3D to C.O., Libmanan, 20 October 1900, 395/4077.

68 Statistics on U.S. casualties taken from M l 1900 1:5:5-43, WD 1901 1:4:5-72; WÜ 1902 1:9:136-78; 94/117, 45th Inf. History; 94/117. 47th Inf. History.

69 Maj. Hugh D. Wise to CO., Sorsogan, 6 April 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 46; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Ynchausti and Co., Sorsogan 5 May, 1900, 395/3668, LS 45; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, P.B., 8th A.C., 6 May 1900, 395/3668, LS Bk 1, LS 53; 94/187, 45th Inf. History; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 30 April 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 414; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 9 May 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 505; Col. Walter Howe to Maj. James A. Shipton, C O., Tobaco, 28 April 1900, LS 583; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 28 April 1900, LS 584; Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D, DSL, 21 May 1900, LS 654 ; Col. Walter Howe to AG, DSL, 5 August 1900, LS 870, all in 94/117, 47th Inf. LS Bk 2.

70 Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 12 August 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 277; Alcalde of Nabua to CO., Iriga, 22 August 1900, RG 395, series 3931, Iriga, CS, Register of Letters Received, July 1900 to Mar. 1902 [hereafter cited as 95/3931]; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 27 August 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1 LS 358; Capt. Patrick, Adj. 45th Inf. to C O. Iriga, 23 November 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 2, LS 1082; Maj. William C. Forbush to AAG, 30, DSL, 30 November 1900, 395/3835, L5 16. 239

71 Col. Joseph H. Dorst toAG, NC 23 August 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 344; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 30 April 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 414; Col. Joseph H, Dorst to AG, NC, 11 July 1900, 94/117,45th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 1114; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to Adj. 47th Inf., 1 August 1900, WD 1900 1:5:349-51. For a sample of reports on food destruction operations in Sorsogan province see Capt. John W. Gulick to Adj. 47th Inf.. 4 August 1900, m 1901 1:5:351-2; Lt. Brice P. Disque to C O., Bulan, 5 October 1900, WD 1901 1:5:358-9; Capt. John W. Gulick to Adj. 47th Inf., 11 November 1901, M21900 1:5:361- 3; Lt. Charles H. Morrow to Post Adj., Bulan, 26 November 1901, M2 1900 1:5:364-7; Capt. John W. Gulick to Adj, 47th Inf., 8 January 1901, M21901 1:5:402. For operational orders see Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, DSL, 12 December 1900, 395/2330, Box 4, C3099.

72 Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 28 February 1900, PIR SD 1070.2; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 10 July 1900,94/117, 45th Inf., LS Bk 3, LS 1109; Hq. General Staff, "Decree," 14 November 1900, PIR SD 1068.10; Capt. Edward E. Terry to Adj., 47th Inf., 29 January 1901, M21901 1:5:415-6; Col. Ramon F. Santos to Lt. Col. Rufino Nieves, 10 and 18 February 1901, PIR SD 1068.10; 94/187,45th Inf. History.

73 "Statement of Patricio Alcala after Surrendering to the Commanding Officer at Guinobatan, P.I., 5th of December 1900," PIR 389.2. For an overview of these operations "Report of Operations in the Third District, Department of Southern Luzon," M l 1901 1.5:321 -453; 94/187, 47th Inf. History; 94/187, 45th Inf. History; Claude W. Harris Diary, 11th Cavalry, U.S.V. Box, USAMHI, Calisle, Pa.

74 Capt. Peter Murray to Lt. Col. James Parker, 23 July 1900, RG 395, series 5040, San Jose de Laganoy, Correspondence, Reports, and Descriptive List of Native Scouts, 1900-1901; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, N.C., 28 May 1900, 94/117, 45th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 668; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 14 July 1900, 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 22; Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 21 July 1900, 395/ 3929, LS Bk 1,84; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 3 December 1900,395/2418, LS Bk 3, LS 1319; "Report of the Intelligence Officer, Nueva Caceras, P.I," 6 January 1902, RG 395, series 4587, Nueva Caceres, CS, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Reports, Orders, and Circulars, 1901-1903 [hereafter cited as 395/4587]. For area reports on the effect of the rinderpest 240

epidemic throughout the 3rd District see the "information on the Philippine Islands," letters in RG 395, series 2421, DSL, 3D, Letters Received Relating to Civil Affairs, 1900-1901 [hereafter cited as 395/2421],

75 Col. Joseph H. Dorst to AG, NC, 20 July 1900 395/3929, LS Bk 1, LS 72; Lt. Col. James Parker to smith Bell and Co., Tobaco, Alb., 17 August 1900; Parker, Old Army, pp. 336-7; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, "Proclamation," 3 April 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1053, p. 48 GV.

76 Lt. Col. Charles 6. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, 4 December 1900, 395/4830, LS Bk 1, LS 223. For similar sentiments, see Maj. william C. Forbush to AAG, 3D, DSL, 1 December 1900, 395/3835, LS 19; Lt. Col. Charles G. Starr to AG, 3D, DSL, 7 December 1900, 395/4830, LS Bk 1, LS 239; Maj. William C. Forbush to AAG, 3D, DSL, 1 February 1901,395/3835, LS 77. For operational accounts of this expedition see M l 1901 1:5:371-82.

77 Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, DSL, 5 February 1901,395/3668, LS Bk 2, LS 42; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, DSL, 21 February 1901,395/2421; Maj. Hugh D. Wise to AG, U.S. Army, 7 February 1901, M l 1901 1:5:425-6; 94/187, 47th inf. History. For a similar raid on the fnsurrecto port of Pilar see Capt. Harry Walsh to Adj., 47th inf., 31 March 1901, 395/3668, LS Bk 2, LS 124.

75 9 4 / 187, 47th inf. History. For reports on operations see Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to Anon. [AG, DSL], 27 December 1900,395/2418, LS Bk 3, LS 1462; Lt. Col. James Parker to C.O., Baao, Buhi, Banua, 1 March 1901, 395/3929, LS Bk 3, LS 463; 94/187, 45th Inf. History.

79 E. Villareal to Col. Ramon Santos, 13 February 1901, PIR SD 1014.7.

80 Antonio Guerrera to Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, 15 March 1901, PIR SD 1014.9.

81 Capt. Charles F. McLain to Adj., 47th inf., 4 February 1901, M i 1901 1:5:421-2. 241

82 Antonio Guerrera to Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmino, 15 March 1901, PIR SD 1014.9; Maj William H. Johnson to AG, 30, DSL, 26 December 1900, TRP, series 1 Reel 8; George Van Horn Moseley, “One Soldier's Journey," (unpublished manuscript), George Van Horn Moseley Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as GVHMP].

83 Lt. Lucien G. Berry to Adj., 2 March 1901,395/5376, LS 285; Maj. William C. Forbush to AAG, 3D, DSL. 10 February 1901,395/2835, LS 79; Col. James Lockett to AG, 3D, DSL, 30 December 1900, 395/5032. LS Bk 1, LS 117; Col. James Lockett to AG, 3D, DSL, 13 January 1901, 395/5032, LS Bk 1, LS 2; Maj. James A. Shipton to Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 3D, DSL, 30 March 1901, 395/5032, LS 83; Lt. Sterling Adams to AG, 3D, DSL, 31 May 1901, 395/4082, LS 121.

84 Capt. John W. Gulick to AG, Provost Guard, 5 March 1901, 395/ 3801 ; Brig. Gen. James M. Bell to AAG, DSL, 5 March 1901, 395/2418, LS Bk 3, LS 2135; WD 1901 1.5:434-6. For operations in Sorsogan see 94/187, 47th inf. History; WD 1901 1:5:345-367.

85 Col. Walter Howe to AG, 3D. DSL. 14 March 1901 94/117,47th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 195; Capt. John W. Gulick to Esteban Pu lay, 2nd Jefe Comman­ ding, 27 February 1901, 395/3801, LS 91; Capt. John W. Gulick to Adj., 47th Inf., 4 March 1901, 395/2420.

86 M i 1901 1:5:323; Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey" GVHMP, For opera­ tions against Arejola see M l 1901 1:5:394-9,440-2; "Reservada," 20 March 1901, PIR SD 1230.2.

87 Capt. Henry H. Benham to C.O. Guinobatan, 5 June 1901,395/3668, LS Bk 2, LS 179. For accounts of the attack see Capt. John M. Cotter to AG, DSL, 26 May 1901, LS 165; Capt. Henry H. Benham to AG, 3D, DSL, 31 May 1901, LS 166; Capt. John M. Cotter to AG, 3D, DSL, 30 May 1900, LS 167, all in 395/3668, LS Bk 2. For an overly optimistic view of the level of pacification in Sorsogan see Col. William Howe to AG, 3D, 8 April 1901, RG 395, series 5311, Sorsogan, Sor, Letters and Telegrams Sent, LS Bk 1 LS 37 [hereafter cited as 395/5311 ].

85 "Report of Operations in the Fourth Separate Brigade, " M i 1902 1:7:336-64; "Memorandum for Colonel Wint," Col. Constant Williams to Col. Theodore Wint, 14 June 1901, 395/2424; Capt. Dana E. Kilbourne 242

to Adj., 26th Inf., 3 August 1901, 395/2420; Lt. Leo. M. Cutts, “Report of Wray's Scouts," 19 July 1901; Maj. Gen. Vito Belarmingo to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 7 July 1901, PIR SD 747.1. There was some contoversy over Col. Theodore J. Wint's attempts to appropriate all the credit for Belarmino's surrender to himself and the 6th Cavalry. See Col. Theodore J. Wint to AG, DSL, 13 August 1901, WQ 1902 1:9:345-7 and endorsement by Col. Constant Williams, 3 October 1901, M l, pp. 347-8.

89 WQ 1902 1:9:336-62; Lt. R. B. Parrot to AG, 3D, DSL, 11 September 1901, RG 395, series 4449, Matnog, Sor., Letters Sent, May 1900 to July 1902, LS 66 [hereafter cited as 395/4449]; Capt. Edmund Wittenmyer to C.O., Sorsogan, 12 September 1901, RG 395, series 5314, Sorsogan, Sor., Letters Received 1901-1904 [hereafter cited as 395/53141; Lt. Col. Leon A. Matilde to AG, 3D. DSL. 1 October 1901, 395/5311, LS Bk 1, LS 226; "List Of Natines in "Anting-Anting' and Similar Organizations in Albay and Sorsogan," PIR SD 673.12; "Report of the Governor of Sorsogan, " Senate, Affairs, pp. 456-9; Coates, "Philippine Constablulary," pp. 54-64, 60-106; Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 569-72. For a pessimistic view of the state of pacification, see the reports of Intelligence Officers, esp. Capt. Charles Young to DM I, November 1901,395/5379; Lt. T. Bruce Esty to DM I, 6 January 1902, 395/4567.

90 Owen, "War in Albay," p. 576. CHAPTER FIVE: THE SECOND DISTRICT, DSL

The forces of the insurrection are not kept in the field, except a few men who accompany the higher officers. The majority of them live at home, even in and about the towns we occupy. When wanted, they are warned through their system of signals and runners and gather at night at some designated place. The number is limited only by the number required or by the number of rifles within reach. The common soldier wears the dress of the country, with his gun he is a soldier; by hiding it and walking quietly along the road, sitting down by the nearest house, or going to work in the nearest field, he becomes an amigo,' full of good will and false information for any of our men who may meet him.i When Brig. Gen. James F. Wade offered this explanation for the continued turmoil in the Second District, Department of Southern Luzon, it was August 26, 1901. The war had been effectively over in the rest of Luzon for months. From the mountains of I locos Norte to the abaca groves of Albay, the main guerrilla forces had surrendered. Throughout the archipelago, new civil gov­ ernments were taking over and police were replacing the Army as the bul­ warks of American colonial authority. Yet in a region only a few hours travel from Army headquarters in Manila, resistance continued unabated. Well led, popularly supported, and sustained by a highly developed infi'a- structure, the guerrillas in the 2nd District appeared able to make good

243 244

MAP 5

SECOND DISTRICT D.S.L.

IJ

*4 I

I D 245 their promise to fight on for another ten years. The war in southwestern Luzon was to be the hardest challenge to Army regional pacification on the island of Luzon. In the end it would be defeated only by the most thorough and controversial pacification campaign of the Philippine War. The 2nd Distict comprised the three provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, an area of some 2,800 square miles with a 1903 census pop­ ulation of almost 560,000 people. The southern province of Batangas, with an area of 1,200 square miles, was the most populous province, with roughly 300,000 inhabitants. The northern province of Laguna had an area of 660 square miles and a population of about 150,000. Tayabas, present day Quezon province, stretched east along the narrow Tayabas peninsula to the Camarines, a total area of 2,334 miles, but with a population of only 109,780. The rich arable land was densely populated and produced rice, sugar, coconuts, fish, and cottage industries. The Army not only faced war in a fishbowl, surrounded by non-combatants, but was forced to fight in ter­ rain that alternated between wet rice paddies and foothills, lakes, seacoast, jungle, and volcanic mountains. In addition, the area was extremely unheal­ thy; the summer monsoons made malaria and dysentery so prevalent that some American garrisons would be reduced to under half their strength.^ Coupled with difficulties of terrain and climate was the fact that Batangas and Laguna, with their sister province of Cavite, were in Wade's words, "the most thickly settled and the richest in southern Luzon, the home of the Tagalos and the birthplace of the insurrection."^ The region had been one of the most heavily Hispanicized areas in the Philippines and was extensively exploited by the Spanish religious orders. During the late 246 nineteenth century the region's landholding elite sought political reforms which would protect their local economic and social status. Most of the educated Tagalog elite who dominated local politics had been subject to the influence of European liberal nationalist ideas and Philippine reformist thought. The ignorantes were also disenchanted with colonial rule and sought solace in millenarian movements such as the Cofradia de San José and its offshoot, the Colorums, which mingled radical social reform with dreams of a Christian utopia. With this heritage of discontent and radical thought, it is not surprising that many of the region's inhabitants were receptive to the message of Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo. In 1896 Batangas and Laguna were the scene of heavy fighting which resulted in several Spanish defeats and virulent guerrilla war. In 1896 Republican forces in southwestern Luzon quickly defeated the Spanish and established local governments.4 Throughout 1899, the Americans concentrated most of their efforts north of Manila, leaving the incipient Philippine revolutionary military for­ ces and governments to the south free from interference. Army operations were conducted chiefly to drive the insurrectos back and prevent any threat to Manila. These sweeps quickly bogged down and may have convinced the guerrilla leadership that the Americans could not sustain prolonged operations.5 The provincial political-military chiefs, Miguel Malvar in Batangas and Juan Cailles in Laguna, were able to centralize authority, discipline their forces, and insure the compliance of the population. While they showed an appreciation of the importance of establishing strong town governments. Cailles and Malvar insisted that the présidentes and 247 military commanders recognized their authority. Under their firm tenure, military forces were established in each town, arms were collected, and relations between local civil and military leaders settled. The result was that Batangas and Laguna, and to a lesser extent Tayabas, were far better organized and prepared to conduct a sustained guerrilla war than other areas of Luzon. It was not until January 1900 that two divisions under the overall command of Brig. Gen. John C. Bates rapidly overran southwestern Luzon. Unfortunately for the Americans, the Filipinos contented themselves with a few abortive battles and then melted away. Somewhat to the surprise of the Americans, the march quickly became "for the most part, a vigorously conducted triumphal procession for the posting of garrisons."^ While the Army occupied Cavite, Batangas, Laguna and most of western Tayabas by early February, it was soon to learn that occupation and pacification were very different problems. Guerrilla resistance in the 2nd District, owed its strength to a com­ bination of regional factors. As in other areas of the Philippines, unique local characteristics played a primary role in determining the nature and level of the guerrilla war. Resistance in southwestern Luzon was sustained by the superiority of the guerrilla leadership, a capable military force, good insurgency policies and tactics, the support of the native elite, and the ability of the guerrillas to suppress local collaboration with the Americans. In the 2nd District, the guerrillas developed a well balanced and flexible system which relied on the close integration of guerrilla forces and a civil support system based in the towns. 248

In Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar and Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, Jefes Superior Polftico-MHitar respectively of Batangas and Laguna provinces, the U.S. Army faced two capable, ruthless, and intelligent guerrilla commanders. Malvar, a native Batangueno, was a successful landowner and member of the principalia. In the Revolt of 1896 he raised a guerrilla band in his native town of Santo Tomas, which he later placed under Aguinaldo. A brigadier general at thirty, his intransigence led him to oppose the Pact of Biac na Bato and threaten Republican officials he suspected of wavering. A charis­ matic leader, dedicated patriot, and able organizer, he was probably the most capable adversary the Americans faced in the Philippine War.7 Juan Cailles, the Batangas-born son of an Anglo-Indian mother and a French father, was a former Cavite schoolteacher. In 1699, at the age of thirty- three, he served as governor of Laguna and was made a brigadier general in August. Like Malvar, he exercised his duties as political-military chief of his province with an iron hand, cowering his civil and military officials with a mixture of exhortation and force.s Both Malvar and Cailles understood the principles of guerrilla warfare and developed similar insurgent strategies in their respective provinces. Unlike some of the commanders in the north, the two generals did not seek a battlefield decision against the invading Army forces. From the beginning, their policy was to deny the Americans control of both the populace and the countryside. They concentrated on establishing and maintaining a clandes­ tine guerrilla support system, or infrastructure, in the occupied towns and the barrios. Orders against participating in American civil government were rigorously enforced, either through appeals to patriotism or assassination. 249 kidnapping, and property destruction. Both men avoided combat except when clearly militarily or politically advantageous. Thus Cailles and Malvar staged attacks to influence the Philippine Commission or the U.S elections and to show Americans and Filipinos "that in the Philippines they are protesting with rifles."^ Under Malvar and Cailles was an officer corps which was also distin­ guished by its long service, military ability, and willingness to exact severe penalties on their fellow countrymen. Nearly all were natives of Batangas, Laguna, or Tayabas, and drew their power more from their local prestige than their official credentials from Aguinaldo. While some officers were veterans of the 1896 revolt, others had joined only when their provinces were invaded. Many were personally commissioned by Malvar or Cailles after they voluntarily raised their own forces in their native villages. In Batangas, for example, the officer corps was "in a real sense Malvar's corps, since many of its members were his relatives or intimate friends."’o Despite Malvar’s insistence that the guerrilla leaders were "modest land­ holders," the bulk of evidence suggests that they came from the more substantial propertied interests in their provinces." Many guerrilla field officers, including Malvar, had also been town or provincial officials under the Spanish or Republican regimes. In some cases a town's guerrillas were \is presfc/ente. The town of Lipa, Batangas, had a local guerrilla band whose "government and administration are under the control of the local présidente who organized it."’2 in Bauan, Batangas, the présidente, also took to the hills with his guerrilla band and fought the Americans. 250

Guerrilla resistance in the 2nd District was thus led by the most powerful segments of the community. These landowner/officers commanded guerrilla forces that were often recruited, supported, and quartered in their native towns and barrios. The guerrilla forces were a mixture of regulars and militia, with the regu­ lars often living in the hills and being supported by isolated barrios. According to Col. Eustacio Maloles, regular units from the Republican Army were broken up and stationed in towns "with express orders to go out and fight throughout their jurisdiction."’3 Malvar's "Guerrilla Warfare. Instructions," issued on October 27,1900, gave detailed directions for the maintenance of these military forces. Malvar ordered each town to raise a column of local troops whose companies would be quartered and supplied by a designated barrio. This column would be the primary military strength of the town and its officers were authorized to collect all available fire­ arms for it's use. Civil officials exercised a great deal of control over the operations of their town's column, and commanders were instructed to "have the chiefs of columns always act in concert with the civil authorities of the towns."Being raised and maintained in local villages, the guerrilla offi­ cers and their troops were well acquainted with the terrain and population. While the landed class provided the officer corps, the ranks were filled with laborers and townspeople of little wealth or education. The typical guerrilla battalion seldom had more than fifty or sixty permanent soldiers with perhaps twenty rifles. These forces, the reguJares some­ times lived in cuarteis or outlying barrios and were supplied by taxes and contributions leveied on the town. Most regular guerrilla bands were small. 251 composed of young bachelors, and held together by a few veterans tied to their officers by long service, deference, and patron-client bonds. In Capt. Nicolas Emahdo's company the nine soldiers ranged from sixteen through thirty five, with the average age in the early twenties. When operational necessities demanded increased forces, recruits were obtained either by calling together other companies, drafting from nearby villages, or sending out press gangs. Most evidence suggests that the populace avoided military service and revolutionary officials drafted from their towns only those individuals too poor or powerless to avoid conscription. The case of Gregorio Tixon, described by his barrio teniente as "unmarried... a servant.. .[and an] orphan... willing to en-list [sic] since he has no money to pay for a substitute" is indicative of this.is One veteran who served for almost five years explained: "We were fighting because our officers told us to fight. We obeyed our leaders. There was no alternative. If we did not obey, we would be punished." As with guerrilla forces throughout Luzon, \.\\q fnsurrecto military organization was hampered by a lack of arms and ammunition. Nevertheless, the guerrillas were better armed and equipped than in most of the island, though Malvar's 1901 claim that he had 7,000 firearms was probably propa­ g a n d a . Cailles and Malvar advocated firepower over numbers, and Malvar restricted the number of bolomen to thirty per cent of company strength. The guerrillas took great pains to protect their weapons and enforced stiff penalties on anyone who surrendered f i r e a r m s . Most insurgents only used their weapons when on operations; other­ wise the rifles were hidden in a variety of ingenious places. Capt. Charles 252

D. Rhodes found fourteen rifles buried in a graveyard while others were hidden in hollowed out bamboo, plowed fields, trees, streams, and caves. Not surprisingly, such exposure made many of the weapons "an interesting lot of junk" and rendered them unservicable.’^ Ammunition was in critical demand and posed more of a problem then rifles and Cailles reported he had many rifles but only twenty rounds per man. Cartridges were manufactured from tin strips and filled with crude gunpowder mixed from matchheads and local sulphur. In the words of one cavalryman, guerrilla firearms and ammunition were "crude affairs but could be very dangerous at close quar- ters."20 The important factor was that these weapons were more than sufficient to enforce guerrilla authority in the towns and barrios where the fnsurrecto bands lived and to maintain resistance indefinitely. As one officer noted, "as long as we are unable to capture their rifles we cannot consider them pacified."2i The guerrilla leadership recognized the comparative inferiority of their forces and utilized tactics designed to prolong the war rather than defeat the Army in the field. As the American forces swept over south­ western Luzon, guerrilla leaders quickly abandoned their entrenchments and dispersed their forces. On January 14, 1900, Lt. Col. Mariano Cabrera criticized "formal" warfare and urged a "guerra de emboscados" to exhaust the Americans.22 As the war went on and the military position of the guerrillas worsened, Malvar moved even further towards a strategy of prolonged and desultory guerrilla war. He realized that the psychological and political presence of armed revolutionary forces was more important than their military actions. As long as guerrilla bands existed, the 253

Americans could not secure the loyalty of the populace or establish a secure colonial government. He urged his forces to fight only from ambush and to avoid combat whenever the outcome could be unfavorable, in 1902, he ordered that if the guerrillas had one hundred cartridges they should use no more than ten a year and thus prolong the war for ten y e a r s .2 3 From the very first, the insurrectos relied heavily on terrorism as a vital tactical tool. In contrast to the 4th District, terrorism in south­ western Luzon was directed both against individuals and property. While some guerrillas did attempt to demoralize the Americans through atrocities upon Army prisoners, most fnsurrecto terrorism was directed against other Fi1ipinos.24 Guerrilla terrorism was intended to punish Filipinos who worked for the Americans, to serve as a warning for potential collaborators, and to demonstrate the Army's inability to protect the populace. For these reasons many of the terrorist actions, especially the killing of collabora­ tors, were not indiscriminate but rather directed against specific targets, carried out in front of numerous witnesses, and publicized heavily by the guerrillas themselves. By publicly assassinating an Army guide or a collab­ orating presidents the guerrillas not only removed a dangerous personal threat but created a state of anxiety in potential americanistas P The execution of collaborators and the destruction of their property was a sanctioned and publicized policy of the fnsurrecto leadership from the beginning of the American occupation. Numerous proclamations were issued asserting that traitors, people who surrendered weapons, iadrones, and other malfactors would be punished with death. Other bulletins cited the killing of americanistas or criminals as evidence of the guerrillas' 254 power to enforce their threats.26 in addition to proclamations, the guer­ rillas relied heavily on the very deed of terrorist action as a form of propa­ ganda. Filipinos who lived in American-held towns were often executed in full view of the populace. One guide was boloed in the town of Batangas during a crowded market day, another guide was cut down in the Bauan market, and Capt. Francisco Miranda, a former fnsurrecto , was stabbed at the Binan cockpit.2? However, if the U.S. garrison or the attitude of the natives made it too risky to conduct a public execution, the insurrectos were quite willing to kidnap the victim and either hold him as a hostage or k ill him in the hills.28 The actual number of civilians killed by the insurrectos in Batan­ gas, Laguna, and Tayabas during war is almost impossible to determine. Many people may have been killed by iadrones who had only a slight con­ nection with the Filipino independence movement.29 others were killed or kidnapped without any Army personnel filing reports or there fate was dis­ covered later through capturedpapers. Cailles' letter book, for example, indicates that that he personally ordered or approved the execution of twenty-nine Filipinos between August 1900 and April 1901. In the fall of 1900, commanding officers were requested to forward esti­ mates of assassinations and assaults on americanistas in their towns to the Philippine Commission. Based on a partial collection of these reports. Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall estimated that in 1900 seventeen natives had been assassinated and 106 had been assaulted for sympathizing with the Americans. Many of these reports, however, are largely guesswork and may reflect the prejudices of individual commanding officers more than the true 255 situation. Capt. Charles J. Sterrett, for example, estimated that fifty-one Filipinos had been killed in the town of Calamba, Laguna, alone, but other officers cited only two or three killings in their towns. There in no com­ parable statistical data for 1901 or 1902 but intensive investigations of a few selected towns show that there had been several killings which pre­ vious commanders had known nothing about. A modest guess, however, would put the number of assassinations and assaults at several h u n d re d .^ o The fnsurrecto use of terror was, for the most part, highly effec­ tive in southwestern Luzon. American efforts at civil government were constantly frustrated by the threat of insurgent retaliation. The elections at the town of Batangas, for example, were effectively squelched when two insurrectos set the town on fire. The commanding officer noted bitterly "it is not likely now that anyone will accept the office of local Présidente at elections set for Sunday night."3i Maj. William Carey Brown found all the potential office holders of Pila terrified of being killed and steadfast in their refusal to have anything to do with civil government.32 So effective was guerrilla terrorism that the correspondence of most guerrilla leaders reveals a complete acceptance of the tactic. One of the few indications of an fnsurrecto questioning terrorist tactics was Col. Buenaventura Dimaguila, a commander in Tayabas. Somewhat significantly, Dimaguila appealed over the head of Cailles and Malvar to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias. He complained that the assassinations were alienating the people, that the guerrillas were committing numerous abuses, and that the wealthy people who used to contribute to the insurrectos had all fled. The assas­ sination of office holders meant that only the worst elements would take 256 office. Dimaguila's lone protest, however, probably reflects his own feud with Cailles as much as it does his humanitarians sentiments. Its unique­ ness underscores the virtual unanimity within the guerrilla leadership on the utility of terrorism, as well as the Army's inability to mount an effective deterrent.33 Based on the provincial towns and barrios and utilizing tactics which made the most of their knowledge of local terrain and limited firepower, the guerrilla military forces in southwestern Luzon were well suited to fighting a prolonged war. The guerrilla bands were virtually independent of each other, and Army operations against one column would have little effect on the guerrillas raised by neighboring villages. The small size of the regular bands made for strong unit cohesion and made maximum use of the limited number of rifles, while the columns could be expanded as long as the town officials remained loyal. Moreover, the guerrillas could quickly assemble, strike, and then disperse, secure in the knowledge that the local inhabitants, many of whom were relatives or friends, would deny all infor­ mation to the Army. Complementing the insurgent military forces was the most developed support system, or infrastructure, in all Luzon. Like the military system, it drew its strength from the municipalities. Just as the guerrilla bands were often raised and officered by municipal leaders, so the insurrectos civil ' governments also relied on local elites. Since most guerrilla forces were essentially town-based forces, their officers usually were well acquainted with local politics and could appoint sympathetic officials.34 if the area's guerrilla forces were commanded by an outsider he would usually summon a 257

Junta of prominent men and solicit their recommendations for tax-collec­ tors or draftees for the columns. Once the local civilian organization was established, it was allowed to function relatively independently as long as it produced supplies, information, and quarters for the guerrillas.^s The guerrilla infrastructure often paralleled American civil govern­ ment and even made use of the same officers. U.S. Army officers found that the local présidentes and town officials, outwardly friendly, were often commissioned fnsurrecto officers. The barrio chiefs, or tenientes, col­ lected taxes and turned them over to insurgent agents, thus occupying the same position in both revolutionary and American governments. Throughout southwestern Luzon the insurgents purposely integrated civil and military duties: "When a town was re-organized, it was done both in a military and civil manner, that is to say, a lieutenant of a barrio was a civil officer, but the head of the town was both the civil and military h e a d ." 3 6 One of the main functions of the infrastructure was to provide an "invisible government" which would exert control over the civilian popu­ lation. From the beginning the insurrecto leadership sought to control or influence municipal governments and to stop the Army from establishing a civil government that would recognize American occupation. Initially all cooperation with the Army was forbidden and any native official who served the Americans was subject to death. Army counter pressure, occasionally exerted through threats to destroy towns which failed to form governments, and the realization that control was more important than non-cooperation, led to a moderation of this initial policy. From mid-1900 on the guerrillas usually allowed town councils to form municipal governments under U.S. 258 authority provided they continued to give clandestine support to the guer­ rillas. Thereafter, town officials consulted or notified their local military commanders of their appointment and secured approval or replacements. In Tiaon and Candalaria, Tayabas, this was carried out to the extreme of having the insurgent commander meet with the principales to draw up a list of candidates who were then "elected" under the auspices of American civil government.38 Another key purposes of this infrastructure, or shadow government, was to support the guerrilla forces with food, money, and supplies. In 1901 Malvar ordered the establishment of a uniform tax system based on a mone­ tary head tax on all people, a ten per cent tax on the rice crop, and a tax on the churches. He also urged special taxes, such as having couples who wished to get married donate a rifle to the guerrillas. Many insurrecto chiefs instituted taxes in their areas or demanded additional supplies and services. Some collectors stated that they had been instructed to collect as much as thirty per cent of the rice harvest. In addition, the guerrillas relied greatly on donations and voluntary contributions from the principaifa , who could arrange emergency loans and supplies.^Q The guerrillas also collected money by fining collaborators, kidnapping people and holding them for ransom, issuing licenses to gambling establishments, and collecting road toils. These extra taxes were necessary sources of revenue because it is clear that many of the official taxes were not collected regularly, largely due to the poverty of the population. On the whole the insurgent tax collec­ tion system worked well; it was not until the reconcentration campaign that the insurrectos went short of food or supplies.^Q 259

The infrastructure also provided other vital support services for the insurrecto military forces. Guerrillas who were sick or being pursued by American forces were hidden or sheltered by civilians. Filipinos who lived in towns furnished valuable information to insurrecto forces on the size and destination of Army expeditions. Guerrilla spies and couriers often obtained information from unknowing Army personnel, in one case the post interpreter was an insurrecto who quickly informed the guerrillas of any collaborator's identity. In another instance the municipal police served as couriers for the guerrillas and informed them of Army movements."*) The strength of the guerrilla infrastructure lay in the support given the insurrectos by the native educated and landholding elite. In contrast to other areas of Luzon, where at least a segment of the native elite felt its interests best served by the Americans, most of the native elite in south­ western Luzon were strong backers of the guerrillas. As already indicated, this class provided most of the insurrecto officer corps and also the civil officials who subverted American political control. Insurgent tax returns show that the leading citizens in individual towns made substantial volun­ tary contributions in addition to their regular taxes. There is ample evidence to expand the conclusion of Glenn A. May to the rest of the 2nd District that "the primary impetus for the resistance [in Batangas] came from the elite and that without their active participation, there would have relatively little opposition to the American occupation.""^* The role of the clergy, the other influential class in southwestern Luzon, is much less clear. John Schumacher has suggested that it was "precisely the organized cooperation of the clergy that had much to do with 260 the fact that the guerrillas were able to hold out so long in the southern

Tagalog p r o v in c e s "‘^2 However, there is little documentary evidence to sug­ gest that the guerrillas enjoyed either the "organized cooperation" of the clergy or that the clergy were a major factor in the resistance. It is proba­ ble clerical resistance to the Americans reflected the clergy's own social position as members of the elite. As members of the "class [of].. .monied mainstays of the insurgents," it is reasonable to expect that the clergy would give the same amount of support to the guerrillas that other members of the provincial elite did. In the pungent words of Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane, "It is to the interest of the Priest and the rich to keep the black Tagals in utter ignorance, and thus prolong the war. With peace they must take lower seat&"43 As Schumacher has rightly pointed out, some clergymen did actively support the insurrectos with either physical, financial, or moral support. There were some clergymen who abandoned their parishes and served with the guerrillas in the field. Most conspicuous were the parish priests of Taal and Lemeri, who defied the orders of their Church superiors and fled with the statue of the Virgin of Caysasay, an object to which many Batanguehos attached considerable sacred powers.'^ Other priests contributed money to the insurrecto forces or hid guerrilla weapons and supplies.'^s During the operations of the 3rd Separate Brigade, several priests were arrested, in part due to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell's policy of insisting that all influential Filipinos either actively aid the Army or go to prison.'* Set against these hostile relations is an equal amount of evidence suggesting that clergymen and Army officers often cooperated and aided 261 each other. The padre at Sari ay a acted as a spy for the Americans "on the quiet," and was so successful in his deception that Malvar sought him out to request additional funds.")? According to Capt. John L. Jordan, the priests were happy to see American troops as the insurrectos persecuted them. Lt. Col. Rufino Revlova complained that the priest of Pila, Laguna, had "seduced" the population into supporting the Americans. Other priests acted as intermediaries in the surrender negotiations for insurrecto officers or convinced their townspeople to return to American held villages. When the 2nd Battalion, 39th U.5.V. Infantry, left Santo Pablo, Laguna, the padre presented them with a beautiful American flag and made a speech thanking them."® In turn,nd secured the release of parishoners or relatives who had run afoul of the Army authorities. The role of the Tagalog clergy was an ambiguous one. and there is sufficient contradictory evidence to challenge Schumacher’s assertions that as a class they were either organized or opposed to the Americans.")® In general, guerrilla warfare in the southern Tagalog region was essentially localized and controlled by the local provincial elite. Cailles and Malvar encouraged this localism by breaking up their own forces and ordering the establishment of columns in each town. They also took pains to insure that military and civil authorities would cooperate with each other and that neither could operate without the other's assistance. Since both military and civil leaders often came from the same town, they were acquainted with the local situation and could alter or adapt to local circumstances. This civil-military system, the most effective in Luzon, allowed the insurrectos to mount a sustained guerrilla war. 262

The Second District, Department of Southern Luzon went through many organizational changes in its short life. For the first months of occupation ini 900 the Army still maintained the organization it had used in the January invasion and officers reported to a confusing variety of expeditionary bri­ gades. The provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas were consolidated into the 2nd District on .April 10, 1900, ar.d placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton. Within a week Wheaton left to take command of the Department of Northern Luzon. He was replaced by Col. William E. Birkhimer, who was in turn replaced by Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall on June 28. Hall com­ manded the 2nd District until April 10 1901, when it was combined with the

1 S t District (Cavite province) and renamed the First District, DSL. Brig. Gen. James F. Wade took command of the DSL while Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sum­ ner was placed in command of the new 1st District. Shortly afterwards the provinces of Tayabas and Cavite were placed under civil government. Wade and Sumner were in turn replaced when the Department of Southern Luzon was made part of the Department of North Philippines in November 1901. Army units in the region were organized into the 3rd Separate Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. James F. Bell. Bell conducted active operations, culminating in the final insurrecto surrenders in April 1902.so Whether because of its constantly changing organizational structure, its rotating leadership, or simply the fact that it contained what William Taft called "the worst provinces in the archipelago," the 2nd District was not one of the better led regions in Luzon.si The Department of Southern Luzon's first commander, Maj. Gen. John C. Bates, was almost sixty and had served in the Civil War, several Indian campaigns, and in the Cuban 263 occupation. An able diplomat, he had negotiated a treaty with Mono leaders which kept them quiet for much of the Philippine War. Despite this varied civil and military experience, Bates was a poor departmental commander. There is no indication that he developed a strategy or counterinsurgency policies, nor that he gave encouragement to those provincial commanders who did. Moreover, as the soldiers in the neighboring 3rd District found. Bates was a poor administrator who was unable to obtain essential supplies and medicines. Bates may have been too conditioned by service in the small post-Civil War army to adapt to conditions in the Philippines.^^ Bates' lack of direction was not initially apparent because from May until June the district was in the capable, if authoritarian, hands of Col. William E. Birkhimer. An expert at military government, he was disliked by his fellow officers as "cold blooded and selfish" and "a damned old nasal- toned a s s ." 5 3 Birkhimer realized that pacification would be a long and complex process in which the Army had to pursue political as well as mil­ itary goals. In March he argued: "We must take care of the good and law abiding people who are now coming back and quieting down on their little farms all about, else we will lose that confidence in us that sound policy requires we should inspire and pursue."54 He advocated stern military measures against the guerrillas but tolerated no abuses in his area, viewing them as "inimical to the good interests of the United States in its efforts to establish friendly relations.'^s Realizing that pacification came about by "killing armed insurrectos and ladrones and showing all people by our armed presence everywhere, that we are masters of the country and intend to 264 remain so," Birkhimer was justifiably suspicious of the exaggerated claims and benevolent policies of Col. Cornelius Gardener in Tayabas province.^? Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall, who replaced Birkhimer in June, lacked both his predecessor's intelligence and drive and offered no corresponding vir­ tues to make up for this deficit. A pre-Civil War graduate of the U.S. Mili­ tary Academy, Hall remains both personally and strategically an enigma. He may have been physically incapable of active command since he was even­ tually replaced for medical reasons. His existing correspondence gives no indication of any strategic plans while his annual report is a simple chronology with appended reports. There is little documentary evidence to suggest that he developed any pacification strategy for his district or even thought to do so. He failed either to support his subordinates' policies or investigate his subordinates' claims, leaving Gardener to carve out a vir­ tually independent sub-district in Tayabas. Hall's apathetic leadership greatly increased the already large obstacles to Army pacification in the 2nd District.57 Under Bates and Hall were some 5,000 troops, making the 2nd District among the strongest districts in Luzon. Five U.S. Volunteer Regiments were stationed there: the 28th commanded by Col. William E. Birkhimer and sta­ tioned in southeast Batangas; the 30th under Col. Cornelius Gardener in Tayabas; the 37th under Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham in northwest Laguna and Tayabas; the 36th under Col. George S. Anderson in southwest Batangas; and the 39th under Col. Robert L. Bullard in north-central Batangas and eastern Laguna. With the exception of Cheatham, all the regimental commanders were professional officers and graduates of the U.5.M.A., and all had 265 extensive service. The company officers and soldiers contained many veterans of the National Guard and Spanish-American War, subjected to a rigorous selection process to insure they were physically and mentally prepared for the tropics.ss Initially, the Americans faced little resistance in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. The Army garrisons in southwestern Luzon experienced only desultory skirmishing, caused primarily by Army patrols intruding into insurrecto strongholds. Although there were some eleven engagements in February, 1900 there were only five in March and one in April. The inhabi­ tants of the towns, who had fled on the approach of the Americans, returned to their homes. In February, after returning from a ten day hike in which the only insurrectos he encountered threw down their guns and surren­ dered, Capt. John L. Jordan wrote that the war was virtually over except for some mopping up. Reflecting this belief, the Army turned its attention to establishing the municipal governments, sanitation projects, schools, police forces, and other paraphernalia of civil government.59 The brief attempt to implement municipal governments in the spring of 1900 revealed considerable problems which might have hindered development even had the insurrecto activity in the summer not made it impossible. Birkhimer believed that the civic organization established under G O. 40 and GO 43 was unnecessarily complicated and its conditions impossible to fulfill. A key problem was that if an officer strictly interpreted the orders, very few people met the necessary property qualifi­ cations to become electors. Only three men qualified in Pangil, Laguna, while at Siniloan twenty-three out of 5,000 inhabitants could be 266 enfranchised.60 Other officers found their towns destitute with no funds available to pay the taxes called for. Faced with a steadily worsening situation, garrison officers procrastinated, circumvented their instructions, or appointed town officials without elections. Lt. Arthur W. Orton simply "rounded up all the natives and required that they elect a Mayor and Vice- Presidente and City Council. Then [I] went back to Los Banos and let them run their own town. '^i A conspicuous exception to this general dislike of civil government was Col. Cornelius Gardener, commander of the 30th U.S.V. Infantry and de facto governor in Tayabas province. An ambitious martinet. Gardener was widely disliked for his willingness to condemn other officers while ignoring his own failings. An extremely vocal supporter of civil government, he put great pressure on his officers to implement it in their towns. Upon his entry in Tayabas, Gardener had pledged to establish civil government, and he set to work with a will to fulfill his promise. Early in his tenure he estab­ lished the practice of meeting with the leading citizens and town officials after church and discussing civic matters. To avoid potential restrictions, he directed that his officers use "considerable latitude" in allowing men to vote even i f they did not fulfill all qualifications.^^ Thereafter, he filed glowing, and often incorrect, reports about the development of government in Tayabas. In February 1901, Gardener wrote that "in my opinion the Prov­ ince is ripe for, and should have, civil government.. .as soon as practicable." Gardener received his wish; Tayabas was placed under civil government in

March and Gardener made its first governor.63 267

Gardener's optimism about civil government in Tayabas was due either to his great powers of self deception or his penchant for sending deliberately misleading reports. An examination of the post correspondence in Tayabas indicates that even with a provincial commander as committed to civil government as Gardener, it was almost impossible to establish working governments in the province. The case of Maj. Matthew F. Steele in Lucban is illustrative. In April, as Gardener ordered his officers to organ­ ize governments, Steele wrote to his wife that he did "not expect a single person to vote" and declared that civil government was impossible.^'’ De­ spite Gardener's ceaseless inquiries, Steele's grim predictions were born out, and he was never able to implement a satisfactory civil government in Lucban, An exasperated Gardener suggested that Steele follow Gardener's example at Sari ay a and lock all the principaHa in a room, refusing to let them out until they had formed a government. When Gardener decided in the fall that the town was ready for reorganization under G.O. 40, the electors responded by fleeing to Lucena. Steele eventually compelled one native to become présidente, but the man went to Manila and appealed to Bates, who informed Steele: "It is not the desire of the Department Commander that friendly natives should be placed in jeopardy by assuming office when we cannot assure them of immunity from those who are still antagonistic; such offices should be assumed voluntarily."65 It was not until January, nearly eight months after he had begun the process of civil government, that Steele was able to appoint a voluntary présidente. Despite Steele's problems. Gardener wrote in September that most of Tayabas' towns, including Lucban, could be given civil government under G.O. 40.^6 268

The Army's failure to implement effective civil government was reflected in the failure to organize armed native police. Bates, as his treat­ ment of the neighboring 3rd District indicates, grew progressively more hostile to the idea of an armed native police and obstructed their creation throughout his tenure.^? Hall also opposed any armed force among the Tagalogs and stated heonly put forth recommendations on their creation because of his superior's directives. Many soldiers serving in the district echoed these misgivings and throughout the war there were several officers who opposed any arming of native p o lic e .6 8 Those officers who supported native police were divided over what organization, armament, and authority they should have. Within the 39th Infantry, for example, Bullard wanted municipal police forces, while one of his battalion commanders opposed any police, and another favored a large provincial constabulary. Birkhimer supported a para-military Guardia C iv il and urged that officers begin training small groups immediately in preparation for the withdrawal of the U.S. Volunteer units. Lt. Col. Robert W. Leonard believed that a Guardia C iv il could prove influential in winning over the populace. Bates quashed these suggestions, however, by stating; "I do not favor a military organization of the natives. The services of an armed civil police could well be utilized, but they should not be armed with weapons which could be used against us in case they prove treacherous In Tayabas, Gardener pushed through the organization of police with the same fervor he had shown towards civil government. Much of Gardener's enthusiasm for native police was due to his mistaken belief that distur­ bances in Tayabas were due to Jadrones and that there were no guerrillas 269 in the province. In June 1900 he ordered police forces formed in the town of Tayabas and armed them with rifles issued by the 30th Infantry. He also urged that a special provincial police force be formed which would be paid by the U.S. Army and would operate throughout Tayabas. While he had less success in convincing his subordinates to form police forces, Gardener's organization of the Tayabas police was impressive.^o With the exception of Tayabas, few native police forces were organ­ ized in the 2nd District in 1900. A district-wide report in December revealed that most towns had very small, underpaid police forces that were armed with bolos and clubs while another report indicated that many towns in Laguna had no police force at all.^i In response to the departure of the volunteer regiments and MacArthur's December 29 orders that the formation of an armed police was regarded as "emergency work," there was some renewed effort to organized police. These efforts were hindered by the discovery that the Ordnance Department had no pistols or shotguns for distribution.'^^ Despite MacArthur's orders. Hall's investigations revealed that in February 1901 there was "a lack of uniformity of organization and pay in the existing force, as well as opinions of the commanders in the matter of the pay and armament of the proposed organizations.''^^ Opposed by the district's high command and lacking any unity of organization or policy, the organization of native police in the 2nd District was left to dedicated garrison commanders. Until the reorganization of the provinces in mid-1901 in preparation for civil government, the police were a negligible factor in Army pacification. 270

Second District officers had better luck in their efforts to imple­ ment social reforms in their areas. Many officers were strong supporters of education and worked hard to develop schools and secure supplies. A departmental circular requesting opinions on education showed that nearly all officers agreed on the necessity of education but there was little consensus over what type of schools to organize, their curriculum, and the role of the American government. Most officers, however, agreed with Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane in his assertion that "it is believed that the natives are very desirous to have good schools and that assistance in that particular will aid very materially to lessen opposition to our authority."?^ Gardener went even further, asserting that "it is education which lifts up a people," and urging the residents of Tayabas to send their children for schooling to the United S t a t e s .? ^ Owing to the efforts of committed Army officers, schools were established in many towns and children of all social classes were taught by native teachers or soldiers. This lack of class barriers and the American's refusal to tolerate religious instruction brought them into some conflict with the local elites and clergy, but officers believed that the schools were much appreciated by the Filipinos.76 In addition to education, individual officers tried to uplift the moral and sanitary standards of their garrison towns. Post officers restricted cock fighting and gambling and attempted to clear up social evils such as prostitution.'^^ Capt. William P. Burnham established a corvee in Paete, Laguna, to build and maintain roads and Gardener employed a similar system in Tayabas. insurrecto prisoners of war to clean up towns, while his officers published extensive sanitary regulations for the local 271

Filipinos78 Army doctors treated native sick and established houses where diseased people could be treated by Army doctors. Gardener sent his regimental doctor to all the barrios in his area to treat the sick for free, claiming "I am convinced that just mere pills will be more effective than bullets in undermining the insurgents lack of authority."^^ Although they were carried through with much commendable enthu­ siasm and occasional local successes, Army experiments in the 2nd District with non-military pacification were unsuccessful. While medicines, roads, and education might have been popular with the Filipinos, they were not sufficient to convince most of the natives to actively side with the Ameri­ can authorities. Gardener and a few other officers remained convinced that: "True loyalty and contentment can only come under a benign civil govern­ ment.The majority of officers, however, believed that until the guer­ rillas were defeated in the field, civil government and social reform was impossible. Many recognized that the enemy was not "the ignorant Tagalo who handled the knife," but rather the "persons of influence" who controlled his actions.81 At the same time, they were increasingly aware that the insurrectos were far from finished as an active enemy. The fragility of the Army's work in social reform and civil govern­ ment was demonstrated in the summer of 1900. With their military forces reorganized and their infrastructure established, guerrilla activity increased considerably. Hoping both to stop Army civil government and influence the presidential elections in the United States, the guerrillas began to launch harassing attacks on U.S. garrisons and patrols. Towns were fired into, supply wagons ambushed, and collaborators openly murdered. 272

After having just eleven engagements between March and May with one soldier killed and two wounded, 2nd District forces had fifty-four engagements between June and August with twelve soldiers killed and twenty-eight wounded.®^ Many officers perceived the increased guerrilla activity as a serious challenge to the American control of the 2nd District. In early June, Chea­ tham commented that there was "undoubtedly renewed activity among the insurgents, taxes are being collected and soldiers impressed, the towns that are not occupied by the Americans and were full of men a month ago are now practically deserted except for the women and children."®^ Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane noted this new guerrilla policy and its advantages for the Army when he commented that in Batangas, "the impression of Filipinos here is that the order is now to fight and that we may look for more activity from the insurgents. This will be but for us: the situation during the past two months was not natural."®*^ Others were worried about the guerrilla activity; Bullard wrote in his diary: "Hostilities almost resumed, so active have insurgents become," while Birkhimer believed, "we control within the line of our bayonets, but no further."®^ The guerrilla activity coincided with soaring sick lists that caused an almost critical manpower shortage in the 2nd District. As the summer rainy season broke in late May, Bullard's belief that southwestern Luzon was "an awful region of known contagious and tropical diseases" was borne out.®® The hardest hit units were the 37th, which had a sick report of twenty-five percent, and the 30th and 39th, which had sick reports of about 273

CHART 7

25 T

No.

Ja Fe Mr Ap My Jn Jy Au Sp Oc No De Month

Second District, DSL: Engagements 19008? thirty per cent for much of the summer. By fall over two hundred soldiers of the 30th had been evacuated to Manila and either placed in hospitals or sent back to the United States for early discharge. The sick reports of the 28th and 38th were about ten to fifteen per cent.88 Conditions were even worse than these figures indicate, because some towns had a disproportion­ ate number of sick. Paete, Laguna, had only thirty men fit for duty out of a strength of 101 in May. Company E, 30th Infantry at Tiaon, Tayabas, had only six fit men and many of the sick were standing guard duty.89 Medical care was often inadequate and in more isolated areas consisted of little more than doses of quinine. Due to a poor supply system, many of the sick were unable to get the special diets and supplies that were necessary for 274

CHARTS

30 T

Cas 15

0 |i" i ” 1 " I p Ja Fe Ma Ap My Jn Jy Au Sp Oc No De Months

Second District; US Casualties, 1900^0

recovery. The result was that men who were sick stayed sick, while healthy men soon broke down because of increased duty and lack of rest.®’ For the most part, insurrecto action was limited to ambushes, wire cutting, and sniping. Occasionally, however, the guerrillas concentrated their forces and launched a major attack on an Army supply train or post. At Taal, Batangas, the small garrison was attacked on July 6 by an estimated 400 guerrillas under Malvar. Although the commander, Lt. Col. Robert W. Leonard, had been warned of the attack by both the présidante and neigh­ boring officers, he apparently took no precautions. The Americans had six men wounded and the guerrillas were able to leave without pursuit. The garrison had some revenge a few days later, when it located a guerrilla concentration. Attacking with the aid of a gunboat, the soldiers killed thirty-eight insurrectos. Birkhimer noted, however, that the engagement 275 netted few lasting results and concluded bitterly; "We cannot destroy the rebels because that have concealed their arms and are the most obsequious of amigos."92 In an effort to prevent the guerrillas from concentrating large forces and overrunning isolated posts, the Army launched several attacks on suspected guerrilla strongholds. One of the most sought after targets was the headquarters of Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles. In late May and early June, Army expeditions moved into the area of northeastern Laguna near the Morong and Infanta borders. Cheatham surrounded and searched four towns as well as sweeping the country thoroughly, but found no insurgent cuartels. In August, however, a native guide showed the Americans the trail to Cailles' camp, which was defended by an estimated 100 insurrectos. The soldiers of the 37th Infantry and 11th Cavalry had a sharp fight before the guerril­ las fled, leaving five dead and eight rifles, as well as valuable p a p e r s . ^ 3 At Mavitac, Laguna, on September 17, American forces, forty soldiers of the 37th and ninety from the 15th Infantry, made a frontal attack on an esti­ mated 800 guerrillas under Cailles. Cheatham had proposed a flanking attack, with the inexperienced 15th, under Capt. David D. Mitchell, acting as a diversionary force. Instead, Mitchell who had spent less than than two days in the Philippines, abruptly changed this plan and sent his men across an exposed causeway flanked on either side by flooded rice paddies. The regulars were cut to pieces, and the Americans lost twenty-one killed and twenty-three wounded. MacArthur privately told Taft that had Mitchell not been killed he would have been court m artialed.^^ 276

To counter insurrecto activity, the Army forces relied on small unit actions and tactics that had been developed in the early months of the war. Birkhimer echoed the beliefs of many officers that the Army had to go on the offensive and avoid leaving its soldiers cooped up in garrisons. He stressed that when soldiers were in the field the populace was inclined to peace, when they were inactive the Filipinos became "insolent" and guerrilla activity flourished.^s Because the guerrillas refused to stand and fight, most Army offensive operations consisted chiefly of constant patrols and what became knows as roundups." Operating at night, an Army patrol would make a quick march, surround a barrio, and then conduct an intensive house- to-house search for weapons, supplies, suspected insurrectos, and corres­ pondence. Church records were examined to obtain a register of all the inhabitants, and this was then compared with the people found in the houses. The inhabitants were interrogated, often by a paid interpreter or former insurrecto, and suspects were carted away to jail. On occasions the popu­ lation of an entire city could be rounded up and hundreds of people interro­ gated or detained. Although the majority of roundups found no rifles or guerrillas, they kept the insurrectos constantly on the move, disrupted their infrastructure, and demonstrated that the Army had considerable pov/ers of harassment. As Birkhimer explained:

we do not know insurrectos and bad men from good ones, so we are often compelled to arrest all alike and bring them in here to be sorted out; in this way the good are temporarily inconven­ ienced, but only temporarily. But even this evil has its good side: the people find that the United States authorities are liable to overhaul them at any moment and it has a salutary, lasting effect.96 277

A far more serious tactic that became increasingly common was the retaliatory burning of the houses or property of suspected insurrectos and their sympathizers. The insurrectos commonly burned buildings as retaliation, and many Americans believed that burning the easily construc­ ted nipa-and-wood native houses did not really constitute serious property damage. Officially, only buildings used exclusively as rebel barracks were to be burned on operations, but these orders were often disregarded. By June 1900 it was common for soldiers to burn houses in the vicinity of where telegraph wires were cut, guerrilla supplies found, or troops were fired on. Indeed, burning was so common that the insurrecto leadership believed it was Army policy.^? Many serving officers accepted the burning of native houses as a legitimate form of retaliation. Birkhimer, who had vigorously protested the burning of a village in March justified the policy in June when Gardener made a similar protest.98 At its most extreme, this policy was articulated by Cheatham, who urged on one expedition against Cailles' headquarters, "My suggestion is to burn freely and kill every man who runs."99 other officers forbade any burning or insured that "destruction of property was.. .effected in such manner as to impress these people with the absolute knowledge that we wage war only on the rebels and their

military supplies." 100 Other pacification methods or policies were developed by individual commanders and used primarily to counter conditions in their area. Maj. George T. Langhorne offered to free prisoners if their families would turn in rifles. Company commanders mounted their troops or used them in conjunction with gunboats. In Tayabas, a picked force under Capt. Charles P. 278

Newberry served as a mobile column which went wherever guerrillas or Jadrones were reported. Operating in the "boondocks" for weeks at a time, they drew supplies and replacements from the other garrison towns.Sur­ prisingly, only a few officers advocated any form of restrictions on food and supplies. Col. George S. Anderson proposed the "thorough destruction of all stores that may serve as subsistence to the Insurgent A r m y . " ’ 02 in May 1900, Gardener ordered that all food in the barrios and small farms be brought into the municipalities and stored, allowing families to keep a small portion for personal use. Gardener's efforts were not duplicated in other areas, and there was no concentrated effort to cut the insurrectos' food supply in the summer of 1900.’03 The lack of central direction and the emphasis on local methods which was apparent in the development of tactics and policies in the 2nd District was also present in the Army's intelligence system. The exact effect of intelligence upon Army operations is not always clear, largely because officers were ordered to avoid written references that might implicate their sources. In April, Birkhimer recommended the establishment of a dis­ trict intelligence service, but the duties of this office were never clarified. From officers' complaints it is clear that it did not organize a central filing system of possible insurrecto sympathizers and there is little evidence in post records that it distributed military intelligence. Throughout 1900 most intelligence activities were handled at the company or regimental level, and while officers shared pertinent information with other units, there was no coordination of intelligence at the district l e v e l . ’ ^ 4 279

On the local level, the Americans developed intelligence services within the garrison towns which were often quite effective. Established in March, these offices relied on information from captured prisoners, guides, spies, informers, and interrogations. Rewards were offered for the capture of prominent guerrillas, though Bates turned down Hall's suggestion for a $ 1,000 price to any Filipino who could capture Cailles. In addition, local civic officials were expected to contribute information on guerrilla activ­ ities and were held responsible for insurrectos discovered in their area. Several présidentes placed the safety of their towns above other consid­ erations and gave the Americans warning of guerrilla attacks.ios The Army encountered substantial difficulties in obtaining accurate information in southwestern Luzon. The inability of Americans to speak Tagalog and the threat of insurrecto retaliation prevented most Filipinos from giving any information to Army patrols. Capt. John L. Jordan gave some indication of this problem, as well as an indirect hint at Army methods of obtaining information, when he commented:

we cannot use spies here as Americans are about twice as large as Filipinos, [a] different color and will never be able to learn their dialects. Not a native will under any circumstances give us any information about the insurgents not even if they are threatened with death or having their houses burned and they will always give notice of our a p p ro a c h . Officers also found that many natives had little concept of numerical strength and were prone to exaggerate, perhaps in order to increase the value of their information. As a result, commanders often received panicky messages of huge concentrations of insurrectos. Bullard passed on one such message with the caution that it should be read "for what it is worth, 280 which I believe is nothing, "lo? Nevertheless, the insurrectos were very worried about the growing effectiveness of Army intelligence and devoted much of their own efforts to identifying and removing native i n f o r m e r s . Closely related to the difficulties Army officers encountered in creating intelligence services were the problems they encountered in the formation of native scouts. In other regions of Luzon the Army was able to draw on ethnic, religious, or class divisions to recruit loyal native auxil­ iaries. In the 2nd District, however, the support of the influential classes for the guerrillas and fear of guerrilla retaliation, executed publicly and often atrociously, adversely affected the enlistment of native scouts. Moreover, neither Bates nor Hall supported the enlistment of armed native forces or did anything to encourage them. Many officers despaired of ever winning over the loyalty of the Tagalog population. One officer suggested that the Army use only a few Tagalog guides and recruit scouts among the Macabebes and other more loyal groups. So great was Army suspicion of the Tagalogs that supporters of native scouts believed it necessary to qualify their recommendations:

I have not full faith in the honesty or truth of any Tagalo even after enlistment in our service but the act of enlistment separates him from his people, and makes him a marked man, and apostates have always proven very zealous. And if not fighting for us these same people are naturally assisting our enemy Finally it is the old plan so often used to advantage of dividing the strength of the enemy and having them fight each other.'05 Given the doubts of most Army officers and the lack of recruits, it is not surprising that there were no native scout units or irregular forces raised 281 in the 2nd District. The Tagalog units that did appear in June 1901 were recruited in other provinces. The Army effort in the 2nd District in 1900 indicated an uneven balance. At the departmental and district levels there was a lack of cen­ tral planning and policy making, leaving much of the conduct of the war up to regimental and company commanders. With some exceptions, civil gov­ ernment, native police, and social reforms proved insufficient to win the hearts and minds of the people. Due to a mixture of fear and loyalty, the bulk of the population gave more heed to insurrecto directives than to the Army. Non-military pacification failed so miserably that almost no Filipi­ nos in the 2nd District took advantage of MacArthur's amnesty.' 'o On the other hand, there was some room for cautious optimism. Despite consid­ erable sickness, the Army had weathered a guerrilla offensive and had in some cases inflicted severe tactical defeats on the insurrectos. Army officers had developed and improved small unit tactics and established counter insurgency methods. Regimental and company intelligence services had been established and were often quite effective, giving the Army a valuable secret service of spies, informers, and guides. The last months of 1900 and early months of 1901 brought substan­ tial changes to the Army's pacification of southwestern Luzon. Many of these changes were caused by external events. The re-election of McKinley and the subsequent declaration of G.O. 100 led to a generally more severe policy throughout the Philippines. On Luzon, Filipino resistance in other areas was virtually eliminated by July 1901, allowing the Army to turn its full attention to the Tagalog heartland. Within the district there v/ere also 282

changes, not least of which was the consolidation of Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas and Cavite in April 1901 and the declaration of civil government in Tayabas and Cavite. The year saw increased and sometimes successful efforts to establish municipal governments and police forces and the organ­ ization of the Federal Party. These changes contributed substantially to a steadily worsening situation for the guerrilla forces, which was only partially alleviated by Malvar's assumption of supreme command. If 1901 was not the year of victory in the former 2nd District, it was a year in which the Army seized the initiative from the insurrectos . The Second District was in a far better position to benefit from MacArthur’s December 20 declaration and his implementation of General Orders No. 100 than other areas of Luzon. The conditions in the district closely approximated those that MacArthur described on December 20, with the insurgents being sustained largely through the aid of the civilian popu­ lation. MacArthur’s emphasis on the importance of breaking up the guerril­ las’ supply system and the role of the "prominent families" gave clear direction to district counterinsurgency. 6.0. 100 outlined the duties and responsibilities of the civilian population and called for strict penalties against guerrillas and their civilian abettors. Not surprisingly, officers felt that they now had a chance to crush guerrilla resistance under an "approved manner of conducting war."’ ’ ’ The 2nd District also benefitted from the end of resistance in the Department of Northern Luzon in June and the pacification of the 3rd District, DSL, in July. In the spring of 1901, Tayabas and Cavite were placed under civil government. This allowed the Army to build up forces in 283

Batangas and Laguna for continuous operations. Although the U.S. Volunteer regiments were withdrawn at the beginning of 1901, they were replaced by regular Army forces with little diminuation of actual strength. By mid- 1901 most of the 1st and 6th U.S. Cavalry, the 4th, 8th, 21st and 30th U.S. Infantry, and several coast artillery units were all active in Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. i '2 The consolidation of the 2nd District with the First District, DSL, in April brought more effective leadership to the newly formed 1st District, DSL. Maj. Gen. James F. Wade replaced Bates as departmental commander. Wade, a cavalryman who had served against the Apaches, possessed a much better understanding of the nature of Filipino guerrilla war than Bates. The ineffectual Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall was replaced by Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner, who had commanded the First District. While Sumner would later be criticized for his lack of vigor, he was an effective district commander. He secured the surrenders of many key insurrectos and continued both miltary and non-military policies to stabilize the region. If both men had a failing, it was in being unable to translate their understanding of the guerrilla war into effective counterinsurgency methods. The decision to grant civil government to Tayabas and Cavite left the Army free to concentrate on Laguna and Batangas, but had unfavorable consequences for pacification in southwestern Luzon. In Cavite the surren­ der of Trias and his forces appeared to end the guerrilla war. In Tayabas the few engagements (only nineteen from February, 1900 to January, 1901), the apparent success of civil government, and the fact that much of the western province was in the Bicol region contributed to the view that it did 284 not possess the same recalcitrant population as Batangas and Laguna. Gar­ dener, an enthusiastic supporter of Tayabas' civil government and the province's former military commander, took over as civil governor in March.' '3 Unfortunately, Tayabas was still far from pacified and the towns on the border functioned as a vital supply and rest stations for Mai van's tired insurrectos, Malvar himself lived in Tayabas for most of 1901. Gardener's arrogance and eccentric behavior led to poisionous relations with both civil and military authorities and prevented organized counter-guer­ rilla operations. The closing months of 1900 and the beginning of the new year saw a shift in the momentum of the guerrilla war. As the elections approached in the United States, the level of guerrilla and Army activity stayed quite high: there were ten engagements in September and eleven in October. There was continuous activity and some towns, such as Los Banos, were subject to sniping and attacks several times. However, in many areas American units had seized the initiative from the guerrillas and engagements were increa­ singly the result of Army patrols finding guerrilla bands. With the close of the monsoon the Army sick lists decreased and the better weather made expeditions easier. No longer confined by the weather and weak forces to the area around their garrisons. Army forces moved into the countryside, often sending expeditions into areas they had previously left alone.""' Army tactics in 1901 remained essentially those developed in 1900, but they were conducted with more expertise and experience. Roundups were both more thorough and more effective, while small patrols and large expeditions attempted to keep the insurrecto forces broken up and away 285 from the towns. Following the guidelines of MacArthur's proclamation, the Army directed more of its operations toward seeking out guerrilla centers and supplies, and destroying the guerrilla infrastructure. Officers noted that many of the guerrillas were deserting or wished to surrender, indicating the success of U.S. operations directed at guerrilla food supplies. While the Americans did score some conspicuous successes, such as the capture of Cailles' papers at his headquarters at Dugot-dugot, the guerrillas avoided large battles whenever possible. For the most part, engagements were confined to long range skirmishing in which the Army suffered few casualties but inflicted little physical damage on the insurrectos. These operations, while not spectacular, gradually forced the insurrectos back into southeastern Batangas and the border area Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas join.^'s The absence of a clear military target, the amigo tactics of the insurrectos, and the guerrilla's ability to blend in with the population led to an increasing blurring of the lines between civilian and military targets, leading to the continued practice of retaliatory burnings. Sumner listed insurrecto cuartels as legitimate targets for destruction and ordered: "In case troops are fired on from any barrio, it will be burned unless advisable to preserve it for our future use.""^ Sumner did attempt to stop the burning of crops and houses by soldiers, believing it "entails hardship and starvation on the peaceful inhabitants."’ However, he was willing to sanction retaliatory burnings against specific targets. When an American guide was murdered in the marketplace at Bauan and witnesses refused to give infor­ mation, Sumner authorized the burning of the marketplace. The soldiers. 286 furious at the death of their "mascot," burned fourteen houses and only stopped the fire when it it threatened their quarters.' 's Amnother aspect of this blurring of the lines between military and civilian targets was the use of excessive force, and occasionally torture, to secure information. Both personal reminiscences and insurrecto propa­ ganda suggest that the U.S. Volunteer units were well behaved and enjoyed relations with the few Filipinos they were able to make friends with. One volunteer officer, also a member of the regulars, summed up his attitude; "I have never burnt a house yet or cut a tree, or whipped a native or hung one, and I don't intend to. If we can't conquer these savages without resorting to Spanish methods, my notion is we had better quit these islands, and let them have them.""® The regulars who followed the volunteers were less well mannered. Perhaps as a result of the use of Macabebe scouts or ex­ guerrillas, there are clear indications that a few soldiers used torture to obtain information in 1901 and 1902. Some officers and men practiced the "water cure," or forcing of water down the victims throat, as a form of interrogation. Capt. Charles D. Rhodes, 6th Cavalry, sanctioned the use of the water cure by a former insurrecto officer to obtain information on the location of weapons. Pvt. Frederick Presher, 1 st Cavalry, helped administer the water cure, but seemed to believe it was harmless. An Army investi­ gation in 1902 concluded that the water cure was practiced, but that in "comparatively few instances is there evidence that a commissioned officer was present ."'20 The Army made serious efforts to improve the quality and organiza­ tion of its intelligence services. In late November, DSL headquarters sent 287

Hall sixteen photographs of Cailles and ordered that they be distributed throughout the department. Photographs of insurrecto leaders were thereafter sent to post commanders along with physical descriptions, habits, and known locations.'^) Captured insurrecto papers were exam­ ined and distributed with greater efficiency. On December 22, 1900, Amer­ ican forces captured the papers of Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias and obtained the names of all his commissioned officers. A list of these names, some 560 insurgent officers, were sent to post commanders in February, 1901, with orders to report on their whereabouts. The capture of Cailles' papers on April 26 provided vital information on his hide outs and supply service, and the information was put to immediate use. Sumner informed his garrison commanders of the exact number of rifles in their areas and he directed them to: "Arrest principal men of town and endeavor to make them produce them."'22 The increasing and effective use of spies and former insurgents caused the guerrillas to spend much of their time attempting to uncover potential in f o r m e r s . '23 These measures, while still not as complete as many officers wished, gave military intelligence in the 2nd District far better organization and direction. In addition to these military measures, the Army continued to work at non-military pacification measures such as civil government and native police forces. While Sumner and Wade do not appear to have encouraged civil government, many garrison officers organized municipal governments along G.O. 40 or 43. In several towns the Americans were able to establish governments that were loyal, effective, and gave some support against the insurgents, in Majayjay and Pila the population were reportedly receptive to 288

American organization and the présidentes very helpful. In Santo Antonio, Laguna, Faustino Lafrades captured five rifles from the guerrillas and in other towns the population showed great enthusiasm for U.S. government.’24 The guerrillas attempted, and often succeeded, in subverting these by having their own nominees appointed to the U.S.-backed governments or by execu­ ting pro-American présidentes .’25 officers also learned that the creation of civil government did not necessarily allow them to divest themselves of their political responsibilities. In one town a battle between political fac­ tions virtually paralyzed civil government while in other areas the new présidentes seemed to delight in controversy.’26 Despite the revelation of new shadow governments in supposedly pacified towns and the problems of local politics, civil government made great strides in Batangas and Laguna. In 1900 the district's towns had been almost impossible to organize, now there were towns that were recognizably loyal and the Army would soon be able turn its full attention on the recalcitrant towns control­ led by the guerrilla infrastructure. A related area in which the Army made steady improvements was the organization of native police. In part this was a response to pressure from headquarters in Manila, which in December 1900 declared that the estab­ lishment of native police was an "emergency measure" and that police would be compensated from insular funds. Further pressure was placed on post commanders in May by a divisional directive which ordered them to report on the weapons, pay, uniforms, and status of their police forces. ’27 As a result, many officers began to devote serious, if unwilling, attention to establishing municipal police. Although the new departmental commander. 289

Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chafeee, wanted the police armed only with pistols or shortguns, shortages in the Ordnance Department threw the burden of arming the police on individual officers. Lt. Trader Norman, the commander of Majayjay, felt that no Tagalogs should be armed, but he followed orders and organized a twenty-two man municipal police force and gave pistols to its officers and NCO's. In Pangil, the présidente purchased five revolvers with the commanders blessing and gave them to the police. In Bauan the native police, armed with weapons borrowed from the infantry garrison, were responsible for more arrests than the soldiers. Another aspect of the success of native police was the formation of volunteer vigilance commit­

tees which helped patrol the barrios and enforce municipal o r d n a n c e s . On the whole, Wade's comment that "our experience in the use of natives for police work has not been entirely satisfactory" was an apt description of the American effort to create loyal police. Norman, for example, learned that his Chief of Police had collaborated with Pedro Cabal les to arrange the kidnapping of two policemen. Lt, Charles B. Russell found that all the police at Bay, Laguna were former insurrectos and the police chief was their former commander. Lt. Patrick A. Connoly had to disarm the police in San José when they failed to arrest ladrones. Con- noly's experience, however, is indicative of the new approach Army officers took toward the police in 1901. He immediately began restructuring and arming a new town police forcejzo The first representatives of the Federal Party appeared in the 2nd District in February and March. Several of these were former guerrilla commanders who had close personal relations with both the local elite and 290 the insurrecto leadership. With Army permission, they were authorized to organize chapters of the Federal Party in the towns and open negotiations with the insurrectos. While Federal Party negotiators did not secure the surrender of Cailles and Malvar, they did achieve the surrender of the forces of Col. Cipriano Calao and Col. Gregorio Katibac. Army officers were also impressed with the capable manner in which Party members were able to win over the populace in previously hostile towns.^^o The guerrillas viewed the organization of the Federal Party as a serious threat and tried to prevent its organization and kill its leaders. A Federaiista was among the five "traitors" executed at Sampaloc by Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles in April. In Laguna, Lt. Col. Pedro Cabal les authorized the arrest and death of all Federal Party members and shortly afterwards re­ quested permission to burn towns where a chapter had been organized. Lt. Col. Emilio Zurbano also authorized the immediate execution of all members of the party and the destruction of any pueblo which supported them. Not surprisingly, Leon Joaquin, a Federaiista, felt "that his personal safety will only be assured by the immediate presence of American troops wherever he g o e s ."’ 3 i Americans saw other signs of more popular support and an increasing split between the populace and the guerrillas. Mariano Lopez, a prominent Batangueno, worked to convince guerrillas to surrender even though his brother served as an insurrecto officer. The town of Magdalena, Laguna, was reported as very friendly with several inhabitants assisting the Army to bring about the surrender of local guerrilla bands. There were instances of formerly loyal insurrectos breaking with their comrades and joining 291 the Americans. Esteban Reyes, the guerrillas' shadow présidente of Pagsanjan, and his police force took their rifles under pretext of cutting telegraph wires and deserted to the Americans. Caballes complained that all the influential people in Pagsanjan had gone over to the Americans and requested that the town be burned. This was an especially bitter pill for Cailles, as he had previously praised the présidente and town of Pagsanjan for their revolutionary sentiments. Indicative of the seriousness of Filipino defections is Cailles' attempt in April to win them back by assuring présidentes they would not be killed after Philippine independence. This is in sharp contrast to his December proclamation in which he gave all those who worked for the Americans thirty days to present themselves or they would be k ille d .1 3 2 For the guerrillas, the fall of 1900 and the beginning of 1901 were a period of both military and psychological setbacks. Despite their denials, the re-election of McKinley was a blow to guerrilla hopes. Juan Cailles attempted to soften the impact of both the election and MacArthur's proc­ lamation by arguing that the U.S. Army had to withdraw the volunteer regiments and could put no more than 20,000 men in the f i e l d . ’33 The greatest blow to revolutionary hopes, however, occurred outside of the 2nd District. After extensive negotiations the commander of southern Luzon, Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias surrendered with most of his forces on March 15. Trias' surrender was followed a few days later by the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo. Both these nationalist leaders believed that continued resistance was futile and Trias wrote to Malvar requesting he surrender. Aguinaldo subsequently 292 issued on April 19 a proclamation "To the Filipino People" declaring his acceptance of U.S. sovereignty.i34 The surrenders of Aguinaldo and Trias forced the insurrectos in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas to develop a new rationale to justify their continued resistance. According to Lt. Col. Noberto Mayo, the insurrecto forces in the 2nd District were ready to follow Trias and surrender but awaited a decision from Malvar. Since Cailles and Malvar had been acting as virtually independent provincial warlords sincethe American invasion, they were not dependent on Trias or Aguinaldo. Certainly there is no evidence that they considered surrendering. On April 4, 1901, Malvar wrote to Cailles requesting a meeting of all the surviving insurrecto chiefs and vowing to continue fighting until the Americans were worn down by "esta guerra intermiable."'3S on April 12 Malvar issued his proclamation to "Brothers and Companions in the Strife," in which he announced he was suc­ ceeding Trias as commander in southern Luzon. While modestly denigrating his own talents, Malvar stated that his assumption of authority was neces­ sary to prevent the independence movement from collapsing. He also made a direct popular appeal for more mass support, claiming that lack of education and social status would not be a hindrance to patriots. On July 13 he declared himself commander-in-chief of all forces in the Philippines and urged all Filipinos to take up arms against the Americans.’^fi Malvar moved quickly both to consolidate his own position and to organize resistance in southwestern Luzon along more efficient lines. He wrote to guerrilla leaders in other areas notifying them of his assumption of command, though he made no effort to direct guerrilla operations outside 293 of his stronghold.’^? He publicized his new authority and his decision to fight in open letters to Trias and Aguinaldo, claiming that he did so only to prevent the guerrilla forces from demoralization. On April 28 he made a thorough military reorganization of southern Luzon, establishing a draft of one man for each 100 inhabitants, fixing taxes on every citizen, creating a reserve, and offering to commission private citizens who recruited and armed their own forces. He ordered that guerrillas were to fight only from ambush and regulated the composition and conduct of guerrilla bands’38 Malvar's decision in effect confirmed the regional emphasis of the Philippine guerrilla war. From his headquarters at Camplonga, Tayabas, near the Batangas and Laguna borders, Malvar provided organizational leadership and a steady stream or orders and resumes governing the military forces in southwestern Luzon. Malvar believed that his policies were carried out throughout southern Luzon, but his provincial and zone commanders appear to have operated relatively independently. Indeed, despite his later claims, some of Malvar's orders show that he was either using them for propaganda purposes or was out of touch with actual conditions in the field. It is doubtful, for example, whether any guerrilla chief in late 1901 had the time to oversee the vaccination of all the children in his area or hire a doctor to inspect all his troops. Moreover, Malvar's later vagueness about specific details in his area indicates his distance from the guerrilla forces.’^Q Malvar and Cailles made a major effort to reorganize the guerrilla organization for a more effective prosecution of the war in Tayabas prov­ ince. Tayabas had always been the weak sister among the three provinces; lacking a strong provincial leader, it had been commanded by a Batangueno, 294

Col. Eustacio Maloles, who was Malvar's brother-in-law. In 1900, Maloles exercised little control over his subordinates and was more an organizer than a field commander. Lt. Col. Emilio Zurbano claimed he was the politi­ cal-military chief of the province in August 1900. Col. Buenaventura Dimaguila considered himself under the authority of Trias, while Col.

Marcel 0 Rada operated independently. This divided and fragmented lead­ ership made guerrilla military resistance in Tayabas very weak and gave Gardener, the provincial commander, the false idea that Tayabas was clear of insurrectos. in January i 901 Malvar uivided the province into three zones under Colonels Mariano Castillo in the west, and Dimaguila and Emilio Zurbano in the notheast and southeast. In April Juan Cailles moved part of the Laguna Brigade into north Tayabas where it was joined by Zurbano's forces at Sam­ paloc. The insurgents took over the town and held it for three days, holding a dance and executing five Filipinos for various offenses. Cailles declared Zurbano the new commander of eastern Tayabas and swore that the Laguna forces would aid Tayabas. This organization appears to have only caused more factionalism. Rada apparently retired, Maloles and Dimaguila surren­ dered shortly afterward, and Zurbano surrendered in July. The guerrillas in Tayabas remained disorganized and fragmented. The insurgent strength in the province lay in its civil infrastructure, not its military forces. The surrenders of Maloles, Dimaguila, and Zurbano are indicative of both the exhaustion of the guerrillas and the increasing willingness of insurrecto officers to come to terms with the Americans. While there had been virtually no surrenders among the top guerrilla leadership in 1900, 295 there were several in 1901. According to Lt. Col. Bernardo Marques, "they surrendered for various things; some because they tired of staying in the field; some through fear and because they lost hope; because some of them had been injured or lost their health through life in the field and some because their families obliged them to surrender."’"'' Dimaguila surrendered because of a feud with Cailles, to release his uncle from a jail, and because newspapers had reported he was negotiating, thus putting him in jeopardy with other insurrectos. Zurbano surrendered "because he saw the scanti­ ness of our resources and believed further resistance would be useless."'"*2 The most important surrender was that of Juan Cailles on June 24, 1901. Cailles' surrender was probably as much a surprise to the Army as it was to the insurrectos. On April 15 he had issued a strong proclamation asserting that he would never surrender. Eleven days later, however, an Army expedition had captured most of his papers, compromising the entire guerrilla infrastructure in Laguna. Cailles may also have been affected by the capture of his personal secretary, who wrote him a letter requesting his surrender and enclosing a copy of Aguinaldo's proclamation. Newspaper reports that he was negotiating may have influenced his decision as well. In early June, Cailles sent a trusted subordinate and probably secured a blanket pardon for himself. Shortly after, he surrendered at Santa Cruz with some 100 officers, 500 men, 140 civilian officials, and 400 rifles. Cailles was viewed as the most dangerous of the insurrectos and Mac Arthur believed his surrender was, "very Important, as it is most probable pacification [of] all southern Luzon will follow quickly."'"'^ 296

While the surrender of Cailles and other officers was indeed "very important," it did not lead to the immediate pacification of the area. The guerrilla organization, as the surrender of Trias had indicated, was too informal, personalized, and localized for one commander to control. Some of Cailles* subordinates, particularly Col. Martin Cabrera, refused to accept the surrender terms and remained in the field with Malvar. In Tayabas, owing to Malvar's efforts at reorganization in the summer of 1901, the surrender of Maloles and Zurbano seems to have simply moved subordinate commanders up a notch. In mid-1901, guerrilla warfare in southwestern Luzon had become so localized that many insurrectos had little contact with anyone outside of their immediate area. ^^4 By early fall 1901 the insurrectos had settled on a very low level of insurgency. Many of the guerrillas had gone back to the villages, hiding their weapons and becoming civilians again. Yet if the guerrillas were not militarily challenging the Americans, they were continuing to maintain their hold on the populations' loyalty. Taxes were still collected, shadow governments still governed, and assassinations still occurred in Army- occupied towns. Malvar's small guerrilla bands, some 500 or 600 regulars, moved constantly and seldom concentrated, but they obtained food quite easily from secret cuarte/s in the mountains and from sympathetic vil­ lages. With some 3,500 rifles hidden and strict injunctions against wasting ammunition, Malvar was convinced he could hold out for another ten years. Sumner believed that Malvar could not "concentrate a force of any magnitude or hold the men together for any time, nor is he likely to risk any general engagement with our troops, his policy is one of negative opposition as far 297 as our Government is concerned, and a reign of terror as far as the natives." ^^5

Within the Army there was a growing feeling of frustration with the situation in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. The rest of the archipelago, with the exception of Samar, was quiet, Aguinaldo had been captured, and Malvar's stubborn resistance the only thing which prevented the Army from total victory in the Philippines. Although officers could see that great strides had been made, they were aggravated by the continued presence of insurrecto bands, the presence of guerrilla sympathizers in the garrison towns, and the ability of the Insurgents to strike at americanistas Maj. Frederick K. Ward concluded that "continuance of such operations as we are able for now, will accomplish nothing more than an actual encouragement of the insurrectos, for they do not not wish to fight and they look upon their ability to remain in the country and avoid us as a substantial success." In Manila, civil and military leaders had decided that neither Sumner nor Wade was capable of ending the war in Batangas. Taft reported: "General Wade is incompetent and General Sumner under him is not very much better " while Chaffee, who succeeded MacArthur in June, complained that Sumner lacked vigor and "has accomplished nothing with Malvar of consequence." For Chaffee, already under pressure from the Balangiga massacre in Samar and receiving reports of possible trouble in the north, the "standstill" in Batangas was intolerable and demanded a quick resolution. The November reorganization of Army forces into Separate Brigades gave Chaffee an opportunity to abolish Wade's position and place Brig. Gen. 298

CHART 9

No. 20

Ja FenrApKyJnJyAuS|>OcNoOeJaFel1rAp Months

Second District, DSL: Engagements 1901-2*^

J. Franklin Bell In command of the newly created 3rd Separate Brigade [356]. Bell had already proven himself as both a fighter and a district commander and was acceptable to both civil and military authorities. The newly formed brigade comprised most of the provinces around Laguna de Bay: Rizal, Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas as well as the large islands of Min­ doro and Marandique and some smaller island groups. Bell was assigned 7,622 soldiers and 660 native troops from the the 1st and 6th U.S. Cavalry and 2nd, 8th, 20th, 21st, 28th, and 30th U.S. Infantry as well as Macabebe, llocano, and Tagalog Native Scout companies. In addition. Bell brought with him a staff of junior officers familiar with his methods.’^ 299

Bell's pacification policy was designed not only to defeat the insur­ gent military forces, but to root out the infrastructure and prevent any resurgence of guerrilla activity. He believed that "the insurrection in this brigade continues because the greater part of the people, especially the wealthy ones, pretend to desire but in reality do not want peace."'so Bell therefore structured a pacification campaign which was designed to: "make the existing state of war and martial law so inconvenient and unprofitable to the people that they will earnestly desire and work for the reestablish­ ment of peace and civil government, and for the purpose of throwing the burden of the war upon the disloyal element."’5i in his military policies. Bell stressed that while surrenders were important, the "primary and most important object of all our operations in this brigade is to obtain posses­ sion of the arms now in the hands of the insurgents."<52 The capture of arms would not only cripple the active insurrectos, but also prevent the hun­ dreds of amigos now posing as civilians from resuming guerrilla warfare. The new brigade commander also sought to break up the insurgent civil organization by measures designed to pressure influential natives and municipal officials into supporting the Army. He believed "the common peo­ ple amount to nothing. They are merely densely ignorant tools, who blindly follow the lead of the principales."<53 Bell struck at the key figures of influence and authority in the community, the priests, principalia , and civil officials. Just as the guerrillas had utilized selective terrorism to insure compliance. Bell used selective retaliation for the same ends. The native elite were held responsible for the behavior of their townspeople and subject to punishment for any infractions. They could be arrested and held 300 for trial not only for their own actions, but for the actions of insurrectos in their area. If an americanista was assassinated and they failed to identify the killers, they could be executed, though in fact none were. If a telegraph wire was cut, their houses were to be singled out for burning. In addition, they were subject to numerous humiliating measures. The only "acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments of either indi­ viduals or town councils should be such acts publicly performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of the Americans by arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgent element."’^4 In order to "make the people want peace, and want it badly," Bell implemented measures which ranged from severe to mildly harassing. The ports of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas were closed, trade or travel on the public roads prohibited, and the payment of rents on Army buildings suspen­ ded. Troops in the field could impress transportation and bearers without payment. Bell also reinstituted the Spanish fifteen day requirement for public works and required the rich to pay a fine to avoid working. He disarmed the native police and cut off the extra pay they received from insular funds, often the majority of their salaries, unless they aided the Army. Guerrilla officers were to be allowed only unconditional surrender and allowed to surrender only when they surrendered with their men and weapons or gave information. Captured guerrillas were to be tried before the provost marshals and could only lighten their sentences by offering valuable information, serving as guides, or securing the surrender of other guerrillas and their arms.’S5 301

The most controversial policy that Bell implemented was that of con­ centrating the populace into protected zones. While concentration was a radical step, it had been attempted previously on a limited scale in some areas of Luzon. Bell had concentrated a few villages during the Abra cam­ paign of 1901, the population of Marinduque Island had been briefly concen­ trated, and the town of Bauan, Batangas, had voluntarily concentrated Its outlying barrios in November. Sumner had toyed with the idea but believed that terrain and the number of inhabitants "precludes the possibility of inaugurating any system of concentration or any thorough control of the food supply."’56 Bell announced the implementation of concentration in Tele­ graphic Circular No. 2 on December 8, authorizing post commanders to establish a zone in each town where inhabitants from "sparsely settled and outlying barrios" could be quartered. He allowed them until December 25 to bring in all their animals, rice, and possessions, and urged commanders to help them as much as possible. After that period all property, livestock, and food found outside the zones was subject to confiscation.’57 Concentration was an effective counterinsurgency policy, but it exacted a high cost in human suffering. The actual process of concentration proceeded smoothly, and by December 20 most civilian Filipinos were restricted to the zones. Bell made earnest attempts to insure that the populace was sufficiently fed and instituted a program to vaccinate every person in the zones. He directed that the utmost care be taken to insure a plentiful supply of food and Instructed his commanders to build storehouses, establish fair food prices, and prevent hoarding and speculation. Bell also 302

CHART 10

12

10

8 ■ KIA 6 ■ WIA 4

2

0 J FMAMJJASONDJ F M A MonUi

Second District. DSL: U.S. Casualties. 1901 established a program whereby men could labor on public works projects and be paid In rice. The Army shipped a large quantity of rice to southwestern Luzon, and this was either sold at cheap prices or given to the destitute. Bell ordered that the populations within the towns be vaccinated, and an estimated 300,000 Filipinos were vaccinated In two months. Col. Arthur L. Wagner, who visited two camps, was convinced that they were healthy and not overcrowded. Despite Bell's efforts and Wagner's optimism, however, concentration took "a substantial toll" In Filipino lives. Lack of food, poor sanitary conditions, and demoralization may have made the population susceptible to the cholera epidemic of 1902.’59 303

In practice, concentration was accomplished relatively easily, though commanding officers often altered or improvised their instructions. Towns of recognized loyalty, such as Nasugbu, Batangas, were given special privi- ledges. In Paete, Laguna, for example, the commander reported that there had been no insurrecto activity for ten months and that with only 100 men he could not possibly enforce the concentration orders. He allowed the inhabitants work in the hemp fields and only required them to come into the village at night. In other cases, officers used the threat of further recon­ centration to force présidentes to turn over hidden r if le s . i6 0 While concentration represented a unique policy developed by Bell, many of his other policies were simply more effective variations of previ­ ous policies. Throughout the 3rd Separate Brigade, the Army was aided by an effective and centralized intelligence service. The Manila-based Office of Military Information under Capt. Ralph Van Deman synthesized reports, analyzed captured documents, and provided pictures and descriptions of known insurrectos . Intelligence at the district and brigade level bene­ fited from the work of Sumner, who had urged that a Bureau of Information be established in Batangas and Laguna which would coordinate and disseminate information to post commanders. This bureau was established on September 23,1901, and it functioned primarily as a clearing house, collecting and passing on information to those commanders whom it could serve. The brigade also benefited from GO. 294 of September 28. This long overdue order designated a post intelligence officer charged with collect­ ing information on the surrounding terrain, disposition of the inhabitants, and guerrilla bands. These officers were soon providing Manila with a 304

Information on the situation in each province and town as well as much needed local tactical intelligence for quick raids and roundups With the population reconcentrated and an effective intelligence system established, the Army was free to embark on military operations against the insurrectos . The most extensive operations were in the Loboo Mountains which ran roughly south of a line from Batangas City to San Juan de Boc Boc. Army officers were aware that these mountains had served as a secure retreat for insurrecto forces since the Army occupation. When expeditions could penetrate the area, they found it teeming with guerrillas and full of supplies. One expedition in November 1901 destroyed over 50,000 lbs. of palay in two days. However, the rugged terrain, poor trails, and problems of supply effectively prevented sustained operations: one expedition in June 1901 had less than half its members complete the march. Sumner, whose operations forced Malvar back into this area, concluded "Malvar can live indefinitely in this stronghold surrounded by enough followers to make a show of government. And unless his supplies are interrupted and the people made to feel the danger and hardships of his presence, they will probably acquiesce in the control assumed by him ."’62 Army operations in the Loboo Mountains under the 3rd Separate Bri­ gade were directed at running down the guerrilla bands and destroying their supplies and crops. With the exception of a few sharp skirmishes, the guer­ rillas made little attempt to defend their storehouse and Army casualties were low. in December, Lt. Edgar Conley and a scout detachment made a thorough reconnaissance of the area, travelling at night, keeping their movements secret, and locating and occasionally destroying supplies. 305

Armed with the information from Conley’s scout, an expedition under Col. Almond B. Wells formed a cordon from Batangas City to Taysan and then swept into the mountains. The soldiers travelled light, their food and sup­ plies carried by impressed Filipinos. In one week’s operations they confis­ cated or destroyed an estimated 1,000,000 tons of rice and palay, 6,000 houses, 200 carabao, 680 horses, and 600 cattle and killed nine insurgents. American forces went back again in mid-January with orders from Bell to take all available forces, impress native guides, and conduct operations ’having for a common object the complete clearing out of every vestige of animal life and every particle of food supply found within the region embra­ ced by lines connecting San Juan, Taisan [sic], Loboo, and the sea.”i^ Amer­ ican expeditions and patrols continued to operate in the mountains until mid-January, and thereafter constantly kept patrols in the area. By March the Americans were receiving aid from many of the former Loboo guerrillas and patrols were finding only a few discouraged civilians. The guerrillas had lost their major sanctuary at the same time the Army was working to cut off any other sources of supply.i^ Other Army operations were also aimed at the destruction or confis­ cation of food supplies. These operations were intended not only to destroy guerrilla stores but also to provide food to the reconcentrated towns. Officers in the field tried to send the food back into the towns, but the insurgent cuartels were often located on mountains or in jungles far from any reconcentrated town. Wells made great efforts to get as much rice as possible into the towns, but in his operations between March 23 and April 1 he still destroyed 180,000 lbs. of palay and 60,000 lbs. of corn. Other 306 commanders seem to have used property destruction as standard operating procedure on their patrols. Frederick Presher described one such raid on the barrio of Alitactac in reprisal for insurrecto disturbances: "All small barrios and isolated shacks were burned, all live stock rounded up or de­ stroyed, bannana [sic] and orange groves and growing crops destroyed. Several square miles of territory were laid to waste."Similarly, Lt. Samuel W. Widdifield conducted a scout near Cuenca, Batangas, "burning everything capable of housing an hombre in sight." The Army was aided on these operations by increasing numbers of Filipinos who for a variety of reasons were now willing to aid the Ameri­ cans openly. Some of these new allies were poor men attracted by the $30 reward for each rifle and the $5 and $10 rewards paid on insurrecto officers. Others were native policemen who wished their insular pay re­ stored. The Army was also helped by villagers tired of insurgent exactions and determined to prevent Army retaliation.’^7 Significantly, however, much of the American support came from the native elite, who abandoned their adherence to the guerrillas in the face of Bell's pressure. It was the "prominent hombres" and “leading citizens" of Bauan who sacked the neigh­ boring towns of San Luis and Balagbag, not the Army troops who accom­ panied them.’^ One of the most active supporters was Juan Cailles, who helped organize a unit of several hundred voiuntarios which accompanied Army forces on expeditions in Laguna. According to Malvar, the fact that the “people" were now actively searching for him was a major factor influencing his decision to s u rre n d e r . 307

Bell's policies also forced many former insurrectos to aid the Army with information and to serve as guides. The testimony of captured officers, perhaps threatened with provost court prosecution, helped Army operations in the field while at the same time compromising the insurgent civil organization. Colonels Anastasio Marasigan, Augustin Dimaguya, and Briccio Laqui were required to make up lists of all their rifles and account for every officer in their command. In one case, a surrendered officer revealed that another former guerrilla officer possessed maps of all the guerrilla cuartels and hiding p la c e s .^ 7 o With concentration effectively removing the ocean that the guerrilla fish swam in and military operations forcing the guerrillas into smaller and smaller pockets, the Army turned its attention against the insurrectos ' civil organization. Bell's chief instruments against the infrastructure were the brigade and post provost courts. These operated in Batangas and Laguna and could also raid into Tayabas and Cavite to arrest guerrilla officers who were hiding there. Allowed considerable leeway in their procedures, the provost courts could try civilians and assess penalties of two years in prison or $ 1.000 in fines. As such they were well suited for punishing all Filipinos suspected of supporting the insurrectos . Bell insured that the courts would be an effective arm by appointing six brigade provosts officers who had served with him in northwestern Luzon. Among these were Capt. Daniel H. Boughton, who had broken up Aglipay's guerrillas in the Batac- Paoay area, and Capt. William T. Johnston who had been a key figure in the

Union counterinsurgency campaign.’7i 308

Johnston's experiences give an indication of how the 3rd Separate Brigade's provost marshals operated. After reporting to Bell in January he was sent to Lipa, Batangas, described by Bell as “the worst town in the bri­ gade." His investigations soon proved “that all of the influential people in that town had been all the time actively engaged in assisting and prolonging the insurrection." Johnston arrested 172 inhabitants implicated as collec­ tors, releasing one for every two rifles surrendered, and promising to release more if the two local insurrecto bands surrendered. He also required the principalia to write a letter repudiating the insurrectos and promising to remain loyal, a document which was then sent to Manila and given considerable publicity as a “spontaneous action." Not satisfied with written promises, he formed a sixty man unit of “volunteers" which he armed with captured guns and used as guides. Having completed the purging of Lipa in two weeks, he was sent on to the second worst town, Tiaon,

Tayabas, where he performed a second and more publicized c le a n u p . *72 Where the brigade's provost marshals did not go, local post comman­ ders instituted similar measures. Bell's policies were clearly designed to punish the influential Filipinos, and Army officers had a hard time restrain­ ing their enthusiasm for this task. There is ample testimony that many officers followed the example of the commanding officer in Pagsanjan, "who arrested all rich people believing that they supported the insurgents on the outside."*73 Nevertheless, they were effective in their central task; to put intolerable pressure upon the native elites who supported the guerrillas. Faced with the loss of their financial and social prestige, most civil 309 officials and principalia had to come to a rapid accomodation with American authority. Both provost marshals and post commanders were greatly aided by their ability to deport undesirable individuals from their villages. Convic­ ted or suspected civil officials and principales were placed in local jails or sent to Malagi Prison, located on a rocky and desolate island. On Malagi the prisoners were subject to stringent prison regulations. Their funds above fifty pesos were confiscated, they were required to wear a brass identification number, and forced to work in a rock quarry. The principalia were made responsible for the behavior of the other prisoners. By the end of March there were 501 prisoners, many of them in rags from the rough work demanded of them. ’^4 The cumulative effect on the insurrectos of Bell's campaign was devastating. An Army communiqué in March described Malvar as unable to give an order or exercise command in two months, out of contact with most of the guerrilla bands, and spending most of his time simply h id in g . *^5 Mal­ var s forces were in worse shape than their commander: harried, dispersed, hungry and facing pressure not only from the Army, but from the formerly loyal populace as well. Within a month of the brigade's operations, surren­ ders were common. In January most of the insurgents in western Batangas surrendered with Marasigan at Taal. Many of the surrendered guerrillas gave testimony to the effectiveness of Bell's measures and their own demora­ lization. Maj. Jacinto Amoranto surrendered sixty-six rifles at Binan and his men confessed to "being entirely out of their chief article of food, rice."'76 In some units there was a complete breakdown and open mutiny: 310

Lt. Col. Nicolas Villega was killed by his second-in-command when he attempted to prevent the surrender of his men at Calamba.^^? Malvar finally surrendered on April 16,1902. Reynaldo lleto has stated that “faced with the prospect of genocide, Malvar had no choice [but to surrender]."(78 Qienn A May believes that Malvar made an arrangement with Bell to turn himself in for eighteen hundred pesos. (79 it is clear, however, that the major cause behind Malvar's surrender was neither his alleged humanitarian sentiments nor his greed, but rather the effectiveness of the Army pacification campaign. Malvar himself stated that he surren­ dered due to "the measures of General Bell The reconcentration, the complete cleaning up of food supplies outside the towns, persecution of the insurgent soldiers by the people, the search for myself by the people, and the demoralization of my troops, was the result of these measures."(80 Another testimonial to the thoroughness and effectiveness of Bell's campaign can be found in the statistics kept of the 3rd Separate Brigade's activities. Between December 1 and April 30, the dates of Bell's tenure, the guerrillas lost 210 killed and 139 wounded. A total of sixty four officers and 835 men were captured, while 413 officers and 2,560 men surrendered. The Army captured 629 rifles and received 2,264 through surrenders. This last statistic is the true indication of the effectiveness of Bell's campaign, for the loss of firearms effectively denied the few insurrectos remaining the ability to sustain resistance to American rule.(8( The pacification campaign in Batangas, Tayabas, and Laguna remains one of the more controversial episodes in a controversial war. Within days after Bell announced his policy, Cornelius Gardener charged that Bell's 311 policies and Army pacification measures were "sowing the seeds for per­ petual revolution."’82 John Schumacher has called it an "infamous" campaign, and Leon Wolff, Russell Roth, and Stuart C. Miller have written polemics on its cruelty and brutality.’83 The campaign has also had its defenders; contemporary officers cited its humaneness, and John Gates has called it "a credit to the American army in the Philippines and a master­ piece of counter-guerrilla warfare."’84 Glenn A. May, one of the few scholars to work in the primary source material, offers perhaps the most impartial judgment; "It was, on both sides, an ugly guerrilla war."’85 This debate overlooks the essential necessity of the campaign. Both the Americans and the insurrectos who served in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas were unanimous in agreeing that if the reconcentration campaign was severe, it was also necessary. The Army simply had no alternative. Without such rigorous methods the guerrillas were prepared to fight on for years with probably even more catastrophic results to the population. Moreover, given the strength of Malvar's support, his strategy, and the difficulties of campaigning in southwestern Luzon, an impartial observer would have to conclude that the campaign was carried out in as effective, quick, and humane a manner as was possible. It is may have been "an ugly guerrilla war," but credit goes to Bell and his troops for not making it a great deal uglier than it was.’86 The Army's pacification campaign in southwestern Luzon was by far the longest, most costly, and most difficult pacification campaign in Luzon. The guerrilla resistance was well organized, well led, and possessed inval­ uable support from the native elite. The guerrillas hid behind the 312 population, living for the most part as amigos and only occasionally enga­ ging in active operations. Their open and sanctioned use of terrorism, particularly the public killing of collaborators, effectively inhibited any native cooperation with the Army. Until the Army could develop methods which brought as much pressure or fear of punishment on the populace as the guerrillas could, the insurrectos controlled the populace. In Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas many of the key elements which characterized Army pacification in other areas of Luzon were either unsuc­ cessful or impossible. The Americans could recruit no ethnic or religious minorities willing to fight against the revolutionaries. Civil governemnt did not provide the Army with a group of loyal and influential natives who would keep the guerrillas out of their villages. Information, one of the most valuable commodities in a guerrilla war, was almost impossible to obtain. As Col. Arthur Wagner stated, the Army was a "blind giant," powerful enough to destroy the enemy, but unable to find him.’87 Moreover, the Army suffered initially from poor leadership and a lack of clear policy, leaving it up to regimental and post commanders to develop tactics and counterinsur­ gency methods. Pacification in southwestern Luzon was far more a tenuous, step-by- step process that in other districts of the island. Local commanders had to create simple intelligence nets and then gradually expand upwards. Tactics were designed to root out guerrillas from villagers. Operations were designed to prevent guerrilla concentrations. On the whole, this process worked, though it was long and involved. The guerrillas were forced back either into the villages as amigos, or into the mountains, and engagement 313 statistics show a rather low level of fighting until late 1901. Intelligence networks were established and there were even some successful attempts at civil government. In many respects Batangas and Laguna in the fall of 1901 were at the same stage of pacification as other districts had been a year earlier. The key difference was that by late 1901 the Army was under great pressure to end the Philippine War immediately, and the high command was willing to sanction measures that would have been rejected in 1900. Bell's policies were well designed to contain the insurrection waged by Malvar and the southwestern Luzon Insurrectos. From the beginning the objective was established, the enemy clearly identified, and the measures to be implemented outlined. Moreover, through his December 1 speech to the brigade’s officers, his telegraphic circulars, and his personal communica­ tions, Bell succeeded in exercising a personal supervision over the campaign that no other district commander duplicated. The reconcentration of the populace, while undoubtedly causing much hardship, effectively separated the populace from the guerrillas. Army pacification methods were designed not only to destroy the insurrectos ' military strength but also to prevent any resurgence of guerrilla war. By dismantling the infrastructure through provost courts, forcing the principaiia to come to an accomodation with the Americans, and depriving the insurgents of food and shelter. Bell was able to pacify an insurgent stronghold in a rapid and thorough manner. John Gates' statement that Bell's campaign represented “pacification in its most perfected form" implies that it was the culmination of continual developments in Army pacification policy.’^a However, it v/ould be more accurate to state that the campaign in southwestern Luzon demonstrates 314 both the regional nature of Filipino resistance and the regional counter­ insurgency policies developed by the Army to combat it. The circumstances that impelled Bell’s policies: the guerrillas’ support among the native elite; the effective use of terrorism; the willingness of the guerrillas to continue a desultory war for years; the capability of the insurgent leadership, were all unique to the southern Tagalog provinces. Bell’s policies and paci­ fication methods were a direct response to the specific circumstances that characterized this regionalized war. They represented less a master-plan for counterinsurgency than Bell’s implicit recognition of the uniqueness of the guerrilla war in southwestern Luzon. The true culmination of Army pacification policy was in this realization that counterinsurgency methods needed to be adopted to the regional guerrilla warfare in Luzon. NOTES

"Report of Brig. Gen. J. F. Wade, U.S.A., Commanding Department of Southern Luzon," WQ 1901 1:7:290 [hereafter cited as "Wade Report"].

Wernstedt and Spencer, Philippine Island World, pp. 392-407; "Province of Tayabas: Press Abstract to be released September II, 1901," RG 350, series 2760, "Tayabas File;" Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officershlp in the United States Army. 1881-1925. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1975), pp. 137-8; May, "Filipino Resistance," p. 533.

"Wade Report," WÛ 1901 1:7:289.

For an overview of conditions in Batangas see Glenn A. May, "Resistance and Collaboration in the Philippine-American War: The Case of Batan­ gas," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 15 (March 1983):71 ; May, "Filipino Resistance," pp. 533-6; "Santa Cruz, Laguna," PIR SD 631.10. For early Filipino resistance see Sturtevant, Peasant Uprisings, pp. 83- 95; I leto, Payson. pp. 37-91 ; Guerrero, "Luzon at War," pp. 213-17. Glenn A. May has pointed out that census figures for this era are very inaccurate, see Glenn A. May, "150,000 Missing Filipinos: A Demo­ graphic Crisis in Batangas, 1887-1903," forthcoming in Annales de Démographie Historique. [I am indebted to Professor May for allowing me to read a copy of this article.)

Col. Juan Cailles to Lt. Gen. Secretary of War. 13 April 1899, PIR SD 1195.3; LeRoy, Americans. 2:34-5 ; Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., Laguna in American Times: Coconuts and Revolucionarios (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1981), pp. 3-4; M i 38 (December 16, 1899).

315 316

LeRoy, Americans. 2:164 For operations see "Otis 1899,“ M l 1900 1:4368-95; "Schwan Report," M l 1900 1:5:387-564; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 224-31; Melvin G. HoIIi, "A View of the American Campaign Against the Filipino Insurgents’: 1900," Philippine Studies 17 (January 1969):97-1 II; Parker, Old Army, pp. 299-303; “DIarlo de Operaclones realizadas por las fuerzas de Batallon de Banahao," PIR SD 942.3.

7 Majul, Mabini, pp. 271-3; Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 351-2; May, "Resistance and Collaboration," pp. 71,75;, May, "Filipino Resistance, " pp. 534-5,540-1; "Glorious Epopée," Taylor. History. Exhibit 70 p. 70-1 LY; ibid. Exhibit 77, p, 76 LY; ibid. Exhibit 79, p. 78 LY. Malvar was criticized for his willingness to subordinate civil authority to the military, see Col. Manuel Arguelles to Emilio Aguinaldo, 22 September 1898, PIR SD 1246.3. For information on Malvar see PIR SD 692,772, 779,902, 1132. For Information on Cailles see PIR SD 294,602,653, 712,716, 1195.

Col. Juan Cailles to P.L, Cavinti, Luisiana, Majayjay, 27 May 1899, PIR SD 294.1; Col. Juan Cailles to Lt. Gen. Secretary of War, 13 April 1899, PIR SD 1195.3; "Proclamation," Col. Juan Cailles, 21 June 1899, PIR SD 339.1; Col. Juan Cailles to Local Chiefs, 21 July 1899, PIR SD 602.1; Col. Juan Cailles to Local Chiefs, 22 July 1899, PIR SD 294.2; Ambriosio Flores to Secretary de Hacienda, 9 August 1899, PIR SD 1195.2; Pedro A. Paterno to Secretary of War, 25 August 1899, PIR 294.3; Taylor. History. Exhibit 1, p. 1 MG; "Proclamation of Emilio Aguinaldo, 20 June 1898, ibid. Exhibit 37, pp. 29- 30 MG; Hq, DSL to CO., Bauan, 11 March 1901, RG 395, series 3092, Bauan, Bat., Letters and Telegrams Received, Dec. 1900 to June 1903, LR 122B [Hereafter cited as 395/3092].

"Testimony of Miguel Malvar," RG 94, AGO 421607, incl. 2, "Proceedings of a Board of Officers to inquire into Allegations made by Maj. Cornelus Gardener, 13th U.S. Infantry In His Report of December 16.1901," pp. 650 [Hereafter cited as Gardener Board]; Leonardo Miguel [pseud ] to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 12 March 1900, PIR SD 294.6; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Vicente Zotomeyer, 24 April 1900, PIR SD 294.10; Maj. John H. Parker to Col. Robert L. Bullard, 17 May 1900, 395/2408, Box 1; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Col. Pablo Asti 11a, 6 August 1900, Tavlor. History. Exhibit 1084. p. 57 GV; Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, "Provisions and Instructions issued by the Supior Commander of Southern Luzon for Observation in 317

this Department," 28 April 1901, M l, Exhibit 1156, pp. 82-3 GV [Hereafter cited as “Provisions"]; Brig. Gen. Mariano Noriel, “Resume of the General Orders and Instructions Given and Issued by these Superior Headquarters of the Departmental Government from the 29th of August to Date," 9 September 1901. ibid. Exhibit 1159 pp. 88-9 GV [Hereafter cited as “Noriel Resumé"]; Col. Julio Herrera to Maj. Domingo Ramos, 14 November 1900, PIR SD 605.2.

May, “Resistance and Collaboration," p. 76, also pp. 75,79-81 ; Hq, DSL to C O., Bauan, 18 March 1901, 395/3092, LR 122A; "Statement of Martin Apelo before Lieut. W. T. Vaughn, 37th Infantry U.S.V., Manila, May 14, 1901," PIR SD 631.8; Glenn A. May. "Private Presher and Sergeant Vergara: The Underside of the Philippine-American War," in Peter W. Stanley, ed.. Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine- American History. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 50-2 [Hereafter cited as May, “Presher/Vergara"]; "Noriel Resume."

Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, “ Copy of a Reply to General Trias," 19 April 1901, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1155, p. 82 GV [Hereafter cited as "Reply to Trias"]. For evidence of the connections between the officers corps and local landowners see May, "Filipino Resistance," pp. 536-7; May, "Resistance and Collaboration," p. 75-6,79-81; Renaldo C. lleto, “Toward a Local History of the Philippine-American War: The Case of Tiaong, Tayabas (Quezon) Province, 1901-1902," The Journal of History 27 (January-December, 1982), p. 74.

'2 Col. Buenaventura Dimaguila to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 30 November 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1125, pp. 70-2 GV; Capt. John D. Hartman to Adj, Batangas, 15 November 1901,RG 395, series 3089, Bauan, Bat, Letters and Telegrams Sent, Dec. 1900 to July 1903, LS 218 [hereafter cited as 395/3089]. >3 "Testimony of Col. Eustacio Maloles," Gardener Board, pp. 97-100.

’4 Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, “Guerrilla Warfare. Instructions." 27 October 1900, PIR 1132.4. See also "Instructions of Letter found on the Adjutant of Martin Cabrera," 5 August 1901, PIR SD 692.10.

15 Jose Maghirang, Lieut, of Barrio, Miguel Pasco, Anselmo Brinas to the Lieut, of Barrios and to the Chief, n.d., PIR SD 719.8. See also “illegible" 318

to Maj. Luciana Atienza, 7 September 1901, PIR SD 719.8; "Relaciones de les soldados revolucionarios," n.d., PIR 712.8; “Testimony of Col. Eustacio Maloles,“ Gardener Board, pp. 97-100; "Testimony of Peotacio Silvala" ibid, pp. 170-1. The term "regulares" as distinct forces is used In Florencio Trinidad to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 23 March 1901, PIR SD 712.1.

May, "Presher/Vergara," p. 53. This overview of the guerrilla forces is taken from the following sources: "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. John C. Bates, U.S.V., Commanding Department of Southern Luzon," M i 1900 1:5:227 [Hereafter cited as "Bates Rept."]; Diary entry 3 February 1900, Robert L. Bullard Diary, Robert L. Bullard Papers, Library of Congress 1900, Washington, D.C., [Hereafter cited as RLBD]; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Col. Pedro Cabal les, 14 February 1901, PIR SD 753.1; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Military Secretary of the Governor General, 17 October 1900, RG 94, series 117,30th Infantry, U.5.V. Letters Sent Book 2, LS 2506 [Hereafter cited as 94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk]; Maj. George T. Langhorne to AG, ID, DSL, 9 February 1901, RG 94, series 117, 39th Infantry, U.S.V., Letters Sent Book 2, LS 25 [Hereafter cited as 94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk]; Maj. George T. Langhorne to AG, DSL, 4 March 1901,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 42; Maj. Lewis E. Goodier to AG, DSL, 12 October 1901, RG 395, series 5007, San José, Bat., Letters Sent, Feb. 1900 to Feb. 1903, LS 88 [Hereafter cited as 395/5007]; "Statement of Cecilio Rosal," 25 January 1901,395/3092; Col. George S. Anderson to Provost Marshall General, Manila, 23 May 1900, RG 94, series 117,38th Infantry, U.S.V., Letters Sent Book 1, LS 692 [Hereafter cited as 94/117, 38th Inf. LS Bk]; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 10 January 1901, 94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 6; "Descriptive List," n.d., 395/3289; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 19 May 1900, 94/117, 39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 679; Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to AG. DSL.395/2330, LR C2585; Capt, Charles M. McLester to AG. DSL, 22 November 1901,395/2330, LS C2621; Brig. Gen. Samuel 5. Sumner to AG, DSL, 2 August 1901, RG 395, series 5101, San Pablo, Lag., Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1901-2 [Hereafter cited as 395/5101]; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Anon. [P.L.'s?], 1899, PIR SD 602.6; "Reorganication de la Laguna," August-September 1901, RG 395/5101; "Military History of Lieutenant Colonel Eustaguio Castelltor," Capt. Charles D. Rhodes, 1901, PIR SD 805.1 ; Capt. Ralph Van Deman, "Report,” 21 December 1901, PIR SD 796.1; May, "Resistance and Collaboration." pp. 81-2; May, "Filipino Resistance," p. 539; Zaide, Philippine Revolution, pp. 278-9. 319

*7 Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 4 April 1901, PIR SD 692.4. While the number of insurrecto weapons is unclear Army sources record that in 1901 a total roughly 4,000 weapons were taken and in 1902 3,600 more were secured, see "Memorandum of Arms Secured," 30 September 1901, RG395, series 2349, ID, DSL, Press Copies of Letters Sent, Dec. 1900 to Dec. 1902, [Hereafter cited as 395/23491; "Report of Operations in the Third Seperate Brigade," M i 1902 1:7:267 [Hereafter cited as "Bell Report"].

18 Malvar, for example, stated that any guerrilla who surrendered his weapon would be fined $250, see Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, "Orders and General Observances Dictated by Superior Headquarters of Southern Luzon," 28 August 1901, in "Appendix F," Capt. Ralph Van Deman, 395/2635, Box 1, No. 256 [Hereafter cited as "Appendix F"]. See also "Noriel Resumé." This was not always followed, Maj. Peotacio Silvala had a force of 100 men but only five rifles. Not surprisingly, he only assembled his forces four times in 1900, "Testimony of Peotacio Silvala," Gardener Board, pp. 170-1.

19 Quote "lot of junk" from Diary entry 13 January 1902, Frederick Presher Diary, 1st U.S. Cavalry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa. [Hereafter cited as FPDj; Diary entry 11 February 1902, Charles D. Rhodes Diary, Charles D. Rhodes Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D C., [Hereafter cited as CDRDl; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 8 June 1900, RG 94, series 117,37th Infantry, U.S.V., Letters Sent Book 1, LS 222 [Hereafter cited as 94/117,37th LS Bk]; Lt. Arthur L. Bump to Regt'l Adj., 29 August 1901, WD 1902 1:9:294; Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to AG, DSL, 28 September 1901, 395/2349; Col. Almond B. Wells to AG, 3SB, 19 November 1901,395/2408, LS 251.

20 Diary entry 10 May 1901, FPD. Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, "Proclamation," 11 November 1901, PIR 902.10; Capt. Charles J. Jterett to AAG, 2D, DSL, 15 and 21 December 1900, RG 395, series 3284, Calamba, Lag., Letters and Telegrams Sent, Nov. 1900 to Sept. 1906, LS Bk 1, LS 8 and 13 [Hereafter cited as 395/3284]; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 31 October 1900 94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 886; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to E. Riego Dios, 21 November 1900, PIR SD 653.4; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L, Paete, Pangil, etc., 24 November 1900, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1123, p. 70 GV; Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG, DSL, 7 January 320

1901,395/2408, Box 3, LR 250; Lt. John W. Craig to AG, DSL, 29 January 1901, RG 395, series 5052, San Juan de Boc Boc, Bat., Letters and Telegrams Sent, July 1900 to Mar. 1903 [Hereafter cited as 395/5052].

21 Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother, 11 July 1900, photocopies of John L. Jordan Papers, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa. (Originals in Tennessee State Library and Archives) [Hereafter cited as JLJP].

22 Lt. Col. Mariano Cabrera to Eliseo Claudio, 14 January 1900, PIR SD 936.7

23 “Provisions"; Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, "The Public and Army of the Department of the South," 19 April 1901, Taylor, History. Exhibit 1156, pp. 83-4 GV; "Testimony of Miguel Malvar," Gardener Board, p. 650; "Appendix F.“

24 The guerrilla treatment of American prisoners of war varied greatly. Juan Cailles sent prisoners back to the American lines, but in Tayabas captured prisoners were tortured and dead soldiers were mutilated, see Frank L. Rose and Sgt. Bernard Llchtlg Questionnaires. 30th U.5.V. Infantry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.; M l 38 (22 September 1900).

25 Taylor, hUstflCy,pp. 44 HS.

25 Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L.S, 22 March 1900 PIR SD 706.14; Maj. Pedro Cabal les to P.L, Cavinti, Lag., 15 July 1900, PIR SD 510.1; Col. Julio Herrera to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, encl. in Hq, ID, DSL to C.O., Bay, 5 March 1901, RG 395, series 3116, Bay, Lag., Memorandums, Circulars, Copies of Telegrams, and Miscellaneous Papers, Dec. 1900 to Feb. 1902, LR 215 [Hereafter cited as 395/3116]; "Proclamation of Lt. Col. Emilio Zurbano, Military Governor of Tayabas, to his Fellow Citizens," 23 March 1901, Taylor. History. Exhibit 1154, p. 81 GV [Hereafter cited as "Zurbano Proclamation"]; Col. Pedro Cabal les, "Articles," 26 July 1901, ibid. Exhibit 1167, pp. 87-8 GV; Manuel Quiroque to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles. 31 March 1900, ibid, Exhibit 1132, p. 81 GV; Leonardo Miguel to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 12 March 1900, encl. in Capt. Frank Taylor to 5MG, 20 August 1900, jbid, Reel 3; Col. Julio Herrera to P.L., Nagcarlan, Rizal, etc., 30 April 1900, PIR SD 220.4; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L's, 22 March 1900, PIR 706.14; Capt. Henry A. Hutchings to AG, Wheaton’s 321

Expeditionary Brig, [hereafter cited as WEB], 19 March 1900,94/117, 37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 60; “Extracts for Letters Sent Book of Cailles, pages 45,46," PIR 716.5; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Vicente Zotomayer, 24 April 1900, PIR 294.10; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L., 20 March 1901 PIR 712.3; Julio Infante to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 18 November 1900, PIRSD 653.10.

27 "Copy of charges against Hemano Marquiz and Nemencio Ylagan," and "Assassination Tomas Diocampo...," 28 September 1901,395/3092, LR 333 A and B; Homer V. Cook Manuscript, 1st U.S. Cavalry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.,; Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother, 10 March 1900, JLJP; Col. George S. Anderson to AG, WEB, 8 March 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LR 486-7; Capt. Edward N. Jones to AG, Calamba, 16 February 1901, RG 395, series 3106, Bay, Lag., Telegrams Sent, Dec. 1900 to Aug. 1902, TS 103, 125, 137, 138, 139 [Hereafter Cited as 395/3106]; M i 38 (27 April 1901; May, "Presher/Vergara" p. 42; Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to P.L., Lipa, 19 July 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 609; Charles J. Crane, The Experiences of a Colonel of Infantry (New York: Knicker­ bocker Press, 1923), pp. 351,358; Capt. Charles A. Humphreys to AG, ID, DSL, 25 February 1901 395/2330, Box 15, Cl495; Capt. John Morrison to AG, 3SB, 27 Novemebr 1901, RG 395, series 2354, ID, DSL, Letters Received, Nov. 1901 -1902, [Hereafter cited as 395/2354] ; U.S. vs. Andres Pax and U.S. vs. Gabrlal Macahia, 13 June 1902, 395/2635, Case no. 13224; Diary entry 26 February 1902, CDRD; Worcester, Philippines. pp. 235-6; Taylor, History, p. 53 HS.

28 Lt. Traber Norman to AG, DSL, April 3 1901, 395/2408, LR 1186; Capt. Charles J. Sterrett to Regt'l. Adj., 8 USI, 23 January 1901,395/3284, LS 16; Maj. Henry B. Mulford to AG, DSL, 25 May 1900,395/2408, LR 826; Alejandro Sancho to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles 13 January 1901, PIR SD 653.5; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 13 and 26 August 1900, MFSP.

29 One of the most hideous crimes, for example, was the torturing and murder of the family of Major Antonio Maximo by a group of what appear to be ladrones. However, because the military commander in the area. Col. Cornelius Gardener, viewed all armed men in Tayabas as ladrones, when in fact many were guerrillas, it is possible these men were under orders. Certainly the fact that they attacked Maximo's family imme­ diately after he surrendered and began to collaborate is indicative of some insurgent sympathies. See Col. Cornelius Gardener to AAG, DSL, 23 322

June 1900,94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1104; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 5 July 1900,94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1252; "Testimony of Charles P. Newberry," Gardener Board, pp. 734-5,747-51; M l 38 (23 February 1901).

30 “List of Men Executed or Ordered to be Executed by Order of General Juan Cailles as shown by his letter and order book 24 August 1900 to 25 April 1901," PIR 716.2; "List of Men Ordered Captured or Arrested by Order of General Juan Cailles," PIRSD 716.1; Senate, Affairs^ p. 1000; Capt Charles J. Sterrett to Regt Adj., 8th Inf., 23 January 1901, 395/3284, LS 16; Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG, DSL, 31 December 1900, RG 395, 395/3089, LS 8 ; Col. Cornelius Gardener to President, U.S. Philippine Commission, 18 December 1900,94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 4, LS 3571; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, ID, DSL, 22 December 1900 94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 949.

Col. George S. Anderson to AG, 2nd Brig., 30 March 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1,LS 532.

32 Maj. William C. Brown to AG, DSL, 9 May 1900,395/2408.

33 Col. Buenaventura Dimaguila to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 20 November 1900 Tavlor. History. Exhibit 1125, pp. 70-2 GV. See also Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to AG, DSL, 28 September 1901,305/2349; Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG, ID, DSL, 22 October 1901, RG 395, series 2355, ID, DSL, Letters Received, 1901 [Hereafter cited as 295/23551.

34 For example, Glenn A. May identifies five of Malvar’s colonels as ex- gobernadorciHos , May, "Resistance and Collaboration," p. 74.

35 “Statement of Cecilio Rosal," 25 January 1901,395/3092; "Testimony of Lt. Col. Ladislao Magcansay," Gardener Board, pp. 400-7; "Testimony of Major Peotacio Silva, "Gardener Board, pp. 170-1; RG 395, series 2093, Hq, DivPhil, Register of Persons Charged With Making Collections for Insurgents, Dec. 1901 to Jan. 1902, [Hereafter cited as 395/2093]; Maj. George T. Langhorne to AG. ID, DSL, 9 February 1901,94/117, 39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 25; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L. Lumban, Longos, Paete, etc., 19 November 19Ô0,395/2408, Box 3, LR 896; Maj. Elmore F. Taggart to AAG, DSL, 23 May 1900, 395/2330, Box 1; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L, Sinaloan, Lag, 8 November 1900, 395/2408, Box 3 LR 323

986; "Manifesto of Major Julio Infante, Chief of the 6th Column of the Province of La Laguna to the Residents of the Town of San Pablo," September 1900, Taylor. History. Exhibit 1087 p. 58 GV; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L., 18 November 1900, PIR SD 941.9.

36 "Testimony of Miguel Malvar," Gardener Board, pp. 659-60. See also Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Vicente Reyes, 12 July 1900, PIR SD 631.2; Gregorio Alvarez, présidente San Pedro Tunasan to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 27 May 1900, PIR SD 631.7; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L., Lumban, Longos, Paete, etc., 19 November 1900,395/2408, Box 3, LR 896; Maj. Elmore F. Taggart to AAG, 2D, DSL, 23 May 1900,395/2330; "Statement of Cecilio Rosal," 25 January 1901,395/3092; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, ID, DSL, 2 January 1901,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 3; "Reply to General Trias," lleto, "Tiaong," pp. 73-5.

37 "Testimony of Miguel Malvar", Gardener Board, pp. 647-8,654; Declarations of Eleneo de Gala, Raymundo Gonzales, Padre Gregorio Alma, "Candalaria. Tayabas P.: Statements of Insurgent Prisoners to U.S. Provost Marshal of said town outlining the methods of insurrection in Tayabas in 1901 + 1902," PIR SD 942.1 [Hereafter cited as "C.T.S."]; lleto, " Tiaong," p. 73; Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 127, "Report of Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U.S. Army, Commanding Department of North Philippines," WD 1902,1:9:230-1; Capt. William T. Johnston to AG, 3SB, 10 March 1902, WD 1902 1:9:285-8. For evidence of guerrillas being consulted or notified of town appointments see Gregorio Alvarez, P.L., San Pedro Tunasan to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 27 May 1900, PIR SD 631.7; "Extracts from Correspondence Appertaining to Tayabas Province Captured by Captain Wilson Chase, 21st Infantry, in Cailles Camp, April 26, 1901" PIR SD 719.1; J. [Juan?] de la Cruz to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 20 April 1901, PIR 712.9; Romuldo Vila to Brig. Gen. Juan Cail'ies, 15 July 1900, PIR 706.3. Much Of the correspondence for Tiaong is in RG 94, AGO no. 421607, enclosure 4; RG 395, series 5493, Tiaon, Tay., Charges and Specifications for Cases Tried by the Judge Advocate of the Summary Court, 1900-1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/ 5493]; RG, 395, series 5494, Tiaon, Tay., Register of Charges and Disposition of Native Prisoners, Feb. to Apr. 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/5494]; RG 395, series 5495, Tiaon, Tay., Testimonies of Natives Suspected of Aiding Insurgents, Feb. to Apr. 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/5495]. 324

38 Statements of Franscisco Fernandez, Santiago Abaudia, Manuel de Gaula, Raymundo Gonzales, Eleno de Gaula, Padre Gregorio Alma, in "C.T.S" Statement of Demetrio de la Cueva, Ramon de Jesus, 94/421607, encl. 4; 395/5495.

39 "Provisions;" " Noriel Resume"; Juan Gabel la to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 11 July 1900, PIR SD 706.5; Capt. Traber Norman to AG, DSL. 14 September 1901, RG 395, series 4255, Majayjay, Lag., Letters Sent, Jan. 1901 to June 1902, LS 88 [Hereafter cited as 395/41551; Capt. William Hase to AG, 3SB, 6 November 1901,395/5052; Sicuando Belen to Tenientes of Barrio, San Gregorio, etc., enclosure in Capt. Ralph Van Deman to I.O., Pila, 28 December 1901, RG 395, series 4749, Pila, Lag , Letters and Telegrams Received, 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/4749]; "Proceedings of a Military Commission... Case 7-Manuel Caag, " 2 Octo­ ber 1901, RG 395, series 5349, Taal, Bat, Charges and Specification for Cases Tried by the Judge Advocate of the Summary Court, 1901, [Here­ after cited as 395/5359]; Col. Jacob Kline to AG, ID, DSL, 27 August 01, RG 395, series 4134, Lipa, Bat, Letters Sent, Nov. 1900 to Jan. 1905, LS Bk 1, LS 273 [Hereafter cited as 395/4134]; Col. Pedro Cabal les, "Orders," 19 December 1901, PIR SD 914.8; Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to AG, DSL, 21 July 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 623; lleto, "Tiaong," pp. 75-6. The best indication of the insurrectos difficulty in assessing taxes is in the testimony given at the Gardener Board, “C.T.S.," PIR 942.1, and 395/2093. For American views of the effectiveness of the guerrilla tax structure see Herbert A. White, "The Pacification of Batangas," International Quarterly. 7 (June-Seot.. 1903);431-44.

^ Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to C O. Magdalena., Lag., 3 April 1901; Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Capt Traber Norman, 30 May 1901 ; Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Lt. Col. Allen Smith, 30 April 1901, all in RG 395, series 5155, Sta. Cruz, Lag., Telegrams Sent by Brigadier General Sum­ ner while in the Field, Apr. to May 1901 [Hereafter cited as 395/5155] ; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 10 January 1901 94/I I 7 ,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, Is 6; Lt. Peter Traub to C.G., 2D, 22 December 1900,395/2408, Box 3, LR 5; Capt. Sancho Calbelo to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 22 December 1900, PIR SD 653.2; Capt William F. Hase to AG, Bat., 24 November 1901, 395/5052; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 17 July 1900, 94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 337; "Statement of Cecilio Rosal," 25 January 1901, 395/3092; "Testimony of Luciano Alabastro," 94/421607; m 1902 1:9:285-8. 325

May, "Filipino Resistance," p. 539. For similar sentiments see Maj. George H. Morgan, “Proclamation," 9 April 1900,395/2408; Col. Benja­ min F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 29 June 1900, 94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 281; Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to P.L, Lipa, 19 July 1900,94/117, 38th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 509; Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane, "Report of Opera­ tions of the Garrison of Lipa, Luzon, P.l. for the Month October 1900," 15 November 1900,395/2408; "Statement of William H. Taft," Senate, Affairs, p. 105; Capt. Edward N. Jones to AG, Calamba, 18 May 1901, 395/3106, LS 246; Lt. A. C. Allen to Editor, M i 38 (16 March 1901); Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Capt. Peter Traub, 30 April 1901, 395/5155; Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Lt. Col. Allen Smith, 30 April 1901,395/5155; Capt. Charles R. Howland, "Notes in Reference to the Province of Batangas," 12 December 1901,395/2635, no. 275; Diary entry 26 February 1902, CDRD; Capt. Daniel H. Broughton to AG, 3SB, 18 June 1902,94/450476; "Testimony of Miguel Malvar" Gardener Board, p. 669; Capt. Daniel H. Boughton in "U.S. vs. Capt. Edwin H. Hickman," RG 153, series 3423, General Court Martial no. 33367 [Hereafter cited as "Hickman Q.M."1; Capt. Henry T. Allen to Sen. Jeremiah Beveridge, 12 February 1902, Henry T. Allen Papers, Correspondence, Box 7, "1902 Jan.-Mar. File," Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [Hereafter cited as HTAP]; Taylor, tüstfilX. p. 54 HS.

42 Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 129, see also pp. 124-8.

43 “Report of Operations of the Garrison of Lipa, Luzon, P.l. for the Month of October 1900," 15 November 1900, 395/2408. Quote "monied main­ stays" from Capt. William Y. Stamper to AG, DSL, 24 January 1901, PIR SD 834.1. For similar sentiments tying the clergy to the landholding elite see "Testimony of an Army Officer," M J 38 (29 September 1900).

44 Maj. George E. Morgan to AG, DSL, 15 September 1900,395/2033, Box 6, M19I4; "Statement of Cecilio Rosal," 25 January 190), 395/3092; Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, pp. 129-30.

45 Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 4 June 1900,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 1 ; "Declaration of Padre Gregorio Alma," C.T.S; "Information in General of 2nd Lt. Floyd L. Frisbee, stationed at Tiaon, 30 January 1902, RG 395, 326

series 5485. Tiaon, Tay., Letters and Telegrams Sent, May to Aug. 1900 [Hereafter cited as 395/5486].

^ RG 395, series 3094, "List and Descriptions of Prisoners Received at Bauan, July 1901 to May 1902" [Hereafter cited as 395/3094]; "Record of Native Prisoners in Confinement at Taal, P.L, 1902," RG 395, series 5361, Taal, Bat., Descriptive Book of Native Prisoners, Jan, to Apr. 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/5361]; Lt. Edgar T. Collins to C.O., Cavin­ ti, 20 December 1901, RG 395, series 3488, Cavinti, Lag., Miscellaneous Orders and Circulars Received, Jan. to June 1902, [Hereafter cited as 395/3488]; Diary entry 6 December 1901, FPD.

^ Col. Cornelius Gardener to C.O., Sariaya, 28 July 1900,94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1529; Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar to Curate in Sariaya, 1 November 1900, PIR SD 692.2. The fact that the priest of Sariaya was an American spy is rather ironic as Shumacher believes Malvar's letter to him illustrates a "confirmation and motivation" for the "general cooperation of the southern Tagalog clergy with the guerrillas," Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 129. For other evidence of priests volunteering intelligence information to Americans see Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 6 September 1900, MFSP.

Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother, 28 February 1900, JLJP; Lt. Col. Rufino Relova to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 19 March 1901, PIR SD 1240.2; Maj. Willard A Holbrook to AG, DSL, 14 July 1900,395/5052, LS 1; Capt. Merrell E. Webb to Col. William E. Birkhimer, 2 June 1900,395/2408, Box 1 ; "Fellow Soldiers," Capt. Edward A. Kreger and Maj. George T. Langhorne to AG, DSL, 30 September 1900, 395/2330, Box 2, LR B2227; Bert McPhail to Anon., 6 October 1900, Nelson E. Bishop File, 39th U.S.V. Box. USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.; Marselo Javier to C O., San Juan de Boc Boc, 30 December 1902, RG 395, series 5055, San Juan de Boc Boc, Bat., Letters and Telegrams Received, July 1900 to Apr. 1903 [Hereafter cited as 395/5055].

49 Capt. Frank D. Buckingham to C O., Lucena, 19 November 1900, RG 395, series 4162, Lucban, Tay., Letters Sent, Feb. 1900 to June 1902, LS Bk 3, LS 745 [Hereafter cited as 395/4162]; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 22 November 1900,94/117, 30th Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 2908; Maj. Daniel Cornman to AG, DSL. 16 October 1901,395/3284, LR 383; Capt. John Cotter to AG, DSL, 17 March 1901, RG 395, series 5295, Si ni loan, Lag., 327

Letters, Telegrams, and Endorsements Sent, Sept. 1900 to Apr. 1901 [Hereafter cited as 395/5295]; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 22 August 1900, MFSP; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Secretary of the Philippine Commission, 8 December 1900,94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 4, LS 3572; Taylor, History, p. 14 HS.

50 "Bates Report," M i 1900.1:5:207-10; M i 37 (26 May 1900); 6.0.66, Hq, DivPhil, 10 April 1901, RG 395, series 2070, Hq, DivPhil, General and Special Orders and Circulars, 1900-17 [Hereafter cited as 395/20701; GO. 179, Hq, DivPhil, Senate, Affairs p. 1650-1; "Chaffee Report," M il 902, 1:9:187, 190-2.

51 William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 23 October 1900, WHTP, Series 21.

52 Maj. Gen. John C. Bates to AG, DivPhil, 15 June 1900,395/2412; William H. Taft to Elihu Root, 23 October 1900, WHTP, Series 21; “Bates Report," M i 1900 1:5:227.

53 Quote "cold blooded" from Diary Entry 2 May 1900, RLBD, "a damned old nasal-coned ass" from Mai. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 30 April 1900, MFSP, Box 7; C. Van Ness Radcliffe, "Personal Sketch of Wm. E. Birk­ himer," Harry M. Moot File, 28th U.S.V. Infantry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.; Wilfred Turnbull, "Reminiscences of an Army Surgeon in Cuba and the Philippines," American Historical Collection Bulletin 2 (April I974):44.

54 Col. William E. Birkhimer to AAG 2nd Brig., 1st Div., 8th A C., 31 March 1900, RH 94, series 117,28th Inf. Letters Sent Bk. 1, LS 437 [Here­ after cited as 94/117,28th. Inf. LS Bk]; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 2 May 1900, 395/2408, Box 1.

55 Col. William E. Birkhimer to AAG, 2nd Brig., I st Div., 8th AC., 6 March 1900, 94/117, 28th. Inf. LS Bk I LS 446.

56 Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, I st end. on Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG. DSL, 30 June 1900, 395/2330, BOX 1. LR 898; Col. William E. Birkhimer to Col. Cornelius Gardener (2nd end ), 1 June 1900,395/2408, LR 902. 328

57 "Report of Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall, U.S.A., Commanding District," M l 1901 1:5:267-315. The available source material for Hall’s correspon­ dence can be found in RG 395, series 2403,20, DSL, Letters, Telegrams, and Endorsements Sent [Hereafter cited as 395/2403] and in his endorsements and orders in district and garrison records in RG 395.

58 "Bates Report" W. 1900 1:5:208; Millett, The General, esp. pp. 111-19; Men of Progress (Detroit: Evening News Assoc., 1900), pp. 155.

59 Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother, 5 and 28 February 1900, JLJP. For similar sentiments see Diary entry 21 and 31 January 1900, RLBD; Maj. Charles T. Boyd, CS, D.P. and 8th A. C., 16 February 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 35; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AAG, 1st Div., 8th AC, 2 March 1900,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 1 ; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, Wheaton's Brig., 12 March 1900,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 499; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, Calamba, 4 May 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 109; Diary entries March to May 1900, WCBD; Eustacio Maloles to P.L., Mauban, 24 March 1900, PIR SD 1219.7; Eustacio Maloles to Capt. Mateo Almorsara, 24 March 1900, PIR SD 1219.7.

80 Maj. William C. Brown to AG, DSL, 9 May 1900,395/2408; Lt. Col. William H. Beacom to AG, DSL, 30 April 1900, 395/2330, Box 1, LR 333; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 8 May 1900,395/2330, Box 1, LR 257; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, 2D, 9 May 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 115; Col. George 5. Anderson to AG, DSL. 11 May 1900, 94/117, 38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 664; Maj. Lewis E. Goodier to Adj, 38th Inf., 13 May 1900,395/2408, LR 1107; "Reports from Station Comman­ ders in 39th Inf...," 20 May 1900, 395/2408, Box 1.

8» “Memoirs of Arthur W. Orton," in Arthur Orton, Fred Shadell, C. Duffy LEW is, "An Up to Date History of the 39th Vol. Inf. (Bullard's Indians)," 39th U.S.V. Infantry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.

82 Col. Cornelius Gardener to C O., Tiaon, 10 June 1900, RG 395, series 5488, Tiaon, Tay., Letters and Telegrams Received, May-Dee. 1900 and May 1902, LR 7 [Hereafter cited as 395/5485]; "To the Inhabitants of the Province of Tayabas," February 1900, RG 395, series 5473, Tayabas, Tay., General and Special Orders, June 1900 to May 1902, [Hereafter cited as 395/5473]; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 8 May 1900, 395/2408, Box 1; Col. Cornelius Gardener to CO, Lucban, 29 April 1900 329

395/4163, LR 84; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 25 July 1900, 395/2408, Box 1, LR 100; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 7 Mav 1900, 395/2408, Box 1.

63 Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 8 February 1901, and "An Act Extending the Provisions of The Provincial Government Act' to the Province of Tayabas," 12 March 1901, RG 350, series 2670, "Tayabas File."

^ Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 19 and 29 April 1900, MFSP; Maj. Mat­ thew F. Steele to Col. Cornelius Gardener, 4 April 1900, RG 395, series 4162, Lucban, Tay., Letters Sent, Feb. 1900 to June 1900, LS Bk 2, LS 51 [Hereafter cited as 395/4162]; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Adj, 30th Inf., 8 May 1900, 395/4162, LS Bk 2, LS 149.

65 Hq, DSL to C O., Lucban, 5 December 1900, RG 395, series 4165, Lucban, Tayabas, Letters and Telegrams Received, Mar. 1900 to June 1902, LR 704; ; Capt. F. D. Buckingham to C O. Lucena, 29 November 1900, LS Bk 3, LS 767; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to AG, DSL, 25 June 1900, LS Bk 2, LS 263; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to AG, DSL, 11 August 1900, LS Bk 3; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Col. Cornelius Gardener, 20 December 1900, LS Bk 3, LS 814, all in 395/4162; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 7 January 1901, Box 7, MFSP; "Testimony of Maj. Matthew F. Steele," Gardener Board, pp. 762-6.

66 Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 10 September 1900,395/2033, Box 7, CAIOO. For a similar misleading report on the state of government in Lucban see Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 7 May 1900,395/2408, Box 1.

67 Maj. Gen. James C. Bates to SMG, 11 October 1900,94/386152.

68 Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall to AG, DSL, 2 February 1901,395/2033, Box 18, CA208; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 9 May 1900,94/117, 37th Inf. L5 Bk I, LS 115; Capt. Charles Humphreys to AG, ID, DSL, 13 July 1901,395/2033, Box 18, CA102

69 Maj. Gen. John C. Bates to AG, DivPhil, 15 June 1900,395/2412. For Army responses see Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 10 June 1900, 395/2412; Maj. John H. Parker to Adj., 39th Inf., 28 June 1900, 395/ 330

2412; "Native Police Packet," 395/2412; Lt. Col. Robert W. Leonard to AAG, Calamba, 26 May 1900,94/117, 28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 503; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 21 June 1900,94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1190; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Col. Arthur Wagner, 24 July 1900, 94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1484; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DivPhil, 15 January 1901,395/2033, Box 18, CA18. For the initial instructions to organize police see Lt. Col. Enoch Crowder to C.G., DSL, 21 June 1900, 395/2033, Box 6, LS M806.

70 Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 7 June 1900,395/2412; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 21 June 1900, LS 1190; Col. Cornelius Gardener to C.O.'s Antimonan, Lopez, Guinyangan, 11 July 1900, LS 1322; Col. Cornelius Gardener to C.O.'s Lucena, Sariaya, Lucban, 31 July 1900 LS 1557 all in 94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Lt. F. F. Foley, 29 July 1900, LS 1543; Capt. Harrison Kerrick to AG, DivPhil, 14 July 1900,395/5254, LS 19; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Col. Cor­ nelius Gardener, 30 August 1900,395/4162, LS Bk 3, LS 501; Capt Law­ rence J. Hearn to Adj, 21st Inf., 18 January 1901, 395/5254, LS 84; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 16 June 1901,395/5721, LS Bk 1, LS 12.

71 “Report of Native Police for December 1900," Packet, 395/2412; "Report of Native Police for February 1901," RG 395, series 3287, Calamba, Lag., Letters Received, 1901-6, LR 81 [Hereafter cited as 395/3287).

72 Quote "emergency work" from Hq., DivPhil to C.G., DSL, 29 December 1900, RG 395, series 5726, Lucena, Tay., Letters and Telegrams Received, 1901-Aug. 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/5726); Capt. C. J. Sterrett to Adj, 8th Inf., 23 January 1901 395/3284, LS 15; Capt. William G. Haan to Maj. Cornelius Gardener, 22 May 1901, 395/2033, Box 18, CA819; Hq, DSL to C.G ., 2D, DSL, 18 February 1901, 395/3092 LR 79; Lt. Traber Norman to AG, DSL, 5 February 1901, RG 395, series 4255, Majayjay, Lag., Letters Sent, Jan 1901 to June 1902, LS 8 [Hereafter cited as 395/4255); Lt. Traber Norman to AG, ID, DSL, 1 May 1901, 395/4255, LS 59; Capt. Alexis R. Paxton to AG, DSL, 25 March 1901, RG 395, series 4638, Paete, Lag., Letters, Telegrams, and Endorsements Sent, OCt. 190 to July 1902, LS 31 [Hereafter cited as 395/4638).

73 Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall to AG, DSL, 2 February 1901, 395/2033, Box 18 CA209. 331

74 Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to Adj, 38th Inf., 13 May 1900, 395/2412; "Public Schools—2nd District," File, 395/2412; Col. George 5. Anderson to SMG, 17 May 1900 94/117,38th Inf. LS 8k 1, LS 679; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL. 10 May 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 125.

75 M i 38 (23 March 1901).

76 Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother, 29 August 1900, JLJP; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Secretary, Philippine Commission, 18 December 1900, 94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk LS 304; Maj. Leonard A. Lovering to SMG, 26 June 1900 RG 395, series 5721, Lucena, Tay., Letters and Telegrams Sent, Mar. 1900 to Sept. 1902, LS Bk 1, LS 103 [Hereafter cited as 395/5721]; Maj. George T. Langhorne to AG, DSL, 30 September 1900,395/2033, Box 2, LR B2227; Maj. George T. Langhorne to AG, DIvPhll, 14March 1901, 94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 47; "The Soldier Teacher in the Philippines," Harper's Weekly 46(18 January 1902) p. 74.

77 Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG, 2D, DSL, 12 February 1901,395/3089 LS 20; District Cmdr., 2D to C O., Calamba, 11 February 1901, RG 395, series 3287, Calamba, Lag., Letters Received, 1901-6, LR 49 [Hereafter cited as 395/3287].

70 Capt. William P. Burnham to AAG, ID, DSL, 30 September 1901, 395/2355; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 21 June 1900,94/117, 30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1190; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, WEB, 21 March 1900,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 1 ; Maj. George T. Langhorne to P.L., Balay­ an, 5 November 1900, RG 395, series 4564, Nasugbu, Bat., Letters and Telegrams Sent, Oct. 1900 to Sept. 1906, LS 9 [Hereafter cited as 395/ 45641; M i 37 (3 March 1900); The Manila Times, (29 January 1900).

79 Col. Cornelius Gardener to C.O. Tayabas, 1901, RG 395, series 5472, Tayabas, Tay., Miscellaneous Letters, Telegrams, Orders, and Reports Received, 1900-1902, [Hereafter cited as 395/5472]; Surgeon to Chief Surgeon, DSL, 30 June 1901 395/3287; Capt. Harrington Kerri ck to AG, DSL, 1 September 1900, RG 395, series 5254, Sariaya, Tay., Letters Sent, Apr. Î900 to Apr. 1902, LS 38 [Hereafter cited as 395/5254].

00 Cornelius Gardener to The Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, 16 December 1901, Senate, Affairs, p. 885. 332

81 Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to P.L., Lipa. 19 July 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 609. For similar sentiments see “Proclamation," Maj. George H. Morgan, 9 April 1900,395/2408; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 29 June 1900, 94/117, 37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 28; Lt. A C. Allen to Editor, M i 38(16 March 1901); Capt. William Hase to AG, 3SB, 16 November 1901,395/5052; "Report of Operations of the Garrison of Lipa, Luzon, P.l. for the Month of October 1900," 15 November 1900, 395/2408; Capt. Edward N. Jones to AG, Calamba, 18 May 1901, RG 395, series 3106, May, Lag., Telegrams Sent, Dec. 1900 to Aug. 1902, TS 246 [Hereafter cited as 395/3106]; Capt. Daniel H. Boughton comments in "Hickman Q.M."

82 For guerrilla plans see Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 4 August 1900, MFSP; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Col. Pablo Asti 11a, 6 August 1900, 941.3. For statistics on engagements see "MacArthur 1900," M21900 1:5:5-43; "Hall Report." M21901 1:5:266-78.

83 Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 8 June 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 222. See also Diary entry 10 April 1900, RLBD; Col. George S. Anderson to AG, DSL, 5 June 1900,395/2408, Box 2, LS 728; Col. George S. Anderson to AG, DSL, 5 July 1900,395/2408, Box 2, LS 796.

84 Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to Adj., 38th Inf., 4 July 1900, 94/117, 38th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 517. See also Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to Sr. Valirio Callao, 4 July 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 2. LS 522.

85 Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 15 July 1900, 94/117,28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 516; Diary entry, 3 July 1900, RLBD.

88 Robert L. Bullard, "Autobiography," Box 9, RLBP.

87 Statistics for engagements taken from W 1900 1:5:15-43; WD 1901 1:4:5-41; WD 1901 1:7:295-404.

88 For casualty statistics for the 28th U.S.V. Infantry see Lt. G. M. Genity to Chief Surgeon, 10 August 1900,94/117,28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 668; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG. Calamba, 28 September 1900,94/117, 28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 837. For statistics on the 30th Infantry see Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 21 June 1900, LS 1190; Col. Cornelius 333

Gardener to AG, Calamba, 20 July 1900, LS 427; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 11 August 1900, LS 1657; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 10 September 1900, LS 1992 all in 94/117,30th Inf., LS Bk 2; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 20 October 1900 LS 2545; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 20 November 1900, LS 2866; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 20 December 1900, LS 3427 all in 94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 3. For a bitter criticism of Gardener's attempts to prevent the evacuation of his sick see Maj. William F. de Niedman to Chief Surgeon, 27 September 1900,395/2330, Box 2, LR A1575. For statistics on the 37th Infantry see Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 8 August 1900, 94/117, 37th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 452. For statistics on the 38th Infantry see Col. George S. Anderson to Chief Surgeon, DSL, 30 July 1900 LS 909; Col. George S. Anderson to Chief Surgeon, DSL 8/30/00 38 3 LS 1050 LS 1050; Col. George S. Anderson to Chief Surgeon, DSL, 30 September, 1900 LS 1229; Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to Chief Surgeon, 10 October 1900, LS 1318, all in 94/117,38th Inf., LS Bk 3. For statistics on the 39th Inf. see Report of Chief Surgeon on Sanitary Conditions at San Pablo and San Tomas," 14 May 1900, 395/2408, Box 1; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 16 May 1900; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 31 August 1900 39 ; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 10 October 1900; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, Division 21 October 1900, all in 94/117.39th Inf. LS Bk 1; Lt. Thomas M. Cobb to Anon., 1 June 1900,395/2408; Diary entry 31 August 1900, RLBD.

89 Maj. William C. Brown to AG, DSL, 22 May 1900, 395/2408, Box 1 ; Report of First Lt. and Ast. Surg. Leis A Griffith, 23 May 1900, 395/2408, Box 1; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 13 August 1900, 94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1680; Col. Cornelius Gardener to C O., Tiaon ,14 August 1900, 94/117, 30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 1689. For similar conditions see "Report of Chief Surgeon on Sanitary Conditions at San Pablo and San Tomas," 14May 1900,395/2408, Box I.

99 Statistics for U.S. casualties taken from W 1900 1:5:15-43; WD 1901 1:4:5-41 ; #1 9 0 1 1:7:295-404.

91 Col. Cornelius Gardener to AAG, DSL, 28 July 1900, 94/117, 30th Inf. LS Bk 2 LS 149; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Capt. Albert D. Nisken, 17 September 1900, 94/117, 30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 2103; Col. George S. Anderson to Maj. George B. Davis, Chief Commissary, 24 June 1900, 334

94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 762; James F. Edwards Questionnaire, 38th U.S.V. Infantry Box, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa..

92 “Report of an Engagement near Taal, Province of Batangas, Luzon, P.I., July 17, 1900, by Col. William E. BIrkhlmer, Twenty-eighth U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Commanding," WQ 1900 1:7:315-8; "Report of an Attack on Taal, Province of Batangas, Luzon. P.I., July 6,1900, by Lieut. Col. Robert W. Leonard, Twenty-eighth U.S.V. Infantry, Commanding," WD 1900 1:7:296-7; Col. William E. BIrkhlmer to AG, Calamba, 6 July 1900 94/117, 28th. Inf. LS Bk 1,LS513.

93 Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 29 May 1900, LS 192; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 8 June 1900, LS 222; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 2 August 1900, LS 418; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 8 August 1900, LS 452, all In 94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1; MaJ. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 4 August 1900, MFSP.

94 Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 19 September 1900, CWS 2:1211; Lt. Thomas R. Marker to AG, DSL, 19 September 1900, WD 1901 1:5:287-9; Faustino Pautua to Miguel Estrada, 21 September 1900, PIR SD 631.4; M i 38 (22 September and 17 November 1900); Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 17 September 1900,94/117, 37th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 572; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 18 Septem­ ber 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 575; Lt. Horace M. Reeves to Maj. Gen. James C. Bates, 20 September 1900,395/2330, Box 2, LR B2436; William H. Taft to Ellhu Root, 18 September 1900, series 21, WHTP.

95 Col. William E. BIrkhlmer to AG, DSL, 15 July 1900, 94/117, 28th. Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 516. For similar sentiments see Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Lt. Col. Allen Smith, 10 May 1901, "Hickman Q.M."

96 Col. William E. BIrkhlmer to AG, DSL, 18 July 1900,94/117,28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 517. For descriptions of “roundups," see "Report of Oper­ ations on San Luis Road Against Ladrones," Maj. John H. Parker to AG, DSL, 26 April 1900, 395/2408, Box 1 ; Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother, 11 July 1900, JLJP; Capt. David E. W. Lyle to AG, WEB, 18 February 1900, 395/2330, Box 27, LR 213; Col. William E. BIrkhlmer to AG, DSL, 15 July 1900,28 1 LS 516; "Captured Report of Lt. Col Julio. Herrera," 12 July 1900, 395/2408, LR 2192; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 27 335

September 1900,94/117, 39th LS Bk 1, LS 857; Capt. John Cotter to AG, DSL, 3 January 1901, RG 395, series 5295, Siniloan, Lag., Letters, Telegrams, and Endorsements Sent, Sept. 1900 to Apr. 1901, [Hereafter cited as 395/5295]; Capt. Edward T. Jones to AG, DSL, 27 February 1901,395/2408, Box 3, LR 1028. See also Diary entry 23 January 1902, CDRD.

97 Col. William E. BIrkhlmer to AG, DSL, 19 June 1900,395/2033, Box 6, M877; Capt. Beverly Read to C O., Lipa, 23 April 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 624; Diary entries for 1 and 2 June 1900, WCBD; Sixto Reyes to General and Policto-Military Commander [Cailles], 2 June 1900, Taylor. History. Exhibit 1064, p. 51 GV; “Acta," Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Vicente Reyes, 12 July 1900 PIR SD 631.2; “Provisions," "Letter from General Malvar" 4 July 1901, PIR SD 1132.8; Col. Joseph Kline to AG, ID, DSL, 12 August 1901, RG 395, series 4134, Lipa, Bat, Letters Sent, Nov. 1900 to Jan. 1905, LS Bk 1 LS 259 [Hereafter cited as 395/4134]; Capt. Howard Hickock to Vicente Reyes, 17 March 1902, RG 395, series 4243, Magdalena, Lag., Letters and Telegrams Sent, Jan. 1901 to July 1902, LS 82 [Hereafter cited as 395/4243]; Maj. Willard A. Holbrook to Adj., 38th Inf., 23 September 1900,395/5052, LS 44; 2nd end Col. William E. Birkhimer to Col. Cornelius Gardener, 1 June 1900 on Col. Cornelius Gardener to AAG, DSL, 25 May 1900 395/2408, LR 902; Diary entry for 28 September 1901, FPD.

98 Col. William E. Birkhimer to AAG, 2nd Brig., 1 st Div., 8th AC., 6 March 1900 94/117,28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 446; Capt. Harrison J. Kerrick to AG, 2D, DSL, 13 May 1900,395/5254, LS 4; 2nd end Col. William E. Birkhimer to Col. Cornelius Gardener, 1 June 1900 on Col. Cornelius Gardener to AAG, DSL, 25 May 1900 395/2408, LR 902.

99 Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 29 May 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 192.

109 Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 18 July 1900,94/117.28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 517; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Capt E. H. Fitzgerald, 27 May 1900, RG 395, series 5488, Tiaong, Tay., Letters and Telegrams Received, LR 3 [Hereafter cited as 395/5488].

101 Maj. George T. Langhorne to AG, DSL, 8 March 1901, 94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 43; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 12 June 1900, 94/117, 336

39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 722; Col. Robert L. Bullard to Chief QM, DSL, 15 May 1900,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 666; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DivPhil, 29 September 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 606. For gunboat operations see Lt. George S. Simonds to AG, DSL, 1 June 1900,395/2033, Box 6. M703; Lt. Charles M. McLester to AG, DSL, 3 September 1900,395/2330, Box 27. RR1921; Capt. Charles M. McLester to AG, DSL, 22 November 1901, 395/2330, Box 23, C2621 ; M i 3G (23 March 1901). For Gardener's operations see Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, Calamba, 3 July 1900, LS 1230; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Lt. Wheat, 27 July 1900, LS 1527; Col. Cornelius Gardener to C O., Sariaya, 28 July 1900, LS 1529 ; Col. Cornelius Gardener to CO, Tiaon, 28 July, 1900, LS 1537, Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG, DSL, 3 October 1900, LS 2305; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Capt. Charles Newberry, 26 October 1900, LS 2620, all In 94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 21 September 1900, MFSP.

’02 Col. George S. Anderson to AG, DSL, 13 July 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 815. See also the objection to this policy, Lt. Col. Robert W. Leonard to AAG, DSL, 1 July 1900 94/117,28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 511.

’03 Col. Cornelius Gardener to C.O. Lucban, 9 May 1900,395/4164, LR 95; Col. Cornelius Gardener to CO. Tiaon, 26 May 1900,395/5488, LR 16; Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Col. Cornelius Gardener, 11 June 1900, 395/4162, LSBk2, LS 209.

’04 Capt. Beverly A Read to C.O.’s, Lipa, San Jose, Bauan, 22 March 1900, 94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LR 519; Maj. Gen. John C. Bates, end. on Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 20 April 1900,395/2408 Box 1; Maj. George I. Langhorne to AG, 20, DSL, 21 January 1901, 395/2330, Box 18. CA167.

’05 Bullard, "Autobiography," RLBP; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, 1 st Div., 8th AC., 2 March 1900,94/117, 39th Inf. LS Bk 1 ; Capt. Beverly A. Read to C O., Lipa and San Jose, 11 March 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LR 497; Capt. Charles H. Hilton to AG, DSL, 16 March 1900, 395/2330, Box 27, LR1900; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AAG, WEB, 16 March, 1900, 94/117, 28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 369; Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother. 15 April 1900; WD 1900 1:7:296-7; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, Calamba, 3 August 1900,94/117, 37th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 425; Col. Cor­ nelius Gardener to C.O. Lucban, 17 August 1900,94/117, 30th Inf. LS Bk 337

2, LS 1717; Col. Cornelius Gardener to Capt. Gilmore G. Scranton, 26 November 1900,94/117,30th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 2955; Maj. Gen. John C. Bates to C.G., 20, end. on Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall to AG, DSL, 16 Jan­ uary 1901,395/2408, Box 3, LR 493; Crane, Experiences, pp. 359-60.

106 Capt. John L. Jordan to Mother, 11 July 1900, JLJP.

107 Col. Robert L. Bullard, end. on Maj. John H. Parker to AG, DSL, 10 May 1900,395/2408. See also Col. William E. Birkhimer to AAG, WEB, 16 March 1900,94/117,28th. Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 369; Maj. George T. Lang­ horne to AG, DSL, 19 May 1900, 395/2408, LR 1901; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AAG, DSL, 26 September 1900, 94/117, 28th. Inf. LS Bk 3, LS 1407.

108 Capt. Sancho Calbelo to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 22 December 1900, PIR SD 653.3; P. P. Wenrlgerr [pseud] to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 6 December 1900, 395/2408, Box 3, LR 694.

109 Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to Adj. 38th Inf., 8 August 1900,94/117,38th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 690. See also Capt. Charles J. Sterrett to Adj, 8th Inf., 23 January 1901, 395/3284, LS 15.

110 Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 15 August 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 483; Col. Benjamin F. Cheatham to AG, DSL, 1 September 1900,94/117,37th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 532; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 9 October 1900, 94/117, 39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 870.

111 Crane, Experiences, p. 362; Robert L. Bullard, “Why Has the Philippine War Lasted So Long," 1901, RLBP; quote "prominant families" from "MacArthur I901"WD 1901 1:4:93-4.

112 "Wade Report,” Mi 1901 1:7:388, 422; M i 1901 l:5:5-7.

113 "Manifesto" Governor Felix M. Roxas, 10 May 1901, PIR SD 936.4; "An Act Extending the Provisions of The Provincial Government Act"' to the province of Tayabas," 12 March 1901,350/2760.

114 Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 27 September 1900 94/117, 39th Inf. LS Bk I, LS 857; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, D5L, 28 November 1900, 94/117.39th Inf. LS Bk 2; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG. DSL. 20 338

December 1900,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2 LS 946. For a survey of American operations in late 1900 see M21901 1:5:284-315.

*15 Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to AG, DSL, 13 August 1901, RG 395, series 2349, ID, DSL, Press Copies of Letters Sent. Dec. 1900 to Dec. 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/23491; Brig. Gen. Samuel 5. Sumner to AG, DSL, 2 August 1901,395/5101; Capt. Edward N. Jones to AG, DSL, 6 February 1901, 395/2408, Box 3, LR 1028.; Capt. John Cotter to AG, DSL, 13 March 1901, 394/5295; Diary entry 10 March 1901, RLBD. For a chronology of operations see “Wade Report,” M21:7:388-417.

115 Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Col. William S. McCaskey, 19 July 1901, 395/2349.

117 Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to All Station Cmdrs., 15 September 1901, 395/3112; Col. Joseph Kline to AG, ID, DSL, 12 August 1901, 395/4134, LS Bk 1, LS 259. For U.S. tactics see Lt. Emory S. West to AG, DSL, 1 April 1901, 395/2330, Box 16, C2174.

118 "Written Record of Instructions Received by Major F. K. Ward from General Sumner," 28 September 1901,395/3092; "Copies of Charges Against ! .ermano Marquiz and Nemencio Ylagan,” and "Assassins of Tomas Diocampo," n.d., 395/3092, LR 333 A and B; Diary entry 28 September 1901, FPD; May, "Presher/Vergara," p. 42.

119 Maj. Matthew F. Steele to Stella, 15 August 1900, MFSP. For other indications of relative U.S. humanity see James F. Edward Question­ naire; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AAG, WEB, 27 March 1900, 395/2408, Box 2; Col. William E. Birkhimer to AG, DSL, 3 October 1900, 395/2330, Box 2, LS 1605; Col. Robert L. Bullard to CO., Tanauan, n.d. 94/117, 39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 698; Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG, DSL, 7 February 1901,395/3089, LS 18; Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG, DSL, 27 February 1901,395/3089, LS 17. For Filipino accusations see Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Sr. Commandante of American [sic]" encl. in Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Vicente Reyes, July 1900, PIR SD 941.7; "La Digna Provencia Laguna y su Valiente General," 12 July 1900, PIR SD 941.6.

120 "Report of an investigation of Outrages by American Soldiers in Batan­ gas Province, P.l." Col. Morris C. Foote, February 1902, 94/476653; Pvt. Homer Cook Questionnaire, 1st Cavalry Box, USAMHI; Diary entry 8 339

October 1901, FPD; Diary entries 19 and 20 January 1901, CDRD; "Letter from General Malvar," 4 July 1901, PIR SD 1132.8; Edmund Block to Hon. H. L. Wilfrey, 18 July 1902,350/2760.

’21 AAG, DSL to C.G., 2D, 3 November 1900,395/2408, Box 2, LR 2957; Hq., DSL to C.O., Calamba, 13 March 1901,395/3287, LR 144; Lt. A. M. Reeve to C.O., All Stations. 2D and 3D, DSL, 11 March 1901,395/2408, LR 1264; Hq., DSL to C.O., Bavsn 18 March 1901, 395/3092, LR 122A; Capt. Ralph Van Deman to C.G., 3SB, 8 January 1902,395/2354, Box 3.

122 Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Lt. Col. Allen Smith, 30 April 1901, 395/5155; Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Capt. Traber Norman, 30 April 1901, 395/5155; Hq., DSL to C O., Bauan, 25 February 1901, 395/3092, LR 103; Capt. John Cotter to AG, DSL, 26 January 1901, RG 395, series 5295, Siniloan, Lag., Letters, Telegrams, and Endorsements Sent, Sept. 1900 to Apr. Î90I (Hereafter cited as 395/5295]; "Names of Insurgent Officals and Agents Taken from the Papers of Juan Cailles...," PIR SD 712.7; ANJ 38 (4 May 1901); "Information Relating to Insurgent Offi­ cials, Military and Civil, Who Lived and Operated in Laguna Province, 1901,-395/3117.

123 Mariano Cabrera to Martin Cabrera, 8 August 1901, PIR SD 763. !.

124 Capt. Charles Crawford to AG, 1D, 5 October 1901, 395/4638 LS 100; Lt. Col. Pedro Cabal les to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 29 March 1901, PIR SD 1240.1; Lt. Col. Rufino Relova to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 19 March 1901, PIR SD 1240.2; Lt. Traber Norman to AG, ID, DSL, 1 May 1901, 395/4255, LS 59.

125 "Unsigned Record" PIR 755; Noriel, "Resume"; Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 3 November 1900, 94/117, 39th Inf. LS Bk 1, LS 892; Lt. Arthur L. Bump to RegtT Adj., 19 August 1902, WD 1902 1:9:294; "Trial of Ricardo Aquirre, présidente of Lemeri," RG 395, series 5359, Taal, Bat., Charges and Specifications for Cases Tried by the Judge Advocate of the Summary Court, 1901 [Hereafter cited as 395/5359).

126 Capt. Edward N. Jones to AG, ID, D5L, 1 August 1901,395/3105, LS 13; Capt. Charles P. Sterrett to Post Adj., Calamba, 24 March 1901, 395/2408, LR 1434; Sotero Batallones to C O., Calamba, 4 October 1901, 395/3287, LR 377; Maj. Daniel Cornman to AG, DSL, 16 October 340

1901,395/3284, LR 383; Sgt. Arthur G. Smith to Post Adj, Calamba, 16 November 1901,395/3287; Sotero Patallones to Sr. Commandante liilitar de Calamba, n.d., 395/3287.

127 Hq, DivPhil to C.G., 2D, 29 December 1900, 395/5726; Hq, DSL to C.G., 2D. 18 February 1901,395/3092, LR 79; Hq, ID, DSL to CO., San José, 15 May 1901,395/5009.

128 Capt. William 6. Haan to Maj. Cornelius Gardener, 22 May 1901, 395/2330, Box 18, CA819; Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, 2 September 1901, HCCP; Lt. Traber Norman to AG, 2D, 5 February 1901,395/4255 LS 8; Lt Traber Norman to AG, 1D, 1 May 1901 395/4255, LS 59; Capt. Alexis R. Paxton to AG, DSL, 25 March 1901 395/4638, LS 31 ; Lt. Henry B. Clark to AG, ID, 2 May 1901, 395/4638; Capt. Charles J. Sterrett to RegtT. Adj., 8th Inf., 23 January 1901,395/3284 LS 15; Col. Cornelius Gardener to AG. 2D. DSL. 16 June 1901,395/5721, LS Bk 1, LS 12; Maj. John H. Parker to AG, ID, DSL, 11 January 1901, 395/2330, Box 18, CA18; Capt. Joseph B. Caughey to AG, ID, dSL, 28 February 1901, Col. Jacob Kline to AG, 2D, DSL, 8 February 1901,395/4134 LS 33; "List and Description of Native Prisoners, Bauan," Bauan, Bat., July 1901 to May 1902,395/3094; Lt. Russel to AG, ID, DSL, 10October 1901,395/3106, TS 575.

129 Quote "not entirely satisfactory" form “Wade Report." WD 1901 1:7:389; Lt. John C. Craig to AG. ID. DSL. 1 June 1901.395/5052; Capt. Traber Norman to AG, DSL, 17 October 1901,395/4255, LS 103 and 104; Lt Charles R. Russel to AG, 3SB, 1 November 1901,395/3110, LR 87; Lt. Patrick A. Connolly to AG, 3SB, 1 December 1901, RG 395, series 5007, San José, Bat., Letters Sent, Feb. 1900 to Feb. 1903, LS 236 [Hereafter cited as 395/5007].

130 Hq., DSL to C.O. Sinaloan, 20 February 1901,395/5304; Col. Jacob Kline to AG, ID. DSL. 28 April 1901. 395/4134. LS 125; Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG. DSL. 21 March 1901. 395/3089. LS 56; Juan de le Cruz to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 20 April 1901, PIR SD 712.9; Maj. Frederick K. Ward to Sr. Alfonso Panopio, 20 March 1901,395/3089, LS 55; Capt. A. L. Parmeter to C O., Bauan, 19 March 1901,395/3092, LR 1205; Pablo Astilla to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 20 March 1901, PIR SD 1230.2. 341

131 Hq, DSL to C O. Sinaloan, 20 February 1901,395/5295. For insurrecto threats see Lt. Col. Pedro Cabal les to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 14 March 1901, PIR SD 1230.1; Lt. Col Pedro Cabal les to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, March 1901. Taylor. History. Exhibit 1147, p. 77-8 GV; "Bando," Col. Emilio Zurbano, 22 March 1901, PIR SD 857.10; “Zurbano Proclamation."

122 Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, "Proclamation," 4 April 1901, PIR SD 706.1 ; "Manifesto of Juan Cailles, Political and Military Commander of Laguna Province." 30 December 1900, PIR SD 602.8; Lt. Col. Pedro Caballes to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 29 March 1901, PIR SD 1240.1; Lt. Col Rufino Relova to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 19 March 1901 PIR SD 1240.2; Diary entry 27 April 1901, RLBD; C O., Magdalena to AG, DSL, 4 April 1901, 395/2408, LR 1647; Capt. John Cotter to AG, DSL, 7 March 1901, 395/5295. For Cailles' relations with Pagsanjan see Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to PL, Pagsanjan 12 May 1900, PIR SD 1195.1.

133 Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to Emiliano Riego de Dios, 21 November 1900, 395/2408, Box 3, LR 694; Col. Buenaventura Dimaguila to Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias, 20 November 1900, Taylor. History. Exhibit 1125, pp. 70-2 GV; Col. Julio Herrera to Anon., 14 November 1900, PIR SD 605.2; P. P. Wenrigger [pseud.] to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 8 November 1900, PIR SD 653.1; "Mete miedo y Engana-tontos," Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 22 December 1900, PIR SD 712.5.

134 "To the Filipino People," in M l 1901 1:4:100-1; Lt. Gen. Mariano Trias to "My Dear Comrade" [Malvar], 13 April 1901. Taylor. History. Exhibit 1155, pp. 81-2 GV; Juan de le Cruz to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 20 April 1901, PIR SD 712.9. For the negotiations behind Trias' surrender see Lt. Col. Frank C. Baldwin to AG, DSL, 3 Jully 1901,395/2330, Box 23, C4034.

135 Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar to Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 4 April 1901, PIR SD 692.3; "Testimony of Lt. Col. Noberto Mayo, " Gardener Board, p. 132.

136 Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar,”Brothers and Companions in the Strife,” 12 April 1900, PIR SD 692.7; Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, "To the Filipino People and its Army, " Tavlor. Historv. Exhibit 1166, pp. 86-7 GV. A very unreliable translation of "Brothers" appears as "To the Public and Army of the Department of the South," 19 April 1901. ibid. Exhibit 342

1158 pp. 63-4 GV. For an extensive study of the importance of this proclamation see, lleto, Payson. pp. 197-205.

137 Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar to C.O., Albay, 23 April 1901, PIR SD 772.2; Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar to General Anadio Maxilcn, 14 May 1901, PIR SD 1246.3; Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar to Brig. Gen. Vicente Lucban, 15 May 1901, Taylor, tllsîflcyi Exhibit 1161, p. 85 GV.

138 Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar, "Copy of a Private Letter Addressed to Senor Emilio Aguinaldo,"19 April 1901, PIR 902.7; "Reply to Trias;" "Provi­ sions;" "Testimony of Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar," Gardener Board, pp. 664-5.

139 "Résumé;" "General Instructions and Dispositions Issued by these Superior Orders Since the 26th of last June Until the Present Date," 28 August 1901, PIR SD 772.9; "General Orders and Instructions. Issued from these Superior Headquarters Since the date of October 1901," II November 1901, PIR SD 799.2; "Testimony of Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar," Gardener Board, pp. 656-7,677-61; Capt. Charles Crawford to Adj., Santa Cruz, 21 November 1901,395/4638, LS 116.

140 Col. Emilio Zurbano, "Fellow Citizens," 23 April 1901, PIR SD 867.8; Col. Emilio Zurbano to P.L., Gumaca, Lopez, Calauan, Guinayangan, 28 April 1901, PIR SD 867.8; "Citizens of the Province of Tayabas," Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles, 23 April 1901, PIR SD 867.8; "Bando," Col. Euseibio Malolos, 31 December 1899, PIR SD 332.13; "Testimony of Bonifactio Obnamia," pp. 498-9 and "Testimony of Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar," pp. 645-6,654, 659-60, all in Gardener Board.

141 "Testimony of Lt. Col. Bernardo Marques," ibid, p. 153; "List of surren­ ders, Filipino troops. Division of the Philippines [May 5 , 1900 to June 10, 19011," m 1901 1:4:127-9.

142 "Testimony of Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar," Gardener Board, pp. 671-2, For correspondence on surrender of Zurbano see Sgt. Etterberg to C O., Lucena, 10 July 1901, LR 417; Lt. Edwin A. Hickman to C O., Lucena 11 July 1901, LR 476; Brig. Gen. James F. Wade to C O., Lucena, 11 July 1901, LR 479; Hq., DSL to Capt. Harry H. Bandholtz, 12 July 1901, LR 782; West to CO., Lucena, 17 July 1901 LR 506; all in RG 395, series 343

5726, Lucena, Tay., Letters and Telegrams Received, 1901 to Aug. 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/5726].

Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washington, 24 June 1901, CWS 2:1288; Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to "Countryman," 15 April 1901, PIR SD 706.2, Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to Capt. Peter Traub, 29 April 1901, 395/5155; ANJ 38 (25 May 1901); Brig. Gen. Samuel 5. Sumner to Capt. Peter Traub, 14 June 1901,395/3112, TR 230; Brig. Gen. Samuel 5. Sumner to Capt. Peter Traub, 16 June 1901,395/3112, TR 237; Arthur L Wagner, AAG, DSL to Capt. Edward N. Jones, 25 June 1901,395/3110, LR 38. For the importance of Cailes papers see PIR SD 716 and 719.

144 Lt. CGI. Martin Cabrera, "Extract," 31 July 1901, PIR SD 755.1; Capt. Edward N. Jones to AG, ID, DSL, 1 July 1901, 395/2355. For conditions in Tayabas see the testimony In the Gardener Board.

145 Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to AG, DSL, 2 August 1901,395/5101 See also Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to AG, DSL, 13 August 1901, 395/2349; Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to AG, DSL, 4 September 1901, 395/2349; "Memorandum," Capt. Henry T. Allen to Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner, 28 September 1901,395/2355; Capt. Charles Crawford to Adj, Santa Cruz, 21 November 1901,395/4638, LS 116; Capt. Charles R. Howland to AG, DNP, 30 November 1901, 395/2354; ANJ 39(14 December 1901); Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, 2 September and 5 November 1901, HCCP; "Testimony of Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar," Gardener Board, p. 650. The estimate of 3,500 guns is from "Bell Report," WQ 1901,1:9:267. For studies of the various stages of guerrilla warfare see, John McCuen, The Art of Counter Revolutionary Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 33-5; Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1966), pp. 29-35.

146 Maj. Frederick K. Ward to AG, ID, DSL, 22 October 1901,395/2355; Maj Daniel Cornman to AG, ID, DSL, 7 October 1901,395/3284, LR 377; "Reports of Operations...," 395/2379.

147 William H. Taft to Ellhu Root, 14October 1901, ERP, SC, Box 164; Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, 25 October, 30 September, 5 November 1901, HCCP; "Confidential. For the Information of the Division Commander," Capt Ralph Van Deman, 4 November 1901, 344

PIR SD 1303.2; Capt. Ralph Van Deman to “Intelligence Officer," 23 October 1901,395/5304; Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to AG, Washington, 7 November 1901, CWS 2:1301; “Bel 1 Report," WD 1901 1:9:263-5. For an officer's criticism of Wade and Sumner see Moseley, “One Soldier's Journey." This criticism seems somewhat unfair, according to Col. Arthur L. Wagner, Sumner claimed, “he was seriously handicapped by his instructions that were given him from department headquarters [Wade]," see, "Statement of Col. Arthur L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant- General, U.S. Army," Senate, Affairs, p. 2854.

Statistics for engagements taken from WD 1901 1:5:5-72; WD 1901 1:7:395-415; WD 1902 1:9:136-78.

149 For organization into Separate Brigades see “Chafee Report," WD 1902 1:9:187; Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin to AG, Washington, 17 July 1901, CWS 2:1289; Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin to Ellhu Root, 28 September 1901, HCCP. For troop strength and staff, see "Bel! Report, " WD 1902 1:9:268, 75.

150 Telegraphic Circular No. 3,9 December 1901, Senate, Affairs, pp. 1607- 1 1.

151 Telegraphic Circular No. 19,22 December 1901, jbid, pp. 1623-5. See also Telegraphic Circular No. 22,23 December 1901, ibid. p. 1628.

152 Telegraphic Circular No. 21,24 December 1901, pp. 1626-7; Tele­ graphic Circular No. 34,12 February 1902, pp. 1236-7, both in ibid.

153 Jelegraphic Circular No. 3, 9 December 1901, ibid, p. 1610.

154 ibid. pp. 1607-11; Telegraphic Circular No. 18,23 December 1901, pp. 1622-3; Telegraphic Circular No. 20, 24 December 1901, p. 1625-6; Telegraphic Circular No. 24, 28 December 1901, p. 1629, all in M l For another example of Bell's early ideas on the complicity of the rich in the continuation of the insurrection see "Report of General A. E. Bates, 1902, " 94/443764; "Diary of Events, Dec. 29, 1901 to Jan. 12, 1902," 22 December 1901, 94/338335.

155 Quote "want peace" is from Telegraphic Circular No. 3,9 December 1901, Senate. Affairs, d p. 1607. The information of Bell's policies can 345

be found in Telegraphic Circular No. 4, 11 December 1901, p. 1611; Telegraphic Circular No. 5,13 December 1901, pp. 1612-14; Telegra­ phic Circular No. 14,20 December 1901, p. 1619-20; Telegraphic Circular No. 15,23 December 1901, pp. 1620; Telegraphic Circular No. 19,24 December 1901, pp. 1623-4; Telegraphic Circular No. 21,24 December 1901, pp. 1626-7, all in ibid: G O. 372, Hq, D.P., 31 December 1901, RG 395, series 5101, San Pablo, Lag., Miscellaneous Correspon­ dence, 1901-2 [Hereafter cited as 395/5101].

156 Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to AG, DSL, 4 September 1901,395/2349. For Bauan see M i 1901 1:9:232. For Marinduque see Capt. William M. Wright to Maj. Gen. John C Bates, 10 December 1900, 395/2330, Box 4, C3011 ; Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin to Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, 19 March 1901, CWS 2:1260; Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to AG, Washing­ ton, 22 March 1901, ibid, p. 1261. For an attempt to force Inhabitants to store food in towns see Col. Cornelius Gardener to C O., Lucban, 9 May 1900,395/4163, LR 95. For an early proposal in southwestern Luzon see Col Jacob Kline to AG, ID, DSL, 27 August 1901,395/4134, LS 273.

157 Telegraphic Circular No. 2,9 December 1901, Senate. Affairs d o. 1606- 7.

158 Statistics for U.S. casualties taken from WD 1901 1:5:5-72; WD 1901 1:7:395-415; WD 1902 1:9:136-78.

159 May, "Zones' of Batangas," p. 103; Col. Arthur L. Wagner to Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, 22 March 1902,395/2635, Box 6, No. 7768; "Wagner Statement," Senate, Affairs, pp. 2847-52,2871-5. For Bell's efforts to insure food and health measures see Telegraphic Circular No. 7, 15 December 1901, pp. 1514-15; Telegraphic Circular No. 10, 20 December 1901, pp. 1616-7; Telegraphic Circular No. 16,23 December 1901, pp. 1621; Telegraphic Circular No. 17,23 December 1901, pp. 1521-2, all in ibid; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to All Station Commanders, 16 January 1902,395/3287; Maj. Louis Breckman to AG, DNP, 30 June 1902, RG 395/2636,Box 10, No.11535; "Report of General A. E. Bates. 1902" 94/443763; Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to AG, Washington, 11 September 1902,94/415839.. There has been much scholarly debate over the number of casualties in the reconcentrated zones. John Gates believes that only 2,000 Batanguenos died as a result of fighting and 7,000 as a result of the reconcentration policy, see Gates, "War- 346

Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898-1902, Pacific Historical Review. 52 (Aug. 1983), pp. 372-3; May, “Demographic Catastrophe.".

160 Capt. Charles Miller to P.L., Lucban, 9 February 1902,395/4162, LS Bk 4, LS 39; Unsigned [Capt. Charles Crawford] to AG, 3SB, 30 January 1902,395/4638; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to Col. Wiliam E. Doughterty, 25 February 1902,395/2354; Sotero Batallones to General of the Armies of United States in Philippines [Sp], 15 January 1902, 395/3287, LR 35. For other accounts of the concentration see Diary entry 11 December 1901, CDRD; Lt. Patrick A Connoly to AG, 3SB, 20 December 1901,395/5007, LS 253; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O., U.S. Napindan, 16 December 1901,395/2349; RG 395, series 3121, Bay, Lag., Monthly and Trimonthly Reports Relating to the Capture of Insurgents, Arms, and Native Prisoners, Sept. 1901 to Apr. 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/3121].

161 Capt. Ralph Van Deman to C.6., 3SB, 8 January 1902,395/2354, Box 3; Diary entry of 14 January 1902, CDRD; Capt. Henry H. Bandholtz to Officer in Charge, DM 1,4 January 1902, RG 395, series 5751, Tayabas, Tay., Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent by the Intelligence Officer, Oct. 1901 to July 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/5751]; Unsigned" [Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner] to AG, DSL, 3 August 1901, 395/5101. For Bureau of Information see Brig. Gen. Samuel 5. Sumner to AG. DSL, 4 September 1901,395/2349; Hq, ID. to C.O. Calamba, 23 September 1901, 395/3117; 395/2392-3 Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to C O., " 23 September 1901,395/2349. For the operation of the Bureau of Information see RG 395, series 2392, ID, DSL, Letters and Endorsements Sent by the Intelligence Officer, Oct. 1901 to Aug. 1902; RG 395, series 2393, ID, DSL, Register of Letters Received by the Intelligence Officer, Sept. 1901 to Aug. 1902. For local intelligence officers see GO. 294, Hq, DivPhil, 28 September 1901,395/2393; "Sheet No.l, Secret Service, " Capt. John W. Furlong to C O., Troop M, 6th Cav., 19 December 1901 and " Sheet No. 2, List of Band of Emeterio Bries, " 395/5101; " Papers of Lt. McLaughlin, 1.0. " RG 395, series 3289, Calamba, Lag., Letters Received Relating to Insurgents, 1902 [Hereafter cited as 395/3289]. For Bell s instructions on intelligence see Telegraphic Circular No. 21, 24 December 1901, p. 1626-7; Telegraphic Circular No. 28,9 January 1902 p. 1631; Telegraphic Circular No. 36, 15 February 1902, pp 1637-8, all in Senate. Affairs. 347

'62 Brig. Gen. Samuel 5. Sumner to AG, DSL, 13 August 1901, 393/2349. For early operations in this area see Col. Robert L. Bullard to AG, DSL, 10 January 1901,94/117,39th Inf. LS Bk 2, LS 6; Capt. John Craig to AG, ID, DSL, 14 June 1901,395/5052; Lt. Col. Charles J. Crane to Adj., 38th Inf., 31 August 1900, 94/117 36th Inf. LS Bk 2 LS 740; Lt. Col. Thomas C. Leho to AG, ID, DSL, 5 June 1901, RG 395, series 4206, Batangas, Bat., Letters Sent, Sept. 1900 to Feb. 1904, LS 47 [Hereafter cited as 395/4206]; Capt. William Hase to AG, 3SB, 14 November 1901, 395/5052; Capt. William Hase to AG, Batangas, 22 November 1901, 395/5052; Crane, Experiences, p. 346.

'63 Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C O., San Juan de Boc Boc, 11 January 1902, 395/5055. For an account of this operation see Capt. William Hase to AG, Bat, 26 January 1902,395/5052; Col. Thodore J. Wint to AG, 3SB, 6 February 1902,395/2379; Capt. George Van Horn Moseley to Adj., Bat­ angas, 7 February 1902,395/2354, Box 2. For earlier operations see Col. Almond B. Wells to AG, 3SB, 8 January 1902, 395/2354, Box 2; Col. Almond B. Wells to CO., Lipa, San Jose, etc., 26 December 1901, 395/4206, LS 297; Lt. Roger S.. .tch to Anon., 26 December 1901, 395/3092, LR 472; Lt. Edgar Conley to C.O.'s, Ibaan and San Jose, 11 December 1901,395/4206, LS 272.

'64 Capt. William Hase to AG, Batangas, 10 March 1902,395/5052; Lt. Roger S. Fitch to AG, 3SB, 24 April 1901,595/2354, Box 2. A summary of Army operations can be found In "Telegraphic Record of Events Occuring in Third Separate Brigade, D.P., Commanded by Brig. Gen. J. F. Bell, U.S.A. From the Fourth of July 1901," Senate, Affairs, pp. 1653- 1726; "Bell Report," WD 1902 1:9:263-323.

'65 Diary entry of 2 December 1901, FPD, see also entries for 5 and 13 December 1902. Col. Almond B. Wells to AG, 3SB, 4 April 1902, 395/2354, Box 3; Lt. Ferdinand W. Kobbé to AG, 3SB, 1 January 1902, RG 395, series 4564, Nasugbu, Bat., Letters and Telegrams Sent, Oct. 1900 to Sept. 1906,LS 183, [Hereafter cited as 395/4564]; Lt. Halsey E. Yates to Adj., San Pablo, 27 December 1901, 395/5099; Lt. Boss Reese to Adj., Batangas, 19 February 1902,395/2354, Box 2.

'66 Lt. Samuel W. Widdif ield to AG, 3SB, 15 January 1902, 395/2635, Box 2, No. 4179. 348

»67 Telegraphic Circular No. 21,24 December 1901, Senate, Affairs, pp. 1626-7; Lt. Samuel Van Leer to Col. Dougherty, 8 February 1902, 395/5295; "Report of Operations of the Garrison of Paete, Laguna, for the Month of December 1901," RG 395, series 2379, ID, DSL, Reports of Operations [Hereafter cited as 395/2379].

160 Diary entries of 26 and 28 December 1902, FPD.

109 Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar,“The Reasons for My Change in Attitude," 16 April 1901, Tavlor. History. Exhibit 1172, p. 89 GV. For other guerrilla testimony of the demoralization due to popular hostility see "Testi­ mony of Ladislao Magcansay," Gardener Board, pp. 412-3; Capt. Charles D. Rhodes to AG, 3SB, 4MArch 19002, 395/2354, Box 2. For the work of volunteers see. Brig. Gen. Juan Cailles to P.L., San Pablo, 27 February 1902, 395/5101; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O.'s, Pueblos of Laguna, 27 February 1902,395/5101; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to C.O., Calamba, 6 April 1902,395/3287; Capt. William T. Johnston and Capt. Charles D. Rhodes to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 16 April 1902, 395/2635, Box 8, No. 9396; Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, 20 March 1902, HCCP; Lt. William M. Fasset to Adj., Batangas, 16 April 1902, 395/2354, Box 3; Lt. Frank Skievaski to AG, 3SB, 13 February 1902, RG 391, series 2082, 11th Company, Native Scouts (Macabebes), LS Bk 1, LS 18 [Hereafter cited as 391/2082,11th Co. NS].

170 Capt. William T. Johnston to CO., Calamba, 7 April 1902,395/3287; Capt. Charles D. Rhodes to AG, 35B, 25 April 1902,395/2354, Box 3; Lt. Frank Skievaski to CO., Balayan, 17 February 1902, RG 391/2082, 11th Co. NS LS Bk 1, LS 21 and 22; Capt. Frank H. Whitman to CO., Cavinti, 8 January 1902,395/3486; Lt. Russell to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 8 January 1902,395/3106, TS 723; Capt. Edmund S. Wright to C O., Laguimanoc, 21 January 1902,395/4162, LS 17; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to Lt. Samuel W. Widdif ield, 22 January 1902,395/5009; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to Lt. Patrick A. Connolly, 24 January 1902,395/5009, LR 841 ; Capt. William T. Johnston and Capt. Charles D. Rhodes to Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, 16 April 1902, 395/2635, Box 8, No. 9396.

171 GO. 1, HQ, 3SB, 3 December 1901, Senate, Affairs, pp, 1642-3; GO. 1, Hq, 3SB, 13 January 1902, Md, p. 1644. 349

172 The quotes and desciption of the Lipa clean up are taken from Johnston, "Brief Record," 94/ACP 4625. See also "Interview. Commanding Officer with Principales. Lipa, Batangas, P.I., February 16.1902," 395/2354, Box 2; "A1 General Bell de la Tercera Brigada de las Fuerzas Amer1canas,"16 February 1902,395/3287, LS 186. For a hostile account of Johnston's behavior see Edward Block to Hon. L. R. Wl ifrey, 16 July 1902,350/2760. For the Tiaon cleanup see the descriptive lists and statements of fnsurrectos In 395/5486,395/5494, 395/5495, 395/5496; M2 1902, 1:9:285-8; Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 127; Itleto, "Tiaong," p. 78. Schumacher ond lleto are under the Impression that the situation In Tiaong was typical of south­ western Luzon. Most evidence suggests Tiaong was a special case In which the extremely weak U.S. garrison, Gardener's Interference, and the insurrecto reorganization of the town In the summer of 1901 made It unique. For similar cleanups see "Investigation In the Pueblo of Tayabas," Lt. Grant T. Trent, 153/3423, Exhibit 52, Hickam Q.M.; “Report of an Inspection of Civil Conditions at Tayabas, Tayabas Province, P.l. by 2nd Lieut. E. A. Hickman, 1st Cavalry on June 28th 1901," 395/5472; "C.T.S.," PIR SD 942.1.

173 Carmen Chavarri to Capt. Louis Bash, 16 February 1902,395/2635, Box 4, No. 5850. For similar policies see Lt. Col. Daniel Cornman to AG, 35B, 1 January 1902,395/2354, Box 2; Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to Lt. Daniel Van Voorhls, 5 March 1902,395/2349; "Testimony of Lt. Edwin A. Hickman," 153/3423, "Hickman Q.M.; " Capt. Charles Miller to P.L., Lucban, 9 February 1902,395/4162, LS Bk 4, LS 39; "Testimony of Lt. Floyd L. Frisbee," Gardener Board, p. 602. For Army sentiments on the benefits of arresting the principaiia see Capt. Lawrence Hearn to AG, Batangas, 13 March 1902 395/5254; "Report of General A. E. Bates, 1902, " 94/443763; Col. Arthur L. Wagner to Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, 22 March 1902,395/2636, Box 6, No. 7788; "Wagner Statement," Senate, Affairs, pp. 2851-2. For the alleged sufferings of the rich see Canning Eyot, ed., The Story of the Looez Family: A Page From the History of the War In the Philippines (Boston: James H. West Co., 1904).

174 [Maj. Gen. George W.?] Davis, AAG to All Satlon Commanders, 3SB, 24 February 1902, 395/3287, LR 168; Davis to C.O.’s, All Stations, 51 March 1902, 395/3287; Capt. John C. MacArthur to AG, 3SB, 15 February 1902, RG 395, series 4271, Malagi Island Prison and Post, Letters and Endorsements Sent, Jan. 1902 to Jan. 1906 [Hereafter cited as 350

395/4271]; Capt. John C. MacArthur to AG, DNP, 29 March 1902, 395/4271, LS 131 ; Capt. John C. MacArthur to Capt. James Lindsey, 11 April 1902,395/4271, LS 183; Post G O. No. 7, By Order of the Commanding Officer of Malagi Prison, Capt. John MacArthur, 2 April 1902, 395/2354, BOX 3.

175 Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell to Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, encl. in Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, 17 March 1902, HCCP; Capt. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 24 January 1902, HTAP, Box 7.

176 Capt. Charles D. Rhodes to AG, 3SB, 4 March 1902,395/2354, Box 2; Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee to AG, Washington, 14 January 1901, [WS 2:1310.

177 Col. Jacob Kline to AG, 3SB, 19 February 1902, 395/3284, LS 71.

178 lleto, Paysim, p. 209.

179 May, "Filipino Resistance," p. 551.

180 Testimony of Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar," Gardener Board, pp. 651-2. see also "The Reason for My Change in Attitude."

181 Statistics taken from WD 1902 1.9.284-5.

182 Col. Cornelius Gardener to The Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, 16 December 1901, Senate, Affairs, pp. 884.

183 Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 134 ; Wolff, Little Brown Brother pp. 356-9; Russell Roth, Muddy Glory (West Hanover, Mass.: Christo­ pher Printing House, 1981), pp. 81-95; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation. pp. 207-9.

184 Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 263; White, "Pacification," p. 444; "Wagner Statement," Senate, Affairs, esp. p. 2855.

105 May, "Presher/Vergara" p. 56.

186 For American civil and military views on the necessity of the campaign see Capt. Henry T. Allen to Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, 1 February 1902 351

and Capt. Henry T. Allen to Sen. Jerimiah Beveridge, 13 February 1902 in HTAP, Box 7; Luke Wright to William H. Taft, 19 April 1902, ERP, Box 164; “Report of General A. E. Bates. 1902,“ 94/443763; “Wagner Statement,“ Senate, Affairs, p. 2861. For the guerrilla testimonials as to the necessity of the campaign see “Testimony of Eustacio Maloles," p. 105; "Testimony of Lt. Col. Noberto Mayo," p. 127; "Testimony of Lt. Col. Bernardo Marques," p. 148; “Testimony of Col. Ladislao Magcansay," pp. 412-3; “Testimony of Genero Brillante," p. 482; “Testimony of Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar," pp. 651-2, all in Gardener Board.

187 "Wagner Statement," Senate, Affairs, p. 2850

188 Gates. Schoolbooks. p. 288. CONCLUSION

Previous historians of the Philippine War havc traditionally attempted to analyze the conflict through an archipelago-wide perspective. Whether they emphasize for benevolence or brutality, Tagalog Rebellion or national liberation war, scholars have viewed both the Philippine War and the Army’s activities as uniform during the war. Believing that conditions throughout the archipelago were identical, they have ignored the great dif­ ferences both within the Filipino resistance movement and the U.S. Army’s pacification policies. Because of this failure to distinguish between different regions or different periods of the war, most scholars have drawn conclusions based on one or two "typical" incidents or attitudes and then applied them to the entire pacification of the Philippines. The result has been that American university-level textbooks blandly assert that the Army used "concentration camps” or "Spanish" methods throughout the Philippines. Throughout this dissertation I have proposed a new historical inter­ pretation of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Philippine War. I have argued that the Philippine War was essentially a regional war and was defeated by a series of almost independent regional counterinsurgency campaigns. After the collapse of Aguinaldo’s regular forces, the U.S. Army was broken

352 353 up into small garrisons, freeing officers in the provinces from direct con­ trol. This decentralization was not intentional, but was almost inevitable given the small U.S. forces,ambivalent policies, rugged terrain, and poor communications. Officers in the provinces soon found that official policies of benevolence or non-military pacification had to be either altered or aban­ doned altogether. In place of these officially sanctioned policies, officers began to develop and implement their own counter insurgency methods. These individual policies reflected their understanding of the realities of the guerrilla war in their immediate locales. The success of these local policies and methods expanded Army control throughout the region, until by 1901 clearly regional counterinsurgency campaigns emerged. These district campaigns effectively crushed the insurgent resistance in most of Luzon and prepared the groundwork for the end of the war in 1902. To test this thsis I have examined Army pacification in four separate districts on the island of Luzon. It is clear in all of them that the Army counterinsurgency campaign was developed and implemented on the provin­ cial and district level. A brief recapitulation of these individual campaigns illustrates the adaptability and flexibility of Army regional counter­ insurgency in the war. The First District, DNL, was initially seen as a friendly region whose populace were hostile to the Tagalog-dominated Philippine Republic. There was an early attempt to Impose civil government, build schools, and estab­ lish roads. Under Maj. John G. Ballance there emerged the most developed Army provincial civil organization in Luzon. Within a few months, however, the discovery that many of the civil governments were actually controlled 354 by the guerrillas and the outbreak of a religiously-inspired revolt led to a reappraisal of district pacification. In two provinces, Union and ilocos Norte, the Americans fought short but very intensive campaigns which effectively cleared much of these provinces from guerrilla influence. Responding to this evidence of guerrilla strength, new district-wide policies were instituted. Martial law was declared, présidantes were held accountable for their townspeople, and travel restrictions and identity cards were issued. In the fall of 1900 the insurrectos launched a brief offensive, concentrated primarily in the previously quiet province of Abra and led by the provincial commander, Lt. Col. Juan Villamor. Army response was immediate and drastic, entailing the destruction of crops and the con­ centration of some villages. This pacification campaign proved successful and the First District was completely pacified by the late spring of 1901. In the Fourth District, DNL, the Americans faced a provincial guerrilla resistance that was both weak and inept. Early guerrilla resistance collap­ sed in the spring of 1900 and many of the former insurgents came to terms with the Americans. Thereafter, resistance came from an outside force of guerrillas under the command of Brig. Gen. Urbano Lacuna. Lacuna never established an infrastructure in the towns and for much of the war he was confined to the hills. His attempt to Insure popular compliance by terrorism ultimately backfired, and the Americans, well led by Funston, were able to capitalize on both anti-Tagalog and anti-terrorist feeling. Utilizing active operations, local support, and a fine intelligence network, Funston reduced the guerrillas to a negligable threat by 1901. The guerrilla resistance in 355 the 4th District was always fragile, and Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston's intelligent leadership insured that it remained so. In the Third District, DSL, the Army faced a very different form of guerrilla strategy. After their unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Amer­ ican landing, the guerrillas withdrew to the hills with much of the popula­ tion. Thereafter, they refused to be drawn into military engagements with the Army and devoted most of their efforts to controlling the countryside. Army pacification evolved into a two-pronged strategy designed to entice the civilian population back into the towns while making the hills untenable for the guerrillas. The Americans relied on benevolent policies such as civil government and schools while enlisting local support through the présidentes and native police. They also sought to cut the guerrillas food supply and harry them with small patrols. By 1901 this had succeeded to such an extent that the guerrillas were forced to launch abortive attacks on Army-occupied towns. The American counter-offensive broke up the guerrilla bands and caused most of them to surrenderby mid-1901. In the Second Distict, DSL, the Americans faced a far more powerful and united resistance led by the provincial elite. In contrast to other areas, the guerrillas were well led and able to establish a strong infrastructure in the Army-occupied towns. The Tagalog composition of the population and the support of the native elite gave the guerrillas far more popular support than elsewhere in Luzon. Early Army attempts at civil government, native police, or social reforms were countered by guerrilla infrastructures and terrorism. Poor Army leadership at the highest levels prevented a unified strategy and led to fragmented operations throughout 1900. The Army had 356 more success in 1901, forcing the surrender of key guerrilla officers and driving the guerrilla forces back into a few isolated areas. A large number of insurgents, however, refused to surrender and tried to prolong the war indefinitely with desultory operations under Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar. The Americans, under Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, responded with the most thorough and complete district pacification of the Philippine War. Using telegraphic circulars to annunciate his policies. Bell implemented a complete counterinsurgency campaign designed to separate the guerrillas from the oopulation. He established reconcentration zones, sent large expeditions into guerrilla strongholds, used provost marshals to break up town infrastructures, and forced the native elites to commit themselves to the Army. These counter insurgency policies had their desired effect and guerrilla resistance collapsed within a few months. All four of these campaigns were fought virtually independently. In the Batangas campaign, Beil used several oTTicers wno naa wiae experience in counteinsurgency warfare in northwestern Luzon. He also utilized methods such as concentration, food restrictions, travel restrictions, and Filipino auxiliaries which had been implemented elsewhere. His campaign, however, was one of the most clearly regional campaigns fought. It was designed specifically for the situation in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas in late 1901. It did not represent a perfection of Army pacification methods, but rather a clear recognition that the war in these three provinces was unique and required the creation of unique and distinct regional pacification policies. 357

In addition to this central challenge to previous archipelago-wide" historical interpretations, my findings indicate that other aspects of the Philippine War need to be re-examined, especially the issues of Philippine guerrilla resistance, U.S. pacification policy and methods, and the possible significance of the Philippine War to the study of guerrilla war. Despite the claims of Filipino nationalist scholars that the Philippine War represents the Filipino people in arms, Filipino guerrilla resistance was essentially regional and decentralized. Guerrilla district commanders ten­ ded to develop a base in one province and turn the rest over to subordinates, as Mariano Trias did in Cavite or Vito Belarmino did in Albay. Realizing the limitations of their authority, superior commanders gave these provincial chiefs a virtual free hand. The strongest guerrilla commanders were pro­ vincial leaders such as Juan Villamor, Miguel Malvar, and Juan Cailles who were natives of the provinces in which they fought and had strong personal connections to important segments of the population. These provincial commanders were virtually independent, obeying superior authority only if it suited them. Provincial commanders, in turn, often turned over authority to zone commanders such as Tomas Tagunton. Where no stong provincial authority existed, guerrilla authority fragmented or devolved upon the strongest local chief, and guerrilla resistance in the province would center on one or two towns or a specific region such as the Batac-Paoay area of Ilocos Norte. The evidence does not support the conclusion that Aguinaldo controlled the guerrilla resistance. Rather the evidence indicates that neither Aguinaldo nor anyone else contolled the war beyond the boundaries of their respective provinces. 358

There was a great deal of variation in both the strategy and methods used by the guerrillas. While the basic objectives of the Filipino nation­ alists were clear and included prolonging the war, avoiding large battles, harassing tactics, and preventing the Americans from exercising civil authority, there was no fixed strategy for achieving these objectives. Belarmino's decision to contest the American landings on the beaches and his decision to abandon the towns are in direct variance with Malvar's decision to disperse his forces and develop a supporting infrastructure in the towns. While all guerrillas tried to control the population, the methods they used to insure compliance varied greatly. The guerrillas in the Bicol region attempted to do this by withdrawing the population from the Army- occupied towns. The guerrillas in Union attempted to construct a carefully organized infrastructure that would function as a shadow government, ostensibly cooperating with the Army while actually aiding the guerrillas. In Ilocos Norte, Aglipay sought to organize Katipunan societies and chal­ lenge the Americans through direct military attack. In southeastern Luzon, Malvar and Cailles relied on support from the elites and the intimidation of collaborators. In central Luzon, Lacuna used terrorism directed primarily at property in an effort to swing the population back to the guerrillas. This disunity in the guerrilla war is even more apparent if we look at the guerrillas' civil organization or infrastructure. MacArthur's model, in which he postulated secret governments operating in American-occupied towns and supporting the guerrillas, is greatly exaggerated. There were probably insurrecto supporters in every town in Luzon, but the well-deve­ loped shadow organizations that MacArthur spoke of existed only in the 1st 359 and 2nd Districts. In the 3rd and 4th Districts the occupied towns were centers of American support and were instrumental in Army pacification policies. Thus in both a military and an organizational sense one of the most uniform characteristics of Filipino guerrilla resistance was its lack, of uniformity. It is also clear that the Philippine War was not a "people's war" either in the Maoist or the popular sense. In every district studied, with the exception of the Tagalog region, the Army was able to enlist and utilize a substantial number of Filipino supporters. Some of these were ethnic or religious groups disenchanted with the abuses or policies of Aguinaldo's government. They joined the Americans for reasons which they viewed as more important than the cause of independence. In the 1st District the Guardia de Honor allied with the Army to protect itsef from revolu­ tionary persecution. In the 4th District a number of llocanos joined the Americans both from fear of Tagalog domination and because the guerrillas had murdered their leader. In the Bicol region many and townspeople, including a substantial number of policemen and volunteers, joined the Americans to protect their towns. The Army also received substantial help from influential segments of Philippine society, including the Filipino clergy. John Schumacher's conclu­ sion that the Filipino clergy contributed subtantially to the guerilla resistance is not borne out in the four districts studied. The findings of this dissertation indicate that the majority of the Filipino clergy willingly collaborated with the Americans and aided the Army against the guerrillas. Only in the 1st District, and then only in the area where Aglipay was in the 360 field, did the clergy play a leading role in the resistance. Even in this dis­ trict the Americans, and especially Young, were able to enlist the clergy's aid in holding mass meetings. During these meetings the Oath of Allegiance was taken by thousands of Filipinos while Filipino priests emphaiszed the sanctity of the oath. In the 4th District there are no references to the cler­ gy being hostile to the Americans. In the 3rd District the clergy, with the exception of four guerrilla-priests, also collaborated. In the 2nd District, some of the clergy, reflecting their position as part of the native elite, opposed the Americans. Many others, however, collaborated with the Army and helped win over their parishoners to American rule. In short, if the Filipino clergy played a key role at all it was in support of the Americans. In addition to the clergy, the Army was often able to enlist the aid of provincial elites against the guerrillas. These are not the "plutocrats" or niustrados who have been criticized by Filipino nationalist scholars such as Agoncillo and Constantine, but rather présidentes, civic officials, merchants, and landowners. These people viewed the war as disruptive and Filipino independence as either undesirable or doomed. The Army civil gov­ ernments and reforms demonstrated the benevolent aspects of American rule. In the 3rd and 4th Districts guerrilla terrorism alienated many Fili­ pinos and led them actively to support the Americans. Some towns, such as Bucay, I locos Norte, were drawn into virtual civil wars against the guer­ rillas. The support of these provincial leaders was a vital factor in the Army victory and indicates both the divisions within Philippine society and the lack of unanimous popular support for the revolutionaries throughout Luzon. 361

The U.S. Army showed itself a competent counterinsurgency force able to adjust and adapt to the challenges it faced in the Philippines. Officers were able both to develop working pacification policies and exploit guerrilla weaknesses. A key to this success was the ability of officers to construct pragmatic pacification policies designed to meet the needs of their towns, provinces, and districts. While they received some guidance from Manila, they were given both the freedom and the opportunity to adopt centralized policies to the needs of their regions. In many cases they had no hesitation in rejecting policies they knew would be impractical. Army civil govern­ ment is one example of this regional adaptation of central policies. In the one district where Manila's insistence on civil government as the primary means of pacification was rigidly followed, the 1st District, it was quickly abandoned in the face of guerrilla resistance. Funston refused even to begin organizing civil government until the 4th District was virtually pacified. In the Bicol region. Brig. Gen James M. Bell developed of his own form of civil organization which was both practical and simple. Another aspect of Army flexibility was the willingness of officers to use Filipino auxiliaries to aid them. Despite the anti-imperialist claims that the Army was racist, Army officers were quick to form alliances with groups and individuals in order to secure the tranquility of their areas. The clearest example of this was in Union province, where the Army allied with the Guardia de Honor against the guerrillas. Funston's use of the llocano Scouts and the 3rd District's use of Bicol volunteers are further illustra­ tions. This was the work of individual officers and was often carried out in the face of obstruction from Manila. Despite MacArthur's verbal support of a 352 native constabulary, he frustrated attempts in the 3rd and 4th Districts to raise native forces in 1900. Army officers in the provinces ignored their lack of official support, however, and developed informal units of auxiliaries and volunteers. The study of the Army's pacification of the Philippines offers many lessons for military theorists in the field of guerrilla warfare. It is a pre- Maoist rural insurgency which was defeated by an Army lacking a strong centralized counterinsurgency strategy. Indeed, the key to the Army success was its lack of adherence to rigid doctrines or theories and the willingness of its officers to experiment with novel pacification schemes. By relying, albeit unintentionally, on the intelligence and ability of its garrison and provincial commanders the U.S. Army threw the burden of pacification on the very people who had to deal v/ith it. In the Philippines there were no helicopters or radio communications to insure that each subordinate followed his instructions to the letter. Most officers were isolated, in some areas it took almost six months for an oficer's superiors to read his situation reports and comment on them. This very lack of official control aided pacification. It not only forced individual officers to be responsible for the pacification of their areas, it prevented interference from their superiors, particularly in Manila. Another aspect of Army pacification that is of importance to present guerrilla studies is the value of experience. Throughout the Philippine War, Army officers and their troops were kept in one district, often in the same town, for much of their term of service. They learned to deal not only with the problems of terrain and climate but with the local guerrilla resistance 363 and the local population. While they complained bitterly of their isolation and lack of support, they soon were forced to establish contacts among the population. After serving in one area for a few months, they soon developed a practical understanding of the key obstacles to pacification and the best methods of overcoming them. Their extended service allowed them the opportunity to experiment with innovative and individualized counter in­ surgency methods. The rapid end of the guerrilla war in Luzon attests to their success. A final conclusion for students of guerrilla warfare is the necessity of achieving a decisive military victory over guerrilla forces. While benevolent polices such as schools, self government, and social reforms may win over the populace and demonstrate an altenative to the revolutionaries, they cannot succeed until military superiority is achieved. In all four of the districts studied the Army attempted to implement non-military pacifi­ cation polices. 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Mi.cle.s

Anon. "The Soldier Teacher in the Philippines." Harpers Weekly 46(18 January, 1902), p. 42.

Betts, Arlington U. "The Memoirs of Arlington Betts," in Betts, Arlington; Madsen, Elmer; Buencamino, Victor. Recollections of the American Regime. Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1973.

Bolton, Grania. "Military Diplomacy and National Liberation." Military Affairs 36(I972):99-104

Boughton, Donald H. "How Soldiers Have Rule in the Philippines." Interna­ tional Quarterly (Dec.-March 1902):222-3.

Burdett, Thomas F. "A New Evaluation of General Otis' Leadership in the Philippines. Military Review 55 (Jan. 1975):79-87.

Chaput, Donald. "Leyte Leadership in the Revolution: The Moxica-Lukban issue." Leyte-Samar Studies 9 ( 1975):3-12.

"Founding of the Leyte Scouts." Leyte-Samar Studies 9:2 (1975);5-10.

Cohran, William B. "The Wanderings of Emilio Aguinaldo." Journal of the Military Service Institution 34 (May-June 1904);454-66.

Crane, Charles J. "The Fighting Tactics of Filipinos" Journal of the Military Service Institution 30 (July 1902);499-507. 381

Farrell, John T. "An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R. M. Taylor and the Philippine Insurgent Records." Catholic Historical Review 39 (Jan 1954):385-407.

Fritz, David L. "Before the ‘Howling Wilderness:' The Military Career of Jacob Hurd Smith, 1862-1902." Military Affairs 43 (Dec. 1979): 186- 90.

Ganley, Eugene F. "Mountain Chase." Military Affairs 34 (Feb. 1960:203-21.

Gates, John M. "The Philippines and Vietnam: Another False Analogy." Asian Studies 10(1972):64-76.

------“War Related Deaths In the Philippines." Pacific Historical Review 53 (Nov. 1983):367-78.

"Indians and Insurrectos: The U.S. .Army’s Experience With Insurgency." Parameters 13 (March 1983):59-68.

"The Pacification of the Philippines." Proceedings of the 9th Military History Symposium. U5AF Academy. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980. pp. 79-91.

Guerrero, Milagros C. "Understanding Philippine Revolutionary Mentality." Philippine Studies 29(1981 ):240-56.

Holli, Melvin G. "A View of the American Campaign Against the "Filipino Insurgents': 1900." Philippine Studies 17(1969):97- 111.

Hunt, Michael H. "Resistance and Collaboration in the American Empire, 1898-1903: An Overview." Pacific Historical Review 48 (Nov. 1979):467-71.

Ileto, Reynaldo C. "Toward a Local History of the Philippine-American War: The Case of Tiaong, Tayabas (Quezon) Province, 1901-1902." The Journal of History 27 (Jan. to Dec., 1982):67-79.

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Larkin, John A. "Philippine History Reconsidered; A Socioeconomic Perspective." American Historical Review 87 (June 1982):613-24.

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May, Glenn A. "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902." Pacific Historical Review 52 (Nov 1982):353-77.

"Filipino Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas, 1899- 1902." Pacific Historical Review 48 (Nov 1979):531-56.

"The'Zones' of Batangas." PhilipineStudies 29(1981 ):89-103.

"Private Presher and Sergeant Vergara: The Underside of the Philippine-American War." Stanley, Peter, ed. Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History. Cambridge, Mass.: Committee on East-Asian Relations, 1984.

"Resistance and Collaboration in the Philippine- American War: I he Case of Batangas." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15 (March 1983):69-90.

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Palmer, Frederick. "White Man and Brown Man in the Philippines." Scribners Magazine 27 (Jan-June 1900):73-86. 383

Sand-30 [pseud.] "Trench, Parapet, or the Open. " Journal of the Military Service Institution 30 (July lQ02);471-87.

Scheurs, Peter. "Surigao, from General Aguinaldo to General Bates, 1898- 1900." Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 11 (1983);57-68.

Schumacher, John N. "Recent Perspective on the Revolution." Philippine Studies 30(1982):445-92.

Steinberg, David J. "An Ambiguous Legacy; Years at War in the Philippines." Pacific Affairs 45 ( 1972); 157-79.

Turnbull, Wilfrid. “ Reminiscences of an Army Surgeon in Cuba and the Philippines." Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 2 (April 1974);31-49.

Ward, John A. "The Use of Native Troops in Our New Possessions." Journal of the Military Service Institution 31 (Nov. 1902);793-805.

Welch, Richard E. "American Atrocities in the Philippines; The Challenge and the Response." Pacific Historical Review 43 (May 1974) 233-53.

______"The Philippine Insurrection and the American Press." Historian 36 (Nov. 1973);34-51.

White, Herbert A. "The Pacification of Batangas." International Quarterly 7 (June-Sept 1903);431-44.

Unpublished Papers

May, Glenn A. " 150,000 Missing Filipinos; A Demographic Crisis in Batangas."

Doctoral Dissertations and Masters Thesis

Borromeo, Soledad M. "El Cadiz Filipino; Colonial Cavite, 1571-1896." Ph.D. dissertation. University of California at Berkeley, 1973. 384

Coats, George Y. “The Philippine Constabulary. 1901-1917." Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1968.

Crouch, Thomas W. “The Making of a Soldier; The Career of Frederick Funston, 1865-1902.“ Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas at Austin 1969.

Delgado, Octavio A. "The Spanish Army in Cuba, 1868-1898: An Institutional Study." Ph D. dissertation. Columbia University, 1981.

Donovan, Consorcia L. "The Philippine Revolution; A 'Decolonized' Version. " Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1976.

Edgerton, Ronald K. “The Politics of Reconstruction in the Philippines, 1945- 1948 “ Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1977.

Fritz, David L. "The Philippine Question; American Civil/Military Policy in the Philippines, 1898-1905." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas at Austin, 1977.

Guerrero, Milagros C. “Luzon at War; Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898-1902," Ph.D. dissertation, Iniversity of Michigan, 1977.

Mulrooney, Virgina F. "No Victor, No Vanquished; United States Military Government in the Philippine Islands, 1898-1901." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1975.

Ragsdale, Jane S. “Coping With the Yankees; The Filipino Elite. 1898-1903." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1974.

Edgar F. Raines. "Major General J. Franklin Bell and Military Reform; The Chief of Staff Years, 1906-1901.“ Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1977.

Woolard, James R. “The Philippine Scouts; The Development of America's Colonial Army." Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1975.