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ITS | USFP Afghan Peace Process Diplomatic Brief Diplomatic Brief Afghan Peace Process Background • In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement that would eventually lead to the first direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government since 2001. • After months of negotiations, the Afghan government and the Taliban agreed in December 2020 to the principles and procedures that would govern the peace talks – the first big step towards a peace agreement. • On April 14, 2021, the Biden administration announced that the United States would be withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. • The peace talks are taking place concurrently with a campaign of targeted assassinations and attacks against Afghani civil servants, media figures, members of the judiciary, and other government o"cials. A vast majority of these attacks can be directly traced to the Taliban and their a"liates. Key Players United States of America Republic of India • Antony Blinken, Secretary of State • Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Minister of External • Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Special A#airs Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Islamic Republic of Pakistan Afghan Government • Mohammad Sadiq Khan, Special Envoy to • Mohammed Masoum Stanekzai, Chief Negotiator Afghanistan and Advisor to the President on Internal Security • Muhemmed Aejaz, Head of the Pakistani • Abdullah Abdullah, Chair of Afghanistan’s High Delegation Council for National Reconciliation Taliban Republic of Turkey • Mawlavi Abdul Hakim, Chief Negotiator • Mevlut Cavusoglu, Foreign Minister • Abdul Ghani Baradar , Deputy Chief Negotiator • Hakan Tekin, Director General for South Asia People’s Republic of China United Nations • Lui Jian, Special Envoy for Afghanistan • Deborah Lyons, Head of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Russian Federation • Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister • Zamir Kabulov, Presidential Special Envoy for Afghanistan USFP Programme 1 Significance The United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 toppled the then Taliban-controlled government. The Taliban, however, resurged in 2006. Since then, the balance of power has changed little in Afghanistan, as both the Taliban and the Afghan government continue their struggle for control of the war-torn country. The current peace talks are the first significant negotiations ever between the Afghani government and the Taliban. Indeed, the resilience with which both sides remained at the negotiating table despite deep-seated grievances and continued violence within the country appears to signify a genuine commitment to finding a path forward for the country. Current Round of Negotiations On March 18, several world leaders held an informal summit in Moscow joining representatives and delegates from the Afghan Republic, the Taliban, the United States, China, Turkey, Pakistan, and Qatar. The summit attempted to pave the way for formal peace talks in Istanbul under UN auspices. In addition to the delegate nations present at the Moscow Conference, India will also attend the peace talks. The Istanbul Conference takes place alongside ongoing talks in Doha that are stalled due to uncertainty surrounding the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s participation in the Istanbul Conference. The talks in Istanbul were scheduled to take place from April 24 to May 4, but have since been postponed until after Ramadan and Eid festivities. USFP Programme 2 Recommendations for the Biden Administration ● Avoid conceding more to the Taliban without concrete assurances. Issues of women's rights, violence against Afghani citizens, free-and-fair elections, and support for counterterrorism measures are all areas where the United States should not make any more compromises. The February 2020 Doha Agreement touched on few of these issues, and since then, the Taliban has fallen short of meeting several of the key commitments it agreed to, such as cutting o# ties to terrorist groups. A comprehensive peace agreement that fails to address all these issues would be a watered-down deal. ● Use the extended withdrawal time period to put diplomatic pressure on the Taliban. The six-month delay in negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government following the Doha Agreement caused a disruption in the timeline negotiated between the United States and the Taliban. This resulted in a delayed schedule for releasing Taliban prisoners and lifting sanctions, as well as ultimately gave the Biden administration room to extend the period for withdrawing U.S. troops. As Barnett Rubin argued back in February, a delayed withdrawal timeline still presents an opportunity to o#er the Taliban something it wants, and gives the Biden administration the opportunity to increase pressure on the Taliban to meet its commitments. ● Prioritize ending the campaign of targeted assassinations. In the first months of 2021 alone, the UN mission recorded more than 80 deaths, including that of a three-year-old boy. ● Focus on aid-delivery e!orts. The UN warns that as many as 18 million Afghans may need humanitarian assistance in 2021, which is double last year’s number and surpasses even Yemen as the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. ● Coordinate with NATO on a withdrawal from Afghanistan. A combined force of 9,600 NATO troops is currently present in Afghanistan, meaning there are more Europeans than Americans in Afghanistan. The United States should coordinate its withdrawal with NATO to ensure a united approach. ● Partner with key actors to implement a comprehensive peace agreement. Representatives from various countries, including China, Russia, Pakistan, and India all have a vested interest in seeing the conflict in Afghanistan resolved. Unlike the United States, they either share a border with Afghanistan, or exist in close proximity. This means they are more directly a#ected by the instability within the country. The integral participation of other key actors can help increase the likelihood and durability of a peace deal. USFP Programme 3 The View from the United States ● Most people in the United States do not have strong opinions on the withdrawal process or America's current policies regarding Afghanistan. A recent article by the Brookings Institution highlighted how Afghanistan is a low priority for most Americans. Traditionally, a public audience disconnected from certain issues results in politicians having more leeway to choose from a range of policy solutions. Without the attention of a fully engaged domestic audience on the Afghanistan peace process, the Biden administration could have greater flexibility in determining the next best steps in the negotiating process. ● Negotiating a lasting multilateral peace settlement that addresses key questions of political balance, governance, security, and human rights is a significant challenge. Some fear that once the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, the Taliban will disregard the outcome of the current peace talks and overrun the country. While this could significantly set back counterterrorism e!orts and worsen an already untenable humanitarian crisis, many experts are now skeptical that continued troop presence gives the United States more leverage over the Taliban. ● A recently leaked letter sent from Antony Blinken to Afghan president Ashraf Ghani laid out a plan for moving forward on the peace process, recognizing the need for more active participation on behalf of the United States and other actors. Among his proposals to "move matters more fundamentally and quickly" towards peace is a comprehensive ceasefire, a roadmap to an inclusive government, and a meeting of senior o"cials to be hosted by the Turkish government. Potential Roadblocks ● Pakistan: Future peace negotiations must involve one of the biggest actors in the conflict. Pakistan o#ers safe havens for Taliban leaders and fighters and is largely considered a critical provider of weapons and aid to the Taliban. Pakistan played an important role during the negotiations for a deal between the United States and the Taliban, and remains a key partner. However, Pakistan could just as easily revert to being a spoiler. Should the Taliban choose to walk away from a peace deal – especially if the United States were to withdraws before a comprehensive peace agreement is negotiated – there is little indication that Pakistan will cease to be their primary sponsor. USFP Programme 4 ● Increased Violence: The current spate of violence and targeted attacks within Afghanistan has significant potential for derailing the peace talks. While it is generally considered a sign of genuine commitment when two conflicting parties stay at the negotiating table despite widespread violence, there remains a chance that one side or the other uses the violence as pretext to withdraw from the peace talks. One of the first steps forward in the negotiating process that Secretary Blinken prioritized was negotiating a 90-day reduction in violence, which would give the peace process more breathing room. ● Individuals: In November 2020, President Ghani threw a wrench in the negotiating process as the two sides were on the cusp of agreeing to more than two dozen procedural points. However, at the last minute, he requested that all guiding documents refer to the government by its formal name, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This delayed the process for another month. Individuals such as President Ghani or Taliban chief Hibatullah Akhundzada, can potentially disrupt and drastically delay peace negotiations, becoming “spoilers” to the peace process. President Ghani in particular was never a
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