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Section 3 2018 Edition
S e c ti o n 3 Vessel Requirements 3.1 Definitions, p. 2 3.2 Size and Draft Limitations of Vessels, p. 4 3.3 Requirement for Pilot Platforms and Shelters on Certain Vessels, p. 16 3.4 Navigation Bridge Features Required of Transiting Vessels, p. 19 3.5 Requirements for Non-Self-Propelled Vessels, p. 31 3.6 Vessels Requiring Towing Services, p. 32 3.7 Deckload Cargo, p. 33 3.8 Construction, Number and Location of Chocks and Bitts, p. 34 3.9 Mooring Lines, Anchors and Deck Machinery, p. 41 3.10 Boarding Facilities, p. 41 3.11 Definite Phase-out of Single-Hull Oil Tankers, p. 47 3.12 Admeasurement System for Full Container Vessels, p. 48 3.13 Deck-loaded Containers on Ships not Built for Container Carriage, p. 49 3.14 Unauthorized Modification to the PC/UMS Net Tonnage Certificate, p. 50 3.15 Calculation of PC/UMS Net Tonnage on Passenger Vessels, p. 51 3.16 Dangerous Cargo Requirements, p. 51 3.17 Cargo Regulated Under MARPOL Annex II, p. 58 3.18 Pre-Arrival Cargo Declarations, Security Inspection and Escort, p. 58 3.19 Hot Work Performed On Board Vessels, p. 60 1 OP Operations Manual Section 3 2018 Edition 3.20 Manning Requirements, p. 61 3.21 Additional Pilots Due to Vessel Deficiencies, p. 62 3.22 Pilot Accommodations Aboard Transiting Vessels, p. 63 3.23 Main Source of Electric Power, p. 63 3.24 Emergency Source of Electrical Power, p. 63 3.25 Sanitary Facilities and Sewage Handling, p. -
Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil Tankers
Order Code RS21997 December 7, 2004 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil Tankers Jonathan Medalia Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary While much attention has been focused on threats to maritime security posed by cargo container ships, terrorists could also attempt to use oil tankers to stage an attack. If they were able to place an atomic bomb in a tanker and detonate it in a U.S. port, they would cause massive destruction and might halt crude oil shipments worldwide for some time. Detecting a bomb in a tanker would be difficult. Congress may consider various options to address this threat. This report will be updated as needed. Introduction The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened interest in port and maritime security.1 Much of this interest has focused on cargo container ships because of concern that terrorists could use containers to transport weapons into the United States, yet only a small fraction of the millions of cargo containers entering the country each year is inspected. Some observers fear that a container-borne atomic bomb detonated in a U.S. port could wreak economic as well as physical havoc. Robert Bonner, the head of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has argued that such an attack would lead to a halt to container traffic worldwide for some time, bringing the world economy to its knees. Stephen Flynn, a retired Coast Guard commander and an expert on maritime security at the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a similar view.2 While container ships accounted for 30.5% of vessel calls to U.S. -
ONI-54-A.Pdf
r~us U. S. FLEET TRAIN- Division cf Naval Intelligence-Identification and Characteristics Section e AD Destroyer Tenders Page AP Troop Transports Pa g e t Wo "'W" i "~ p. 4-5 z MELVILLE 28 5 BURROWS 14 3, 4 DOBBIN Class 4 7 WHARTON 9 9 BLACK HAWK 28 21, 22 WAKEFIELD Class 12 11, 12 ALTAIR Class 28 23 WEST POINT 13 14, 15, 17-19 DIXIE Class 7 24 ORIZABA 13 16 CASCADE 10 29 U. S. GRANT 14 20,21 HAMUL Class 22 31, 3Z CHATEAU THIERRY Class 9 33 REPUBLIC 14 AS Submarine Tenders 41 STRATFORD 14 3 HOLLAND 5 54, 61 HERMIT AGE Class 13 5 BEAVER 16 63 ROCHAMBEAU 12 11, 12, 15 19 FULTON Class 7 67 DOROTHEA L. DIX 25 Sin a ll p. H 13, 14 GRIFFIN Class 22 69- 71,76 ELIZ . STANTON Cla ss 23 20 OTUS 26 72 SUSAN B. ANTHONY 15 21 AN TEA US 16 75 GEMINI 17 77 THURSTON 20 AR Repair Ships 110- "GENERAL" Class 10 1 MEDUSA 5 W orld W ar I types p. 9 3, 4 PROMETHEUS Class 28 APA Attack Transports 5- VULCAN Class 7 1, 11 DOYEN Class 30 e 9, 12 DELTA Class 22 2, 3, 12, 14- 17 HARRIS Class 9 10 ALCOR 14 4, 5 McCAWLEY , BARNETT 15 11 RIGEL 28 6-9 HEYWOOD Class 15 ARH Hull Repair Ships 10, 23 HARRY LEE Class 14 Maritime types p. 10-11 13 J T. DICKMAN 9 1 JASON 7 18-zo; 29, 30 PRESIDENT Class 10 21, 28, 31, 32 CRESCENT CITY Class 11 . -
13 Ship-Breaking.Com
Information bulletin on September 26th, 2008 ship demolition #13 June 7th to September 21st 2008 Ship-breaking.com February 2003. Lightboat, Le Havre. February 2008 © Robin des Bois From June 7th to September 21st 2008, 118 vessels have left to be demolished. The cumulative total of the demolitions will permit the recycling of more than 940,000 tons of metals. The 2008 flow of discarded vessels has not slowed down. Since the beginning of the year 276 vessels have been sent to be scrapped which represents more than 2 millions tons of metals whereas throughout 2007 289 vessels were scrapped for a total of 1.7 milion tons of metals. The average price offered by Bangladeshi and Indian ship breakers has risen to 750-800 $ per ton. The ship owners are taking advantage of these record prices by sending their old vessels to be demolished. Even the Chinese ship breaking yards have increased their price via the purchase of the container ship Provider at 570$ per ton, with prices averaging more than 500 $. However, these high prices have now decreased with the collapse of metal prices during summer and the shipyards are therefore renegotiating at lower price levels with brokers and cash buyers sometimes changing the final destination at the last minute. This was the case of the Laieta, which was supposed to leave for India for 910 $ per ton and was sold to Bangladesh at 750 $ per ton. The price differences have been particularly notable in India; the shipyards prices have returned to 600 $ per ton. From June to September, India with 60 vessels (51%) to demolish, is ahead of Bangladesh with 40 (34%), The United States 8 (7%), China 4 (4%), Turkey 2 (2%), Belgium and Mexico, 1 vessel each (1%). -
Appendix: Case Studies of Environmental Dredging Projects Table 1
1. Introduction This section describes the sources of available data on which much of the performance standards is based. Completed dredging projects that provide information on upstream and downstream water column conditions, as well as on mass of contaminant removed, provide a basis for determining historical rates of loss and dredging-related recontamination. It was thought that dredging projects that have been completed or are currently in progress can provide practical information on resuspension issues. Information on water quality data, equipment used, monitoring techniques, etc. from these projects will give insight as how to develop the performance standards. For the resuspension standard, water column monitoring results available from other sites were used to complete an analysis of the case study data. The process used to gather relevant information from dredging sites and the information obtained are included herein. It is also important to review all information that exists for the Hudson River. Available data was used to assess the existing variability in the Hudson River water quality, and can be used to estimate the water column quality during and resulting from the dredging operation. Descriptions of the data sets available to perform this analysis are provided herein. 2. Case Studies Objective and Overview During completion of the Hudson River Feasibility Study (FS) and the associated Responsiveness Summary (RS), the GE dredging database, the USEPA website, and other online sources were investigated to identify dredging projects that were relevant and similar to that proposed for the Hudson River in size and complexity. The USEPA and State agencies were contacted to gather information for each dredging project. -
Maritime Orientation Package
MARITIME ORIENTATION PACKAGE Port Nelson 1 MARITIME ORIENTATION PACKAGE Introduction This ‘Maritime Orientation Package’ will introduce the complex Maritime industry to Health Protection Officers (HPOs) who may have to implement and apply health measures within it. Background New Zealand Public Health Units are designated as ‘competent authorities’ by the World Health Organisation for ensuring maritime Points of Entry (POE) comply with the standards required by the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) and the International Maritime Organisation. Most New Zealand Public Health Units have a Maritime POE in their region. The Maritime Environment comprises many unique factors and has its own language rich with acronyms. For a HPO to be competent and feel confident working in the maritime environment they need a basic understanding of: • Vessel Types – their purpose and the possible public health issues associated with them. • The layout of a ship – where to go and what to look for. • Maritime Terminology – communication with the personnel on board and dockside in the lexicon. • The sequence a vessel follows upon entering NZ waters and the ensuing processes; o gaining pratique, o berthing, o discharging and loading cargo, o replenishment of food and water, o refuelling, and o departure for another jurisdiction, and • The suite of documents that ships maintain to show that management practices on board comply with international regulations and requirements. Purpose The purpose of this orientation package is to familiarise HPOs with some background information that will enable them to be able to confidently conduct their duties at the port. The package is in three parts; • maritime terminology, • an illustrated compendium of ship types that might be encountered in NZ waters, and • a schematic showing the layout of a ship. -
LNG AS SHIP FUEL No 01 2014
LNG AS SHIP FUEL No 01 2014 THE FUTURE – TODAY LNG READY SERVICE ENGINES FOR GAS-FUELLED SHIPS RECOMMENDED PRACTICE ON BUNKERING GLOBAL LNG SOLUTIONS DNV GL Anzeige Safe Hands MARITIME PUT THE FUTURE OF YOUR FLEET IN SAFE HANDS As your classification partner, our extensive maritime vessels, benefitting your business and the maritime industry expertise, technical knowledge and regulatory foresight as a whole. With DNV GL your fleet is in safe hands. will help to ensure that your fleet meets the demands Can you afford anything else? of the future. Our aim is safety, compliance and optimal operational performance throughout the lifetime of your Learn more at dnvgl.com/maritime 2 LNG AS SHIP FUEL No. 01 2014 EDITORIAL In 2000 the first LNG-fuelled ferry based on DNV GL standards was launched. This ferry has been operating safely and successfully ever since. Over the years that have followed, shipping has seen bunker prices rise sharply and environmental regula- tions tighten, while in the LNG sector there has been a surge in production and deployment of infrastructure. Combined, these trends have set the stage for LNG to emerge as a viable fuel choice on a much larger scale. In 2014 the industry hit a significant milestone with over 120 LNG-fuelled ships in operation or on order worldwide. They range from passenger ferries, Coast Guard ships, containerships and Con-Ro vessels to Dr Gerd-Michael Wuersig tankers and platform supply vessels. The vast majority Business Director LNG-fuelled ships Senior Principal Specialist of these ships is in operation or will be built to DNV Business Development GL class, reflecting the trust our customers have in [email protected] our long involvement in this technology and our continually evolving technical expertise. -
US Maritime Administration
U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs January 8, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46654 SUMMARY R46654 U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) January 8, 2021 Shipping and Shipbuilding Support Programs Ben Goldman The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) is one of the 11 operating administrations of the Analyst in Transportation U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Its mission is to develop the merchant maritime Policy industry of the United States. U.S. maritime policy, largely set out by the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1936 and with some roots in even older legislation, is codified in Subtitle V of Chapter 46 of the U.S. Code. As currently articulated, it is the policy of the United States to “encourage and aid the development and maintenance of a merchant marine” that meets the objectives below, which MARAD helps to achieve via the following programs and activities: Carry domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial part of the waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the United States. International shipping is dominated by companies using foreign- owned or foreign-registered vessels taking advantage of comparatively lower operating costs. The MARAD Maritime Security Program (MSP) supports U.S.-flagged ships engaged in international commerce by providing annual subsidies to defray the operating costs of up to 60 vessels. Originally scheduled to expire at the end of 2025, authorization for MSP was extended through 2035 by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92). Similar programs were established to support tankers and cable-laying ships, either in that same law or in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. -
Revolutionizing Short Sea Shipping Positioning Report
Revolutionizing short sea shipping Positioning Report Magnus Gustafsson Tomi Nokelainen Anastasia Tsvetkova Kim Wikström Åbo Akademi University Revolutionizing short sea shipping Positioning Report Executive summary Shipping in the Baltic Sea forms an essential part of Finnish • Establishing real-time integrated production and logistic industry. At present, the utilization rate of bulk and general planning to ensure optimized just-in-time freight through- cargo ships serving Finland is under 40%, and the old-fash- out the logistic chain. ioned routines in ports lead to ships sailing at non-optimal • Introducing a new cargo handling concept developed by speeds and thereby to unnecessary fuel consumption. Lack of MacGregor that reduces turnaround time in ports, maxi- transparency and coordination between the large numbers of mizes cargo space utilization, and secures cargo handling actors in logistical chains is the key reason for inefficiencies in quality. sea transportation, operations in ports, and land transporta- • Employing a performance-driven shipbuilding and opera- tion. Addressing these inefficiencies could increase the com- tion business model that ensures a highly competitive ship petitiveness of Finnish industry, and, at the same time, create by keeping world-leading technology providers engaged a basis for significant exports. throughout the lifecycle of vessels. By changing the business models and ways of working • Implementing new financing models that integrate insti- it would be possible to lower cargo transportation costs by tutional investors with a long-term investment perspective 25-35% and emissions by 30-35% in the dry bulk and general in order to reduce the cost of capital and put the focus on cargo logistics in the Baltic Sea area. -
Global Shipping: Choosing the Best Method of Transport
Global Shipping: Choosing the Best Method of Transport When shipping freight internationally, it’s important to choose the appropriate mode of transportation to ensure your products arrive on time and at the right cost. Your decision to ship by land, sea, or air depends on a careful evaluation of business needs and a comparison of the benefits each method affords. Picking the best possible mode of transportation is critical to export success. Shipping by truck Shipping by truck is a popular method of freight transport used worldwide, though speed and quality of service decline outside of industrialized areas. Even if you choose to ship your products by sea or air, a truck is usually responsible for delivering the goods from the port of arrival to their final destination. When shipping by truck, the size of your shipment will determine whether you need less- than-truckload (LTL) or truckload (TL) freight. LTL involves smaller orders, and makes up the majority of freight shipments. The average piece of LTL freight weighs about 1,200 pounds and is the size of a single pallet. However, LTL freight can range from 100 to 15,000 pounds. Beyond this limit, your shipment is likely to be classified as truckload freight. It is more economical for large shipments to utilize the space and resources of a single motor carrier, instead of being mixed with other shipments and reloaded into several different vehicles along the route. TL providers generally charge a ‘per mile’ rate, which can vary depending on distance, items being shipped, equipment, and service times. -
Investigation of Abandoned WW II Wrecks in Palau
Investigation of Abandoned WW II Wrecks in Palau Tomo Ishimura1 Abstract Over forty Japanese vessels were sunken in the water of Palau during WWII. Some wrecks sunk in the shallow water at a depth of 20 meters or less and were salvaged. Other wrecks at 30 meters depth or more still remain and are legally protected by the authority of Palau Government but are seriously threatened by illegal treasure hunters. Initial efforts to identify human remains of Japanese soldiers were made in 2005. As part of an archaeology advisory team for the Japanese Government I carried out underwater surveys of sunken WWII vessels in Palau. In 2010 and 2011, I conducted investigations of the WWII vessels again, together with on-shore research on sites and features associated with the Japanese occupation period, funded by the Takanashi Foundation for Arts and Archaeology (Japan). The research revealed that the most of the vessels sunken in Palau were not genuine military vessels of Japanese Imperial Navy or Army but converted vessels originally built for non-combat purposes. These vessels were slow in speed and not well-equipped for combat activity. Most of them were destroyed by American aerial bombing on March 30th 1944. The evening before (March 29th) the main force of the Japanese Combined Fleet, including its flagship Musashi, retreated from Palau. It is clear that the vessels left in Palau were abandoned as a “third wheel” of the Combined Fleet. These abandoned-converted vessels include cargo carriers, tankers, whaling boats and fishing boats. This implies that Japanese troops were experiencing a difficult and desperate campaign at that time. -
RO-RO Cargo Vessel FERRIES & RO-RO, YACHTS, HIGH SPEED BOATS
RO-RO Cargo Vessel FERRIES & RO-RO, YACHTS, HIGH SPEED BOATS 27,000 DWT Builder / Yard No.: Shipyard 3. MAJ / 2788 Owner / Flag: CMA-CGM / BAHAMAS Designed by: Shipyard 3. MAJ The vessel is RO-RO ship suitable to carry containers, trucks, trailers, general cargo and cars and vans on hoistable deck. Cargo space is divided into two (2) forward cargo holds with 40’ cellguides and one (1) cargo space divided with decks into three (3) garages, and cargo space on weatherdeck with container fittings. Double bottom and side arranged for ballast water, HFO and antiheeling tanks. The ship’s hull is specially equipped for in-water surveys. Engine room is equipped for unattended operation. Classification: BV Cargo equipment I W HULL W MACH • Stern quarter ramp: 46.5 m (incl. flap) x 12.0 m/250 t RO-RO cargo ship, equipped for capacity, four (4) wheels axle load 60 t carriage of containers • Stern door: 27.0 m x 7.0 m Unrestricted navigation • Car decks: W AUT-UMS, W SYS-NEQ1 2A area abt. 2300 m2 eleven (11) hoisting panels MON-SHAFT, INWATER SURVEY 3A area abt. 3480 m2 seventeen (17) hoisting panels, starboard aft panel use as ramp Length overall (extreme) 211.60 m • Fixed ramp lower deck to tank top: 28.3 m x 8.0 m with Length between perpendiculars 190.00 m gastight hydraulically operated ramp cover Breadth, moulded 32.20 m middle deck to lower deck: 57.4 m x 12.0 m with Depth, moulded to weather deck 22.70 m watertight hydraulically operated ramp cover Design draught (extreme) 10.50 m middle to weather deck: 53.4 m x 8.0 m with Deadweight at design draught 26,700 t watertight hydraulically operated ramp cover Main engine 3.