Page 1 of3 Marines in World War II Historical Monograph The Battle for Tarawa by Capt James R. Stockman, USMC Historical Section, Division ofPublic Information Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 1947 Contents Chapter Page Foreword ii 111 Pr~il!ce Introduction 1 Strategic Situation 1 Importance ofthe Gilberts 1 Plans for Operation GALVANIC 2 Task Organization 2 Tarawa Planning 3 http://www.ibiblio.orgihyperwarIUSMCIUSMC-M-Tarawa/index.html 1111712005 Page 20f3 Tarawa 5 Japanese Occupation ofTarawa 6 Japanese Defenses on Betio 7 Enemy Situation 8 Rehearsal and Movement to Target 9 Final Approach, Task Force 53 11 The First Day. 20 November 1941 12 Preparations Prior to H-Hour 12 The Landings 15 3dBattalion, 8th Marines, is Committed 18 Situation on Beach RED 1 21 Tanks on D-Day 24 HermIe's Mission 25 Landing the Artillery 27 Evening D-Day 28 The Second Day. 21 November 1943 29 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, Lands 29 1st Battalion, 2d Marines 30 2dBattalion, 2dMarines 32 GREEN Beach is Secured 33 Crowe's Battalion 33 Supply Situation 34 The Pack Howitzers 37 The 6th Marines 38 The Light Tanks 39 Bairiki 40 1st Battalion. 6th Marines, Lands 40 Situation Ashore, SecondAfternoon 40 The Thir~LQ~22 November 19~3 43 Plansfor the Day 43 Artillery on Bairiki 44 Attack ofHay's Battalion 45 Attack o/the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines 45 http://www.ibiblio.org!hyperwarIUSMCIUSMC-M-Tarawalindex.html 11/17/2005 --- --- --""""... - ......,.................... "''''" Page 3 of3 Attack ofthe 2dBattalion, 8th Marines 46 The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, Lands 48 Plansfor the Afternoon 49 Afternoon Attack ofIst Battalion, 6th Marines 50 General Situation 50 The Counterattack 52 Nuisance Air Raids 54 The Island is Secured 56 The Fourth Day 56 Attack of3dBattalion, 6th Marines 57 Enemy Pocket RED I-RED 2 Area Destroyed 58 End ofBattle 59 Mi~~QILCQmpl~t~d 62 2dBattalion, 6th Marines, Mops Up the Atoll 62 Apamama: Corps Scouts 63 Apamama: 2d Marine Division 64 Abaiang, Marakei, and Maiana Atolls 65 The Division Leaves Tarawa 65 Conclusion 66 Appendix A: Bibliography 70 App~l}dixJl:_MJlJiI1e~Ca~l.!i:!lties 72 ~Jmendix C: JapaI1~se Casualties 73 ~ppendL'LJ2: Chronology 74 Appendix E: United States Task Organizations 76 Appendix F: 20 November 1943 80 Appendix G: Brief History ofthe Gilbert Islands Before the Japanese Invasion 81 b-lWendix H: Command and Staff-=:V Amphibious Corps and 2d Marine Division 20 82 November 1943 Appendbd: EstiIl1JlJed Against Actual Enemy Weapon Emplacements, Betio Island, 85 Tarawa AJ!P-endix tM~ssage from Major General Julian C. Smith to Officers and Men, 2d Marine 86 Divisi.on Transcribed andformatted by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation http://www.ibiblio.orglhyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Tarawa/index.html 11/17/2005 Page lof2 Foreword Tarawa was the first in a series ofamphibious operations which carried United States forces across the Central Pacific to the homeland ofJapan. When the 2d Marine Division landed on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll on 20 November 1943, twenty years ofMarine Corps study and work, already tested at Guadalcanal and at Bougainville, was put to an acid test. Tarawa was the :first example in history ofa sea-borne assault against a heavily defended coral atoll. Marine preparations for this operation were thorough; its plans were executed in a noteworthy manner. In the final analysis, however, success at Tarawa depended upon the discipline, courage, and fighting ability ofthe individual Marine. Seldom has anyone been called upon to fight a battle under more difficult circumstances. In capturing Tarawa, the 2d Marine Division accomplished a difficult mission in an expeditious manner. Seventy-six hours after the assault troops landed inthe face ofheavy resistance, the battle was over and an important base secured with the annihilation ofits defending garrison. Ofeven greater importance, however, was the fact that this successful operation underlined the soundness ofour doctrines ofamphibious assault. The lessons learned and confirmed at Tarawa paid great dividends in every subsequent operation from the Marshalls to the shores ofIwo lima and Okinawa. A.A. VANDEGRIFT General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps -ii- Preface This operational monograph is one ofa series prepared by the Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, concerning Marine Corps operations in World Warn. The first narrative was sent out for criticism and comment to officers who were present at Tarawa in principal positions. Upon receipt oftheir replies, a final revision, along with further editing, was undertaken. Tarawa is as factually accurate as the sources from which its subject matter was obtained. Inthe first six chapters there is no surmise; the facts are presented as they were recorded or obtained through interview. The last chapter sets forth, briefly, the importance and success ofthe battle for Tarawa, and mentions some ofthe lessons learned. It is believed, however, that it is too early to attempt a full critical analysis or detailed evaluation of the importance ofthe Tarawa operation in the Pacific war, ofthe lessons learned inthat operation, or their effect upon subsequent operations. Maps used in this monograph were prepared by the reproduction Department Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. Only official Marine Corps and Navy photographs are used. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Tarawa/USMC-M-Tarawa-Fwd.html 11/17/2005 Page 2 of2 All statements contained in this monograph have been thoroughly documented, although, in the interests oftextual smoothness and appeamnce, no citations have been made. A documented master copy ofthe entire monograph is on file in the Marine Corps archives and may be consulted at any time, subject to security regulations. Specific information as to documentation or source material will be furnished upon request. W.E.RILEY, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Division ofPublic Infonnation -iii--­ http://www.ibiblio.orglhyperwarIUSMCIUSMC-M-TarawalUSMC-M-Tarawa-Fwd.html 11117/2005 --- --- -_.......- .a.",... .......... \& ...... u l"-'.l.I.Q.l'''''''l. • .1J Page 1 ofB Chapter I Introduction Strategic Situation The strategic situation in the Pacific in the fall of 1943 was this: The Japanese had been driven out oftbe Aleutians in the North Pacific; with the landing ofthe 3d Marine Division on Bougainville, the conquest ofthe Solomons in the South Pacific neared completion; General MacArthur, in the Southwest Pacific, had secured eastern New Guinea and was preparing to invade the Bismarcks. Since the beginning ofthe war, it had been the opinion ofthe United States Chiefs ofStaffthat Japan Itcould best be defeated by a series ofamphibious attacks across the far reaches ofthe Pacific." In 1942 and early 1943, the attacks were few and widely scattered and the land fighting was done on the edge ofthe enemy's island defensive perimeter, ranging from Guadalcanal to Attu. That there were few amphibious attacks in the Pacific during the first year and a halfofthe war, and that these were limited in scale, may be traced to the global strategy to which the United States was committed: To defeat Germany first; to maintain increasing pressure on Japan; and to keep China in the war. So long as the war in the Pacific had a second priority, increasing pressure on Japan, in the form ofamphibious attacks, had to be limited to the means at hand. Importance ofthe Gilberts ItThe Gilbert Islands are a group ofcoral atolls lying athwart the equator. They had been held by the British up to the outbreak ofthe war in December 1941, when they were seized by the Japanese. Their location is ofgreat strategic significance because they are north and west ofother islands in our possession and immediately south and east ofimportant bases in the Carolines and Marshalls. The capture ofthe Gilberts was, therefore, a necessary part ofany serious thrust at the Japanese Empire."l At the QUADRANT Conference in Quebec, August 1943, the specific routes ofthe advance on Japan were laid out and operations in the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Marianas were agreed to. Before the QUADRANT Conference, however, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific and Pacific Ocean areas, had been alerted to begin planning for operations in the Central Pacific. On 20 July~ 1943, a directive was sent by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff instructing Nimitz to plan and prepare for operations in the Ellice and Gilbert Island groups.Z United States plans for the Central Pacific operations called for the capture ofa succession of Japanese positions from which attacks could be launched against Japanese strong points such as Truk. and the Marianas and also against essential lines ofcommunication. The several directives issued for these operations deimed the purposes as to gain control ofthe Gilbert Islands and the Marshall Islands, to secure a base area for the attack on the Carolines, to improve the security of our lines ofcommunications and to support other operations in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean by extending pressure on the Japanese. -1­ Plans for Operation GALVANIC Operation Plan 13-43 http://www.ibiblio.orglhyperwarIUSMCIUSMC~M- TarawalUSMC-M-Tarawa-l.html 11/17/2005 Page 2 of13 On the basis ofthe directives from the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, Admiral Nimitz began to organize and prepare his forces for the forthcoming operations. Planning studies and directives were sent out to the various units earmarked to participate in the Gilberts operation. Early planning envisaged the seizure ofNauru, Bititu (Betio) Island ofthe Tarawa Atoll, and airfield sites on Apamama as the primary objectives in the Gilberts operation. As planning progressed, certain intelligence information, not previously available, indicated that Nauru was heavily defended and offered extremely poor landing beaches. As a result, it was decided to substitute Makin for Nauru. While planning and preparations were in full swing, Admiral Nimitz ordered carrier-based strikes on Marcus, Tarawa, Apamama, and Wake to take place during the months ofAugust, September, and October.