‘be cArefuL what you wisH for …’ The Lessons of tHe Lib – LAb pAct for tHe Lib – Con coalition Much attention has focused upon the lessons to be drawn by Liberal Democrat– Conservative coalition ministers from previous arrangements between Liberals and Conservatives. However, the most recent relationship between Liberals and another party – and in some ways the relationship most similar to the current coalition – is the Lib- We must not give the impression of being afraid to soil our hands with the Lab Pact of 1977–78, responsibilities of sharing power … We must be bold enough to deploy the agreed by David Steel coalition case positively. (David Steel, Liberal Assembly, September 1976) when James Callaghan’s We are prepared to co-operate with other parties, even as we insist on the need for a fundamental break in Britain’s political habits. … We are pre- Labour government had pared to co-operate with whichever party will go with us some way along lost its parliamentary the same road. (The Real Fight is for Britain, Liberal manifesto, 1979) majority. What can this Electoral reform would enlarge [the parties’] choices and ensure an open coalition based on a public majority with authority to run our affairs … By episode tell us about the a chance, which I am glad we were able to take advantage of, the Lib–Lab effects of co-operation agreement provided a short but successful spell of majority government (David Steel, A House Divided: the Lib–Lab Pact and the Future of British Politics on Liberal identity and 1980, p. 161) fortunes? Matt Cole We had now accepted that Parliament could work and – with a future Lib–Lab draws the lessons. coalition, stronger than the Agreement – the government could be effective in a hung Commons. (David Steel, Against Goliath: David Steel’s Story, pp. 147–48) 58 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 ‘be cArefuL what you wisH for …’ The Lessons of tHe Lib – LAb pAct for tHe Lib – Con coalition avid Steel regarded The course of the Lib–Lab pact clear that Steel would accept a lower the Lib–Lab pact as The pact (Steel preferred to call it price for a longer agreement than more than an iso- an ‘agreement’) came into exist- many of his colleagues. Although lated chance event: ence because, following by-elec- the tension between these views he looked upon it as tion defeats and defections, James was present throughout the pact, Dan early experiment in a strategy Callaghan’s Labour government there were three phases in the devel- which would eventually see the had lost the parliamentary major- opment of the arrangement: the Liberals in a full coalition govern- ity of four which it had gained at first was one of relative harmony ment, and urged Liberals to draw the 1974 election. To secure the pas- within and between the partners; conclusions from the experience sage of legislation and stay in office, the second was one of crisis, which of it for that purpose. Although Callaghan offered the Liberal MPs – broke the trust underpinning the Steel’s preference and expectation then thirteen in total – consultation pact; and the latter period was one was for a working relationship over policy in exchange for support in which the spirit of the pact had with Labour, the Liberal mani- in the division lobbies. gone, though it lived on in prac- festo following the pact made The first arrangement by which tice – it was politically a ‘dead man clear the party’s readiness to work Liberal MPs supported Callaghan’s walking’. In all three phases Liberals with either main party under the government was a vote of ‘no confi- secured achievements, but they right circumstances. Steel himself dence’ tabled by Margaret Thatcher were of diminishing significance reiterated during the 2010 elec- on 23 March 1977; however, Steel and came at increasing cost. tion campaign that ‘Nick Clegg had looked forward to the opportu- As they secured the confidence is absolutely right to stick to his nity for some time, and his reaction vote of 23 March, Callaghan and argument that the electorate to it set the tone of Liberal politics Steel drew up an agreement for the must first decide the composition for years to come. The reasons for remainder of the parliamentary of the Commons, and that the going into a pact were both national session, which was accepted by all party leaders must thereafter act and partisan; tactical and strategic. Liberal MPs even though some responsibly in accord with their Even the Liberals most suspicious were surprised at its limited fruits. decisions.’1 He also confirmed of cooperation with other parties There would be a Joint Consultative his approval of the deal with the could see the attractions of sustain- Committee between Labour min- Tories after its publication.2 Thus, ing Callaghan in office: a general isters and their counterparts in the though it is dangerous to make election would expose the Liberals’ ‘Shadow Administration’, as the predictions from past events, it financial and political vulnerabil- Liberal MPs and peers involved is reasonable to take Steel’s cue ity, whereas an arrangement with Left: Jim came to call themselves; Liberal and consider what the experience Callaghan would provide stabil- Callaghan proposals on worker participation, of the Lib–Lab pact of 1977–78 ity for the nation at a time of eco- promises homelessness and small businesses might suggest about the situation nomic crisis on terms at least partly David Steel his were to be given a serious hearing, in which the Liberal Democrats determined by Liberals, and dem- reward (PR) and – most tantalising of all – the now find themselves. There are onstrate the practicality of the sort after his Labour issue of proportional representation certain similar features which of cooperation entailed by the elec- colleagues (PR) for elections to the proposed give the Lib–Lab pact a poten- toral reform promoted by the party. have voted devolved bodies in Scotland and tial value as a guide for observ- The questions were how long the on it (Gibbard Wales and for direct elections to the ers, if not actors, in the coalition cooperation should continue and at cartoon, European Assembly was to be put process. what price, and it was immediately Guardian) before the Commons. Steel was in Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 59 ‘be cArefuL what you wisH for …’ tHe Lessons of tHe Lib-lab pAct for tHe Lib-con coalition bullish mood about the opportunity exceptions, favourable’ and that who had defected to the Liberals and wrote to Liberal candidates on ‘the Party will stand solidly with three years earlier, convinced the 24 March: the Parliamentary Party and the Liberal Assembly at Brighton to Leader.’7 Shadow Administration pass a resolution demanding that Admire the photos of the Liberal and Joint Consultative Committee a ‘substantial majority’ of Labour MPs in the Daily Mail! When meetings went ahead and senior MPs must support PR for the did photographs of all the MPs Liberals in the Lords wrote to Steel European elections in order for the last appear on the front page of a calling for ‘a more stable and longer pact to continue. popular daily? You will have a dif- term agreement.’8 There was even October saw a reshuffle of the ficult time. You will have resigna- a remarkable historical continuum Shadow Administration in which tions in your constituency. (You provided by a letter from Sir George doubters made way for more solid would have had from others if we Schuster, who said: ‘in listening to supporters of the pact: Smith, who had sided with the Tories). Don’t what you said last night I felt for had resigned as employment spokes- be defensive. Be aggressive. Go all the first time that public expression man, was replaced by Baroness out to detail the bridling of social- was given to a true Liberal mes- Seear, and Grimond stepped down ism. Forget the textual analysis of sage.’9 Yet there remained amongst from his responsibility for energy the Agreement. It’s what we make Liberals a body of sceptical opin- policy, which was handed to Lord of it that matters.3 there ion which feared for Liberal inde- Avebury. In November, a Party However, little was guaranteed, pendence and by the summer Steel Council meeting at Derby insisted and the votes on PR were to be free remained recalled, ‘the Party was extremely that if Labour MPs did not endorse votes so that Labour MPs would restless’10 following very poor local PR for Europe, then a special be at liberty to oppose the meas- amongst election results in May, when three- Assembly would have to be called ure. From the outset there were quarters of Liberal county council to review the pact. Everything now Liberals who took John Pardoe’s Liberals a seats were lost. depended upon the Commons vote view that ‘David was determined to During the autumn of 1977, on the introduction of PR on 13 do a deal at all costs’. Labour minis- body of scep- the pact was tested to destruction, December. ters agreed, as one source reported: though this would not be pub- The vote for PR in European ‘the “terms” were heard with some tical opinion licly evident until later. The deli- elections was lost by 319 to 222. incredulity by the Cabinet’ and cate balance of opinion within the Conservative whipping against ‘the [Labour] Party had simply which feared Liberal Party was reflected in the the bill did damage, but more sig- undertaken to do what it had any- Annual Report to the Assembly, nificant to the Liberals was Labour’s way intended to do and desist from for Liberal which argued that ‘the sudden re- lukewarm response.