The Edwin O. Reischauer Center For East Asian Studies The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2012 THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL SUTIDES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON, D.C. THE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: 2012 THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. Edwin O. Reischauer (Oct. 15, 1910 – Sept. 1, 1990) TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ····················································································································· 1 William L. Brooks Structural Issues Impeded Progress in Japan-South Korea Relations ···························· 27 Patrick Branco Same Game or End Game? Japan and the North Korea Conundrum ····························· 39 Matthew Yi The Political Influence of the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management ··· 49 Narae Choi Japan’s Energy Security in a Post-3/11 Future ······························································· 63 Dan Zhu Japan’s Monetary Policy Choices in a World of Financial Crisis ·································· 78 Conor Foley A Golden Opportunity: Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership ··································· 94 Max Helzberg Damage Control: Nuclear Fear and Japanese Exports after 3/11 ·································· 105 Benjamin Lauer Startup Japan: Ensuring Future Economic Growth ······················································· 120 Timothy Koide Class Research Trip to Tokyo, November 2011: Photo Album ···································· 132 A Year of Solidarity in U.S.-Japan Relations: Supporting Japan’s Recovery at the Reischauer Center ·········································································································· 134 Kent E. Calder Reischauer Center Events, 2011-2012 ··········································································· 138 Contributors ··················································································································· 141 INTRODUCTION The U.S.-Japan relationship in 2011 was profoundly affectedly by the aftermath of an enormous tragedy that hit Japan on March 11 – the Great Northeast Japan Earthquake. This year‘s issue of U.S.-Japan in Global Context brings into sharp focus the impact of the great earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis in northeast Japan on ties with the U.S. and Asian neighbors, energy security, managing the economy, and political leadership. The introduction below has been lengthened to delve deeply into the events and policy challenges of that fateful year, while placing into that context the themes contained in the collection of papers that follow. The papers, written by the students of Johns Hopkins University‘s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), in dealing with broad policy themes, also address Japan‘s efforts to cope with a range of specific issues while under great stress from the triple disaster. The Triple Disaster on March 11, 2011 At 2:46 on the afternoon of March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck Japan offshore, triggering a tsunami wave of up to 10 meters (33 ft) that engulfed large parts of northeast Japan and also damaged the Fukushima nuclear plant, was a disaster of epoch proportions for even a country prone to severe earthquakes, tsunami and volcanic eruptions. The number of dead and missing is now estimated to be 22,900. So massive in size was the earthquake that, according to NASA, the force shortened the length of the Earth's day by a fraction and shifted how the planet's mass is distributed. At peak, over 400,000 people in northeast Japan were displaced by the triple disaster. Those fortunate enough to have homes left to return to did so, reducing the evacuees to 216,963 in three weeks. Their lives in ruins, no home, occupation, or even community to return to, people were forced to live in evacuation centers for months with only the basics of human needs being provided. In April, the government began to build temporary housing for the homeless, and by the end of August almost all of the centers were closed down. No one knows how long people living in such housing will have to stay there, for it will take years to rebuild from scratch the communities washed into the sea. In areas affected by the nuclear accident, there is no timetable for the 80,000 living in temporary housing to return. The immediate enormous challenge is the removal and disposal of over 23 million tons of debris in the three prefectures – Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima – hit by the earthquake and tsunami. Although work to clear the debris is well underway, it is not clear where the remaining mountains of rubble everywhere – a total 1.6 times that of the 1995 Osaka-Kobe earthquake -- can be removed in the estimated three years time being allotted. The government is negotiating with prefectures across Japan to accept the hauled away debris. And rebuilding the vast stretch of devastated communities along the northeast coast will take up to 10 years to complete, according to some estimates. The earthquake was followed by a series of tsunami waves – the worst in the history of Japan – that severely damaged the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO)-operated Fukushima No. 1 1 nuclear complex, located along the coast of the towns of Futaba and Okuma in Fukushima Prefecture. As a result of the disaster, all external power sources were lost, causing the supply of cooling water to the plant's No. 1, 2 and 3 reactors to stop. Hydrogen was generated as a result of a chemical reaction between fuel rods and water, leading to explosions that severely damaged reactor buildings. The government, which initially estimated the accident level at 4 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), later raised the level to 7 -- the highest rank. This matched the level of the Chernobyl catastrophe, which at that stage was the worst nuclear accident in history. Compounding of missteps exacerbated nuclear crisis TEPCO‘s failure in its initial response to the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in Fukushima Prefecture created a chain reaction of trouble, according to analysis of events during the first three weeks after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. At the crippled nuclear power plant, three reactors have been cooled by injecting water using temporarily set up pumps. However, there were fears the spent nuclear fuel rods stored in the reactors' temporary storage pools would overheat again. It was only in May that TEPCO admitted that a meltdown had actually occurred. That was when everyone understood the enormous extent of the accident. TEPCO's way of publicly releasing information related to the accident also drew much criticism from the start. The nuclear plant lost all power on the afternoon of March 11 due to the gigantic tsunami that followed the great earthquake, causing an emergency halt to the operations of the Nos. 1 to 3 reactors. The Nos. 4 to 6 reactors already were not operating due to periodic inspections. Temperatures and pressures inside the pressure vessels of the Nos. 1 to 3 reactors began rising sharply, complicating the injection of cooling water into the reactors. When the level of water in the reactors drops, nuclear fuel rods become exposed, overheat and may start melting, risking damage to the reactor as well as the emission of radioactive substances. On the night of March 11, TEPCO planned a controlled release of vapor mixed with radioactive substances from the No. 1 reactor, in an operation to decrease pressure in the pressure vessel. However, the operation was not carried out until 10:17 a.m. the following day, four hours after Prime Minister Naoto Kan left the Prime Minister's Office to travel to the Fukushima Prefecture plant for an inspection. Also, evacuation of residents in areas within 10 kilometers of the power plant had not been completed at that time. Then, on the afternoon of March 12, a hydrogen explosion occurred at the No. 1 reactor, destroying the reactor building roof. Kenzo Miya, professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, an expert on nuclear engineering, said the prime minister's inspection delayed TEPCO's original plans to vent the pressure vessel. "Because of the prime minister's [impending] inspection, the start of the 'vent' was delayed. The possibility that the subsequent actions all fell behind can't be denied," Miya said. Haruki Madarame, chairman of the Cabinet Office's Nuclear Safety Commission, also noted the time- loss disadvantage. "Work [to conduct the 'vent'] took time to get under way. As a result, several hours were lost before starting to inject seawater [to cool the reactor]. It was a painful incident," Madarame said, when recalling the situation on the night of March 23. 2 Meanwhile, TEPCO President Masataka Shimizu and Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata were on separate business trips on March 11 when the tsunami hit the plant. They could not return to Tokyo until the following day. "As we communicated with cell phones and other measures, there were no chain of command problems," an official of TEPCO's public relations department said. However, the absence of top management officials might have resulted in the delay in the initial response, some people involved in the handling of the accident said. Use of seawater To cool the reactor core, TEPCO started injecting seawater in the No. 1 reactor shortly after 8 p.m. on March 12--a full 19 hours since the containment vessel's pressure began rising