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Home , David Steel, Liberal Democrats (UK), Liberal Party (UK, 1989)

‘Be careful what you wish for …’ The lessons of the Lib – Lab pact for the Lib – Con coalition

Much attention has focused upon the lessons to be drawn by Liberal Democrat– Conservative coalition ministers from previous arrangements between and Conservatives. However, the most recent relationship between Liberals and another party – and in some ways the relationship most similar to the current coalition – is the Lib- We must not give the impression of being afraid to soil our hands with the Lab Pact of 1977–78, responsibilities of sharing power … We must be bold enough to deploy the agreed by coalition case positively. (David Steel, , September 1976) when ’s We are prepared to co-operate with other parties, even as we insist on the need for a fundamental break in Britain’s political habits. … We are pre- Labour government had pared to co-operate with whichever party will go with us some way along lost its parliamentary the same road. (The Real Fight is for Britain, Liberal manifesto, 1979) majority. What can this would enlarge [the parties’] choices and ensure an open coalition based on a public majority with authority to run our affairs … By episode tell us about the a chance, which am glad we were able to take advantage of, the Lib–Lab effects of co-operation agreement provided a short but successful spell of (David Steel, A House Divided: the Lib–Lab Pact and the Future of British Politics on Liberal identity and 1980, p. 161)

fortunes? Matt Cole We had now accepted that Parliament could work and – with a future Lib–Lab draws the lessons. coalition, stronger than the Agreement – the government could be effective in a hung . (David Steel, Against Goliath: David Steel’s Story, pp. 147–48)

58 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 ‘Be careful what you wish for …’ The lessons of the Lib – Lab pact for the Lib – Con coalition

avid Steel regarded The course of the Lib–Lab pact clear that Steel would accept a lower the Lib–Lab pact as The pact (Steel preferred to call it price for a longer agreement than more than an iso- an ‘agreement’) came into exist- many of his colleagues. Although lated chance event: ence because, following by-elec- the tension between these views he looked upon it as tion defeats and defections, James was present throughout the pact, Dan early experiment in a strategy Callaghan’s Labour government there were three phases in the devel- which would eventually see the had lost the parliamentary major- opment of the arrangement: the Liberals in a full coalition govern- ity of four which it had gained at first was one of relative harmony ment, and urged Liberals to draw the 1974 election. To secure the pas- within and between the partners; conclusions from the experience sage of legislation and stay in office, the second was one of crisis, which of it for that purpose. Although Callaghan offered the Liberal MPs – broke the trust underpinning the Steel’s preference and expectation then thirteen in total – consultation pact; and the latter period was one was for a working relationship over policy in exchange for support in which the spirit of the pact had with Labour, the Liberal mani- in the division lobbies. gone, though it lived on in prac- festo following the pact made The first arrangement by which tice – it was politically a ‘dead man clear the party’s readiness to work Liberal MPs supported Callaghan’s walking’. In all three phases Liberals with either main party under the government was a vote of ‘no confi- secured achievements, but they right circumstances. Steel himself dence’ tabled by were of diminishing significance reiterated during the 2010 elec- on 23 March 1977; however, Steel and came at increasing cost. tion campaign that ‘ had looked forward to the opportu- As they secured the confidence is absolutely right to stick to his nity for some time, and his reaction vote of 23 March, Callaghan and argument that the electorate to it set the tone of Liberal politics Steel drew an agreement for the must first decide the composition for years to come. The reasons for remainder of the parliamentary of the Commons, and that the going into a pact were both national session, which was accepted by all party leaders must thereafter act and partisan; tactical and strategic. Liberal MPs even though some responsibly in accord with their Even the Liberals most suspicious were surprised at its limited fruits. decisions.’1 He also confirmed of cooperation with other parties There would be a Joint Consultative his approval of the deal with the could see the attractions of sustain- Committee between Labour min- Tories after its publication.2 Thus, ing Callaghan in office: a general isters and their counterparts in the though it is dangerous to make election would expose the Liberals’ ‘Shadow Administration’, as the predictions from past events, it financial and political vulnerabil- Liberal MPs and peers involved is reasonable to take Steel’s cue ity, whereas an arrangement with Left: Jim came to call themselves; Liberal and consider what the experience Callaghan would provide stabil- Callaghan proposals on worker participation, of the Lib–Lab pact of 1977–78 ity for the nation at a time of eco- promises homelessness and small businesses might suggest about the situation nomic crisis on terms at least partly David Steel his were to be given a serious hearing, in which the Liberal Democrats determined by Liberals, and dem- reward (PR) and – most tantalising of all – the now find themselves. There are onstrate the practicality of the sort after his Labour issue of proportional representation certain similar features which of cooperation entailed by the elec- colleagues (PR) for elections to the proposed give the Lib–Lab pact a poten- toral reform promoted by the party. have voted devolved bodies in and tial value as a guide for observ- The questions were how long the on it (Gibbard Wales and for direct elections to the ers, if not actors, in the coalition cooperation should continue and at cartoon, European Assembly was to be put process. what price, and it was immediately Guardian) before the Commons. Steel was in

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 59 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition bullish mood about the opportunity exceptions, favourable’ and that who had defected to the Liberals and wrote to Liberal candidates on ‘the Party will stand solidly with three years earlier, convinced the 24 March: the Parliamentary Party and the Liberal Assembly at Brighton to Leader.’7 Shadow Administration pass a resolution demanding that Admire the photos of the Liberal and Joint Consultative Committee a ‘substantial majority’ of Labour MPs in the ! When meetings went ahead and senior MPs must support PR for the did photographs of all the MPs Liberals in the Lords wrote to Steel European elections in order for the last appear on the front page of a calling for ‘a more stable and longer pact to continue. popular daily? You will have a dif- term agreement.’8 There was even October saw a reshuffle of the ficult time. You will have resigna- a remarkable historical continuum Shadow Administration in which tions in your constituency. (You provided by a letter from Sir George doubters made way for more solid would have had from others if we Schuster, who said: ‘in listening to supporters of the pact: Smith, who had sided with the Tories). Don’t what you said last night I felt for had resigned as employment spokes- be defensive. Be aggressive. Go all the first time that public expression man, was replaced by Baroness out to detail the bridling of social- was given to a true Liberal mes- Seear, and Grimond stepped down ism. Forget the textual analysis of sage.’9 Yet there remained amongst from his responsibility for energy the Agreement. It’s what we make Liberals a body of sceptical opin- policy, which was handed to Lord of it that matters.3 There ion which feared for Liberal inde- Avebury. In November, a Party However, little was guaranteed, pendence and by the summer Steel Council meeting at Derby insisted and the votes on PR were to be free remained recalled, ‘the Party was extremely that if Labour MPs did not endorse votes so that Labour MPs would restless’10 following very poor local PR for Europe, then a special be at liberty to oppose the meas- amongst election results in May, when three- Assembly would have to be called ure. From the outset there were quarters of Liberal council to review the pact. Everything now Liberals who took ’s Liberals a seats were lost. depended upon the Commons vote view that ‘David was determined to During the autumn of 1977, on the introduction of PR on 13 do a deal at all costs’. Labour minis- body of scep- the pact was tested to destruction, December. ters agreed, as one source reported: though this would not be pub- The vote for PR in European ‘the “terms” were heard with some tical opinion licly evident until later. The deli- elections was lost by 319 to 222. incredulity by the Cabinet’ and cate balance of opinion within the Conservative whipping against ‘the [Labour] Party had simply which feared Liberal Party was reflected in the the bill did damage, but more sig- undertaken to do what it had any- Annual Report to the Assembly, nificant to the Liberals was Labour’s way intended to do and desist from for Liberal which argued that ‘the sudden re- lukewarm response. Though a what it could not do.’4 emergence of the Liberal Party onto majority of Labour MPs voting – declared his opposition to the pact independ- the national stage as a result of the 147 to 122 – had supported the bill, early on, and from the outset former ence and Agreement with the Government fewer than half of the Parliamentary leader and David has enabled the Party to wield a Labour Party had cast their vote, Penhaligon, the MP for , were by the sum- degree of real and immediate influ- and eleven ministers, four of them extremely sceptical and supported ence more in line with its electoral Cabinet members, had voted the project only out of loyalty to mer Steel support at the last election’ but against it. This was hardly the ‘best colleagues.5 Most of the anxiety at acknowledged that ‘it has strained endeavours’ of the government this stage, however, was about the recalled, ‘the our meagre resources to the limit.’ which Liberal MPs had been prom- details of policy or the length of the Cyril Smith’s attempt to have the ised in July. An immediate meeting agreement. Steel was able to per- Party was agreement renegotiated was voted of Liberal MPs decided to continue suade his colleagues at a weekend down by 716 delegates to 385 at the with the pact by only six votes to meeting of MPs in late June that extremely Assembly in September, but Steel four. To achieve this, Steel was ‘the results to date have been worth- was obliged by an Assembly resolu- obliged to pretend that Callaghan while and beneficial to the nation restless’ fol- tion to promise that in the coming was going to see the queen to call an but that any future agreement still vote on PR in European elections, election, a prank which made some depends on the government pursu- lowing very ‘we will be watching the division of his colleagues feel physically ing policies which will bring down lists most carefully. We have a right sick. The pact was now doomed, the rate of inflation and provide the poor local to expect the substantial majority of although the precise circumstances necessary economic stability for the Labour members – and especially of its demise were as yet unknown. country.’6 In July, Steel convinced election Ministers whose continuance in A Special Assembly was called to his fellow MPs to continue the pact office depends on us – to support the meet in Blackpool in January 1978 into another parliamentary session results in Government’s recommendation.’ to discuss the situation. based upon a ten-point agreement May, when The same month Liberal MPs were Conscious of the hostile reaction which promised a free Commons infuriated to see a study into the he was likely to face at Blackpool, vote on PR for European elections three-quar- grievances of small businesses – for Steel secured a long run-in of over and consideration of profit-sharing which they had pressed the govern- a month to the Assembly, care- in industry. ters of Lib- ment since the first days of the pact fully crafted a resolution for debate For four months Steel unques- – set up with no recognition of their which gave him discretion over tionably had the support of most eral county role in its establishment; Steel was the ending of the pact, and wrote of the party, and party head- obliged to release a retrospective a stern letter to Liberal candidates quarters noted confidently council seats press statement claiming the credit on 16 December on his view of the that ‘initial reactions we have for his colleagues. Former Labour best way forward: ‘I am not going received are, with relatively few were lost. Minister , to change course now. I think the

60 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition

Party would be crazy to change of the motion nor the mood in the course but you are entitled to do so conference hall suggested that the if you wish at the Special Assembly.’ delegates were voting to continue it By 13 January a note of anxiety had indefinitely.’13 replaced the bravado of the previ- There were occasional minor ous month as he urged candidates triumphs over budget measures, or ‘please ensure if you or your con- opportunities to advertise Liberal stituency delegates are speaking novelties such as a land bank, but that nothing is said thoughtlessly few of these ideas came to fruition. which can be picked up and used One or two MPs, such as Sir Russell against ourselves in the future by Johnston, urged Steel to press on our enemies.’ Regretting that the with the pact, hoping that Labour discussion has taken him away would repent on PR for Europe from other activities he warned that and the proposed devolved bodies ‘there must soon come an end to this in Scotland and Wales, but these discussion of our strategy in favour measures were again defeated by of more effective promotion of it.’ Labour peers in April.14 The bal- On the other side of the debate, ance of party opinion had tipped Liberator argued that ‘somehow or in favour of the sceptics, and only other the Liberal Party must find a courtesy and electoral necessity way of deciding when to get out of had restrained the Liberals from the pact’, and complained that ‘the ending the pact straight away. The problem in all of this, of course, is to lesson for Steel was clear: much of ensure that David Steel listens to the the Liberal party would support party, rather than blindly pursuing his strategy of inter-party coopera- his obsession with coalition.’11 tion, but the circumstances had to The Blackpool Assembly be right, and the rewards had to be approved the continuation of the delivered. In particular, the promise pact by 1,727 votes to 520, but it of electoral reform – always cen- exposed publicly the divisions tral to the Liberals’ idea of politics within the party. Steel contin- – was sacrosanct. Publicly, the pact ued to insist that ‘I have to place ended with a whimper: in May Steel on record that the Prime Minister acknowledged that it would not delivered exactly what he under- continue beyond the parliamentary took to deliver on PR’, to dele- session;15 on 23 June 1978, he told gates’ cries of ‘Rubbish!’; but even Scottish Liberals wearily that ‘it has Richard Wainwright, who opened been an appallingly difficult time the debate with a speech supposed for Liberals. We face an electorate How the Sunday subject of clear legislative propos- to bridge the two factions, referred brainwashed into seeing politics as Times and the als, a situation upon which the party to the ‘perverse sectarian Labour a contest between a pair of mighty Daily Mail saw could build. Such was the oppo- vote in favour of gerrymander- adversaries’ and called for autumn the Pact sition to the Lib–Lab pact in the ing’, and the tone of the debate election. At the end of July, Liberal party that Steel has acknowledged was more important than the sub- opposition lost the government a recently that ‘it’s fair to describe it as stance of the resolution which was vote on the dock labour scheme; but a Steel/Callaghan Pact’ because ‘the agreed. Although Steel was granted it was not until August that Alan Liberals, as usual, were difficult and the freedom to continue with the Beith as chief whip gave notice that had to be cajoled along.’17 For Steel, pact for the remainder of the ses- all joint meetings were at an end. however, a precedent had been set: sion, most delegates regarded this For sceptics this experiment in he opened 1979 with a party politi- as allowing the pact a dignified cooperation had been costly and cal broadcast quoting Bill Rodgers demise in preference to administer- fruitless: electorally, not only did and Edward on the virtues ing a lethal injection; it was not an they lose previously hard-won of inter-party cooperation and the encouragement to attempt to revive council representation, but the need for a statutory incomes policy, it. The exasperation that would Liberals also lost ground at every and went on to argue at the general continue to face Steel over the next parliamentary by-election during election in May that the Liberals had decade was expressed in Liberator, the pact, with the vote declining by ‘knocked sense into Labour’ and to which said ‘the Special Assembly over 10 per cent in half of the con- appeal for a ‘Liberal wedge’ to split showed that getting radicals elected tests between April 1977 and May the two main parties’ control of to positions within the party does 1978. The party’s Gallup poll rat- the Commons. The argument over little or no good if the majority ing fell into single figures for the cooperation would surely return. of constituency workers are pre- first time in five years in August pared to come along to Assemblies 1977, not to rise again until the 1979 and play “follow my leader”.’12 The general election campaign.16 The Similarities and differences Times (23 January 1978) however, tangible rewards in terms of policy between the pact and the was more accurate in its assessment had been thin, though a number of coalition of Liberal attitudes to the pact, com- Liberal demands had received seri- The relationships and circumstances menting that ‘neither the wording ous discussion and had been the of the parties involved in these two

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 61 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition arrangements can be compared in Liberals did in 1977–78. At by- The pact the government in the Upper the following ways: elections in traditional areas House. However, this entails the • Both arrangements are – as in of Liberal presence (Penistone avoided the reality that Lib Dem MPs, unlike 1924 and 1929 – the result of in July 1978, Oldham East in Liberal MPs of the 1970s, can- parliamentary arithmetic rather January 2011) the Liberal vote worse imme- not all rely on the sort of media than ideological convergence holds up, but there is no mid- exposure and personal vote (as would have been the case in term fillip; in other contests diate fate of which sustained all but three of 1997 had the Liberal Democrats (such as the Barnsley the thirteen Liberal MPs who joined Blair’s Cabinet) or eco- by-election of March 2011, the a renewed supported the pact from a drop nomic crisis or war (as in 1915–22 July 1977 Saffron Waldon by- of a third in their party’s nation and 1931–45). The motivation election, or the local elections electoral vote in 1979. holding the parties together is of 1977 and 2011) the tactical and contest, and • Most importantly the relation- the belief that the government strategic purpose of the Liberal ship in 2010 is a fixed one, unlike they have formed is better for vote is harder for the floating changed the temporary and spontaneous the nation and for their party voter to grasp whilst the Liberals relationship of the pact. There than the holding of another gen- support, but are not themselves, public per- is no obvious way of creating eral election. Any threat to that the main party of government. space for a recovery such as Steel analysis therefore jeopardises the ceptions of enjoyed between 1978 and 1979; arrangement. The differences between the pact Steel himself has been quoted • In both arrangements, the and the coalition which might the Liberal talking of the need to formulate Liberal Party and its successor give observers caution in drawing an exit strategy.19 are the junior partners, able and conclusions are as follows: Party and expected only to secure a limited • The current arrangement is with number of concessions from the a different, and historically less its role in Conclusions other party. tribal and more pragmatic, party. The conclusions which might be • Both arrangements have fea- The reluctance of the Labour such a way drawn from this comparison are: tured the establishment of for- Party to make meaningful con- • For observers, the ostensible mal negotiating machinery by cessions at times of tension in that when relationships between the par- which commitments are secured, 1977–78, and in the coalition ties do not necessarily reflect including policy promises from negotiations of May 2010,18 may the elec- the changing reality of attitudes the major partner party (a free be replaced by greater flexibil- within the parties, which are far vote on PR for European elec- ity in the pursuit of power by tion came more fluid and complex than the tions in 1977, for example, or the the Conservatives. This was it was less arrangement itself; and yet its referendum on AV in 2010). The apparently illustrated in the sub- continuation is dependent upon machinery in 1977 was the Joint stantial amendment of Andrew damaging the balance of those attitudes. Consultative Committee of six Lansley’s health reforms. • Needless to say, strategy for the leading figures in the Labour • The Liberal Democrats are than most 2015 election will depend heav- and Liberal Parties; in 2010 the now in office as members of the ily upon the display of ‘trophies’ machinery took the form of the executive, rather than merely had feared it from the coalition: key policy negotiating teams. supporting the party in govern- achievements that are held to • Both parties in the arrangement ment. They have lost opposition- would be. justify the arrangement and its contain now, as they did in 1977, party funding, and are now held adverse effects from the point a spectrum of opinion ranging directly responsible for govern- of view of former and poten- from enthusiastic support for ment policies. On the other hand tial Lib Dem voters. This can cooperation (on both occasions they have access to the civil serv- even be a general and negative found specifically in the lead- ice and have more direct control achievement like Steel’s ‘stop- ers of both parties) to grudging, over policy. One key effect is ping socialism’ or the progres- suspicious acceptance of the idea, that policy is made in coordi- sive lowering of inflation; but it and resistance to its individual nation with the other govern- has to be credible and electorally effects (Peter Shore and Tony ing party rather than by taking significant. The Lib Dem lead- Benn in the Labour Cabinet of Liberal decisions to an ongoing ership started this process with 1977, mirrored by Cyril Smith Joint Consultative Committee. their ‘business card’ of achieve- and • Lib Dem MPs are more numer- ments circulated at their Spring in the Liberals; David Davis ous and more vulnerable to 2011 conference in , but or Christopher Chope in the party support swings, than in voters will need more. Conservatives of 2010 or Charles the 1970s. The ratio of Labour • There has to be the possibil- Kennedy and in MPs to Liberal MPs during most ity of departure by the Liberal the Lib Dems). Most MPs and of the pact was 24 to 1; between Democrats, or else the deal loses activists hover between the two, the parliamentary parties of its underpinning parliamentary and most are capable of moving the coalition it is a less uneven logic. Not only does that pos- along the spectrum when they 5.4 to 1. There is now competi- sibility strengthen one leader’s feel loyalty to the leadership has tion for Lib Dem frontbench hand against the other’s, but it been stretched and party identity positions, whereas Steel had strengthens each leader’s hand is under threat. to draft peers into his Shadow against his own dissidents, as • The Liberal Democrats are suf- Administration to make up the both Benn and Steel acknowl- fering at the polls just as the numbers rather than to represent edged Callaghan did in muting

62 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 ‘be careful what you wish for …’ the lessons of the lib-lab pact for the lib-con coalition

his left wing20 and Cameron’s to do this because of the features of was defeated in the Lords in April, when Labour peers bold move to push the 1922 the situation – distance from gov- voted against. committee to accept a referen- ernment, a clean break before the 15 David Steel, press release, 25 May 1978, dum on AV.21 An exit strategy is election and politi- Steel papers File A/3/1. Party Chair- therefore essential to staying in cal bases of its MPs – which are no man Geoff Tordoff’s own statement successfully. longer so clearly in evidence. It is read: ‘we now look forward to being • Liberal Democrat MPs will changing the ‘differences’ above to able to present to the country a clear come under unfamiliar intense ‘similarities’ which will make the and independent Liberal programme.’ 16 P. Norris, British By-elections: the Vola- pressure at the next election and difference. tile Electorate (Clarendon 1990), Appen- will therefore need to rely upon dix. In fairness it should be pointed out personal and constituency appeal Matt Cole is a Visiting Fellow of the that in no by-election of the October more than ever. MacAllister, and the author of 1974 parliament did any Liberal can- Fieldhouse and Russell22 have Richard Wainwright, the Liberals didate match the party’s performance observed that this remains part and Liberal Democrats (Manchester at the preceding general election, but the decline became much more marked of their appeal, although it is less University Press, 2011). after April 1977. Only in one of the universal than Butler remarked previous contests had the drop in the was previously the case,23 and the 1 , 21 April 2010. vote edged past 10 per cent. See also results bore this out in 1979. The 2 D. Steel, ‘Why we must make this A. King (ed.), British Political Opinion local election losses of 2011 were coalition work’, , 15 May 1937–2000 (Politico’s, 2001), pp. 11–13 2010. less brutal than those of 1977, on Gallup’s monthly poll ratings. 3 David Steel papers, LSE, file A/3/1. 17 Cited in M. Oaten, Coalitions (Har- but they are a reminder that 4 P. Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall: riman House, 2007), p. 193. each MP’s own strengths will Britain in the Seventies (Michael Joseph, 18 This is the view of the talks empha- determine both their individual 1985), pp. 259–60. sised in D. Laws, 22 Days in May: the fates and the size of the Lib Dem 5 A. Penhaligon, Pe nh aligo n birth of the Lib Dem–Conservative coali- group after 2015. (, 1990), pp. 161–62. tion (Biteback, 2010). 6 Liberal Party Organisation press 19 Sunday Express, 19 Sept. 2010. The Lib–Lab pact was elector- release, 27 June 1977, Steel papers, file ally damaging and brought few 20 T. Benn, ’s Diaries (Hutchin- A/3/1. son, 1995), pp. 407–9; Whitehead, The policy victories, and commenta- 7 Undated note in Liberal Party Papers, Writing on the Wall, p. 261. 24 tors such as Michie and Hoggart file 19/3 21 R. Wilson, Five Days to Power: the Jour- and Whitehead25 scoffed at its sig- 8 Lords Byers, Gladwyn, Wigoder and ney to Coalition Britain (Biteback, 2010), nificance. Even some of the senior Baroness Seear to David Steel, 21 July pp. 217–22. Liberal MPs who remained loyal to 1977. 22 I. MacAllister, E. A. Fieldhouse, A. 9 Sir George Schuster to David Steel, Russell, ‘ Fever? The Political Steel at the time of the pact voiced 16 June 1977. Schuster had been a 26 Geography of Liberal Voting in Great scepticism afterwards. Many of Liberal candidate before World War Britain’, Political Geography, 21/4 (2002), the same doubts could be expressed One, Liberal National MP for Walsall pp. 421–47. about the impact of the coali- from 1938 to 1945, and a close friend of 23 D. Butler (ed.), Coalitions in British Poli- tion upon the Liberal Democrats. Asquith and Violet Bonham Carter. tics (Macmillan, 1978), p. 110. Nonetheless, the pact avoided the 10 D. Steel, Against Goliath: David Steel’s 24 A. Michie and S. Hoggart, The Pact: Story (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), worse immediate fate of a renewed the inside story of the Lib–Lab government, p. 134. 1977–78 (Quartet Books, 1978). electoral contest, and changed pub- 11 Liberator, December 1977–January 25 Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall, pp. lic perceptions of the Liberal Party 1978. 258–75. and its role in such a way that when 12 Liberator, February–March 1978. 26 J. Grimond, Memoirs (Heinemann, the election came it was less damag- 13 The Times, 23 Jan. 1978. 1979), pp. 249–55; Penhaligon, Penha- ing than most had feared it would 14 Johnston to David Steel, 16 March ligon, pp. 160–77. 1978, Steel papers File A/3/1. PR in the be. The party was, however, able Liberal History 300 years of party history in 24 pages The Liberal Democrat History Group’s pamphlet, Liberal History: A concise history of the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats, has been revised and updated to include the 2010 election and the formation of the coalition.

Liberal History is available to Journal of Liberal History subscribers for the special price of £2.00 (normal price £2.50) with free p&p. To order, please send a cheque for £2.00 (made out to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) to LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, SW12 0EN.

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 63