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Re-Examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia1

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Re-Examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia1 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia1 Hannan R. Hussain* Abstract This paper re-examines the centrality of Pakistan-United States (US) ties vis-à-vis South Asia, beginning with an acknowledgement of historical consistencies, and the challenges posed to them in the Trump era. It then argues why the bilateral relationship is likely to retain its centrality, based on two cases: a case for convergence, and a case for divergence. The first option articulates how joint pursuits for peace in Afghanistan, and shifting economic alliances, render Pak-US cooperation integral to the South Asian security order. In the second case, differing counterterrorism positions – despite a joint pursuit for stability – demand immediate reconciliation and realignment of interests. These findings establish the degree of importance Pak-US ties continue to hold for South Asian stability, and warn that undermining the relationship can starve the region of a viable alternative. Keywords: US-Pak Ties, Convergence, Divergence, Geoeconomics, Counterterrorism, Afghanistan Peace. 1 An excerpt from this research paper was published by the author in Express Tribune, titled “Re-assessing Pakistan-US Centrality,” November 6, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2094137/6-re-assessing-pakistan-us-centrality/. * The author is Assistant Research Officer at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan. His research focuses on counter-militancy and populism in South Asia, sectarian dynamics and geopolitics in the Gulf. @ Islamabad Policy Research Institute. JoCA Vol. 4 (1&2): 95-116. Journal of Current Affairs 95 Hannan R. Hussain Introduction pread over seven decades, Pakistan-United States (Pak-US) relations enjoy historic centrality to South Asia. This became evident during the S1980s, when defence cooperation began to peak in Afghanistan.2 Additionally, both Washington and Islamabad demonstrated mutual dependence in engaging with key powers: the formalisation of Sino-US ties through Pakistan, and the latter’s communication to Delhi via Washington.3 However, with the distancing of Pakistan from US military designs in Afghanistan – and a consequent hardline from the Trump administration – experts on both ends of the spectrum have begun to question whether the relationship is beginning to lose its deep-rooted centrality. This paper argues that despite recent complications, joint pursuits for peace in Afghanistan, shifting economic alliances, and differing counterterrorism viewpoints are likely to sustain Pak-US centrality to South Asia. It begins by establishing the historic basis for diplomatic and strategic convergence between both countries, and the reasons underpinning post- Trump bilateral discord. The paper also details India’s threat perception within Pakistan’s foreign policy calculus, and how the former’s confrontational role over the past four decades has shifted Washington’s focus from Islamabad to New Delhi. It puts the spotlight on Islamabad’s resistance to the hardline US approach, and reveals the motivations among US experts to view Pakistan differently. Finally, the paper presents two cases where bilateral cooperation between Pakistan and the US is most likely to remain central: a case for convergence, and a case for divergence. In the former, limited defence cooperation threatens to compound Pakistan’s prospects of cross-border peace with Afghanistan, and endangers US demilitarisation interests. Moreover, securitising South Asia’s emerging economic order is also contingent upon consistent Pak-US engagement. In the latter case, frequent distrust can easily undermine joint Pak-US counterterrorism objectives in South Asia. Integrating divergent 2 Robert M. Hathaway, The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States (Washington, D.C: Wilson Center, 2017), 36, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-leverage-paradox. 3 “Memorandum of Conversation: Hilaly, Kissinger, and Saunders,” US Department of State, accessed July 10, 2020, https://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e13/72406.htm. 96 Vol. 4, Nos. 1 & 2 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia counterterrorism priorities into an overarching strategy can create a strong case for Pak-US centrality to South Asia. Historical Consistencies in Pak-US Security Ties Two security considerations dominate the history of Pak-US relations. First, the view that Afghanistan serves as the engine of regional stability. Second, the utility Islamabad and Washington afforded each other in reaching out to key powers. Afghanistan as a Regional Counterweight Both Pakistan and the US have relied heavily on Afghanistan to contain the influence of regional rivals. Washington’s extensive financial, training and intelligence support to the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s, helped fuel resistance to the Soviet occupation.4 The US viewed Soviet Union’s footprint in Afghanistan as a ‘threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia’, undermining US ascendancy in the Cold War.5 Pakistan’s decision to join the US covert operation, in exchange for economic aid, left Afghanistan as the pillar of Pak-US strategic convergence between late 70s and the mid-1980s. A similar US approach to regional balance became evident in October 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom signaled Washington’s 19-year long engagement in the Afghan war. Washington encouraged President Hamid Karzai to demonstrate greater dependency on Afghan warlords, and on frequent occasions, suggested that he distrust them.6 The Bush Administration itself gave rise to these divisive warlords in 4 Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 145-146. 5 Kyle Tadman, “An American Provocation: US Foreign Policy during the Soviet- Afghanistan War,” Western Illinois Historical Review 5 (Spring 2013): 31-65 (50), http://www.wiu.edu/cas/history/wihr/pdfs/Tadman- AnAmericanProvocationVol5.pdf. 6 Ronald E. Neumann, Failed Relations between Hamid Karzai and the United States: What Can We Learn? report (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2015), https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/failed-relations- between-hamid-karzai-and-united-states-what-can-we-learn. Journal of Current Affairs 97 Hannan R. Hussain Afghanistan’s domestic political scene, urging Karzai to follow suit.7 The extent to which such internal maneuverings eased Washington’s fight against the Taliban remains unclear. But the broadening of US interests in Kabul’s governance framework significantly influenced the leadership’s attitude towards its people, as well as toward key regional powers – including Pakistan. One result of Pakistan’s Cold War cooperation with the US was an acceleration in its military and economic competition with India. Numerous wars took place between the two powers, and India’s decision to proceed with nuclear tests in 1974 naturally prioritised Pakistan’s own defence considerations. Adding to the complications was Delhi’s tacit support for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1980. Well-documented accounts reveal that Delhi’s stated posture of non-alignment was underpinned by a robust national consensus, which pushed for Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.8 One of Delhi’s core rationales was to keep Pakistan’s newfound alliance with the US at bay. Ultimately, India and Pakistan found themselves on opposite ends of the Cold War pendulum, reflective of a polarising South Asian security order that demanded Pakistan’s attention. Trends in Pakistan’s regional stability support vis-à-vis Afghanistan are evident even today. Islamabad remains skeptic of Delhi’s developmental assistance to Afghanistan, viewing it as a build-up to India’s cross-border provocation.9 As a response, Islamabad has pushed for diplomatic dialogue with Kabul, consistently affirming peaceful solutions to Afghanistan’s internal conflicts and furthering measures for regional security. Though Pakistan and the US have deployed two fairly different approaches to Afghanistan, both have unequivocally relied on it to bring regional balancing goals to fruition. 7 Neumann, Failed Relations between Hamid Karzai and the United States, 12. 8 Partha S. Ghosh and Rajaram Panda, “Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi’s Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics,” Asian Survey 23, no. 3 (March 1983): 261-279 (265), https://doi.org/10.2307/2644273. 9 Nandita Palrecha and Monish Tourangbam, “India’s Development Aid to Afghanistan: Does Afghanistan Need What India Gives?” Diplomat, November 24, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/indias-development-aid-to-afghanistan- does-afghanistan-need-what-india-gives/. 98 Vol. 4, Nos. 1 & 2 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia Allies as Mediums of Engagement Washington and Islamabad have also depended on one another to reach out to key powers. The US deemed Pakistan crucial to establishing formal diplomatic ties with China.10 During the 1970s, Washington’s deep- seated skepticism of Beijing was overtaken by its heightening Cold War tussle with Moscow. Beijing’s contentious relationship with the Soviets suggested a critical addition to US containment efforts. To get through to China, however, President Richard Nixon began improving ties with Pakistan. By the 1970s, Islamabad emerged as Washington’s primary medium of engagement.11 President Yahya Khan’s visit to Beijing in October 1970 was seen as an opportunity by Washington
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