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News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 27 – February 2, 2021)

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News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 27 – February 2, 2021) רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ( למ )מ" מ" ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 27 – February 2, 2021) Overview In the Gaza Strip this past week the number of active Covid-19 cases continued to decrease; in response Egypt opened the Rafah Crossing. In Judea and Samaria mainly because of concern over the spread of the British variant led the Palestinian Authority (PA) government to extend the state of emergency. In the meantime the acquisition of coronavirus vaccines continues. Israel delivered 2,000 of 5,000 doses for vaccinating PA medical personnel. A Palestinian attempted to stab an IDF soldier at the Gush Etzion Junction. The terrorist was killed. No Israeli casualties were reported. The Gaza Strip remained relatively quiet. On two separate occasions, IDF UAVs fell inside the Gaza Strip during security operations. Mohammed al-Emadi, chairman of Qatar's National Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza, arrived in the Gaza Strip bringing Qatar's monthly donation of $3 million. PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh reported that formal contacts had been renewed between the PA and the American administration after the complete break in relations under Trump. In the meantime, preparations continue for the PA elections, and all the Palestinian organizations are expected to meet in Cairo in the near future for deliberations. The Spread of Covid-19 The Gaza Strip The decrease in the extent of Covid-19 infection continues. This past week 1,622 new active cases were detected. Between February 1 and 2, 1,970 tests were administered with a positive result rate of 7.2%. The number of active cases in the Gaza Strip is currently 4,248, down from 4,722 a week ago. There are 88 patients in ICUs, 50 of them on ventilators. There have been 523 coronavirus-related deaths, up from 513 a week ago (Ma'an, February 2, 2021). 023-21 2 Judea and Samaria This past week the number of active cases rose slightly, with 1,941 new active cases detected. Over a period of 24 hours 2,865 tests were administered with a positive result rate of 12.91%. The number of active cases is 3,736, up from 3,591 a weeks ago. There are 54 patients in ICUs, 15 of them on ventilators. There have been 1,326 coronavirus-related deaths, up from 1,318 a week ago (Facebook page of the ministry of health in Ramallah, February 2, 2021). State of emergency extended At the beginning of the weekly government meeting PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh reported a decrease in the extent of coronavirus infection, the result, he said, of the preventive measures taken by the PA government. He also said the occupancy of Covid-19 beds in hospitals had lessened, as had the number of patients in ICUs (Muhammad Shtayyeh' Facebook page, February 1, 2021). Despite the decline in infection and because of the spread of the British variant, on February 1, 2021 Mahmoud Abbas issued an order extending the state of emergency for 30 days (Wafa, February 1, 2021). Covid-19 vaccines arrive in the Palestinian Authority (PA) On February 1, 2021, Israel delivered 2,000 Covid-19 vaccines to the PA, the first installment of 5,000 vaccines manufactured by Moderna. The vaccines, which were delivered through the Bitunia Crossing, are intended for PA medical personnel (Israeli media, February 1, 2021). They are the first vaccines delivered to the Palestinians, although during the past weeks the PA were in contact with a number of companies manufacturing the vaccine. While the delivery of the vaccines from Israel was documented and reported in the media, including the Palestinian media, Dr. Kamal al-Shakhra, spokesman for the ministry of health in Ramallah, continued denying the reports, calling them "fake news" (Facebook page of the ministry of health in Ramallah, February 1, 2021). 023-21 3 Covid-19 vaccines delivered to the Palestinians from Israel (Shehab Facebook page, February 1, 2021). The arrival of vaccines in the PA was reported as follows: PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh told the weekly government meeting they expected to receive the first delivery of 50,000 doses of the vaccines from various sources, and they would begin vaccinating Palestinians in the middle of February 2021. The second delivery is expected to arrive, according to Shtayyeh, at the end of February 2021. Usama al-Najjar, a member of the ministry of health's emergency committee to combat Covid-19, said during an interview that in the coming days they would receive a large number of vaccines from Pfizer, Sputnik (a Russian company) and AstraZeneca. He said people would begin receiving the vaccine as soon as it arrived, and the first to be inoculated would be medical staff, people taking care of Covid-19 patients, high-risk groups and the aged (Sawt al-Quds, January 30, 2021). On January 29, 2021, Abd al-Hafiz Nofal, the PA representative in Russia, announced that the first consignment of 5,000 doses of the Russian vaccine, donated by the Russian government, would arrive in the coming days. In the meantime, the PA was negotiating the acquisition of 100,000 additional doses from Russia, which were expected to arrive during February 2021 (al-Quds, January 29, 2021). Ali Abd al-Rabbo, director of preventive medicine in the ministry of health in Ramallah, said the ministry was in contact with Sinopharm, a Chinese corporation, for the acquisition of vaccines. He said the ministry would purchase a specific quantity of the Chinese vaccine and groups in China would donate more doses (Sawa, January 27, 2021). 023-21 4 Israel's South Rocket and mortar shell fire into Israel This past week no rocket or mortar shell hits were identified in Israeli territory. Monthly Distribution of Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire 700 691 600 578 500 400 300 200 122 100 89 25 2 1 1 2 2 14 13 4 6 15 1 0 1 3 3 15 4 4 2 3 0 0 July July May May June June April April March March Jan-19 Jan-20 August August January October October February February February December December November November September September Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits 5000 4500 3,852 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1,403 1500 1,159 1,119 974 925 845 1000 783 787 375 373 195 500 158 103 39 24 15 29 3 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Operation Cast Lead Operation Pillar of Defense Operation Protective Edge 023-21 5 Other events During an IDF operational activity on February 2, 2021 a UAV fell near Khan Yunis (southern Gaza Strip). According to IDF sources, the loss of the UAV will not lead to information being leaked (IDF spokesman, February 2, 2021). On January 31, 2021, as well, a UAV fell during an IDF operation activity in the northern Gaza Strip. The Palestinian media reported that an Israeli UAV had fallen in the northern Gaza Strip near Beit Hanoun and that "security forces" had taken it (Shehab, January 31, 2021). Judea and Samaria Attempted stabbing attack at the Gush Etzion Junction On January 31, 2021, a Palestinian attempted to stab an IDF soldier at the Gush Etzion Junction. The terrorist was shot and died later. He arrived at the Gush Etzion Junction armed with a wooden rod to which three knives had been attached and ran towards the soldier, who was standing at the bus stop. One of the IDF fighters securing the location shot and mortally wounded the terrorist, who later died. No Israeli casualties were reported (IDF spokesman, January 31, 2021). A similar stabbing attack was attempted last week in Samaria. Right: The scene of the stabbing attack at the Gush Etzion Junction (Palinfo Twitter account, January 31, 2021). Left: Three knives attached to a wooden rod (IDF spokesman, January 31, 2021) The Palestinian media reported that the terrorist was Muhammad Hussein Amro, 35, from Halhul (north of Hebron). Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said his death at the hands of Israel showed the IDF was continuing its "aggressive behavior" and that the "settlers" continued attacking the Palestinian people. He said that in view of the activities, and to repel [alleged Israel] aggression, all forms of the "resistance" [i.e., terrorism] had to be escalated (Filastin al-Yawm, January 31, 2021). 023-21 6 Stones and Molotov cocktails thrown, and other events In Judea and Samaria Palestinians continued throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at vehicles driving on the roads. The more prominent events were the following:1 February 1, 2021: Stones were thrown at a vehicle south of Nablus. No casualties were reported. The front windshield of the vehicle was damaged. February 1, 2021: Stones were thrown at a vehicle southwest of Nablus. No casualties were reported. February 1, 2021: Stones were thrown at a vehicle east of Ramallah. No casualties were reported. February 1, 2021: Stones were thrown at a vehicle north of Modi'in Illit. No casualties were reported. The vehicle was damaged. February 1, 2021: Stones were thrown at a vehicle west of Nablus. No casualties were reported. January 31, 2021: Stones were thrown at a vehicle in Tekoa, south of Bethlehem. No casualties were reported. The vehicle was damaged. Window of a vehicle broken in Tekoa (Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria, January 31, 2021). January 31, 2021: Stones were thrown at a vehicle north of Modi'in Illit.
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