Iran: Balancing East Against West
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Sanam Vakil Iran: Balancing East against West There are no bells, no sirens, and no early-warning systems that signal Iran’s eastward shift. After struggling to develop political and com- mercial relations with the United States and Europe, Iran has forsaken this approach. Having survived 25 years of isolation, war, and sanctions, Iran’s leadership is no longer willing to bargain away its national security concerns, nuclear ambitions, human rights policy, or commercial creativity for unfavor- able Western political and trade incentives. The Iranian regime is looking to the East, where human rights violations and proliferation proclivities are considered practical matters of regime survival. Iran has searched for and found strategic partners willing to accept its nefarious activities and willing to deal with it on a quid pro quo basis. Iran’s carefully cultivated relationships with China, Russia, and India are providing it with the economic and political coverage that it could never obtain from the West. From the perspective of Iran’s leaders and their Eastern counter- parts, a perfect storm of interests is gathering, anchoring the strategic Silk Road and enabling these countries to circumvent the United States and Europe. This shift has been effective in light of the pending nuclear crisis, as Iran is now successfully using its cultivated commercial and strategic rela- tions with China, Russia, and India to counterbalance the threat of Western nuclear sanctions. These three nations have each secured important domestic, regional, and economic links to Iran. They have proved useful for Iran both at the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council, where China, Russia, and India have opposed sanctions and military action against Iran. In doing so, they have morphed their relationships with Iran from com- Sanam Vakil is an assistant professor of Middle East studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). © 2006 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 29:4 pp. 51–65. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ AUTUMN 2006 51 l Sanam Vakil mercial ties toward an increasingly strategic alliance. Further solidifying this shift toward the East has been the election of the revolutionary nationalist ideologue, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as Iran’s president. Unlike his predeces- sor, Muhammad Khatami, Ahmadinejad is lured by the strength and stability of the East. The question is, is today’s globalizing economy already diverse enough for this strategy to work? Abandoning the Western Dream For centuries, Iran oriented its vision and focus toward the West. As Indo- European descendents, Persians prided themselves on their distinct ancestry in the region. Each Persian dynasty ranging from the Safavid to the Pahlavi focused its policies toward Europe and the United States. So profound has been the Iranian obsession with the West, especially during its twentieth- century Pahlavi modernization campaign, that Iranian author Jalal al-Ahmad wrote Gharbzadegi: Weststruckness,1 capturing the Iranian national submis- sion to the West and its technology. In contrast to this obsession, Iran’s vacillating international pendulum took a neutral stance during the apogee of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini pursued a policy of “neither East nor West,” seeking to disassociate Iran from the overimposing policies of the United States as well as the ideological policies of the Soviet Union. The econom- ic consequences of isolation and the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, however, forced Tehran to seek regional integration at the start of the 1990s, ending its decade-long seclusion. At that time, Iran’s reemergence into the world of commerce was initially directed toward the United States. Engaging the “Great Satan” was necessary to fill Iran’s empty coffers and the mouths of the hungry population simultaneously. Yet, Iran’s postwar international policy of economic and political moderation failed. Iran asked the U.S. oil company Conoco to develop oil fields in 1995, a move that signaled Tehran’s desire to improve relations with Washington. Congressional pressure, however, forced President Bill Clinton to issue an Executive Order banning the develop- ment of petroleum resources in Iran for national security reasons. This move paved the way for the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), passed in 1996. The ILSA imposed sanctions on any company that invested more that $20 mil- lion in Iran’s energy sector. There did exist a waiver provision that allowed for investment in Iran by Gazprom, Total, and Petronas in 1998. In general, though, these stringent measures compelled Iran to find alternative trading partners. The European Union offered a second-best alternative and alleviated Iran’s desperate revenue shortfall. This arrangement proved successful only for a short time, however, as European complaints about Iran’s nefarious 52 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ AUTUMN 2006 Iran: Balancing East against West l human rights record, terrorist activities, and clandestine nuclear program slowly began to impede investment progress as early as 1997. Trade and com- mercial ventures became contingent on social and political reform. For the theocratic government, pleasing the EU required ideological compromises on its revolutionary ideals. When oil prices were low, Iran temporarily acceded to the ebb and flow of European pressure. As oil revenues increased, Iran had the luxury of seeking out other trading part- ners equally eager for a quid pro quo. In 1997 the election of the reformist Khata- Iran’s national mi as president brought the hope of a “Tehran interest has been Spring” to the Iranian political and social scene. Twice elected—the second time in 2001—with reoriented toward an overwhelming majority, Khatami sought to the East. challenge the institutionalized system on civil rights and political liberties. His reformist camp is no longer at the helm of the ship, however, having been systematically marginalized and then defeated in the February 2004 parliamentary elections, as well as in the recent presidential election in June 2005. Tehran Tango What remains today in Iran is the ongoing ideological divide between con- servative and pragmatic politicians, otherwise known as the contest between strict constructionists and judicial activists. The former adhere to the initial revolutionary principles of Imam Khomeini; the latter argue for an evolu- tionary revolution that strives forward in pursuit of Iran’s national interests. The latter group, the pragmatists, would seek to compromise ideology in favor of relations with the United States and economic incentives to provide their government with long-awaited legitimacy and security. The conserva- tive clerics, however, fear that such a compromise would usher in an era of political contest and instability that would culminate in an end to clerical rule. In the long run, although the domestic debate over Iran’s direction is still unresolved, the June 2005 presidential election changed the course of the country’s future. Many analysts predicted that the pragmatic candidate and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani would capture the polls, but an Islamist underdog candidate emerged instead as the victor in the country’s first runoff election. Ahmadinejad, Tehran’s former mayor, is a child of the revolution. A devout Muslim and loyalist to the regime, he worked his way through the rank and file of government positions. Running on a populist agenda seeking to roll back corruption and return Iran to the Islamist revo- THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ AUTUMN 2006 53 l Sanam Vakil lutionary ideology of Khomeini himself, Ahmadinejad was not only the last- minute choice of the supreme leader but also a dedicated member of the Revolutionary Guards. His election brings the country’s first nonclerical nationalist president to power. In addition, he has ushered in the ascendancy of his elite corps along with his unique messianic ideology. With a national interest directed at preserving the Islamic Republic, it goes without saying that the new president is inclined to preserve the Is- lamic state at all costs. In this vein, the national interest has been reoriented toward the East, as demonstrated by Ahmedinejad’s recent statement that “[o]ur nation is continuing the path of progress and on this path has no significant need for the United States.”2 Having witnessed Iran’s failed flirta- tions and attempts at rapprochement with the West through a 16-year dé- tente policy, these hard-liners are no longer willing to sacrifice the country’s image, security, and commercial interests in exchange for humiliating West- ern agreements. Indeed, they hope to advance Iran’s goal of becoming both an indispensable regional power and an economic and technological pow- erhouse. Ahmadinejad’s economic vision is clearly married to his political vision, in which expanding trade and security relations with China, Russia, and India can bolster Iran’s role in the global economy. Chinese Checks and Balances Beijing’s relationship with Tehran requires a delicate balancing act between China’s ever-growing energy demands and its foreign policy calculations. Beijing’s unquenchable thirst for energy supplies has dictated its newly cul- tivated relations with oil-rich states such as Iran. This relationship, among others, has brought China into conflict with the United States, which seeks to restrict all possible investment into the Islamic Republic.3 For Chinese leaders, walking the line between their growing domestic energy impera- tives and their fragile relations with the Bush administration is increasingly important. Iran underscores the convergence and divergence of Sino-U.S. interests. Most recently, Chinese ambassador Lio G. Tan highlighted the im- portance of the Iranian market for China, noting that “the abundant natural resources, big market, geographical location, and educated workforce are among relative advantages of Iran, stressing the expansion of mutual coop- eration.”4 Its growing dependence on Iran signifies that economic synergies are also generating strategic ones. China became a net importer of oil in 1993.