Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 1

Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea

Jongkon Lee*

Several studies have emphasized the ideological mismatch between political parties and the mass public in Korea. In spite of party polarization, Korean citizens have tended to be ideologically moderate. This mismatch has been a puzzle, in that ordinary citizens are likely to realign their ideologies following those of political elites. This article provides the key to the puzzle regarding faction polarization in a political party. The intraparty conflicts among political moguls' personal factions rather than inter-party conflicts led to the ideological realignment of Korean citizens. In particular, fierce bilateral confrontation of Liberty Korea Party (LKP) factions has led to faction polarization that increased not only the number of extremely conservative citizens but also that of moderate people. Compared to the LKP, the Democratic Party (DP) was less likely to cause faction polarization, because of multilateral conflicts among small factions, which led to single-peaked ideological realignment at slightly progressive points.

Key Words: Korean political party, personal faction, faction polarization, ideological realignment

I. Introduction

In South Korea, several studies have argued that the ideological stances of political parties have become polarized since the 2000s (Kang 2012, Ka 2016), whereas the Korean mass public has been moderate (Lee 2011, Chae 2014). According to the Joongangilbo Ideology Survey, the proportion of moderate legislators decreased to about 20% in the late 2000s, whereas the ratio of moderate citizens has been stable and significant at around 40% in Korea (Lee 2011). The electoral surveys performed by the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC) reaffirmed this fact. The KSDC surveys measured Korean citizens'

* Ewha Womans University; E-mail: [email protected]

KOREA OBSERVER, Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 2018, pp.1-23 © 2018 by INSTITUTE OF KOREAN STUDIES. https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2018.49.1.1 2 Jongkon Lee

Figure 1. Party Polarization in Korean Politics

Source: Data based on the surveys performed by Jungangilbo and KDSC

Table 1. Ideological Positions of Korean Citizens

2008 2012 2014 2016 2017 + Most Conservative (10) 7.00% 9.07% 3.06% 1.19% 1.71% + Median (5) 28.24% 28.73% 25.03% 25.64% 24.87% + Most Progressive (0) 3.05% 3.35% 0.41% 0.85% 1.79% Ideological Variance 5.71 5.82 4.25 3.63 4.54 + Note: the number of parenthesis means the 11 Likert-scale ideological positions in KDSC surveys. Source: Data based on the surveys performed by KDSC ideological positions and their inferences about Korean political parties' ideologies on 11-point Likert scales (0 through 10; a larger number indicates conservative ideology).1 The survey said that Korean citizens perceived that the ideological distance between two major Korean political parties—the Democratic Party (DP) and the Liberty Korea Party (LKP)—has broadened. In contrast, the ideological variance of Korean citizens has decreased, and the ratio of ideologically extreme citizens has also decreased during the 2000s and 2010s (see Table 1). To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the party polarization phenomenon in Korea. The KSDC carried out public opinion surveys about the perceived ideologies of the LKP and the

1. The surveys were related to the elections of South Korea. There were National Parliament elections in 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. Then, KSDC performed surveys immediately after the elections. The data of 2014 was related to th the 6 local elections, whereas that of 2017 was related to the 19th presidential election. Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 3

DP, whereas Joonangilbo asked legislators about their subjective ideologies. Both surveys indicate that the ideological gap between the LKP and the DP has increased recently. In contrast, Korean citizens themselves believed that their ideologies were relatively moderate compared to the party ideologies. According to the 2016 KSDC survey, LKP supporters believed that their average ideology was 6.60 and that of LNP was 7.47. DP supporters answered that their average ideology was 4.12 and that of the DP was 3.46. This ideological mismatch is a puzzle. Because it is very hard for ordinary citizens to have consistent ideologies and make ideological decisions by themselves (Converse 1964), they frequently refer to political elites regarding political ideas or activities (Carmines and Stimson 1989, Zaller 1992, Hetherington 2001). In particular, political parties have been the most convenient references for ordinary citizens in making political choices (Rahn 1993). In other words, the ideologies of the aggregate bodies of political elites (i.e., political parties) should be influential in the ideological realignment of the mass public. In reality, several studies have argued that the policy preferences and ideologies of Korean political parties have affected those of Korean citizens (Song 2015, Chae 2014). Nevertheless, the proportion of moderate Korean citizens has always been high in spite of party polarization (Lee 2011, Chae 2014). This article discusses the puzzle in terms of faction conflict in Korean political parties. In Korea, the political influence of political parties' brand names has been limited. Instead, political moguls and their personal factions have dominated Korean politics (Lee 2014). As a result, Korean citizens' ideological realignment might have been affected more by intraparty faction conflicts than by inter-party conflicts. In particular, significant faction conflicts might produce faction polarization among party supporters, which could increase the ratio of moderate citizens. Faction polarization refers to the surge of two extreme ideological positions among party factions.

II. Theory and Hypothesis: Faction conflict and Polarization in South Korea

A. Party, Faction, and Political Cue in Korean Politics

The political ideology of individual citizens could be identified from the top down and from the bottom up (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). In a bottom-up manner, diverse 4 Jongkon Lee personality and individual differences may affect ideological tendencies. For example, socioeconomic status (Naumann, Benet-Martínez, and Espinoza 2016) and genetic factors (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005) could have affected ideological development. Nevertheless, the ideological continuum is a high-level abstraction, and it is very hard for ordinary citizens to hold consistent preferences across contexts (Converse 1964). Instead, they are likely to receive and accept political cues from political elites (Zaller 1992). Political cues imply informational shortcuts for ill-informed citizens to infer candidates' ideological stances, personal capabilities, and moralities (Bartels 2000, Lupia 1994, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). They allow citizens to interpret complex political issues efficiently given their bounded cognitive capabilities (Lupia 1994). Thus, effective cues in politics significantly affect electoral outcomes. In reality, a plethora of political science studies explained the formation of ideology in a top-down fashion (Feldman 1988, Sniderman and Bullock 2004, Carmines and Stimson 1989). In particular, political parties as aggregate bodies of political elites have been believed to have a significant impact on the ideological development of ordinary citizens (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, Gilens and Murakawa 2002, Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010). By providing informational shortcuts (i.e., party cues), political parties allow citizens to behave ideologically consistently (Petersen et al. 2013). In this sense, Sniderman (2000, 81) said, "Citizens can overcome informational shortfalls about politics, not because they (mysteriously) can simplify public choices effectively, but because these choices are systematically simplified for them." As a result, partisan-ideological sorting could be made in the mass public (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, Bafumi and Shapiro 2009, Mason 2015). In particular, during election times, when the electoral campaign can affect citizens' perception of party positions, the partisan-ideological sorting could be realigned (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014). However, partisan cues have been relatively weak in Korean politics (Dalton and Weldon 2007). According to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data, 65% of Korean people did not identify with a party during 1996-2000 (Schmitt 2002), and the partisan independence ratio reached even 71.5% in 2000 (So and Hyun 2006). Likewise, depending on KSDC surveys, only about 30% of Korean citizens answered that political party was the most important factor in their voting decisions.2 Instead, the relative

2. For example, according to the KSDC survey in 2016, about 33.2% of Korean citizens answered that political parties are the most important factor in voting, whereas 35.6% of the people answered that personality or morality is more important. Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 5 importance of political moguls and their personal factions in a political party was much greater (Heo 2013).3 Historically, several political figures who led Korean politics, such as Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, or Park Chung Hee, have built up their own factions in political parties and have affected the ideological realignment of Korean citizens. In recent years, Moon Jae In, Park Geun Hye, Ahn Cheol Soo, and other influential politicians have established their own factions in political parties and have provided political cues for ideological realignment to Korean citizens (Lee 2014, Hellmann 2014). Based on the argument above, Hypothesis 1 could be drawn. Hypothesis 1: Korean citizens realigned their ideologies depending on the political cues from favored political moguls and their personal factions.

B. Faction polarization in Korean Politics

Because multiple factions have existed in a political party, Korean citizens have faced conflicting cues from different factions that belonged to the same party. To illustrate, in recent years, the most dominant faction of the LKP was led by Park Geun Hye. She is the daughter of former president Park Chung Hee and had significant political support in the Northern Gyeongsang region. Thanks to her abundant political resources, she formed the pro-Park faction in the LKP and provided clear political cues to Korean citizens—especially those who supported the LKP. However, there were also anti-Park factions in the LKP. Several party leaders, such as Lee Myung Bak, Chung Mong Joon, Kim Moon Soo, and Kim Moo Sung, have maintained anti-Park factions in the LKP. Consequently, LKP-supporters faced cues not only from the pro-Park faction but also from the anti-Park faction. Likewise, in the DP, the faction led by Moon Jae In has been dominant. Moon Jae In had a personal relationship with former president Roh Moo Hyun and worked as a chief presidential secretary. Thus, he could succeed Roh's political legacy, including his political faction in the DP. Similar to the LKP case, there were several anti-Moon factions in the DP, and DP supporters simultaneously faced political cues from pro-Moon and anti-Moon factions. When facing conflicting cues, citizens would refer not only to favored groups (in-group, hereafter) that they support but also to hostile groups (out-group, hereafter) in realigning their ideologies (Nicholson 2012, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014). In other words,

3. Not only political parties but also individual politicians could affect the citizens' ideological stances . 6 Jongkon Lee citizens tend to assimilate their ideologies to those of in-groups and contrast theirs against out-groups (Levendusky 2018). Thus, the political relationship between factions is important in realigning political ideologies. When the relationship between in-group and out-group factions is bilaterally hostile, ideological polarization could result because of the contrasting effect (Amira 2015, Davis and Mason 2016, Mason 2015, Stroud 2010). In this manner, the severe bilateral confrontation between two dominant factions might produce significant faction polarization. However, the ideological polarization from faction conflicts might be narrower than that from party polarization. Inter-party conflicts generally occur between a progressive party and a conservative one, thereby producing two polar points at extremely progressive and extremely conservative ideologies. In contrast, faction conflicts tend to be one-sided. For example, both pro-Park and anti-Park factions of the LKP were conservative, despite their relative ideological difference. Thus, the ideological sorting of LKP supporters might be placed only on the conservative side. As a result, the right endpoint of the LKP's faction polarization should be extremely conservative ideology, and the left endpoint would be an only minimally conservative ideology that is close to a moderate ideology (i.e., moderately conservative or moderate). Likewise, the endpoints of the DP's faction polarization would be extremely progressive and minimally progressive points (around a moderate point). This theoretical argument explains the puzzle of Korean citizens' ideological distribution. Because the influence of political moguls' personal factions has been significant, and their conflicts have been severe, faction polarization has happened in Korean politics. Consequently, faction polarization has pushed a significant number of Korean citizens to moderate points. Hypothesis 2: When bilateral faction conflict in a political party is significant, faction polarization could result. The faction polarization would increase not only the number of ideologically extreme citizens but also that of moderate (i.e., between progressive and conservative ideologies) citizens.

C. Asymmetric Faction Conflicts in Korean Politics

In Korean politics, faction conflicts have been prevalent in both the LKP and the DP. However, the characteristics of the faction conflicts have been slightly different in the political parties. In the LKP, two big factions collided with each other seriously, Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 7 especially during the 2000s and the early 2010s. In particular, during National Assembly election times, the two factions were in conflict over candidate nomination. Depending on which faction in power, different candidates could be nominated in a top-down manner. As a result, the citizens who supported the LKP also had conflicting cues from two powerful factions. In the LKP, faction conflicts have been related to Park Geun Hye for more than a decade. In the late 2000s, the pro-Park faction was a relatively minor faction in the LKP, because Park Geun Hye was defeated in the LKP's presidential primary in 2007, and Lee Myung Bak was elected the Korean president. As a result, many pro-Park legislators failed to be nominated by the party. Some of them temporarily left the LKP and ran for the election as the candidates of the Pro-Park Alliance or as independent candidates. The Pro-Park Alliance was the name of the political party that was temporarily established by the defected pro-Park faction members in 2008. Nevertheless, the pro-Park faction in the LKP was robust. Because Park Geun Hye was highly supported by the Northern Gyeongsang region—the most important political base of the LKP—the pro-Park faction could confront the anti-Park faction even in the late 2000s. In the early 2010s, the faction conflict of the LKP was still fierce and the political power of the pro-Park faction gradually increased. Park Geun Hye emerged as the most dominant presidential candidate of the LKP. In addition, pro-Park legislators who were elected as independent candidates or as members of the Pro-Park Alliance rejoined the LKP in 2011. As a result, the pro-Park faction grew significantly and directly confronted the anti-Park faction. Then, in contrast with the 2008 National Assembly election, many anti-Park legislators failed to be nominated in 2012 because of faction conflict. This severe bilateral faction conflict promoted faction polarization of the LKP on the conservative side. Finally, after Park Geun Hye was elected in the 2012 presidential election, the pro-Park faction dominated the LKP. Several anti-Park faction leaders, such as Kim Moo Sung and Ryu Seung Min, could not directly confront the pro-Park faction. In other words, the LKP's bilateral faction confrontation was relieved during the mid-2010s, as the pro-Park faction definitely controlled the LKP. Even during 2016 National Assembly election, pro-Park legislators publicly distinguished "trustworthy" pro-Park people from anti-Park legislators in the nomination process. Compared with the LKP, there were several personal factions in the DP. Thus, multilateral faction conflict happened in the DP. For example, in 2008, Chung Dong Young, Sohn Hak Kyu, the successors of Roh Moo Hyun (e.g., Ahn Hee Jung), the 8 Jongkon Lee successors of Kim Dae Jung (e.g., Park Jie Won), and some other powerful politicians established their own factions in the DP. However, their public popularity was limited, and their factions hardly provided appealing cues to citizens. Moreover, Sohn Hak Kyu and other DP politicians did not have sufficient public popularity. As a result, it was hard for citizens to have attractive cues from the DP during the late 2000s, and could not contrast their cues to those of other factions. In addition, even though the DP factions were generally in conflict, they also frequently coalesced with each other, at least loosely, because the small and unpopular factions needed to work together with other factions to unite their political resources. Thus, the bilateral contrast in ideological realignment was limited in the DP. A similar situation persisted in the early 2010s. Political moguls, such as Moon Jae In, Kim Doo Kwan, Sohn Hak Kyu, Chung Sye Kyun, Chung Dong Young, and Kim Han Gil, established their own personal factions in the DP. Also, in the mid-2010s when several powerful politicians (e.g., Kim Han Gil, Ahn Cheol Soo, and Park Jie Won) defected from the DP and established a new party, People's Party, Moon Jae In, Kim Chong In, Sohn Hak Kyu, Chung Sye Kyun, and others led their own personal factions in the DP. These multilateral faction competitions limited the bilateral contrast in ideological realignment. In addition, unlike the fierce confrontation between pro-Park and anti-Park factions in the LKP, the pro-Moon faction has relatively dominated the party in the 2010s. Consequently, limited faction polarization might happen in the DP. Hypothesis 3: At least since the mid-2000s, faction polarization tends to be significant on the conservative side, because of the significant faction conflict of the LKP. In contrast, it might be limited on the progressive side.

III. Hypothesis Testing: Ideological Distribution of the Mass Public

To examine the effect of faction conflict on ideological realignment, several regression tests were performed, using KDSC survey data on the National Assembly elections in 2008, 2012, and 2016. The dependent variable was the ideological stances of individual citizens, and the major independent variables were the perceived ideological positions of faction leaders. The KDSC used 11-point Likert scales (0 through 10; a larger number indicates conservative ideology) to measure (perceived) ideological stances. In the LKP, the most dominant faction has been the pro-Park faction. Thus, for the Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 9

LKP-related regression, the perceived ideologies of Park Geun Hye were included. In addition, the perceived ideologies of several publicly well-known anti-Park politicians, such as Chung Mong Joon (2008 and 2012), Kim Moon Soo (2012), and Kim Moo Sung (2016), were also included in regression models. Chung Mong Joon had been one of the potential presidential candidates in the LKP and publicly supported Lee Myung Bak in the 2007 presidential election against Park Geun Hye. In the early 2010s, Kim Moon Soo and Chung Mong Joon were in conflict with Park Geun Hye, especially over the LKP's presidential candidate, and were supported by the anti-Park faction. Kim Moo Sung was the LKP chairperson during the mid-2010s, led the anti-Park faction, and frequently criticized Park Geun Hye during her presidency. The regression models were repeatedly tested with three different sample groups. The first group was all the supporters of the LKP (i.e., the people who strictly preferred the LKP to any other Korean political parties). The second group of people included the supporters of Park Geun Hye (i.e., the people who strictly preferred Park Geun Hye to other LKP's politicians, such as Chung Mong Joon, Kim Moon Soo, and Kim Moo Sung) among the LKP supporters. The third group was those who supported the LKP, but whose most preferred politician was not Park Geun Hye. This model and sample selection rules were also applied to DP-related regressions. The only difference was that the second and third groups were defined in terms of Moon Jae In supporters in 2012 and 2016, and Chung Dong Young supporters in 2008. Because the most dominant faction in the DP was related to Moon Jae In and Chung Dong Young in recent years, the sample groups were divided in terms of the supporters of these politicians. In addition, several faction leaders' perceived ideologies were included in the DP-related regressions: Sohn Hak Kyu (2008 and 2012) and Kim Chong In (2016). Sohn Hak Kyu participated in the presidential primaries of the DP, in 2007 against Chung Dong Young and in 2012 against Moon Jae In. Also, he was the DP's chairperson in 2008 and during the early 2010s. Kim Chong In belonged to the LKP for a long time and was one of Park Geun Hye's main advisors. However, he joined the DP as chairperson of the Emergency Planning Commission after the resignation of Moon Jae-in as party leader in 2016. Even though he could not establish a big faction in the DP, he led the 2016 National Assembly election and provided an important cue to DP supporters. In addition to these independent variables, several demographic factors were inserted because bottom-up ideology establishment might be possible. Several studies have argued that income might have a curvilinear effect on ideological stances (Kang 2013, Lee 2015, 10 Jongkon Lee

Han 2013); income and the squared value of income were inserted. In addition, it has been well known that regional background has been highly related to ideological stances. In particular, the residents of Northern Gyeongsang and Southern Gyeongsang tended to be conservative, whereas Jeolla citizens were relatively progressive. Thus, these regional variables were also inserted as dummies. In addition, education level, gender, and age were also included in the regression models.4

A. LKP's Faction Conflict and Ideological Realignment

The regression results of LKP supporters' ideological realignment are specified in Table 2. The LKP supporters' ideologies were generally affected by the perceived ideologies of Park Geun Hye in 2008, 2012, and 2016. However, depending on the most preferred politician, the voters realigned their ideologies differently. In 2008, regression tests were performed three times with different groups. Model 1-1 included all the LKP supporters. Model 1-2 and Model 1-3 were for the groups who most preferred Park Geun Hye, or not.5 The same sampling rule was consistently applied to other ideological realignment models. For Model 1-2, citizens tended to realign their ideologies following that of Park Geun Hye. However, Model 1-3 indicates that they realigned with Chung Mong Joon, instead of Park Geun Hye. In other words, statistically significant independent variables for the perceived ideologies of political moguls were different between Models 1-2 (Park Geun Hye) and 1-3 (Chung Mong Joon). That implies significant cue conflict among LKP supporters. Likewise, in 2012, regression results show that the political cue of Park Geun Hye was not influential for the LKP supporters who did not prefer Park Geun Hye the most (Model 1-6), even though Park Geun Hye's perceived ideology was influential for those who supported her. In contrast, in 2016, the perceived ideology of Park Geun Hye affected all kinds of LKP supporters. These results indicate that the faction conflict of the LKP was highly significant in 2008 and 2012, but somewhat relieved because of the dominance of the pro-Park faction in

4. Income was measured by monthly household income. The KDSC surveyed income with 10 groups in 2008, 12 groups in 2012, and 8 groups in 2016. Education was measured by 8 groups in 2008, 9 groups in 2012, 4 groups in 2016. Higher value indicates more education. Gender was inserted as a dummy (1: male, 0: female). 5. The KDSC surveyed the citizens' preferences for important politicians. The people who answered that they most preferred LKP to any other parties and that they preferred Park Geun Hye more than any other politician, including the leaders of the anti-Park faction, were sampled for Model 1-2. The people of Model 1-3 were the LKP supporters who did not most prefer Park Geun Hye. Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 11

Table 2. Regression Tests on the LKP's Ideological Realignment

Year 2008 2012 2016

+ LKP & LKP & LKP & LKP & LKP & LKP & Sampled People LKP LKP LKP Park ~Park Park ~Park Park ~Park Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Name 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9 Park Geun Hye .280* .649*** .145 .543*** .616*** .296 .287*** .321*** .241† Ideology (.128) (.130) (.164) (.087) (.092) (.217) (.076) (.095) (.122) Chung Mong Joon .326** -.067 .418** .030 .079 .188 Ideology (.107) (.163) (.131) (.076) (.089) (.226) Kim Moon Soo -.134* -.084 -.293*** Ideology (.056) (.064) (.085) Kim Moo Sung .180** .276*** .009 Ideology (.062) (.065) (.098) .175 .174 .356 -.880 -1.533* .274 .501† .265 .830 Income (.246) (.304) (.318) (.605) (.653) (1.113) (.284) (.306) (.515) -.005 -.001 -.022 .170 .271* -.018 -.050† -.027 -.074 Income Squared (.020) (.024) (.027) (.103) (.116) (.202) (.029) (.037) (.046) -.140† .004 -.191† .126 .064 .169 -.051 .099 -.206 Education (.084) (.120) (.114) (.094) (.105) (.191) (.097) (.094) (.181) .159 .016 .330 .223 -.274 .974* -.037 -.280† .395† Gender (.274) (.419) (.374) (.271) (.314) (.461) (.137) (.158) (.230) .038** .030* .044** .044*** .035* .052† .033*** .030*** .042*** Age (.012) (.015) (.017) (.012) (.015) (.028) (.006) (.008) (.012) Northern .723 .419 .891 .870* 1.339** .558 .417† -.028 1.022** Gyeongsang (.495) (.787) (.614) (.354) (.458) (.554) (.215) (.294) (.323) Southern .570 .686 .450 -.115 .327 -1.092 -.364* -.548* .376 Gyeongsang (.384) (.485) (.466) (.339) (.323) (.672) (.182) (.223) (.369)

++ -1.097*** .523 -1.095* -1.509† -1.518 -2.674*** -1.982*** Jeolla Omitted Omitted (.289) (.932) (.485) (.824) (.929) (.362) (.399) .627 -.208 .540 1.455 2.344† .263 .509 .212 .309 Constant (1.083) (1.403) (1.464) (1.236) (1.308) (2.592) (1.042) (.945) (2.112) N 162 56 106 148 101 47 396 255 141 R-Squared .376 .511 .378 .444 .520 .572 .311 .422 .265 Robust standard errors in parentheses, † Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01 level, ***Significant at .001 level (two-tailed) + Note: LKPS means all the LKP supporters. LKP & Park means LKP supporters who most preferred Park Geun Hye. LKP & ~Park means LKP supporters who did not most prefer Park. ++ Jeolla variable was omitted in some models because of a collinearity problem.

2016. This regression generally approves Hypothesis 1, that Korean citizens realigned their ideologies because of the political cues from favored political moguls and their personal factions. In addition, according to Hypothesis 2, the fierce bilateral faction conflict of the LKP might increase faction polarization on the conservative side. The faction polarization of 12 Jongkon Lee the LKP in 2008 and 2012 can be observed in Figures 2-1 and 2-2. Figure 2-1 is the ideological distributions of the LKP supporters who did not most prefer Park Geun Hye. In contrast, Figure 2-2 shows those who most preferred Park Geun Hye.6 As expected in Table 2, there was faction polarization during this period. In the ideological distribution of Park Geun Hye supporters, extremely conservative ideology peaked, whereas the

Figure 2. LKP's Faction polarization in 2008 and 2012

Figure 3. LKP's Relieved Faction polarization in 2016

6. In 2012, only the LKP supporters who most preferred Park Geun Hye were sampled. However, in 2008, because of the collective defection of pro-Park faction members and the establishment of the "Pro-Park Alliance," previous LKP supporters refused to express their preference for the party. To correct the bias, those who believed that Park sincerely represented their opinions were sampled, even when they were Pro-Park Alliance supporters or did not express their party preferences. Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 13 minimally conservative (i.e., moderate) point also peaked for other LKP supporters who did not like Park Geun Hye. However, the trend has changed during the mid-2010s. Models 1-7, 1-8, and 1-9 show that Park Geun Hye affected the ideological realignment of all kinds of LKP supporters in 2016, which implies relieved faction conflict. During this period, the

Table 3. Regression Tests on the DP's Ideological Realignment

Year 2008 2012 2016

+ DPS & DPS & DPS & DPS & DPS & DPS & Sampled People DPS DPS DPS Chung ~Chung Moon ~Moon Moon ~Moon Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Name 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8 2-9 Moon Jae In .665*** .831*** .633*** .405*** .484*** .340*** Ideology (.093) (.188) (.106) (.047) (.078) (.061) Chung Dong .467** .422* .470† Young Ideology (.147) (.166) (.252) Sohn Hak Kyu .068 .189 -.183 .077 .060 .057 Ideology (.166) (.211) (.269) (.079) (.161) (.091) Kim Chong In .307*** .303*** .310*** Ideology (.047) (.081) (.062) .950 1.512 1.429 .768 1.967† .444 .357 -.080 .682 Income (.609) (.897) (1.251) (.773) (.987) (.980) (.290) (.433) (.371) -.068 -.131 -.089 -.169 -.368* -.096 -.027 .027 -.066† Income Squared (.051) (.073) (.095) (.133) (.163) (.171) (.030) (.046) (.037) -.256† -.181† -.269 -.171† .067 -.236* -.080 .133 -.150 Education (.146) (.249) (.224) (.095) (.186) (.115) (.089) (.119) (.129) .515 .415 1.650† -.065 -.154 -.022 -.189 -.145 -.210 Gender (.584) (.779) (.937) (.299) (.650) (.347) (.146) (.206) (.211) -.002 .035 -.037 -.001 .055* -.009 .010 .013 .009 Age (.024) (.044) (.027) (.013) (.020) (.015) (.007) (.010) (.008) Northern 2.366* 2.678 .638 .608 .324 .469 .221 ++ Omitted Omitted Gyeongsang (.894) (1.575) (.623) (.638) (.409) (.593) (.555) Southern -.361 -1.763 .244 -.729† -.414 -.642 -.016 .506† -.271 Gyeongsang (1.182) (.859) (1.217) (.425) (.795) (.533) (.181) (.288) (.241) .731 .654 1.767* .304 .487 .370 .622** .684** .587† Jeolla (.811) (.1.366) (.748) (.374) (.604) (.426) (.206) (.225) (.324) .831 -2.645 1.245 1.715 -4.611 2.951 -.105 -.727 -.029 Constant (2.531) (5.029) (3.098) (1.583) (2.730) (1.845) (.843) (1.354) (1.031) N 63 34 29 158 30 128 308 134 174 R-Squared .473 .550 .561 .420 .720 .360 .500 .583 .476 Robust standard errors in parentheses, † Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01 level, ***Significant at .001 level (two-tailed) + Note: DPS means all the DP supporters. DPS & Chung (or Moon) means DP supporters who most preferred Chung Dong Young (or Moon Jae In). DOS & ~Chung (or Moon) means DP supporters who did not most prefer Chung (or Moon). ++ Northern Gyeongsang variable was omitted in some models because of a collinearity problem. 14 Jongkon Lee pro-Park faction totally dominated the LKP. As a result, faction polarization was also relieved. Figure 3 shows that the LKP supporters' ideological distributions similarly peaked at a moderately conservative point without polarization in 2016, regardless of their preferred political moguls/factions. Surely, ideological distribution of supporters for a specific party is dependent on many conditions including the existence of third parties and presidential issues. Despite the limitation, Figures 2 and 3 indicate that there might be significant ideological realignment among LKP supporters.

B. DP's Faction conflict and Ideological Realignment

Different from the LKP case, the DP's faction conflicts have tended to be multilateral. Not only Chung Dong Young and Moon Jae In, but also plenty of politicians have established their own factions in the DP. However, relative to the public popularity of Moon Jae In and Chung Dong Young, there were no highly popular political moguls in anti-Moon or anti-Chung factions, because there were too many small factions in the DP, and their conflicts were less noticeable, compared to the LKP's fierce bilateral confrontation. As a result, DP supporters could not employ the cues from anti-Moon factions in 2012 and 2016, even when they did not most prefer Moon Jae In. Likewise, even though the ideological sorting of Chung Dong Young was relatively limited in 2008 (partly because he was defeated in the 2007 presidential election in a landslide), DP supporters

Figure 4. DP Supporters' Ideological Distribution in 2008, 2012, and 2016 Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 15 were likely to use his cue in ideological realignment, because there was no other remarkable option. Table 3 indicates this situation. All kinds of DP supporters have realigned their ideologies similarly. Without fierce bilateral faction conflicts, there was limited faction polarization in the DP. Extremely progressive ideologies have been absent compared to the extremely conservative ideologies in the LKP. Consequently, the ideological distribution of DP supporters tended to be bell-shaped, proving Hypothesis 3. DP supporters' ideologies also peaked at moderate points (at four or five in Figure 4), thereby increasing the number of moderate citizens. Similar to the LKP that contributed to increasing moderate citizens under faction polarization, the DP also positively affected the growth of moderate citizens. However, the moderation has happened without faction polarization. As a consequence of the faction politics of the LKP and the DP and subsequent ideological sorting, there were plenty of moderates, as Figure 5 indicates. However, as faction polarization was limited in the LKP, the ratio of moderate citizens declined in the mid-2010s. In addition, a slightly asymmetric ideological distribution of all Korean citizens emerged in 2008 and 2012. There were some extremely conservative citizens because of faction polarization in the LKP, whereas there were few extremely progressive citizens. However, this trend was also relieved. The ratio of extremely conservative people also decreased, as faction polarization of the LKP disappeared.

Figure 5. Korean Citizens' Ideological Distribution in 2008, 2012, and 2016 16 Jongkon Lee

Table 4. Regressions for Extreme Ideology Determinants

Sampled People LKP Supporters Korean Citizens + Year (DV Dummy) 2008 (10) 2012 (10) 2016 (10) 2008 (4,5,6) 2012 (4,5,6) 2016 (4,5,6) 2016 (4,5,6) Model Name Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 3-4 Model 3-5 Model 3-6 Model 3-7 Park Geun Hye 2.756** .688** 1.591 -.146** -.176** -.114* -.109* Ideology (.899) (.218) (1.151) (.046) (.055) (.051) (.050) Chung Mong Joon .218 -.039 .046 -.050 Ideology (.264) (.119) (.043) (.052) Kim Moon Soo -.144† .027 Ideology (.085) (.049) Kim Moo Sung -.084 -.044 -.039 Ideology (.162) (.043) (.043) Moon Jae In .004 .120** .109* Ideology (.056) (.042) (.042) Chung Dong .040 Young Ideology (.046) Sohn Hak Kyu -.036 .084 Ideology (.051) (.054) Ahn Cheol Soo .108** Ideology (.040) Kim Jong In .136** .108* Ideology (.046) (.047) -.376 -.633 1.335 -.085 .134 .369 .356 Income (1.168) (1.056) (1.282) (.146) (.451) (.222) (.219) .035 .116 -.163 .005 -.022 -.041 -.039 Income Squared (.095) (.184) (.140) (.013) (.078) (.024) (.024) -.267 .223 .169 .073 -.034 .065 .065 Education (.300) (.171) (.353) (.060) (.070) (.078) (.078) .785 -.378 -.123 -.326† -.226 .013 .011 Gender (.1.172) (.473) (.479) (.174) (.187) (.131) (.131) .021 .051† .061 -.012† -.025** -.013* -.014** Age (.040) (.029) (.037) (.007) (.008) (.005) (.005) Northern .620 .808 .154 .759 -.806* -.193 -.184 Gyeongsang (.1.147) (.600) (.734) (.289) (.361) (.230) (.229) Southern 1.437 -.306 -.853 .007 .182 .569** .482** Gyeongsang (.2.040) (.551) (1.009) (.272) (.240) (.179) (.180)

++ .934** .631† .775*** .834*** Jeolla Omitted Omitted Omitted (.333) (.360) (.235) (.238) -28.180** -9.326** -22.807 .755 1.779† -.195 -.465 Constant (10.109) (2.929) (14.233) (.755) (.992) (.785) (.796) N 166 182 398 606 563 1118 1118 Log -17.643 -68.494 -40.931 -394.957 -344.103 -717.75 -713.86 pseudolikelihood Robust standard errors in parentheses, † Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01 level, ***Significant at .001 level (two-tailed) + Note: The numbers in parentheses explain how to make dummy variables. When the number in a parenthesis is 10, the value regarding ideological stance was recoded into 1. Others were recoded into 0. ++ Jeolla was omitted in some models because of a collinearity problem. Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 17

C. Extreme and Moderate Ideology Determinants in Korean Politics

Depending on the previous argument, extremely conservative ideological realignment might be positively affected by the perceived ideology of Park Geun Hye in 2008 and 2012, when faction polarization was significant. To examine the argument more rigorously, the effect of the perceived ideology of Park Geun Hye was reexamined, with extremely conservative ideology as a dependent variable. To measure the dependent variable, a dummy variable was made; in the 11-Likert ideology scale of the KDSC, 10 was recoded 1, other values were recoded 0. Then, Table 4 reaffirmed the argument that the perceived ideology of Park Geun Hye positively affected the extremely conservative ideological realignment in 2008 and 2012. In contrast, as expected, the variable is not statistically significant in 2016, because of the limited faction conflict of the LKP. In addition, in terms of moderate ideology, the cue from Park Geun Hye was also highly meaningful. For Models 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, and 3-7, a dummy variable of moderate ideology was employed as the dependent variable; in the 11-Likert ideology scale of KDSC, 4, 5, and 6 were recoded 1, other values were recoded 0. As seen at Table 2, LKP supporters who did not want to follow Park Geun Hye's ideological stances moved far away from the perceived ideological points of Park Geun Hye. They realigned their ideologies at the minimally conservative (i.e., moderate) points. In other words, a bilateral contrast in ideological realignment happened for the cue from Park Geun Hye. On the other hand, the perceived ideologies of the DP politicians (e.g., Moon Jae In and Kim Jong In) positively affected the ideological realignment of moderate people. In addition, Ahn Cheol Soo, who belonged to the DP prior to 2016, also led the moderate ideological realignment in the mid-2010s. Different from the case of Park Geun Hye, assimilation in ideological realignment increased the number of moderate citizens.

IV. Ideological Realignment in 2017

During late 2016, there was a significant political change in Korea. President Park Geun Hye was impeached by the National Assembly on charges related to influence peddling. As a result, the pro-Park faction became significantly weak in 2017. Before the 2017 presidential election, Hong Jun Pyo who has never been related to the pro-Park faction was nominated as the presidential candidate of the LKP. Even after his defeat 18 Jongkon Lee

Figure 6. DP and LKP Supporters' Ideological Distribution Change in 2017

in the presidential election, Hong was elected as the chairperson of the LKP in July 2017. The political transformation of the LKP destroyed the political cue from Park Geun Hye. Moreover, her cue could not be inherited by other pro-Park politicians such as Kim Jin Tae or Seo Cheong Won, because of their limited popularity. As a result, the faction conflict between two big factions in the LKP could not persist. In reality, regarding the impeachment, many anti-Park faction members defected from the LKP and established a new party named the "Bareun Party." As a result, the faction conflict of the LKP and subsequent faction polarization has been minimal in 2017. Figure 6-2 compares the ideological distribution of LKP supporters in 2012, 2016, and 2017. The data of 2017 was also from KDSC's electoral survey immediately after the 19th presidential election. In 2012, there was faction polarization in the LKP, thereby producing two peaked points in ideological realignment. However, the ideological distribution of the LKP became single-peaked without polarization at the moderately conservative point. In 2017, the ideological distribution has been more sharply single-peaked than in 2012 and 2016. In addition, Figure 6 indicates the possibility of partisan sorting that has been hidden by faction polarization. Following party polarization, the supporters of the DP became more progressive, while those of the LKP became more conservative. Admittedly, this trend might be related to factional cohesion/fractionalization instead of partisan sorting. The progressive trend of DP supporters could be caused by the party's significant split in early 2016, regardless of partisan sorting. Moreover, it is highly probable that exceptional political moods that were related to the presidential impeachment made the Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 19 partisan sorting only temporary. Progressive and conservative people have been in severe conflict for several months over the impeachment, and the ideological polarization of Korean citizens could emerge regardless of party polarization. Despite that, it is also probable that the phenomenon might not be exceptional.

V. Conclusion

Faction conflict has been significant in Korean politics and has affected electoral politics and party politics for a long time (Lee 2014). Despite that, there have been few studies to interpret the effect of faction conflict on the ideological distribution of Korean citizens. Even though political parties have been highly important in Korean politics, they have been less powerful in ideological realignment. Because Korean party organizations have been weak, and thus easily destroyed by political environments, Korean citizens have been more interested in the decisions and behaviors of political moguls and their personal factions. In particular, when there was a significant intraparty faction conflict, the party supporters have become narrowly polarized. Admittedly, there might be a circular causation between faction polarization and the ideological realignment of Korean citizens. Despite that, as many political behavior studies have argued, elite cues are meaningful in determining the ideological stances of the public, and the variance of elite cues derived from faction polarization would affect the Korean citizens' ideological realignment. However, faction conflict was asymmetric between the DP and the LKP. While LKP faced a bilateral confrontation between pro-Park and anti-Park factions, the DP's faction conflicts were somewhat multilateral and were dominated by a pro-Moon faction recently. As a result, faction polarization has been significant only on the conservative side. Especially in 2008 and 2012, among LKP supporters, those who preferred Park Geun Hye moved to extremely conservative positions, but those who did not most prefer Park Geun Hye tended to be only minimally conservative. The faction polarization contributed to increasing the number of moderate citizens. However, as the pro-Park faction definitely dominated the LKP, faction polarization has been reduced in the mid-2010s. In reality, the ratio of moderate citizens relatively decreased in the mid-2010s (see Figure 5). In contrast, relative to the LKP, the DP's faction conflicts were multilateral, and the pro-Moon faction has been relatively dominant. Therefore, fierce bilateral faction collision 20 Jongkon Lee was generally absent in the DP. As a result, even though there were some faction conflicts in the DP, their bilateral contrast in ideological realignment was insignificant. All kinds of DP supporters have tended to sort their ideologies similarly, thereby producing a bell-shaped ideological distribution around slightly progressive points. Considering that faction conflict has affected the ideological realignment of Korean citizens, the recent transformation of Korean politics might be highly meaningful. Since the 2017 presidential election, faction conflicts in the DP and the LKP have significantly changed. The impeachment of Park Geun Hye and the weakening of the pro-Park faction relieved bilateral faction conflicts in the LKP. Likewise, the election of Moon Jae In as the 19th Korean President increased the internal power of the pro-Moon faction in the DP. Thus, the bilateral confrontation between two big factions might disappear both in the LKP and in the DP at least temporarily, thereby limiting their faction polarization. Instead, the hidden effect from party polarization could grow; mass polarization could follow party polarization, instead of (intraparty) faction polarization. In reality, the ideological realignment of Korean citizens has gradually polarized in recent years as Figure 6 indicates.

References

Alford, John R., Carolyu L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?" American Political Science Review 99 (2):153-67. Amira, Karyn Ann. 2015. "Ideological Extremity Perception: Causes and Consequences." PhD diss., Stony Brook University. Bafumi, Joseph, and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2009. "A New Partisan Voter." The Journal of Politics 71 (1):1-24. Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. "Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion." American Journal of Sociology 114 (2):408-46. Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." American Journal of Political Science 44 (1):35-50. Bolsen, Toby, James N. Druckman, and Fay Lomax Cook. 2014. "The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion." Political Behavior 36 (2):235-62. Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 21

Transformation of American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chae, Chin-Won. 2014. "A Theoretical Discussions on Overcome Logic of the Camp and Moderate Politics." Journal of Democracy and Human Rights 14 (1):307-43. Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In Ideology and Discontent, edited by David Apter, 202-61. New York: Free Press. Dalton, Russell J., and Steven Weldon. 2007. "Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization." Party Politics 13 (2):179-96. Davis, Nicholas T., and Lilliana Mason. 2016. "Sorting and the Split-Ticket: Evidence from Presidential and Subpresidential Elections." Political Behavior 38 (2):337-54. Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values." American Journal of Political Science 32 (2):416-40. Fernandez-Vazquez, Pablo. 2014. "And Yet It Moves." Comparative Political Studies 47 (14):1919-44. Gilens, Martin, and Naomi Murakawa. 2002. "Elite Cues and Political Decision Making." Political Decision Making, Deliberation and Participation 6 (1):15–49. Han, Guiyoung. 2013. "Why Did the Poor Vote to the Conservative Party in 2012 Presidential Election?" Journal of Korean Social Trend and Perspective 2013 (3):9-40. Hellmann, Olli. 2014. "Party System Institutionalization Without Parties: Evidence from Korea." Journal of East Asian Studies 14 (1):53-84. Heo, Uk. 2013. "What Delays Democratic Consolidation in South Korea?" Korea Observer 44 (4):569-91. Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." American Journal of Political Science 95 (3):619-31. Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." Annual Review of Psychology 60 (1):307-37. Ka, Sang Joon. 2016. "Policy Attitude of Legislators and Polarization of the National Assembly." Oughtopia 31 (1):327-54. Kang, Won-Taek. 2012. "The Ideological Tendencies and Policy Attitudes of the 19th Korean National Assemblymen." Korean Journal of Legislative Studies 18 (2):5-38. Kang, Won-Taek. 2013. "'Class Betrayal Voting' in South Korean Elections." Korean Journal of Political Parties 12 (3):5-28. Lee, Jongkon. 2014. "The Instability of Korean Political Parties: Cue-givers and Cue-chasing Politicians." Japanese Journal of Political Science 15 (1):113-30. 22 Jongkon Lee

Lee, Jongkon. 2015. "Class Betrayal Voting: Income Group and Vote Choice in Korean Presidential Elections." Korea Observer 46 (4):783-808. Lee, Nae Young. 2011. "Main Source of Ideological Conflict in Korea: Public Polarization or Elite Polarization?" Korean Journal of Party Studies 10 (2):251-87. Levendusky, Matthew S. 2018. "Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?" Journal of Politics 80 (1):59-70. Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." The American Political Science Review 88 (1):63-76. Mason, Lilliana. 2015. ""I Disrespectfully Agree": The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization." American Journal of Political Science 59 (1):128-45. Naumann, Laura P., Verónica Benet-Martínez, and Penelope Espinoza. 2016. "Correlates of Political Ideology Among U.S.-Born Mexican Americans." Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (1):20-28. Nicholson, Stephen P. 2012. "Polarizing Cues." American Journal of Political Science 56 (1):52-66. Petersen, Michael Bang, Martin Skov, Søren Serritzlew, and Thomas Ramsøy. 2013. "Motivated Reasoning and Political Parties: Evidence for Increased Processing in the Face of Party Cues." Political Behavior 35 (4):831-54. Petersen, Michael Bang, Rune Slothuus, and Lise Togeby. 2010. "Political Parties and Value Consistency in Public Opinion Formation." Public Opinion Quarterly 74 (3):530-50. Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates." American Journal of Political Science 37 (2):472-96. Rogowski, Jon C., and Joseph L. Sutherland. 2016. "How Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization." Political Behavior 38 (2):485-508. Schmitt, Hermann. 2002. "Multiple Party Identifications." the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, WZB in Berlin, February 21-24. Sniderman, Paul M. 2000. "Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reasoning." In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin, 67-84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sniderman, Paul M., and John Bullock. 2004. "A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 23

Political Choice: The Hypothesis of Menu Dependence." In Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change, edited by Willem E. Saris and Paul M. Sniderman, 337-57. Princeton: Princeton University Press. So, Soon Chang, and Keun Hyun. 2006. "Party Politics and the Emergence of the Non-Partisan Group in Korea Elections." Journal of Korean Policy Sciences 10 (2):47-77. Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2016. "Agree or disagree." Party Politics 23 (1):66-75. Song, Hyun-Joo. 2015. "Effect of Partisanship Strength and News Frames on Partisan Polarization." Korean Journal of Journalism & Communication Studies 59 (6):221-45. Stroud, Natalie Jomini. 2010. "Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure." Journal of Communication 60 (3):556-76. Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

Received 25 August 2017 Received in revised form 16 December 2017 Accepted 19 January 2018