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Political Climate and Prospects for October 2019 Project ‖ Social Index

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Political Climate and Prospects for October 2019 Project ‖ Social Index [Monthly Prospects] Issue Report Political Climate and Prospects for October 2019 Project ‖ Social Index Issue 60 (September 30, 2019) ￭ General Review of Government in September 2019 ⚫ Prolongation of the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ even after his appointment as justice minister negatively impact President Moon’s evaluation ⚫ Moon’s approval rating decreases while it increases for the Liberty Korea Party (LKP) ⚫ The public’s confusion regarding their subjective political ideologies ⚫ Negative impact of the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ intensifies as prosecutors continue to expand investigations ￭ Analysis of Political Ideologies by Age and Gender ⚫ Battle between the political parties becomes more evident within Korean society ⚫ Females and males in their 20’s exhibit extremely different political ideologies ⚫ Females and males in their 30’s are the main supporters of the ruling party ⚫ Females and males in their 40’s also display a favorable disposition toward the ruling party ⚫ Females and males in their 50’s show potential for change in their political ideologies ⚫ Females and males who are 60 years old or older express severe dissatisfaction towards the ruling party ￭ Main Events and Prospective Trends of October ⚫ Main events and other notable matters in October ⚫ Greater attention will be given to Moon’s decisions amid the prolongation of the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal' ￭ Three Main Points of the Political Climate in October ① What will happen to the government after Moon’s involvement in the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ ② Will the approval rating of the LKP continue to increase? ③ Will negotiations between North Korean and the US be able to take place in October? ￭ Ipsos Global Resources: Global Happiness Study [Monthly Propsects] Political Climate and Prospects for October 2019 ￭ General Review of Government in September 2019 ❏ Prolongation of the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ Even After His Appointment as Justice Minister Negatively Impacts the Presidential Evaluation ❍ Even after the appointment of Cho Kuk as justice minister, the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ failed to subside, which negatively impacted the presidential evaluation. - Before the appointment of Cho Kuk as justice minister, greater attention was given to his suitability to the position. However, after the appointment took place, many began to question President Moon’s personnel management capabilities, which directly impacted his presidential evaluation. - At one point, President Moon’s approval rating dropped to 40% (a record low upon taking office), which is something that still needs to be overcome (Source: Korea Gallup). ❍ Initially it has been expected that the influence of the scandal would subside after Cho Kuk’s appointment as justice minister. However, continued investigations through the indictment of Cho’s wife in addition to the search and seizure operations have intensified the scandal overall. - On September 27th, President Moon delivered a public warning to prosecutors, in which intensified tensions between political parties suggest a possibility for the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ to have a greater influence on public affairs and for party tensions to worsen even further. President Moon's Performance Evaluation (4th Week of September, 2019) (Source: Korea Gallup / Unit: %) 53 54 52 50 49 49 49 49 50 49 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 46 46 48 45 45 45 45 46 44 43 44 46 41 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 40 42 44 44 44 44 44 40 40 43 41 42 42 41 Positive Negative September Week 1, Major Incidents - 09/02 Cho Kuk’s confirmation hearing at the National Assembly fails, September Week 2, Major Incidents Cho Kuk declares holding of press conference/ Chinese - 09/09 President Moon appoints Cho Kuk as justice minister foreign minister Wang Yi visits North Korea - 09/12~15 Chuseok holiday - 09/06 Cho Kuk’s confirmation hearing at the National * Prosecutorial investigations regarding Cho Kuk continue; the battle between Assembly/Indictment of Cho Kuk’s wife for prosecution political parties are prolonged. - 09/07 LKP rallies against Cho Kuk September Week 3, Major Incidents September Week 4, Major Incidents - 09/16 Hwang Kyo-ahn, chairman of the Liberty Korea Party, is the first - 09/23 Prosecutors conduct domestic search and seizure operations representative of the opposition party to publicly shave his head South Korea-Poland summit The electronic securities system is launched in South Korea - 09/24 President Moon delivers a keynote speech at the UN General - 09/17 First case of African swine fever is confirmed in South Korea Assembly/Korea-America Summit South Korea revises export and import measures regarding strategic - 09/26 President Moon returns to South Korea materials (South Korea removes Japan from trade whitelist) - 09/27 President Moon delivers a public message regarding prosecutorial - 09/22 President Moon departs to attend the United Nations (UN) General investigations Assembly Hwang Kyo-ahn, chairman of the Liberty Korea Party, - 09/28 Large-scale candlelight vigil takes place for prosecutorial reform announces an economic transition plan ❏ President Moon’s Approval Rating Decreases While It Increases for LKP ❍ Despite the suspicions, controversies, and prosecutorial investigations surrounding Cho Kuk, President Moon pushing ahead with Cho’s appointment as justice minister changed the nature of the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal.’ -- Before the appointment, the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ primarily involved the suitability of Cho Kuk as an individual. However, following the appointment, the issue has raised questions about President Moon’s role regarding personnel management. ❍ In addition to focusing on Cho Kuk’s suitability as justice minister, the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ has expanded to include issues related to President Moon’s administration and the ruling party, which raises expectations _ When observing the party that public opinion will have a direct impact on the president’s performance approval ratings for the month evaluation and on party approval ratings. of September, the approval ratings of the Democratic Party ❍ When observing the party approval ratings for the month of September, the of Korea consistently decreased since August and approval ratings of the Democratic Party of Korea consistently decreased since that of the Liberty Korea Party August and that of the Liberty Korea Party consistently increased, which was the consistently increased, which result of the intensified negative public sentiments toward Cho Kuk. was the result of the intensified negative public - Public opinion polls for the 3rd week of September regarding the suitability of Cho sentiments towards Cho Kuk. Kuk as justice minister have revealed 36% of the public stating that he is suitable, whereas 54% stated that he is unsuitable (Source: Korea Gallup). - Therefore, approval ratings for the Democratic Party of Korea dropped to 37% whereas such ratings for the Liberty Korea Party increased to 23% (Source: Korea Gallup) ❍ It is expected that the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal’ will have a direct impact on President Moon’s performance evaluation and approval rating for the month of October. However, as such evaluations are not about the scandal itself but more about the battle between the political parties, close attention will be given to what kind of consequences will take place. Approval Ratings of Government Parties (5th Week of September, 2019) (Source: Korea Gallup / Unit: %) 50 41 41 39 40 39 39 39 40 39 40 39 40 40 37 38 38 37 38 38 38 37 40 35 36 36 27 27 30 25 26 25 26 25 26 25 26 26 26 24 24 24 23 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 24 20 23 24 24 24 24 23 2223 21 22 22 21 21 21 20 21 21 21 20 20 19 20 19 18 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 10 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 - DPK LKP Bareunmirae Non-partisan ❏ The Public’s Confusion Regarding Their Subjective Political Ideologies ❍ Many people seem to be having a difficult time establishing their political position or ideologies due to the ‘Cho Kuk Scandal.’ ❍ The trends of subjective political ideologies in September bring high attention _ Professor Chin Jung-kwon initially stated with criticism to the changing size of the progressive group which fluctuated as follows: 29% that the issue revolved around (1st week of September) → 26% (3rd week of September) → 29% (4th week of Cho Kuk should not be about September). disputes amongst individuals with different political - The rise and fall of the progressive group were symbolically demonstrated ideologies or from different political parties but should be by Professor Chin Jung-kwon’s movements. about discussions dealing with - Professor Chin Jung-kwon initially stated with criticism that the issue fairness and justice. _Although Cho Kuk is currently revolved around Cho Kuk should not be about disputes amongst involved in a controversy individuals with different political ideologies or from different political revolved around morality, he maintains a reserved attitude parties, but rather discussions dealing with fairness and justice. by remaining sincere about the prosecutorial reform and by - Although Cho Kuk is currently involved in a controversy revolved around emphasizing his qualification to carry out the reform. morality, he maintains a reserved attitude by remaining sincere about the prosecutorial reform and by emphasizing his qualification to carry out the reform. ❍ The size of the conservative group also shows a fluctuating trend varying from 23% → 27% → 25%, which results from the ideological changes amongst the centrists rather than the conservatives. --Such fluctuations in size seem to demonstrate the rational behaviors of conservatives, who tend to switch from being in the conservative to the centrist group after an incident regarding the manipulation of state affairs takes place. ❍ The size of the centrist group is gradually decreasing since it hit its peak of 33% during the first week of September. -Centrists generally maintain a negative stance towards Cho Kuk, but when the battle between political parties heighten, centrists face an internal conflict of whether they should remain in the centrist group or switch to the conservative group.
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