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The Role of Ultra-Orthodox Political Parties in Israeli Democracy
Luke Howson University of Liverpool The Role of Ultra-Orthodox Political Parties in Israeli Democracy Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy By Luke Howson July 2014 Committee: Clive Jones, BA (Hons) MA, PhD Prof Jon Tonge, PhD 1 Luke Howson University of Liverpool © 2014 Luke Howson All Rights Reserved 2 Luke Howson University of Liverpool Abstract This thesis focuses on the role of ultra-orthodox party Shas within the Israeli state as a means to explore wider themes and divisions in Israeli society. Without underestimating the significance of security and conflict within the structure of the Israeli state, in this thesis the Arab–Jewish relationship is viewed as just one important cleavage within the Israeli state. Instead of focusing on this single cleavage, this thesis explores the complex structure of cleavages at the heart of the Israeli political system. It introduces the concept of a ‘cleavage pyramid’, whereby divisions are of different saliency to different groups. At the top of the pyramid is division between Arabs and Jews, but one rung down from this are the intra-Jewish divisions, be they religious, ethnic or political in nature. In the case of Shas, the religious and ethnic elements are the most salient. The secular–religious divide is a key fault line in Israel and one in which ultra-orthodox parties like Shas are at the forefront. They and their politically secular counterparts form a key division in Israel, and an exploration of Shas is an insightful means of exploring this division further, its history and causes, and how these groups interact politically. -
The Life and Death of Socialist Zionism
The Life and Death of Socialist Zionism Jason Schulman (Published in New Politics, vol. 9, no. 3 (new series), whole no. 35, Summer 2003) In previous decades it was not uncommon for democratic leftists, Jewish ones in particular, to believe that the state of Israel was on the road to exemplifying—as Irving Howe once put it—“the democratic socialist hope of combining radical social change with political freedom.”1 But times have obviously changed. Today, no one would argue with the assertion that Israeli socialism is “is going the way of the kibbutz farmer,” even if the government continues to be the major shareholder in many Israeli banks, retains majority control in state-owned enterprises, owns a considerable percent of the country's land, and exerts considerable influence in most sectors of the economy.2 The kibbutzim themselves, held up as “the essence of the socialist-Zionist ideal of collectivism and egalitarianism,” are fast falling victim “to the pursuit of individual fulfillment.”3 The Labor Party is ever more estranged from Israel’s trade union movement, and when it governs it does so less and less like a social-democratic party, and its economic program has become ever more classically liberal. To many Israelis, who remember the years of Labor bureaucratic power, “socialism” means little more than “state elitism.” In examining “what happened,” it is worthwhile to ask what precisely the content of Israeli socialism was from its inception. There are essentially two narratives of “actually-existing” Labor (Socialist) Zionism. One argues that the most important of the Zionist colonists were utopian socialists who had no intent to be either exploiter or exploited. -
One Nation Under Arms? Military Participation Policy and the Politics of Identity
Security Studies 14, no. 3 ( July–September 2005): 529–564 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Inc. DOI: 10.1080/09636410500323245 One Nation under Arms? Military Participation Policy and the Politics of Identity RONALD R. KREBS Students of comparative military organizations have advanced three hypotheses to explain when armed forces adopt more liberal manpower policies: when a major security threat looms, when the military professionalizes, or when the surrounding society grows more tolerant of difference. This article argues that all three are the- oretically and empirically problematic: they potentially have much to contribute, but only in conjunction with a perspective that is more appreciative of the centrality of political processes. Enduring reform of the military’s participation policies is more productively viewed through the lens of the struggle over national and commu- nal identity. To illustrate the power of this alternative approach, this article reconsiders cases commonly cited in support of the existing hypotheses: the racial desegregation of the U.S. military, the integra- tion of the Druze into the Israel Defense Forces, and the imperial and independent Indian armies’ policies with respect to what the British termed “class.” The participation (or manpower) policies of armed forces determine who serves in the military and in what capacity. Accused of disloyalty or incom- petence, communal minorities have often faced discrimination in military institutions. They have been segregated. They have been limited to support units in which it was claimed they could do the least damage to national security or to which it was asserted they were best suited by virtue of their intellectual and physical endowments. -
Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949-2019
WID.world WORKING PAPER N° 2020/17 Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949-2019 Yonatan Berman August 2020 Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949{2019 Yonatan Berman∗ y August 20, 2020 Abstract This paper draws on pre- and post-election surveys to address the long run evolution of vot- ing patterns in Israel from 1949 to 2019. The heterogeneous ethnic, cultural, educational, and religious backgrounds of Israelis created a range of political cleavages that evolved throughout its history and continue to shape its political climate and its society today. De- spite Israel's exceptional characteristics, we find similar patterns to those found for France, the UK and the US. Notably, we find that in the 1960s{1970s, the vote for left-wing parties was associated with lower social class voters. It has gradually become associated with high social class voters during the late 1970s and later. We also find a weak inter-relationship between inequality and political outcomes, suggesting that despite the social class cleavage, identity-based or \tribal" voting is still dominant in Israeli politics. Keywords: Political cleavages, Political economy, Income inequality, Israel ∗London Mathematical Laboratory, The Graduate Center and Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality, City University of New York, [email protected] yI wish to thank Itai Artzi, Dror Feitelson, Amory Gethin, Clara Mart´ınez-Toledano, and Thomas Piketty for helpful discussions and comments, and to Leah Ashuah and Raz Blanero from Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality for historical data on parliamentary elections in Tel Aviv. -
Geographical Representation Under Proportional
CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine www.democ.uci.edu It is frequently assumed that proportional representation electoral systems do not provide geographical representation. For example, if we consider the literature on electoral reform, advocates of retaining single-member district plurality elections often cite the failure of proportional representation to give voters local representation (Norton, 1997; Hain, 1983; see Farrell, 2001). Even advocates of proportional representation often recognize the lack of district representation as a failure that has to be addressed by modifying their proposals (McLean, 1991; Dummett, 1997).1 However, there has been little empirical research into whether proportional representation elections produce results that are geographically representative. This paper considers geographical representation in two of the most “extreme” cases of proportional representation, Israel and the Netherlands. These countries have proportional representation with a single national constituency, and thus lack institutional features that force geographical representation. They are thus limiting cases, providing evidence of the type of geographical patterns we are likely to see when there are no institutions that enforce specific geographical patterns. We find that the legislatures of Israel and the Netherlands are surprisingly representative geographically, although not perfectly so. Furthermore, we find an interesting pattern. While the main metropolitan areas -
Israel's Use of Sports for Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy
University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 5-2018 ISRAEL'S USE OF SPORTS FOR NATION BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Yoav Dubinsky University of Tennessee, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Recommended Citation Dubinsky, Yoav, "ISRAEL'S USE OF SPORTS FOR NATION BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2018. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/4868 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Yoav Dubinsky entitled "ISRAEL'S USE OF SPORTS FOR NATION BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Kinesiology and Sport Studies. Lars Dzikus, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Robin L. Hardin, Sylvia A. Trendafilova, Candace L. White Accepted for the Council: Dixie L. Thompson Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) ISRAEL’S USE OF SPORTS FOR NATION BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Yoav Dubinsky May 2018 Copyright © 2018 by Yoav Dubinsky All rights reserved. -
The Political Mobilization of the Arab Minority in Israel: Shifts in Political Demands and Activities
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal College of Arts and Sciences 4-9-2010 The Political Mobilization of the Arab Minority in Israel: Shifts in Political Demands and Activities Sherihan Abd El Rahman University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the Ethnic Studies Commons Recommended Citation Abd El Rahman, Sherihan, "The Political Mobilization of the Arab Minority in Israel: Shifts in Political Demands and Activities" 09 April 2010. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/122. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/122 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Political Mobilization of the Arab Minority in Israel: Shifts in Political Demands and Activities Abstract Previous scholarly work on the demands and political activities of the Arab minority in Israel have focused on studying Arab political parties and parliamentary participation, asserting that Arab demands fall into one of two categories: radical or adaptive. That is, in studying Arab participation, or lack thereof, in parliamentary processes, one can claim that Arabs want either complete separation from the state of Israel (radical demands) or complete integration into the state of Israel (adaptive demands). However, recent trends have witnessed a decrease in Arab Israelis’ interest in political parties and parliamentary participation, such as voting in Knesset elections and attempts to pass legislation. This disinterest is a direct result of the inability and inefficiency of parliamentary processes to make practical changes in the daily lives of the Arab minority, who are underprivileged, socio-economically, politically, and legally. -
Political Parties and Interest Groups In
1 Political Parties and Interest Groups in Contemporary Israel Gregory Mahler1 December, 2007 The building blocks of Israeli democracy have been its political parties. Israel was described nearly fifty years ago as a parteienstaat, (“party-state”), and the role of political parties in the day-to-day operation of the polity has not diminished. In this session I want to discuss the structure and behavior of political parties and related interest groups, how political parties are organized in Israel, what their key issues are, and how they differ from each other. Then, my focus will shift to interest groups, another very important structure in the contemporary Israeli democratic arena. The Setting Israeli Parliamentary government. Model of Parliamentarism in Israel. The underlying factor in contemporary Israel that explains a good deal of the turbulence in the political system is that of the political party. The Israeli political system has been referred 1 This is substantially taken from Chapter 6, “Political Parties and Interest Groups,” in my recent book Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a Modern State. Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 2 to as a parteienstaat par excellence,1 and the description is appropriate. Political parties played an important role in Israel’s achieving statehood. One could even say that the State of Israel “was actually brought into existence by political parties, which were organized and developed entities . years before the coming of statehood.”2 Indeed, contemporary Israeli political parties are a direct link to the past in that virtually all have roots in some prestate political form.3 The Israeli political party system could almost be classified as overdeveloped. -
Israel BP Proof
THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF Middle East INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Programme Briefing Paper No. 3 MARCH 2003 Doves Vote Hawk: The January 2003 Elections in Israel Yossi Mekelberg Introduction Israeli elections are not renowned for producing conclusive results. Observers are usually as perplexed on the day after them as they were on the day before. Nevertheless, this was not the case on 28 January 2003, when the Likud Party led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and the right wing in general, emerged as clear winners. In contrast, the Labour Party and its allies on the left suffered a painful defeat. Opinion polls had consistently predicted a Likud victory, though the margin of that victory was a surprise to most. Yet a comfortable result at the ballot box does not guarantee the quick and easy formation of a new government. BRIEFING PAPER 2 Doves vote hawk: the January 2003 elections in Israel Despite winning less than one-third of the seats, and rifts and eventually the final irreversible crisis. The so- needing to ensure the support of at least twenty-three called national unity government had become a more Members of Knesset (MKs) in order to form a government of national paralysis, and was the main majority coalition, Ariel Sharon emerged as the big reason for the lack of progress of any political, winner of Israel’s elections, with the luxury of economic or social policies – above all the peace considering a number of options for constructing his process with the Palestinians. A number of groupings coalition. within the Labour Party grew exasperated at After experimenting for nearly seven years and supporting and serving in a government which gave three election campaigns with an electoral system them little chance of implementing any of their party’s whereby voters cast two separate ballots, one for policies. -
Legislative Election Results in Israel, 1949-2019
Chapter 19. "Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949-2019" Yonatan Berman Appendix: Figures, tables and raw results Main figures and tables Figure 1 Legislative election results in Israel, 1949-2019 Figure 2 Class cleavages in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 3 Vote for right and left in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1949-2019 Figure 4 Residual identity component in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1981-2015 Figure 5 Vote for right-wing and left-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in Israel, 2003-2015 Figure 6 The educational cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 7 Vote for right-wing parties among Sepharadic voters in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 8 The religious cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 9 The gender cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 Appendix figures and tables Figure A1 General election results in Israel by bloc, 1949-2019 Figure A2 Income inequality in Israel, 1979-2015 Figure A3 Vote for left by social class (excluding center and Arab parties), 1969-2019 Figure A4 Vote for the Republican and Democratic candidates in New York City, 1948-2016 Figure A5 The effect of the 2003 reforms on left and right vote Figure A6 Share of voters by ethnicity and religiosity, 1969-2019 Table A1 Division of parties to blocks Table A2 The effect of the 2003 reforms on right vote Figure 18.1 - Legislative election results in Israel, 1949-2019 100% Right (Likud, Israel Beitenu, etc.) Left (Labor, Meretz, etc.) 90% Center (Kahol Lavan, etc.) Arab parties (Joint Arab List, etc.) 80% Ultra-orthodox (Shas, Yahadut HaTora, etc.) 70% 60% 50% 40% Share of votes (%) votes of Share 30% 20% 10% 0% 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world). -
History: Re-Birth of a Nation
From Modest Beginnings to a Vibrant State History: Re-Birth of a Nation The birthplace of the Jewish people is the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael). There, a significant part of the nation’s long history was enacted, of which the first thousand years are recorded in the Bible; there, it’s cultural, Remember the days of old, religious, and national identity was formed; and there, its physical consider the years of many presence has been maintained through the centuries, even after the generations... majority was forced into exile. During the many years of dispersion, the (Deuteronomy 32:7) Jewish people never severed nor forgot its bond with the Land. With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Jewish independence, lost 2,000 years earlier, was renewed. Israel The Jewish Homeland From Biblical Days Written by Professor Joshua Schwartz What makes a “homeland”? Is it the territory that binds an ethnic group together, a geographic entity possessing a long association with that ethnic group, perhaps its “country of origin” in which its national identity was born? This is how we usually think today of “Jewish homeland”: the term is often synonymous with “Jewish State,” “Homeland of the Jewish People,” “National Home for the Jewish People” and even State of Israel. These concepts, however, are modern and relate mostly to modern perceptions of national identity and geography. Perceptions change and, The story of Israel begins not in Israel but in Mesopotamia ABOVE: Jersualem’s thus, so, theoretically, might homelands. Thus, a Jewish “beyond the River” (Euphrates). God Himself, however, Old City contains Zachariah’s Tomb and homeland might be planned or established in Uganda, called us out to come to Canaan, the Land of Israel other ancient burials in Argentina, Birobidzhan, or a fictional one might be posited (Joshua 24:2-4). -
The Balfour Declaration a Century Later: Accidentally Relevant Ian S
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 4, WINTER 2017 THE BALFOUR DECLARATION A CENTURY LATER: ACCIDENTALLY RELEVANT Ian S. Lustick Dr. Lustick is the Beth W. Heyman Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. This article is based on a paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Association for Israel Studies at Brandeis University, June 12-14, 2017. he 2017 centennial of the Balfour “HMG should recognize its role during the Declaration has been observed Mandate and now must lead attempts to with great fanfare. The theme reach a solution that ensures justice for the of the 2017 annual meeting of Palestinian people,” it added. Tthe Association for Israel Studies was “A As with every anniversary associated Century after Balfour: Vision and Real- with the Arab-Israeli conflict, one side’s ity.” In February 2017, Israeli Prime celebration is the other side’s occasion for Minister Benjamin Netanyahu exulted in mourning and protest. That is perfectly un- the British government’s invitation to him derstandable, and the Balfour Declaration to attend its celebration of the centenary: is, rightly, considered a major step toward “While the Palestinians want to sue Britain an ultimate aim of Zionism — establish- for the Balfour Declaration, the British ment of a Jewish-dominated state in the prime minister is inviting the Israeli prime Land of Israel and, accordingly, toward the minister to an event to mark the hundredth catastrophe of destruction and displace- anniversary of the declaration. That speaks ment visited upon the Arab inhabitants of volumes.” Israel reciprocated by inviting Palestine.