The Qin Expeditionary Force and Its Constitution
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"Dashing forward without helmets"? : The Qin Expeditionary Force and its Constitution MIYAKE Kiyoshi (Kyoto University) 1. Background Why could the Qin achieve the unification of the Warring States? It is not easy to answer this question because there are various reasons, which connect with each other in a complicated fashion. Among these reasons, the military strength of the Qin has always been counted as an important factor. Zhang Yi depicted the Qin army as follows: Ch'in has more than 1,000,000 armored troops, 1,000chariots, and 10,000 cavalrymen. Its Tiger Racing Knights who dash forward without helmets, drawing their bows and brandishing their halberds, simply cannot be calculated. the number of its armored cavalrymen, the fine horses of Ch'in, with forelegs thrust forward and rear legs stretched back, from hoof to hoof measuring three hsün as they soar through the air, are beyond counting. The knights from East of the Mount join battle after girding armor and donning helmets; the men of Ch'in charge the enemy casting off their armor, barefoot and striped to the waist, a human head dangling in their left hands, a live captive clutched in their right. [秦帶甲百餘萬,車千乘,騎萬匹,虎賁之士跿跔科頭貫頤奮戟者,至不可勝計。秦 馬之良,戎兵之衆,探前趹後蹄閒三尋騰者,不可勝數。山東之士被甲蒙冑以會戰,秦人 捐甲徒裼以趨敵,左挈人頭,右挾生虜。](Shiji 70, 2293. Quote English translation from [Nienhauser 1994].) This is a mere threat in order to coerce the king of Han, so we should discount the reliability of this description. But Xunzi also admitted the superiority of the Qin soldiers to the men of other Warring States. He asserted that it was due to the Qin social system, in which commoners could not expect an elevation of social status without meritorious performance in battle [Xunzi, Chap. 15, Yiping]. On the other hand, the soldiers in the Qin army have been supposed to be conscripted peasants. This supposition is supported by the phrase, "Gengzhan zhi shi 耕戰之士" . The system of conscripting peasant soldiers has been already investigated by several scholars [Yu 1982, Yang 2010]. According to them, adult males in Qin were obliged to annually do 1 military service for a specific term, but in practice, they served their time longer (or shorter) than the regulations specified. An excess (or deficient) period of service was carried forward, and they were released from the duty of military service when they had served one year in total. However, turning our attention to the Qin military history, we cannot help questioning whether Qin military campaigns could have been conducted under the above described draft system. In particular, after the end of 4th century BCE, the number of long-term, large-scale campaigns to conquer the territory outside the Guanzhong Plain increased, and it would have been impossible to sustain these campaigns with an army constituted only by peasant soldiers, who served a maximum of just one year. Moreover, there is another question: Why was the Qin peasant soldiers' army overwhelmingly stronger than that of the other Warring States? Was every Qin peasant extremely brave? Did he become an excellent soldier without any training or experience in the battlefield, dashing in and fighting without his helmet in order to be rewarded? It would be unwise to take the statements by Zhang Yi at face value, as he had a prejudice that Qin men were born to be soldiers, and were fundamentally brave. If military strength was one of the crucial factors behind the unification by the Qin, we should analyze the secret to its strength through the study about concrete examples. In my presentation, I will take up the campaign to capture Ying 郢, the capital of Chu 楚, which lasted from 280BCE to 277BCE, as an example. 2. The conquest of Ying In this campaign, Qin troops invaded Chu from two sides. One group advanced southward along the Han River, another marched eastward along the Yangtze River. The military achievements of both tend to be credited to Bai Qi, though only because he was the commander-in-chief of these troops. According to Shiji 史記, it was the Sima Cuo’s force that invaded Chu from Shu along the Yangtze River in the 27th year of King Zhaoxiang's reign (280BCE). It follows that since Bai Qi led the Han River area army, Sima Cuo led the Yangtze River area army in actual fact. The number of soldiers under the command of Bai Qi was "tens of thousands". Compared with the 200, 000 soldiers dispatched in order to conquer Chu later in the reign of Qin Shihuang, the size of Bai Qi’s force was not large. On the other hand, according to Zhanguoce 戰國策, the unity of soldiers was very strong, and they came to respect their commander as if he were their parent. In addition, this force penetrated deep into the 2 enemy's territory, so they took provisions from the population of the newly occupied area1. Although there was the good possibility of plunder, Bai Qi never neglected logistics. He settled Qin criminals in the important cities around the Han River system within the occupied territory, gradually securing his firm foothold behind him. The criminals were first settled in Rang 穰 along the Tuan 湍 River in the 27th year (280BCE), the next year in Nanyang 南陽, and finally in Deng 鄧 and Yan 鄢, which were captured by Bai Qi, in the 28th year (279BCE)2. After having secured supply bases along the Han River, he launched the attack on Ying in the 29th year (278BCE). It is supposed that the elite troop of Bai Qi formed the main strength of the Han River area army on the front line, while convicts served as backup logistics support. Sima Cuo advanced from Shu to Qianzhong 黔中 via the Yangtze River in the 27th year. Before his expedition started, he had assembled soldiers in the Longxi 隴西 region3. It is not certain what kind of soldiers comprised this expeditionary force. But, needless to say, Longxi, one of the six provinces of "the son of a distinguished family (liangjiazi 良家子)4", is a place known for producing excellent cavalry. Moreover, there were various ethnic groups, like Mianzhu 緜諸 or Dihuan 翟豲, in Longxi5, and it is supposed that they could be conscripted for the expeditionary force. According to Huayangguozhi 華陽國志, Sima Cuo attacked Chu with "a hundred thousand of Ba-Shu people 巴蜀衆十万"6. This description is supported by the discovery of the tomb of Ba people as well as Qin people in Matianping, Xupu County, Hunan Province [Hunansheng Bowuguan, etc. 1984]. Considering these facts, it is very likely that the Yangtze River area army was comprised by no few soldiers from various ethnic groups in Longxi, Ba, and Shu. After having attacked Qianzhong region in the 27th year, this force advanced along the river and captured Xiliang 西陵. Then, they are supposed to have kept 1 …王乃使應侯往見武安君、責之曰「楚、地方五千里、持戟百萬。君前率數萬之眾入楚、拔鄢郢、焚其廟、 東至竟陵、楚人震恐、東徙而不敢西向。…」武安君曰「是時楚王恃其國大、不恤其政、而羣臣相妬以功、 諂諛用事、良臣斥疎、百姓心離、城池不修、既無良臣、又無守備。故起所以得引兵深入、多倍城邑、發梁 焚舟以專民、以掠於郊野、以足軍食。當此之時、秦中士卒、以軍中為家、將帥為父母、不約而親、不謀而 信、一心同功、死不旋踵。楚人自戰其地、咸顧其家、各有散心、莫有鬬志。是以能有功也。…」(『戦国策』 中山策「昭王既息民繕兵」) 2 二十六年、赦罪人遷之穰。…二十七年、錯攻楚。赦罪人遷之南陽([正義]南陽及上遷之穰、皆今鄧州也)。 …二十八年、大良造白起攻楚、取鄢・鄧、赦罪人遷之。(『史記』秦本紀) 3 又使司馬錯發隴西、因蜀攻楚黔中、拔之。(『史記』秦本紀) 4 趙充國字翁孫、隴西上邽人也、後徙金城令居。始為騎士、以六郡良家子[注、服虔曰、金城、隴西、天水、 安定、北地、上郡是也。]善騎射補羽林。(『漢書』趙充國傳) 5 秦穆公得由余、西戎八國服於秦、故自隴以西有緜諸・緄戎・翟、䝠之戎、 岐・梁山・涇・漆之北有義 渠・大荔・烏氏・朐衍之戎。(『史記』匈奴列伝) 6 (周赧王)七年、封公子惲為蜀侯。司馬錯率巴蜀衆十萬、大舶舩萬艘、米六百萬斛、浮江伐楚、取商於 之地、為黔中郡。(『華陽國志』蜀志) This invasion on Chu is dated to 308BCE, distinguished from the campaign in the 27th year of King Zhaoxiang's reign (280BCE). But except for this record, no description about Sima Cuo's invasion on Chu is in the Huanyangguozhi, there is a possibility of misdating. 3 advancing, and they participated in the attack against Ying with the Han River area army in the 29th year. After the fail of Ying in the 29th year, the troops advanced farther eastward and captured Jingling 竟陵. After the occupation, Nan Province was founded around this area. Next year, Bai Qi continued to attack, occupying Wu Province in Chu and the Jiangnan region, founding Qianzhong Province in this area. These were first provinces founded by Qin, except for several provinces in the new territory inside the "Guanzhong", like Shang, Ba, and Shu Province [Tsuchiguchi2011]. Taking into account the mobilization of the convicts and the discovery of the Ba tombs, this campaign to attack Ying should be regarded as a large-scale population shift, as well as an invasion. In other words, it was a campaign followed by the occupation of a wide area. Based on the above, two points should be noted: (1) There was a difference between elite troops and supporting units. In the expeditionary force led by Bai Qi, it was "tens of thousands" soldiers who played a major role in actual battles, and they were just a part of a whole army. In the case of the Battle of Changping 長平(260BCE), 25,000 men for surprise attack ("奇兵二萬五千") played a critical role in dividing the Zhao troops into two. I guess that this was also a part of the special forces under the command of Bai Qi. What gave victory to Bai Qi was not the total size of his army, but rather an existence of strong elite troops. (2) When the long-term expedition was sent out, it was not the case that every commoner in the Qin territory shared an equal burden of military service. Rather, there was a tendency that men in a specific region or a specific group were conscripted selectively--settlers in the frontier areas or newly occupied territories, non-Chinese ethnic groups, and convicts, to be concrete.