The Crash of Flight 90

THE CRASH OF FLIGHT 90: DOOMED BY SELF DECEPTION? BY ROBERT TRIVERS AND HUEY P. NEWTON Two biologists offer a startling interpretation: this tragic event, they say, was triggered by behavior that has evolved over eons as a survival tactic. The following article is unsettling. The mechanism of self-deception, they say, Then, four seconds later: editors believe that its disturbing thesis may doomed Flight 90. Their article offers a Copilot: That doesn’t seem right, does it? help us to understand why some disasters unique interpretation of a tragic event. Three seconds later: occur and enable us to place what is Copilot: Ah, that’s not right. sometimes labeled negligence in a larger The benefit of self-deception is the more Two seconds later: context. While some of the language of the fluid deception of others. The cost is an Copilot: Well… story may seem brutally frank, the editors impaired ability to deal with reality. Two second later: believe the story has a constructive purpose, Ultimately we measure the cost of self- Pilot: Yes it is, there’s 80. and they feel only sympathy for the aircrew deception by its negative effects on It takes 11 seconds for the pilot to respond to and the others who perished. reproductive success and survival, but we the copilot. Apparently referring to an Seven months after a Tampa-bound Air are often far from able to make this final airspeed of 80 knots, he seeks to explain Florida 737, Flight 90, slammed into a connection. One approach is to begin with a away the instrument readings that are bridge and plunged into the Potomac River, disaster and work backward, looking for troubling the copilot. This fails to satisfy the killing 78 people, the National evidence of a pattern of self-deception copilot, and one second later: Transportation Safety Board reached its leading up to the event. Copilot: Naw, I don’t think that’s right. verdict. It attributed the crash to several Nine seconds later, having received no factors. First, the crew failed to activate the REALITY EVASION support from the pilot, the copilot wavers: anti-ice system of the plane’s engines before Consider, for example, the crash of Flight Copilot: Ah, maybe it is. takeoff. This in turn caused an engine- 90, immediately after takeoff on January 13, Two seconds later, the pilot states the speed pressure-ratio (EPR) sensor to give false 1982, during a heavy snowstorm. The at which they are traveling: readings that registered more thrust than in transcript of the final 30 minutes of Pilot: 120. fact was there. Also implicated were the conversation between the pilot and copilot Two seconds later: pilot’s decision to take off with snow and/or suggests a pattern of self-deception and Copilot: I don’t know. ice on the plane’s wings and his failure to reality evasion on the part of the pilot that Caught between his own doubts and the abort takeoff after being informed by the contributed directly to the tragedy. By pilot’s certainty, the copilot finally lapses copilot (who was at the plane’s controls) that contrast, the copilot comes across as reality- into uncertainty. Eight seconds later, the the EPR readings were inconsistent with oriented, but insufficiently strong in the face pilot says “V-1.” This is the go/no go other instrument readings. The board also of his captain’s self-deception. These are decision speed. After this point, the flight concluded that the pilot could have averted relatively crude characterizations, but useful can no longer be aborted safely because it the crash by applying full thrust seconds after to bear in mind as we try to capture the would run out of runway. Now we note a liftoff. complex way in which patterns of self- striking reversal in the roles of the pilot and Air Florida has disputed these findings, deception may generate a human disaster. copilot. So far the copilot has done all the charging that the crash was caused by a flaw Let us begin as the airplane is cleared for talking, the pilot only giving routine in the design of the 737 that makes it pitch takeoff and its engines are fired up to head information. Now that they have passed the sharply and by “undetected and down the runway. It will roar down the speed at which there committed to their undetectable” ice that formed on the leading runway for 47 seconds before reaching the course, the copilot no longer speaks, and the edge of Flight 90’s wing. speed at which the final decision must be pilot speaks repeatedly. Two seconds after Drs. Robert Trivers and Huey P. Newton, made about whether to go or not. At any V-1, the pilot says “Easy.” Four seconds biologists at the University of California, moment during this time the pilot can abort later he says “V-2.” This is the speed that Santa Cruz, have drawn a more startling the flight safely. Ten seconds after starting you must maintain to clear the end of the conclusion after reviewing the available down the runway the copilot responds to runway if an engine fails. Two seconds later evidence. The roots of the disaster, they say, instrument readings that are inconsistent. the sound of the stickshaker, a device that lie in evolutionary biology. The adaptive Copilot: God, look at that thing. signals an impending stall, is heard in the Copilot: D’they get yours? Can you see the copilot who first calls attention to the cockpit. your wingtip? strange instrument readings. It is the copilot Six seconds later: Pilot: I got a little on mine. who refers to them three times before the Pilot: Forward, forward. Copilot: This one’s got about a quarter to pilot responds to him. Two seconds later: half inch on it all the way. The transcript suggests how easily the Speaker undetermined: Easy. We see that the self-deceiver gives an disaster could have been averted. Imagine One second later: imprecise and diminutive answer concerning that earlier conversations about the snow on Pilot: We only want 500. a danger, while the copilot gives precise the wings, the heavy weight of the airplane Two seconds later: description of the extent of the danger. The and the slushy conditions underfoot had Pilot: Come on, forward. copilot also curses the snow, saying it is induced a spirit of caution in both pilots. Three seconds later: “probably the [expletive deleted] snow I’ve How easy it would have been for the pilot to Pilot: Forward. seen.” say “Well, this is a somewhat tricky situation. Two seconds later: Seven minutes before takeoff: I think we should take off with full speed but Pilot: Just barely climb. Copilot: Boy, this is a losing battle here watch our instruments carefully, and if we on trying on trying to deice those things, it fail to develop insufficient power, I think I AVERT A STALL gives you a false sense of security, that’s all should abort the takeoff.” Yet the The pilot is apparently urging the copilot to it does. conversation never had a chance to turn in reduce the rate of climb to avert the stall. Pilot: That, ah, satisfies the Feds. this direction, for every time the copilot Before the pair were committed to the fatal Copilot: Yeah---As good and crisp as the approached the subject, the pilot chose either flight, the pilot had little or nothing to say. air is and no heavier than we are I’d… to not respond or to divert attention from the Now that they have made their mistake, he Pilot: Right there is where the icing truck, problem that they faced. Mechanisms of comes out into the open and tries to reason. they oughta have two of them, you pull self-deception, having deprived him of even Four seconds later: right.. the most rudimentary advance planning, offer Speaker undetermined: Stalling, we’re -------------------------------------- him a quick fix for the disturbing instrument falling. readings and, after the fateful decision is One second later: Before takeoff, pilot and made, a 10-second illusion that he may be Larry, we’re going down, Larry. copilot explore a fantasy about able to get the airplane into the air safely. One second later: Dr. Aaron Waters, a noted geologist and Pilot: I know it. how ice should be removed professor emeritus at the University of Almost simultaneously, the recorder picks from planes on the runway. California, Santa Cruz, who has been a up “sounds of impact.” -------------------------------------- member of mountain rescue groups, The copilot did all his talking while it still The pilot and copilot now explore a responded to our account as follows (in a mattered. At the end, he is only heard from fantasy together on how the plane should be letter dated 2/23/82): telling his pilot what the pilot has been so deiced just before takeoff on the runway. reluctant to see: “Larry, we’re going down, Note that the copilot begins with an accurate A DISTURBED FEELING Larry.” And the pilot finally says, “ I know description of their situation; they have a Your example of the Flight 90 crash, it.” false sense of security. The pilot notes that however, left a disturbed feeling about the The dichotomy between self-deceiver and the arrangement satisfies the higher ups, but way you wrote it up. You correctly blame the reality-seeker was evident in earlier then switches the discussion to the way the pilot for the crash, but maybe you do not exchanges between the pilot and copilot as system should work.

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