Sharing the Dragon's Teeth
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Interim GRP - MNLF Ceasefire Agreement
In the Name of God, the Omnipotent, the Merciful GRP - MNLF Formal Peace Talks with the OIC Participation Jakarta, 25th October - 7th Novemeber 1993 Interim GRP - MNLF Ceasefire Agreement This document is entitled: "1993 Interim Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of The Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the Participation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)". WHEREAS, there are on-going formal negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF Peace Panels being held in Jakarta, Indonesia, with the participation of the Representatives of the OIC in order to attain a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Southern Philippines, primarily in the area of regional autonomy; WHEREAS, there is an existing informal ceasefire between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police of the GRP, on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Armed Forces of the MNLF, on the other, as a result of the meeting between the erstwhile President Corazon C. Aquino and Chairman Nur Misuari in the capital lown Jolo, the Province of Sulu, on 5th September 1986; WHEREAS, all the parties at the current Formal Peace Talks, subscribing to the a dable suggestion of the Honorable Foreign Minister of Indonesia, do hereby agree on the following: 1. To formalize and further strengthen the structure and conduct of the ceasefire which was agreed upon between the erstwhile Philippine President Corazon C. Aquino, and Chairman Nur Misuari of the MNLF. The latter in embarking on the peace process had obtained the concurrence of the Secretary-General of the OIC. -
The Origins of Hamas: Militant Legacy Or Israeli Tool?
THE ORIGINS OF HAMAS: MILITANT LEGACY OR ISRAELI TOOL? JEAN-PIERRE FILIU Since its creation in 1987, Hamas has been at the forefront of armed resistance in the occupied Palestinian territories. While the move- ment itself claims an unbroken militancy in Palestine dating back to 1935, others credit post-1967 maneuvers of Israeli Intelligence for its establishment. This article, in assessing these opposing nar- ratives and offering its own interpretation, delves into the historical foundations of Hamas starting with the establishment in 1946 of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (the mother organization) and ending with its emergence as a distinct entity at the outbreak of the !rst intifada. Particular emphasis is given to the Brotherhood’s pre-1987 record of militancy in the Strip, and on the complicated and intertwining relationship between the Brotherhood and Fatah. HAMAS,1 FOUNDED IN the Gaza Strip in December 1987, has been the sub- ject of numerous studies, articles, and analyses,2 particularly since its victory in the Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006 and its takeover of Gaza in June 2007. Yet despite this, little academic atten- tion has been paid to the historical foundations of the movement, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Gaza branch established in 1946. Meanwhile, two contradictory interpretations of the movement’s origins are in wide circulation. The !rst portrays Hamas as heir to a militant lineage, rigorously inde- pendent of all Arab regimes, including Egypt, and harking back to ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam,3 a Syrian cleric killed in 1935 while !ghting the British in Palestine. -
American University of Beirut Hizballah
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT HIZBALLAH: THE SURVIVAL OF GROWTH by MARCUS BURKE HALLINAN A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts to the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut Beirut, Lebanon July 2016 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT THESIS, DISSERTATION, PROJECT RELEASE FORM Student Name: Hallinan Marcus Burke Last First Middle Master’s Thesis Master’s Project Doctoral Dissertation I authorize the American University of Beirut to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of my thesis, dissertation, or project; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes. I authorize the American University of Beirut, three years after the date of submitting my thesis, dissertation, or project, to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of it; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes. __________________________________________________ Signature Date ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I first would like to thank my family, my mother, Kelly, father, Gerald, Jesse, Emily, Lola and Cali, who had been supportive of this life changing decision to attend the American University of Beirut in 2013. I could not have done it without you. Thank you and I love you. I would also like to thank Catherine Batruni for the countless proof readings of this paper, responding to my endless questions and for being a truly great friend. -
KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH TERHADAP AL-MA'unah ADALAH PROSES KEADILAN, KATA PM (Bernama 29/12/2001)
29 DEC 2001 Mahathir-Ma'unah KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH TERHADAP AL-MA'UNAH ADALAH PROSES KEADILAN, KATA PM KUALA LUMPUR, 29 Dis (Bernama) -- Perdana Menteri Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad berkata kerajaan tidak pernah bertolak ansur terhadap tindakan ganas seperti yang dilakukan kumpulan Al-Ma'unah dan rakyat haruslah sedar akan akibat undang-undang yang menanti mereka yang melakukannya. Semasa diminta mengulas hukuman mati dan penjara sepanjang hayat yang dikenakan terhadap 19 anggota Al-Ma'unah kerana melancarkan peperangan terhadap Yang di-Pertuan Agong, beliau berkata: "Kerajaan tidak pernah bertolak ansur terhadap tindakan sedemikian. Rakyat patut tahu." Dr Mahathir, yang juga pengerusi Barisan Nasional (BN) dan presiden Umno berkata demikian pada satu sidang akhbar selepas merasmikan perhimpunan agung Parti Progresif Penduduk Malaysia ke-48 di Pusat Dagangan Dunia Putra (PWTC) di sini. Semasa ditanya sama ada beliau gembira dengan hukuman itu, Perdana Menteri berkata ia bukan soal suka atau gembira. "Saya tidak kata yang saya gembira. Saya tidak gembira apabila seseorang itu dihukum mati. Ini merupakan satu keputusan. Ia bukan soal kegembiraan atau suka hati atau apa-apapun. Ia merupakan soal mendukung keadilan," katanya. Mereka yang dihukum mati ialah ketua kumpulan Al-Ma'unah Mohamed Amin Mohamed Razali, orang kanannya Zahit Muslim dan ketua wilayah utara kumpulan itu Jamaluddin Darus. Kesalahan itu dilakukan di tiga tempat di Perak -- dua di Gerik, Hulu Perak dan ketiga Bukit Jenalek, Sauk di Kuala Kangsar. Detektif Korporal R. Saghadevan dan Truper Matthew Medan telah ditembak di Bukit Jenalek. Dr Mahathir berkata: "Saya fikir keluarga orang yang telah dibunuh itu tentulah berasa di negara kita ini terdapat keadilan tidak kira kaum atau agama. -
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 6, Issue 1 Jan/Feb 2014
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 6, Issue 1 Jan/Feb 2014 Annual Threat Assessment SOUTHEAST ASIA Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore SOUTH ASIA Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA China and Central Asia MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Somalia INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY 2 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT Terrorism and Political Violence in 2013 Southeast Asia peace talks were held in January 2014. Iraq, too, remains besieged by sectarian violence and constant attacks. In Yemen, Southeast Asia has seen some of its insurgencies and conflicts multiple insurgencies and a robust threat from Al Qaeda in the diminish while others have continued unabated. In Thailand, the Arabian Peninsula have hampered an already difficult political restive south continued to see violence in 2013 while Bangkok transition. In Egypt, Morsi’s ouster has seen protests continuing witnessed a political crisis with protests against the government to plague the country while the military attempts another turning violent. In Myanmar, reforms have moved forward but political transition. Libya, meanwhile, faces a persistent security communal violence continues to plague the country and has challenge in its southern border region and the success of its evolved from targeting Rohingyas towards Muslim minority transition after Gaddafi will depend on the militias which communities in general. Indonesia continues to face a potent deposed the former dictator giving up their arms. In Somalia, threat from radicalization and concern has emerged over the al-Shabaab has intensified its campaign against the role its “hard” counterterrorist approach is playing in fueling government in the wake of a hardline faction emerging further extremism. -
Palestine 100 Years of Struggle: the Most Important Events Yasser
Palestine 100 Years of Struggle: The Most Important Events Yasser Arafat Foundation 1 Early 20th Century - The total population of Palestine is estimated at 600,000, including approximately 36,000 of the Jewish faith, most of whom immigrated to Palestine for purely religious reasons, the remainder Muslims and Christians, all living and praying side by side. 1901 - The Zionist Organization (later called the World Zionist Organization [WZO]) founded during the First Zionist Congress held in Basel Switzerland in 1897, establishes the “Jewish National Fund” for the purpose of purchasing land in Palestine. 1902 - Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II agrees to receives Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement and, despite Herzl’s offer to pay off the debt of the Empire, decisively rejects the idea of Zionist settlement in Palestine. - A majority of the delegates at The Fifth Zionist Congress view with favor the British offer to allocate part of the lands of Uganda for the settlement of Jews. However, the offer was rejected the following year. 2 1904 - A wave of Jewish immigrants, mainly from Russia and Poland, begins to arrive in Palestine, settling in agricultural areas. 1909 Jewish immigrants establish the city of “Tel Aviv” on the outskirts of Jaffa. 1914 - The First World War begins. - - The Jewish population in Palestine grows to 59,000, of a total population of 657,000. 1915- 1916 - In correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca, wherein Hussein demands the “independence of the Arab States”, specifying the boundaries of the territories within the Ottoman rule at the time, which clearly includes Palestine. -
THE JIHAD Different Areas of Research
The Strategic Studies Group (GEES) is the oldest private and independent think- tank of Spain. Since 1987 has produced assessments and analysis and has advised different corporations, governments and media outlets inside as well beyond Spain. The reports, analysis, articles and events are prepared by specialists from THE JIHAD different areas of research. During the more than 30 years of existence, the Strategic Studies Group (GEES) has become an indispensable reference within the world of liberal-conservative ideas, specially in issues related to security and defense. The Strategic Studies AGAINST SPAIN Group (GEES) and its members are active members in several international initiatives and networks of think-tanks across the world, being considered globally as the most influential conservative center in Spain. ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND FUTURE VISIT THE STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP: OF THE ISLAMIST THREAT http://www.gees.org ON SOCIAL NETWORKS: https://www.facebook.com/grupoGEES Strategic Studies Group https://twitter.com/grupogees © 2018 GEES – Strategic Studies Group ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE ISLAMIST THREAT THE JIHAD AGAINST SPAIN SPAIN AGAINST THE JIHAD The Jihad AGAINST SPAIN ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE ISLAMIST THREAT Strategic Studies Group GEES TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE BY IGNACIO COSIDÓ ........................................................................ 5 PRESENTATION ..................................................................................................... 9 1. EUROPE’S FIGHT AGAINST ISLAMIST TERROR ......................................... -
Suicide Terrorists in the Current Conflict
Israeli Security Agency [logo] Suicide Terrorists in the Current Conflict September 2000 - September 2007 L_C089061 Table of Contents: Foreword...........................................................................................................................1 Suicide Terrorists - Personal Characteristics................................................................2 Suicide Terrorists Over 7 Years of Conflict - Geographical Data...............................3 Suicide Attacks since the Beginning of the Conflict.....................................................5 L_C089062 Israeli Security Agency [logo] Suicide Terrorists in the Current Conflict Foreword Since September 2000, the State of Israel has been in a violent and ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, in which the Palestinian side, including its various organizations, has carried out attacks against Israeli citizens and residents. During this period, over 27,000 attacks against Israeli citizens and residents have been recorded, and over 1000 Israeli citizens and residents have lost their lives in these attacks. Out of these, 155 (May 2007) attacks were suicide bombings, carried out against Israeli targets by 178 (August 2007) suicide terrorists (male and female). (It should be noted that from 1993 up to the beginning of the conflict in September 2000, 38 suicide bombings were carried out by 43 suicide terrorists). Despite the fact that suicide bombings constitute 0.6% of all attacks carried out against Israel since the beginning of the conflict, the number of fatalities in these attacks is around half of the total number of fatalities, making suicide bombings the most deadly attacks. From the beginning of the conflict up to August 2007, there have been 549 fatalities and 3717 casualties as a result of 155 suicide bombings. Over the years, suicide bombing terrorism has become the Palestinians’ leading weapon, while initially bearing an ideological nature in claiming legitimate opposition to the occupation. -
EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE NOTE (U//LES) Suicide Vest and Belt Improvised Explosive Device Tactics in the Middle Eastern, African, An
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE NOTE Terrorism Explosive Device Analytical Center 17 November 2015 (U//LES) Suicide Vest and Belt Improvised Explosive Device Tactics in the Middle Eastern, African, and European Regions Show Minimal Signs of Tactic Migration (U) LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE: The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), US intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network. (U//LES) The FBI Terrorism Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) assesses the tactics used to construct suicide vest and belt improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the Middle Eastern, African, and European regions likely (see Appendix A) have minimal correlation. Use of these tactics allows suicide bombers to discretely move to a desired target location and make real-time decisions to maximize lethality. The suicide belt design allows the wearer to conceal the device and blend in with their surrounding environment, as well as to position themselves in potentially crowded environments while not raising suspicion.1 This assessment is made with medium confidence (see Appendix B), based upon reliable forensic exploitation and varying degrees of reliability with open source reporting. -
Hamas's Political Wing: Terror by Other Means by Matthew Levitt
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 440 Hamas's Political Wing: Terror by Other Means by Matthew Levitt Jan 6, 2004 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Matthew Levitt Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow and director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis n January 5, 2004, the council of Arab interior ministers concluded its twenty-first session in Tunis by O renewing its "strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and sources." The question remains whether this condemnation will lead to action against Hamas, including its political leadership. The Role of Hamas's Political Leaders Hamas leaders readily acknowledge the central role that the organization's "political wing" plays in operational decisionmaking. For example, in May 2002, Hamas military commander Salah Shehada stated publicly that "the political apparatus is sovereign over the military apparatus, and a decision of the political [echelon] takes precedence over the decision of the military [echelon], without intervening in military operations." In July 2001, Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi told Reuters, "The [Hamas] political leadership has freed the hand of the [Izz al- Din al-Qassam] brigades to do whatever they want against the brothers of monkey and pigs." Indeed, it is the political leadership that has most clearly stated the movement's goals. According to one such leader, Ismail Abu Shanab, "There are no civilians in Israel because every citizen is required to serve in the army. We are at war with Israel. -
Dealing with Hamas
DEALING WITH HAMAS 26 January 2004 ICG Middle East Report N°21 Amman/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. HAMAS: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT.............................................................. 4 A. ORIGINS................................................................................................................................4 B. TRANSFORMATION................................................................................................................5 C. ASCENDANCY .......................................................................................................................6 D. THE CHALLENGE OF OSLO ....................................................................................................8 III. HAMAS AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE ..................................................... 10 A. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE ...........................................................................................10 B. THE HAMAS CHARTER ........................................................................................................11 C. HAMAS AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION ............................................................................13 D. HAMAS AND THE USES OF VIOLENCE ..................................................................................16 IV. OPTIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS.................................................................. -
Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They?
Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? Rommel C. Banlaoi Yuchengco Center De La Salle University Manila i Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? © Copyright 2009 by the Yuchengco Center Printed in the Philippines. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Center. ISBN: 978-971-94089-2-5 Please address all inquiries to: Yuchengco Center 2nd Floor, Don Enrique T. Yuchengco Hall De La Salle University 2401 Taft Avenue, Manila 1004 Philippines email: [email protected] fax: (632) 525-3457 url: http://yc.dlsu.edu.ph ii Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures …………………………………………….….………………… iv List of Tables …………………………………………….…..………………… v List of Acronyms …………………………...…………….…..……………… vi Acknowledgement …………………………………………....……………… xi Foreword …………………………………………………….………………… xiii Abstract ………………………………………………………………………… xix Introduction …………………………………….……….……………………… 1 Chapter I: Conceptualizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Definition, Evolution and Causes ………………………..……………… 5 Chapter II: Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia and Modes of Operation ……………….………………….….…....………… 31 Chapter III: Impact of Terrorism on Socio-Economic Development in the Region