Maritime Terrorism in the Indian Ocean Rim:

Peering into the Darkness

Keegan B. Steele

California State University Maritime Academy

April, 2017

Via CIMSEC™

MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 1

Abstract

The Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) has become a major geopolitical and security interest in the 21st century. One of the biggest issues that faces the Indian Ocean today is the swift growth of maritime related security threats. This is a major concern to not only first world nations like the

United States, but also to developing states in the region. Due to the lack of stability in the region, the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been a breeding ground for violent non-state actors. Piracy, illicit trade, and terrorism are just a few of the non traditional maritime security threats. With instability in an already pirate-infested area, the threat of a growing maritime terrorism domain is a looming and haunting notion. This thesis will look into the history of maritime based terrorist attacks, and the potential for up and coming non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and organized crime in a region of instability.

MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 2

Introduction

Maritime terrorism is a real and current threat to the world’s maritime industry. Acts of terrorism have been committed in the past, that have not only been devastating to infrastructure, but also have caused loss of life. According to (Nincic, 2012), maritime terrorism represents a very small percentage of all terrorist attacks. “A similar analysis of the RAND terrorism database supports these figures; of the 40,126 terrorist incidents recorded between 1968 and 2007, only

136 (0.34%) were against the maritime domain” (Nincic, 2012, para. 1). Not only are these numbers low, but there hasn’t been a truly significant maritime terrorist incident since the bombing of the Limburg in 2002. Terrorist organizations that plot these attacks are a special and unique type of non-state actor, but where does the capability and intent from these groups come from? With the growing threat of the Islamic State in the Middle East and North Africa, is there a potential that the next big attack on the west will be a maritime related target? The threats that the world sees today are very unlike what has been known for centuries. In the past, the threats that sovereign states were concerned about were other sovereign states. With the establishment of what is known as a “new world order,” these threats began to take on a different form. After the Cold War, the world saw a major balancing of power between the United States and the

Soviet Union. At the time the term was used by presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail

Gorbachev to describe the peace that was being attempted. Groups of people, whether it be from

Eastern Europe, or the Middle East typically formed as gangs or mafias, but soon enough became full fledged terrorist organizations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the

Russian Mafia began its rise to power and became known as one of the most widespread criminal organizations. In the Middle East, the rise of al-Qaeda began shortly after the Soviet occupation MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 3

in Afghanistan. These groups became known officially as non-state actors. These non-state actors were known to be politically motivated, and violent in nature. The maritime realm and industry are advantageous targets for these types of groups due to the vast unregulated coastlines and international waters. The difficulty perceived in attempting to stop these terrorist groups lies not only in the prevention of an attack, but also in defeating the use of the marine environment as a means of transportation. These non-state actors have developed the capability to take advantage of the coastlines of the world, where ports are not regulated by Coast Guards. In doing so, the transportation and smuggling of narcotics, weapons, and even humans are just a few of the potential crimes being committed. By definition, international waters are ruled by everyone and also by no one. However, the maritime domain is neither safe nor secured. The biggest concern that is shared among intelligence experts, according to RAND’s publication for, Center For

Terrorism Risk Management Policy, is that “the next major terrorist strike against Western interests is as likely to emanate from a non territorial theater, as from a land-based one”

(Greenberg, 2006, p. 2). Although there are plenty of regions of the world who have not been directly affected by regional terrorism, no matter how far away a country is, or how different their economy is, terrorism affects all. Alongside that, this means that countries like those in

Europe who have been lucky to staved off major attacks by terrorist organizations must continue to develop security measures as a prevention and deterrence in the 21st century.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is one of the most culturally diverse areas in the world, stretching from the East Coast of Africa, to Southeast Asia. Consequently, it is also one of the most dangerous regions in the world, with a number of security threats to not only the millions of people living there, but also to the United States and its allies. The Indian Ocean has an ancient tradition of trade, connecting the seaports of East Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, India, and MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 4

Southeast Asia. There are a number of religions, races, and cultures that range from Christianity to Islam, to Hindu and Buddhist. In a lecture at CSU-Maritime Academy on East Africa and the

Indian Ocean Rim, Meredith (2015) stated, “Swahili city-states grew rich and cosmopolitan with monsoon stopovers Intermingling of Arabs, Indians, Africans, in marriage, culture, language, religion” (p. 1). To understand the current state of this vast region, it is best to look to the past and examine how this region was shaped by its ancient history. Early trading along the littoral rim boosted the production of society due to the influx of a source of new raw materials. What is known as the “Pre-European trade,” was established just before the 15th century, stretched from

Mozambique on the coast of Africa, to Indonesia. The Maritime culture including sailing and trade, helped spread faith, culture, and religion thousands of miles. The Indian Ocean was referred to as the “Muslim Sea.” The Western half of this region has seen conflict for thousands of years, mostly stemming from the diversity of faith and culture. In the Northern region of the

IOR known as the Middle East, conflict has arisen as a result of dominant external powers attempting to rule, and the influence and interference these powers have on the region. This term defined in international relations is known as a Shatterbelt Region (Cohen, 2003). A Shatterbelt

Region is defined as an area of instability, caught between colliding super powers, under constant stress. Peripheral to the Middle East is the Horn of Africa, which contains one of if not the most unstable areas in the Indian Ocean Rim. The Horn of Africa, also sometimes referred to as the Swahili Coast, is culturally Islamic. On the coast lies Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia inland. Since before the 19th century, the Indian Ocean has been ruled and influenced by foreign powers. Although not always successful, the colonialism that took place in certain parts of the IOR molded the region to what it is today. For example, the British Empire ruled South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda, and in the East, India and Sri Lanka. The Indian Ocean MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 5

in this time period was then known as a “British Lake.” Although the British Empire hadn’t necessarily colonized the Northern Coast of Africa (Horn of Africa), the influence and obvious

Western aggression left distaste in the region. This region has been a hotspot for years, but is most infamously known for its lack of political governance. The Horn of Africa and Northern

Swahili Coast are considered extremely dangerous and is now controlled by many local militias and tribes, and even terrorist organizations. These groups with the most firepower typically make the rules, and which is why foreign aid is scarce. Somalia is most commonly remembered in reference with the United States for the notorious “Black Hawk Down” incident which was between the local Somali al-Qaeda terrorist cell, local Mogadishu Militiamen, and self- proclaimed president Mohamed Farrah Aidid. After the incident, the United States and its allies pulled out from the region leaving a major power vacuum that was filled by further radical terrorism. Currently, there are many international governmental organizations dedicated to the counter terrorism regime. As far as maritime terrorism is classified, however, there are far fewer.

The United Nations has implemented policies regarding maritime security threats at sea, those including both piracy and terrorism. Alongside the United Nations, the European Union has task forces dedicated specifically to the region of East Africa to combat the rise in piracy. The United

States has AFRICOM, which is one of the six combatant commands in the world, and the headquarters for the U.S. Department of Defense in Africa. One of the other main task forces in the region is Combined Maritime Forces, with 31 participating nations. “Combined Maritime

Forces (CMF) is the leading multi-national naval partnership, which exists to promote security, stability and prosperity across approximately 3.2 million square miles of international waters, which encompass some of the world’s most important shipping lanes” (Combined Maritime

Forces, 2002, para 1). These government coalitions mostly are there for counter-piracy MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 6

operations, but are also a deterrent for maritime based terrorist attacks, even if their prerogative states otherwise. Further in the thesis, these government coalitions will be described in much more depth.

Literature Review

Maritime terrorism is a non-traditional security threat, that many underestimate. In the

21st century, there have been a handful of incidents committed by various terrorist organizations that have shaken the world. Terrorist attacks at sea or in Port remain one of the most

unpredictable attacks, and it is never certain when and where they will occur. However, acts of

terrorism are not only classified as an attack, but can also be defined as a means of transportation

of paraphernalia, and other illicit items. Is the occurrence and damage enough to warrant the

research needed to determine whether we can predict them, or whether we can plan to deter

them, and can there be an active maritime counter terrorism regime able to stop attacks in the

future? With the current trends and rise of radical extremists, is there a potential that the next

tragedy to the United States or another nation will see another “9/11” in the maritime domain?

There have been multiple groups that all agree that maritime terrorism is a real and existential threat that should not be taken lightly nor ignored. One major concern shared among intelligence experts, is that the next major terrorist attack will most likely occur from a non territorial theater, as compared to a land-based one (Greenberg, 2006). However, there are those who also believe that there is a potential for infamous Somali Pirates based off the Eastern coast of Africa that could become a source of finance for regional terrorist groups. This linkage between pirates and terrorists further develops the argument that maritime terrorism is a genuine risk for the maritime industry (Shortland & Vothknecht, 2011). MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 7

Pertaining to the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), the Gulf Coast Countries (GCC) remain entangled between a dangerous Assad Regime in Iran, and a deadly Sunni extremist group in both Iraq and Syria. The fear remains that ISIS will continue to spread across North Africa, and even into the regions of the Gulf Coast. This alone could be devastating to not only the GCC, but to the United States and its interests in the region (Goldenberg & Dalton, 2015). The potential threat of a major attack occurring on a merchant vessel are only increased due to the high usage of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), and the heavy traffic of chokepoints in unstable regions. There is a growing concern that criminal organizations will transport Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) related materials to terrorists who have the potential to use them to attack the United States, its allies, or friendly countries (Koknar, 2005). As highlighted by Cordner in the, Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, the Indian Ocean region is advancing from a major maritime trade route, to a rapidly changing sphere of influence.

In order to maintain the freedom of maritime navigation, it is important for major littoral powers like India to assume responsibility for these regional threats (Cordner, 2010). Although there has been successful mounted terror attacks on the “high seas” (M/V Limburg), more often than not the most effective occur in coastal and inland waterways. The reason these attacks occur in such few places is due to the fact that the maritime geography is only favorable in certain regions of the world (Murphy, 2007). Maritime Security studies by scholars in the Indian Ocean region have previously focused mainly on armed robbery and piracy at sea. Research done by

Winner, Schneider, and Weldemichael, who are established scholars have provided articles pertaining to the multiple aspects of Maritime Security (with a focus on terrorism).

A conclusion drawn from all of these authors is that maritime terrorism should not be underestimated, nor should it be overlooked in comparison to decreasing piracy trends (Winner, MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 8

Schneider, & Weldemichael, 2012). This thesis will examine the complexity of the Indian Ocean region, whether the current counter-terrorism regime is successful, and future trends and speculations with current terrorist organizations and their maritime capabilities.

Analyzing Maritime Terrorism: Probability and Impact Risk Assessment

One of the most challenging components when assessing the risk of a terrorist attack is

having policies already implemented that act as more of a proactive “safety net.” The difficulty

with creating proactive policies is that trying to plan for an uncertain future and an uncertain

enemy can be extremely difficult. Unfortunately, there are typically more successful reactive

policies that become implemented later on. For example, a policy that was implemented as

reactive, would be the Suppression of Unlawful Acts At Sea (SUA). In terms of prevention,

liability of these maritime accidents and disasters involve, “ unique legal and jurisdictional issues

that arise concerning events that occur on navigable waterways” (Greenberg, 2006, p. 4).

Businesses that participate in maritime commerce have to deal with the issue of liability and are

required to take the necessary security measures to provide safety measures and to alleviate

potential attacks. Maritime safety has always been a major concern of the United States, “. . .

[safety] has been the predominant discourse within the maritime industry since the sinking of

Titanic tragedy in 1912, there was a relatively low interest of the US government in port security

throughout the 20th century” (Booth and Altenbrun, 2002, p. 3).

International Policy

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and International

regulations on international maritime security were strengthened to both protect against potential

terrorist threats and deter potential terrorist acts. In 2002, under the International Ship and Port

Facility Security (ISPS) Code, related international rules were established as an amendment to MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 9

the International Convention for the Safety of life at Sea (SOLAS). With the implementation of the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

(SUA),

“Subsequent international treaty efforts designed to combat maritime terrorism have

created separate legal grounds and mechanisms for international jurisdiction over high

seas terrorist attacks, but with rules that could easily create conflicting or ambiguous

jurisdiction among multiple sovereign states under some circumstances”(Greenberg et al.,

2006, p. 45).

According to international law, this poses a potential dilemma because of the mandatory jurisdiction for the flag state, the territorial state, and for the state of the nationality of the perpetrator of the unlawful act (Greenberg et al., 2006).

UNCLOS: Determining Piracy

The United Nations clause on the Law of the Sea treaty (UNCLOS) claims in article 100 that all states must cooperate on the deterrence of piracy. “Article 100 imposes the obligation on all states to ‘cooperate to the fullest extent on the repression of piracy on the high seas . . .”

(Epps, 2014, p. 221). In article 110, piracy is given a technical definition:

“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention,

or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a

private ship or a private aircraft and directed: (I) on the high seas, against another ship or

aircraft, or against persons or property on board such shift or aircraft; (ii) against a ship,

aircraft, persons or property in a place outside jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of

voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 10

making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an

act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)” (Epps, 2014, p. 221).

UNCLOS states that it is an obligation for states to cooperate on the repression of piracy on the high seas, and although states may be unaware of their own citizens committing acts of piracy, the punishment still stands. Due to the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, maritime terrorism is now under the same umbrella of legality as maritime piracy.

SUA Protocol

One of the leading international policies in relation to non-traditional security threats on the high seas is the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation. The SUA protocol was adopted in 1985, shortly after the Achille Lauro incident.

Sponsored by multiple nations involved in the incident, this was the first piece of international legislation that dealt specifically on terrorism on the high seas (MacDonald, 2013). Although the convention wasn’t perfect, it was the beginning of what came to be known as the counter- maritime terrorism regime (Steele, 2016). One of the most important aspects of the SUA convention is the fact that it brought maritime terrorism at sea under the same consideration as piracy, “The advantage to characterizing maritime terrorism as piracy is obvious; piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction whereby all States possess the right to take enforcement action regardless of any connection to the offence” (MacDonald, 2013, p. 486). However, according to

MacDonald (2013), extending the universal jurisdiction to maritime terrorism could overstep on flag State sovereignty, which would find most states unwilling. In 2005, the SUA convention underwent important changes, such as addressing the trafficking of narcotics, however, the 2005

Protocol saw much less participation of states. “By comparison, the 2005 Protocol has only 23 contracting parties representing 30.27% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet” . . . MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 11

“Therefore, despite the availability of the more comprehensive 2005 Protocol, SUA is still the

dominant maritime anti-terrorism regime” (MacDonald, 2013, p. 488).

Risk and Liability

One of the most difficult challenges that can be come from obtaining a truly secure vessel lies in the security of the port. No matter how safe a ship may be, the real threat lies when it is closest to land. Although this isn’t the only threat when it comes to ship safety, it is the most concerning, and typically the most unpredictable. USS Cole-style improvised explosive attacks

are difficult to deter because it is difficult to keep a port 100% secure. The amount of people,

cargo and machinery in constant movement at any given port makes eliminating threats

extremely challenging, depending of course where the port is located. For example, the Port of

Long Beach would be considered fairly secure in most aspects from an outside perspective

because of the assumptions that can easily be made. The port is located on the west coast of the

United States, a place that typically is secured by the Coast Guard. Other ports across the world,

like the port of Aden, highlight the security challenges. “Despite the importance and

vulnerability of ports, and the influence of War on Terror governance, an ethnographic analysis

of post-9/11 operational port security realities has remained non-existent in criminology, until recently” (Eski, 2016, p. 462). Ultimately, risk and liability amounts to the preparedness of the port and the crew of the given vessel. The best deterrence to any threat is to be prepared. Being prepared can be the difference in saving a life, or the entire crew and vessel.

Threats and Vulnerabilities

The threats of acts of terrorism are not as prominent as one would suggest. A ship is much more likely to be attacked by a group of pirates near the Horn of Africa than they are to have a ship hijacked in a terror plot. Although speculation could suggest that terrorists and piracy MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 12

factions are collaborating, “economic motivations for piracy [which depend for fulfillment on the

stability of maritime trade] may be in direct conflict with the motivations of terrorists [i.e., in

achieving maximum disruptive effects in connection with attacks],” (Greenberg, 2006, p. xxii),

alongside that, “some plausible forms of maritime terrorism [e.g., sinking a cargo ship in order to

block a strategic lane of commerce] actually present relatively low risk, in large part because the

targeting of such attacks is inconsistent with the primary motivation for most terrorist groups”

(Greenberg, 2006, p. xxii), which would achieve maximum public attention through loss of life.

According to the RAND corporation, the maritime environment withholds many unique

characteristics, that could make it attractive to organized attacks by terrorist groups and

organizations. Due to the vast territory of the high seas, and the under regulated and inconsistent

security along the world’s coastlines, these maritime based attacks have the potential to inflict

devastating harm. Lastly, with the construction of extremely durable hulls for ships, any attack

that was attempted would have to be able to overcome this feat of engineering. The hulls now

made to be standardized on all merchant vessels are built to withstand heavy damage in order to

prevent damage and oil spills. Although al-Qaeda was successful with an overloaded skiff loaded with explosives, this isn’t the only way a terrorist organization can incite massive amounts of damage. Many still fear the chances of an incident similar to the highjacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985.The Achille Lauro incident fueled the creation for what is known today as the counter maritime terrorism regime. This incident remains one of the most spectacular and successful strikes to date. Although there aren’t a vast number of terrorist groups that have been able to have a successful maritime campaign, there have been plenty of incidents since the USS Cole in

2000. One of the most devastating was the attack on the Philippine SuperFerry 14 that occurred in 2004. The terrorist group Abu Sayyaf combined with Jemaah Islamiyah and the Rajah MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 13

Soliaman Movement masterminded the attack by storing 20 sticks of dynamite inside a

hollowed-out television (Greenberg, 2006, p. 22, table 2.1). The attack was extremely deadly

with a total loss of life of 116.

Susceptibility of Maritime Targets

In the shipping industry, it is difficult to ignore the potential dangers that the shipping

lanes hold. These Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) run throughout the world, splitting a

number of countries via waterways and canals. Unfortunately, there are SLOCs that pass

seaborne traffic through narrow and congested chokepoints. These chokepoints are mandated by

forced speed restrictions due to speed and maneuverability, and can foster a slough of risks to

ships. With the combination of a dangerous choke point like the Bab-El Mandeb Strait, and the

instability that plagues the Horn of Africa, safe shipping through this chokepoint is extremely

difficult. Greenberg et al., (2006) notes that,

“The international community appears to have become progressively more cognizant of

the general vulnerability of global shipping as a result of the largely unpoliced nature of

the high seas, the fact that many littoral governments lack the resources—and in certain

cases, the willingness—to enact serious programs of coastal surveillance, and the sheer

esoteric character that typifies much of the oceanic environment” (p. 12).

Alongside merchant shipping vessels, other maritime targets like cruise liners could be a major risk. With the amount of foreign travelers on one cruise liner at a time, an event like the

Hijacking of the Achille Lauro could be the next major attack. Although cruise liners typically stay far away from any type of dangerous waters, there are still many ways for terror cells to sidle on to these cruise liners without being caught. Most of the time, crews are vetted thoroughly, however, the real potential is for the underpaid (in some cases) workers on docks MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 14

and in shipyards and ports that can be much more easily influenced by bribes and illicit offers

(Greenberg, 2006). According to (Greenberg, 2006), it is the time when cruise liners anchor offshore for extended periods of times in potentially dangerous waters, usually for the tourists to travel to land or sight-see, where the highest probability for an attack could occur. “It is during these prolonged stops that a liner would be most exposed to a collision assault—either from a fast approach and explosive-laden suicide craft or a more sizable boat” (Greenberg, 2006, p. 76).

Although this thesis covers the Indian Ocean Rim, and more specifically the Horn of Africa and

Arabian Peninsula, cruise liners are less often going to be traveling these straits, however, those that do are especially vulnerable because trip itineraries are readily available online. Cruise ships, though, are designed with safety as a number one priority. Disabling or sinking a cruise ship would prove to be much more challenging than most would assume,

“Attempting to overcome these safeguards through an onboard explosion would require

several highly powerful bombs as well as a sophisticated understanding of the structural

integrity of the target in question, particularly in terms of being able to discern quickly

and accurately locations where explosions could be expected to cause the most damage”

(Greenberg, 2006, p. 77).

In turn, the most successful and deadly way of attacking a ship of formidable size would be a ramming technique of a small boat laden with explosives, as successfully completed in both the bombing of the USS Cole and the M/V Limburg.

Failed and Rogue States

One of the most prominent reasons for instability in a given region is due to a poorly governed state. For example, a state without any sort of regulatory laws or principles is destined for anarchy. The Horn of Africa region on the East coast of Africa is a prime example of severe MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 15

instability. Although there are roughly six countries that contribute to the Horn of Africa region,

certain states suffer from a lack of a stable government. One of the main reasons this region is

subject to political instability is due to the different clans and tribes. In Somalia, for example, the

clans are the governing law, and will decide what happens to a village, negotiate with a terrorist

group, or participate in illicit behavior. Just across the Strait of Bab-el Mandeb lies Yemen, a war

torn and politically unstable state in the grips of multiple insurgencies.

Somalia

The state of Somalia has seen dozens of occupations in the last few centuries. Ranging

from Egypt and France, to Britain and Italy, foreign rulers have inhabited the lands. Although

there have been periods of independence, like in the mid 20th century, drought and war have

ultimately lead to a slow downturn of political corruption and turmoil. In analysis of the

country’s history, (Somalia, 2016) key events are described that show series of events that have

shaped Somalia politically. In the early 1990s the region known as Somaliland, a former British

protectorate, declared unilateral independence. Although not internationally recognized,

Somaliland has a working government and has stayed away from the political turmoil of its

former nation. In the mid 1990s the United States was involved in Somalia in an attempt to quell

the then-infested al-Qaeda stricken city of Mogadishu. After the unsuccessful operation known

as the “Battle of Mogadishu” between United States Army Rangers and Somali Militia, the

United Nations Peacekeepers and United States military vacated the region. Since then, the state

of Somalia has undergone a period of radical Islam. In the mid-2000s, with al-Qaeda still heavily active in the region, the United States ordered airstrikes in the South with its first military presence since the battle of Mogadishu. Somalia began to become an international concern in

2008, when the first major reports of piracy begin. The United Nations Security Council MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 16

authorized nations to send warships to Somalia’s territorial waters. To this day, al-Qaeda is fairly

active in the region; however, there is a new terrorist organization that joined forces with al-

Qaeda, known as al-Shabaab (Somalia profile, 2016).

Deterring piracy and terrorism can be done with the right amount of military support in the right places; however, the real root lies in the breeding ground of these threats. An analysis on Maritime Private Security noted that the root of the problem is that, “. . . today, Somalia

remains an ungoverned geographical space, with no acting government for most of the region.

That being said, the regions where tribal clans have been in control since the civil war need to be

taken care of first. These regions aren’t just a host for green and blue water piracy operations

anymore, but are now a breeding ground for terrorist organizations to thrive” (Steele, 2016, p. 8).

The Horn of Africa states and the southern coast of Yemen are hotspots for terrorist activity.

With the recent rise of the Islamic state it seems that it is only a matter of time until the influence

spreads to the Arabian Sea, and the Bab-El Mandeb strait. This region of the Indian Ocean was

in headlines October of 2016, as a group of Houthi rebels attempted a strike on a United States

Guided Missile Destroyer. The USS Mason came under fire by the rebels stationed near the

coast. Although both missiles fell short of the ship, countermeasures were deployed. According

to the Washington Post, “The U.S. Navy launched Tomahawk missiles early Thursday from the

Red Sea at three coastal radar sites in Yemen, destroying targets associated with missile attacks

on U.S. ships this week while warning that it would not tolerate similar actions in the future”

(Lamothe, 2016, para. 1).

In recent headlines, Somalia has elected a new president, Ex-Prime Minister Mohamed

Abdullahi Mohamed, who is a dual citizen of both the United States and Somalia. According to

an article by the BBC, Mr. Mohamed’s victory came as a surprise because Somalia has not had a MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 17

democratically elected president since 1969 (Somalia’s president, February 2017). The election taking place is in hopes that with the newly elected president, the road to democracy might be less challenging. It is noted in the article that there was heightened security, and more than

20,000 African Union troops are stationed in Somalia as a preventative measure to keep the infamous militant Islamist group al-Shabaab from interfering and overthrowing the government.

Although Mr. Mohamed has begun the path to democracy for the nation of Somalia, the fear of the militant group al-Shabaab still lingers to the South. Fortunately for Somalia, the United

Nations as well as the African Union have stated that the vote has become a building block for a stable democracy, and are hopeful for the future of Somalia. If President Mohamed can obtain peace and begin the stabilization of the country, disposing the internal conflict of al-Shabaab will begin to be much easier.

Yemen

Yemenis located in one of the most resource heavy areas in the Middle East. On the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen and the port city of Aden is an important sea port that has been ruled by many different powers, foreign and domestic over the last few centuries.

When the Suez Canal was opened up by the British in 1869, Aden was a major refuelling port, and in the past it has seen regional security threats such as terrorist attacks in the early 2000s, and more recently, piracy off the coast of Somalia. Although Somalia has been able to deter its number of pirate attacks, another threat to the maritime industry is looming. Yemen relies heavily on its oil exports, and with the resurgence of al-Qaeda in the last decade, their declining reserves are in trouble.

“Yemen’s southern coastline is on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb which links the Red Sea

and the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime choke point where roughly 8.2% of global oil MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 18

supply passed through in 2009” . . . “Its oil exports, accounting for 70% of Yemeni

government revenue, make the country highly dependent on its declining reserves”

(Anzinger, 2014, para. 2).

In early 2011 the Middle East and Arab world underwent what was known to most as the

Arab Spring, a systematic political change. The Arab Spring spread from Northern Africa to

parts of the Arabian Peninsula like Yemen. Following the Egyptian and Tunisian successful

uprisings, many Yemeni civilians took to the streets in protest of the government. The protests

were about President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the way the government was being run. In late

2011 President Saleh resigned, and in February 2012, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi ran unopposed

and became the new president (Yemen profile, 2017). After the election of President Hadi,

Yemen fell deeper into political corruption and northern rebels known as the ‘Houthis’ began to

advance south to take control of the capital, Sanaa. Since 2014, Yemen has been shrouded in

conflict with these Houthi rebels aligned with Iran, who after seizing the capital forced the

legitimate government into exile in Saudi Arabia. Although peace talks and an updated

constitution were initiated by the weak government, the Houthis rejected the draft, and instead

appointed a presidential council to replace Hadi (Yemen Profile, 2017). In March of 2015, the

Islamic State began its first set of major attacks in Yemen, with two suicide bombings targeting

Shia Mosques in Sanaa, killing 137 people (Yemen Profile, 2017). The Yemeni political

structure consisted of a multitude of political parties all fighting for control of the country, its

capital, and the stronghold in the south, the Port of Aden. The Saudi-led coalition then began its campaign of airstrikes, and a naval blockade in the south to try and regain control of Aden.

The role of AQAP, which will be touched on in more detail later, is to topple the Saudi monarchy and Yemeni government, and establish an Islamic caliphate (Yemen, 2015). As major MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 19

political dissidence was occurring in the capital, Saudi led forces began to make headway in

Aden. While the United States is currently trying to help stabilize the region with the help of

Saudi Arabia, Yemen and its people are heavily suffering. Not only from AQAP, but also now

from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s Yemen Province, or ISIL-YP for short. ISIL-YP

has made recent headlines in Yemen, claiming responsibility for a suicide attack in the south that

killed 48 (Al-batati, 2016). This political instability is a breeding ground for these terrorist

organizations, and these groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL-YP have taken advantage of the disorder to further deepen the country's turmoil. Although the Saudi coalition force has recaptured Aden, the air strikes that are supposed to be targeting the Houthi rebel groups, al-Qaeda, ISIL-YP have been causing massive amounts of collateral damage to innocent civilians in Yemen. In October of 2016, an airstrike led by the Saudi’s hit a crowded funeral in the capital of Sanaa, killing 140 and injuring 500 (Yemen Profile, 2017).

There is a fair amount of evidence that these air strikes have been successful, however with the amount of reported civilian casualties, it is easy to see that another solution may be the best bet. In order to stave away from maritime terrorism becoming a feasible threat again in

Yemen, the government must take control of the South, and keep terrorist organizations like al-

Qaeda and ISIL-YP at bay. If the country continues to delve further into chaos, the threat to the global shipping industry could be in serious peril. The most controversial piece of information about this situation in Yemen, is that some believe that this is an Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy war, where Saudi Arabia backs the legitimate president Hadi and wishes to reinstate the government, while Iran, the largest Shiite community is thought by some to be backing the Shiite Houthi rebels. Although there is no factual evidence, there are those who believe this because Iran has been known to back other Shiite minorities in the region. In an article written by Yara Bayoumy MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 20

and Phil Stewart, an analysis of the weapons transfers from the Iranians to the Houthis allegedly

puts Oman in the middle by claiming Oman isn’t involved in the smuggling, but turns a blind

eye. “We have been concerned about the recent flow of weapons from Iran into Yemen and have

conveyed those concerns to those who maintain relations with the Houthis, including the Omani

government” (Bayoumy et al., 2016, para. 5). This could be a potential nightmare for the United

States because Oman is one if its allies in the region. The war has been raging now for just over

two years, and if the allegations are true about the Saudis smuggling small arms and missiles to

the Houthis, then it could prolong for much longer. In order to maintain regional security and

prevent a global incident, the Saudi led coalition needs to retake the capital, reinstate President

Hadi, and continue to crack down on terrorist organizations. Lastly, al-Qaeda and the Islamic

State are competing for the dominant caliphate in the region. Which means, the violence and bloodshed will only further increase until one destroys the other, or Western nations alongside the Saudi coalition defeat them both.

Private Security Companies (PSCs)

The use of privately contracted security companies (PSCs) is not a new concept, nor will demand for protection ever disappear. As far back as history yields, the use of PSCs or, sometimes referred to as mercenaries, have been a major part of conflicts around the globe. In today’s day and age, PSCs have been extremely successful in the Middle East, ranging from a number of military operations. These companies contract out security teams that are made up of

Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASPs). These PCASPs have seen action in some of the toughest parts of the world. Now that the United States has pulled out a massive amount of troops from the Middle East (still roughly 5000), these PSCs have began to find contracts revolving around the maritime industry. With the continuing rise of piracy in the late MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 21

2000s, companies like Blackwater Worldwide and Hart Security to name a few, have began to seek contracting jobs near the Gulf of Aden. These pirate-infested waters are host to a multitude of security threats to not only the ships passing through, but to the crew as well. The decision to contract PCASPs was highlighted in an analysis of Maritime Private Security, (Steele, 2016) the use of contracted security teams has not always been as favorable as it is now for a variety of reasons. Merchant ships traditionally are not to have any mounted guns as to the concern of other nations and the right of innocent passage. However, with the continuing rise of piracy and other illicit activities in major chokepoints of the world, some opinions have changed. “The Danish

Shipowners Association changed their position a couple of weeks before, on 27 January 2011, from a very clear dissociation on the use of armed guards to a hold a new position recommending the use of armed guards” (Struwe, 2012, p. 588).

Regional task Forces

CTF 150: Maritime Security

One of the most active task forces in the region, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) CTF:

150 Maritime Security task force, is one of three operating task forces. CTF: 150 covers an area stretching roughly over two million square miles, covering; the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the

Indian Ocean (Combined Maritime Forces, 2002). Its main mission is to encourage maritime safety and security in order to deter terrorist related acts and illegal activities. CTF: 150 was established to not only ensure the safety of the shipping industry in the region, but to also safeguard the maritime industry as a whole to counteract terrorism. Task Force 150 was developed under the US Navy under the control of the US Naval Forces Central Command

(CENTCOM), and after the attacks of September 11th, 2001 was retasked as a multi-nation coalition (Combined Maritime Forces, 2002). The goals of the task force now lie in a much MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 22

wider scope than terrorist threats in the covered regions, but also to address threats to member

states and their values. Current operations by Task Force 150 have been successful, as there has

not been an attack in recent years.

Operation Atalanta

Operation Atalanta, also known as EU NAVFOR, is the European Union’s Naval Forces

first counter piracy operation located off of the Eastern coast of Somalia, with its area of

operations spanning 4.7 million square miles. The way the European Union sees terrorism is

through the recent November 2015 Paris attacks. According to Eski ( 2016), European societies

should not be as afraid of terrorism as they are; however, “Europe is most addicted to fear and

obsessed with security” . . . “the fear of terrorism is used and exaggerated by the European Union

(EU) that has ambitions to become a powerful, global counter-terrorist actor” (Eski, 2016, p.

461). Operation Atalanta works with the capacity of the European Union's Council in accordance with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although EU NAVFOR operates as a counter piracy coalition, the task force is charged with maintaining safe and navigable waters throughout the Gulf of Aden. As described in an analysis on Maritime Private Security (Steele, 2016)

Thomas Kossendey, the ministry’s parliamentary undersecretary, “Unless the roots of piracy are tackled . . . we will still be conducting Atalanta in 50 years” (Hemicker, 2012, p. 2). Operation

Atalanta has been inherently successful at deterring the number of pirate attacks. According to a

marine blog posted by Rear Admiral Jonas Haggren of the Swedish Royal Navy, the new Force

Commander for Operation Atalanta, “Pirate attacks and the number of hijacked ships have been

at a very low level over the past two years. Last year saw only four hijacking attempts and none

of them were successful. The last successful hijacking took place in 2013” (Rider, 2015, para. 4).

Rider later poses the question, with the EU NAVFOR task force mandate expiring in December MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 23

of 2016, how will the EU continue to be committed to the maritime security presence, and how

will that affect the progress that has been made?

AFRICOM

The United States African Central Command’s Africa Maritime Law Enforcement

Partnership (AMLEP) is the leading Maritime Law Enforcement program for Africa. The

AMLEP’s area of operations include all of the littoral African states; however, one of the prime

objectives lies off of the Eastern coast of Somalia, and the Horn of Africa region. According to

AMLEP, “The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) program enables

African partner nations to build maritime security capacity and improve management of their

maritime environment through real world combined law enforcement operations” (United States

Africa Command, n.d.). The AMLEP program is in charge of patrolling all African waters in

search for illicit maritime behavior such; as illegal fishing, trafficking of narcotics, people,

weapons, environmental crimes, piracy, and terrorist behavior. Working alongside these other

regional task forces, AFRICOM has been fairly successful, especially in Somalia. According to a

press release by U.S. Africa Command on January 7, the Federal Government of Somalia,

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces and U.S. advisors conducted a self-defense

strike against the al-Qaeda associated terrorist group, al-Shabaab, one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the region. “During a counterterrorism operation to disrupt al-Shabaab, the combined partner forces observed al-Shabaab fighters threatening their safety and security. The

U.S. conducted a self-defense strike to neutralize the threat, no enemy fighters were killed”

(United States Africa Command, 2017, para. 2). The press release states that the United States remains committed to their partners in eliminating terrorism and strengthening security in the region. AFRICOM's fight in Somalia continues to this day in Somalia, with growing support. MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 24

However, it is unclear what the future holds with the potential linkage of al-Shabaab and al-

Qaeda in the region.

AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a multidimensional Peace Support

Operation that is charged with the duty and responsibility of: Reducing the threat of al-Shabaab, providing security to enable the political process, and successfully transferring security to the

Somali security forces. AMISOM Maritime has a specific Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) that is tasked with ensuring the safety of ships entering Somali ports. The VPD has been actively training with EU NAVFOR on counter piracy operations, rules of engagement, and the detention of suspects involved with illicit maritime behavior (AMISOM Maritime, 2011). As stated by the

AMISOM Maritime mission profile,

“The AU has appealed to the UN Security Council to authorize an expanded marine

component to help bring security to the coastline of Somalia and deny the al Shabaab the

opportunity to benefit from piracy and illegal maritime trade . . . UNSC Resolution 2036,

is also meant to play a key role in dislodging al Shabaab from its coastal strongholds, as

well as in subsequent efforts to deny the group the ability to resupply, infiltrate and ferry

fighters” (AMISOM Maritime, 2011, para. 8).

An important point to note is that although Al-Shabaab may not yet be interested in committing any acts of terrorism at sea, the use of ships to ferry fighters, resupply, and infiltrate certain regions is still considered illicit terrorist activity.

The Contemporary Threat of Maritime Terrorism MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 25

Maritime terrorism is defined by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

(CSCAP) as follows:

…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using

or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their

passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts,

port areas and port towns or cities (Quentin, 2003, para. 2).

Maritime terrorism has materialized as a foreboding threat in the world, targeting both merchant vessels and naval vessels. To understand where maritime terrorism might be heading in the future, one must find the reasons that might motivate terrorists to assume operations in a marine environment. For years government and intelligence officials have believed that modern day terrorist groups might be looking to expand operations to the maritime domain. One of the biggest reasons is the arduous security measures that exist on land, and the tight borders between countries. However, since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the “overall latitude of action on the world’s oceans and coastal waters remains prevalent, offering extremists the opportunity to move, hide, and strike in a manner not possible in a terrestrial theater” (Greenberg, 2006, p. 15).

This has inherently increased the amount of pressure internationally on littoral states to step up coastal and port security at an attempt to deter illicit maritime behavior. As stated previously, almost all federal maritime ports in the shipping industry follow rules and regulations such as the

ISPS code; however, in littoral states that are known as areas of instability, the challenge remains.

Maritime Capable Terrorist Groups MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 26

While maritime terrorism continues to remain in question of how real the threat is, there

are groups that have proven successful, and those that have risen and fallen. The most infamous

groups that come to mind; Palestine Liberation Front [Abu Abbas Faction] (PLF) known for the

hijacking of the Achille Lauro, al-Qaeda most known for the successful attacks against the USS

Cole and the M/V Limburg, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had a successful

maritime campaign in Sri Lanka against governmental forces who were most known for their

deadly fast attack boats, homemade submersibles, and success rate, and Abu Sayyaf Group

mostly known for their terror campaign in the Sulu Sea in the Philippines. This list was

generated in 2009 by the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism (Nincic,

2012), and since then terrorist groups have been added such as; al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Shabaab, a group located on the coast of Somalia, and possibly in coercion with Somali pirates in the region.

Palestinian Liberation Front (Abu Abbas Faction)

Most infamously known for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the Palestinian

Liberation Front (PLF) ran a fairly successful campaign in the mid 20th century. The PLF was the first of the current period of of modern maritime terrorism. The PLF was founded by

Muhammed Zaidan (Abu Abbas) and Talat Yaakub in 1977 when they split from the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PLF was designated as a Foreign Terrorist

Organization by the U.S. following the infamous hijacking and attack on the Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt in 1985. The reason the PLF is remembered is because following the incident in 1985, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA) was passed, supported by some of the affected nations, in order to create a counter maritime terrorism regime. MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 27

The Achille Lauro Incident

The forefront of the maritime terrorism regime was established in 1988 following the

infamous hijacking of the Achille Lauro October 7th, 1985. The Achille Lauro incident was

classified as maritime terrorism when four men representing the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

boarded the Italian MS Achille Lauro liner off the coast of Egypt. Austria, Italy, and Egypt

shared the perspective that the Achille Lauro incident did not qualify as piracy. These nations co-

sponsored a proposal for an international convention that would fill this legal lacuna and address

maritime terrorism for the first time (MacDonald, 2013). Steele (SUA, 2016) asserted that the

convention was adopted by the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) in Rome on 10 March 1988. The convention

then came into force on March 1st, 1992 after it had been ratified by 15 states, the required number for the proposal. The main reason this convention was adopted was “to provide for a comprehensive suppression of unlawful acts committed against the safety of maritime navigation which endanger innocent human lives, jeopardize the safety of the persons and property, seriously affect the operation of maritime services and thus are of grave concern to the international community as a whole” (International Maritime Organization [IMO], 1988, p. 1).

Although the incident of the Achille Lauro sparked the creation of the maritime terrorism regime, it was the incident that occurred at the turn of the century that truly started the conversation of real threats.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda has had one of the most advanced maritime terror strategies to date, due to their tactics developed by Abd al Rahman al-Nashiri: MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 28

this four-part strategy consisted of: 1) suicide attacks on vessels, 2) hijacking ships and

using them as “weapons” against port or transportation infrastructure, 3) attacking large

vessels such as supertankers from the air by using explosive-laden small aircraft, and 4)

attacking vessels with underwater demolition teams or with suicide bombers (Nincic,

2012, para. 6).

Al-Qaeda proved time and again that their plans to attack Western maritime targets could be successful, with the first attack in 2000, the bombing of the USS Cole, and later the bombing of the French Tanker, M/V Limburg in 2002. Although the bombing of the USS Cole was al-

Qaeda’s first successful attack, it was not its first attempt. No less than 9 months prior in January

of 2000, a bomb laden skiff was loaded in the Port of Aden, however, the skiff was loaded too

heavily and sank.

The Bombing of the USS Cole

On the morning of Thursday, October 12th, 2000, under Commander Kirk Lippold, the

United States Destroyer Cole stopped in the Aden Harbor for a fuel stop. Around 10:30 in the

morning a small fiberglass skiff rammed into the port side of the ship, carrying roughly a quarter

ton of explosives and two suicide bombers (Whitaker, 2003). The boat exploded, sending

massive shockwaves throughout the hull of the ship, killing 17 American sailors. The

organization behind this plot was al-Qaeda, and it was a shocking blow to the United States and

the world. Not more than a year later, the same terrorist organization known as al-Qaeda

formulated an even deadlier plot, this time on American soil. September 11th, 2001 was a day

that the world will never forget, and is a tragedy like no other. “September 11, 2001's events

have shown that no country in the world is immune from terrorism. Whatever the reasons behind

them, acts of terrorism can be committed at any time and at any place. Shipping and ports were, MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 29

are and will be no exceptions. Unfortunately, all means of transport are preferential terrorist

fields” (Goulielmos, 2005, p. 463). The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)

Code is an amendment to the already existing Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS). Both

SOLAS and ISPS code were implemented to continue the act of suppression of these potential

attacks through international maritime policy.

Bombing of the Limburg

After the devastating attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden, another attack by al-

Qaeda not more than two years later occurred on October 6th, 2002 off the coast of Yemen. The

Limburg was carrying crude oil from Iran to Malaysia, and was in the Gulf of Aden off the coast

of Yemen to pick up another load of oil. Similar to the bombing of the USS Cole, suicide

bombers rammed an explosives-laden dinghy into the starboard side of the tanker, immediately

spilling roughly 90,000 barrels of oil and killing one crew member (Yemen, 2002). According to

the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) an annual study

conducted in 2006 showed, “Although the incident resulted in only three deaths (two of them

were the bombers), it directly contributed to a short-term collapse of international shipping business in the Gulf.” al-Qaeda was constantly “. . . urging young muslims to wage their jihad against Washington by focusing on targets that are liable to have a disruptive economic effect, including shipping” (Lal et al., 2006, p. 26). The following statement was released by Osama Bin

Laden, which proved the above prerogative:

By exploding the oil tanker in Yemen, the holy warriors hit the umbilical cord and

lifeline of the crusader community, reminding the enemy of the heavy cost of blood and

the gravity of losses they will pay as a price for their continued aggression on our

community and looting of our wealth (Lal et al., 2006, p. 26). MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 30

The similarities between the methods in both the bombing of the USS Cole and M/V Limburg

highlight the fact that terrorists do not see a difference between merchant and naval vessels. “The

poorly protected, relatively slow and massive ocean-going vessels such as the Limburg present

much softer targets to terrorists than better-protected U.S. Navy ships” (Koknar, 2005, para. 3).

One of the most challenging aspects when dealing with non-traditional maritime security threats such as maritime piracy and terrorism is that the current deterrence in place is ineffective.

Although the United States, European Union, and NATO have combined to create counter-piracy and counter-terrorism task forces, the threat still remains. “Many pirates continue to try their luck right under the noses of the international naval forces. . . Although pirates avoid high risk activities, the “catch and release” policy dictated by international human rights laws is clearly not an effective deterrent” (Shortland, and Vothknecht., 2011, p. 134). Enders and Sandler

(2006) were the first to point out that the main effect of counter-terrorism measures is to raise the marginal cost of carrying out specific types of attacks (or attacks in specific locations), leading to a substitution effect. They show that when investment in anti-terrorism measures makes certain activities less likely to succeed (e.g. sky-jacking), terrorist groups respond by undertaking other types of activities instead (e.g. kidnapping). This is one of the biggest issues seen today with maritime terrorism and the threat of an attack. If these predictions are taken into account, that would mean the United States and its allies have been able to fairly successfully deter these acts of terror and it is only a matter of time until these terrorist organizations turn to the sea. The maritime industry is a ripe target for terrorists for two main reasons. The public sector offers big ticket items such as oil platforms and container vessels, whereas the private sector can contain anything from a private yacht, to an oil tanker. According to the RAND think tank dedicated to maritime terrorism, “Terrorist attacks can destroy property that is exclusive to individuals or MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 31

private firms”. . . “Attacks can likewise affect the public sector, by destroying public property

and by interfering with revenue sources that provide for public goods and services” (Greenberg,

2006, p. 30).

Since the capture of al-Nashiri in 2002 by the United States, there has been much less of

a maritime threat from al-Qaeda. However, it was stated in February of 2010 that Yemen-based

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) stated,

“it would coordinate with “Islamic fighters” from Somalia to secure both sides of the Bab

al-Mandab strait, through which 30% of the world’s trade passes annually” . . . “While

there are doubts about AQAP’s current ability to close the strait, both the Yemeni and

Somali governments have urged the international community to take steps to eliminate

AQAP and al-Shabaab “to avert the risk to the global economy posed by a seizure of Bab

al-Mandab” (Nincic, 2012, para. 7).

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Al-Qaeda’s presence in the Arabian Peninsula is typically lesser known, and since

Nashiri was captured in 2002, there really hadn’t been much of a presence. In 2009 though,

AQAP increased its strength by merging its Saudi and yemeni franchises. In a letter from Osama

Bin Laden to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Bin Laden proposed to ‘gain support’ on the ground by

providing social services, such as food and water, to the locals (Anzinger, 2014, para. 6).

Although Osama Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Wuhayshi continued with the strategy. Al-Qaeda

affiliates in Yemen then claimed they would coordinate with other “Islamic fighters” from

Somalia (Al-Shabaab) to secure both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb (Nincic, 2012). With a threat that could potentially cripple global trade, it is an absolute necessity for both al-Shabaab in MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 32

Somalia and AQAP in Yemen to be eliminated. The threat of maritime terrorism in this specific

region alone is enough to be of global concern.

Al-Qaeda’s leader and founder in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, was seen as second in command for the terrorist organization, and a former personal assistant to Osama

Bin Laden. Active for many years, Wuhayshi, “[Wuhayshi] played a major role in forming the

AQAP offshoot, Ansar al-Sharia, in 2011, to appeal to disaffected youth in Yemen at the time of the Arab Spring” (Yemen, 2015, para. 8). However in June of 2015, Nasser al-Wuhayshi was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen (Yemen Profile, 2017). This was a major blow for AQAP; however, a successor was named, Qasim al-Raymi (Yemen, 2015). In early February there was a raid by U.S. Navy Seals in Yemen. The operational details are still being confirmed; however, reports state that the goal of the massive operation was to capture or kill Qasim al-Raymi, who is considered the third most dangerous terrorist in the world, and is also a major recruiter

(McFadden, 2017). Al-Raymi is among those that escaped from a prison cell in Yemen, and took over when a U.S. airstrike in 2015 killed Nasser al-Wuhayshi (Yemen, 2015). The operation was deemed successful by White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer in a statement, “The goal of the raid was intelligence gathering and that's what we received and that's what we got and that's why we can deem it a success” (McFadden, 2017, para 14). Unfortunately however, al-Raymi was neither killed, nor the target according to the Pentagon’s chief spokesman, Navy Capt. Jeff

Davis, “I can tell you it's not true," . . . "[the military] never had any hope, intention or plan" of killing or capturing the AQAP leader in the operation (McFadden et. al., 2017, para. 9). As far as the future holds for AQAP, one of the main goals is to continue the developing relationship with

East Africa’s Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 33

Located in the Horn of Africa region, al-Shabaab which directly translates to ‘The Youth’

is a very capable and deadly terrorist organization. Al-Shabaab’s deep roots stem from the political corruption and instability in the failed state of Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s area of operations are mostly in the southern portion of Somalia, inland of the port city of Mogadishu, which is currently held by the African Union. Al-Shabaab’s main objective is to topple the Somali government and create a Sharia state of Islam (Somalia’s al-Shabab, 2016). Al-Shabaab in the past has attacked Kenya, saying that it is revenge for counter-terror operations in Somalia. If Al-

Shabaab can continue to wreak havoc in the ungoverned state of Somalia, and the Transitional

Federal Government (TFG) can not contain Al-Shabaab’s movements near the fragile state of

Kenya, then the terrorist group will ultimately continue the same type of havoc and atrocities in

Kenya (Steele, 2015). Currently, there is believed to be 9,000 active fighters, not including the potential alliance between al-Qaeda (Somalia’s al-Shabab, 2016). The fight against al-Shabaab has been mainly by African soldiers and private companies, more than likely due to the United

States pulling out of Somalia only two decades before (Shanker & Schmitt, 2011). Although

United States General Carter Ham of AFRICOM says al-Shabaab may be on the run, there is evidence that could potentially state otherwise (Shanker & Schmitt, 2011). Of course the real concern here is whether or not al-Shabaab has the potential to become a maritime terrorist group.

“In a joint video released in February 2012, former al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane said he ‘pledged obedience’ to al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri . . . The two groups have long worked together and foreigners are known to fight alongside Somali militants” (Somalia’s al-

Shabab, 2016, para. 4). If there is an active link between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda, then there is surely a possibility that these two groups could produce a deadly terror campaign together at sea. MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 34

Due to the linkage between the two terrorist organizations, the United Nations Security Council

passed UNSC 2036 which states:

Noting the presence of Al-Shabab, which has joined Al Qaeda, requests the African

Union to increase AMISOM’s force strength to the maximum of 17,731 uniformed

personnel. It also requests that AMISOM continues to provide capacity-building to

Somali security forces and urges states to coordinate with AMISOM (UNSC Resolution

2036, 2012).

Alternatively, al-Shabaab had for a moment considered pledging allegiance to the Islamic State,

but in the end it was decided to stay aligned (mostly) with al-Qaeda (Oladipo, 2015). It seems that not all of al-Shabaab wishes to be aligned with al-Qaeda, in late 2015, Sheikh Abdulqadir

Mumi, a prominent former ‘spiritual leader’ and recruiter declared allegiance to the Islamic State

(IS), giving IS its first outpost in East Africa. Although only a very small portion decided to align with IS, this move may prove as an even larger security threat in the region (Oladipo,

2015). “If the IS propaganda campaign leads to more defections, it could declare a branch in East

Africa, prompting a potentially devastating three-way war between IS, al-Shabab and the Somali government . . . It would also herald the arrival of a more potent enemy for other East African governments” (Oladipo, 2015, para. 25). Al-Shabaab’s maritime capabilities are still fairly unknown, however with the guidance of AQAP, the potential of a terrorist attack occurring in the

Strait of Bab-el Mandeb remains extremely high. It is unsure what the future holds for al-

Shabaab, however with the most recent UNSC 2036 Resolution, the amount of support in

Somalia has greatly increased (UNSC Resolution 2036, 2012).

The Islamic State MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 35

The Islamic State (IS) has become known as one of the deadliest, far reaching, and fastest

growing terrorist organizations of its time. The IS started as a split off from al-Qaeda’s branch in

Iraq in 2006, by a man named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-

Jihad (JTJW) in 1999. Both Zarqawi and Bin Laden,

“came of age during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but their

respective organizations have distinct genetic material, attributable in part to their

different backgrounds, leadership styles, and aims . . . This is the case even though the

two groups formed a marriage of convenience beginning in 2004” (Zelin, 2014, p.1).

Although there was a marriage between the two tribal factions, differences in upbringing and education, Bin Laden more middle class with a college education and Zarqawi poor and violent, ultimately lead to the violent separation between the two groups. The two groups further stemmed throughout the last ten years, Osama Bin Laden was killed though, while Zarqawi created a deadly movement that called thousands to arms in Syria and Iraq. As far as the Islamic

State is considered, it is typically not known to be a maritime threat. With that being said however, there has been IS cells that have spread to the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and now even in East Africa. Although the Islamic State hasn’t directly admitted to any plans involving the maritime industry or domain, IS could easily follow suit of its rival al-Qaeda and see the benefit. At the moment there doesn’t seem to be any indication that the Islamic State has plans to attack merchant vessels in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula region, however other IS affiliated around the world have already begun to do so.

Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist group located in the Philippines made recent headlines when they attacked a Vietnamese cargo vessel, killing one crew member and capturing another six (France-

Presse, 2017). Abu Sayyaf, one of the most significant and deadly terrorist organizations in MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 36

Southeast Asia, has declared allegiance to the Islamic State (Singh, 2017). The concern here is

that, with the success rate of Abu Sayyaf’s attacks in the maritime domain in Southeast Asia,

how likely is it for the Islamic State to see the benefit of closing a major chokepoint like the

Strait of Bab-el Mandeb, or attacking a merchant vessel?

The link between Pirates and Terrorists

Before concluding this thesis, one final question should be considered, are Somali pirates

working alongside terrorist groups like al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda? If so, what are the potential implications that could further undermine the Somali transitional government from regaining control of Somalia? The first fact to denote is that the means of pirates and terrorists are not aligned. Pirates, for example, target merchant vessels as a financial means, holding a ship hostage as a monetary gain. Whereas terrorists and radical islamists see only a political means, or a statement for propaganda. Alongside that, “Islamist movements have at all times been highly opposed to piracy, considering it in breach of Sharia law (Shortland & Vothknecht, 2011, p.149).

Although radical islamists may not be keen to the idea of committing acts of piracy against ships that are flagged under a muslim state, evidence shows that it is also the pirates who are trying to stay out of contact with these terrorist organizations.

“Nonetheless, naval intelligence telephone interceptions show that Islamists are keen to

form operational and financial links with pirates. The pirates, however, fiercely resist

contacts with Islamist organisations, fearing that any evidence of cooperation would lead

to an escalation in the intensity and the severity of counter-piracy efforts” (Shortland &

Vothknecht, 2011, p. 150).

This fact alone shows that even though the potential for a partnership may be there, there are reasons on both sides to stay out of the business ventures of the other. However, because Sharia MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 37

law is constantly being misinterpreted for jihadists, it can be extremely difficult to know whether the future of this deadly relationship has the chance to prosper, potentially into a much larger problem. Although pirates/criminals and terrorists haven’t found a common cause, they are still seeing the potential use of one another.

“The first reason is that both insurgents and terrorists are prepared to do business with

criminals who have specific goods or skills they need, such as forged documents, or

services that can expedite their operations, such as smuggling networks that can infiltrate

operatives into specific destinations” (Murphy, 2007, p. 30).

There is already issues with the trafficking of narcotics and weapons, and with the potential of vessel seizure by pirates, terrorist groups may use this to their advantage in the war on terror.

Predictions for the Future

We are living in an interesting period of time in 2017, with the changing of governments, and shifting of foreign powers it is difficult to predict what will happen in the global political system. If there is one fact to be seen, it is that the global jihadist and radical islamist ideology will be here until it is completely destroyed. The shipping industry will always remain the main intermodal system of transportation for international trade. In order to maintain the freedom of navigation and shipping, it is a duty of the United Nations to allocate all available resources to keep these sea lanes safe and flowing efficiently. There will always be terrorist groups and non- state actors attempting harm to the Western world, and it is up to the United States and other major powers to stay adamant about deterring these threats. It all starts with regional stability in regions of instability, however even in Kenya a fairly stable country, an island of stability fairs no chance in a sea of instability. As far as these terrorist groups in the region are considered, it is very difficult to provide even the slightest prediction because of how often the political hierarchy MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 38

is changed in a terrorist group. For example, when Osama Bin Laden was killed in 2011, al-

Qaeda suffered a major blow. Pertaining to the current fight to destroy ISIS, at any moment the

agenda of this terrorist group could change, for better or worse. It is difficult to say in this

moment whether the Islamic State and AQAP will be able to settle their differences in the future,

or if in the end they end up destroying each other. The threat of maritime terrorism is absolutely

as real as it can get at the moment, and in order to stave from the next major attack to the

transportation industry, the United Nations, the United States, and its allies must remain vigilant

in preparation for anything. Terrorist groups will always find a way to create the next attack

when it is least expected, so it is up to those in positions of intelligence to help create plans and

policy to counter that.

After recently speaking with a Lieutenant in the Navy, he was vocal in his opinion about

what the United States Naval strategy will be in the next decade. He was clear on one aspect, that the U.S. Navy will definitely remain a heavy presence in these major regions of conflict in the world (Gulf of Aden), and that however the events may take place on land, the United States

Navy will always be ready and prepared for any sort of attack. It is easy to see that, even if these

forementioned terrorist organizations try and commit acts of terror in the Gulf of Aden, Strait of

Bab-el Mandeb, or Horn of Africa regions, that these regional maritime security coalitions will be able to handle and further deter maritime crime. These government coalitions have been able to test their abilities over the last few years suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, and are now more ready and capable to handle more serious threats like terrorism, which most train for anyway. The most imminent threat to a maritime target is not on the high seas, but close to shore, in port, or in inland waters. If AQAP, al-Shabaab, and ISIS are to become a serious threat to the maritime industry, they will likely use methods closer to shore. MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM Steele 39

A Real Threat

Despite the constant warnings of a coming attack, there hasn’t been an attack in a few years, so, how concerned should we be about maritime terrorism? The answer to that question, is that we should be gravely concerned. Even if only one attack occurs, the potential economic fallout poses a “clear and present danger” that may “potentially cripple global trade and have grave knock-on effects on developed economies” (Nincic, 2012, para. 8). These indications potentially highlight a coming maritime terror campaign. Hijacking a ship, sinking a vessel in a strait, or detonating an explosive on a passenger ship would all be extremely devastating to not only the global economy, but to the global trade industry as well. Shipping is the world's number one mode of transport, and “with trade concentrated in so few ports in today’s global economy, even a single maritime terrorist incident has the potential for significant economic disruptions with considerable financial and human implications” (Nincic, 2012, para. 10). Given the potential impacts of an attack, maritime terrorism is undoubtedly a real and current threat.

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