DOCSLIB.ORG

Panel of Experts Report on North Korea

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Panel of Experts Report on North Korea Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) Summary Over the period under review the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has continued to reject and to violate Security Council resolutions. In November 2010 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea revealed that it had been pursuing a programme of uranium enrichment and was constructing a new nuclear reactor. The country has also continued to defy the bans on imports and exports of nuclear-related items, of conventional arms and of luxury goods, and this report details several seizures of banned shipments. The Panel believes that, while sanctions have clearly not stopped the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programmes and trade in arms, they have made it more difficult and expensive for the country to pursue these. Nevertheless Member States continue to face numerous difficulties in implementing sanctions. The Panel has discovered loopholes and other vulnerabilities in shipping and transportation practices that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and others have exploited, and notes increasing sophistication on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea both in the establishment of shell and front companies and offshore financial agents, and in the proliferation of affiliates, substitutes and aliases intended to mask already designated entities and individuals. This report therefore includes a variety of recommendations to improve the effectiveness of sanctions. These include suggested responses to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s uranium enrichment programme, further efforts to encourage Member States to report as required by the Council, extending the list of items prohibited by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), clearer guidelines on the definition of luxury goods and an expansion and updating of the list of eight entities and five individuals currently sanctioned by the Committee. 11-32818 (E) 120511 !""#$%"%!! In pursuing its mandate the Panel has consulted extensively with Member States, inspected seized goods and interviewed numerous experts at international conferences and in New York. It has increased its knowledge of techniques of sanctions evasion used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (which include extensive falsification of documents and diversion of cargo), illicit financial transactions carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the channels through which banned goods travel, and cooperation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with other States in pursuing proscribed activities. The Panel is grateful for the cooperation it has received from many Member States. Much remains to be done to improve sanctions implementation among Member States and to constrain the networks that facilitate sanctions evasion. Looking forward, the Panel plans to work with Member States to improve the rate of filing of national implementation and compliance-related reports, to work towards establishing best practice for vigilance on cargo to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to suggest other entities and individuals for designation, and to recommend ways of countering the efforts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to evade sanctions. 2 11-32818 Contents Page Abbreviations.................................................................. 5 I. Introduction ................................................................... 6 II. Methodology .................................................................. 7 III. Background ................................................................... 7 IV. Panel of Experts................................................................ 9 V. Reports of Member States........................................................ 12 A. National implementation reports .............................................. 13 B. Compliance-related reports (inspection, seizure and disposal) ...................... 15 VI. Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ............................................ 16 A. Nuclear programmes........................................................ 16 B. Ballistic missile programmes ................................................. 24 C. Other existing weapons of mass destruction programmes .......................... 26 VII. Export and import-related measures ............................................... 27 A. Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related exports and imports ................................................................... 27 B. Arms exports and imports ................................................... 30 C. Ban on luxury goods ........................................................ 32 VIII. Interdiction.................................................................... 34 A. Trade and transportation infrastructure ......................................... 34 B. Patterns of sanctions evasion ................................................. 38 C. Interdiction actions ......................................................... 41 IX. Financial measures ............................................................. 43 A. Illicit financial transactions .................................................. 44 B. Foreign investment in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea .................. 46 X. Designation of goods, entities and individuals ....................................... 48 A. Designation of entities and individuals ......................................... 48 B. Designation of goods ....................................................... 52 XI. Unintended impact ............................................................. 53 A. Unintended impact on the humanitarian situation ................................ 53 B. Unintended impact on diplomatic missions ..................................... 54 XII. Recommendations .............................................................. 54 11-32818 3 Annexes A.1. Imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre ................................... 61 A.2. Imagery of the fuel fabrication complex ............................................ 62 A.3. Imagery of the 5-MWe reactor and light water reactor construction site .................. 63 A.4. Imagery of the new launch site close to Tongchangdong ............................... 64 A.5. Items designated by Member States as luxury goods .................................. 65 A.6. List of autonomous designations .................................................. 72 A.7. Main transportation routes in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ................ 81 4 11-32818 Abbreviations HEU highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IATA International Air Transport Association ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IMO International Maritime Organization INFCIRC information circular (IAEA publication) LEU low enriched uranium LLI Lloyd’s List Intelligence MWe Megawatt-electrical MWt Megawatt-thermal SWU separative work unit UF6 uranium hexafluoride WCO World Customs Organization 11-32818 5 I. Introduction 1. In paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), the Secretary- General was requested to establish a Panel of Experts to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed by the Council in its resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and, in particular, to document incidents of non-compliance; to assist the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in carrying out its functions; and to make recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee or Member States may consider to improve implementation of those measures. This is the Panel’s second annual report. 2. The situation remains challenging. At the date of this report there are no indications that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is ready to roll back its proscribed programmes. The political and security climate on and around the Korean peninsula has deteriorated in the wake of unprovoked acts of war by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. With the Six-Party Talks stalled the sanctions remain the primary Council mechanism for both condemnation and constraint of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s non-conventional capabilities. 3. Although the revelation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its uranium enrichment programme despite the sanctions might seem to raise issues about their effectiveness, it appears that the country may have acquired and developed much of this programme before their adoption. Recent developments are therefore not evidence that they have been ineffective. On the contrary evidence suggests that the sanctions have succeeded in economic terms by raising the costs of illicit transfers while simultaneously lowering the returns to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. They are also believed to have increased the risk of doing business for States and non-State actors, which may have a deterrent effect. Nevertheless, implementation of the sanctions has to be improved to prevent further development and possible proliferation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programmes. 4. During the reporting period, the Panel followed up on its investigations and on the findings it has reported to date. This report and its confidential annex present the latest findings of the Panel. It notes both challenges and
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Korea (Democratic People's Republic Of)'S Constitution of 1972 with Amendments Through 2016
    PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:44 constituteproject.org Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)'s Constitution of 1972 with Amendments through 2016 Subsequently amended This complete constitution has been generated from excerpts of texts from the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project, and distributed on constituteproject.org. constituteproject.org PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:44 Table of contents Preamble . 3 CHAPTER I: POLITICS . 4 CHAPTER II: THE ECONOMY . 7 CHAPTER III: CULTURE . 10 CHAPTER IV: NATIONAL DEFENCE . 12 CHAPTER V: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS . 13 CHAPTER VI: STATE ORGANS . 16 SECTION 1: THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY . 16 SECTION 2: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA . 18 SECTION 3: THE STATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION . 19 SECTION 4: THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY . 20 SECTION 5: THE CABINET . 23 SECTION 6: THE LOCAL PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY . 25 SECTION 7: THE LOCAL PEOPLE’S COMMITTEE . 27 SECTION 8: THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICE AND THE COURT . 28 CHAPTER VII: EMBLEM, FLAG, ANTHEM AND CAPITAL . 31 Korea (Democratic People's Republic of) 1972 (rev. 2016) Page 2 constituteproject.org PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:44 • Political theorists/figures • Preamble Preamble • Reference to country's history The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the socialist motherland of Juche where the ideas and leadership of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are applied. The great Comrade Kim Il Sung was the founder of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the father of socialist Korea.
    [Show full text]
  • North Korea's Political System*
    This article was translated by JIIA from Japanese into English as part of a research project to promote academic studies on the international circumstances in the Asia-Pacific. JIIA takes full responsibility for the translation of this article. To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your personal use and research, please contact JIIA by e-mail ([email protected]) Citation: International Circumstances in the Asia-Pacific Series, Japan Digital Library (March 2016), http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/korean_peninsula.php Series: Korean Peninsula Affairs North Korea’s Political System* Takashi Sakai** Introduction A year has passed since the birth of the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea following the sudden death of General Secretary Kim Jong-il in December 2011. During the early days of the regime, many observers commented that all would not be smooth sailing for the new regime, citing the lack of power and previ- ous experience of the youthful Kim Jong-un as a primary cause of concern. However, on the surface at least, it now appears that Kim Jong-un is now in full control of his powers as the “Guiding Leader” and that the political situation is calm. The crucial issue is whether the present situation is stable and sustain- able. To consider this issue properly, it is important to understand the following series of questions. What is the current political structure in North Korea? Is the political structure the same as that which existed under the Kim Jong-il regime, or have significant changes occurred? What political dynamics are at play within this structure? Answering these questions with any degree of accuracy is not an easy task.
    [Show full text]
  • Why North Korea Wants to Acquire Nuclear-Tipped ICBM?
    Page 2 of 31 About the Author Prerna Gandhi is a Research Associate at the Vivekananda International Foundation with a focus on Japan, ASEAN and Korean Peninsula. She is currently a doctoral student at Dept. of East Asian Studies, Delhi University. She is also a recipient of the Mitsubishi Corporation International Scholarship and visited Japan in the “Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths Program- JENESYS” in summer of 2011. http://www.vifindia.org ©Vivekananda International Foundation Page 3 of 31 Threat of Military Conflict on Korean Peninsula Introduction The threat of another military conflict has always existed on Korean peninsula since the Korean War of 1950 ended without a peace treaty in 1953. However, rather than a direct North and South Korea confrontation, the latent possibilities of a conflict have now moved into the direction of a US-North Korea conflict. The increased pace of nuclear and missile testing under Kim Jong-un’s supremacy has sought to hasten North Korea’s surge of being able to field a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Certain successful tests in the latter half of 2017 have closed the credibility gap of North Korean threat. This had made terminating its nuclear weapons program now a strategic matter interspersed with an aggressive military posturing by the US. While the earlier Obama administration in the US had sought not to give any public credence to North Korea under its ‘Strategic Patience’ policy, the new Trump administration has been vocal of all cards including military ones being on the table. However, any lasting solution to increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula will require a regional consensus.
    [Show full text]
  • Kim Jong-Un's New Entourage
    Kim Jong-un’s New Entourage By Andy Lim Understanding Pyongyang Inner Circle Studying Pyongyang leadership is an unenviable task, much like Kremlinologists who received no credit for their work after they failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but it should not be a thankless one. When confronted with a regime as closed and as secretive as Pyongyang’s, the only way for scholars to get around the fog is to capitalize on the little information available, although sometimes those information might turn out to be unreliable. That task becomes even more difficult when dealing with a regime in Pyongyang that purges officials on a regular basis, where the term Pyongyang shuffle, a seemingly poor Machiavellian joke is used to demonstrate how quickly people can fall from grace. But this behavior is not entirely unreasonable because we have an actor in the Kim dynasty that has every self-interest to do anything to maintain its power. Luckily for them, they have just the right authoritarian tools of control at its disposal – the ability to purge anyone they perceived to be a threat to their power without substantial consequences. This piece, in its attempt to examine the up and rising military and party officials who have emerged under Kim Jong-un during the past two years, might seem like a Sisyphean task given the opacity and the quick turnaround rate of purges in Pyongyang. But in trying to understand who in the post-Jang period are most likely to fill the power vacuum besides the Dear Leader, one can piece together how Kim Jong-un reshuffles his key personnel to accomplish his ultimate goal of consolidating his unitary leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • North Korean Leadership Dynamics and Decision-Making Under Kim Jong-Un a Second Year Assessment
    North Korean Leadership Dynamics and Decision-making under Kim Jong-un A Second Year Assessment Ken E. Gause Cleared for public release COP-2014-U-006988-Final March 2014 Strategic Studies is a division of CNA. This directorate conducts analyses of security policy, regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategy and force assessments. CNA Strategic Studies is part of the glob- al community of strategic studies institutes and in fact collaborates with many of them. On the ground experience is a hallmark of our regional work. Our specialists combine in-country experience, language skills, and the use of local primary-source data to produce empirically based work. All of our analysts have advanced degrees, and virtually all have lived and worked abroad. Similarly, our strategists and military/naval operations experts have either active duty experience or have served as field analysts with operating Navy and Marine Corps commands. They are skilled at anticipating the “prob- lem after next” as well as determining measures of effectiveness to assess ongoing initiatives. A particular strength is bringing empirical methods to the evaluation of peace-time engagement and shaping activities. The Strategic Studies Division’s charter is global. In particular, our analysts have proven expertise in the follow- ing areas: The full range of Asian security issues The full range of Middle East related security issues, especially Iran and the Arabian Gulf Maritime strategy Insurgency and stabilization Future national security environment and forces European security issues, especially the Mediterranean littoral West Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea Latin America The world’s most important navies Deterrence, arms control, missile defense and WMD proliferation The Strategic Studies Division is led by Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Operational Environment & Threat Analysis Volume 10, Issue 1 January - March 2019 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED OEE Red Diamond published by TRADOC G-2 Operational INSIDE THIS ISSUE Environment & Threat Analysis Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS Topic Inquiries: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Angela Williams (DAC), Branch Chief, Training & Support The Hermit Kingdom .............................................. 3 Jennifer Dunn (DAC), Branch Chief, Analysis & Production OE&TA Staff: North Korea Penny Mellies (DAC) Director, OE&TA Threat Actor Overview ......................................... 11 [email protected] 913-684-7920 MAJ Megan Williams MP LO Jangmadang: Development of a Black [email protected] 913-684-7944 Market-Driven Economy ...................................... 14 WO2 Rob Whalley UK LO [email protected] 913-684-7994 The Nature of The Kim Family Regime: Paula Devers (DAC) Intelligence Specialist The Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State .................. 18 [email protected] 913-684-7907 Laura Deatrick (CTR) Editor Challenges to Engaging North Korea’s [email protected] 913-684-7925 Keith French (CTR) Geospatial Analyst Population through Information Operations .......... 23 [email protected] 913-684-7953 North Korea’s Methods to Counter Angela Williams (DAC) Branch Chief, T&S Enemy Wet Gap Crossings .................................... 26 [email protected] 913-684-7929 John Dalbey (CTR) Military Analyst Summary of “Assessment to Collapse in [email protected] 913-684-7939 TM the DPRK: A NSI Pathways Report” ..................... 28 Jerry England (DAC) Intelligence Specialist [email protected] 913-684-7934 Previous North Korean Red Rick Garcia (CTR) Military Analyst Diamond articles ................................................
    [Show full text]
  • North Korean House of Cards Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-Un
    North Korean House of Cards Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un Ken E. Gause H R N K North Korean House of Cards Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un Ken E. Gause H R N K Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Copyright © 2015 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior permission of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 1001 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 435 Washington, DC 20036 P: (202) 499-7970 ISBN: 9780985648053 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015954268 BOARD OF DIRECTORS Gordon Flake (Co-Chair) Chief Executive Officer, Perth USAsia Centre, The University of Western Australia Co-author, Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea Katrina Lantos Swett (Co-Chair) President and CEO, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice John Despres (Co-Vice-Chair) Consultant on International Financial & Strategic Affairs Suzanne Scholte (Co-Vice-Chair) President, Defense Forum Foundation Seoul Peace Prize Laureate Helen-Louise Hunter (Secretary) Attorney Author, Kim II-Song’s North Korea Kevin C. McCann (Treasurer) General Counsel, StrataScale, Inc., Counsel to SHI International
    [Show full text]
  • The 8Th Congress of Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Jong-Un's Thoughts And
    No. 74 June 2021 The 8th Congress of Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Jong-un’s Thoughts and Future of North Korea Kuri Sravan Kumar © Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi Institute of Chinese Studies, B-371 (3rd floor), Chittaranjan Park, Kalkaji, New Delhi - 110 019 Landline Telephone: +91-11-4056 4823 Fax: +91-11-23830728 Email: [email protected] Website: www.icsin.org ABOUT THE AUTHOR Kuri Sravan Kumar is a Doctoral candidate at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, New Delhi. He has completed his Masters in East Asian Studies, from University of Delhi, New Delhi. He has studied Korean Language from Korean Cultural Center (King Sejong Institute), New Delhi and Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi. He has an interest in North Korean Politics, India-Korea relations, Inter-Korean relations and East Asian security. Contact: [email protected] The 8th Congress of Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Jong-un’s Thoughts and Future of North Korea Abstract North Korea is an enigma, and it follows a leader-centric approach. The Workers Party of Korea is the highest-ranking body of North Korea. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, last one year onwards, North Korea is in self-isolation and world hardly have any clue about Kim Jong-un and DPRK. This paper attempt is to discuss the 8th congress of Workers Party of Korea, 2021, especially its focus on Kim Jong-un speeches and congress resolutions and its remarks on Inter-Korean relations, North Korea-America relations, and North Korea’s economic plan.
    [Show full text]
  • Time Zone Flight To/From North Korea
    Dear traveler to North Korea, We would like to say thank you for choosing Korea Konsult AB as your travel partner. Korea Konsult AB was established in 2003 and it is based in Stockholm. Sweden was the first Western country to establish a diplomatic mission in North Korea. Until now Sweden has been representing the United States, Canada, and some other countries in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK). Korea Konsult AB is proud to be called the major European gateway to North Korea. Our mission is to bring people from all over the world to North Korea and let them acquire first-hand experience of North Korea as it actually is, rather than as it is pictured in mass media. The following information is prepared in order to make your journey in the DPRK convenient and fun. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you need any further assistance. Time Zone UTC/GMT+9: Pyongyang is 1 hour ahead of Beijing (China), 7 hours ahead of Stockholm, Paris and Berlin (8 hours in winter time), 6 hours ahead of Moscow and 1 hour behind Vladivostok. Flight to/from North Korea AirKoryo is the state-owned national flag carrier airline of North Korea. According to the flight schedule AirKoryo operates a modern jet fleet on its Beijing – Pyongyang route: ● Tu-204 is a modern aircraft launched in production in 1995. Air Koryo was officially handed over to the first Tu-204 on 27 December 2007. This aircraft complies with noise regulations described in Chapter 3 of Supplement 16 to ICAO and meets all current European and ICAO requirements.
    [Show full text]
  • Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts Pursuant To
    Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) 1 Final Version I. Executive Summary 1. On 12 June 2009, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1874 (2009) in which it requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts mandated to: gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed by the Council in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), in particular incidents of non-compliance; make recommendations on actions the Council, the Committee or Member States may consider to improve implementation of those measures; and, assist the 1718 Committee in carrying out its functions. 2. The measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and strengthened by resolution 1874 (2009) include: (a) a ban on the provision to and the procurement from DPRK of nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related items as well as all arms and related materiel, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel provided to the DPRK; (b) a ban on the transfer to or from the DPRK of services and assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the proscribed items; and (c) a ban on the provision of luxury goods to the DPRK. 3. Resolution 1874 (2009) also introduced a strong interdiction system, which calls upon all Member States to inspect all cargo to and from the DPRK in their territory and to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State on the high seas, if the Member State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains proscribed items.
    [Show full text]
  • North Korea After Kim Jong Il
    70 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 8|2011 North Korea after Kim JoNg il Political aNd social PersPectives ahead of the exPected chaNge of Power Dr. Colin Dürkop is Colin Dürkop / Min-Il Yeo Resident Represen- tative of the Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung in the Repub lic of Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a state outside the frame of world politics. North Korea is the poor part of a divided nation, whose Stalinist dictatorship potentially threatens the world community with its nuclear weapons. The DPRK is also a regime that survived the collapse of the Eastern Bloc states and demonstrates an excessive leadership. Despite its dependency on foreign supplies of relief goods the isolated country practises an Min-Il Yeo carries out unpredictable foreign policy. There are repeated confronta- researches about the tions and military conflicts in particular with the Republic of relationship between the two Korean states. Korea (RK) but also with the United States. His book “Die Möglich- keiten einer Wieder- Kim Jong Il has been heading North Korea since 1994, vereinigung Koreas” (“Possibilities of a taking over from the dictatorship of his father Kim Il Sung, Reunion of Korea”) the founder of the state in a perfectly smooth transition. has been published Due to strict secrecy there is only little known about him – by Bouvier, Bonn (Germany). a circumstance that creates a questionable impression of the North Korean head of state. Ever since 2008, however, there have been increasingly more rumours about Kim Jong Il’s bad health and that is why for a while now observers predict a short life expectancy for him.
    [Show full text]
  • Songbun North Korea’S Social Classification System
    Marked for Life: Songbun North Korea’s Social Classification System A Robert Collins Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s Social Classification System Marked for Life: Songbun North Korea’s Social Classification System Robert Collins The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 1001 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 435, Washington, DC 20036 202-499-7973 www.hrnk.org Copyright © 2012 by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 0985648007 Library of Congress Control Number: 2012939299 Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s Social Classification System Robert Collins The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 1001 Connecticut Ave. NW Suite 435 Washington DC 20036 (202) 499-7973 www.hrnk.org BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Jack David Committee for Human Rights in Senior Fellow and Trustee, Hudson Institute North Korea Paula Dobriansky Former Under Secretary of State for Democ- Roberta Cohen racy and Global Affairs Co-Chair, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Nicholas Eberstadt Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute Andrew Natsios Co-Chair, Carl Gershman Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown President, National Endowment for Democracy University, Former Administrator, USAID David L. Kim Gordon Flake The Asia Foundation Co-Vice-Chair, Executive Director, Maureen and Mike Mans- Steve Kahng field Foundation General Partner, 4C Ventures, Inc. Suzanne Scholte Katrina Lantos Swett Co-Vice-Chair, President, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights Chairman, North Korea Freedom Coalition and Justice John Despres Thai Lee Treasurer, President and CEO, SHI International Corp. Consultant, International Financial and Strate- Debra Liang-Fenton gic Affairs Former Executive Director, Committee for Hu- Helen-Louise Hunter man Rights in North Korea, Secretary, The U.S.
    [Show full text]