Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 1 Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea Jongkon Lee* Several studies have emphasized the ideological mismatch between political parties and the mass public in Korea. In spite of party polarization, Korean citizens have tended to be ideologically moderate. This mismatch has been a puzzle, in that ordinary citizens are likely to realign their ideologies following those of political elites. This article provides the key to the puzzle regarding faction polarization in a political party. The intraparty conflicts among political moguls' personal factions rather than inter-party conflicts led to the ideological realignment of Korean citizens. In particular, fierce bilateral confrontation of Liberty Korea Party (LKP) factions has led to faction polarization that increased not only the number of extremely conservative citizens but also that of moderate people. Compared to the LKP, the Democratic Party (DP) was less likely to cause faction polarization, because of multilateral conflicts among small factions, which led to single-peaked ideological realignment at slightly progressive points. Key Words: Korean political party, personal faction, faction polarization, ideological realignment I. Introduction In South Korea, several studies have argued that the ideological stances of political parties have become polarized since the 2000s (Kang 2012, Ka 2016), whereas the Korean mass public has been moderate (Lee 2011, Chae 2014). According to the Joongangilbo Ideology Survey, the proportion of moderate legislators decreased to about 20% in the late 2000s, whereas the ratio of moderate citizens has been stable and significant at around 40% in Korea (Lee 2011). The electoral surveys performed by the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC) reaffirmed this fact. The KSDC surveys measured Korean citizens' * Ewha Womans University; E-mail: [email protected] KOREA OBSERVER, Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 2018, pp.1-23 © 2018 by INSTITUTE OF KOREAN STUDIES. https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2018.49.1.1 2 Jongkon Lee Figure 1. Party Polarization in Korean Politics Source: Data based on the surveys performed by Jungangilbo and KDSC Table 1. Ideological Positions of Korean Citizens 2008 2012 2014 2016 2017 + Most Conservative (10) 7.00% 9.07% 3.06% 1.19% 1.71% + Median (5) 28.24% 28.73% 25.03% 25.64% 24.87% + Most Progressive (0) 3.05% 3.35% 0.41% 0.85% 1.79% Ideological Variance 5.71 5.82 4.25 3.63 4.54 + Note: the number of parenthesis means the 11 Likert-scale ideological positions in KDSC surveys. Source: Data based on the surveys performed by KDSC ideological positions and their inferences about Korean political parties' ideologies on 11-point Likert scales (0 through 10; a larger number indicates conservative ideology).1 The survey said that Korean citizens perceived that the ideological distance between two major Korean political parties—the Democratic Party (DP) and the Liberty Korea Party (LKP)—has broadened. In contrast, the ideological variance of Korean citizens has decreased, and the ratio of ideologically extreme citizens has also decreased during the 2000s and 2010s (see Table 1). To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the party polarization phenomenon in Korea. The KSDC carried out public opinion surveys about the perceived ideologies of the LKP and the 1. The surveys were related to the elections of South Korea. There were National Parliament elections in 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. Then, KSDC performed surveys immediately after the elections. The data of 2014 was related to th the 6 local elections, whereas that of 2017 was related to the 19th presidential election. Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 3 DP, whereas Joonangilbo asked legislators about their subjective ideologies. Both surveys indicate that the ideological gap between the LKP and the DP has increased recently. In contrast, Korean citizens themselves believed that their ideologies were relatively moderate compared to the party ideologies. According to the 2016 KSDC survey, LKP supporters believed that their average ideology was 6.60 and that of LNP was 7.47. DP supporters answered that their average ideology was 4.12 and that of the DP was 3.46. This ideological mismatch is a puzzle. Because it is very hard for ordinary citizens to have consistent ideologies and make ideological decisions by themselves (Converse 1964), they frequently refer to political elites regarding political ideas or activities (Carmines and Stimson 1989, Zaller 1992, Hetherington 2001). In particular, political parties have been the most convenient references for ordinary citizens in making political choices (Rahn 1993). In other words, the ideologies of the aggregate bodies of political elites (i.e., political parties) should be influential in the ideological realignment of the mass public. In reality, several studies have argued that the policy preferences and ideologies of Korean political parties have affected those of Korean citizens (Song 2015, Chae 2014). Nevertheless, the proportion of moderate Korean citizens has always been high in spite of party polarization (Lee 2011, Chae 2014). This article discusses the puzzle in terms of faction conflict in Korean political parties. In Korea, the political influence of political parties' brand names has been limited. Instead, political moguls and their personal factions have dominated Korean politics (Lee 2014). As a result, Korean citizens' ideological realignment might have been affected more by intraparty faction conflicts than by inter-party conflicts. In particular, significant faction conflicts might produce faction polarization among party supporters, which could increase the ratio of moderate citizens. Faction polarization refers to the surge of two extreme ideological positions among party factions. II. Theory and Hypothesis: Faction conflict and Polarization in South Korea A. Party, Faction, and Political Cue in Korean Politics The political ideology of individual citizens could be identified from the top down and from the bottom up (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). In a bottom-up manner, diverse 4 Jongkon Lee personality and individual differences may affect ideological tendencies. For example, socioeconomic status (Naumann, Benet-Martínez, and Espinoza 2016) and genetic factors (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005) could have affected ideological development. Nevertheless, the ideological continuum is a high-level abstraction, and it is very hard for ordinary citizens to hold consistent preferences across contexts (Converse 1964). Instead, they are likely to receive and accept political cues from political elites (Zaller 1992). Political cues imply informational shortcuts for ill-informed citizens to infer candidates' ideological stances, personal capabilities, and moralities (Bartels 2000, Lupia 1994, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). They allow citizens to interpret complex political issues efficiently given their bounded cognitive capabilities (Lupia 1994). Thus, effective cues in politics significantly affect electoral outcomes. In reality, a plethora of political science studies explained the formation of ideology in a top-down fashion (Feldman 1988, Sniderman and Bullock 2004, Carmines and Stimson 1989). In particular, political parties as aggregate bodies of political elites have been believed to have a significant impact on the ideological development of ordinary citizens (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, Gilens and Murakawa 2002, Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010). By providing informational shortcuts (i.e., party cues), political parties allow citizens to behave ideologically consistently (Petersen et al. 2013). In this sense, Sniderman (2000, 81) said, "Citizens can overcome informational shortfalls about politics, not because they (mysteriously) can simplify public choices effectively, but because these choices are systematically simplified for them." As a result, partisan-ideological sorting could be made in the mass public (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, Bafumi and Shapiro 2009, Mason 2015). In particular, during election times, when the electoral campaign can affect citizens' perception of party positions, the partisan-ideological sorting could be realigned (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014). However, partisan cues have been relatively weak in Korean politics (Dalton and Weldon 2007). According to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data, 65% of Korean people did not identify with a party during 1996-2000 (Schmitt 2002), and the partisan independence ratio reached even 71.5% in 2000 (So and Hyun 2006). Likewise, depending on KSDC surveys, only about 30% of Korean citizens answered that political party was the most important factor in their voting decisions.2 Instead, the relative 2. For example, according to the KSDC survey in 2016, about 33.2% of Korean citizens answered that political parties are the most important factor in voting, whereas 35.6% of the people answered that personality or morality is more important. Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 5 importance of political moguls and their personal factions in a political party was much greater (Heo 2013).3 Historically, several political figures who led Korean politics, such as Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, or Park Chung Hee, have built up their own factions in political parties and have affected the ideological realignment of Korean citizens. In recent years, Moon Jae In, Park Geun Hye, Ahn Cheol Soo, and other influential politicians