"Dashing forward without helmets"? : The Expeditionary Force and its Constitution

MIYAKE Kiyoshi (Kyoto University)

1. Background

Why could the Qin achieve the unification of the Warring States? It is not easy to answer this question because there are various reasons, which connect with each other in a complicated fashion. Among these reasons, the military strength of the Qin has always been counted as an important factor. Zhang Yi depicted the Qin army as follows:

Ch'in has more than 1,000,000 armored troops, 1,000chariots, and 10,000 cavalrymen. Its Tiger Racing Knights who dash forward without helmets, drawing their bows and brandishing their halberds, simply cannot be calculated. the number of its armored cavalrymen, the fine horses of Ch'in, with forelegs thrust forward and rear legs stretched back, from hoof to hoof measuring three hsün as they soar through the air, are beyond counting. The knights from East of the Mount join battle after girding armor and donning helmets; the men of Ch'in charge the enemy casting off their armor, barefoot and striped to the waist, a human head dangling in their left hands, a live captive clutched in their right. [秦帶甲百餘萬，車千乘，騎萬匹，虎賁之士跿跔科頭貫頤奮戟者，至不可勝計。秦 馬之良，戎兵之衆，探前趹後蹄閒三尋騰者，不可勝數。山東之士被甲蒙冑以會戰，秦人 捐甲徒裼以趨敵，左挈人頭，右挾生虜。](Shiji 70, 2293. Quote English translation from [Nienhauser 1994].)

This is a mere threat in order to coerce the king of , so we should discount the reliability of this description. But Xunzi also admitted the superiority of the Qin soldiers to the men of other Warring States. He asserted that it was due to the Qin social system, in which commoners could not expect an elevation of social status without meritorious performance in battle [Xunzi, Chap. 15, Yiping]. On the other hand, the soldiers in the Qin army have been supposed to be conscripted peasants. This supposition is supported by the phrase, "Gengzhan zhi shi 耕戰之士" . The system of conscripting peasant soldiers has been already investigated by several scholars [Yu 1982, Yang 2010]. According to them, adult males in Qin were obliged to annually do

1 military service for a specific term, but in practice, they served their time longer (or shorter) than the regulations specified. An excess (or deficient) period of service was carried forward, and they were released from the duty of military service when they had served one year in total. However, turning our attention to the Qin military history, we cannot help questioning whether Qin military campaigns could have been conducted under the above described draft system. In particular, after the end of 4th century BCE, the number of long-term, large-scale campaigns to conquer the territory outside the Guanzhong Plain increased, and it would have been impossible to sustain these campaigns with an army constituted only by peasant soldiers, who served a maximum of just one year. Moreover, there is another question: Why was the Qin peasant soldiers' army overwhelmingly stronger than that of the other Warring States? Was every Qin peasant extremely brave? Did he become an excellent soldier without any training or experience in the battlefield, dashing in and fighting without his helmet in order to be rewarded? It would be unwise to take the statements by Zhang Yi at face value, as he had a prejudice that Qin men were born to be soldiers, and were fundamentally brave. If military strength was one of the crucial factors behind the unification by the Qin, we should analyze the secret to its strength through the study about concrete examples. In my presentation, I will take up the campaign to capture 郢, the capital of 楚, which lasted from 280BCE to 277BCE, as an example.

2. The conquest of Ying

In this campaign, Qin troops invaded Chu from two sides. One group advanced southward along the Han River, another marched eastward along the Yangtze River. The military achievements of both tend to be credited to Bai Qi, though only because he was the commander-in-chief of these troops. According to Shiji 史記, it was the Cuo’s force that invaded Chu from along the Yangtze River in the 27th year of King Zhaoxiang's reign (280BCE). It follows that since Bai Qi led the Han River area army, Sima Cuo led the Yangtze River area army in actual fact. The number of soldiers under the command of Bai Qi was "tens of thousands". Compared with the 200, 000 soldiers dispatched in order to conquer Chu later in the reign of Qin Shihuang, the size of Bai Qi’s force was not large. On the other hand, according to Zhanguoce 戰國策, the unity of soldiers was very strong, and they came to respect their commander as if he were their parent. In addition, this force penetrated deep into the

2 enemy's territory, so they took provisions from the population of the newly occupied area1. Although there was the good possibility of plunder, Bai Qi never neglected logistics. He settled Qin criminals in the important cities around the Han River system within the occupied territory, gradually securing his firm foothold behind him. The criminals were first settled in Rang 穰 along the Tuan 湍 River in the 27th year (280BCE), the next year in Nanyang 南陽, and finally in Deng 鄧 and Yan 鄢, which were captured by Bai Qi, in the 28th year (279BCE)2. After having secured supply bases along the Han River, he launched the attack on Ying in the 29th year (278BCE). It is supposed that the elite troop of Bai Qi formed the main strength of the Han River area army on the front line, while convicts served as backup logistics support. Sima Cuo advanced from Shu to Qianzhong 黔中 via the Yangtze River in the 27th year. Before his expedition started, he had assembled soldiers in the Longxi 隴西 region3. It is not certain what kind of soldiers comprised this expeditionary force. But, needless to say, Longxi, one of the six provinces of "the son of a distinguished family (liangjiazi 良家子)4", is a place known for producing excellent cavalry. Moreover, there were various ethnic groups, like Mianzhu 緜諸 or Dihuan 翟豲, in Longxi5, and it is supposed that they could be conscripted for the expeditionary force. According to Huayangguozhi 華陽國志, Sima Cuo attacked Chu with "a hundred thousand of Ba-Shu people 巴蜀衆十万"6. This description is supported by the discovery of the tomb of Ba people as well as Qin people in Matianping, Xupu County, Hunan Province [Hunansheng Bowuguan, etc. 1984]. Considering these facts, it is very likely that the Yangtze River area army was comprised by no few soldiers from various ethnic groups in Longxi, Ba, and Shu. After having attacked Qianzhong region in the 27th year, this force advanced along the river and captured Xiliang 西陵. Then, they are supposed to have kept

1 …王乃使應侯往見武安君、責之曰「楚、地方五千里、持戟百萬。君前率數萬之眾入楚、拔鄢郢、焚其廟、 東至竟陵、楚人震恐、東徙而不敢西向。…」武安君曰「是時楚王恃其國大、不恤其政、而羣臣相妬以功、 諂諛用事、良臣斥疎、百姓心離、城池不修、既無良臣、又無守備。故起所以得引兵深入、多倍城邑、發梁 焚舟以專民、以掠於郊野、以足軍食。當此之時、秦中士卒、以軍中為家、將帥為父母、不約而親、不謀而 信、一心同功、死不旋踵。楚人自戰其地、咸顧其家、各有散心、莫有鬬志。是以能有功也。…」（『戦国策』 中山策「昭王既息民繕兵」） 2 二十六年、赦罪人遷之穰。…二十七年、錯攻楚。赦罪人遷之南陽（[正義]南陽及上遷之穰、皆今鄧州也）。 …二十八年、大良造白起攻楚、取鄢・鄧、赦罪人遷之。（『史記』秦本紀） 3 又使司馬錯發隴西、因蜀攻楚黔中、拔之。（『史記』秦本紀） 4 趙充國字翁孫、隴西上邽人也、後徙金城令居。始為騎士、以六郡良家子[注、服虔曰、金城、隴西、天水、 安定、北地、上郡是也。]善騎射補羽林。（『漢書』趙充國傳） 5 秦穆公得由余、西戎八國服於秦、故自隴以西有緜諸・緄戎・翟、䝠之戎、 岐・梁山・涇・漆之北有義 渠・大荔・烏氏・朐衍之戎。（『史記』匈奴列伝） 6 （周赧王）七年、封公子惲為蜀侯。司馬錯率巴蜀衆十萬、大舶舩萬艘、米六百萬斛、浮江伐楚、取商於 之地、為黔中郡。（『華陽國志』蜀志） This invasion on Chu is dated to 308BCE, distinguished from the campaign in the 27th year of King Zhaoxiang's reign (280BCE). But except for this record, no description about Sima Cuo's invasion on Chu is in the Huanyangguozhi, there is a possibility of misdating.

3 advancing, and they participated in the attack against Ying with the Han River area army in the 29th year. After the fail of Ying in the 29th year, the troops advanced farther eastward and captured Jingling 竟陵. After the occupation, Nan Province was founded around this area. Next year, Bai Qi continued to attack, occupying Wu Province in Chu and the Jiangnan region, founding Qianzhong Province in this area. These were first provinces founded by Qin, except for several provinces in the new territory inside the "Guanzhong", like Shang, Ba, and Shu Province [Tsuchiguchi2011]. Taking into account the mobilization of the convicts and the discovery of the Ba tombs, this campaign to attack Ying should be regarded as a large-scale population shift, as well as an invasion. In other words, it was a campaign followed by the occupation of a wide area.

Based on the above, two points should be noted: (1) There was a difference between elite troops and supporting units. In the expeditionary force led by Bai Qi, it was "tens of thousands" soldiers who played a major role in actual battles, and they were just a part of a whole army. In the case of the Battle of Changping 長平(260BCE), 25,000 men for surprise attack ("奇兵二萬五千") played a critical role in dividing the troops into two. I guess that this was also a part of the special forces under the command of Bai Qi. What gave victory to Bai Qi was not the total size of his army, but rather an existence of strong elite troops. (2) When the long-term expedition was sent out, it was not the case that every commoner in the Qin territory shared an equal burden of military service. Rather, there was a tendency that men in a specific region or a specific group were conscripted selectively--settlers in the frontier areas or newly occupied territories, non-Chinese ethnic groups, and convicts, to be concrete. In other words, a group of men preferentially recruited for military service was distinguished from the other. By setting this group of people at the core of expeditionary forces, the Qin authorities tried to minimize the negative influence on agricultural production and the social disturbances brought by warfare. Needless to say, professional soldiers should be counted as a member of “group of men preferentially recruited for military service”. Military officers, officials belonging to the army, and private subordinates7 of officers in a higher rank had to join expeditionary forces

7 In Shuihudi Qin strips, we can find a 'private staff (Sili 私吏)' who followed a commander ( 尉) in the battle of Xingqiu 邢丘. 奪首 軍戲某爰書、某里士五（伍）甲縛詣男子丙、及斬首一、男子丁與偕。甲告曰、甲、尉某私吏、 與戰刑（邢）丘城。今日見丙戲旞、直以劍伐痍丁、奪此首、而捕來詣。診首、已診丁、亦診其痍状。 （封診式 31～33） It tells that a commander-class officer could take a private subordinate to the battle with him. Though the number and the constitution are unknown, Chao She, General of Chao, employed many staffs, kept an intimate relationship with

4 when so ordered. In addition, there were soldiers who should be distinguished from ordinary conscript soldiers in that they were selected according to certain criteria, and trained, even though some scholars do not regard them as professional soldiers 8 . According to Shigechika[1999], a local regular army was constituted of selected soldiers, who were classified into several types, like caiguan 材官, qishi 騎士, etc. Each had to be on duty at his prefecture during a specific term every year, where he received military training; , they were then exempt from tax and compulsory labor. Shigechika also suggests that this system originated from the Qin, and consisted of men called jiazou 駕騶9, qingche 輕車, xuzhang 壻 張, yinqiang 引強, zhongzu 中卒10 in the Shuihudi Qin bamboo strips. They constituted the regular army in each prefecture, and the scale of it could be estimated to be around 300 at the end of the Qin dynasty11. In addition to these types of soldiers, I would like to call attention to the existence of volunteers who enlisted for long-term military service. They were called rongmu 冗募.

3. Rongmu 冗募: Long-term military volunteers

We can find the word, rongmu, in the Shuihudi documents:

[Suppose] a rongmu returns home and he states the number of days has been already completed, though, the documents have not yet come. If the fact is different from his statement, he shall be sentenced, corresponding to the number of the remaining days before the official end of term, to the fine, equivalent to four months service at the frontier per day. [冗募歸、辭曰日已備、致未來、不如辭、貲日四月居邊。]（Qinlü Zachao 35）

It is true that the existence of military volunteers in the Qin has been already pointed out, but scholars have not paid attention to it, because we find little evidence of it in the historical sources, and the meaning of rong was not clear. However, the recovery of the Ernian Lüling gave us several keys for understanding the

them. 始妾事其父、時為將、身所奉飯飲而進食者以十數、所友者以百數、大王及宗室所賞賜者盡以予軍吏士 大夫、受命之日、不問家事。（『史記』趙奢列伝） 8 Some scholars regard "qishi 騎士" or "caiguan 材官" in the Han dynasty as a sort of professional soldier, and others take it to be a peasant soldier. About this argument, Takamura reviews disputed points [Takamura 2008]. 9 ●駕騶除四歳、不能駕御、貲教者一盾、免、賞（償）四歳䌛（徭）戍。（秦律雑抄 3） 10 ●輕車、䞣張、引強、中卒所載傅（傳）到軍、縣勿奪。奪中卒傳、令、尉貲各二甲。（秦律雑抄 7～9） 11 Shigechika [1999]aimed at the fact that Xiang Yu obtained 8,000 elite soldiers (精兵八千人) when he raised an army and assembled soldiers from prefectures under the control of Kuaiji Province (『史記』項羽本紀). There were 28 prefectures in Kuaiji, according to Hanshu, so average number of soldiers in the prefectural regular army could be estimated to be 300.

5 correct meaning of rong. It is the antonym of geng 更. Whereas geng denotes being engaged in a specific official task by rotation, rong means working during a longer term outside the rotation system, being under the official control in preparation for an urgent demand [Yang2008, Miyake2013]. Based on this understanding, we could interpret rongmu as a long-term military volunteer. We also can find "rongbian 冗邊" in the following selection from Shuihudi, which tells us that his term lasted for 5 years.

If one whose mother or sisters are liqie, even though he himself is not punished for a crime, wants to be assigned to the frontier on a full time basis for 5 years, without reducing the original number of days of his compulsory labor, in order to free one person to become a commoner, this is to be permitted.[...] Statutes concerning Sikong [百姓有母及同牲（生）爲隷妾、非適（謫）罪殹（也）而欲爲冗邊五歳、毋賞（償）興 日、以免一人爲庶人、許之。…司空律](Qinlü 18 zhong 151-152)

In this article, a person agreed to serve as rongbian in order to free a liqie among his relatives. This special case does not allow us to conclude that the term of rongbian was 5 years in every case. But, at least, considering the articles quoted above, it appears the term of each military volunteer was fixed beforehand, and that he received a certificate when the term expired. Later, among Liye Qin strips, dated to around the end of Qin Shihuang's reign or the reign of Ershi, we can find "rongmu qun shuzu 冗募群戍卒" mentioned:

[...] a group of soldiers, who enlisted for long-term military service: 143. [...]...26. ●The deceased: 1 [...]...626, and one deceased. Document for job evaluation about acting commandant Hu. Start working in 11th month, day ji-you, until 12th month, day xin-wei. [ 冗募群戍卒百卌三人 尉守狐課 廿六人 ●死一人 十一月己酉視事、盡十二月辛未。 六百廿六人而死者一人]（⑧132＋⑧334）

Though this docuemtn is difficult to understand because the upper part has been damaged, it seems to be a list on which the number of soldiers and their status under the commandant of a prefecture was written. And it tells that 143 men in the prefectural troop were "rongmu". "Rongmu qun shuzu" was abbreviated to "rongshu 冗戍".

6

The 30th year [of the Qin Shihuang's reign], 5th month, wuwu being the first day of the month, on the xinyi [24th] day, Chang, acting chief of the Sikong Bureau, dares to report the following: A long-term soldier, holding the social rank shiwu, [name?], will return to Gaocheng Prefecture. He is exempted from payment for clothing and supplies [during his return travel?]. If there is anything to be conveyed, please send an official to convey it. Please send a reply. I dare to report this. [...] [卅年五月戊午朔辛已、司空守敞敢言之。冗戍士五（伍）□ 歸高成。免 衣 用。當傳、謁遣吏傳。謁報。 敢言之。（正） 辛已旦食時食時、隸臣殷行 武（背）]（⑧666+⑧2006）

The spaces between the characters around "免衣用" on the second line are unnaturally wide, the meaning of which is not clear. At least, we can guess that the chief of Sikong asked relevant officials to cause "rongshu" X to return home successfully. The antonym of "rongshu" is "gengshu". That term appears in the following list, also from Liye:

【司】空佐敬二甲Ｌ 庫佐駕二甲ー 令佐圂一盾ー 更戍嬰二甲 【司】空守謷三甲ー 田官佐賀二甲ー 令佐冣七甲ー 更戍□二甲 司空守巸三甲ー 髳長忌再□䙴ー 令佐逌二甲已利 更戍裚贖耐二 司空佐沈二甲以 校長予言貲二甲ー □廿錢 更戍得贖耐 □□□一盾入 發弩□二甲ー 更戍晝二甲 更戍堂贖耐 庫武二甲ー 倉佐平七【盾】 更戍五二甲 更戍齒贖耐 田佐□一甲 更戍登二甲 更戍暴贖耐 （⑧149＋⑧489）

In this strip, the combination of official title, personal name and the name of the punishment for each person are listed in four columns. Though the titles from the 1st column to the 3rd, like "Sikong zuo 司空佐", are that of officials, there are 10 "gengshu" from the end of the 3rd column to the 4th, with the punishments, " [the fine of] 2 sets of armor (貲)二甲", "redeeming having his beard shaved off 贖耐" and so on. Most men listed as "gengshu" are from Chengfu 城父 Prefecture.

人忠、出貸更戍士五（伍）城父陽鄭得（⑧850） 稟人忠、出貸更戍城父士五（伍）陽䊒倗。八月九月(⑧980)

These are records about official loans of food, in which we can find two "gengshu" as

7 recipients. Both of them, and all other "gengshu" whose legal domicile is knowable, are from Chengfu. It follows that "gengshu" were systematically drafted in a lump at this prefecture. Moreover, there was another type of soldiers, called "fashu"12. They were the criminals sentenced to compulsory labor on the frontier, or who did compulsory labor instead of paying a fine. These "fashu" come from various places, in contrast with the "gengshu". In short, there were three types of soldiers among the regular army of Qianling Prefecture during the Qin, i.e., ordinary conscript soldiers, volunteers, and convicts, and the term of the latter two was longer than conscript soldiers. Though it is not sure whether 143 was the total number of "rongshu" in Qianling, or that in the smaller unit, it is clear that the proportion was not small.

4. Concluding remarks

At present, "rongmu" appears only in historical sources concerning frontier guards. There is no evidence to prove that military volunteers were assembled for any expeditionary campaign. But I'd like to emphasize the fact that there were not a few men who applied for recruitment, and voluntarily became frontier guards for a long term of service. They were the men who decided to be soldiers in order to earn a living, so to speak. Semiprofessional soldiers were surely included among them. If this sort of group of men existed in the Qin, and if the authorities utilized them as military volunteers, then it is quite reasonable to assume that the Qin secured its military strength by recruiting volunteers from these groups of people, as well as conscripting peasants, when an expeditionary force was organized. The soldiers surely varied in quality. The military prowess expected of peasant soldiers was probably inferior to professional soldiers, who were select, well-trained soldiers, and volunteers with much battle experience. I suppose that soldiers called "ruishi 鋭師 (or 鋭 士)" in the received sources could be veterans like these. For instance, Qin attacked Qi in cooperation with other states in the 23rd year of King Zhaoxiang's reign (284BCE). In this campaign, the expeditionary force was commanded not by a general, but by one bearing the rank of commander ("wei 尉"). This fact suggests that the scale of the army was not large, perhaps because of the long distance travelled during the campaign. Shiji records this campaign as follows:

12 罰戍士五資中宕登爽、署遷陵書。 （⑧429） 粟米一石九斗少半斗。卅三年十月甲辰朔壬戌、發弩繹・尉史過出貸罰戍士五醴陽同□＝禄。 廿。 令史兼視平。 過手。（⑧761） 徑廥粟米四石。卅一年七月辛亥朔朔日、田官守敬・佐壬・稟人娙出稟罰戍公卒襄城武宜都胠・長利士五 甗。 令史逐視平。 壬手。（⑧2246）

8

In the 40th year [of King Min's reign] (284BCE), Yan, Qin, Chu, and San-Jin carried out a joint campaign. Each dispatched elite troops to attack, and defeated us in Jixi. [四十年、 燕・秦・楚・三晉合謀、各出鋭師以伐、敗我濟西。] (Shiji 46: 1900)

This record shows that it was elite troops ("ruishi 鋭師") which were dispatched, even though the scale was not large13. It is also possible that "rui" was only a eulogistic word, but we can find "ruishi 鋭士", which is distinguished from "zhongshi 中士"14. It follows that in this case the "ruishi" literally indicates the group of soldiers whose combat strength was practically superior to the other. When the total number of soldiers was mentioned, it could include the logistical soldiers as well as the fighting forces15. There are some examples about the proportion of the transport soldiers as follows:

Now I have heard that the number of your [King Xiang of Wei] soldiers, there are 200,000 warriors, 200.000 blue turbans, 200,000 shock troops, 100,000 transport soldiers, 600 chariots, and 5,000 horsemen.[今竊聞大王之卒、武士二十万、蒼頭二十万、奮撃二十万、 廝徒十万、車六百乗、騎五千匹。](Shiji 69: 2255)

If the middle-scale army is going to be organized, there should be [omission?] nobles as officers, thousands of commoners as the ranks, and hundreds thousands of subordinates, on that human resources you could finally dispatch the army. [若使中興師、君子庶人也、 必且數千、徒倍十萬、然後足以師而動矣。](Mozi, Feigong)

Though the latter does not indicate the constitution of the army directly, it suggests that a mass of subordinates, one of whose important roles might be a logistics, was needed, beyond the nobles and commoner soldiers at the core of the army. Therefore, the expeditionary force should be analyzed by dividing it into combat troops and support troops, and the former is supposed to have been constituted of veterans, called "ruishi" in several cases. The same may be said of the elite troops under Bai Qi's command. On the other hand, conscripted peasant soldiers were probably assigned auxiliary tasks around the elite troops. Though I think that my assertion is not too far from the truth, there is not enough proof to support it. But I want to emphasize my basic viewpoint: If we observe the Qin army as a

13 Qin was able to dispatch 10,000 "ruishi" in the King Huiwen's reign. 二十四年、肅侯卒。秦・楚・燕・齊・魏出鋭師各萬人來會葬。子武靈王立。（『史記』趙世家） 14 韓嘗以二十萬之衆辱於晉之城下、鋭士死、中士傷、而晉不拔。（『史記』楚世家） 15 料大王之卒、悉之不過三十萬、而廝徒負養在其中矣。（『史記』張儀列伝）

9 rather flat military organization constituted mostly by conscripted peasant soldiers who served in the army for maximum one year, and assume that Qin peasants became an excellent soldiers without any training, and fought bravely for rewards, because they got accustomed to collective behavior in their daily life and being bound by strict rules, then we will continue to be taken in by the glib talk of the school of diplomacy's men, and misunderstand the truth of Qin military history.

(I appreciate the help from Charles Sanft (The University of Tennessee), who kindly corrected the first English version of my paper. But, of course, it is myself who are responsible for every fault in the final version.)

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