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North Korean House of Cards Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-Un North Korean House of Cards Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un Ken E. Gause H R N K North Korean House of Cards Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un Ken E. Gause H R N K Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Copyright © 2015 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior permission of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 1001 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 435 Washington, DC 20036 P: (202) 499-7970 ISBN: 9780985648053 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015954268 BOARD OF DIRECTORS Gordon Flake (Co-Chair) Chief Executive Officer, Perth USAsia Centre, The University of Western Australia Co-author, Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea Katrina Lantos Swett (Co-Chair) President and CEO, Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice John Despres (Co-Vice-Chair) Consultant on International Financial & Strategic Affairs Suzanne Scholte (Co-Vice-Chair) President, Defense Forum Foundation Seoul Peace Prize Laureate Helen-Louise Hunter (Secretary) Attorney Author, Kim II-Song’s North Korea Kevin C. McCann (Treasurer) General Counsel, StrataScale, Inc., Counsel to SHI International Corp. Roberta Cohen (Co-Chair Emeritus) Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Specializing in Humanitarian and Human Rights Issues Andrew Natsios (Co-Chair Emeritus) Former Administrator, USAID Director, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs and Executive Professor, The Bush School of Government & Public Service, Texas A&M University Author of The Great North Korean Famine Morton Abramowitz Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation Jerome Cohen Co-Director, US-Asia Law Institute, NYU Law School Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations Lisa Colacurcio Advisor, Impact Investments Rabbi Abraham Cooper Associate Dean, Simon Wiesenthal Center, LA Ken E. Gause I Jack David Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Paula Dobriansky Chair, World Affairs Council of America Adjunct Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Distinguished National Security Chair, U.S. Naval Academy Nicholas Eberstadt Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute Author of books on North Korea including The End of North Korea Carl Gershman President, National Endowment for Democracy Stephen Kahng President, Kahng Foundation David Kim Coordinator, The Asia Foundation Debra Liang-Fenton U.S. Institute of Peace Former Executive Director, HRNK Winston Lord Former Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Department of State Former Ambassador to China Former Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State Former President, Council on Foreign Relations Former Chairman, National Endowment for Democracy Marcus Noland Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Peterson Institute for International Economics Author of books on North Korea including Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas Jacqueline Pak EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Greg Scarlatoiu Committee for Human Rights in North Korea II TABLE OF CONTENTS I. About the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) .......... 1 II. Preface ......................................................................................................... 2 III. About the Author ...................................................................................... 5 IV. About this Study ........................................................................................ 6 V. Acknowledgements ...................................................................................... 7 VI. Executive Summary ................................................................................... 8 VII. Abbreviations ........................................................................................... 13 VIII. Introduction ........................................................................................... 15 A. Sources ................................................................................................ 17 B. Organization ....................................................................................... 18 IX. Section One: North Korean Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un .................................................................................................... 20 A. Chapter One: The Transfer of Power ................................................... 21 1. The Mourning Period ................................................................. 21 2. Transitional Leadership .............................................................. 24 3. Purges, Demotions, and Promotions .......................................... 27 4. Civil-Military Relations by Mid-2013 ........................................ 38 5. Role of the Regents .................................................................... 39 B. Chapter Two: The Purge of Jang Song-taek and the Destruction of the Regent Structure ...................................................................................... 46 1. The Seeds of Jang’s Demise ......................................................... 46 2. Role of the Control Tower .......................................................... 50 3. Jang Song-taek’s Fall from Grace ................................................ 53 a. Kim Jong-il’s Will ............................................................. 54 b. Jang’s Ill-Fated Trip to China ............................................ 54 c. Jang Under Investigation .................................................. 56 d. The Purge Unfolds............................................................ 58 4. The Aftermath of the Purge ........................................................ 62 C. Chapter Three: North Korean Leadership Dynamics Post-Jang Song-taek ..................................................................................... 64 1. Impact on Power Networks ........................................................ 64 2. Leadership Dynamics in 2014/2015 ........................................... 69 Ken E. Gause III 3. The Regent Structure.................................................................. 69 4. Kim Jong-un and the Wider Leadership ..................................... 73 a. Key Advisors ..................................................................... 74 b. Key Individuals in the Second Echelon of the Leadership ...................................................................... 82 c. Key Individuals in the Third Echelon of the Leadership ...................................................................... 88 d. Key Individuals in the Fourth Echelon of the Leadership ...................................................................... 98 D. Section One Conclusion ..................................................................... 115 X. Section Two: Kim Jong-un’s Apparatus of Power ....................................... 118 A. Chapter Four: How the Regime Operates ............................................ 120 1. The Suryong System .................................................................... 120 Kim Jong-il Reorients the System ......................................... 123 2. The Leadership System Under Kim Jong-un ............................... 126 a. Reviving the Party............................................................. 126 b. Has the Suryong System Collapsed? .................................. 127 3. The Decision-Making Process .................................................... 129 a. Glimpses into the Process ................................................. 130 b. Kim Jong-un’s Role as Decision-Maker ............................. 137 4. Role of Formal Leadership Bodies .............................................. 140 5. Kim Jong-un’s Leadership Style .................................................. 144 B. Chapter Five: The Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat ..................... 152 1. The Personal Secretariat Under Kim Jong-il ................................ 153 2. The Personal Secretariat Under Kim Jong-un ............................. 158 3. Organization and Function ........................................................ 159 a. Personal Secretariat Personnel and Structure ..................... 161 b. Secretarial Office of the Central Committee Personnel and Structure........................................................................ 167 4. Role in the Supreme Leader’s Decision-Making .......................... 170 5. The Future of the Personal Secretariat ......................................... 173 C. Chapter Six: The Royal Economy—Controlling the Kim Family Finances ....................................................................................175 1. Origins of the Royal Economy ................................................... 175 2. Constructing the Royal Economy .............................................. 177 a. Gift-Giving ....................................................................... 184 b. Weapons Sales .................................................................. 189 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea IV c. Tapping into the Royal Economy: Jang
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