Militant Islamic Converts and Terrorism in the Philippines
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PHILIPPINES TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF MILITANT ISLAMIC CONVERTS Asia Report N°110 – 19 December 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. BALIK-ISLAM ............................................................................................................... 2 A. ISLAM IN MANILA .................................................................................................................3 B. THE SAUDI CONNECTION ......................................................................................................4 III. AHMED SANTOS AND THE RAJAH SOLAIMAN MOVEMENT........................ 6 IV. FOREIGN JIHADIS, ABU SAYYAF AND THE MILF ............................................ 8 A. JANJALANI’S MOVE AND THE RISE OF “FREELANCE” JIHADIS ...............................................8 B. MILF FACTIONALISM AND U.S. INTERVENTION..................................................................13 V. THE SUPERFERRY AND VALENTINE’S DAY BOMBINGS ............................. 16 VI. UNITED FRONT TACTICS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND URBAN COUNTER- TERRORISM................................................................................................................ 18 VII. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND NEW THREATS.................................................. 20 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 22 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES ....................................................................................................24 B. MAP OF MINDANAO ............................................................................................................25 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................26 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................27 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................30 Asia Report N°110 19 December 2005 PHILIPPINES TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF MILITANT ISLAMIC CONVERTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Terrorist alliances in the Philippines are in flux in a way Several counter-terrorism “successes” have inadvertently that could affect the peace process between the Arroyo deepened the nexus between foreign jihadis, Abu Sayyaf, government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front the RSM, and more militant MILF members. One is (MILF). The MILF is distancing itself from partnership pressure on the MILF through its peace talks with the with the extremist Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), pushing government to stop harbouring foreign terrorists, whether individual JI members increasingly toward the Abu members of JI or other Indonesian groups. This, as Sayyaf Group (ASG). MILF members unhappy with noted, has led the foreign fugitives to find other partners. concessions by more moderate leaders may seek to Secondly, pressures ranging from widespread arrests to join militant alliances. The ASG and JI are working the collapse of JI’s administrative structure in Mindanao increasingly with the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), have forced foreigners into far greater direct cooperation militant converts to Islam based in Manila and northern with their hosts. Thirdly, the U.S.-Philippine “Balikatan” Luzon, who are a vehicle for more experienced terrorist manoeuvres on Basilan island forced the core of ASG to groups to move into the country’s urban heartland. As flee to the Mindanao mainland (by way of Sulu), bringing it pursues peace, the government needs a better security/ it into more direct contact with militant MILF commanders human rights balance: improved police anti-terrorism seeking new alliances in the face of the moderate Al-Haj capacity but also humane detention and speedier, more Murad’s rise to leadership. transparent prosecution of suspects. The fate of the peace process remains tied to how counter- The RSM is the radical fringe of the Balik-Islam terrorism strategies are pursued but is complicated movement, literally “return to Islam”. Members call by a number of factors. First, while the ethnically themselves “reverts”, not converts, for two reasons. First, Maguindanaon-controlled leadership of the MILF is they maintain that all humans are born free of sin into willing to act against rogue commanders of the same Islam, but, misled by parents or guardians, may be brought ethnicity who support and protect foreign terrorists, it up in other traditions. When they revert to Islam, they are is not willing to do the same against ethnic Maranaos, cleansed of sin. Secondly, they argue that Islam was the for fear of splitting the movement. Secondly, the steady country’s original religion, whose spread was forcibly deterioration of the government’s 1996 agreement with reversed by Spanish colonial intervention. A powerful the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) may symbol of this frustrated destiny is Rajah Solaiman, undermine MILF confidence in its own peace process and Muslim overlord of Manila at the time of the Spanish drive some disaffected members into militant alliances. conquest. Filipino workers returning from Saudi Arabia Thirdly, if MILF moderates are perceived as giving away and the Gulf are the most important source of adherents too much for only limited concessions, militant leaders for the more ideological forms of activist Balik-Islam. may break openly with them. Finally, efforts of various militant groups to build a united front strategy, using real Ahmed Santos, the RSM leader arrested in October, and perceived human rights violations by the Philippines converted to Islam in 1993, and married into the top ranks government against suspected terrorists as a recruiting of the ASG before RSM was formally established in argument, may help build a defensive bulwark around January 2002, apparently to divert military attention from those who are actually committing acts of terror. the Basilan-based ASG. In 2004 and 2005, members of his new group took part in two bombings in the capital region that reflected intertwined relationships between RECOMMENDATIONS the converts, the ASG who directly handled them, their Indonesian mentors and the MILF commanders who To the Philippines Government: sheltered all three groups. 1. Exchange and integrate comprehensive databases on persons of interest with other countries in the Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts Crisis Group Asia Report Nº110, 19 December 2005 Page ii region; the databases should include full information 4. Accelerate the judicial process in Philippines on cohort and kinship connections and actual or terrorism cases, ensure that trials are transparent potential antagonisms, so Philippine and Malaysian and evidence is made public, and bring Ahmad officials have a keener appreciation of JI and like- Faisal, alias Zulkifli, and Ahmed Santos to trial minded groups, and Indonesians and Malaysians as matters of priority. know enough about the MILF and ASG to ask 5. Expand the mandate of the Ad Hoc Joint Action jihadi detainees the right questions. Group (AHJAG) to cover MILF and MNLF 2. Craft carefully, in consultation with civil liberties personnel in collusion with identified terrorist experts, an anti-terrorism law that, to reduce well- groups or individuals, and require MILF to provide founded fears of abuse, contains safeguards such a full accounting of disciplinary action taken against as: commanders with proven terror ties as well as its own list of terrorism suspects. (a) limits on pre-trial detention; 6. Create a new senior cabinet-level position in (b) regular judicial review of individual cases; the Philippines overseeing the peace process, and empowered to liaise and build consensus with key (c) guarantees of access to legal counsel. stakeholders in Congress, the security forces, local politicians and civil society groups, and to manage 3. Provide for a single national identification system a full-time, permanent peace panel with enhanced to facilitate law enforcement efforts to identify and diplomatic status. track suspects. Jakarta/Brussels, 19 December 2005 Asia Report N°110 19 December 2005 PHILIPPINES TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF MILITANT ISLAMIC CONVERTS I. INTRODUCTION Despite the arrest of RSM founder Ahmed Santos on 26 October 2005, the emergence of a militant wing within Balik-Islam is particularly worrying for three reasons. Over the last two years, alliances among terrorist and It may presage more attacks in the northern Philippines, insurgent groups in the Philippines have been in a state of particularly the urban heartland around Manila, similar flux. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which to the Superferry bombing of 27 February 2004 and the provided protection and training facilities to Jemaah coordinated, three-city bombing on Valentine’s Day, 14 Islamiyah (JI) for over a decade, has increasingly found February 2005. It suggests that a fresh channel for funding the ties a liability, particularly as peace talks inch forward South East Asian terrorism might be forthcoming from with the Philippines government. Meanwhile, key JI the Gulf countries, since a pool of some 900,000 Filipino fugitives from Indonesia and Malaysia have moved closer workers in Saudi Arabia generates a steady stream of to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), while JI’s administrative