A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Triangularity and the Quad Plus Countering China’s Growing Influence KENTA AOKI Abstract Little has been discussed about the role of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran in the context of the Quad Plus’s possible areas of cooperation in the Indo- Pacific. This matters greatly to the Quad Plus because the area holds the Strait of Hormuz, which features as one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. To fill this gap, this article discusses impact of the Trump administration’s “America First” on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, and argues that the policy led these nations to look toward China and Russia. After closely looking at each case, this article proposes that engaging Iran—rejoining Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) and keeping Chabahar port development open—and supporting the Afghan peace process are the way forward to bring greater peace and stability not only in this region but also in the whole world in the long term. Uncertainty remains as the United States and Iran lost trust in one other. Thus, the United States and Iran must use a limited window of opportunity before the next Iranian presidential election in June 2021. Introduction In recent years, competition for influence within the Indo- Pacific theater has been gaining wider attention in strategic circles. This is partly because the basic principles of rules- based order have waned, as “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion ”began to be seen in several parts of the world, as exempli- fied by China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and Russia’s annexation of Crimea.1 This trend has become more visible after the COVID-19 pandemic, as the United States and Europe realized the perils of China’s “wolf warrior” diplo- macy.2 Under such circumstances, ways to improve connectivity are becoming increasingly important political, diplomatic, and economic tools that promote sta- bility and prosperity. Currently, the Quad Plus, originally composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States and later joined by South Korea, Vietnam, New Zealand, Israel, and Brazil,3 works hand- in- hand toward enhancing connectivity, expanding its scope from the Asia- Pacific to the Indo- Pacific. JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 285 Aoki Previous studies primarily focused on Southeast Asia under the motto of “ASEAN’s centrality and unity,” due to China’s expansionism in East China and South China Seas.4 Thus, little has been discussed about the role of Paki- stan, Afghanistan, and Iran in the context of the Quad Plus’s possible areas of cooperation in the Indo- Pacific. This matters greatly to the Quad Plus because the area holds the Strait of Hormuz, which features as one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. It hosts oil flow of 17 million barrel/day, representing 30 percent of all seaborne- traded crude oil during 2015.5 In short, maintaining energy security and freedom of navigation in the area are one of the top priori- ties for the Quad Plus. To fill this gap, this article argues that the Trump administration’s “America First” policy led Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran to look toward China and Russia for succor, which eventually incurred considerable diplomatic loss to the members of the Quad Plus. This article consists of four sections. The first three sections examine Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, respectively. Then, section four discusses pros and cons of the research thesis. This article proposes that engaging Iran and supporting the Afghan peace process are the way forward to bring greater peace and stability not only in this region but globally as well. The methodology adopted in this article is based on literature review and a field survey in Chabahar, Iran, and Karachi, Pakistan, in February 2018 and March 2019, respectively. Iran: The Point of Contention The Trump Administration’s Maximum Pressure Campaign Since the inauguration of US president Donald Trump in January 2017, his administration has pursued a hardline stance against Iran, labeling it as the main sponsor of global terrorism. The US–Iran standoff has led Iran to approach China, which is damaging the interests of members of the Quad Plus. For this reason, this section will scrutinize US policy toward Iran during the Trump administration. Trump’s mistrust of Iran is deeply rooted, as he continuously criticized Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East throughout the 2016 election cycle and into his term as president.6 On 8 May 2018, Trump eventually announced that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA),7 which had been seen as one of the most important legacies of the Obama administration. On 21 May 2018, shortly after Trump’s announce- ment, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pledged to commence “the strongest sanc- tions in history” and outlined 12 conditions required of Iran before any new deal would be made with the country.8 These demands encompassed various issues, 286 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Triangularity and the Quad Plus such as abandoning nuclear programs, including plutonium processing and devel- opment of ballistic missiles; suspending support for Shia militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere; and the cessation of threats to- ward Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These demands were designed to curtail Iran’s strategic intent and ultimately minimize Tehran’s op- tions, which is considered to be a huge blow to the Iranian regime. Under the maximum pressure campaign, Iran has faced one of the most seri- ous financial crises in history. Washington’s harsh policy toward Iran took a phased approach. The biggest step against the Iranian regime was to end sanc- tion waivers for Iranian crude oil imports for eight countries: India, China, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This meant that few governments were allowed to import crude oil from Iran, which was the coun- try’s main source of revenue. Despite the fact that Iran needed India’s continued support for buying fuel, India had to stop purchasing Iranian crude oil. Hence, it was not a coincidence when Iran excluded India from a railway project be- tween Chabahar and Zahedan.9 With a mixture of many other financial sanctions on Iranian companies and individuals locked out of the international money transfer network, the country’s financial situation got worse daily, which consequently led Tehran to request 5 billion USD in emergency funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in March 2020.10 In addition, the COVID-19 outbreak hit Iran in February 2020, exacerbating the financial situation and rendering it more difficult for Iranian citizens to lead normal lives. Due to the closure of borders with neighboring countries and the decrease of inbound tourists, revenue generation from trade of non- oil products and tourism, two potential alternative industries, also became limited. In short, Iran is faced with a double issue: US sanctions and COVID-19. In addition to such economic statecraft, tensions between the United States and Iran centered on the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and other places, soared dramatically. The turning point was a US drone strike on IRGC Quds Force commander Qa- sem Soleimani near the Baghdad International Airport on 3 January 2020, which further sparked tensions between Washington and Tehran. In response, the IRGC launched more than a dozen missiles at al- Asad Air Base in Iraq’s Anbar province, which hosts US troops, on 8 January 2020.11 Although many expected the United States to exact revenge against Iran, the Trump did not approve further actions, expressing the view that Iran avoided causing human casualties and eventually stood down. In addition, debates surrounding the arms embargo on Iran and at- tacks on nuclear facilities in Natanz are still ongoing. This status, as well as any action for Israel and against Iran, was maintained by President Trump, aimed at winning a second term in November 2020. However, JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 287 Aoki as former Vice Pres. Joe Biden won the election, there could be a significant shift in American policy, as he has officially expressed his wish to rejoin JCPOA if Iran returns to strict compliance with the deal.12 Iran has gradually reduced its com- mitment under JCPOA by exceeding the threshold (3.67 percent) of uranium enrichment since May 2019. As of June 2020, the Institute for Science and Inter- national Security (ISIS) estimates that Iran’s stock of low- enriched uranium grew to 2,323.9 kilograms, all enriched below 5 percent, and breakout timelines are 3.5 months.13 It is true that Iran is engaged in destabilizing behavior across the Mid- dle East, crushes internal protesters in brutal fashion, and poses a threat to the interests of the Quad Plus. Nevertheless, it is also certain that the JCPOA pro- vided a platform where the UN Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany (referred to as the P5+1) were able to have a dialogue with Iran. In this sense, it must be said that the United States eventually pushed Iran to reactivate its nuclear development programs. Israel, a member of the Quad Plus, would surely oppose any cooperation with Iran, so cautious measures must be taken to reduce tensions between the United States and Iran. Chabahar Port Development Although what the members of the Quad Plus can offer to Iran seems limited, or nearly nonexistent, it is notable that the Chabahar port is exempted from US sanctions. According to the US Department of State, the United States granted an exception to Chabahar because it is vital for the ongoing support of Afghani- stan’s growth and humanitarian relief.14 Washington also might have taken its friendly diplomatic relations with India into consideration.