THE CRASH OF FLIGHT 90:

DOOMED BY SELF DECEPTION?

BY ROBERT TRIVERS AND HUEY P. NEWTON

Two biologists offer a startling interpretation: this tragic event, they say, was triggered by behavior that has evolved over eons as a survival tactic.

The following article is unsettling. The mechanism of self-deception, they say, Then, four seconds later: editors believe that its disturbing thesis may doomed Flight 90. Their article offers a Copilot: That doesn’t seem right, does it? help us to understand why some disasters unique interpretation of a tragic event. Three seconds later: occur and enable us to place what is Copilot: Ah, that’s not right. sometimes labeled negligence in a larger The benefit of self-deception is the more Two seconds later: context. While some of the language of the fluid deception of others. The cost is an Copilot: Well… story may seem brutally frank, the editors impaired ability to deal with reality. Two second later: believe the story has a constructive purpose, Ultimately we measure the cost of self- Pilot: Yes it is, there’s 80. and they feel only sympathy for the aircrew deception by its negative effects on It takes 11 seconds for the pilot to respond to and the others who perished. reproductive success and survival, but we the copilot. Apparently referring to an Seven months after a Tampa-bound Air are often far from able to make this final airspeed of 80 knots, he seeks to explain Florida 737, Flight 90, slammed into a connection. One approach is to begin with a away the instrument readings that are bridge and plunged into the Potomac River, disaster and work backward, looking for troubling the copilot. This fails to satisfy the killing 78 people, the National evidence of a pattern of self-deception copilot, and one second later: Transportation Safety Board reached its leading up to the event. Copilot: Naw, I don’t think that’s right. verdict. It attributed the crash to several Nine seconds later, having received no factors. First, the crew failed to activate the REALITY EVASION support from the pilot, the copilot wavers: anti-ice system of the plane’s engines before Consider, for example, the crash of Flight Copilot: Ah, maybe it is. takeoff. This in turn caused an engine- 90, immediately after takeoff on January 13, Two seconds later, the pilot states the speed pressure-ratio (EPR) sensor to give false 1982, during a heavy snowstorm. The at which they are traveling: readings that registered more thrust than in transcript of the final 30 minutes of Pilot: 120. fact was there. Also implicated were the conversation between the pilot and copilot Two seconds later: pilot’s decision to take off with snow and/or suggests a pattern of self-deception and Copilot: I don’t know. ice on the plane’s wings and his failure to reality evasion on the part of the pilot that Caught between his own doubts and the abort takeoff after being informed by the contributed directly to the tragedy. By pilot’s certainty, the copilot finally lapses copilot (who was at the plane’s controls) that contrast, the copilot comes across as reality- into uncertainty. Eight seconds later, the the EPR readings were inconsistent with oriented, but insufficiently strong in the face pilot says “V-1.” This is the go/no go other instrument readings. The board also of his captain’s self-deception. These are decision speed. After this point, the flight concluded that the pilot could have averted relatively crude characterizations, but useful can no longer be aborted safely because it the crash by applying full thrust seconds after to bear in mind as we try to capture the would run out of runway. Now we note a liftoff. complex way in which patterns of self- striking reversal in the roles of the pilot and Air Florida has disputed these findings, deception may generate a human disaster. copilot. So far the copilot has done all the charging that the crash was caused by a flaw Let us begin as the airplane is cleared for talking, the pilot only giving routine in the design of the 737 that makes it pitch takeoff and its engines are fired up to head information. Now that they have passed the sharply and by “undetected and down the runway. It will roar down the speed at which there committed to their undetectable” ice that formed on the leading runway for 47 seconds before reaching the course, the copilot no longer speaks, and the edge of Flight 90’s wing. speed at which the final decision must be pilot speaks repeatedly. Two seconds after Drs. Robert Trivers and Huey P. Newton, made about whether to go or not. At any V-1, the pilot says “Easy.” Four seconds biologists at the University of California, moment during this time the pilot can abort later he says “V-2.” This is the speed that Santa Cruz, have drawn a more startling the flight safely. Ten seconds after starting you must maintain to clear the end of the conclusion after reviewing the available down the runway the copilot responds to runway if an engine fails. Two seconds later evidence. The roots of the disaster, they say, instrument readings that are inconsistent. the sound of the stickshaker, a device that lie in evolutionary biology. The adaptive Copilot: God, look at that thing. signals an impending stall, is heard in the Copilot: D’they get yours? Can you see the copilot who first calls attention to the cockpit. your wingtip? strange instrument readings. It is the copilot Six seconds later: Pilot: I got a little on mine. who refers to them three times before the Pilot: Forward, forward. Copilot: This one’s got about a quarter to pilot responds to him. Two seconds later: half inch on it all the way. The transcript suggests how easily the Speaker undetermined: Easy. We see that the self-deceiver gives an disaster could have been averted. Imagine One second later: imprecise and diminutive answer concerning that earlier conversations about the snow on Pilot: We only want 500. a danger, while the copilot gives precise the wings, the heavy weight of the airplane Two seconds later: description of the extent of the danger. The and the slushy conditions underfoot had Pilot: Come on, forward. copilot also curses the snow, saying it is induced a spirit of caution in both pilots. Three seconds later: “probably the [expletive deleted] snow I’ve How easy it would have been for the pilot to Pilot: Forward. seen.” say “Well, this is a somewhat tricky situation. Two seconds later: Seven minutes before takeoff: I think we should take off with full speed but Pilot: Just barely climb. Copilot: Boy, this is a losing battle here watch our instruments carefully, and if we on trying on trying to deice those things, it fail to develop insufficient power, I think I AVERT A STALL gives you a false sense of security, that’s all should abort the takeoff.” Yet the The pilot is apparently urging the copilot to it does. conversation never had a chance to turn in reduce the rate of climb to avert the stall. Pilot: That, ah, satisfies the Feds. this direction, for every time the copilot Before the pair were committed to the fatal Copilot: Yeah---As good and crisp as the approached the subject, the pilot chose either flight, the pilot had little or nothing to say. air is and no heavier than we are I’d… to not respond or to divert attention from the Now that they have made their mistake, he Pilot: Right there is where the icing truck, problem that they faced. Mechanisms of comes out into the open and tries to reason. they oughta have two of them, you pull self-deception, having deprived him of even Four seconds later: right.. the most rudimentary advance planning, offer Speaker undetermined: Stalling, we’re ------him a quick fix for the disturbing instrument falling. readings and, after the fateful decision is One second later: Before takeoff, pilot and made, a 10-second illusion that he may be Larry, we’re going down, Larry. copilot explore a fantasy about able to get the airplane into the air safely. One second later: Dr. Aaron Waters, a noted geologist and Pilot: I know it. how ice should be removed professor emeritus at the University of Almost simultaneously, the recorder picks from planes on the runway. California, Santa Cruz, who has been a up “sounds of impact.” ------member of mountain rescue groups, The copilot did all his talking while it still The pilot and copilot now explore a responded to our account as follows (in a mattered. At the end, he is only heard from fantasy together on how the plane should be letter dated 2/23/82): telling his pilot what the pilot has been so deiced just before takeoff on the runway. reluctant to see: “Larry, we’re going down, Note that the copilot begins with an accurate A DISTURBED FEELING Larry.” And the pilot finally says, “ I know description of their situation; they have a Your example of the Flight 90 crash, it.” false sense of security. The pilot notes that however, left a disturbed feeling about the The dichotomy between self-deceiver and the arrangement satisfies the higher ups, but way you wrote it up. You correctly blame the reality-seeker was evident in earlier then switches the discussion to the way the pilot for the crash, but maybe you do not exchanges between the pilot and copilot as system should work. This is not without its bring out clearly enough that it was the they sat in the cockpit together prior to value and may, indeed lead to an improved pilot‘s complete insensitivity to the copilot’s departure in extremely cold weather and a system in the future, but in their immediate doubts, and to his veiled and timid pleas for driving snowstorm. A half hour before situation concentration on the general issue help, that was at the root of all this trouble. takeoff the following exchange took place” rather than diverted attention from the The pilot, with much more experience, just Copilot: We’re too heavy for the ice. difficulties at hand. sat there completely unaware and without Copilot: They get a tractor with chains on Just before takeoff the copilot asks the any realization that the copilot was it? They got one right over here. pilot for advice on their next situation: desperately asking for friendly advice and He is referring to the unsuccessful efforts of a Copilot: Slushy runway, do you want me professional help. Even if he (the pilot) had tractor to push the plane from the deicing and to do anything special for this or just go for gruffly grunted, “If you can’t handle it, turn anti-icing position back to its runway it? it over to me,” such a response would have position. The tractor has failed because of Pilot: Unless you got anything special probably shot enough adrenaline into the the icy ground. you’d like to do. copilot so that he would have either flown the Copilot: I’m surprised we couldn’t power Copilot: Unless just takeoff the nose mission successfully, or aborted it without it out of here. wheel a little early like a soft field takeoff or accident. Pilot: Well, we could if he wanted me to something. From limited experience in mountain pull some reverse. The pilot, to whose greater experience the rescue work, and considerable experience The copilot is suggesting using the plane’s copilot appears repeatedly to defer, has no with dangerous work in abandoned mines, own power to get back into position. The help to offer on how to take off in these I’ve found that the people who lead others pilot replies that it could be done with reverse particular circumstances. This makes their into trouble are the hale and hearty thrust. They try, but the attempt fails, and in final conversation all the more vivid. The insensitive jocks trying to show off. They the end a tractor with chains on does the job. copilot is at the controls of the plane. cannot perceive that a companion is so Just before takeoff, the condition of the Having failed to give his copilot any advice terrified that he is about to “freeze” to the winds is also considered. Given the seating and having failed to plan in the slightest for side of a cliff---and for very good reason. arrangements in the cockpit, each man checks difficulty in takeoff, the pilot’s only And once this has happened the one that led the wing on his own side. responsibility is to read the instruments and him into it becomes an even worse basket Pilot: Get your wing now. warn the copilot of any problem. Yet it is case, and the most difficult one to rescue. I think the copilot “froze” and immediately the said he twice told the pilot that he should heading down runway at full speed as judged pilot “froze” even worse and began talking wait until just before takeoff before deicing; by his own body. In his split role he neither to the airplane. However, the copilot is also otherwise, the deicing fluid would cause wet discharges the copilot’s roll nor assumes full at fault; left to himself he would have called snow to collect, which is precisely what responsibility for the flight. Indeed, he the tower and not flown the mission, but in happened. A picture taken of the plane just repeatedly seeks to convey to the copilot the the presence of his companion he was guilty after deicing shows snow already covering message that this is a routine flight, requiring of self-deception. the upper fuselage. nothing more than the usual self-confidence. The media have concentrated on the icing On the Air Florida flight, a natural question on the wings, but the master geologist sees a MOVING THE AIRCRAFT is “What were the potential benefits to the human parallel to the freezing weather. Each The problem of snow and ice on the wings copilot of acquiescing to the pilot’s self- man, in turn, “freezes” in fright and the may have been compounded by the decision deception? To answer this we would have to disaster is complete. The most recent to use the plane’s own power to try and present detailed information on the way in evidence on the faulty instrument readings move the aircraft back from the gate. This which copilots are required to relate to their bears out Dr. Waters’ interpretation. It is kind of casual incaution is exactly what one superiors. But we can speculate on the cost now known that the airplane was getting 25% would expect from an “airplane jock.” to the copilot of becoming known as a less thrust than its instrument readings Certain types of adventurous men are “chicken,” someone too frightened to take on showed! especially prone to this form of self- the role of a pilot when the circumstances are ------deception. (Both the pilot (age 34) and the adverse. copilot (age 31) had been military pilots ------Like the weather, the copilot before turning to commercial work.) was cold prior to takeoff. By The use of reverse thrust could have Why did the pilot seem to have pushed the slush to the leading edge of the the illusion that overconfidence contrast, the pilot was cool— wings. This is precisely where ice and snow nothing was fazing him. do the greatest damage. Indeed, in a 1980 plus skill would always work in ------bulletin, Boeing, the plane’s manufacturer, his favor? The takeoff consumed almost 17 seconds had already warned against using 737 ------more time (and a greater length of the reversers during snowfalls. If reverse thrust What are the benefits of the pilot’s self- runway) than it should have. Had the pilot, is used, Boeing advised, the wing’s edges deception? An analogy to fights in nature in fact, aborted at the go/no-go speed, he should be cleared of any ice and snow. It may be beneficial. When two animals are would have run out of runway. can cause the plane’s nose to “pitch up” too evenly matched in a fight, each will attempt If the copilot was cold prior to takeoff, the far at takeoff and roll to the side, threatening to convince the other that the fight will go in pilot was positively “cool.” Nothing fazed a stall. This is what seems to have happened his favor. As this time, a convincing false him. The situation in which he found himself to Flight 90. front may succeed in frightening away one’s was nothing new to his industry nor his A second consequence of using reverse opponent. By contrast, when two fighters are company. In the previous September, for thrust is that it may have caused snow to poorly matched, a display of bravado by the example, Air Florida’s chief 737 pilot swirl up and block the sensors that caused underdog will carry little weight. Thus, we attached a 737 winter-flight note to the the false readings on the amount of the imagine that presenting a falsely positive monthly Air Florida crew newsletter. He engine thrust and speed of forward front may often have been advantageous to specifically warned of the dangers of winter movement. the pilot prior to Flight 90, giving him the flying at the more northerly airports. Superimposed on all this detailed illusion that skill plus overconfidence works “Nobody can be too prepared for LaGuardia, information stands one obvious fact. On the in all encounters. Put another way, a pattern O’Hare, White Plains, or Washington mission in question the copilot was flying of self-deception can become ingrained National.” He told crews to look for snow the plane. That is, he was playing the role of through many small instances of positive and ice buildup and to arrange for as late an the pilot and the pilot, meanwhile, was feedback, thereby lulling the self-deceiver airframe dicing as practical: “If heavy playing the role of the copilot. This is into the comfortable illusion that self- freezing precipitation exists, it may be intended to be educational for the copilot, deception will always work in his favor. necessary to get deiced again if significant since he thereby learns how to become a Summary ground delays occur” (emphasis added). pilot, but the pilot is still in charge. In effect, We have tried to show that the processes of Nine airliners taking off before Flight 90 he is to do two things at once: discharge the self-deception, acting primarily in the pilot, were deiced between 9 and 44 minutes before duties of the copilot while remaining contributed directly to the disaster of Flight takeoff, but Flight 90 went 49 minutes its last responsible for the flight itself. 90. This pattern included insensitivity to deicing and anti-icing and takeoff. Did this confusion of roles contribute to numerous signals from the copilot and a We now see that the final discussion the disaster? We believe it did. Had the confusion of roles between pilot and copilot. between pilot and copilot in a new light. pilot been flying the plane that day, we We conclude that the human element of self- Both the pilot and copilot know that their believe the chances for survival would have deception is the main factor leading up to the plane needs a second deicing, but instead of been better. The copilot shows himself to be disaster. This conclusion has implications for seeking it, the pilot leads them into a fantasy a careful man. In this flight, he even air safety and, by analogy, implications for world in which they get their second deicing discharges some of his customary duties, our understanding of the way in which without losing their place in the line waiting such as reading the instruments. By natural selection acts on processes of self- to takeoff. contrast, the pilot handles the airplane the deception. The American Airlines maintenance chief way one might handle a horse, by seat-of- whose men serviced the Air Florida plane the-pants control. The pilot himself might have ignored the instrument readings,

------The preceding article was originally written by Trivers, R.L. & Newton, H.P. Science Digest 'The crash of flight 90: doomed by self-deception?' November 1982, pp 66,67,111. Trivers, R.L. & Newton, H.P. Science Digest 'The crash of flight 90: doomed by self-deception?' November 1982, pp 66,67,111.